Analysis
May 14, 2010
Summary: Next month’s expected
visit of Massoud Barzani, president
of the Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment, to Turkey is a first step ending
hostility between Ankara and the
Kurdish leadership and ending
Turkey’s long-time Kurdish problem.
One of the biggest propellers of
change has been flourishing trade
ties. Iraq is Turkey’s fourth largest
trading partner. Most of this trade
is conducted with the Iraqi Kurds.
The other major change in Turkey’s
relations with the Iraqi Kurds is that
they are no longer viewed through
the PKK lens, but from an Iraq-wide
perspective. Friendship with the
Iraqi Kurds allows Ankara to have
a greater say in Baghdad. The Iraqi
Kurdish and Turkish economies are
already tightly intertwined. Once
the Iraqi Kurds strike an agreement
with Baghdad over the sharing of oil
revenues, they can start selling their
own oil and natural gas resources
through Turkey. This virtuous cycle
can help alleviate poverty among
Turkish Kurds. Yet, Ankara must
never cede to the age-old temptation
of playing one set of Kurds against
the other.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org
Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds: From Red Lines to
Red Carpets
by Amberin Zaman*
ANKARA — If all goes to plan a critical NATO ally, Turkey, and its
Massoud Barzani, the president of Kurdish friends in Iraq was long a
the Kurdistan Regional Government source of worry in Washington. Now
(KRG) will be paying his first official the red lines are fading. Turkey is
visit to Turkey next month. The deci- preparing to roll out the red carpet for
sion to invite the Kurdish leader is in Barzani. The Kurds’ internationally
line with recent moves designed to respected leader is expected to meet
end over a decade of hostility between with Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep
Ankara and the Iraqi Kurdish leader- Tayyip Erdoğan and perhaps even with
ship. Friendship with the Iraqi Kurds President Abdullah Gül.
is one of the main pillars of Turkey’s
attempts to solve its long-running During a recent trip to the Iraqi
Kurdish problem. Kurdish enclave I was able to observe
firsthand the dramatic shift in Anka-
Until recently Barzani, who is also ra’s outlook. Turkey’s first ever Consul
the leader of the most powerful General to Erbil is among its most
Iraqi Kurdish faction, the Kurdistan promising career diplomats. Aydin
Democratic Party (KDP), was firmly Selcen cut short a tour in Washington
embedded in Turkey’s official gallery to come to Erbil. In the old days Erbil
of rogues. He was derided as a cocky would have been viewed as a dumping
tribal upstart who emboldened by ground for mediocre officers. Today
U.S. support was accused of plotting it’s a good career move he says.
against Turkey. Turkey’s hawkish
generals would ever so often warn Selcen has no hang-ups about calling
against the “red lines” that Barzani the Kurdish region “Iraqi Kurdistan” or
must not breach. “Don’t try to grab Barzani its “President.” Until recently he
Kirkuk” or else... Don’t think about would have been accused, perhaps even
independence or else…” The subtext prosecuted, for doing so on charges of
was that Turkey would invade the inciting ethnic separatism.
Kurdish controlled enclave. A
defiant Barzani vowed to fight back. There are several reasons for the
The potential for conflict between change. It comes after a prolonged
*
Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
Analysis
chill prompted by Barzani’s refusal to take military action
against separatist rebels of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK). The PKK’s top leaders are based together with
an estimated three to five thousand rebels in the moun-
tainous terrain that separates Iraqi Kurdistan from Iran
and Turkey. Turkey still complains that Barzani doesn’t do
enough to squeeze the rebels. But it has dropped demands
that his peshmerga fighters take up arms against the Turk-
ish Kurds. This in turn reflects the new thinking in Ankara.
Firepower alone cannot quell the 25-year long Kurdish
rebellion. Turkey knows that it cannot eradicate the PKK
altogether, but it can weaken them to the point where some
kind of bargain can be struck.
Meanwhile, political, social, and economic reforms tailored
to dissuade disaffected young Kurds from heading toward
the mountains need to be rapidly enacted. Turkey’s military
leadership agrees. This in turn reflects the changes within
the Turkish Armed Forces where hardliners are being
increasingly sidelined partly as a result of the Ergenekon
trial.2 Armed with the generals’ support, Erdoğan’s ruling
Justice and Development Party (AKP) began introducing
such measures last year. They were heralded as the “Kurdish
Opening.” They include easing bans on the Kurdish lan-
guage and co-opting Turkey’s largest pro-Kurdish party, the
BDP. These have been twinned with moves to get the PKK
to lay down its weapon with the help of the Iraqi Kurds.
The opening appeared to slam shut when a group of PKK
fighters attacked a convoy of Turkish soldiers last Decem-
ber in the northeastern province of Tokat, well outside the
rebels’ traditional zone of engagement in the Kurdish domi-
nated southeast.
Some seven Turkish soldiers perished in the attack. A wave
of nationalist fury ensued. The raid was probably staged
by PKK hardliners who owe their raison d’etre to contin-
ued violence. Clashes between the PKK and the army have
begun to escalate in recent weeks. All of this makes it harder
for Erdoğan to justify further Kurdish-oriented reforms;
not least because nationwide parliamentary elections are
scheduled to take place by the summer of 2011. Despite
these setbacks—and much to the PKK’s dismay—Turkey’s
relations with the Iraqi Kurds have emerged unscathed.
2
One of the biggest propellers of change is flourishing trade
ties. During the week I spent in Erbil at least three differ-
ent business delegations from Turkey were in town. Iraq is
Turkey’s fourth largest trading partner. Most of this trade is
conducted with the Iraqi Kurds. “If Iraqi Kurdistan were an
independent country it would rank among Turkey’s top ten
trading partners,” notes Selcen, the Turkish Consul General.
Erbil’s main boulevard is dotted with Turkish shops, its sky-
line with new flashy buildings put up by Turkish contractors.
These include the five star hotel Divan, owned by Turkey’s
richest conglomerate, Koç Holding. The state-owned Turk-
ish Airlines is expected to begin flying to the Kurdish region
in the coming month and two major Turkish banks will be
opening branches in Erbil next month. It’s hard to imagine
that PKK camps are just a three-hour drive away.
During my trip, I met with Barzani at his mountain for-
tress overlooking Erbil. Relaxed and confident he sounded
genuinely committed to improving relations with Ankara.
Over cups of frothy Kurdish style cappuccino, Barzani
heaped praise on Erdoğan for his “daring” and “courageous”
reforms and insisted these must not be frozen because of
the Tokat attack. He said he was ready to continue between
Turkey and the rebels. When I asked him whether Turkey
would have to eventually talk to the rebels he said: “Turkey
will need to deal with the PKK because their problem is
with the PKK.” Yet he acknowledged that the rebels were
divided and that there were indeed hardliners bent on sabo-
taging peace. Barzani will undoubtedly be discussing for-
mulas to disarm the PKK and to persuade their leaders to
go into exile somewhere in Europe or elsewhere. It’s a tricky
affair. Murat Karayilan, the most senior PKK commander
is widely believed to be leaning toward a deal. But he faces
stiff resistance from Cemil Bayık and Dursun Kalkan, vet-
eran hardliners who are allegedly allied with Iran. Another
sticking point is the Mahkmour refugee camp, where some
10,000 Turkish Kurds have been languishing for years. The
camp, more of a shantytown, has evolved into a rest and
recreation center for the PKK. It also provides recruits.
Repatriating these Kurds will further test relations between
Ankara and the KRG.
I also met with PKK leader Murat Karayilan in the Kandil
mountains bordering Iran, where the PKK controls a large
swathe of land. The PKK is clearly unnerved by the warm
ties between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds. They don’t seem to
Analysis

believe Barzani will stick to his pledge never to fight fellow

Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist
Kurds again. Their suspicions will have been re-inforced by
a trilateral security agreement signed on April 11 in Istanbul Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent for The Economist and
between Iraq, Turkey, and the United States. The details of writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf.
the agreement are being kept secret but as one senior Turk-
ish official put it to me “it’s the most comprehensive plan of About GMF
action ever against the PKK.” Alongside military options it
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a
includes measures to cut off logistical supplies to the PKK nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution
and to crack down on its alleged drug trafficking, racketeer- dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding
ing, and money laundering activities in Europe and beyond. between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting
individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by
The other major change in Turkey’s relations with the Iraqi convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,
Kurds is that they are no longer viewed through the PKK and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can
lens, but from an Iraq-wide perspective. Friendship with the address a variety of global policy challenges. In addition, GMF
Iraqi Kurds allows Ankara to have a greater say in Bagh- supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. In
dad. (With Washington’s support it is quietly encouraging addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven
Barzani to lend support to a broad-based government in offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,
and Bucharest.
the wake of Iraq’s parliamentary elections. At the same time
Turkey is courting Iraq’s Sunni and Shia Arab leaders while
About the On Turkey Series
support for its ethnic Turkmen cousins is far more subtle.
Prior to the elections, Turkey cajoled Turkmen’s in Kirkuk GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
to ally themselves with a faction led by the former pro-secu- current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
lar Shiite Prime Minister Ayyad Allawi. The result: Allawi’s briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
group won about an equal amount of votes as the Kurds. tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
The Kurds erstwhile grip over the oil rich province, which To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at
they claim as their own, has been weakened. www.gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at
http://database.gmfus.org/reaction.
Some Iraqi Kurds claim that if things don’t work out with
Baghdad in the long run, joining Turkey would be the
second best option after outright independence. They may
be exaggerating but the Iraqi Kurdish and Turkish econo-
mies are already tightly intertwined. Once the Iraqi Kurds
strike an agreement with Baghdad over the sharing of oil
revenues, they can start selling their own oil and natural
gas resources through Turkey. The ensuing wealth is poised
to help generate income and investment in Turkey’s own
Kurdish hinterland. This virtuous cycle can help alleviate
poverty among Turkish Kurds. Yet, Ankara must never cede
to the age-old temptation of playing one set of Kurds against
the other. Barzani is no longer just another tribal leader. He
is the Kurdish national leader. And as much as he dislikes
the PKK he is no longer willing to kill fellow Kurds. As one
senior Iraqi Kurdish official put it, “They may be terrorists
but they are Kurds.”