paper series

A Very Secular Affair:

The Power Struggle of
Turkey’s Elites

Michael Thumann
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
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 A Very Secular Affair:
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites

Transatlantic Academy Paper Series

April 2010

Michael Thumann*
Bosch Fellow, Transatlantic Academy

*Michael Thumann served as a Bosch fellow with the Transatlantic Academy. He is also the Middle East bureau chief for the
German weekly Die Zeit.

I would like to thank the staff of the Transatlantic Academy, in particular Academy Director Stephen Szabo, Anna Murphy,
and Erica Cameron for their support and assistance for the organization of meetings within the foreign policy community.
Thanks also to Academy fellows Ahmet Evin, Kemal Kirisci, Ron Linden, Nathalie Tocci, Juliette Tolay-Sargnon, and Joshua
Walker for giving me the opportunity to get an insight in their research work and the valuable support during my stay in the
Uinted States. Finally, I want to thank the Robert Bosch Foundation in Germany for their financial support for this report
and their involvement in the Transatlantic Academy.
 Turkey is a democracy in which many actors use
the word coup d’etat to describe what is going on
in the country. This makes Turkish democracy
very special both in the West and the Middle East.
Pro-government circles warn about numerous
coup attempts in the last years orchestrated by
state-related security agencies. Indeed, a surprising
This is a struggle number of high-ranking former gendarmerie
about power, chiefs have been arrested; journalists and lawyers
about influence were put behind bars. On the other side of the
on the minds and political spectrum, leftist and nationalist politicians
hearts of Turks, and analysts critical of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) referred to as a “civilian
about economic
coup” in the making when they speak about the
assets in the
intentions of the government. Suspicions run high,
powerhouses of
accusations are quickly delivered on all sides, and
a rising Turkey.
many conspiracy theories are up in the air.
What these quarrels reveal is a deep divide in the
country, a picture of fragmented elites, and a deep
fall out about the future direction of the country.
Some call it a clash of Islamists or politicians with a
religious agenda against secularists. It is obvious that
one finds many believing Muslims on one side of the
barricade and many secularist minded Turks on the
other side. In spite of this the label Islamist versus
secular forces is strongly misleading as it suggests
that this is a battle about religion or religiously
related issues. This is a wrong perception.
This is a struggle about power, about influence on
the minds and hearts of Turks, about economic
assets in the powerhouses of a rising Turkey. It is
also a fight for political dominance in Turkey in the
21st century. New elites that started their ascent in
the political periphery of the country have made
it to the center. The classical elites that have built
the Turkish state from scratch in the 20th century
face strong competition in the center today. The
government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has shaped
the first decade of this century in Turkey with an
absolute majority in parliament. Where does his
2 Transatlantic Academy
strength emanate from? What is the concern of the
opposition? This paper will first describe the rise
of the periphery elite; it will then shed light on the
fears of the classical centrist elite.1 When necessary,
parallels will be drawn to the development of a
pious middle class in Egypt. Finally, it shall depict
the structural deficits of the Turkish political
system that obstruct a smooth transition from
the dominance of the classical elite to political
competition in a democracy and a fair distribution
of power in the country.
The rise of the Anatolian middle classes
During the 1950s, businessmen and traders first
joined together in the cities of Central Anatolia to
compete with state-owned enterprises in a largely
state-controlled economy. The city of Kayseri presents
a good example of what happened here. In Kayseri
today, you will still find the Sahabiye Medrese, a
religious school of solid stonework blackened by
the centuries, and the old Seljuk fortress, built as
a residence by the Seljuk sultans. Otherwise, very
little has remained of its past. Excavators dig up
old residential areas. The new bus station is a bold
experiment in glass, plastic, and dazzling white
concrete. Beyond the station stands an enormous
industrial zone, where 139 new plants were set up on
only one day in 2004. Advertising posters encourage
people to drink more Cola Turka and to drive more
Turkish tractors. During the 1960s and 1970s, textile
companies grew here under the protection of high
customs tariffs. However, the real breakthrough
came under Prime Minister Turgut Özal, a former
world banker and devout Muslim. He invited foreign
investors to Anatolia and arranged favorable loans for
small- and medium-sized privately owned industrial
enterprises. The opening up of the economy under
Özal allowed the Anatolian middle class to flourish
in the late 1980s. They became one of the pillars of
1
   I would like to thank my assistant Ayse Boren for her
important contributions to this section of the paper.
Turkey’s export industries in the 1990s. Turkey’s
customs union with the European Union in 1996 also
fostered this new prosperity.
Here is one example of the entrepreneurs that were
interviewed for this research project. Saffet Arslan
has always paid his own way in life. His father was a
simple carpetmaker. His parents sent Arslan out to
work after he completed elementary school. At the
age of 14, he was already working as a cabinetmaker
in a furniture workshop. But soon, he opened a
small cabinetmaking shop, established more and
more branches and eventually founded the Ipek
Company in 1991. His furniture factory obviously
satisfied a need among the Turkish population—
folding beds. The 53-year-old is a capitalist and
devout Muslim at the same time. “Islam tells us
that profit must be justified: work hard, don’t take
advantage of others and help the needy,” he says.
Arslan also funds a school, a sports center and
scholarships for students at the local University.
Erciyes University in Kayseri receives support from
a large number of businesses, and its departments
and schools bear the names of benefactors. Kayseri
has few restaurants and hardly any bars, where in
Arslan’s opinion you would only waste your time.
Only international hotels serve alcohol. Arslan
has already been on the Hajj, but takes time out
for prayers only on Fridays at noon. Workers are
allowed to pray in the factory mosque during their
lunch breaks, and on Fridays they all travel together
to the large new mosque, a bus journey of only five
minutes, to what is known as the Central Mosque
of the Organized Industrial Zone—with a highly
modern underfloor heating.
The economic miracle in Kayseri is built on people’s
own efforts. This blend of high-technology and
high moral standard, was described as a “Central
Anatolian Revolution” in a report by the European
Stability Initiative in Istanbul and Brussels.
Its initiators have been described as “Islamic
Calvinists,” as pragmatic and devout businessmen.2
The Calvinist label has been rejected by some on
various grounds, but the paper has rightly stressed
the pragmatic character of these businessmen.
Where grandfathers still worked in huge
conglomerates remote controlled from the capital
Ankara 20 years ago, their sons and grandsons in
Kayseri tried to take their fortunes into their own These usually
hands. Together with other businesses in Istanbul devout Turks have
and other major cities, many pious entrepreneurs
a strong desire
have established a very competitive industry in the not to be labelled
last 20 years.3 Surprisingly, many of these small-
as backward.
and medium-size enterprises have not suffered
When asked they
too much in the economic downturn of 2009.
The businesspeople interviewed for this research
state that Islam
have stated that they have had losses in exports to and modernity
the European Union. But they could offset these fit together
shortfalls partly by exporting to new markets in the rather well.
Middle East, in particular to Syria and Iraq.
The picture unfolding during the past two decades
is that new groups have joined Turkey’s traditional
middle and upper classes: entrepreneurs and
merchant families from Central Anatolia, which
despite its geographical location is part of the
political periphery of Turkey. These usually
devout Turks have a strong desire not to be
labelled as backward. When asked they state that
Islam and modernity fit together rather well. This
is the formula with which they have moved from
Anatolia to the metropolis of Istanbul and on to
the capital Ankara. Many of them are supporters,
and some are members of the conservative AKP
government of Prime Minister Erdoğan. What
they expect is non-interference by the state,
economically liberal policies, low tariffs, and
2
   ESI report, “Islamic Calvinists. Change and Conservatism in
Central Anatolia,” September 19, 2005, http://www.esiweb.org/
pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf
3
   E. Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu, “Globalization,
alternative modernities and the political economy of Turkey,”
Review of International Political Economy, February 2005, pp.
105-128.
A Very Secular Affair: 3
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 as few trade barriers as possible. It is a business
driven, and pragmatic way of looking at the state
and society. Some of them speak highly of Turgut
Özal who abolished foreign currency controls and
tariff barriers. Their success formula is: the market
economy is good; civil liberty and independence
are good. However, many felt that this was not
How could the enough. During the 1990s and after, the key issue
periphery increase was no longer just creating wealth. How do you
take control of the center? How can the periphery
its influence?
increase its influence? The traditional response
The traditional
of Anatolia’s middle class was “with money.” The
response of
adjusted more modern answer, however, was “with
Anatolia’s middle
brains and broadcasts”—in other words, with the
class was “with
aid of the universities and the media.
money.” The
modern answer Ten years ago, on the outskirts of Istanbul,
was “with brains Anatolian patrons founded Fatih University. Now,
and broadcasts.” their children come to the elite school west of
Turkey’s biggest city. Students can look out from
the campus onto a large lake and, as they hope,
toward a better future. They study together with
students from China, Africa, the Middle East,
and Russia. There are more women than men
among the roughly 8,000 young people at the
university. Unlike many fellow students at elite state
universities, most of them do not come from the
middle classes of Ankara and Istanbul, but from
the provinces, from conservative families who
“trust” the university, as many of the interviewed
lecturers and students say. Students here move in
what they describe as “decent surroundings”—no
drugs, no alcohol, no seminars during midday
prayers on Friday. The university is sponsored
by conservative businessmen from Anatolia. All
of them are close to Fethullah Gülen who can be
portrayed in a broader Middle Eastern context as
a preacher of a mildly conservative Islam. Gülen
was a disciple of the religious leader, Said Nursi,
and has established a powerful religious association
of his own. The movement operates many schools
and non-governmental organizations in countries
4 Transatlantic Academy
all over the world. Most critically, it is viewed by
the secular establishment of Turkey. Gülen who
lives in the United States is said to have never seen
the university supported by his movement. Many
of the Fatih graduates go into industry, one third
returns to their family’s business. Few alumni so
far successfully arrived at the political center others
have gone into the media.
For decades, the monopoly of public opinion was in
the hands of secular big businessmen with close ties
to the secular state or secularist governments. This
situation has come to an end more than a decade
ago. Competition for the classical elites comes
among other places from a white office building in
Istanbul with an automatically watered deeply green
lawn—the headquarters of the Zaman newspaper.
The influential daily has a circulation of some
750,000 copies. In addition, it has a news agency, a
magazine and a professionally produced English-
language newspaper. This media empire belongs
to several Anatolian businessmen who are close to
Fethullah Gülen. A strict smoking ban applies in
the Zaman building. An emphasis on cleanliness
is also part of its philosophy. “Faith, values, and a
secular state belong together,” says Ekrem Dumanli,
the 46-year-old editor-in-chief who stems from
the small town of Yozgat in Central Anatolia.
According to its editor, the newspaper fosters a
liberal-conservative world-view, family values and
the right blend of Turkish culture and Western
democracy. Zaman argues in favor of Turkish EU
membership, a region where it is already spreading
its influence. The Frankfurt edition of Zaman
sells up to 50,000 copies a day in Germany. The
English-language edition of Zaman is delivered to
the letter boxes of foreign diplomats, researchers,
and journalists in Turkey and the English-language
website is most widely read in the United States
and in Muslim Malaysia. The English-language
edition of Zaman is a loss-making operation that is
part of a strategic vision. Whenever Turkey makes
international headlines, Zaman aims to promote its
view of the world, explains the editor-in-chief of the
English-language edition Bülent Kenes. He states
that the view from outside also influences decisions
in Turkey’s bitter domestic struggles.
One of the very prominent brawls was fought
about the media company including the TV station
ATV and the newspaper Sabah. The media outlets
had been seized from one of Turkey’s leading
businessmen, Turgay Ciner, in April 2007 when
secret agreements between Ciner and the previous
owner had come to light. ATV and Sabah were
eventually bought by Çalık Holding, which offered
1.1 billion dollars for ATV Sabah and won the
only partially transparent tender organized by the
Savings, Deposits, and Insurance Fund TSMF in
December 2007. Çalık Holding is by no means a
small or medium enterprise, but one of Turkey’s
giant corporations simultaneously engaged in
textile and energy production, construction,
finance, media, and telecommunications. In this
respect, it resembles the Doğan Holding, which
has been fined excessively by financial authorities
for the sale of assets to a German media company.
Contrary to Doğan, Çalık Holding enjoys the
privilege of working closely with the AKP
government. Çalık has won some very crucial
tenders over the last years. A son in law of the
prime minister is present on the board of Çalık that
indicates that the AKP government over time has
partly adjusted to some traditional principles of
governance and business in Turkey.
What has changed dramatically today is the fact
that the former periphery elites have become
very visible in the centers of Turkey, notably in
Istanbul. This is true not only for business but for
the street. The rise of the new elites has brought
upon a change in style and fashion that is seen very
critically by the classical center elites of Turkey. To
be sure, it is not the assumed growth in numbers of
women with headscarves that should be discussed.
As a matter of fact, a recent survey tells the opposite
story. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of
women wearing veils has gone down.4 What has
made the headscarf very noticeable though is the
fact that more women who wear it want to be part
of the urban space. Unlike in the past, they go
out, they shop, and they spend their free time in
cafes. A consumer culture of pious Muslims has What has made
grown over the years that contributes to Turkey’s the headscarf
domestic demand and spurs the construction of
very noticeable
new shopping malls, housing projects, hotels, and though is the fact
holiday resorts. The shopping malls accommodate
that more women
many boutiques offering a large assortment of
who wear it want
silk headscarves and long dresses. Especially local
Turkish producers control this growing market,
to be part of the
such as Vakko, Ipek Yol, Beymen, Tekbir and urban space.
others. Their success on the domestic market They go out, they
has made them competitive also in neighbouring shop, and they
Muslim countries. Istanbul sees more and more spend their free
gated communities where people from the devout time in cafes.
upper middle class move in, carrying evocative
names like “Hilal Konakları” (Crescent residences).
During Ramadan, some prefer to have Iftar,
the fast breaking ceremony, at five star hotels.
Private hotel complexes for pious travellers on the
Mediterranean coast offer all the profane pleasures
of secular resorts except alcohol. And they have
separate recreational facilities for men and women,
sometimes separated zones on the beach. The
devout way of indulging into consumer delights
has sparked a discussion in both religious circles
and secular groups. While an Islamist thinker like
Ali BulaÇ strongly criticises the loose morale of
consumerism,5 a representative of the conservative
entrepreneurs’ association MUSIAD offers this
relieving interpretation: “Whatever a Muslim
needs is never a luxury. Everything I need to do
my job and to live my life better is a need and not
4
   Ali Carkoglu, Research Project of Sabanci University, with
TESEV)
5
   Ali Bulaç, “Üretici Güçler,” Zaman, January 27, 2010, p. 21.
A Very Secular Affair: 5
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 a luxury.”6 However, as will be shown later on, it is
precisely the visibility of the periphery classes in
the center that has increased the unease of Turkey’s
classical elites about their economic success.
Liberalization the Egyptian way
The sea change generated by a broad pious, and
For the first time
pragmatic middle class in Turkey can be better
in the history
understood if weighed against Egypt, a country
of the Turkish
matching Turkey in size, population, and in some
republic, a
aspects of industrial development. This brief
politician with
comparison is to show the remarkable economic
an Islamist past
story of modern Egypt, which unlike in Turkey has
was aspiring been entirely captured by the state. It was in the
to the highest 1970s when President Anwar as-Sadat introduced
position in the economic liberalization of Egypt after the years
state, which was of a socialist inspired controlled economy under
the symbol of the President Gamal Abd an-Nasir. The aim was to
allow private entrepreneurs to expand in a carefully
secular republic.
liberalized economy. The trouble was, however, that
the state and its plentiful agencies managed to retain
control over wide parts of the economy and that
businessmen were forced to cooperate closely with
bureaucrats when they want to make sure they are
not marginalized in the market. As a result of that
the state expanded its share of economic output and
revenue during the so-called liberalization period
in the 1970s and 1980s. Important sectors such as
energy production, tourism, and the management
of the Suez Canal were run by state agencies that
acted like private companies in an environment
safe of competition and other malicious impact.
Thus, the government was able to retain its position
as the main distributor of wealth and rents in
Egypt. For the government and the president, in
office since 1981, the economy is one of the main
pillars of power. A devout strong middle class has
not emerged in Egypt, small- and medium-size
6
   Sebnem Gumuscu, “Economic Liberalization, Devout
Bourgeosie, and Change in Political Islam: Comparing Turkey
and Egypt,” European University Institute, EUI RSAS Working
Paper 2008/19, p. 19.
6 Transatlantic Academy
enterprises remain weak and dependent. When
the government and the judiciary deal with the
movement of the Muslim Brothers, founded
by Hassan al Banna in 1928 and still illegal as a
political party, they arrest not only representatives
of the organization, but they specifically target
businessmen close to the movement, put them
behind bars, disrupt their businesses to ensure that
no economic backbone of political Islam emerges.
For these entrepreneurs, confronting the state
through engagement in political Islam meant to
be out of business soon. Due to crackdowns like
these and the overwhelming role of the state the
Egyptian economy has taken another turn since the
1980s than the Turkish economy under Turgut Özal
and his successors. A sizeable small and medium
enterprise sector of Anatolian proportions has not
come to light in Egypt.
The fears of the classical elites in Turkey
In the years 2007 and 2008, Turkey witnessed a
power struggle of unprecedented magnitude that
was initiated with Abdullah Gül’s nomination
to the post of president. For the first time in the
history of the Turkish republic, a politician with
an Islamist past and a wife wearing the veil was
aspiring to the highest position in the state, which
was the symbol of the unified, secular, and modern
republic. Challenged by this ambitious claim, the
Kemalist upper-middle classes mobilized the army,
the jurisdiction, the media, and themselves. Part
of the mobilization was a condition put up by the
Constitutional Court that the president be elected
by at least 367 deputies in parliament. The pressure
was buttressed with the April 27 e-memorandum of
the army in which the military top brass expressed
its concern about the direction of the country. The
most impressive display of unease, however, was the
secular middle class people who took to the streets
in a series of massive demonstrations in April and
May 2007, armed with symbols such as Turkish
flags and photographs of Mustafa Kemal. On these
so-called “Republican Meetings” people shouted
slogans such as “We are all Kemalists, we are all
Turks,” “Atatürk youth is on duty,” “No sharia, no
coup,” and “Turkey is secular; it will remain so.” For
the first time in a long period, the elites of Turkey
who were used to leading highly-individualized
lives formed a collective body in public space for
the sake of expressing the same concerns. The
aim of the following paragraphs is to understand
the dynamics of this collective reaction; that is, to
explore the apprehensions of these well-educated,
professionally established, economically well-doing
members of the classical middle class who perceive
themselves as the bearers of the true republican
values of Turkey.
Back in the 1920s, education constituted one of
the most important legs of the modernization
project of the Turkish national state as it was not
only about learning mathematics and physics alone
but also, and more importantly, about learning to
become the “ideal citizens” of the young republic.
Modernization in education was a fundamental
part of the nation-building project. The education
reforms of the early republic started in 1924 with
the enactment of the Tevhid-i Tedrisat law (Law
of Unification of Instruction) which foresaw that
“all education instruments be placed under the
control of the Ministry of National Education.”7
The reforms which were completed in the 1940s
were designed to institute a secular authority while
erasing any religious impact on the institution of
education, and to implement the idea of a unified
Turkish people with the help of new curricula
and textbooks. A remarkable centralization of
educational agencies was put in place which until
today works in favor of the government and the
bureaucracies in charge in Ankara. The social
anthropologist, Esra Özyürek, has interviewed
7
   Henry J. Rutz and Erol M. Balkan, Reproducing Class:
Education, Neoliberalism, and the Rise of the New Middle Class
in Istanbul, Berghahn Books: New York 2009, p. 41.
many first generation teachers from the 1920s
and 1930s and points out that they were referred
to as the “soldiers of the education army” under
the command of the “chief teacher” Atatürk.8
Özyürek interviewed the instructors to better
understand how identities were shaped in the early
era of the republic. She found out that the teachers
internalized the public cause to such an extent Many first
that their private selves had simply dissolved in it. generation
Both in their appearances and their discourses the teachers from the
more than 80-year-old teachers were very careful 1920s and 1930s
not to disclose any details about their private
were referred to
lives. When Özyürek visited their homes she was
as the “soldiers
always greeted in formal clothes and hosted in the
most public room of the house. When she asked
of the education
the interviewees about their experiences back in army” under
the founding days of the republic their answers the command
completely lacked any private dimension in order of the “chief
to show their attachment to the official ideology of teacher” Atatürk.
the state.9 What one interviewee had to say about
her marriage displayed even more explicitly how
she had identified with the young state and its
leader: “As a Kemalist couple, we both worked for
our country. […] All his life he supported Atatürk,
the republic, freedom, and modernization … I also
was known as a Kemalist in my teaching career.”10
In the early days of the republic, even in the most
private spheres of life the public was affirmed,
celebrated, and reproduced. Since then, of course,
the strong identification of individual actors with
public causes has undoubtedly been shaken and
reduced. But this background is crucial to better
understand the present concerns of the present
classic elites of Turkey. Many of them still admire
8
   Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and
Everyday Politics in Turkey, Duke University Press: Durham
2006, p. 34.
9
   Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and
Everyday Politics in Turkey, Duke University Press: Durham
2006, pp. 38-9.
10
 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern: State Secularism and
Everyday Politics in Turkey, Duke University Press: Durham
2006, p. 46.
A Very Secular Affair: 7
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 the founder of the republic and consider themselves
to be “Kemalists.”
Still, until this day, the center middle classes in
Istanbul and Ankara have put their stakes in
the public domain and state institutions such as
schools, public offices, the army, and jurisdiction.
Some However, they are also well represented in real
representatives of or virtual spaces where the public is constantly
contested and recreated, such as the street, cafes
the secular elite
and theaters, or the media. The classical elites were
believe that major
safely placed in all these domains of the republic;
Western forces
and the people I interviewed for this paper are no
have teamed up exceptions. For practical purposes, I will refer only
with the current to three of them, a translator, a journalist, and an
government in NGO worker. Their fathers had all occupied high
order to “turn ranks in state offices. The translator for foreign
Turkey into diplomats and cultural officer was the daughter of
another Iran.” an army colonel. Her mother was one of the first
staff members of the newly found Meteorology
Institute. The mother of the journalist was a history
teacher. All interviewed persons lived and worked
in a European country for some time in their life,
as correspondents, or as staff in embassies, non-
governmental organizations, and trade associations.
The schools they visited were among the best
students could go to in the 1960s and 1970s in
Istanbul, they all offered foreign languages, notably
the Austrian School, the German High School,
and the Galatasaray lycee. As a general rule, these
prestigious schools accept only a small number of
students every year, which automatically elevates
their graduates to the status of an elite minority.
This has shaped the self confidence and the self
image of the people I have interviewed. One of
them said: “My husband is from St Joseph High
School; his mother is from the American Academy
in Uskudar. My grandfather was a high-ranking
doctor in the army. You can imagine who I am. I
come from an upper middle class family, always
well educated, maybe not rich but economically
well-off.” In the view of these representatives of the
8 Transatlantic Academy
classical elite, education and heritage produce a
“scarcity value”11 that distinguishes them from the
society in general.
However, this self confidence seems to have been
shaken as all three representatives of the elite
minority voice strong concerns. The translator
believes that major Western forces have teamed
up with the current government in order to “turn
Turkey into another Iran;” the journalist talks of a
“civilian coup” that is gradually and systematically
implemented by the government and which will
eventually abolish democracy. They no longer feel
as secure as they used to and as if to compensate
for this they emphasize the assets in which they
believe—their education, the republican values
they stand for, or the fact that their families have
lived in Istanbul for seven generations. It is as if
they hope to render themselves immune against the
changes that are reshaping Turkey and the world
by wedding themselves to the founding values of
the Turkish republic or emphasizing their roots
in the cultural and political centers of Turkey.
A feeling of loss has captured the classical elite.
Two major developments, the mass migration
to the big cities that began in the 1950s and the
liberalization project that was implemented after
the 1980 coup have worked against their interests.
Vast immigration has radically transformed the
social and architectural texture of Turkish cities.
Many members of the classical middle classes
see this as a threat to the urban culture posed
by “uneducated” and “uncivilized” rural masses.
When asked how Istanbul had changed in the last
20-30 years the NGO official replied that “Anatolia
came to Istanbul” while she herself worked for the
well-being of this Anatolia in an association which
supports 250 disadvantaged households in Istanbul.
She did not blame them for coming to Istanbul and
 Pierre Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital” in Readings in Economic
11
Sociology, ed. Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Blackwell Publishing:
Malden, MA, 2002, p. 284.
stressed that life conditions in their hometowns
had forced them to seek a better life in the city.
However, she was concerned about the migrants’
low level of education and the impact on urban life
and society. The translator found the newcomers
“disrespectful” and complained about the various
sorts of local food they had brought from the
eastern provinces, such as a meat pizza called
“lahmacun.” The journalist concluded that “the
subculture of migration overwhelmed the original
culture of Istanbul.” He did not simply view this
as a historical change but as the destruction of the
city. In this perception Istanbul is rather a timeless
entity: there could be one and only one Istanbul,
“their” Istanbul which is slowly but steadily
deprived of its true essence by the migrants.
And there seems to be ample reason for concern.
The new settlements of the immigrants, the twisted
streets they built and the jobs they aspire to, their
ways of working their way through the city, their
manners and gazes have forced the classical city
dwellers to reposition themselves in public space.
Previously, the established middle classes in big
cities like Istanbul, and even more so in Ankara
and Izmir, thought that they would live in a more
or less homogeneous environment of people who
share a specific urban code for moving around
in the city. However, the newcomers are not only
ignorant of this code but they sometimes directly
challenge this spirit. If you are constantly pushed
in buses or trains, said the translator, you can no
longer smile politely. Thus the urban middle classes
feel threatened at the very spot where they had
most safely established themselves. The cultural
consequences of mass migration seem to be even
more important than the social motives behind it.
So they have developed various tactics in discourse
and in practice in order to deal with the “invasion
of the rural mass.” There are two essential ways
of separating from the newcomers. The first is to
draw strict, mental borderlines between different
districts and neighborhoods that shall remain
separated so that undesired interactions would be
minimized. The journalist compared the Istanbul
districts of Cihangir and Fatih and said it is hard to
believe that Cihangir as “the district of artists and
intellectuals” and the district of the devout lower
middle class Fatih are “parts of the same country,
let alone being parts of the same city.” Of course, A feeling of
Fatih is a very old part of the city and at least some marginalization
of its inhabitants can also draw back their family overwhelms the
histories to Ottoman times. But it is perceived as a classic elites as
hub of the newcomers. The translator complained
immigrants take
about the women of Fatih with their veils and hijabs
over large parts of
when asked about the changes unfolding in the city.
She insisted that the division of the city must not
Turkey’s big cities
be bridged by intruders: “They should exist there, and the political
and we here.” The second way of separation is to representatives
withdraw from the city center into self-contained they usually vote
satellite towns that make disconcerting trips to for dominate many
downtown unnecessary. The residents of these municipalities.
middle or upper middle class satellite towns often
detach their bonds with the city life that they deem
“disorderly.” This way they mark their class and
cultural differences in the urban space. Seen from
this perspective, the city was more an idea than a
reality and the only means to save it was to take it
with you as you moved to the outskirts of the city.12
A feeling of marginalization overwhelms the
classic elites as immigrants take over large parts of
Turkey’s big cities and the political representatives
they usually vote for dominate most of the
municipalities. The journalist says that “the
Istanbul of my childhood was under the influence
of the minorities.” He referred to the Greek and
Armenian middle classes that have been driven
out by several Turkish governments and the state
bureaucracy, possibly by the fathers and mothers of
the interviewees. “As they are gone,” he continued,
 Sencer Ayata, “Yeni Orta Sınıf ve Uydu Kent Yaşamı” in Kültür
12
Fragmanları: Türkiye’de Gündelik Hayat, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti
and Ayşe Saktanber, Metis Yayınları, 2003, pp. 37-56.
A Very Secular Affair: 9
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 “we are the minorities.” He depicted an imaginary
alliance with the minorities in assuming that they
shared a consensus with the non-Muslim minorities
about what it meant being modern, urban, and
civilized. As opposed to the disintegrated Istanbul
of Kurds and rural Anatolians, the Istanbul of
Greeks and Armenians appears as the genuine
For Kemalists, Istanbul. However, it is precisely the non-existence
the threat posed of these groups today that allows for visualizing
by AKP and its a fairytale-coexistence in the past:13 a city that
supporters from manifested itself in the form of elegant ladies and
the periphery gentlemen promenading on High Street “in gloves
and its powerful and hats” rather than in a frantic crowd gulping
down “lahmacun” and “çiğ köfte” [raw meatballs].
economic base
is much more With the ascent of AKP to power in 2002, the
toxic than the changed landscape of the cities has been cast over
one posed by the whole country. Such is the perception of the
the Kurds. interviewees but also the view expressed in many
secular mainstream media. In this respect, the AKP
and its pious base of voters seem to resemble the
Kurdish immigrants from East Anatolia. Like the
Kurdish immigrants many devout Muslims did not
participate in the classical modernization project
of Turkey, which is why the center elites tend to
describe them as “backward.” For Kemalists, the
threat posed by AKP and its supporters from the
periphery of Turkey and its powerful economic
base is much more toxic than the one posed by the
Kurds. Those who support the Kurdish insurgents
of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are a rather
small group that can be marginalized and has
no chance of coming to power in the center.The
former members of Turkey’s numerous Islamic
parties, however, are not only in government.
With the election of the Kayseri born politician
 Arus Yumul, “Azınlık mı Vatandaş mı?” in Türkiye’de Azınlık ve
13
Çoğunluk Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, ed.
Ayhan Kaya and Turgut Tarhanlı, TESEV Yayınları: Istanbul,
2005, p. 97. Referred to in Füsun Üstel and Birol Caymaz,
“Seçkinler ve Sosyal Mesafe,” Research project of Istanbul Bilgi
University Center for Civil Society Studies with Open Society
Foundation, April 2009, p. 14.
10 Transatlantic Academy
Abdullah Gül to the president’s position they have
occupied the sublime chair of Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk. Besides, they are setting up their cadres
in public offices, demanding the right for pious
Muslims to enter universities with headscarves,
and aspiring to the public activities and spaces that
the center middle classes had reserved for them.
In brief, they claim the same positions, the same
schools, the riches, and even the same concepts
such as modernity and democracy that were
previously seen as the monopoly of the classical
elites. Even the drive to the West was subjugated by
them. Many successive Turkish governments had
asked the European Union to start membership
negotiations. But it was notably Prime Minister
Erdoğan who received the honor to open these
negotiations in 2005.
With the AKP government, the pious businessmen
and middle classes have moved up to a different
position in Turkish society. The economic
liberalization of the 1980s had allowed them to
grow into strong competitors in business, now
they want to be enlisted as “elites” and demand
their share. For the interviewed translator it looks
as such: “Now the religious people have money.
They drive Mercedes, expand in our neighborhood
and show no respect.” The journalist adds: “The
graduates of (religious) Imam Hatip schools are
now being appointed to positions of principles.
They take positions everywhere. You can recognize
them by their moustache. In all institutions,
branches, people of religious background move
up. Also in state tenders almost always people
from that background win. Also green capital is
becoming big capital now.” The translator adds:
“We feel that things are sliding from our hands
and that we live with the fear that our children will
see a darker future.” When taking these arguments
together, religion is clearly a question of secondary
concern. It is rather the speedy upward mobility
of the periphery elites that has become the major
worry of the classic elites. Hakan Yılmaz who has
conducted a comprehensive research on the middle
classes of Turkey described the situation faced by
the Kemalist upper middle classes in the following
way: “Turkey becomes more alien to them. They
don’t know people in high positions in the state
anymore because AKP has been ruling for so long.
Their social and cultural capital does not count
anymore. They have good education but they
cannot find a job anymore.”14
A specific problem for the classical elites is the fact
that their professed adversaries seem to be perfectly
organized while they are hamstrung by divisions
and discord. The periphery elites control modern
non-governemental organizations, entrepreneurial
organizations, smart pressure groups, expanding
think tanks, one of them also present in
Washington, a powerful net of small- and medium-
size companies, nation-wide media, a splendidly
organized governing party, and they have a common
mission: to rule the country for good. This is how
it looks from the angle of the center elite. At closer
inspection however, they have the same institutions
in many aspects but they are utterly fragmented. The
major business association TUSIAD cannot agree
on whether to defy the government’s support for
pious businessmen or to applaud the economically
liberal policies of Erdoğan’s cabinet. Secular
politicians are not able to unite on a common
platform while the strongest party of the opposition,
the secularist Republican People’s Party (CHP), was,
for a long time, led by an able hour-to-hour tactician
and an extremely unable political strategist with the
same name: Deniz Baykal. The party occupies the
position of a “social democratic” party in Turkey
although it does not address the concerns of lower
classes and workers but instead resorts to nationalist
and anti-Western rhetoric. In the first free election
in Turkey in 1950, Atatürk’s CHP lost the majority
 Interview with Hakan Yilmaz at Bogazici University on
14
October 15, 2009.
and was never able to regain it. Structurally, it is an
elitist minority party with no visible intent or ability
to actually win elections. To the end of retaining
control, the CHP agreed on coalition governments
in the past. But first and foremost the party relies
on the traditionally secularist institutions, the
army, the bureaucracy, and the judiciary. Instead of
trying to govern through a majority in parliament The strongest
they merely block unwelcome policies of others by opposition party,
appealing to the Constitutional Court or calling on the secularist
the army to intervene. This may work to temporarily CHP, was led by
obstruct the policy of competing parties but it
an able hour-to-
prevents the CHP and the secularists from shaping
hour tactician
the future of Turkey.
and an extremely
The political weakness adds to the woes of the unable political
secular classical elites. They see themselves as strategist with
the avant-garde of modernity but have been the same name:
pushed to the fringes by globalization and the Deniz Baykal.
opening of their country. They are divided into
nationalist isolationists in the CHP and open-
minded supporters of globalization in TUSIAD.
Some want to bring Turkey into Europe but others
hate the European Union for its consideration of
minorities in Turkey and the tacit support for the
AKP government. They claim to be the beacon of
Turkey’s Westernization yet reject many Western
standards and changes to Turkish laws proposed
by the European Union in the membership
negotiations since 2005. The classical elites are split
by individualistic motives and a growing sense
of escapism from political reality. The powerful
demonstrations of 2007 were rather an exception to
the rule. Turkey has not seen any similar expression
of the will to prevail from the center elites since.
The remarkable strength of Egypt’s
center elites
Here again, a brief comparison with Egypt sheds
light on the special path Turkey has embarked
upon when compared to other countries in
the Eastern Mediterranean region. Under the
A Very Secular Affair: 11
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 leadership of President Hosni Mubarak, the
sluggish liberalization of the Egyptian economy
has continued but in a fashion that ensured the
state would stay firmly in control. Small- and
medium-size enterprises could not flourish under
the impact of heavy taxation, high expenditures
for bureaucratic procedures, red tape and very
In Egypt, an expensive credit. These conditions worked very
authoritarian much in favour of big companies which could
state, the center afford to pay bribes and procedural expenses
elites have while being able to settle issues directly with high
ranking government officials. Since the 1990s huge
stayed in power
altogether. The corporations emerged on the scene, partly as a
result of privatisation of state enterprises, partly
flip side is that
as actors in new economic fields of expansion.
political power
The telecommunications giant Orascom is a
is not rooted in
prototypical enterprise which is simultaneously
public support engaged in construction and other areas. An
but in prohibition
oligarchic class of entrepreneurs has emerged which
and police works closely with the highest echelons of power or
intervention. holds important positions in the ruling party NDP
and in the government. “Liberalization” meant at
times that in privatized companies the previously
state appointed management retained its position
and continued to work for its own benefit and
bonuses. In an authoritarian state, the center elites
of Egypt have stayed in power altogether. The flip
side is that Egypt remains a structurally instable
country where political power is not rooted in
elections and public support but in prohibition and
police intervention. Patrimonial elite reproduces
itself at the top of the state while interfering in any
potentially competitive civil society engagement.
The consolidation of power rests on the oppression
of liberal and religiously inspired opposition
groups. As a result of this the pragmatic devout
middle class of Egypt is tiny compared to Turkey
while strongly conservative voices still dominate
the discourse within political Islam. As a banned
political organization, the Muslim brotherhood
could never evolve into a movement in which
12 Transatlantic Academy
devout Muslims, Arab nationalists, and liberal
businessmen could agree on a common platform.
Whereas in the AKP, business considerations play
a prominent role, which has been nurtured by EU
accession negotiations, the Egyptian Islamists and,
in most cases, its sympathizers have a preference
for pious principles. In the political field, this is
the source of their legitimacy and their structural
weakness at the same time. They cannot even
remotely dream of what AKP has achieved.
The political clash at the center of Turkey
Prime Minister Erdoğan has governed the country
since 2003. He comes from a modest family, and
made his way up from the docklands of Kasimpasa
to the post of mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s. His
down-to-earth policies in this position such as
replacing old power supply lines and outdated
heating systems, or the overhaul of municipal waste
disposal convinced many people that he is a rather
pragmatic than ideological leader. Erdoğan in his
early days made a career as a football player. As an
outspoken man from the bottom of society who is
sometimes confrontational and highly emotional,
he is an outstanding election campaigner. With
his background, he is not a classical representative
of the Anatolian middle class. That applies all the
more to President Gül who stems from an old
merchant family in Kayseri. Both politicians made
their career initially in Turkey’s Islamist movement
and were members of the Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi, RP) that governed during the 1990s until
the army forced it out of office. Their political
past has been systematically exploited by their
opponents and also leads to confusion about the
character of the new AKP, which Erdoğan founded
in 2001 with Gül. The AKP’s program doesn’t
say a word about religion or Islam. Its political
opponents allege it has a secret agenda to Islamise
Turkey. It is hard to detect this agenda after eight
years with Erdoğan at the helm of government.
Every related dispute, such as the argument about
the right to wear headscarves at universities in
2008, has ended in the confirmation of Turkey’s
secular character. Seen in the context of Islamist
movements since the foundation of the Muslim
brotherhood in 1928, it is obvious that the AKP
is not an Islamist or “mildly” Islamist party. This
becomes strikingly evident when compared to
genuine Islamist movements in the Arab world
and beyond but also at closer inspection in Turkey
itself. The AKP is a kind of melting pot of devout
conservative forces, Turkish nationalists, liberal
reformists, and pious businessmen. In order to keep
these different factions together, its political line
is primarily one of pragmatism; in negative terms,
this has led to a political zigzag course, and is
certainly one explanation why reforms are now and
again sluggish and delayed.
The regional elections in March 2009 demonstrated
that the AKP is mainly the party of the Anatolian
middle classes. It celebrated its successes in Central
Anatolia, but was defeated in the Mediterranean
cities and the Kurdish East. The elections also
revealed a noteworthy weakness of Erdoğan’s party.
It was not able to attract lower classes of voters in
the same way as it did in previous elections. In fact,
there is an Islamist party in Turkey on the rise, the
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), which received
some 5 percent of the vote in the regional elections
on March 29, 2009. With its charismatic leader,
Numan Kurtulmus, it has a potential vote of up to
8-10 percent, which roughly corresponds to the
number of Turks who support the introduction
of Sharia law. As a rule, these voters belong to the
poorest, worst educated, and most underprivileged
strata of Turkish society.
Erdoğan’s time in office can be divided into two
distinct periods. First, during the years of reform
from 2003 to 2005, he energetically implemented
the dream of many Turks of leading a reformed
Turkey into the European Union. An updated penal
code, reformulated civil rights, and the gradual
reduction of the military’s role in politics enabled
Turkey to pursue accession negotiations with the
European Union since the end of 2005.
Erdoğan’s second period though has been one of
a constant struggle for power since 2006. He had
to withstand a constitutional dispute about the
A profound irony
office of president, a threat of intervention from
of Erdoğ an’s
the general staff in April 2007, and the dubious
closure proceedings against his own party in
struggle with the
classic elites is
2008. The reforms and the quest for power at
the top of the Turkish state with President Gül’s that he has over
election mobilized the political opponents who time assumed
did not like the demilitarization of the Turkish some traditional
society pressed for by the AKP; the increase of political positions
power by the Anatolian elites and the breaking of the Turkish
of some old taboos such as a more relaxed policy centralized state.
on minorities and the negotiations with Armenia
about open borders and diplomatic relations. In
2009, the far-reaching plans to reform the strict
educational and organizational laws concerning
the Kurdish population led to bitter struggles
with nationalist and leftist-Kemalist opponents.
Further tension has been caused by ongoing
trials against a criminal network of state security
agencies accused of organizing terrorist attacks
and coups. The investigations into a number of
coup attempts planned directly by the army have
led to the arrest of several high-ranking officers
and the interrogation of generals. Intermittently,
the procedures are hamstrung by inaccuracies and
lack of transparency, but still they target people
who seem to be involved in serious crimes. After
the start of the investigations the frightening
numbers of anonymous terrorist attacks in Turkey
substantially decreased.
However, a profound irony of Erdoğan’s fierce
struggle with the classic elites is that he has over
time assumed some traditional political positions
of the Turkish centralized state. This is amply
illustrated in a number of policy fields. First, in
A Very Secular Affair: 13
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 his ways he reprimands media unfriendly to the
government. The prime minister even offended
pro-government columnists prompting a signature
campaign against his attempts to intimidate
independent journalists. Erdoğan also follows the
classical Turkish line of dealing with the PKK.
Despite the ongoing investigations against former
Turkey is an and current members of the army, he meets
extremely regularly with the chief of the general staff. His
reform proposals to alleviate the Kurdish problem
centralized
have been approved by the army’s representatives
state in which
on the National Security Council. At times,
the teacher in
Erdoğan even defended the general staff against
a remote village
fierce attacks from the Kemalist CHP of Deniz
is appointed
Baykal. The prime minister made some promising
by government
gestures toward the Greek Orthodox Patriarchy
agencies in the
in Turkey, but then in 2009 linked any progress
same way as in its status and rights to progress for the Muslim
hazelnut prices minority in Greece—a classic Turkish demand
are fixed by denying the Patriarchy its domestic roots and
bureaucrats causing impasse. In March 2010, when a committee
in Ankara. of the U.S. House of Representatives passed a
resolution on the genocide against the Armenians
of the Ottoman Empire in 1915, Turkey withdrew
the Turkish ambassador from Washington. In an
interview with the BBC, Erdoğan criticized the
U.S. decision and suggested that there were around
100,000 Armenians illegally living and working
in Turkey. “Tomorrow, I may tell these 100,000 to
go back to their country, if it becomes necessary,”
Erdoğan told the BBC.15 By linking a diplomatic
row with possible pressure on foreign citizens in
his country the Erdoğan hinted at a very traditional
pattern of Turkish policy. Fifty years ago, secularist
Turkish governments retaliated ruthlessly against
the established Greek minority in Istanbul when
Turkey and Greece clashed over Cyprus. The
concept of driving out unsolicited foreigners
 BBC, March 17, 2010: http://209.85.229.132/
15
search?q=cache:3Tba8dm-I_EJ:news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8572934.
stm+erdogan+armenia+deportation+bbc&cd=1&hl=de&ct=
clnk&gl=de
14 Transatlantic Academy
appears to be so classical Kemalist that the
nationalist CHP deputy, Canan Aritman, claimed
that Erdoğan had taken up her idea. Her assertion
was justified. In subsequent speeches, the prime
minister implicitly revoked the suggestion. In sum
however, Erdoğan’s statements and policies indicate
that the man from the periphery has arrived at the
centre of the Turkish state.
Once a politician has taken the heights of the prime
minister’s office or those of Cankaya, the legendary
hill of the President’s palace, Turkey looks very
different than from the periphery. Despite its
stunningly high mountains in the south and the
east, the country looks completely flat. Turkey is
an extremely centralized state in which the teacher
in a remote village is appointed by government
agencies in the same way as hazelnut prices are
fixed by bureaucrats in Ankara. Erdoğan, Gül,
and their political associates had resented this
centralist system for a long time when they ruled in
municipalities and had to put up with government
interference. Now, at the helm of the central state
they have learned to appreciate it. After eight
years with the same government, Turkey changes
gradually from the top to the bottom as any country
with such a strongly centralized state would change.
Police cadres have been changed, and it is claimed
that officials close to the Gülen movement occupy
more and more important positions. It is hard
though to substantiate these claims. By the same
token, judges and prosecutors more sympathetic
to the government have moved up. A long overdue
reform plan of the Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors (HSYK) has prompted protests of the
Kemalist establishment. The transformation seems
also to materialize in the investigation against the
state-related insurgency networks.
Given the emphasis on education in the Turkish
state, the YÖK institution, a powerful agency
overlooking universities, is crucial to shape the
minds and skills of future economic cadre and state
officials. President Gül has appointed the president
of YÖK. To be fair, it must be said that everybody
who occupied this position was the target of
criticism since the institution was founded in 1982.
Its main aim is to control the inner workings of the
universities that are supposed to be autonomous.
The current president, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, has been
attacked by critics who argue that YÖK is working
in close cooperation with the government, and
that “YÖK appoints people that are close to the
religious cadre of AKP who are as incompetent in
academia as they are in administrative positions.”16
Such claims are not easy to substantiate but they
reveal the anger prompted by new appointments
and the vast dilemmas of centralizing decisions
on workforce in this way. Presently, new state
universities are created in Turkey that offer plenty
of opportunity to appoint new academic staff close
to the government. Many decisions on human
resources in Turkish institutions are taken by the
president or the government. The general director
of the state television network TRT is likewise
appointed by the president. First, candidates for this
position apply to the Turkish Radio and Television
Supreme Council (RTÜK) for the general
directorship of TRT. Then RTÜK chooses three
candidates out of all applicants and sends the list to
the president who has the final word on the choice.
The current general director of TRT, İbrahim
Şahin, was appointed by Gül in 2007. The president
will also be able to appoint three new judges to the
constitutional court before the end of this year.
Another crucial agency is the Telecommunication
Presidency, which was established in 2005 under
the auspices of the Information Technologies and
Communication Institution. Its main task is to
organize intelligence work, or in the words of a
government website, “to detect communication
 İzge Günal, Burak Gürbüz, and Neşe Özgen, “YÖK’te ne var ne
16
yok?” in Radikal 2, July 5, 2009. See: http://www.radikal.com.
tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalEklerDetay&ArticleID=943693
&Date=23.03.2010&CategoryID=42
through telecommunication, to eavesdrop this
communication, to evaluate the signaling and to
record it…”17 The directors of this institution are
appointed directly by the prime minister and are
required to regularly inform him about the data
they have collected.
In the political struggle, the AKP both suffers and
The outdated
profits from the system that the classical elites had
Turkish
once built to surely control the country. The party
was almost closed down in 2008, many of its reform
constitution was
written under
laws are blocked by the Constitutional Court that
is dominated by the classical establishment. At the the tutelage
same time, the AKP can exercise power through of the army in
the channels available to the prime minster and 1982 and many
the president. Meanwhile, the Turkish constitution amendments
allows only for an odd way of checks and balances. followed this spirit.
The Kemalist ideal went as such: While the
government was elected by the people of Turkey
the presidency, the sacred army, the constitutional
court, and other central institutions should
remain in the hands of the classical elites. The
state bureaucracy, the military and the jurisdiction
were supposed to be the opposition to the prime
minister’s cabinet. This arrangement was shaken
in 2008, when Gül claimed the presidency for
the majority party in parliament. What would
have been an entirely normal step in a Western
democracy was seen as a strike against the old
regime by the classical elites.
The Turkish constitution was written under the
tutelage of the army in 1982 and many amendments
followed this spirit. Erdoğan often talked about the
need of constitutional change but has achieved little
until spring 2010. One important reason was the
elementary rejection of any constitutional change
by the secularist opposition, another cause were
the half-hearted attempts of the AKP to engage the
opposition in the process. In April however, the
AKP presented several constitutional amendments
 See: http://www.tib.gov.tr/kat/baskanlik
17
A Very Secular Affair: 15
The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
 many of which were an improvement. For example,
the package envisaged a change to the intransparent
ways the highest judicial bodies of Turkey were
selected. Most of the amendments were passed by
parliament in early May and were then subjected to
a referendum. However, an important law did not
make it through the national assembly. It was the
The fact that above mentioned Turkish party closure law, which
regions and cities threatened the existence of the AKP in 2008, and
are deprived of was used to shut down the pro-Kurdish DTP in
participation, 2009. Interventions like these fit the way how most
that they have no of Turkey has been governed until this day. Many
money and no amendments planned by the AKP were useful but yet
the package failed to address the most pressing and
clout is the biggest
problematic clauses of the basic law. Until this day,
obstacle for future
the germs of authoritarianism are still entrenched
democratization
in many regulations and the composition of the top
in Turkey. leading institutions. It is remarkable that in a country
so diverse there are very few powers devolved to the
regions. The AKP passed a local government law in
2004 so that Turkish municipalities have, on paper at
least, the same powers as European municipalities.
The dilemma is that towns and districts do not have
the sources of revenue that would enable them to
cope with their responsibilities. Local authority is
further weakened by a division of power between a
democratically elected mayor and a bureaucratically
appointed governor. The poorer Kurdish regions in
the East as well as the rich and potentially powerful
regions in the West, including the secularist
stronghold Izmir ruled by the CHP, do not enjoy the
privilege of having a self-sufficient local government
or strong representatives in the capital to push for
their interests. There is no separation of powers
neither at the top of the state nor in the provinces. In
Ankara, there is no institution that permits regional
authorities to contribute to nation-wide decisions.
The fact that regions and cities are deprived of
participation, that they have no money and no clout is
the biggest obstacle for future democratization
in Turkey.
16 Transatlantic Academy
Some Kemalists and center elite representatives
argue that the AKP pursues a hidden Islamic
agenda. However, the evidence for such claims is
hard to detect. The power struggle of the Turkish
elites is indeed a very secular affair. The rise of
the periphery elite to power is the result of a
long-term sociological change combined with a
serious malfunction of the Turkish political system.
There are strong indications that the old system of
governance is gradually co-opting the AKP. Turkey
was stunned when a local AKP politician said
about the old establishment: “They have blacklisted
everybody whose daughter wears a headscarf. Now
we blacklist them.”18 He received a dressing down
from higher party ranks but how many deputies
are there thinking the same way? If this drift
takes root the periphery elites that had set out to
change the center will be changed themselves by
the rules of the old regime. The AKP government’s
strength and attitude emanates from institutions
that the Kemalists had once built to safeguard
their supremacy. The fear of the classical elites and
the adaption of some periphery politicians to old
rules do not bode well for Turkey’s democracy.
The resulting battles reveal that the basic law of the
republic of the 1980 coup is extremely out of date. It
is not able to cope with the dramatic transformation
of Turkey as it cannot balance the interest
groups competing for power at the center. The
upsetting example of Egypt should warn Turkish
politicians about the toxic stagnation and structural
instability of unreformed states with authoritarian
constitutions. To restore a political equilibrium in a
changing society, Turkey has seen four coup d’etats
in 40 years. But also many secular Turks recognize
that this is no longer an option, popular support for
a coup has sharply diminished. Instead permanent
obstruction of reforms and eventual destabilization
 The AKP deputy of Kahramanmaras Avni Dogan, see Radikal,
18
March 2, 2010, AKP’li Dogan Artik Fisleme sirasi bizde: http://
www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay
&ArticleID=981500&Date=22.02.2010&CategoryID=98
through unending confrontation are an increasing
risk. In this scenario, Turkey’s economic and
political achievements of the last decade will be in
the balance.

The stakes are high, which is why Turkey has to

find a way out of the battle trenches. The country
needs a governing party that is immune against
triumphalism and a cabinet that stands by its
reform plans and prudently seeks consensus to
implement them. It needs a cooperative secular
center left party with a strong popular footing
enabling it to return to power one day not by
army coups but in elections. And Turkey needs
the long delayed political framework for fair
competition. All of this would be ensured through
a profound constitutional reform that would aim at
decentralizing and further democratizing Turkey
at the same time. A new division of power both at
the center and in the provinces is long overdue. The
AKP, the Turkish parliament, and the European
Union in membership negotiations with Turkey
should vigorously push for these reforms.

A Very Secular Affair: 17

The Power Struggle of Turkey’s Elites
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