TRINIDAD GO V.

VICENTE VELEZ CHAVES

G.R. No. 182341

FACTS: On January 29, 1997, Vicente Chaves filed a Complaint against spouses Trinidad
Go and Gonzalo Go before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City for
the removal of clouds on his transfer certificates of title.

The trial court allowed two parties to intervene in the case: a) Alice, who alleged that her
rights to the share of the conjugal partnership are being trampled upon and and; b)
Mega Integrated Agro-Livestock Farms, Inc. which claimed that it had purchased from
Vicente in December 1996 a portion of the property.

After due hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente Chaves. The Go
spouses appealed to the CA Cagayan de Oro. They filed their brief and furnished
Vicente with a copy thereof before the June 12, 2007 deadline. However, all the other
adverse parties moved before the CA to have the appeal dismissed:

a. Mega argued in its Motion to Dismiss[ that Go spouses failed to file their brief on
time. It appears that Go spouses failed to furnish Mega with a copy of their
brief. Their counsel, Atty. Kathryn Dela Serna, claimed inadvertence for the
mistake.
b. Vicente on the other hand, complained about the form of the appellants brief
he received.
c. More than two months after the filing of the appellants brief, Alice still had not
received a copy of said brief

Ruling of the Court of Appeals - Acceding to all the appellees objections and opining
that an utter and flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure is inexcusable, the CA
dismissed the appeal of the Go spouses.

ISSUE: Whether the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal

HELD: Yes. Our rules of procedure are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of
cases and permit the prompt disposition of unmeritorious cases which clog the court
dockets and do little more than waste the courts time. These technical and procedural
rules, however, are intended to ensure, rather than suppress, substantial justice. A
deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as petitioners should be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, rather than lose their
property on mere technicalities. We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation that:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to
speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. In
numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules when to
do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION)
662 SCRA 152
DECEMBER 13, 2011

FACTS: A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the
allegation that respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major
shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines,
Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental
cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by Victor Africa (Son of the
late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing him to account
for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting
rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130. In the
former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party
thereto.

In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former
director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral
examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine
Embassy in London, England. The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts
set forth in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or
establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPIs Class A stock.

As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1st Motion) to adopt the
testimonies of the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr.
Maurice Bane which was denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not
available for cross-examination. The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998
resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999.
Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. In
rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the case for the
purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial
notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however denied by the
SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed by the
petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition
which the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of
the petitioners failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period.

ISSUE: Whether the sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
its interlocutory order in 1998 had become final

HELD: The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
interlocutory order; thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could not
have given it a character of finality so long as the main case remains pending. 42 On
this basis, the petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayans denial of its 3rd motion was
plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.

 In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by
a court order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order,
resolution or decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine
whether the 1998 resolution is final or interlocutory in nature.

A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding
completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however,
merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the
merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved partys remedy is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order
does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated
upon. The term final judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes
of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future
determination.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves
substantial proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not
end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its
application.54 (emphasis supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is
interlocutory. The Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the 1998
Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the
presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of
the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.

An interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is finally
resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the
Sandiganbayans 1998 resolutionwhich merely denied the adoption of the Bane
deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009could not have attained
finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does)
despite the petitioners failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal. 56

ROMEO SAMONTE VS. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC.

G.R. NO. 165544.
OCTOBER 2, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Romeo Samonte is the President and General Manager of S.B.
Commercial Traders, Inc. (SB Traders, for brevity), a corporation engaged in the business
of retailing motor oils and lubricants. It purchases Mobil products on credit basis from one
of Mobil Oil Philippines authorized dealers in Bulacan, herein private respondent S.F.
Naguiat, Inc., with an express agreement to pay within a period of 60 days from date of
delivery.
The private respondent filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against SB
Traders and the petitioner. The private respondent alleged that SB Traders incurred an
obligation to pay the total sum of P1,105,143.27 arising from the sale of Mobil Oil
products. It further averred that SB Traders was merely an alter ego of the petitioner and
that it was operating for his sole benefit. Therefore, the petitioner and SB Traders must be
held solidarily liable for the subject amount.

Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-
trial conference. Hence, trial ensued, the public respondent rendered judgment in favor
of the private respondent. The petitioner failed to appeal the said decision. Thereafter,
on motion by the private respondent, the public respondent ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution

The petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground that the public
respondent made serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating the evidence
presented.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the RTC in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment filed by petitioner

HELD: The CA issued its assailed Decision dismissing the petition. In so ruling, the CA found
that the records showed that petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal from the RTC Decision dated May 25, 2001 causing the said decision to become
final and executory; that when petitioner filed the petition for relief from judgment,
petitioner did not offer any reason for his failure to appeal; there was no assertion that
the RTC decision was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. The CA noted that the petition was not accompanied by an affidavit of
merit showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon and the
facts constituting petitioners good and substantial defense as required by law. It also
agreed with the RTCs observation that petitioner did not assail the proceedings
conducted below, but merely questioned the validity of the dispositive portion of the RTC
decision, thus, the petition for relief from judgment was fatally flawed and should have
been dismissed outright.

The CA added that notwithstanding such defect, the RTC proceeded with hearing the
petition perhaps as an act of grace giving petitioner one last chance to protect his
interest and present evidence in support of his arguments, but petitioner opted to
dispense with the presentation of evidence in support of the said petition; that petitioner
could not claim that he was denied his day in court or claim that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion. The CA then said that once a judgment becomes final,
executory and unappealable, the prevailing party shall not be deprived of the fruits of
victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.

Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a remedy provided by law to
any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate
remedy.6 When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a
motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was
not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The
rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of
the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a
mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to
reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by counsel.

To reiterate, petition for relief is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional
cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy which is not present in
petitioners case. Thus, petitioners resort to a petition for relief under Rule 38 was not
proper and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying the petition for relief from judgment.