G.R. No.

110120 March 16, 1994
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a
tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City
Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as
required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance from LLDA as required under
Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.6

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City
Government of Caloocan.
ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the
350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a
pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan
City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy
elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for
adjudication.
The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November
10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that
the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the
dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks,
in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint
of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the
receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters
since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA
issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan
Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist
from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin
dumpsite.
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting
held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau
Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the
LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias
Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its
dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump
trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.
On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage
dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the
surrounding area.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992
with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with
prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its
complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority
empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and
desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of
Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it
which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts
of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No.
C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however,
maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other,
should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued
in the consolidated cases an order11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons
acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order
which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite
during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542,
seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring
the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving
due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file
the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the
Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on
November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary
restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the
calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350
tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be
resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find
alternative solutions to this garbage problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to
immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if
any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be
maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the
morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral
argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning
where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or
his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized
representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its
study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage
and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the
parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits
of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for
resolution.15Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.
(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction
issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set
aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that
any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and
protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found
on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an
integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is
granted by the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining
order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this
Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA
under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City
Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of
this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the
Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction
over the matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government
unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to
determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see
that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the
inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and
authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage
in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial
jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law,
authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease
and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive
Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850,
as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding
against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any
project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from
the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court
of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with
the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d),
(e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial
disposal system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any
permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate
pollution.
(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded
the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted
administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this
case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies
implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the
authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive,
necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay
Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering
the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the
water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage
dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that
requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is
essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR
which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed
the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created
under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of
the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another
forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative
agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to
carry out and make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and
Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and
control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention
of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the
responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious
effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.
In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others,
to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by
local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of
the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the
LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the
basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in
Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under
Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an
Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the
Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at
the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the
following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts
presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan
to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have
been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant
environment laws,23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of
injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No.
813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or
modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution."24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4,
par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease
and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar
to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7
of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927,
series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that
there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter
or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly
bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
granting such authority need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule
that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it
is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.26 In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and
desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,
et al.,27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue
an ex-parte cease and desist order when there isprima facie evidence of an establishment
exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.
The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like
that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and
untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be
made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such
orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those
which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the
exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life,
commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public SO ORDERED.
interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which
provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of

non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect
and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them."28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and
authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first
instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the
LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the
power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna
de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in
the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the
government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is
concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or
orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting
in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be
sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region
and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell
further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an
administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City
is hereby made permanent.
JOHN ERIC LONEY, G.R. No. 152644
STEVEN PAUL REID and Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
Petitioners, Present: Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and

Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO, On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ. the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
rivers.
Respondent. February 10, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal

Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B), [4] sub-paragraphs 5
DECISION
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
CARPIO, J.: 1067),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control

Decree of 1976 (PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine
The Case
Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for

This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]

dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the

ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense

Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers

Hernandez (petitioners). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the
reconsideration. Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Facts

Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President

and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, The Ruling of the MTC
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on
mining in the province of Marinduque.
petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x

x. The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners

 common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997(Consolidated Order), [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to
violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
property.[13]
7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing
to mine tailings which were precipitately discharged into the
Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29
drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to
River systems, the very term and condition required to be undertaken
under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
1990.
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners
the Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of not
evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving
the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued
guilty pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act.In both instances, the terms and
conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly
violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in proving Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
violations of the three (3) special laws.
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the
parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3)
aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the
Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public
Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the
respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same
elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
7942).

The Ruling of Branch 94

Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for
[v]iolation of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48
and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby
DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and
96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to
In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but
be tried on the merits.
denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
held:

After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion
that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other
offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The
from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the
appellate court held:
same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine
tailings which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash
rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed against the accused each
the aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in
charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in this
nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically
jurisdiction that
provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x

A single act may offend against two or more entirely

xxxx
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section
element which the other does not, an acquittal or
3, Rule 117].
conviction or a dismissal of the information under
one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x.
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the
xxxx
public respondent contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Relova for being violative of their right against multiple prosecutions.
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements
of each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with
require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being
does not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]
charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the
context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the same section. x x x

acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067, xxxx

PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act
or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and
(2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v.
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to
the case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are
for violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in
character.

Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges xxxx

for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence,
petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents
understanding that the laws by which the petitioners have been
[charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an
additional fact or element which the other does not, although they
stemmed from a single act. x x x
 ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL
xxxx WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.][19]
that would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against
the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court
equally finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion The Issues
to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]

The petition raises these issues:

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
Resolution of 14 March 2002.
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless

Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN
MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE contravenes People v. Relova.
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT: The Ruling of the Court

A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE

WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING
The petition has no merit.
ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON
A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE
BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than
DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT states:
AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE single punishment for various offenses.
NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON
SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL
ELEMENTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges
RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE
PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE UNDER more than one offense.[21]

Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The
Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing
his defense.[23] Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses,
with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition
deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them
proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of necessary or
adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or
incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law
thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit
to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense.[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or
more) offenses arising from the same act are not the same
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior
jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present.[28] However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they
should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative
analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of
these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required
of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River
and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the
authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence
of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not
indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution
Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code
even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with
the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even
[if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved
is the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution
itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated
under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine
tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog
and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the
accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything
to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be
liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under
the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because
violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential
element of these laws.
 On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required
under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of
mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river
system, much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished
by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by
the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in
se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942).
What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts
statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC,
after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double
jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were
the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and
a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the
same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance
[of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the
Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt to
commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is
not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of
course correct. This is clear both from the express terms of the
constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act. x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the
petitioners position is that it must be examined, not under the
terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution,
but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first
sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in
the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses
may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of
Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition:
the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy isavailable
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
 from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute
such as the Revised Penal Code, providedthat both offenses spring
from the same act or set of acts. x x x[30] (Italicization in the original;
boldfacing supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a

single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also

because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or

incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute.

In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which

prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses

arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November

2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170599 September 22, 2010
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
and HON. GENERAL MANAGER CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC. (in its capacity as operator of SM CITY
MANILA), Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 28, 2004 and November 23, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79192. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Orders3 dated October 2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003 of petitioner Public
Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), in LLDA Case No.
PH-02-03-076, while the CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on February 4, 2002 by the
Pollution Control Division of the LLDA of the wastewater collected from herein
respondent's SM City Manila branch. The results of the laboratory tests showed that the
sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for
inland water imposed in accordance with law.4
On March 12, 2002, the LLDA informed SM City Manila of its violation, directing the same
to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said
company and ordering the latter to pay a penalty of "One Thousand Pesos (1,000.00) per
day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 4 February 2002, the date of
inspection, until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater."5
In a letter6 dated March 23, 2002, respondent's Pollution Control Officer requested the
LLDA to conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming that they already took measures
to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLDA.
In an Order to Pay7 dated October 2, 2002, herein petitioner required respondent to pay a
fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) which represents the accumulated daily penalty
computed from February 4, 2002 until March 25, 2002.
In two follow-up letters dated July 2, 20028 and November 29, 2002,9 which were treated
by the LLDA as a motion for reconsideration, respondent asked for a waiver of the fine
assessed by the LLDA in its March 12, 2002 Notice of Violation and Order of October 2,
2002 on the ground that they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the pH
levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their request for re-sampling
leading to a minimal damage to the environment. Respondent also contended that it is a
responsible operator of malls and department stores and that it was the first time that the
wastewater discharge of SM City Manila failed to meet the standards of law with respect to
inland water.
On January 10, 2003, the LLDA issued an Order10 denying respondent's request for a
waiver of the fine imposed on the latter.
On April 21, 2003, respondent submitted another letter11 to the LLDA requesting for
reconsideration of its Order dated January 10, 2003.
On May 27, 2003, the LLDA issued another Order to Pay 12 denying respondent's request
for reconsideration and requiring payment of the fine within ten days from respondent's
receipt of a copy of the said Order.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA praying for the
nullification of the Orders of the LLDA dated October 2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May
27, 2003.
On June 28, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting the petition of herein respondent
and reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of the LLDA. Ruling that an
administrative agency's power to impose fines should be expressly granted and may not
be implied, the CA found that under its charter, Republic Act No. 485013 (RA 4850), the
LLDA is not expressly granted any power or authority to impose fines for violations of
effluent standards set by law. Thus, the CA held that the assailed Orders of petitioner,
which imposed a fine on respondent, are issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse
of discretion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA via its
Resolution dated November 23, 2005.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
5.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PETITION CANNOT BE
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES, BY WAY OF
EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE.
5.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE PETITION OF
SM PRIME.
5.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LLDA WAS NOT CONFERRED
BY LAW THE POWER TO IMPOSE FINES AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT COLLECT THE SAME
FROM SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.14
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent with the CA is premature. Petitioners argue that respondent did not raise
purely legal questions in its petition, but also brought to the fore factual issues which were
properly within the province of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which is the agency having administrative supervision over the LLDA.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners aver that a reading of the provisions of Rule
43 of the Rules of Court would show that the CA has no jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent. Petitioners also assert that respondent is already barred
by estoppel from questioning the LLDA's power to impose fines, because it (respondent)
actively participated in the proceedings conducted by petitioners without challenging such
power.
Lastly, petitioners aver that the LLDA has the power to impose fines and penalties based
on the provisions of RA 4850 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 927.
The Court rules for the petitioners.
As to the first assigned error, the Court agrees with petitioners that respondent did not
exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to
seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all
the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.15 Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power
can be sought.16 The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones
cause of action.17 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons.18 The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts
of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the
case.19 While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to several
exceptions,20 the Court finds that the instant case does not fall under any of them.
It is true that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is when the issues raised are purely legal. However, the Court is not persuaded
by respondent's contention that the special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA
involved only purely legal questions and did not raise factual issues. A perusal of the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that factual matters were raised,
to wit: (a) whether respondent has immediately implemented remedial measures to
correct the pH level of the effluent discharges of SM City Manila; and (b) whether the third
party monitoring report submitted by respondent proves that it has complied with the
effluent standards for inland water set by the LLDA. Respondent insists that what has been
raised in the petition filed with the CA was whether the LLDA committed grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the evidence it presented and in proceeding to impose a penalty
despite remedial measures undertaken by the latter. Logic dictates, however, that a
determination of whether or not the LLDA indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in
imposing fine on respondent would necessarily and inevitably touch on the factual issue of
whether or not respondent in fact complied with the effluent standards set under the law.
Since the matters raised by respondent involve factual issues, the questioned Orders of the
LLDA should have been brought first before the DENR which has administrative
supervision of the LLDA pursuant to E.O. No. 149.211avvphi1
Neither may respondent resort to a petition for certiorari filed directly with the CA on the
ground that the Orders issued by the LLDA are patently illegal and amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction because, as will be subsequently discussed, the assailed Orders of the
LLDA are not illegal nor were they issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.
Anent the second assigned error, the Court does not agree with petitioners' contention
that the CA does not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari filed by
respondent questioning the subject Orders of the LLDA. Petitioners argue that Section
1,22 Rule 43 of the Rules of Court enumerate the quasi-judicial agencies whose decisions or
orders are directly appealable to the CA and that the LLDA is not among these agencies.
Petitioners should have noted, however, that Rule 43 refers to appeals from judgments or
orders of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. On the
other hand, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically governs special civil actions
for certiorari, Section 4 of which provides that if the petition involves acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or the rules, the petition shall
be filed in and cognizable only by the CA. Thus, it is clear that jurisdiction over acts or
omissions of the LLDA belong to the CA.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioners that respondent is already estopped from
questioning the power of the LLDA to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact that
respondent actively participated during the hearing of its water pollution case before the
LLDA without impugning such power of the said agency. In fact, respondent even asked for
a reconsideration of the Order of the LLDA which imposed a fine upon it as evidenced by
its letters dated July 2, 2002 and November 29, 2002, wherein respondent, through its
pollution control officer, as well as its counsel, requested for a waiver of the fine(s)
imposed by the LLDA. By asking for a reconsideration of the fine imposed by the LLDA, the
Court arrives at no conclusion other than that respondent has impliedly admitted the
authority of the latter to impose such penalty. Hence, contrary to respondent's claim in its
Comment and Memorandum, it is already barred from assailing the LLDA's authority to
impose fines.
In any case, this Court has categorically ruled in Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake
Development Authority,23 that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its
function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region. In expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication of
pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), 24 except
where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court
further ruled that although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not
preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of
responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.
In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority,25 this Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which sustained the LLDA's Order
requiring the petitioner therein to pay a fine representing penalty for pollutive wastewater
discharge. Although the petitioner in that case did not challenge the LLDA's authority to
impose fine, the Court acknowledged the power of the LLDA to impose fines holding that
under Section 4-A of RA 4850,26 as amended, the LLDA is entitled to compensation for
damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards. Section
4-A provides, thus:
the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the
surrounding areas. x x x28
Indeed, how could the LLDA be expected to effectively perform the above-mentioned
functions if, for every act or violation committed against the law it is supposed to enforce,
it is required to resort to some other authority for the proper remedy or penalty. The
intendment of the law, as gleaned from Section 4(i) of E.O. No. 927, is to clothe the LLDA
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those which are implied or
incidental but, nonetheless, are necessary or essential for the full and proper
implementation of its purposes and functions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June
28, 2004, and the Resolution dated November 23, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79192,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
dated October 2, 2002, January 10, 2003 and May 27, 2003, are
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay SO ORDERED.
and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality
standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public,
juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be
earmarked for water quality control management.

In addition, Section 4(d) of E.O. No. 927, which further defines certain functions and
powers of the LLDA, provides that the LLDA has the power to "make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time
within which such discontinuance must be accomplished." Likewise, Section 4(i) of the
same E.O. states that the LLDA is given authority to "exercise such powers and perform
such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under
this Executive Order." Also, Section 4(c) authorizes the LLDA to "issue orders or decisions
to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing."

In Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA,27 this Court had occasion to discuss the
functions of the LLDA, thus:

x x x It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative

agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws [PD
813 and EO 927], to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting
and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding Provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems,
and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under
such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake Region from
PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., G.R. No. 165299 LLDA conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent.[5] The result of the
Petitioner, laboratory analysis showed non-compliance with effluent standards particularly Total
Present: Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Oil/Grease Concentration
and Color Units.[6] Consequently, LLDA issued to petitioner a Notice of Violation[7] dated 30
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, October 2001 which states:
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
BRION, THE GENERAL MANAGER
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and PACIFIC STEAM LAUNDRY, INC.
ABAD, JJ. 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Brgy. Paraiso
Quezon City

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT Subject: Notice of Violation

AUTHORITY, Promulgated: PH-01-10-303
Respondent.
December 18, 2009 Gentlemen:
x--------------------------------------------------x
This refers to the findings of the inspection and result of laboratory analysis of the
wastewater collected from your firm last 5 September 2001. Evaluation of the results of
DECISION laboratory analysis showed that your plants effluent failed to conform with the 1990
Revised Effluent Standard for Inland Water Class C specifically in terms of TSS, BOD,
Oil/Grease and Color. (Please see attached laboratory analysis)
CARPIO, J.:
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to submit corrective measures to abate/control
the water pollution caused by your firm, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this letter.
The Case
Furthermore, pursuant to Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 984, PACIFIC STEAM
LAUNDRY, INC. is hereby ordered to pay a penalty of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per
day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from 5 September 2001, the date
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 30 June 2004 and the Resolution of inspection until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater and a fine of Five
dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238. Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) per year for operating without the necessary
clearance/permits from the Authority.

Very truly yours,

The Facts (signed)

CALIXTO R. CATAQUIZ
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of General Manager
laundry services. On 6 June 2001, the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) endorsed to respondent Petitioner submitted its application for LLDA Clearance and Discharge Permit and
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) the inspection report on the complaint of
black smoke emission from petitioners plant located at 114 Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon informed LLDA that it would undertake the necessary measures to abate the water
City.[3] On 22 June 2001, LLDA conducted an investigation and found that untreated
pollution.[8] On 1 March 2002, a compliance monitoring was conducted and the result of
wastewater generated from petitioners laundry washing activities was discharged directly
to the San Francisco Del Monte River. Furthermore, the Investigation Report [4] stated that the laboratory analysis[9] still showed non-compliance with effluent standards in terms of
petitioners plant was operating without LLDA clearance, AC/PO-ESI, and Discharge Permit
TSS, BOD, Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD), and Oil/Grease Concentration. It was reported
from LLDA. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of

that petitioners wastewater treatment facility was under construction. Subsequently,
another wastewater sampling was conducted on 25 April 2002 but the results [10] still
failed to conform with the effluent standards in terms of Oil/Grease Concentration.
Meanwhile, on 15 April 2002, a Pollution Control and Abatement case was filed against
petitioner before the LLDA. During the public hearing on 30 April 2002, LLDA informed
petitioner of its continuous non-compliance with the effluent standards. Petitioner
requested for another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002. The
laboratory results[11] of the wastewater sampling finally showed compliance with the
effluent standard in all parameters. On 9 August 2002, another public hearing was held to
discuss the dismissal of the water pollution case and the payment of the accumulated daily
penalty. According to LLDA, the penalty should be reckoned from 5 September 2001, the
date of initial sampling, to 17 May 2002, the date LLDA received the request for
re-sampling. Petitioner manifested that its wastewater discharge was not on a daily basis.
In its position paper[12] dated 25 August 2002, petitioner prayed that the Notice of
Violation dated 30 October 2001 be set aside and the penalty and fine imposed be
reckoned from the date of actual hearing on 15 April 2002.
On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay,[13] the pertinent portion of which
reads:
Respondent prayed that the Notice of Violation issued on 30 October
2001 and its corresponding daily penalty be set aside and that the
imposable penalty be reckoned from the date of actual hearing and not
on 5 September 2001. It is respondents position that the Notice of
Violation and the imposition of the penalty had no legal and factual
basis because it had already installed the necessary wastewater
treatment to abate the water pollution.
This Public Hearing Committee finds respondents arguments devoid of merit. Presidential
Decree No. 984 prohibits the discharge of pollutive wastewater and any person found in
violation thereof shall pay a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (PhP5,000.00) [sic] for
every day during which such violation continues. The mere discharge of wastewater not
conforming with the effluent standard is the violation referred to in PD No. 984. Sample of
respondents effluent was collected on 5 September 2001 and the results of laboratory
analysis confirmed the quality thereof. Thus, a notice of violation was issued against the
respondent after it was established that its discharge was pollutive. The fact that the
subsequent re-sampling reported compliance with the effluent standard does not negate
the 5 September 2001 initial sampling. Respondent passed the standard because it already
implemented remedial measures to abate the water pollution. It is therefore but just and
proper that the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling, 5 September
2001, to 17 May 2002, the date the request for re-sampling was received by the Authority.
The 5 June 2002 sampling confirmed that respondents effluent already complied with the
standard showing that its water pollution has ceased. Respondent did not submit any
proof of its actual operation hence, the penalty shall be computed for five (5) working days
per week, excluding Saturdays and Sundays as well as legal holidays from 5 September
2001 to 17 May 2002, for a total of one hundred seventy-two (172) days.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Pacific steam Laundry, Inc. is hereby
ordered to pay the accumulated daily penalty amounting to ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND (PhP172,000.00) PESOS within fifteen(15) days from receipt
hereof as a condition sine qua non for the dismissal of the above-captioned case.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied in its Order [15] dated
27 November 2002.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, as well as the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that LLDA has the power to impose fines, thus:
Concededly, the power to impose administrative fines in pollution
abatement cases was expressly granted under Section 9 of P.D. 984 to
the now defunct National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC), thus:
Section 9. Penalties. - (a) Any person found violating
or failing to comply with any order, decision or
regulation of the Commission for the control or
abatement of pollution shall pay a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos per day for every day during
which such violation or default continues; and
the Commission is hereby authorized and
empowered to impose the fine after due notice
and hearing.
Nonetheless, it may be well to recall that the LLDA was created under
R.A. 4850 with the end view of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces, and carrying out the development of the Laguna
Lake Region with due regard and adequate provisions for
 environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the preservation of undue
ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. To correct
deficiencies and clarify ambiguities that impede the accomplishment of
the Authorities goal, Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
promulgated P.D. 813. Finally, to enable the LLDA to effectively perform
its role, Former President Marcos further issued E.O. 927, which
granted the LLDA additional powers and functions, viz:
Section 4. Additional Powers and Functions. - The
authority shall have the following powers and
functions:
public health and welfare, the delegation of authority to the agency
is liberally construed.
The LLDA, as an agency implementing pollution laws, rules and
regulations, should be given some measures of flexibility in its
operations in order not to hamper it unduly in the fulfillment of its
objectives. How could it effectively perform its role if in every act of
violation, it must resort to other venue for the appropriate remedy,
because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal with it?[16] (Emphasis
in the original)

xxx The Issues

(d) Make, alter or modify orders

requiring the discontinuance
Petitioner raises two issues:
of pollution specifying the
conditions and time within
which such continuance must 1. Does the respondent LLDA have the implied power to
be accomplished. impose fines as set forth in PD 984?

xxx 2. Does the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose

penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of legislative
(i) Exercise such powers and perform powers?[17]
such other functions as may be
necessary to carry out its duties and
responsibilities under this Executive
order. The Ruling of the Court

Indeed, the express grant of power to impose administrative fines as

couched in the language of P.D. 984 was not reproduced in E.O. 927, We find the petition without merit.
however, it can be logically implied from LLDAs authority to exercise
the power to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of Power of LLDA to Impose Fines
pollution. In addition, the clear intendment of E.O. 927 to clothe LLDA
not only with the express powers granted to it, but also those implied, Petitioner asserts that LLDA has no power to impose fines since such power to impose
incidental and necessary for the exercise of its express powers can be penal sanctions, which was once lodged with the National Pollution Control Commission
easily discerned from the grant of the general power to exercise (such) (NPCC), is now assumed by the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to Executive Order
powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry No. 192 (EO 192).[18]
out its duties and responsibilities.
We disagree with petitioner.
This finds support in the wealth of authorities in American
Jurisprudence, citing adherence of other courts to the principle that the
Presidential Decree No. 984 (PD 984)[19] created and established the NPCC under the
authority given to an agency should be liberally construed in order to
permit the agency to carry out its statutory responsibilities. This is Office of the President. EO 192, which reorganized the DENR, created the Pollution
especially true where the agency is concerned with protecting the

Adjudication Board under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed the powers and
functions of the NPCC with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.
Section 19 of EO 192 provides:
SEC. 19. Pollution Adjudication Board. There is hereby created a
Pollution Adjudication Board under the Office of the Secretary. The
Board shall be composed of the Secretary as Chairman, two (2)
Undersecretaries as may be designated by the Secretary, the Director of
Environmental Management, and three (3) others to be designated by
the Secretary as members. The Board shall assume the powers and
functions of the Commission/Commissioners of the National
Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases under Republic Act 3931 and Presidential Decree
984, particularly with respect to Section 6 letters e, f, g, j, k, and p
of P.D. 984. The Environmental Management Bureau shall serve as the
Secretariat of the Board. These powers and functions may be delegated
to the regional officers of the Department in accordance with rules and
regulations to be promulgated by the Board. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6, paragraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), (k), and (p) of PD 984 referred to above states:
SEC. 6. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
xxx
(e) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Decree and
its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(f) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the
conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.
(g) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may
determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof: Provided, however, the Commission, by rules
and regulations, may require subdivisions, condominium, hospitals,
public buildings and other similar human settlements to put up
appropriate central sewerage system and sewage treatment works,
except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage works or
changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic
or sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided with
septic tanks or their equivalent. The Commission may impose
reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or renewal of all permits
herein required.
xxx
(j) Serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparations, or restitution of the damages
and losses resulting from pollution.
(k) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Decree and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Commission.
xxx
(p) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry
out its duties and responsibilities under this Decree.
On the other hand, LLDA is a special agency created under Republic Act No. 4850 (RA
4850)[20] to manage and develop the Laguna Lake region, comprising of the provinces of
Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan. RA 4850,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 (PD 813),[21] mandates LLDA to carry out the
development of the Laguna Lake region, with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution.[22]
Under Executive Order No. 927 (EO 927),[23] LLDA is granted additional powers and
functions to effectively perform its role and to enlarge its prerogatives of monitoring,
licensing and enforcement, thus:
SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The Authority [LLDA] shall
have the following powers and functions:
a) Issue standards, rules and regulations to govern the approval of plans
and specifications for sewage works and industrial waste disposal
systems and the issuance of permits in accordance with the provisions
of this Executive Order; inspect the construction and maintenance of
sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems for compliance to
plans.
b) Adopt, prescribe, and promulgate rules and regulations governing the Procedures of the
Authority with respect to hearings, plans, specifications, designs, and other data for
sewage works and industrial waste disposal system, the filing of reports, the issuance of
permits, and other rules and regulations for the proper implementation and enforcement
of this Executive Order.
 c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the Thus, in Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Court held that the
provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board,
regulations only after proper notice and hearing. except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. Indeed,
d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying even PD 984 authorizes the LLDA to undertake pollution control activities within LLDAs
the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be development area. Section 10 of PD 984 provides:
accomplished.
e) Issue, renew or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be
SEC. 10. Jurisdiction. The Commission [NPCC] shall have no jurisdiction
reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
over waterworks or sewage system operated by the Metropolitan
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial
Waterworks Sewerage System, but the rules and regulations issued by
disposal system or parts thereof: Provided, however, that the Authority, by rules and
the Commission for the protection and prevention of pollution under
regulations, may require subdivisions, condominiums, hospitals, public buildings and
the authority herein granted shall supersede and prevail over any rules
other similar human settlements to put up appropriate central sewerage system and
or regulations as may heretofore have been issued by other government
sewage treatment works, except that no permits shall be required of any new sewage
agencies or instrumentalities on the same subject.
works or changes to or extensions of existing works that discharge only domestic or
sanitary wastes from a single residential building provided with septic tanks or their
In case of development projects involving specific human
equivalent. The Authority may impose reasonable fees and charges for the issuance or
settlement sites or integrated regional or subregional projects,
renewal of all permits herein required.
such as the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority and the
f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend
Laguna Lake Development Authority, the Commission shall consult
or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is
with the authorities charged with the planning and execution of
necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
such projects to ensure that their pollution control standards
g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or
comply with those of the Commission. Once minimum pollution
instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this executive Order and its implementing
standards are established and agreed upon, the development
rules and regulations and the orders and decision of the Authority.
authorities concerned may, by mutual agreement and prior
(h) Authorize its representative to enter at all reasonable times any property of the public
consultation with the Commission, undertake the pollution control
dominion and private property devoted to industrial, manufacturing processing or
activities themselves. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
commercial use without doing damage, for the purpose of inspecting and investigating
conditions relating to pollution or possible or imminent pollution.
(i) Exercise such powers and perform such other functions as may
be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this In this case, the DENRs Environmental Management Bureau endorsed to LLDA the
Executive Order. (Emphasis supplied)
pollution complaint against petitioner. Under Section 16 of EO 192, the Environmental

Management Bureau assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC except with respect

A comparison of the powers and functions of the Pollution Adjudication Board and the to adjudication of pollution cases, thus:
LLDA reveals substantial similarity. Both the Pollution Adjudication Board and the LLDA
are empowered, among others, to: (1) make, alter or modify orders requiring the
SEC. 16. Environmental Management Bureau. There is hereby created an
discontinuance of pollution; (2) issue, renew, or deny permits for the prevention and
Environmental Management Bureau. The National Environmental
abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation
Protection Council (NEPC), the National Pollution Control
or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system; and (3) exercise such
Commission (NPCC) and the Environmental Center of the Philippines
powers and perform such other functions necessary to carry out their duties and
(ECP), are hereby abolished and their powers and functions are
responsibilities. The difference is that while Section 19 of EO 192 vested the Pollution
hereby integrated into the Environmental Management Bureau in
Adjudication Board with the specific power to adjudicate pollution cases in
accordance with Section 24(c) hereof, subject to Section 19 hereof. x x
general,[24] the scope of authority of LLDA to adjudicate pollution cases is limited to the
x (Emphasis supplied)
Laguna Lake region as defined by RA 4850, as amended.
The Environmental Management Bureau also serves as the Secretariat of the Pollution
Adjudication Board, and its Director is one of the members of the Pollution Adjudication
Board. Clearly, by endorsing to LLDA the pollution complaint against
petitioner, the Environmental Management Bureau deferred to LLDAs jurisdiction over the
pollution complaint against petitioner.
Although the Pollution Adjudication Board assumed the powers and functions of the NPCC
with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude LLDA from assuming
jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as
penalty.
Thus, in the recent case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake
Development Authority,[26] the Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals which
sustained LLDAs Order, requiring petitioner therein to pay a fine of P1,062,000
representing penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge. Although petitioner in that case
did not challenge LLDAs authority to impose fine, the Court acknowledged the power of
LLDA to impose fines, holding that under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is
entitled to compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and
effluent standards. Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, reads:
SEC. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources
of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet
established water and effluent quality standards or from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or
otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority
to be earmarked for water quality control and management.
Under Section 4(h) of EO 927, LLDA may exercise such powers and perform such other
functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities. In Laguna Lake
Development Authority v. Court of Appeals,[27] the Court upheld the power of LLDA to issue
an ex-parte cease and desist order even if such power is not expressly conferred by law,
holding that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in
the exercise of its express powers. The Court ruled that LLDA, in the exercise of its express
powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution
cases in the Laguna Lake region, has the implied authority to issue a cease and desist order.
In the same manner, we hold that the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise
of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the
Laguna Lake region.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
Petitioner contends that if LLDA is deemed to have implied power to impose penalties,
then LLDA will have unfettered discretion to determine for itself the penalties it may
impose, which will amount to undue delegation of legislative power.
We do not agree. Contrary to petitioners contention, LLDAs power to impose fines is not
unrestricted. In this case, LLDA investigated the pollution complaint against petitioner
and conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent. It was only after the
investigation result showing petitioners failure to meet the established water and effluent
quality standards that LLDA imposed a fine against petitioner. LLDA then imposed upon
petitioner a penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater. The P1,000
penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of penalty prescribed under PD 984:
SEC. 8. Prohibitions. No person shall throw, run, drain, or otherwise
dispose into any of the water, air and/or land resources of the
Philippines, or cause, permit, suffer to be thrown, run, drain, allow
to seep or otherwise dispose thereto any organic or inorganic
matter or any substance in gaseous or liquid form that shall cause
pollution thereof.
xxx
SEC 9. Penalties. x x x
(b) Any person who shall violate any of the previous provisions of Section Eight of
this Decree or its implementing rules and regulations, or any Order or Decision of the
Commission, shall be liable to a penalty of not to exceed one thousand pesos each day
during which the violation continues, or by imprisonment of from two years to six years,
or by both fine and imprisonment, and in addition such person may be required or
enjoined from continuing such violation as hereinafter provided.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, there are adequate statutory limitations on LLDAs power to impose fines which
obviates unbridled discretion in the exercise of such power.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 30 June 2004 and the
Resolution dated 8 September 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75238.
SO ORDERED.
THE ALEXANDRA CONDOMINIUM G.R. No. 169228 (e) Cluster E 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; E-1 and E-2.
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present: On 2 September 1987, the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission issued a
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, Development Permit to PhilRealty to develop Cluster A of the project. In the Development
CARPIO, Permit, PhilRealty was required to submit its condominium plans to the Building Official of
- versus - CORONA, Pasig City. Architect Walter R. Perez (Architect Perez), then Building Official of Pasig City,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and reviewed the Site Development and Location Plan as well as the Sanitary/Plumbing Plans
BERSAMIN, JJ. and Specifications of the project. On 24 September 1987, Architect Perez issued a Building
Permit. On 30 September 1987, Architect Perez issued a Sanitary/Plumbing Permit
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT Promulgated: acknowledging the fixtures to be installed but without indicating the System of Disposal
AUTHORITY, including a Waste Water Treatment Plan. On 15 December 1988, Architect Perez issued a
Respondent. September 11, 2009 Certificate of Final Inspection and a Certificate of Occupancy for Buildings A-1 to A-3.
x--------------------------------------------------x
PhilRealty undertook the same process for Clusters B, C, D, and E. Building Permits and
Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy were issued for these clusters from 1991 to
DECISION 1993. On 31 December 1993, upon completion of Buildings E-1 and E-2, PhilRealty
formally turned over the project to TACC. However, PhilRealty did not turn over the
CARPIO, J.: as-built plans for the perimeter drainage layout, the foundation, and the electrical and
plumbing layout of the project. Thereafter, TACC managed the project through Century
Properties Management Corporation.
The Case
On 24 June 1998, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) advised TACC that its
wastewater did not meet government effluent standards provided in Sections 68 and 69 of
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 26 April 2005 Decision[1] and 1 the 1978 National Pollution Control Commission Rules and Regulations (NPCC) as
amended by Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order
August 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82409.
No. 34.[3] LLDA informed TACC that it must put up its own Sewage Treatment Plant (STP)
for its effluent discharge to meet government standards.
The Antecedent Facts
Since a sewage treatment plant would cost approximately P15 million to put up, TACC
experimented with a proposed solution from Larutan Resources Development Corporation,
Philippine Realty and Holdings, Inc. (PhilRealty) developed, established, and constructed which treated the septic vault water with biological enzymes. Still, TACCs water discharge
failed to meet the government standards.
The Alexandra Condominium Complex from 1987 to 1993. In a Deed of Conveyance dated

18 April 1988, PhilRealty transferred to The Alexandra Condominium Corporation (TACC)
a parcel of land with an area of 9,876 square meters located at 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig
City as well as all the common areas of the project. The land was covered by Transfer
On 26 March 1999, LLDAs Environmental Division collected samples of TACCs
wastewater. In a report dated 6 April 1999, LLDA found two determinants in TACCs
samples:(1) Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) and (2) Oil/Grease (OG). LLDA found that
TACCs samples failed to meet government standards of 150 for COD and 5 for OG.

Certificate of Title No. 64355. In a Notice of Violation[4] dated 6 May 1999, LLDA directed TACC to submit corrective
measures to abate or control its water effluents discharged into the Laguna de Bay.LLDA
The condominium project consists of the following phases: likewise imposed upon TACC a daily fine of P1,000 from 26 March 1999 until full cessation
of pollutive wastewater discharge.

(a) Cluster A - 3 Five Storey Buildings; A-1, A-2 and A-3; TACC entered into an agreement with World Chem Marketing for the construction of the
(b) Cluster B - 2 Eleven Storey Buildings; B-1 and B-2; STP for P7,550,000. The construction was completed by the second week of October 2001.
(c) Cluster C - 2 Seven Storey Buildings; C-1 and C-2;
(d) Cluster D - 2 Fourteen Storey Buildings; D-a and D-2; and
In an Order dated 19 July 1999, LLDA stated that the daily penalty was imposed upon
TACC for the pollutive wastewater discharge, and to condone the penalty would be
tantamount to tolerating the pollution of the river bodies and the Laguna de Bay which is
contrary to LLDAs mandate.
On 1 April 2002, TACC requested LLDA to dismiss the water pollution case against it
because of the favorable analysis undertaken by the LLDAs Pollution Control Division on
28 February 2002. LLDA conducted a hearing on 26 April 2002. In its position paper filed
on 15 May 2002, TACC requested LLDA to condone the imposition of the penalty of P1,000
per day since March 1999 in recognition of the remedial and corrective measures it
undertook to comply with government standards.
On 4 September 2003, LLDA issued an Order requiring TACC to pay a fine of P1,062,000
representing the penalty from 26 March 1999 to 20 February 2002.
TACC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 26 April 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals resolved the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant petition is
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the prayer for temporary restraining order is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The Court of Appeals sustained LLDAs contention that the petition for certiorari was
prematurely filed. LLDA pointed out that TACC failed to file a motion for reconsideration
of the 4 September 2003 Order before filing the petition before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals also ruled that before a party is allowed to seek the courts intervention,
he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the proper remedy should have been to resort to an
administrative remedy before the DENR Secretary prior to judicial action. The Court of
Appeals noted LLDAs allegation of TACCs offer to compromise, which LLDA countered
with an advice to address the offer to the Commission on Audit (COA). Hence, the Court of
Appeals found that TACC had not abandoned its administrative remedies despite
simultaneous resort to judicial action.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Republic Act No. 4850[6] (RA 4850), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813,[7] LLDA shall be compensated for the damages to the water
and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay resulting from failure to meet established water
and effluent quality standards. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983,[8] LLDA is mandated to make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuation of pollution specifying the conditions and the time
within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. Further, the Court of Appeals
ruled that Presidential Decree No. 984[9] provides for penalties for violation or
non-compliance with any order, decision or regulation of the Commission for the control
or abatement of pollution.
TACC filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 1 August 2005 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
TACC raises the following issues in its memorandum:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
disregarding TACCs exhaustive efforts in
complying with the governments standards on
effluent discharge; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Non-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Court of Appeals ruled that due to the transfer of LLDA to the DENR under Executive
Order No. 149[10] (EO 149), TACC should have first resorted to an administrative remedy
before the DENR Secretary prior to filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first
made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under
their jurisdiction before the controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for
review.[11] A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without
cause of action and dismissible.[12]
EO 149 transferred LLDA from the Office of the President to the DENR for policy and
program coordination and/or administrative supervision x x x.[13] Under EO 149, DENR
only has administrative power over LLDA. Administrative power is concerned with the
work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.[14]
However, Executive Order No. 192[15] (EO 192), which reorganized the DENR, mandates
the DENR to promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land
pollution and to promulgate ambient and effluent standards for water and air quality
including the allowable levels of other pollutants and radiations.[16] EO 192 created the
Pollution Adjudication Board[17] under the Office of the DENR Secretary which assumed
the powers and functions of the NPCC with respect to the adjudication of pollution cases,
including NPCCs function to [s]erve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or
restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.[18] Hence, TACC has an
administrative recourse before the DENR Secretary which it should have first pursued
before filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Powers of the LLDA to Impose Penalty
RA 4850 specifically mandates LLDA to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo,
Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for
environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and
ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration
and pollution.[19] LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, has the responsibility to protect
the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants
emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.[20]
Under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, LLDA is entitled to compensation for damages
resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards, thus:
Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources
of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet
established water and effluent quality standards and from such other
wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or
otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority
to be earmarked for water quality control and management.
In the present case, TACC does not challenge LLDAs authority to impose the
fine. However, TACC argues that since it had already exhausted efforts and substantially
spent to comply with established effluent quality standards, the daily penalty imposed by
the LLDA is an unwarranted financial burden to its unit owners and should thus be
condoned. TACC further argues that the non-compliance with government standards was
due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty.
TACCs arguments have no merit.
PhilRealty formally turned over the project to TACC on 31 December 1993. Thereafter,
TACC managed the project. It was almost five years after, or on 24 June 1998, when LLDA
advised TACC that its wastewater did not meet government effluent standards. It is clear
that the responsibility to comply with government standards lies with TACC. If, as claimed
by TACC, the non-compliance was due to the omission and fault of PhilRealty, TACCs
recourse is to file an action, if warranted, against PhilRealty in a proper court.TACC cannot
escape its liability to LLDA by shifting the blame to PhilRealty. Hence, the LLDA did not
abuse its discretion in issuing its 4 September 2003 Order. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. This remedy is not administrative but

legislative, and need not be resorted to before filing a judicial action.

Condonation of Penalty and Pending Offer to Compromise
Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the Court of Appeals finding that there was a pending
offer to compromise when the petition for certiorari was filed before it. There is nothing in
As regards the condonation of the penalty, the power to compromise claims is vested
the records that indicates that TACC withdrew its offer of compromise. At the same time,
exclusively in the COA or Congress pursuant to Section 20 (1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I,
there is also nothing to indicate that TACC submitted a compromise offer to COA, as
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) which provides:
Auditor Malit had advised. Hence, it is not proven that this petition was simultaneously
Section 20. Power to Compromise Claims. - (1) When the interest of the
availed of with the offer to compromise.
Government so requires, the Commission may compromise or release in
whole or in part, any settled claim or liability to any government agency
not exceeding ten thousand pesos arising out of any matter or case Failure to File a Motion for Reconsideration
before it or within its jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the
President, it may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or
liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In case the claim or For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, TACC must
liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief show that (1) the LLDA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
therefrom shall be submitted, through the Commission and the discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain,
President, with their recommendations, to the Congress[.] x x x speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
In a letter dated 5 May 2004,[21] TACC manifested its offer to compromise by paying a
reconsideration of the assailed decision.[26] The purpose of this requirement is to enable
reduced fine of P500,000. In its response dated 8 July 2004,[22] LLDA stated that the
the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher
proposal would be forwarded to LLDAs Board of Directors although it is necessary that the
court.[27] To dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and
case be withdrawn from the court. In a letter dated 11 September 2004,[23] TACC stated
valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement.[28] Petitioner may not arrogate
that in a regular meeting held on 6 September 2004, the members of TACCs Board of
to itself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. [29]
Directors unanimously agreed to withdraw the petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals, provided the LLDA would agree to reduce the penalty to P500,000. In a letter
In the present case, TACC did not file a motion for reconsideration of the 4 September
dated 22 September 2004,[24] LLDA referred the offer to its resident auditor Antonio M.
2003 Order. TACC also failed to show sufficient compelling and valid reason to dispense
Malit (Auditor Malit) on the ground that only the COA had the authority to compromise
with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration. Hence, we agree with the
settlement of obligations to the State. In a letter dated 23 September 2004, Auditor Malit
Court of Appeals that the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed before it.
informed LLDA that the power to compromise claims is vested exclusively in the COA

pursuant to Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 1445.[25] Auditor Malit stated that the
Finally, TACC wants the Court to review the mandate of LLDA to help transform it from a
request for compromise should be addressed to COA. However, since the amount of the
regulatory agency into a developmental and promotional agency. However, we agree with
penalty sought to be condoned is P1,062,000, the authority to compromise such claim is
LLDA that such a review of LLDAs charter is not within the jurisdiction of this Court.
vested exclusively in Congress pursuant to Section 20 (1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I,
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 26 April 2005 Decision and 1 August

2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82409.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as
the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI and ENGR. BIENVENIDO
L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the
DENR-ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region
XI, petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE
GUZMAN, City Mayor, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari assailing the decision[2] dated May
28, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ of
mandamus and injunction in favor of respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner,
the Republic, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of Non-Coverage in
favor of respondent.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. Attached to the application were the required
documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed location map of the project site; b) brief
project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning and Development Office
that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB Region XI
denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an
environmentally critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No.
1586, otherwise known as the Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No, 1151, also known as the Philippine Environment
Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed
with the construction of its project.
Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a
petition for mandamus and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as
Civil Case No. 28,133-2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an
environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical area; thus it was
outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR,
through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the
required documents.
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of
mandamus and injunction is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and
against respondents Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the other
respondents by:
1) directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of
Non-Coverage, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection
with the construction by the City of Davao of the Artica Sports Dome;
2) making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151
and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA
system), which requires local government units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned
or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities are
mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant
effect on the quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the
Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica
Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project an
environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the
EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the
requirements for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of
mandamus to issue the CNC, if it refuses to do so.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence,
the instant petition for review.
With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment,
filed a manifestation expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to
secure an ECC for its proposed project. It thus rendered the instant petition moot and
academic. However, for the guidance of the implementors of the EIS law and pursuant to
our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar,[4] we are inclined to address the issue
raised in this petition.
Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,[5] otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to
be exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions,
governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are those that concern the health,
safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.[6] Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits
or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.[7] When
exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an
agency of the national government.[8] When engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an
agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.[9]
Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to promote
the peoples right to a balanced ecology.[10] Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao,
can not claim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with
governmental functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment,
which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part must be considered with
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the enactment.[11] The trial court,
in declaring local government units as exempt from the coverage of the EIS law, failed to
relate Section 2 of PD 1586[12] to the following provisions of the same law:
WHEREAS, the pursuit of a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection
program necessitates the establishment and institutionalization of a system whereby the
exigencies of socio-economic undertakings can be reconciled with the requirements of
environmental quality; x x x.
Section 1. Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to attain and maintain a
rational and orderly balance between socio-economic growth and environmental
protection.
xxxxxxxxx
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the
National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project
or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said
critical project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such
government offices, agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the
realignment of government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that no person, partnership or corporation shall
undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly
authorized representative.[13] The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical.
The state and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units[14] are juridical
persons.[15] Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the
coverage of PD 1586.
Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said law intends to implement the
policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development and
environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The
above-quoted first paragraph of the Whereas clause stresses that this can only be possible
if we adopt a comprehensive and integrated environmental protection program where all
the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the private sectors. The
local government units, as part of the machinery of the government, cannot therefore be
deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system.[16]
The foregoing arguments, however, presuppose that a project, for which an
Environmental Compliance Certificate is necessary, is environmentally critical or within an
environmentally critical area. In the case at bar, respondent has sufficiently shown that the
Artica Sports Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is
not an environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical
area. In support of this contention, respondent submitted the following:
1. Certification from the City Planning and Development Office that the project is not
located in an environmentally critical area;
2. Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO-West) that the project area is within the 18-30% slope, is outside the scope of the
NIPAS (R.A. 7586), and not within a declared watershed area; and
3. Certification from PHILVOCS that the project site is thirty-seven (37) kilometers
southeast of the southernmost extension of the Davao River Fault and forty-five (45)
kilometers west of the Eastern Mindanao Fault; and is outside the required minimum
buffer zone of five (5) meters from a fault zone.
The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports
Dome is not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally
critical project. It is axiomatic that factual findings of the trial court, when fully supported
by the evidence on record, are binding upon this Court and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[17] This Court is not a trier of facts.[18]
There are exceptional instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the
trial court, namely: a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) when the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but
is contradicted by the evidence on record; and j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.[19] None of these exceptions, however,
obtain in this case.
The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental
protection and regulates certain government activities affecting the environment, was
established by Presidential Decree No. 1586. Section 2 thereof states:
Under Article II, Section 1, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 1586, the
declaration of certain projects or areas as environmentally critical, and which shall fall
within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System, shall be by Presidential
Proclamation, in accordance with Section 4 of PD 1586 quoted above.
Pursuant thereto, Proclamation No. 2146 was issued on December 14, 1981,
proclaiming the following areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and
within the scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System established under PD
1586:

There is hereby established an Environmental Impact Statement System founded and A. Environmentally Critical Projects
based on the environmental impact statement required under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, I. Heavy Industries
including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking which significantly affect
a. Non-ferrous metal industries
the quality of the environment.
b. Iron and steel mills
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
Section 4 of PD 1151, on the other hand, provides: d. Smelting plants

Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all II. Resource Extractive Industries
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare,
a. Major mining and quarrying projects
file and include in every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the
b. Forestry projects
quality of the environment a detailed statement on

1. Logging
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking
2. Major wood processing projects
3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be public/private forests
implemented 4. Forest occupancy
5. Extraction of mangrove products
(c) alternative to the proposed action 6. Grazing

(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are c. Fishery Projects
consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the
same; and 1. Dikes for/and fishpond development projects

(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a III. Infrastructure Projects
finding must be made that such use and commitment are warranted.
a. Major dams
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled,
jurisdiction over, or special expertise on, the subject matter involved shall comment on the hydroelectric or geothermal)
draft environmental impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days c. Major reclamation projects
from receipt of the same. d. Major roads and bridges

B. Environmentally Critical Areas

 1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves,
wildlife preserves and sanctuaries;
2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened
species of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic
hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions;
said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally
critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of
Non-Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled
by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 28,133-2000,
granting the writ of mandamus and directing the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to issue in favor of the City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage, pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction of the
Artica Sports Dome, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

a. tapped for domestic purposes

b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by
appropriate authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities

11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following conditions:

a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;

b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong
winds and storm floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.

12. Coral reefs, characterized by one or any combinations of the following conditions:

a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;

b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.

In this connection, Section 5 of PD 1586 expressly states:

Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. All other projects, undertakings and areas not
declared by the President as environmentally critical shall be considered as non-critical
and shall not be required to submit an environmental impact statement. The National
Environmental Protection Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however
require non-critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental
safeguards as it may deem necessary.

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub does not come close to any of the projects or areas
enumerated above. Neither is it analogous to any of them. It is clear, therefore, that the
G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK, DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA BINAY, ELMA GARCIA,
VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO,
ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE DIMAYACYAC, RENATO
PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN, CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON
BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS, NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN,
GENALYN and JORVAN QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents FELICIANA
and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her parents
CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO BINAY, minor, represented by his
parents EFRENITA and CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and other
MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch VII, THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Region IV, represented by its Regional Executive Director and its Regional Director
for Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ORIENTAL MINDORO
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA, PUERTO GALERA MAYOR
GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY,
CENON SALCEDO, JERRY DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS,
MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN,
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and
DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR WILHELMINA LINESES, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Order2 dated 7 November 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 7 ("Manila RTC"), dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of
Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an
Environmental Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power
Corporation ("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary
mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove
area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.3
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power
barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power
barge would provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro
pending the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The
ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or
until 30 June 1999.4
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto Galera,5 sought
reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however, denied petitioners' plea on 15
July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction
to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the
following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for
Environment Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative ("ORMECO"),
which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain
officials of Puerto Galera.6 Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as
additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro represented by then
Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for the demolition of mooring
structures that respondents had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court issued a
20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the mooring facility.
However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCOR's manifestation
that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the
construction of the mooring facility.7
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the provincial
officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed
that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint
without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has no jurisdiction to
enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the
Manila RTC's territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160,9 and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of
the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
petitioners' complaint.
Hence, this petition.
 The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court's order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss tenable and
meritorious.
Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking this
legal action in Court x x x.
It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be x x x
elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the process of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that
before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of Justice, all remedies of
administrative character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should
first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978).
And petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition
dismissible (Chia vs. Acting Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on
lack of cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao, 111 Phil.
643; Sarabia vs. Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002, May 23, 1961; Gone,
et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975; Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al.,
L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28,
1983).
Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and bereft of
merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and there was an immediate
need for judicial intervention.
The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has jurisdiction
and authority over the same . . .. And corollary to this, the issue as to whether or not the
Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera bay and
protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact which the DENR may appropriately
resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].
This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the enforcement
of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be enforced within [the]
territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are being or about to be
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda,
197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court ruled: "Regional Trial Courts can only enforce
their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories. Furthermore, we
find the issuance of the preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of
Negros Occidental a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means
jurisdictional falsity) as the Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only
enforce their writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.
And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in the case at
bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated November 27, 1989,
and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National Power Corporation (NPC) is a
public utility, created under special legislation, engaged in the generation and distribution
of electric power and energy. The mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro
is one of its infrastructure projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380,
November 27, 1989 x x x.
And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs. Honorable
Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction to issue injunctive
writs against [the] National Power Corporation. The latter enjoys the protective mantle of
P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx xxx xxx
Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself together
with the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Even assuming
arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the latter enforce the same against
the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro which was impleaded by the petitioners as
a necessary party together with the Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the
government officials of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are
being performed outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the
injunction and annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all the
available administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunctive
writ prayed for in the Amended [Complaint].10
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.11
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of
action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of laws on
environmental protection and on local government participation in the implementation of
environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCOR's ECC. If
the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence, NAPOCOR or the provincial government
of Oriental Mindoro could not construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of
non-compliance with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility
becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners' main prayer, which is the
annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the
issuance of the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners' complaint.
Petitioners' complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether
petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Manila or Oriental
Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be determined by the residence of the
parties.12
Petitioners' main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent, DENR
Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Regional
Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office there.
Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive writs is
limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial
region.13 Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 ("PD No. 1818") prohibited14 courts from
issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring
facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 ("RA No. 8975"), which took effect on 26
November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates more clearly the coverage of the
prohibition, reserves the power to issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and
provides penalties for its violation.15 Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental
Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the
question of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that
its injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC,
although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However,
since the construction of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the
validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving petitioners' complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first
avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law
for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such
remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of a court's intervention
renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.16
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1) Presidential Decree
No. 1586 ("PD No. 1586") and its implementing rules establishing the Environmental
Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-3717 and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37.
Section 418 of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an environmentally critical project, or a
project located within an environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to
secure an ECC prior to the project's operation.19 NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because
the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is
located within an environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146,
issued on 14 December 1981.20
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional Directors on the
implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the final
decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal with
the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be immediately executory.
SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to grave abuse
of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would cause grave or
irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but not
limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:
Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those relating to the
issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and penalties. By inference,
the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-issuance of the ECC may also be
appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts prior to availing of this remedy would
make the appellant's action dismissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved party
of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will result in the
finality of the RED's or Secretary's decision(s), which can no longer be disturbed.
An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the RED's decision, unless the Secretary directs
otherwise.
The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the filing of
a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an opportunity to re-evaluate
his decision. (Emphasis added)
Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR Secretary
and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary
the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the
Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners' omission
renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action.21 Consequently, the Manila
RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action.
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with the DENR
Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of existing laws and
regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2)
Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), and (3) the
provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements for the zoning permit and
social acceptability of the mooring facility.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act exempts a
party from complying with the rule on exhaustion Of administrative remedies,22 this does
not apply in the present case.
Presidential Decree No. 1605
Presidential Decree No. 1605 ("PD No. 1605"),23 as amended by Presidential Decrees Nos.
1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone "the coves and waters
embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island." This decree provides in
part:
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction of
marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-commercial
wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera; the destruction
of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and coastline by large barges,
motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of destruction by other human activities are
hereby prohibited.
Section 2. x x x
No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other
commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of the Office
of the President upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism Authority. (Emphasis
supplied)
NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of "Puerto Galera Bay as protected by
Medio Island",24 PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that
Minolo Cove is one of the "enclosed coves of Puerto Galera"25 and thus protected under PD
No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In
any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power
barge that will supply 14.4 megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental
Mindoro, including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned
public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The
mooring facility is not a "commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking" as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the issuance
of the ECC does not violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like
wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants.
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to emphasize the
legislative concern "for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean
environment."26 These provisions require every national government agency or
government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local
government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of its sanggunian before
implementing "any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion
of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of
animal or plant species." Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance.
It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorized or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to
consult with the local government units, non-governmental organizations, and other
sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its
impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse
effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented
by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section . . . 26 hereof are
complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless
appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,27 the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean
projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections 26 and 27,
to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may
cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land,
rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species; and (6) other
projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing
in the locality where these will be implemented.
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners admit,28 the
mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not belong to any of
the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring facility. It is another
matter if the operation of the power barge is at issue. As an environmentally critical
project that causes pollution, the operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of
the concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the construction of
the mooring facility, not the operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC
does not violate Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.
Documentary Requirements for ECC Applications
Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an environmentally critical
area is required to submit an Initial Environment Examination, which must contain a brief
description of the environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process
undertaken, when appropriate.29 As part of the description of the environmental setting,
the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not submit to the
DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of consultations and the
issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission
renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the submissions
required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render the issuance of the
ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the
patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC "[without any]
semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when
manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or
has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid
of any color of authority."30
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under DAO
96-3731 to issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical areas. RED
Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the
Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with full authority pursuant
to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption is that he acted with the requisite
authority.32 This clothes RED Principe's acts with presumptive validity and negates any
claim that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his discretion. While
petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they must do so before the proper
administrative forum before resorting to judicial remedies.
On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial recourse
because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which requires it to
secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates
NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building permits,
from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCOR's ECC is subject to
cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify petitioners' conduct in
ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR
Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should comply with the
requirements of consultation and locational clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically,
petitioners themselves refuse to abide with the procedure for filing complaints and
appealing decisions laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address complaints for
the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC
must undergo an administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit
his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who will then render his
decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority
to issue cease and desist orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered
under DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions
of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners' complaint on
NAPOCOR's alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and maintain
the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost importance of
protecting the environment.33 Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of
violators of environmental laws.34 Legal actions to achieve this end, however, must be
done in accordance with established rules of procedure that were intended, in the first
place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 OTADAN vs. RIO TUBA NICKEL MINING CORP. Bataraza, Palawan and the undated Separate Letters, in the vernacular, of the residents of
Barangay Iwahig, Sarong, and Rio Tuba, Bataraza, Palawan are NOTED.
SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 23 2004.

G.R. No. 161436 (Lipin Otadan, et al. vs. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation.)

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 26, 2004 filed by the petitioners of
this Court's Resolution dated February 23, 2004 denying their petition for review on
certiorari for late filing, the Court resolved to DENY WITH FINALITY said motion for lack of
merit. It is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the
appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory.[1]cralaw

Moreover, the petitioners mainly assail the Decision dated September 30, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75014 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when
he issued the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) No. 0201-021-313 to the
respondent Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation for its Hydrometallurgical Processing
Plant in Barangay Rio Tuba, Municipality of Bataraza, Palawan. The issuance of the ECC is
an exercise by the Secretary of the DENR of his quasi-judicial functions. This Court has
consistently held that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.[2]cralaw It
has also been held that the exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a
matter that can best be discharged by the government agency concerned, and not by the
courts.[3]cralaw This Court has likewise consistently adhered to the principle that factual
findings of quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality and
are binding even upon the Supreme Court if they are supported by substantial
evidence.[4]cralaw Further, administrative agencies are given a wide latitude in the
evaluation of evidence and in the exercise of its adjudicative functions. This latitude
includes the authority to take judicial notice of facts within its special
competence.[5]cralaw The petitioners failed to present compelling reasons to warrant the
deviation by this Court from the foregoing salutary principles.

Likewise, the petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Attached Motion for Extension of Time
and Amended Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.

The Opposition dated May 7, 2004 filed by the respondent, the Letters, in the vernacular,
dated May 8, 2004, of the Katutubong Palawan at Katutubong Mulbog ng Barangay Sarong,