SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182645 December 15, 2010
In the Matter of the Heirship (Intestate Estates) of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, Antonio Rodriguez,
Macario J. Rodriguez, Delfin Rodriguez, and Consuelo M. Rodriguez and Settlement of their Estates,
RENE B. PASCUAL, Petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. ROBLES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is the Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Jaime M. Robles (Robles) seeking to set
aside this Court's Decision dated December 4, 2009 which nullified the April 16, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57417 and the February 27, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iriga City, Branch 34 in SP No. IR-1110 and reinstated the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the same
RTC in the same case.
Robles' Motion is based on the following arguments:
A.) THE HEREIN MOVANT JAIME M. ROBLES, BEING A REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST WAS
NEVER IMPLEADED AS RESPONDENT IN THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (WITH PRAYER
TO CLARIFY JUDGMENT) DATED MAY 10, 2008 WHICH WAS FILED BEFORE THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON MAY 13, 2008 - - - BY PETITIONER-RENE B. PASCUAL;
B.) THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER 04, 2009 ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT IN G.R. NO. 182645 WAS RENDERED BASED ON A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MEMORANDUM DATED APRIL 7, 2009, WHOSE COPIES THEREOF WERE NEVER
SERVED UPON THE HEREIN MOVANT;
C.) THE NAME OF HEREIN MOVANT-JAIME M. ROBLES APPEARS AS RESPONDENT IN THE
TITLE OF THIS CASE AS CAPTIONED IN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT'S ASSAILED
DECISION DATED DECEMBER 04, 2009. HOWEVER, HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE
COMMENT NOR ANSWER TO THE PETITION, A CLEAR VIOLATION TO (sic) THE RULES OF
COURT AND TO (sic) THE CONSTITUTION.
D.) THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS PRESENTED THE SALIENT
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD JUSTIFY THE RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON THE
PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL AND THE RULE THAT CERTIORARI IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE
FOR A LOST APPEAL. THE DECISION ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS DATED APRIL 16, 2002 HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY BY WAY
OF AN ENTRY OF JUDGMENT ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT ON NOVEMBER 10,
2005, IN G.R. NO. 168648 ENTITLED JAIME M. ROBLES PETITIONER, VS. HENRY F.
RODRIGUEZ, ET. AL., AS RESPONDENTS.1
Robles prays for the reversal of the presently assailed Decision and the entry of a new judgment requiring him
to file his comment and memorandum to the petition. Robles also seeks the reinstatement of the December
15, 1994 Order of the RTC declaring him as the only forced heir and next of kin of Hermogenes Rodriguez.
For a clearer discussion and resolution of the instant Motion, it bears to restate the relevant antecedent facts
as stated in the assailed Decision of this Court, to wit:
On 14 September 1989, a petition for Declaration of Heirship and Appointment of Administrator and
Settlement of the Estates of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez (Hermogenes) and Antonio Rodriguez (Antonio)
was filed before the RTC [of Iriga City]. The petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No. IR-1110, was filed
by Henry F. Rodriguez (Henry), Certeza F. Rodriguez (Certeza), and Rosalina R. Pellosis (Rosalina). Henry,
Certeza and Rosalina sought that they be declared the sole and surviving heirs of the late Antonio Rodriguez
and Hermogenes Rodriguez. They alleged they are the great grandchildren of Antonio based on the following
genealogy: that Henry and Certeza are the surviving children of Delfin M. Rodriguez (Delfin) who died on 8
February 1981, while Rosalina is the surviving heir of Consuelo M. Rodriguez (Consuelo); that Delfin and
Consuelo were the heirs of Macario J. Rodriguez (Macario) who died in 1976; that Macario and Flora
Rodriguez were the heirs of Antonio; that Flora died without an issue in 1960 leaving Macario as her sole heir.
Henry, Certeza and Rosalina's claim to the intestate estate of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, a former
gobernadorcillo, is based on the following lineage: that Antonio and Hermogenes were brothers and the latter
died in 1910 without issue, leaving Antonio as his sole heir.
At the initial hearing of the petition on 14 November 1989, nobody opposed the petition. Having no oppositors
to the petition, the RTC entered a general default against the whole world, except the Republic of the
Philippines. After presentation of proof of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, the RTC allowed Henry,
Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support of the petition. After evaluating the
evidence presented, the commissioner found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the
direct line of Antonio and required them to present additional evidence to establish the alleged fraternal
relationship between Antonio and Hermogenes.
Taking its cue from the report of the commissioner, the RTC rendered a Partial Judgment dated 31 May 1990
declaring Henry, Certeza and Rosalina as heirs in the direct descending line of the late Antonio, Macario and
Delfin and appointing Henry as regular administrator of the estate of the decedents Delfin, Macario and
Antonio, and as special administrator to the estate of Hermogenes.
Henry filed the bond and took his oath of office as administrator of the subject estates.
Subsequently, six groups of oppositors entered their appearances either as a group or individually, namely:
(1) The group of Judith Rodriguez;
(2) The group of Carola Favila-Santos;
(3) Jaime Robles;
(4) Florencia Rodriguez;
(5) Victoria Rodriguez; and
(6) Bienvenido Rodriguez
Only the group of Judith Rodriguez had an opposing claim to the estate of Antonio, while the rest filed
opposing claims to the estate of Hermogenes.
In his opposition, Jamie Robles likewise prayed that he be appointed regular administrator to the estates of
Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion of land included in the estate of Hermogenes
covered by OCT No. 12022 located at Barrio Manggahan, Pasig, Rizal.
After hearing on Jamie Robles' application for appointment as regular administrator, the RTC issued an Order
dated 15 December 1994 declaring him to be an heir and next of kin of decedent Hermogenes and thus
qualified to be the administrator. Accordingly, the said order appointed Jaime Robles as regular administrator
of the entire estate of Hermogenes and allowed him to sell the property covered by OCT No. 12022 located at
Barrio Manggahan, Pasig Rizal.
On 27 April 1999, the RTC rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-Santos and her co-heirs as heirs in the
direct descending line of Hermogenes and reiterated its ruling in the partial judgment declaring Henry, Certeza
and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. The decision dismissed the oppositions of Jamie Robles, Victoria Rodriguez,
Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez, for their failure to substantiate their respective claims of
heirship to the late Hermogenes.
On 13 August 1999, the RTC issued an Amended Decision reversing its earlier finding as to Carola Favila-
Santos. This time, the RTC found Carola Favila-Santos and company not related to the decedent
Hermogenes. The RTC further decreed that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the heirs of Hermogenes. The
RTC also re-affirmed its earlier verdict dismissing the oppositions of Jaime Robles, Victoria Rodriguez,
Bienvenido Rodriguez, and Florencia Rodriguez.2
Robles then appealed the August 13, 1999 Decision of the RTC by filing a Notice of Appeal, but the same was
denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 22, 1999 for Robles' failure to file a record on appeal.
Robles questioned the denial of his appeal by filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
In a Resolution dated February 14, 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for consideration and
adjudication on the merits on the ground that the said court has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court and that
no special and important reason was cited for this Court to take cognizance of the said case in the first
instance.
On April 16, 2002, the CA rendered judgment annulling the August 13, 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC.
Henry Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and his group moved for the reconsideration of the CA decision, but the same
was denied in a Resolution dated January 21, 2004. Rodriguez and his co-respondents did not appeal the
Decision and Resolution of the CA.
On the other hand, Robles filed an appeal with this Court assailing a portion of the CA Decision. On August 1,
2005, this Court issued a Resolution denying the petition of Robles and, on November 10, 2005, the said
Resolution became final and executory.
On May 13, 2008, the instant petition was filed.
On December 4, 2009, this Court rendered the presently assailed Decision which held as follows:
In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any
decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. x
xx
xxxx
The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the
appeal period expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, x x x
xxxx
In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended Decision. On 12
October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of filing a record on appeal. The
RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his failure to file a record on appeal as required by
the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999
Amended Decision of the RTC lapsed into finality. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to
entertain the case knowing that Jaime Robles' appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality.
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by
law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has
the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. x x
x Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any
appeal. There are exceptions to this rule, unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that
would justify the relaxation of said rule.3
The basic contention of Robles in the instant Motion is that he is a party-in-interest who stands to be adversely
affected or injured or benefited by the judgment in the instant case. He also argues that the failure of service
upon him of a copy of the instant petition as well as petitioner's memorandum, and the fact that he was not
required or given the opportunity to file his comment or answer to the said petition nor served with any order,
resolution or any other process issued by this Court in the instant petition, is a clear denial of his right to due
process.
In his Comment and Opposition, petitioner contends that Robles has no legal standing to participate in the
instant petition. Petitioner argues that in an original action for certiorari, the parties are the aggrieved party
against the lower court and the prevailing party. Petitioner claims, however, that Robles was never impleaded,
because he was not the prevailing party in the assailed Decision of the CA as well as the questioned Order of
the RTC. Petitioner further avers that the inclusion of Robles' name as respondent in the caption of the instant
petition was a result of a clerical error which was probably brought about by numerous cases filed with this
Court involving Robles and the subject estate.
The Court finds partial merit in the instant motion.
Petitioner admitted in his Comment and Opposition to Robles' Motion that in the instant petition he filed, only
the CA and the RTC were impleaded as respondents.
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. When the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of
a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join
as private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or respondents, the person or
persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the duty of such private
respondents to appear and defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public
respondent or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such proceedings in
favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or respondents.
Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the petition is pending, the public respondents shall
not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is elevated to a
higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. However,
unless otherwise specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein.4
In Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v. Dela Cruz,5 this Court ruled as follows:
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and
who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The
presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear
and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit
or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.6
In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party. He stands to be injured or benefited by the outcome of
the petition. He has an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such
that the courts cannot proceed without his presence.7 Moreover, as provided for under the aforequoted
Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision,
considering that he would benefit from such judgment. As such, his non-inclusion would render the petition for
certiorari defective.8
Petitioner, thus, committed a mistake in failing to implead Robles as respondent.
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action.9 The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.10 Parties may be added by order
of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are
just.11 If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may
dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.12
Based on the foregoing, and in the interest of fair play, the Court finds it proper to set aside its decision and
allow Robles to file his comment on the petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 4, 2009
is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ORDERED to furnish Robles a copy of his petition for certiorari within a period of
five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution. Thereafter, Robles is DIRECTED to file his comment on the
petition within a period of ten (10) days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse1 to the Court from the Decision2 dated November 23, 2011and Order3 dated February
16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 (RTC) in RTC Case No. 11-13833 which
dismissed, on the ground of improper remedy, petitioner A.L. Ang Network, Inc.'s (petitioner) petition for
certiorari from the Decision4 dated June 10, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City, Branch
4 (MTCC) in Civil Case No. SCC-1436, a small claims case for sum of money against respondent Emma
Mondejar (respondent).
The Facts
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint5 for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases6 before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of 23,111.71 which
represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.7
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor from the
homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and occupies Lot 8, Block 3
of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005, respondent and her family consumed a total
of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon application of the agreed rate of 113.00 for every 10 cu.
m. of water, plus an additional charge of 11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to
28,580.09.8 However, respondent only paid the amount of 5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of 23,111.71
which was left unpaid despite petitioners repeated demands.9
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid petitioner
the agreed monthly flat rate of 75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding their agreement that the
same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners, petitioner unilaterally charged her
unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40 cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of
water a day) far above the average daily water consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also
questioned the propriety and/or basis of the aforesaid 23,111.71 claim.10
In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondents water line for not paying the adjusted water charges since
March 2003 up to August 2005.11
The MTCC Ruling
On June 10, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision12 holding that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of
Public Convenience (CPC)13 by the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, then,
it can only charge respondent the agreed flat rate of 75.00 per month prior thereto or the sum of 1,050.00
for the period June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003. Thus, given that respondent had made total payments
equivalent to 1,685.99 for the same period, she should be considered to have fully paid petitioner.14
The MTCC disregarded petitioners reliance on the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Boards (HLURB)
Decision15dated August 17, 2000 in HLURB Case No. REM C6-00-001 entitled Nollie B. Apura, et al. v. Dona
Carmen I Subdivision, et al., as source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates for water
consumed from June 1, 2002 to August 7, 2003 in the absence of proof (a) that petitioner complied with the
directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the
rates to be charged, and (b) that the HLURB approved of the same.16
Moreover, the MTCC noted that petitioner failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it actually
began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the
terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondents
obligation.17 Accordingly, it ruled that the earlier agreed rate of 75.00 per month should still be the basis for
respondents water consumption charges for the period August 8, 2003 to September 30, 2005.18 Based on
petitioners computation, respondent had only paid 300.00 of her 1,500.00 obligation for said period. Thus,
it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the balance thereof, equivalent to 1,200.00 with legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from date of receipt of the extrajudicial demand on October 14, 2010 until fully paid.19
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari20 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in finding that it (petitioner) failed to establish with
certainty respondents obligation, and in not ordering the latter to pay the full amount sought to be collected.
The RTC Ruling
On November 23, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision21 dismissing the petition for certiorari, finding that the said
petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided under
Section 2322of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that it cannot
supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to pay petitioner a bigger sum
than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration23 but was denied in an Order24 dated February 16, 2012, hence, the
instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners recourse under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:
SEC. 23. Decision. After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the
facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of
Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal
is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution.25 Nevertheless, the
proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available
remedy,26 does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. This general rule has been enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance
Corporation,27 wherein it was held that:
In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law." In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co., the Court ruled:
x x x Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari may
only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law,"
this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient
ground to prevent a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an
adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy not the mere absence of
all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the
propriety of certiorari.
This ruling was reiterated in Conti v. Court of Appeals:
Truly, an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the Rules is an absence of
an appeal nor any "plain, speedy and adequate remedy" in the ordinary course of law, one which has been so
defined as a "remedy which (would) equally (be) beneficial, speedy and sufficient not merely a remedy which
at some time in the future will bring about a revival of the judgment x x x complained of in the certiorari
proceeding, but a remedy which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment
and the acts of the inferior court or tribunal" concerned. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In this relation, it may not be amiss to placate the RTCs apprehension that respondents recourse before it
(was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of [small claims cases], because it asks [the court] to
supplant the decision of the lower [c]ourt with another decision directing the private respondent to pay the
petitioner a bigger sum than what has been awarded."28 Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an
original action29 designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is
therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC,
in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely
abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the
controversy.30
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to
assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTCs ruling.
Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the
RTC).1wphi1 To be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari.31Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari
against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.32 This procedure is also in consonance with
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.33
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,34 certiorari
petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This
petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously
mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded
thereto for its proper disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 23, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 16, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 45 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
RTC Case No. 11-13833 is hereby REINSTATED and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014
JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO, Petitioners,
vs.
JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the May 6, 2011
Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 03896-MIN, which affirmed the September 27,
2010,2 October 7, 20103 and November 9, 20104 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 14
(RTC-Br. 14), in Civil Case No. 33,551-2010, an action for Cancellation of Lien. It is entitled "JEWM Agro-
Industrial Corporation v. The Registry of Deeds for the City of Davao. Sheriff Robert Medialdea. John & Jane
Does. and all persons acting under their directions.
This controversy stemmed from various cases of collection for sum of money filed against So Keng Kok, the
owner of various properties including two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 292597 and 292600
(subject properties), which were attached by various creditors including the petitioners in this case. As a result,
the levies were annotated on the back of the said titles.
Petitioners Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo (Spouses Crisologo) were the plaintiffs in two (2)
collection cases before RTC, Branch 15, Davao City (RTC-Br. 15), docketed as Civil Case Nos. 26,810-98 and
26,811-98, against Robert Limso, So Keng Koc, et al. Respondent JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation (JEWM)
was the successor-in-interest of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in another collection case before RTC, Branch 8,
Davao City (RTC-Br. 8), docketed as Civil Case No. 26,513-98, against the same defendants.
On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8 rendered its decision based on a compromise agreement, dated October 15,
1998, between the parties wherein the defendants in said case were directed to transfer the subject properties
in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold
the same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. Thereafter, TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676 were eventually issued in the
name of JEWM, both of which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of lis pendens in
connection with the other pending cases filed against So Keng Kok.
A year thereafter, Spouses Crisologo prevailed in the separate collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15 against
Robert Lim So and So Keng Koc (defendants). Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants were ordered to
solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. When this decision attained finality, they moved for execution. On June
15, 2010, a writ was eventually issued.
Acting on the same, the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of sale scheduling an auction on August 26, 2010. The
notice of sale included, among others, the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now,
in the name of JEWM.
In the same proceedings, JEWM immediately filed its Affidavit of Third Party Claim and the Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelam. It prayed for the exclusion of the subject properties from the notice of sale. In an order, dated
August 26, 2010, however, the motion was denied. In turn, the Spouses Crisologo posted a bond in order to
proceed with the execution.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction before RTC-Br. 14, docketed as Civil Case No. 33,551-2010. It prayed for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the public sale of the subject properties covered in the writ of
execution issued pursuant to the ruling of RTC-Br. 15; the cancellation of all the annotations on the back of the
pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. "The Register of
Deeds of Davao City, Sheriff Robert Medialdea, John and Jane Does and all persons acting under their
direction" were impleaded as defendants.
At the scheduled hearing before RTC-Br. 14 on September 22, 2010, Spouses Crisologos counsel appeared
and filed in open court their Very Urgent Manifestation questioning the authority of the said court to restrain the
execution proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses Crisologo were not
parties in the case.
On September 24, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed an Omnibus Motion praying for the denial of the application
for writ or preliminary injuction filed by JEWM and asking for their recognition as parties. No motion to
intervene was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it was unnecessary since they were
already the John and Jane Does named in the complaint.
In the Order, dated September 27, 2010, RTC-Br. 14 denied Spouses Crisologos Omnibus Motion and
granted JEWMs application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 1, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion before RTC-Br. 14 praying for
reconsideration and the setting aside of its September 27, 2010 Order. This was denied in the RTC Br.-14s
October 7, 2010 Order for lack of legal standing in court considering that their counsel failed to make the
written formal notice of appearance. The copy of this order was received by Spouses Crisologo on October 22,
2010. It must be noted, however, that on October 27, 2010, they received another order, likewise dated
October 7, 2010, giving JEWM time to comment on their Very Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on October 1,
2010. In its Order, dated November 9, 2010, however, RTC-Br. 14 again denied the Very Urgent Motion
previously filed by Spouses Crisologo.
On November 12, 2010, JEWM moved to declare the "defendants" in default which was granted in an order
given in open court on November 19, 2010.
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Very Urgent Manifestation, dated November 30, 2010, arguing that they
could not be deemed as defaulting parties because they were not referred to in the pertinent motion and order
of default.
On November 19, 2010, Spouses Crisologo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari5 under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the RTC-Br. 14 orders, dated September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9,
2010, all of which denied their motion to be recognized as parties. They also prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
In its Resolution, dated January 6, 2011, the CA denied the application for a TRO, but directed Spouses
Crisologo to amend their petition. On January 19, 2011, the Spouses Crisologo filed their Amended
Petition6 with prayers for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the annulment of the
aforementioned orders of RTC Br. 14, and the issuance of an order dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in favor of JEWM.
Pending disposition of the Amended Petition by the CA, JEWM filed a motion on December 6, 2010 before
RTC-Br. 14 asking for the resolution of the case on the merits.
On January 10, 2011, RTC-Br. 14 ruled in favor of JEWM, with the dispositive portion of its Decision7 stating
as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:
1. the preliminary writ of injunction issued on October 5, 2010 is hereby made permanent;
2. directing herein defendant Registry of Deeds of Davao City where the subject lands are located,
to cancel all existing liens and encumbrances on TCT No. T-325675 and T-325676 registered in
the name of the plaintiff, and pay the
3. cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Spouses Crisologo then filed their Omnibus Motion Ex Abudanti ad Cautelam, asking RTC- Br. 14 to
reconsider the above decision. Because no motion for intervention was filed prior to the rendition of the
judgment, a certificate, dated March 17, 2011, was issued declaring the January 10, 2011 decision final and
executory.
On May 6, 2011, the CA eventually denied the Amended Petition filed by Spouses Crisologo for lack of merit.
It ruled that the writ of preliminary injunction subject of the petition was already fait accompli and, as such, the
issue of grave abuse of discretion attributed to RTC-Br. 14 in granting the relief had become moot and
academic. It further held that the failure of Spouses Crisologo to file their motion to intervene under Rule 19
rendered Rule 65 inapplicable as a vehicle to ventilate their supposed right in the case.9
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the action for Cancellation of Annotations may
proceed even without notice to and impleading the party/ies who caused the annotations, in clear
contravention of the rule on joinder of parties and basic due process.
II. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a very constrictive interpretation of the rules in holding
that a motion to intervene is the only way an otherwise real party in interest could participate.
III. The Court of Appeals erred in denying our application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issues raised by petitioners before it [had] been
mooted by the January 10, 2011 decision of RTC Branch 14.10
Spouses Crisologo submit as error the CA affirmation of the RTC- Br. 14 ruling that the action for cancellation
may proceed without them being impleaded. They allege deprivation of their right to due process when they
were not impleaded in the case before RTC-Br. 14 despite the claim that they stand, as indispensable parties,
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the action for the cancellation of annotations covering the subject
properties. They cite Gonzales v. Judge Bersamin,11 among others, as authority. In that case, the Court ruled
that pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, notice must be given to all parties in
interest before the court may hear and determine the petition for the cancellation of annotations on the
certificates of title.
The Spouses Crisologo also question the statement of the CA that their failure to file the motion to intervene
under Rule 19 before RTC-Br. 14 barred their participation in the cancellation proceedings. They put emphasis
on the courts duty to, at the very least, suspend the proceedings before it and have such indispensable
parties impleaded.
As to the ruling on the denial of their application for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction,
Spouses Crisologo claim that their adverse interest, evinced by the annotations at the back of the certificates
of title, warranted the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against JEWMs attempt to cancel the
said annotations in violation of their fundamental right to due process.
Lastly, Spouses Crisologo cast doubt on the CA ruling that the issues presented in their petition were mooted
by the RTC-Br. 14 Decision, dated January 10, 2011. Having been rendered without impleading indispensable
parties, the said decision was void and could not have mooted their petition.
In their Comment,12 JEWM asserts that Spouses Crisologos failure to file a motion to intervene, pleadings-in-
intervention, appeal or annulment of judgment, which were plain, speedy and adequate remedies then
available to them, rendered recourse to Rule 65 as improper; that Spouses Crisologo lacked the legal standing
to file a Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14; and that
Spouses Crisologo were not indispensable parties since their rights over the properties had been rendered
ineffective by the final and executory October 19, 1998 Decision of RTC-Br. 8 which disposed unconditionally
and absolutely the subject properties in favor of its predecessor-in-interest.
JEWM further argues that, on the assumption that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 applies, no notice to Spouses
Crisologo was required because they were not real parties-in-interest in the case before RTC-Br. 14, or even if
they were, their non-participation in the proceedings was because of their failure to properly intervene
pursuant to Rule 19; and, lastly, that the case before RTC-Br. 14 became final and executory because
Spouses Crisologos did not perfect an appeal therefrom, thus, rendering the issues in the CA petition moot
and academic.
In their Reply,13 Spouses Crisologo restate the applicability of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to the effect that
any cancellation of annotation of certificates of title must be carried out by giving notice to all parties-in-
interest. This they forward despite their recognition of the mootness of their assertion over the subject
properties, to wit:
Again, we respect JAICs position that "the claims of subsequent attaching creditors (including petitioners)
have been rendered moot and academic, and hence the entries in favor of said creditors have no more legal
basis and therefore must be cancelled." But we likewise at least ask a modicum of respect by at least being
notified and heard.14
The Ruling of the Court
The crux of this controversy is whether the CA correctly ruled that RTC-Br. 14 acted without grave abuse of
discretion in failing to recognize Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of
lien.
In this respect, the Court agrees with Spouses Crisologo.
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons
considered as indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D.
No. 1529,15 to wit:
Section 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. -No erasure, alteration or amendment shall be made
upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of
Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the
ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant inchoate
appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon the
certificates have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or
memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; x x x or upon any other reasonable ground; and the
court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or
cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any
other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper.
In Southwestern University v. Laurente,16 the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an
encumbrance cannot be ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself. It
would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose
liens were annotated at the back of a certificate of title.
Here, undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676. Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be benefited or injured by any
order relative to the cancellation of annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as
indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the case for cancellation, being one of the many lien
holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.17
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all
possible issues, not only between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be
affected by the judgment.18
In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable
parties, failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited rule.
In fact, in Sps. Crisologo v. Judge George E. Omelio,19 a related administrative case, the Court found the trial
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law when it disregarded the claims of Spouses Crisologo to participate.
In part, the Court stated:
This is not the first time Judge Omelio has rendered a decision affecting third parties interests, without even
notifying the indispensable parties. In the first disputed case, JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Register of
Deeds, Sheriff Medialdea, John & Jane Does and all persons acting under their directions, Judge Omelio
failed to cause the service of proper summons upon the John and Jane Does impleaded in the complaint.
Even when Sps. Crisologo voluntarily appeared in court to be recognized as the John and Jane Does, Judge
Omelio refused to acknowledge their appearance and ordered the striking out of Sps. Crisologos' pleadings.
For this reason, the Investigating Justice recommended admonishing Judge Omelio for failing to recognize the
Sps.Crisologo as indispensable parties in that case.
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, the cancellation of the annotation of the sale without notifying the buyers, Sps. Crisologo, is a violation
of the latters right to due process. Since this is the second time that Judge Omelio has issued an order which
fails to notify or summon the indispensable parties, we find Judge Omelio guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a stiffer penalty in the future.
xxx
WHEREFORE, We find Judge George E. Omelio GUILTY of four counts of the serious charge of gross
ignorance of the law for the following acts: (a) refusing to recognize Spouses Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette
B. Crisologo as indispensable parties; in violation of the latter's right to due process. Accordingly, we
impose upon Judge George E. Omelio the penalty of fine of Forty Thousand Pesos (40,000.00), with a
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.20
The trial court should have exercised prudence in denying Spouses Crisologos pleas to be recognized as
indispensable parties. In the words of the Court, "Judge Omelio should be penalized for failing to recognize
Sps. Crisologo as indispensable parties and for requiring them to file a motion to intervene, considering that a
simple perusal of the certificates of title would show Sps. Crisologos adverse rights because their liens are
annotated at the back of the titles."21
This manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
In State Prosecutors II Comilang and Lagman v. Judge Medel Belen,22 the Court held as inexcusable abuse of
authority the trial judges "obstinate disregard of basic and established rule of law or procedure." Such level of
ignorance is not a mere error of judgment. It amounts to "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,"23 or in essence, grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Needless to say, judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence
requires no less.24
Despite the clear existence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14, JEWM asserts technical
grounds on why the CA did not err in dismissing the petition via Rule 65. It states that:
a) The Crisologos could have used other available remedies such as intervention under Rule 19,
an appeal of the judgment, or even an annulment of judgment, which are, by all means, plain,
speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law;
b) The Crisologos lack legal standing to file the Rule 65 petition since they were not impleaded in
the Branch 14 case.
The rule is that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, no adequate recourse, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule
65.
Although Intervention under Rule 19 could have been availed of, failing to use this remedy should not
prejudice Spouses Crisologo. It is the duty of RTC-Br. 14, following the rule on joinder of indispensable
parties, to simply recognize them, with or without any motion to intervene. Through a cursory reading of the
titles, the Court would have noticed the adverse rights of Spouses Crisologo over the cancellation of any
annotations in the subject TCTs.
Neither will appeal prove adequate as a remedy since only the original parties to an action can appeal.25 Here,
Spouses Crisologo were never impleaded. Hence, they could not have utilized appeal as they never
possessed the required legal standing in the first place.
And even if the Court assumes the existence of the legal standing to appeal, it must be remembered that the
questioned orders were interlocutory in character and, as such, Spouses Crisologo would have to wait, for the
review by appeal, until the rendition of the judgment on the merits, which at that time may not be coming as
speedy as practicable. While waiting, Spouses Crisologo would have to endure the denial of their right, as
indispensable parties, to participate in a proceeding in which their indispensability was obvious. Indeed,
appeal cannot constitute an adequate, speedy and plain remedy.
The same is also true if recourse to Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 is made since this remedy
presupposes a final judgment already rendered by a trial court.
At any rate, the remedy against an interlocutory order, not subject of an appeal, is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.26
This takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously discussed, RTC-Br. 14 acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not recognizing Spouses Crisologo as indispensable parties to the pertinent action.
Based on the above, recourse to the CA via Rule 65 would have already been proper, except for one last
issue, that is, Spouses Crisologos legal standing to file the same. JEWM cites DBP v. COA27 where the Court
held:
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65, however, is not available to any person who feels injured by the
decision of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions. The person aggrieved
under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a
party in the proceedings before the court a quo, or in this case before the COA. To hold otherwise would open
the courts to numerous and endless litigations.
Under normal circumstances, JEWM would be correct in their averment that the lack of legal standing on the
part of Spouses Crisologo in the case before RTC-Br. 14 prevents the latters recourse via Rule 65.
This case, however, is an exception. In many instances, the Court has ruled that technical rules of procedures
should be used to promote, not frustrate the cause of justice. Rules of procedure are tools designed not to
thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict and rigid application may, for good and
deserving reasons, have to give way to, and be subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice
in the normal cause.28
Be it noted that the effect of their non-participation as indispensable parties is to preclude the judgment, orders
and the proceedings from attaining finality. Time and again, the Court has ruled that the absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not
only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Consequently, the proceedings before RTC-Br. 14
were null and void including the assailed orders, which may be "ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head."29
To turn a blind eye to the said nullity and, in turn, rule as improper the recourse to Rule 65 by the lack of legal
standing is to prolong the denial of due process to the persons whose interests are indispensible to the final
disposition of the case. It will only result in a protracted litigation as Spouses Crisologo will be forced to rely on
a petition for the annulment of judgment before the CA (as the last remaining remedy), which may again reach
this Court.1wphi1 To prevent multiplicity of suits and to expedite the swift administration of justice, the CA
should have applied liberality by striking down the assailed orders despite the lack of legal standing on the part
of Spouses Crisologo to file the Rule 65 petition before it. Besides, this lacking requirement, of which Spouses
Crisologo were not even at fault, is precisely the reason why this controversy arose.
All told, the CA erred in dismissing the amended petition filed before it and in not finding grave abuse of
discretion on the part of RTC-Br. 14.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals is NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. The September 27, 2010, October 7, 2010 and November 9, 2010 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, are likewise NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 33,551-2010 is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. The respondent is ordered to implead all parties
whose annotations appear at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 325675 and 325676.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary
objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case
No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that
the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile
respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on the matter of
bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been
placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Benjamin
Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was
later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination. 10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail
,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as
to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have made a
determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of
right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an
application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with plunder, "the
maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He
anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that he is over seventy
(70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against
Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be
found guilty of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk and his
physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors that are
considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to
fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile is not
strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enriles motion for
reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may
be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i)
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at it is the
duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception
and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile,
if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof
showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable
penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional
right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on
the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes.[[21] The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and
the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.23
2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or
is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under
the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has
been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these
courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
 (b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.
3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal
cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within
the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be
allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing
with notice to the Prosecution.31The indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in
Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et
al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense,
in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over
its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits of three
policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court possessed at the time it
issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who
probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled
as the accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at
the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these
guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary
hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the
discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial
matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in
Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail
has only argued that
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is only
reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or
absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution deemed worthy. The
relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty
provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated
in the accuseds favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with
reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be
made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has
the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to
the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his
being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his
utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced
a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of
his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private
lives, his long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the
UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; (Annexes
1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery disease
; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis
intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent
ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant risk s
to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications,
including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease,
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of
ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven
allergen exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43 guilty.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required special Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility because of the health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies ran as follows: Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari ,
JUSTICE MARTIRES: connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
National Police Hospital? virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is
DR. SERVILLANO: exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court
No, Your Honor. GRANTS the petition for certiorari ; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the
JUSTICE MARTIRES: Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-
? CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond of 1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
PSUPT. JOCSON: immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other
No, Your Honor. lawful cause.
JUSTICE MARTIRES: No pronouncement on costs of suit.
Why? SO ORDERED.
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any
fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the patient
worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela
Rama v. The Peoples Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:
x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,
independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to
exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47
xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner "is
actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular
pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioners
previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from
quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner
to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently
to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against
Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released
on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be
injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the Peoples Court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner on bail.48
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical
condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either
admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider
in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 177130 June 7, 2011
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA in his official capacity as THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JENNY LIND R. ALDECOA-DELORINO, Presiding Judge, Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, ASSOCIATION OF PETROCHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, representing JG
Summit Petrochemical Corporation, et al., Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Then Executive Secretary petitioner Eduardo Ermita assailed via certiorari the writ of preliminary injunction
granted by public respondent Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa Delorino, then Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 137, by Omnibus Order1 dated February 6, 2007 in favor of private
respondent Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP or private respondent)
denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and enjoining the government from implementing Executive Order No.
486.
Executive Order No. 486 (E.O. 486) issued on January 12, 2006 by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
reads:
LIFTING THE SUSPENSION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEDULE ON
PETROCHEMICALS AND CERTAIN PLASTIC PRODUCTS UNDER THE COMMON EFFECTIVE
PREFERENTIAL TARIFF (CEPT) SCHEME FOR THE ASEAN FREE TRADE AREA (AFTA)
WHEREAS, Executive Order 234 dated 27 April 2000, which implemented the 2000-2003 Philippine schedule
of tariff reduction of products transferred from the Temporary Exclusion List and the Sensitive List to the
Inclusion List of the accelerated CEPT Scheme for the AFTA, provided that the CEPT rates on petrochemicals
and certain plastic products will be reduced to 5% on 01 January 2003;
WHEREAS, Executive Order 161 issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the suspension of the application of
the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain products in 2003 and 2004 only;
WHEREAS, the government recognizes the need to provide an enabling environment for the naphtha cracker
plant to attain international competitiveness;
WHEREAS, the NEDA Board approved the lifting of the suspension of the aforesaid tariff reduction schedule
on petrochemicals and certain plastic products and the reversion of the CEPT rates on these products to EO
161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
pursuant to the powers vested in me under Section 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978 (Presidential
Decree No. 1464), as amended, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex "A" (Articles Granted Concession under the CEPT
Scheme for the AFTA) hereof, as classified under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978, as
amended, shall be subject to the ASEAN CEPT rates in accordance with the schedule indicated in Column 4
of Annex "A". The ASEAN CEPT rates so indicated shall be accorded to imports coming from ASEAN Member
States applying CEPT concession to the same product pursuant to Article 4 of the CEPT Agreement and Its
Interpretative Notes.
SECTION 2. In the event that any subsequent change is made in the basic (MFN) Philippine rate of duty on
any of the article listed in Annex "A" to a rate lower than the rate prescribed in Column 4 of Annex ""A, such
article shall automatically be accorded the corresponding reduced duty.
SECTION 3. From the date of effectivity of this Executive Order, all articles listed in Annex "A" entered into or
withdrawn from warehouses in the Philippines for consumption shall be imposed the rates of duty therein
prescribed subject to qualification under the Rules of Origin as provided for in the Agreement on the CEPT
Scheme for the AFTA signed on 28 January 1992.
SECTION 4. The Department of Trade and Industry, in coordination with National Economic and Development
Authority, the Department of Finance, the Tariff Commission and the Bureau of Customs, shall promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations that will govern the reversion of the CEPT rates on petrochemicals and
plastic products to EO 161 (s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation.
SECTION 5. All presidential issuances, administrative rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are
contrary to or inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 6. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately following its complete publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of January in the year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Six. (emphasis
supplied)
The above issuance in effect reduces protective tariff rates from 10% to 5% on the entry of inexpensive
products, particularly plastic food packaging, from ASEAN Free Trade (AFTA) member countries into the
Philippines.
APMP, an organization composed of manufacturers of petrochemical and resin products, opposed the
implementation of E.O. 486. Contending that the E.O. would affect local manufacturers, it filed a petition
before the RTC of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 06-2004, seeking the declaration of its
unconstitutionality for being violative of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6647 which prohibits the President from
increasing or reducing taxes while Congress is in session2 and Sec. 402(e)3 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It
thereupon prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation.
Petitioner contends that public respondent gravely abused her discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the
petition for prohibition and granting the writ of preliminary injunction as the exercise of the quasi-legislative
functions of the President cannot be enjoined. He avers that writs of prohibition lie only against those persons
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
By granting injunctive relief, petitioner contends that public respondent effectively preempted the trial of and
pre-judged the case, given that what private respondent seeks is to stop the implementation of E.O. 486.
Further, petitioner contends that the grant of injunctive relief was not supported by fact and law, for what
APMP sought to be protected was "future economic benefits" which may be affected by the implementation of
the E.O. benefits which its members have no right to since protective tariff rates are government privileges
wherein no one can claim any vested right to.
On the merits, petitioner maintains that E.O. 486 is not constitutionally infirm, it having been issued under the
authority of Secs. 401 and 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code which set no limitations on the Presidents
power to adjust tariff rate and serve as the governments response to its AFTA commitment on Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).
Since it is only the Omnibus Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and granting a writ of preliminary injunction
that is being assailed, the Court will not pass on the constitutionality of E.O. 486 which is still pending before
the trial court.
Private respondent prays in its Comment for the denial of the present petition, alleging that, among other
things, the petition is premature as petitioner failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Omnibus Order of public respondent, and maintaining the propriety of the remedy of prohibition which it filed to
assail the E.O.
The issues then are:
1. Whether public respondent erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition and not
granting petitioners motion to dismiss the petition;
2. Whether a motion for reconsideration should have been filed by petitioner; and
3. Whether public respondent erred in granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of APMP.
On the issue of jurisdiction
Rule 65, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (emphasis supplied)
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor4 expounds on prohibition as a remedy to assail executive
issuances:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to
desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial
functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its
cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the
principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an
action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation
that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction"
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
(emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, it is settled that what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.5 A perusal of the petition of
APMP before the trial court readily shows that it is not a mere petition for prohibition with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. For it is also one for certiorari as it specifically alleges that E.O. 486
is invalid for being unconstitutional, it having been issued in contravention of Sec. 4 of R.A. 6647 and Sec.
402(e) of the Tariff and Customs Code, hence, its enforcement should be enjoined and petitioner prohibited
from implementing the same.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.6 Thus, even if the petition was
denominated as one for prohibition, public respondent did not err in treating it also as one for certiorari and
taking cognizance of the controversy.
On the propriety of filing a motion
for reconsideration
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before
the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.7 This rule, however, is not
without exceptions.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity,
as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have
been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where
the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex
parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.8 (emphasis supplied)
The present case involves the constitutionality and implementation of an executive issuance involving tariff
rates and, as alleged by petitioner, the Governments commitments under the AFTA. Clearly, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with following exceptions (c ) and (i) in the above enumeration in
Siok Ping Tang.
On the grant of the writ of
preliminary injunction
APMP alleges that it is composed of manufacturers of petrochemical products and that the implementation of
the assailed E.O. reducing tariff rates on certain petroleum-based products will result in the local market being
flooded with lower-priced imported goods which will, consequently, adversely affect their sales profits. In
granting the assailed writ, public respondent held that, based on the initial evidence presented, the APMP
stands to lose "substantial revenues" and some of its members "may eventually have to close up or stop
ongoing works on their Naphtha Cracker plants" if E.O. 486 is implemented. Public respondent thus ruled that
the APMP was entitled to the writ as it has a "valuable stake in the petrochemical industry" and the
enforcement of E.O. 486 will adversely affect its members; and that petitioner violated APMPs right on the
strength of an invalid executive issuance.
Public respondent noted that the Southern Cross case cited by petitioner which ruled that no court is allowed
to grant injunction to restrain the collection of taxes is inapplicable in the present case, since restraining the
implementation of E.O. 486 will not deprive the Government of revenues; instead, it will result in more
revenues as the proposed reduction of rates will be enjoined.
Public respondent thus concluded that there is sufficient basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of APMP.
It is well to emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the
sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof.9 In the present case, however, where it is the
Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance which enjoys the presumption of validity,
such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution. Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,10 enlightens:
In Social Security Commission v. Judge Bayona, we ruled that a law is presumed constitutional until otherwise
declared by judicial interpretation. The suspension of the operation of the law is a matter of extreme delicacy
because it is an interference with the official acts not only of the duly elected representatives of the people but
also of the highest magistrate of the land.
In Younger v. Harris, Jr., the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No
citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.
The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the
plaintiff who seeks its aid. 752 Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 49, 61 S.Ct. 418, 420, 85
L.Ed. 577.
And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this rule, that:
"It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that
incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith . . ." 319 U.S., at 164, 63 S.Ct., at
881.
The possible unconstitutionality of a statute, on its face, does not of itself justify an injunction against good
faith attempts to enforce it, unless there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual
circumstance that would call for equitable relief. The "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described
as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally
disfavored.
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a law assailed to be unconstitutional, the
party must establish that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate
that it is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and
the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. The higher standard reflects judicial deference toward
"legislation or regulations developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover, an
injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the movant with substantially all the
relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.
Considering that injunction is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the situation, including the public
interest. In litigations between governmental and private parties, courts go much further both to give and
withhold relief in furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are
involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against future enforcement, he is burdened to show
some substantial hardship. (emphasis supplied)
Indeed, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued precisely to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicated to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Still, even if it is a temporary and ancillary
remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant must convincingly show its entitlement to the
relief. St. James College of Paranaque v. Equitable PCI Bank,11 explains:
Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may be
granted if the following grounds are established, thus: virtual law library
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
And following jurisprudence, these requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction, be it
mandatory or prohibitory, will issue:
(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse;
(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable
injury. (emphasis supplied)a1a
It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ, the APMP must show that it has a clear and
unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent necessity for its issuance. 12 That APMP
had cause of action and the standing to interpose the action for prohibition did not ipso facto call for
the grant of injunctive relief in its favor without it proving its entitlement thereto.
Transfield Philippines, Inc. v. Luzon Hydro Corporation,13 illuminates on the right of a party to injunctive relief:
Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the
said right. It must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial,
that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. Moreover, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted to when there is a
pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation. (emphasis supplied)
Contrary to public respondents ruling, APMP failed to adduce any evidence to prove that it had a clear
and unmistakable right which was or would be violated by the enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the
petition at the court a quo was anchored on APMP and its members fear of loss or reduction of their income
once E.O. 486 is implemented and imported plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due to
reduced tariff rates. As correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection over "future economic
benefits" which, at best, it had an inchoate right to.
More importantly, tariff protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and, therefore,
APMP cannot claim redress for alleged violation thereof. In a similar case wherein the validity of R.A. 9337
with respect to provisions authorizing the President to increase the value-added tax (VAT) rates, the Court
held:
The input tax is not a property or a property right within the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A
VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The distinction between statutory privileges and vested rights must be borne in mind for persons have no
vested rights in statutory privileges. The state may change or take away rights, which were created by the law
of the state, although it may not take away property, which was vested by virtue of such rights.14 (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1
Assuming arguendo that it was upon the governments assurances that the members of APMP allegedly
"invested hundred of millions of dollars in putting up the necessary infrastructure," that does not vest upon
APMP a right which must be protected.
Respecting the element of "irreparable injury," the landmark case of Social Security Commission v.
Bayona15teaches:
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor Council,
83 ALR, 193). "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a
repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement" (Phipps v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., 7
ALR, 741). An irreparable injury to authorize an injunction consists of "a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the
property has some peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of
the loss thereof" (Dunker v. Field and Tub Club, 92 P., 502). (emphasis supplied)
As does the more recent case of Philippine Air Lines v. National Labor Relations Commission:16
An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable
redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered
irreparable injury when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself
or the nature of the right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the
measurement of damages. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, aside from APMPs allegations that the reduced tariff rates will adversely affect its
members business and may lead to closure, there is no showing what "irreparable injury" it stood to suffer
with the implementation of E.O. 486.
In fine, not only is there no showing of a clear right on the part of APMP which was violated; the injury sought
to be protected is prospective in nature, hence, the injunctive relief should not have been granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated February 6, 2007 issued by
public respondent Hon. Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino is REVERSED insofar as it granted a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in favor of private respondent, Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the
Philippines (APMP). Accordingly, the Writ is DISSOLVED, and the case REMANDED to the court of origin for
further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 200903 July 22, 2014
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAY ANG MAHIBIRAP, INC., represented by its Vice-President, CARLITO BADION,
CORAZON DE JESUS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, represented by its President, ARNOLD
REPIQUE, FERNANDO SEVILLA as President of Samahang Pamata sa Kapatirang Kr.istiyano,
ESTRELIETA BAGASBAS, JOCY LOPEZ, ELVIRA VIDOL, and DELIA FRA YRES, Petitioners,
vs.
JESSIE ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Hon.
GUIA GOMEZ, in her capacity as MAYOR OF THE CITY. OF SAN JUAN, Hon. HERBERT BAUTISTA, in
his capacity as the MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY, Hon. JOHN REY TIANGCO, in his capacity as MAYOR
OF NAVOTAS CITY, and the GENERAL MANAGER of the NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the public respondents from evicting the individual
petitioners as well as the petitionerassociations members from their dwellings in the cities of San Juan,
Navotas and Quezon without any court order, and to compel the respondents to afford them judicial process
prior to evictions and demolitions. The petition primarily seeks to declare asunconstitutional Section 28 (a) and
(b) of Republic Act No. 7279 (RA 7279), otherwise known as Urban Development Housing Act, which
authorizes evictions and demolitions under certain circumstances without any court order.
The Factual Antecedents
The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Jocy Lopez, Elvira
Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned by and located in the cities of San Juan,
Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs1). These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and
demolition pursuant to Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in order to give way to the implementation and
construction of infrastructure projects2 in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners.3
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without any court order when: (1)
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places suchas sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; and (2)
persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented.
The Petition
On March 23, 2012, the petitionersdirectly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus before the Court,
seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. (the public respondents)to first
secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279.
The petitioners justify their directrecourse before this Court by generally averring that they have no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.4 They also posit that the respondents gravely
abused their discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 which are patently unconstitutional.
They likewise insist that they stand to be directly injured by the respondentsthreats of evictions and
demolitions. In the alternative, they contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues raised in
this case clothes them with legal standing.5
The petitioners argue that Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due process
because they warrant evictions and demolitions without any court order. Theypoint out that Section 6, Article 3
of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the impairment of liberty of abode unless there is a court order.
Moreover, Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 violate their right to adequate housing, a universal right
recognized in Article 25 of Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights and Section 2 (a) of RA 7279. The
petitioners further complain that the respondents had previously conducted evictions and demolitions in a
violent manner, contrary to Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution.6
The Respondents Case
A. The Position of the Mayor of Navotas
The Mayor of Navotas prays for the outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural defects. First,
the petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65 petition before the
Court.7 Second, the petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus in
assailing the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. According to the Mayor of Navotas, the
office of a writ of prohibition is merely to prevent the public respondents usurpation of power or improper
assumption of jurisdiction. On the other hand, a writ of mandamus only commands the public respondent to
perform his ministerial functions. Third, the petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion
that the Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed. Fourth, the petition does not present any justiciable
controversy since the City of Navotas had already successfully evicted the petitioners in San Roque, Navotas
on November 28, 2011. Fifth, the petition was filed out of time since the petitioners were personally notified of
the intended eviction and demolition on September 23, 2011.8
The Mayor argues that Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to
beconducted even without a court order provided they are done in accordance withthe law and in a just and
humane manner. According to him, RA 7279 isprecisely the law referred to by Section 10, Article 13 of the
1987 Constitution. The Mayor also disputes the petitioners claim that RA 7279 does notafford the informal
settlers procedural due process prior to evictions and demolitions. He points out that Section 28 of RA 7279
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) mandate that the affected persons or entities shall be given
notice at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction or demolition. The respondents are likewise required
to consult with the duly designated representatives of the affected families and communities with respect to
their relocation. He further asserts that his faithful implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279, which
are presumed to be constitutional, cannotbe equated to grave abuse of discretion. Lastly, the Mayor of
Navotas insists that the petitioners invocation of their right to freely choose their abode is misplaced since
they have no vested right to occupy properties that they do not own.9
B. The Position of the Mayor of San Juan
The Mayor of San Juan similarly argues that the petitioners improperly availed themselves of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus before the Court. She contends thatshe performed neither judicial nor ministerial
functions in implementing RA 7279, the enabling law of Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution. She
also maintains that the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the successful eviction of some of
the petitioners in Pinaglabanan, Corazon de Jesus, San Juan. The Mayor of San Juan further stresses that
Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 already lay down the procedure in evicting informal settlers in a just and
humane manner.10C. The Position of the Mayor of Quezon
The Mayor of Quezon City holds that the petitioners premature invocation of the Courts power of judicial
review and their violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts are fatal to their cause of action. Moreover, the
petitioners failed to substantiate the material allegations in the petition. He additionally argues that his faithful
implementation of RA 7279, which the legislature enacted inthe exercise of police power, does not amount to
grave abuse of discretion.11
D. The Position of the Secretary ofInterior and Local Government
and the General Manager of the National Housing Authority
The Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the National Housing Authority (NHA)General Manager
adopt the Mayor of Navotas position that the petition is procedurally infirm. They further argue that the liberty
of abode is not illimitable and does not include the right to encroach upon other person properties. They also
reiterate that Section 28 of RA 7279 provides sufficient safeguards in ensuring that evictions and demolitions
are carried out in a just and humane manner.12
The Issues
This case presents to us the following issues:
(1) Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and
(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;
(b) Whether the petitioners correctlyavailed themselves of a petition for prohibition and
mandamus;
(2) Whether Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 are violative of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the
1987 Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
We dismiss the petition.
The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly filed the petition before the
Court.
The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to the Court withtheir
petition for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioners appear to have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, not a court offirst instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general determinant
of the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of
forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners have unduly taxed the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to matters within our exclusive jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners only
contributed to the overcrowding of the Court's docket. We also wish to emphasize that the trial court is better
equipped to resolve cases ofthis nature since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normallyundertake
an examination of the contending parties evidence.13
The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus.
We cannot also ignore the petitioners glaring error in using a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the
current case.
The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or persons exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.14 We issue a writ of
prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondents usurpation or grave abuse of
jurisdiction or power.15
On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled.16 Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty. It will not control a public officers exercise of discretion as where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercisehis judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to actprecisely because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the court.17
In the present case, the petitionersseek to prohibit the respondents from implementing Section 28 (a) and (b)
of RA 7279 without a prior court order of eviction and/or demolition. In relation to this, paragraph 1, Section 28
of RA 7279 provides:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or
demolition, however, maybe allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public placessuch as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented;or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. (emphasis and underline ours)
A reading of this provision clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.18
Consequently, the time when the public respondents shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions under Section
28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial, judicial or quasi-judicial. The duty is
discretionary if the law imposesa duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide when the duty
shall be performed.
In contrast, a ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,in a
prescribedmanner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.19
On the other hand, both judicial and quasi-judicial functions involve the determination of what the law is, and
what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect tothe matter in controversy and, on the basis
thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.20
The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 is not the lis motaof the case.
Even if we treat the present petition as one for certiorari since it assails the constitutionality of Section 28 (a)
and (b) of RA 7279, the petition must necessarily fail for failure to show the essential requisites that would
warrant the Courts exercise of judicial review. It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence thatthe courts
will not determine the constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the
existence of personal and substantial interest on the part ofthe party raising the constitutional question; (3)
recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary to the decision of the case.21
Save for the petition pertaining to the City of Quezons threat of eviction and demolition, this case no longer
presents a justiciable controversy with respect to the Mayors of Navotas and San Juan. We take note of the
Comments of these Mayors who alleged that they had already successfully evicted the concerned petitioners
in their respective cities at the time of the filing of the petition.
What further constrains this Court from touching on the issue of constitutionality is the fact that this issue is not
the lis mota of this case. Lis motaliterally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our coequal branches of the government.
This means that the petitioner who claims the unconstitutionality of a law has the burden of showing first that
the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question that he raised is unavoidable.
If there is some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
question of constitutionality should be avoided.22 Thus, to justify the nullification ofa law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.23
We carefully read the petitions and we conclude that they fail to compellingly show the necessity ofexamining
the constitutionality of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 in the light of Sections 1 and 6, Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution.24 In Magkalas v. NHA,25 this Court had already ruled on the validity of evictions and demolitions
without any court order. In that case, we affirmed the validity ofSection 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1472
which authorizes the NHA to summarily eject all informal settlers colonies on government resettlement
projects as well as any illegal occupant in any homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by
the NHA. In that case, we held that Caridad Magkalas illegal possession of the property should not hinder the
NHAs development of Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project. We further stated that demolitions and evictions
may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in the following instances: (1) when the property
involved is an expropriated property xxx pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315;
(2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any
homelot, apartment or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of
P.D. No. 1472;
(3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks
and playgrounds, pursuant toSection 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279;
(4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.26 (emphasis ours)
We note that Section 10, Article13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not
be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance withlaw and in a just and humane manner.
Paragraph 1, Section 28 of RA 7279 allows summary evictions and demolition in cases where persons
orentities occupy danger areas and when persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure
projects with available funding are about to be implemented.
To ensure that evictions and demolitions are conducted in a just and humane manner, paragraph 2, Section
28 of RA 7279 commands the public respondents to comply with the following prescribed procedure in
executing eviction and/or demolition orders:
In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following
shall be mandatory:
(1) Notice upon the effected persons orentities at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of eviction
or demolition;
(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the duly designated representatives of
the families to be resettled and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be
relocated;
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives during eviction or demolition;
(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part in the demolition;
(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office hours from Mondays to Fridays
and during good weather, unless the affected families consent otherwise;
(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for structures that are permanent and of
concrete materials;
(7) Proper uniforms for members ofthe Philippine National Police who shall occupy the first line of
law enforcement and observe proper disturbance control procedures; and
(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent: Provided, however, That in cases of
eviction and demolition pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and homeless citizens,
relocation shall be undertaken by the local government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies within forty-five (45) days from service
of notice of final judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall be executed:
Provided, further, That should relocation not be possible within the said period, financial assistance
in the amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty (60) days shall
be extended to the affected families by the local government unit concerned.
This Department of the Interior and Local Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council shall jointly promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above provision.
Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their
discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, theymerely imputed jurisdictional abuse
to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support their
claim.
This is precisely the reason why we frown upon the direct filing of Rule 65 petitions before the
Court.1wphi1 To the point of being repetitive, we (xxx source text missing)
Lastly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their allegations that the public respondents gravely abused their
discretion in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. Instead, they merely imputed jurisdictional
abuse to the public respondents through general averments in their pleading, but without any basis to support
their claim.
This is precisely the reason why we frown upon the direct filing of Rule 65 petitions before the Court. To the
point of being repetitive, we emphasize that we are not trier of facts and this applies with greater force to Rule
65 petitions which are original and independent actions. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally
the domain of the executive department, the petitioners must establish facts that are necessarily linked to the
jurisdictional problem they presented in this case, i.e., whether the public respondents exercised their power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility in implementing Section 28 (a) and
(b) of RA 7279.
Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of discretion was so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, this petition must necessarily fail.27
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for its serious procedural defects. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
LEONARDO DE-CASTRO,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, where petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways through
the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
108499, to wit:
1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092 dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being filed
out of time; and
2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the
name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No. 0062-04, the Republic sought to
expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the
Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). Said property belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T-
821169 and located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the Republic
sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to St.
Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-821170. Said property adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No. 0062-
04.
Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging that the subject land originated
from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant to
Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the issuance of an order of
expropriation.4 It was granted by the trial court per Order5 dated August 16, 2005, ruling that the Republic has
a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of the subject property, with "no pronouncement as to
just compensation" since the subject property originated from a free patent.6 A motion for the issuance of an
order of expropriation was likewise filed by the Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this could be
resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two cases, which was granted by the trial court.7
On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincents motion for reconsideration of its Order dated
August 16, 2005 granting expropriation.8 As alleged in the petition, no appeal was taken by St. Vincent from
said orders.9
After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification of the
Order dated August 16, 2005,10 contending that although it does not oppose the ruling regarding the
determination of public purpose and the Republics right to expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims
that it is entitled to just compensation.
Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16, 2005 by entering the subject
portion of St. Vincents property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon the Republic and its agents to
immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or structures they introduced on its property in a
demand-letter11 dated October 3, 2008.
Due to St. Vincents refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the lower court in its Order12 dated November 25,
2006 2008. The lower court, however, modified its Order dated August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to
immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the
property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower
court per Order13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed
with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the
motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen
(15) days or until May 4, 2009 within which to file its petition for certiorari.
On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the lower courts orders dated
November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution15 ordering the Republic to show cause why its
petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16 dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the relaxation of the rules
by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in the case and in consideration of
substantial justice. St. Vincent filed its Comment/Opposition17 dated July 15, 2009 alleging among others that
the said explanation is merely pro forma due to the Republics failure to justify its explanation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republics petition
for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as extensions of time are now
disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC18 and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19
On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration alleging that it merely relied in good
faith on the appellate courts resolution granting the former an additional period of fifteen (15) days within
which to file the subject petition.
On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the Republics motion for reconsideration,
stating that it cannot disobey the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation.20
Hence, this petition.
The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon the strength of the
substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject
to the Courts sound discretion.
St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege any circumstance nor state any
justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. And in the absence of any such circumstance or justification, the general rule on pro forma
motions/pleadings must apply.
The Issue
The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the CA did no more than include such
matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed the Republics
petition for certiorari for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Courts Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the Republics motion for
extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for
review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated, among others: "Provided that this Motion for Extension
of Time to File Petition for Review is seasonably filed, as prayed for, x x x."22 Thus, the CA granted extension
inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules.23 On this score alone, the CA should have
admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution dated April 30, 2009
granting the extension prayed for.
Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the ground that the same
was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated July 15, 2010, which dismissed
the Republics motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the
sixty (60)-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari is non-extendible. The petitioner, however,
insists that Domdom allows extensions of time to file a petition.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the relationship between
its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with respect to the application of the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall
be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case
exceeding fifteen (15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer
or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan,
whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an
omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be
filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its
meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a
change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction
different from that previous to its amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65,
the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph
under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve
any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x:
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of xxxx
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural rules would
paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x Consequently, in order to protect strong
As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65
from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.24 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours) under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition.
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated: Considering that the imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein
On the Peoples argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant prejudice to the
allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the following provision in Section 4 of substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition before the CA within the 15-day
Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to absolutely prohibit motions for extension: extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the CA when it granted
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case respondent Power Ones Motion for Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and
exceeding fifteen (15) days." emphasis ours)
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads: To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts Corporation, the
xxxx general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for extension, unlike order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the
in the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. If such were sound discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands
the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that "no extension of time to Power cases.
file the petition shall be granted." Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republics petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted
Courts sound discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public
sought and, at all events, given its merits.25 (Citation omitted and emphasis and underscoring ours) interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the petition.
the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the general rule that WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days from notice of judgment or from the order July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is
denying a motion for reconsideration. Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the
of the sixty (60)-day period subject to the Courts sound discretion.26 Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and to proceed with the case with dispatch.
Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule, viz: SO ORDERED.
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be instituted within a period
of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case.
xxxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty
reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time
from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants
fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the
rules.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible, only that there are certain exceptional circumstances,
which may call for its non-observance. Even more recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,29 the Court, taking into consideration Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the
procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice and
safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the extension granted by the CA to the respondent Power One
Corporation due to the exceptional nature of the case and the strong public interest involved.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the reason behind the amendments
under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of petition for certiorari in order to
delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the
period to file a Rule 65 petition for compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as
reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave
abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to avoid any
unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the constitutional right of the
parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
x x x.
Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the deletion of the clause
in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make the filing of a motion for extension to
file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended,
the deleted portion could have just simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file
such petition. Thus, because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Courts sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious cases.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186560 November 17, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO P. DE LEON, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks the nullification of the Decision1 dated October 28, 2008
and the Resolution2 dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811.
Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in
1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold
the same rank as judges. The application was approved by GSIS. Thereafter, and for more than nine years,
respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly
pension.3
Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the
law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge
did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Thus, GSIS stopped the payment of
respondents monthly pension.4
Respondent wrote GSIS several letters but he received no response until November 9, 2007, when
respondent received the following letter from GSIS:
Dear Atty. De Leon:
This is in response to your request for resumption of pension benefit.
It appears that you retired under Republic Act No. 910 in 1992 from your position as Chief State Prosecutor in
the Department of Justice. From 1992 to 2001, you were receiving pension benefits under the said law.
Beginning the year 2002, the Department of Budget and Management through then Secretary Emilia T.
Boncodin already refused to release the funds for your pension benefit on the ground that Chief State
Prosecutors are not covered by R.A. 910. This conclusion was later on affirmed by Secretary Rolando G.
Andaya, Jr. in a letter dated 6 June 2006.
In view of these, you now seek to secure benefits under Republic Act No. 660 or any other applicable GSIS
law.
We regret, however, that we cannot accede to your request because you have chosen to retire and in fact
have already retired under a different law, Republic Act No. 910, more than fifteen (15) years ago. There is
nothing in the GSIS law which sanctions double retirement unless the retiree is first re-employed and qualifies
once again to retire under GSIS law. In fact, Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8291 provides for exclusivity of
benefits which means that a retiree may choose only one retirement scheme available to him to the exclusion
of all others.
Nonetheless, we believe that the peculiarities of your case is a matter that may be jointly addressed or
threshed out by your agency, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Budget and Management.
Very truly yours,
(signed)
CECIL L. FELEO
Senior Vice President
Social Insurance Group5
Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue
paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. He also asked that GSIS and
the DBM be ordered to pay him damages.6
In the assailed October 28, 2008 Decision, the CA resolved to grant the petition, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The GSIS is hereby ordered to pay without delay petitioner Atty.
Fernando de Leon, his monthly adjusted pension in accordance with other applicable law not under RA 910. It
is also ordered to pay the back pensions which should also be adjusted to conform to the applicable law from
the time his pension was withheld.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA found that GSIS allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following precedents which allowed
non-judges to retire under the said law. The CA said that it was not respondents fault that he was allowed to
avail of the benefits under R.A. No. 910; and that, even if his retirement under that law was erroneous,
respondent was, nonetheless, entitled to a monthly pension under the GSIS Act. The CA held that this was not
a case of double retirement, but merely a continuation of the payment of respondents pension benefit to which
he was clearly entitled. Since the error in the award of retirement benefits under R.A. 910 was not attributable
to respondent, it was incumbent upon GSIS to continue defraying his pension in accordance with the
appropriate law which might apply to him. It was unjust for GSIS to entirely stop the payment of respondents
monthly pension without providing any alternative sustenance to him.8
The CA further held that, under R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 8291, and Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146,
respondent is entitled to a monthly pension for life. He cannot be penalized for the error committed by GSIS
itself. Thus, although respondent may not be qualified to receive the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910,
he is still entitled to a monthly pension under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, and R.A. No. 8291.9
Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its
motion for reconsideration.
GSIS admits that respondent received monthly pensions from August 1997 until December 2001. Thereafter,
the DBM refused to remit the funds for respondents pension on the ground that he was not entitled to retire
under R.A. No. 910 and should have retired under another law, without however specifying which law it
was.10 It appears that the DBM discontinued the payment of respondents pension on the basis of the
memorandum of the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel that Chief Prosecutors of the DOJ are not entitled to the
retirement package under R.A. No. 910.
Because of the discontinuance of his pension, respondent sought to convert his retirement under R.A. No. 910
to one under another law administered by GSIS.11 However, this conversion was not allowed because, as
GSIS avers, R.A. No. 8291 provides that conversion of ones retirement mode on whatever ground and for
whatever reason is not allowed beyond one year from the date of retirement.
GSIS assails the CAs Decision for not specifying under which law respondents retirement benefits should be
paid, thus making it legally impossible for GSIS to comply with the directive.12 It then raises several arguments
that challenge the validity of the appellate courts decision.
GSIS argues, first, that the CA erred in issuing a writ of mandamus despite the absence of any specific and
clear right on the part of respondent, since he could not even specify the benefits to which he is entitled and
the law under which he is making the claim.13
Second, GSIS alleges that it had refunded respondents premium payments because he opted to retire under
R.A. No. 910, which it does not administer. Thus, GSIS posits that the nexus between itself and respondent
had been severed and, therefore, the latter cannot claim benefits from GSIS anymore.14
Third, GSIS contends that the CA erred in concluding that respondent would not be unjustly enriched by the
continuation of his monthly pension because he had already benefited from having erroneously retired under
R.A. No. 910. GSIS points out that it had refunded respondents premium contributions. When the Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel concluded that respondent was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910, it was
implicit recognition that respondent was actually not entitled to the 1.2 million lump sum payment he
received, which he never refunded.15
Fourth, GSIS points out that the CA erred in concluding that respondent was not seeking conversion from one
retirement mode to another. It reiterates that R.A. No. 8291 expressly prohibits conversion beyond one year
from retirement. To compel GSIS to release respondents retirement benefits despite the fact that he is
disqualified to receive retirement benefits violates R.A. No. 8291, and would subject its officials to possible
charges under R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Fifth, GSIS contends that respondent is not entitled to the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 8291 because,
when he retired in 1992, the law had not yet been enacted. The retirement laws administered by GSIS at that
time were R.A. No. 660, R.A. No. 1616, and P.D. No. 1146.
Lastly, GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to
perform an act that is contrary to law.
Respondent traverses these allegations, and insists that he has a clear legal right to receive retirement
benefits under either R.A. No. 660 or P.D. No. 1146.16 He claims that he has met all the conditions for
entitlement to the benefits under either of the two laws.17 Respondent contends that the return of his
contributions does not bar him from pursuing his claims because GSIS can require him to refund the premium
contributions, or even deduct the amount returned to him from the retirement benefits he will receive.18 He also
argues that resumption of his monthly pension will not constitute unjust enrichment because he is entitled to
the same as a matter of right for the rest of his natural life.19
Respondent accepts that, contrary to the pronouncement of the CA, he is not covered by R.A. No. 8291. He,
therefore, asks this Court to modify the CA Decision, such that instead of Section 13 of R.A. No. 8291, it
should be Section 12 of P.D. No. 1146 or Section 11 of R.A. No. 660 to be used as the basis of his right to
receive, and the adjustment of, his monthly pension.
Furthermore, respondent argues that allowing him to retire under another law does not constitute "conversion"
as contemplated in the GSIS law. He avers that his application for retirement under R.A. No. 910 was duly
approved by GSIS, endorsed by the DOJ, and implemented by the DBM for almost a decade. Thus, he should
not be made to suffer any adverse consequences owing to the change in the interpretation of the provisions of
R.A. No. 910. Moreover, he could not have applied for conversion of his chosen retirement mode to one under
a different law within one year from approval of his retirement application, because of his firm belief that his
retirement under R.A. No. 910 was proper a belief amply supported by its approval by GSIS, the favorable
endorsement of the DOJ, and its implementation by the DBM.20
The petition is without merit.
Initially, we resolve the procedural issue.
GSIS contends that respondents petition for mandamus filed before the CA was procedurally improper
because respondent could not show a clear legal right to the relief sought.
The Court disagrees with petitioner. The CA itself acknowledged that it would not indulge in technicalities to
resolve the case, but focus instead on the substantive issues rather than on procedural
questions.21 Furthermore, courts have the discretion to relax the rules of procedure in order to protect
substantive rights and prevent manifest injustice to a party.
The Court has allowed numerous meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and
lapses. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Strict and rigid
application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than to promote substantial
justice must always be avoided.22
Besides, as will be discussed hereunder, contrary to petitioners posture, respondent has a clear legal right to
the relief prayed for. Thus, the CA acted correctly when it gave due course to respondents petition for
mandamus.
This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years, was
comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself
abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for
the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation.
The inflexible rule in our jurisdiction is that social legislation must be liberally construed in favor of the
beneficiaries.23 Retirement laws, in particular, are liberally construed in favor of the retiree24 because their
objective is to provide for the retirees sustenance and, hopefully, even comfort, when he no longer has the
capability to earn a livelihood. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in
order that efficiency, security, and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.25 Indeed,
retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and
all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.26
In this case, as adverted to above, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the
reinstatement of his retirement benefits.
In stopping the payment of respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM,
which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a
judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to
receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled
to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant retirement law. This is flawed logic.
Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is
disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law.
The CA, however, incorrectly held that respondent was covered by R.A. No. 8291. R.A. No. 8291 became a
law after respondent retired from government service. Hence, petitioner and even respondent agree that it
does not apply to respondent, because the law took effect after respondents retirement.
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits
under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended
by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146.
In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this law
provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in 1992.27
Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the following requisites:
Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension.
(a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:
(1) has at least fifteen years of service;
(2) is at least sixty years of age; and
(3) is separated from the service.
Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this.
Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law, to wit:
Section 12. Old-Age Pension.
(a) A member entitled to old-age pension shall receive the basic monthly pension for life but in no case for a
period less than five years: Provided, That, the member shall have the option to convert the basic monthly
pensions for the first five years into a lump sum as defined in this Act: Provided, further, That, in case the
pensioner dies before the expiration of the five-year period, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to the
balance of the amount still due to him. In default of primary beneficiaries, the amount shall be paid to his legal
heirs.
To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since
respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper
retirement law to respondents claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910. In this way, GSIS would be faithful to its
mandate to administer retirement laws in the spirit in which they have been enacted, i.e., to provide retirees
the wherewithal to live a life of relative comfort and security after years of service to the government.
Respondent will not receive --- and GSIS is under no obligation to give him --- more than what is due him
under the proper retirement law.
It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 1146 specifically mandates that a retiree is entitled to monthly pension for
life. As this Court previously held:
Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the government pensions do
not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have
contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. The reason
for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service to the government. Retirement benefits to
government employees are part of emolument to encourage and retain qualified employees in the government
service. Retirement benefits to government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in
the service of their country.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits
that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to
benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law
can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and
opportunity to be heard.28
It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following
jurisprudence laid down by this Court.
One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners interpretation of the
pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement
system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing.
Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the
same.1avvphi1 His right to receive monthly pension from the government cannot be jeopardized by a new
interpretation of the law.
GSIS argument that respondent has already been enormously benefited under R.A. No. 910 misses the
point.
Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are
intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of having to worry
about his financial support or upkeep. A pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the retiree for a
dual purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government service; and to permit them to retire from
the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who
have been incapacitated by illness or accident.29
Surely, giving respondent what is due him under the law is not unjust enrichment.
As to GSIS contention that what respondent seeks is conversion of his retirement mode, which is prohibited
under R.A. No. 8291, the Court agrees with the CA that this is not a case of conversion within the
contemplation of the law. The conversion under the law is one that is voluntary, a choice to be made by the
retiree. Here, respondent had no choice but to look for another law under which to claim his pension benefits
because the DBM had decided not to release the funds needed to continue payment of his monthly pension.
Respondent himself admitted that, if the DBM had not suspended the payment of his pension, he would not
have sought any other law under which to receive his benefits. The necessity to "convert" was not a voluntary
choice of respondent but a circumstance forced upon him by the government itself.
Finally, GSIS would like this Court to believe that because it has returned respondents premium contributions,
it is now legally impossible for it to comply with the CAs directive.
Given the fact that respondent is ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, the refund by GSIS of respondents
premium payments was erroneous. Hence, GSIS can demand the return of the erroneous payment or it may
opt to deduct the amount earlier received by respondent from the benefits which he will receive in the future.
Considering its expertise on the matter, GSIS can device a scheme that will facilitate either the reimbursement
or the deduction in the most cost-efficient and beneficial manner.
The foregoing disquisition draws even greater force from subsequent developments. While this case was
pending, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10071,30 the Prosecution Service Act of 2010. On April 8,
2010, it lapsed into law without the signature of the President,31 pursuant to Article VI, Section 27(1) of the
Constitution.32
Section 24 of R.A. No. 10071 provides:
Section 24. Retroactivity. - The benefits mentioned in Sections 14 and 16 hereof shall be granted to all those
who retired prior to the effectivity of this Act.
By virtue of this express provision, respondent is covered by R.A. No. 10071. In addition, he is now entitled to
avail of the benefits provided by Section 23, that "all pension benefits of retired prosecutors of the National
Prosecution Service shall be automatically increased whenever there is an increase in the salary and
allowance of the same position from which he retired."
Respondent, as former Chief State Prosecutor, albeit the position has been renamed "Prosecutor
General,"33should enjoy the same retirement benefits as the Presiding Justice of the CA, pursuant to Section
14 of R.A. No. 10071, to wit:
Section 14. Qualifications, Rank and Appointment of the Prosecutor General. - The Prosecutor General shall
have the same qualifications for appointment, rank, category, prerogatives, salary grade and salaries,
allowances, emoluments, and other privileges, shall be subject to the same inhibitions and disqualifications,
and shall enjoy the same retirement and other benefits as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals and shall be appointed by the President.34
Furthermore, respondent should also benefit from the application of Section 16 of the law, which states:
Section 16. Qualifications, Ranks, and Appointments of Prosecutors, and other Prosecution Officers. x x x.
Any increase after the approval of this Act in the salaries, allowances or retirement benefits or any upgrading
of the grades or levels thereof of any or all of the Justices or Judges referred to herein to whom said
emoluments are assimilated shall apply to the corresponding prosecutors.
Lastly, and most importantly, by explicit fiat of R.A. No. 10071, members of the National Prosecution Service
have been granted the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, to wit:
Section 25. Applicability. - All benefits heretofore extended under Republic Act No. 910, as amended, and all
other benefits that may be extended by the way of amendment thereto shall likewise be given to the
prosecutors covered by this Act.
Hence, from the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 10071, respondent should be entitled to receive retirement
benefits granted under R.A. No. 910.
Consequently, GSIS should compute respondents retirement benefits from the time the same were withheld
until April 7, 2010 in accordance with P.D. No. 1146; and his retirement benefits from April 8, 2010 onwards in
accordance with R.A. No. 910.
A final note. The Court is dismayed at the cavalier manner in which GSIS handled respondents claims,
keeping respondent in the dark as to the real status of his retirement benefits for so long. That the agency
tasked with administering the benefits of retired government employees could so unreasonably treat one of its
beneficiaries, one who faithfully served our people for over 40 years, is appalling. It is well to remind GSIS of
its mandate to promote the efficiency and welfare of the employees of our government, and to perform its
tasks not only with competence and proficiency but with genuine compassion and concern.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated October 28, 2008 and the Resolution
dated February 18, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101811 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to (1) pay respondents retirement
benefits in accordance with P.D. No. 1146, subject to deductions, if any, computed from the time the same
were withheld until April 7, 2010; and (2) pay respondents retirement benefits in accordance with R.A. No.
910, computed from April 8, 2010 onwards.
In order that respondent may not be further deprived of his monthly pension benefits, this Decision is
IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.