6. LRT vs.
Navidad, 397 SCRA 75 (2003)
FACTS:
Nicanor, who was drunk, entered the EDSA LRT after purchasing of a ticket.
While Nicanor was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned in the area (working under the Prudent
Security Agency) approached Nicanor and the two had a misunderstanding
and fought. No evidence was presented to show who started the fight.
Marjorie, widow of Nicanor, and children filed a complaint for damages against
Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro Transit, and Prudent for the death of her
husband.
o LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-
claim against Escartin and Prudent.
o Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards
RTC judged in favor of Navidad and ordered Prudent Security and Escartin to
pay damages while Roman and LRTA was dismissed for lack of merit.
Prudent appealed to the CA and the CA ruled that Prudent and Escartin were
not liable and that Roman and LRTA was the ones liable.
o CA ruled saying that although Navidad had not boarded the train yet,
a contract of carriage had already existed when Navidad entered
the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying
the fare and getting the token and
o LRTA and Roman failed to show that emergency brakes could not
have stopped the train in time. Prudent was exempted because there
was no showing that Escartin inflicted blows upon Navidad. CA
denied MR. hence this petition.
Hence this present petition
o Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court,
contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from
the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered
the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death
of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence
imposed upon a common carrier.
ISSUES:
1. W/N LRTA is liable. Yes
2. W/N Prudent is liable? No.
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES. LRTA is liable
Common carriers are burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence
in ensuring the safety of passengers.
Provisions
Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employees.
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if
the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good
father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.
Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it
not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract
of carriage.
They are liable for death of or injury to passengers
a. Through the negligence or willful acts of its employees
b. Willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission.
In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of
the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
In other words, when an act which constitutes the breach of contract,
tantamounts to a quasi-delict, if there had been no contract, the contract
can be said to be have been breached by tort which would mean that the
rules on tort can apply.
There is nothing that links Prudent to the death of Nicanor, for the reason that
the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven.

LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier
In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier
may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier
is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
There is also no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from
liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad
is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus,
Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.

2. NO, Prudent is not liable.

Prudent in this case may only be liable for tort under the provisions of Article
2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Art 2180. The premise,
however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made
liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families (diligence of a good father) in the
selection and supervision of its employees.

The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown.

A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Art of the Civil Code can apply.

Liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract
7. Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., G.R. No. 180440 (2012)
Facts:
On June 1995, Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel,
invited her friend, Dr. Genevieve L. Huang, for a swim at the hotels pool. At
around 7:00 p.m., the hotels pool attendant informed them that the swimming
pool area was about to be closed. The 2 went to the shower room adjacent
to the swimming pool to take a shower and dress up. When they came out of
the bathroom, the entire swimming pool area was already pitch black and
there were the only ones there. The doors were also locked.
After some time, Huang saw a phone behind the lifeguards counter. As she
went inside, the wooden countertop fell on her head and knocked her down
almost unconscious. Delia immediately notified the hotel phone operator of
the incident. Not long after, the hotel staff arrived at the main entrance door
of the swimming pool area and gave her an icepack. Huang demanded the
services of the hotel physician. Hotel physician, Dr. Dalumpines, instead of
immediately providing the needed medical assistance, presented a
Waiver and demanded that it be signed by Huang, otherwise, the hotel
management will not render her any assistance. Huang refused to do so and
left the hotel.
Thereupon, Huang consulted several doctors (7 neuro, 1 optha) because she
began experiencing on and off severe headaches that caused her
three sleepless nights. They all said she had a serious brain injury.
In defense, PHI and Dusit denied all the material allegations. According to
them, a sufficient notice on the glass door of the hotel leading to the
swimming pool area to apprise the people, especially the hotel guests, that
the swimming pool area is open only from 7am to 7pm. Nevertheless, the
lights thereon are kept on until 10:00 p.m. for, (1) security reasons; (2)
housekeeping personnel to do the cleaning of the swimming pool
surroundings; and (3) people doing their exercise routine at the Slimmers
World Gym, which was open until 10pm. Even granting that the lights in the
hotels swimming pool area were turned off, it would not render the area
completely dark as the Slimmers World Gym near it was well- illuminated.
Around 7:40pm, Ms. Pearlie (hotel nurse) was informed that there was a
guest requiring medical assistance. She hurriedly went to the pool area.
Although Huang looked normal as there was no indication of any blood or
bruise on her head, Ms. Pearlie still asked her if she needed any medical
attention to which she replied that she is a doctor, she was fine and she did
not need any medical attention. Instead, requested for a hirudoid cream to
which Ms. Pearlie acceded. Dr. Dalumpines came to check Huangs
condition. Huang insisted that she was fine and that the hirudoid cream was
enough. Dr. Dalumpines requested Huang to execute a handwritten
certification regarding the incident that occurred that night. An X- Ray test
was also suggested to Huang but she replied that it was not necessary. She
also refused further medical attention.
On Aug 1996, Huang filed a complaint for damages against respondents. The
trial court dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, Huang
belatedly raises the defense on breach of contract. She maintains that that
an implied contract existed between them in view of the fact that the hotel
guest status extends to all those who avail of its services its patrons and
invitees. The CA affirmed the TCs decision. MR denied. Hence, this Petition
for certiorari under Rule 45.
She also avows that the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat
superior are applicable in this case. It was an accident caused by the fact that
the hotel staff was not present to lift the heavy counter top for Huang as is
normally expected of them because they negligently locked the main
entrance door of the hotels swimming pool area.
Issue: Whether respondents PHI and Dusit are liable to Dr. Huang.
Held: NO. Initially, Huang sued respondents mainly on account of their negligence
but not on any breach of contract. Presently, she claims that her cause of action
can be based both on quasi-delict and breach of contract. A perusal of the
complaint evidently shows that her cause of action was based solely on quasi-
delict (negligence). It is evident from the complaint and from her open court
testimony that the reliance was on the alleged tortious acts committed against her
by respondents, through their management and staff.
In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon
the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the
formers complaint will be dismissed. In a breach of contract, negligence is
presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract
and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in
the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is
followed. It is now too late to raise the said argument for the first time before
the SC without causing injustice.
As Huangs cause of action is based on quasidelict, it is incumbent upon her
to prove the presence of the following requisites before respondents PHI and
Dusit can be held liable, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault
or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
 respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Further,
since her case is for quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established as it is the basis of her action. The burden of proof is upon her.
Second element Absent: In this case, Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged
negligence of respondents. Other than her self-serving testimony that all the
lights in the hotels swimming pool area were shut off and the door was locked,
which allegedly prompted her to find a way out and in doing so a folding
wooden counter top fell on her head causing her injury, no other evidence was
presented to substantiate the same.
Even her own companion during the night of the accident inside the hotels
swimming pool area was never presented to corroborate her allegations. On
the other hand, the witnesses presented by the respondents positively
declared that it has been a normal practice of the hotel management not to
put off the lights until 10pm. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of
the swimming pool surroundings, including the toilets and counters.
There is a remote possibility that the hotels swimming pool area was in
complete darkness as the aforesaid gym was then open until 10pm, and the
lights radiate to the hotels swimming pool area. Ergo, she cannot fault the
Hotel for the injury she allegedly suffered because she herself did not heed
the warning at the pool to the effect that it was only open from 7:00 to 7:00
P.M. Thus, when the her own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, she then cannot recover damages.
Even Huangs assertion of negligence on the part of respondents in not
rendering medical assistance to her is preposterous. Her own Complaint
affirmed that respondents afforded medical assistance to her after she met
the unfortunate accident inside the hotels swimming pool facility. Moreover,
the Hotel shouldered the expenses for the MRI services at the Makati Med.
Res Ipsa Loquitur & Respondeat Superior: With regard to Huangs contention
that the principles of res ipsa loquitur and respondeat superior are applicable
in this case, this Court holds otherwise. Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates
to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or
establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case. The doctrine finds no application if
there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. In the case at
bench, even granting that respondents staff negligently turned off the lights
and locked the door, the folding wooden counter top would still not fall on
Huangs head had she not lifted the same. Records showed that she lifted the
said folding wooden counter top that eventually fell and hit her head.
Doctrine of respondeat superior finds no application in the absence of any
showing that the employees of respondents were negligent. Since in this case,
the trial court and the CA found no negligence on the part of the employees
of respondents, thus, the latter cannot also be held liable for negligence. With
the foregoing, the following were clearly established, to wit: (1) petitioner
stayed in the hotels swimming pool facility beyond its closing hours; (2) she
lifted the folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her head; and (3)
respondents extended medical assistance to her. As such, no negligence can
be attributed either to or to their staff and/or management.
Third element: On the issue on whether Huangs debilitating and permanent
injuries were the result of the accident she suffered at the hotels swimming
pool area, the Court holds that there is no cogent reason to depart from the
lower courts findings.
(1) Huang had a past medical history which might have been the
cause of her recurring brain injury.
(2) The findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a causal relation between
the 11 June 1995 accident and the brain damage suffered by
Huang. Dr. Perez himself testified that the symptoms being
experienced might have been due to factors other than the
head trauma she allegedly suffered.
(3) Dr. Sanchezs testimony was hearsay.
(4) Medical reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of
doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or treatment
were neither identified nor testified to by those who issued them.
Being deemed as hearsay, they cannot be given probative
value.
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents as well as
their management and staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the millions
of damages prayed for. Since respondents arc not liable, it necessarily follows
that First Lepanto cannot also be made liable under the contract of Insurance.

8. Padua vs. Robles, G.R. No. L-40486 (1975)
Facts:
In the early morning of New Years Day of 1969, a taxicab (driven by Punzalan
and operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Robles) struck 10 year old
Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City.
The impact hurled Padua about 40 meters away from the point where the
taxicab struck him, as a result of which he died. Normandys parents (Paulino
and Lucena Bebin Padua) filed with the CFI Zambales (civil case 427-O) and
sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab. The city fiscal filed
with the same court (criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide
through reckless imprudence.
On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the
Paduas but dismissed the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab. Almost a year
later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted
Punzalan of homicide through reckless imprudence under Art. 365. The same
decision also said: The civil liability of the accused has already been
determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino Padua, et
al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.
After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought
execution thereof. This proved futile and the corresponding court officer
returned the writ of execution unsatisfied. Unable to collect the amount of
P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court
against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latters subsidiary responsibility
under the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a
motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment
and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The court a quo
granted Robles motion to dismiss on the ground that the Paduas complaint
states no cause of action. Paduas elevated the case to CA and CA certified
case to SC.
Issue:
(1) W/N the judgment in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and
adjudication of Punzalans civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which
Robles subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.
(2) If in the positive, is there double recovery?
Held: Yes.
There was an intention to adjudicate Punzalans civil liability from the criminal
case. However, there is no double recovery. Hence, Paduas are entitled to
the civil liability, which stems from the subsidiary civil responsibility of Robles.
It would appear that a plain reading of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O
easily results in the conclusion that the said judgment assessed no civil liability
arising from the offense charged against Punzalan.
However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies,
and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on
the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising
from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity
therefor.
The same judge tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case
1158-O. Knowledge of and familiarity with all the facts and circumstances relevant and
relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when
he rendered judgment in the criminal action. Therefore, it cannot reasonably be
contended that it was the intention, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit
recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which
Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity
therefor.
Clearly, it was the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas right to the
civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158- O.
Indeed, by including such statement in the dispositive portion of the said judgment, the
court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as
Punzalans civil liability in criminal case 1158-O.
In negligence cases, the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 and an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177. Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission.
The Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180,
which action proved ineffectual. (as proven by the unsatisfied writ of execution from the
civil case)
There is no inconsistency between the aforementioned action previously availed of by
the Paduas and their subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from
the offense committed by Punzalan and, consequently, for exaction of Robles
subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the
proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission.
 For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned regardless of the number of the rights violated. Here, there was only one injury
unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of sustained by the Joseph, vesting him with only one cause of action, though
indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. with different remedies against different persons.
9. Joseph vs. Bautista, 170 SCRA 540 (1989)
A recovery under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other; the
Facts: rationale against this is the rule against unjust enrichment.

Perez owned a cargo truck for conveying cargo and passengers from Also, being solidarily liable, full payment by one or some, as well as their
Dagupan to Manila. In January 1973, Villa drove the truck from Valenzuela to subsequent release, resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability
Pangasinan. Joseph, with his livestock, boarded the truck going to all other solidary debtors.
Valenzuela, paying P9.

On the way, Villa tried to overtake a tricycle, but at the same time, a pick-up
truck owned by Sioson and Pagarigan, and driven by Villanueva, tried to
overtake the cargo truck. The cargo truck was forced to veer towards the
shoulder, ramming a mango tree. Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of
his legs.

He then filed a complaint for damages against Perez (owner) based on a

breach of contract of carriage; against Sioson and Villanueva, quasi-delict. As
he could not ascertain who the real owners of the vehicles were, he amended
his complaint to implead everyone, including a certain Cardeno.

On 27 September 1974, Sioson, Villanueva, Pagarigan, and Cardeno, through

the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid Josephs claim for P1,300.
Petitioner executed a release of claim against them. They thus filed a motion
to exclude themselves from the case.

Perez opposed this, and filed a Counter Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the release inured to the favor of all respondents, as their liability was solidary.
The judge agreed, and dismissed the case; a Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.

Issue: Whether or not the release of claim inured to the benefit of Perez.

Held: YES.

A Cause of Action is the delict or wrongful act or omission violating the rights
of a party. It is true that a single act or omission can be violative of various
rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of
several separate and distinct legal obligations.

However, where there is only one wrong, there is only one cause of action,
 Issue: Whether or not the provision against double recovery was violated.

Held: NO.
10. AG&P, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114841-42 (1995)
Facts:
Sometime in 1982, petitioner commenced the construction of a steel
fabrication plant in the Batangas, necessitating dredging operations in an area
adjacent to the real property of private respondents Castillo. An action for
damages against herein petitioner was filed by the Castillos alleging that:
During the on-going construction of its steel and fabrication yard, petitioners
personnel and heavy equipment trespassed into the adjacent parcels of land
belonging to them without their consent.
Petitioners heavy equipment damaged big portions of their property which
were further used by petitioner as a depot or parking lots without paying any
rent therefor.
The Castillos specifically alleged in their complaint that as a result of
petitioners dredging operations, the soil of the formers property became
infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. They further
averred that petitioners heavy equipment used to utilize (private
respondents) land as a depot or parking lot of these equipment(s) without
paying any rent therefor.
Clearly, petitioner was guilty of two culpable transgressions on the property
rights of private respondents:
(1) for the ruination of the agricultural fertility or utility of the soil of
their property and
(2) for the unauthorized use of said property as a dump site or depot
for petitioners heavy equipment and trucks. Consequently,
there is no merit in said objection of petitioner.

As a result of the dredging operation of petitioner, the sea silt and water
overflowed and were deposited upon their land. Said property which used to
be agricultural lands principally devoted to rice production could no longer be
planted with palay as the soil became infertile, salty, unproductive and
unsuitable for agriculture.

Petitioner denied all the allegations. Trial court ruled in favor of the Castillos
ordering defendant to pay for damages. On appeal, the CA modified the
decision and increased the award for damages. On appeal by certiorari, the
SC ruled that CA erred in increasing the award for damages considering that
the Castillos did not appeal but affirmed the decision of the trial court in all
respects.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the Court of

Appeals violated Article 2177 of the Civil Code on double recovery which
states that: the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant when it condemned the petitioner as a result of its
dredging operations, to pay private respondents not only the expected total
amount of profits the latter would have derived from the expected sale of their
palay harvest for 135 months or over 11 years, from the half hectare
agricultural land, but also rentals on the basis of P5.00 per square meter of
their said entire landholdings.
 A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities namely: civil liability arising from the crime
11. Lim vs. Ping, G.R. No. 175256 (2012) (ex delicto) and an independent civil liability.

Facts:
FR Cement Corp (FRCC) owned/operates a cement manufacturing plant. It
issued several Withdrawal Authorities (WA) (imagine Warehouse Receipts)
for the accounts Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt, cement dealers/traders.
The WAs state the quantity of bags the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw
from the cement plant. Said WAs are valid for 6 mos. from issuance unless
revoked. Abovementioned traders/dealers sold their WAs covering 50,000
bags to Co Ping. for P63/bag (3.15M). In turn, Co sold the same WAs to Lily
Lim at P64/bag (3.2M). Lim was able to withdraw 2,800 bags. Also, she WAs
covering 10,000 bags back to Co.
In April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200
remaining bags. Upon her inquiry, FRCC and Co explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release the bags once Lim pays
for the price difference or agrees to receive lesser quantity of cement.
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action.
If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final
outcome of the criminal action. On the other hand, the independent civil
liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two
types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the
rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata.

Thereafter, she demanded Co to resolve her problem with FRCC or for the
return of her money. Unsuccessful, a case for Estafa through
Misrepresentation/Conversion was filed in RTC Pasig with prayer for
damages. Co was later acquitted when his demurrer for insufficient evidence
was granted. He was also relieved from civil liability in the same case. Thus,
Lim sought refuge before the CA.

Pending her appeal, Lim filed a complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages in RTC Manila against Co and other parties indicated in the WAs.
She asserted 2 causes of actions: (1) Breach of Contract; and (2) Abuse of
Rights & Unjust Enrichment. She also prayed for moral & exemplary damages.
Co filed a Motion to Dismiss based on lis pendens and forum shopping.
Denying the Motion, the RTC said there was no forum shopping because the
case pending in the Estafa case and this Civil case are different.

Issue: Did Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages while her appeal on the civil aspect for estafa was
pending?

Held: NO. The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted
together with the criminal action. The second action is a civil action arising from a
contractual obligation and for tortuous conduct (abuse of rights).