Fire Investigation Summary 2-1998

Fire Investigation Summary
Grain Elevator
Explosion
Haysville, Kansas
June 8, 1998
A series of explosions in a large
grain storage facility resulted in
the deaths of seven people.
Dust explosions are a leading

hazard in the grain industry. A
lack of proper housekeeping and
equipment maintenance can
contribute to the accumulation
of combustible dust. If
combustible dust is suspended
and ignited the resulting
explosions can result in the
loss of life and property.
National Fire Protection Association

Fire Investigations Department
On Monday, June 8, 1998, at approximately due to the damage that occurred in the
9:20 a.m., a series of explosions occurred at a central portion of the facility (in the
grain elevator facility in Haysville, Kansas tunnels beneath the silos and in the space
(five miles south of Wichita). There were under the headhouse). Information
seven fatalities as a result of the explosions. regarding the events that took place in
Ten workers were injured by the blasts. these areas prior to the explosions will be
difficult to obtain since all of the
NFPA Fire Investigator Robert Duval arrived employees working in this area at the time
at the site on Tuesday, June 9, 1998, and of the explosions were killed.
joined a team of investigators from Sedgwick
County; the City of Wichita, the Kansas State Following the initiating event, several
Fire Marshal's Office, and the Bureau of explosions occurred throughout the facility
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. (statements of witnesses regarding the
number of explosions ranged from two to
The grain elevator was one of the largest in five). The first explosion caused dust
the world. The facility contained 246 within the facility to be placed into
concrete silos, each measuring 30 feet (9.1 suspension in the air thereby contributing
m) in diameter and over 120 feet (36.6 m) in to a series of subsequent explosions.
height. Each silo could hold approximately
70,000 bushels (2,464 m3) of grain, making The rescue and recovery efforts that
the total capacity of the facility nearly 21 followed the explosions involved local,
million bushels (739,200 m3), including the 7 state, and federal resources. The
million bushels (246,400 m3) contained in the Sedgwick County Fire Department was
headhouse bins. At the time of the incident, assisted at the scene by the City of Wichita
the facility was filled to about 33 percent of Fire Department, Oklahoma City Fire
capacity. The facility measured over 2,700 Department Rescue Team, personnel and
feet (823 m) or approximately one-half mile equipment from both Fort Riley Army
in length. Wheat was the main product being Base and McConnell Air Force Base, as
stored in this facility. well as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) who
The explosions occurred as the facility was provided a Urban Search and Rescue
being prepared for the early summer harvest (US&R) Team from Lincoln, Nebraska.
of wheat in the Midwest. Workers were Several other local fire departments from
preparing the facility for the harvest by the Sedgwick County area also provided
cleaning the gallery houses at the top of the technical rescue and support personnel and
silos as well as the conveyor tunnels under additional equipment.
the silos. Routine maintenance, which
included greasing bearings on the four The rescue efforts continued for five days.
conveyor lines, was also taking place The efforts were originally focused on
throughout the facility. rescuing four workers that were last seen
in the tunnels in the south portion of the
An unknown ignition source ignited dust facility before the blast. Upon entering the
within the facility and resulted in a series of tunnels beneath the silos the rescuers were
explosions that killed seven workers and confronted with tons of grain. The
severely damaged the entire structure. The distribution chutes below each silo had
actual ignition source may never be known been destroyed in the blasts, allowing
1999 NFPA Fire Investigations Report Summary Haysville, Kansas Grain Elevator Explosion
grain to spill into the tunnels. The technical manual housekeeping, such as removing
rescue teams from the local fire departments dust from inaccessible places where dust
along with the US&R team from Lincoln, NE collection systems cannot reach.
had to construct shoring beneath each silo to
stem the flow of grain, and allow the removal The fact that dust provides a powerful fuel
of the grain by vacuum, as they searched. source must be stressed in training
The effort was scaled back on Saturday, June employees and contractors in the hazards
13, 1998. Rescuers then focused on making of dust handling and collection. A
the facility safe to conduct a recovery combination of respect for the power of
operation for the one remaining worker who dust explosions and appreciation for the
was located on July 22, 1998. Smoldering effect that a thorough housekeeping and
fires that had continued to burn in several maintenance program will have on
silos remote from the area where rescuers reducing the potential of an explosion is an
were operating were extinguished. important factor in employee training.
The entire facility suffered varying degrees Dust will always be present in grain
of damage. Production at the facility is back handling facilities. The control and
in partial operation utilizing about one-half of removal of this dust and the control or
the original capacity of the facility. The removal of potential ignition sources are
headhouse has been demolished. Temporary, the keys to eliminating the explosion
exterior bucket elevators are being used to hazard.
transport the grain product.
Grain elevator explosions and fatalities

associated with those explosions have been
reduced in recent years. As new facilities are
constructed, modern methods of dust
collection, and fire/explosion suppression and
prevention are implemented, reducing the
hazards posed by fire or explosion.
However, the potential for these hazards

continues to exist at many older facilities
where modern technology has not been
implemented. These facilities must rely on
the human factors of proper housekeeping
and preventive maintenance programs to
limit the potential for fire or explosion.
Figure 1: Photo showing damage to
The basic method of limiting the explosion headhouse structure (NFPA)
hazard is to reduce the potential fuel load.
This is accomplished through a
comprehensive housekeeping program, Written by Robert Duval, Fire Investigator
where dust accumulations are promptly and NFPA Fire Investigations Department
regularly cleaned. This should include a
complete dust collection system as well as
1999 NFPA Fire Investigations Report Summary Haysville, Kansas Grain Elevator Explosion
Fire Investigation The National Fire Protection Associations Fire
Investigations Department documents some of
the most significant fires and incidents
Summary throughout the world. The objective of these
investigations is to determine what lessons can
be learned from these incidents. The
information is then made available to the fire
safety community to be used in developing
future codes and standards. A complete listing
Grain Elevator of reports is available, either upon request or
can be viewed on our web page.
Explosion NFPA Fire Investigations Department
One Batterymarch Park

Quincy, MA 02269 USA
1-617-984-7467 (tel)
Haysville, Kansas 1-617-984-7056 (fax)
investigations@nfpa.org
June 8, 1998 www.nfpa.org
Related reports published by the Full copies of this report, or any

other Fire Investigation Report can
NFPA Fire Investigations be ordered, for a fee, by contacting
Department include: the NFPAs Charles S. Morgan
Library
Lenoir, North Carolina Dust Explosion 1-617-984-7445 (tel)

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Bombing/US&R 1-617-984-7060 (fax)
Operations library@nfpa.org
This summary may be reproduced in whole or in part for fire safety educational purposes so long as the meaning of the
summary is not altered, credit is given to the National Fire Protection Association, and the copyright of the NFPA is
protected. This may not be used for advertising or commercial purposes without the express consent of the NFPA. Each use
shall include the following statement: 1999 National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA
GRAIN ELEVATOR EXPLOSION
HAYSVILLE, KANSAS
JUNE 8, 1998
GRAIN ELEVATOR EXPLOSION
HAYSVILLE, KANSAS
JUNE 8, 1998
Prepared by
Robert Duval
Fire Investigator
National Fire Protection Association
ABSTRACT
On Monday, June 8, 1998, at approximately 9:20 a.m., a series of explosions occurred at

a grain elevator facility in Haysville, Kansas (five miles south of Wichita). There were
seven fatalities as a result of the explosions. Ten workers were injured by the blasts.
NFPA Fire Investigator Robert Duval arrived at the site on Tuesday, June 9, 1998, and
joined a team of investigators from Sedgwick County, the City of Wichita, the Kansas
State Fire Marshal's Office, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.
The grain elevator was one of the largest in the world. The facility contained 246
concrete silos, each measuring 30 feet (9.1 m) in diameter and over 120 feet (36.6 m) in
height. Each silo could hold approximately 70,000 bushels (2,464m3) of grain, making
the total capacity of the facility nearly 21 million bushels (739,200 m3), including the 7
million bushels (246,400 m3) contained in the headhouse bins. At the time of the incident,
the facility was filled to about 33 percent of capacity. The facility measured over 2,700
feet (823 m) or approximately one-half mile in length. Wheat was the main product
being stored in this facility.
The explosions occurred as the facility was being prepared for the early summer harvest
of wheat in the Midwest. Workers were preparing the facility for the harvest by cleaning
the gallery houses at the top of the silos as well as the conveyor tunnels under the silos.
Routine maintenance, which included greasing bearings on the four conveyor lines, was
also taking place throughout the facility.
An unknown ignition source ignited dust within the facility and resulted in a series of
explosions that killed seven workers and severely damaged the entire structure. The
actual ignition source may never be known due to the damage that occurred in the central
portion of the facility (in the tunnels beneath the silos and in the space under the
headhouse). Information regarding the events that took place in these areas prior to the
explosions will be difficult to obtain since all of the employees working in this area at the
time of the explosions were killed.
Following the initiating event, several explosions occurred throughout the facility
(statements of witnesses regarding the number of explosions ranged from two to five).
The first explosion caused dust within the facility to be placed into suspension in the air
thereby contributing to a series of subsequent explosions.
The rescue and recovery efforts that followed the explosions involved local, state, and
federal resources. The Sedgwick County Fire Department was assisted at the scene by
the City of Wichita Fire Department, Oklahoma City Fire Department Rescue Team,
personnel and equipment from both Fort Riley Army Base and McConnell Air Force
Base, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who provided a
Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Team from Lincoln, Nebraska. Several other local
1999 National Fire Protection Association Grain Elevator Explosion, Haysville, Kansas Page 1
fire departments from the Sedgwick County area also provided technical rescue and
support personnel and additional equipment.
The rescue efforts continued for five days before being scaled back on Saturday, June 13,
1998. The efforts were originally focused on rescuing four workers that were last seen in
the tunnels in the south portion of the facility before the blast. Upon entering the tunnels
beneath the silos the rescuers were confronted with tons of grain. In the blasts the
distribution chutes below each silo had been destroyed allowing grain to spill into the
tunnels. The technical rescue teams from the local fire departments along with the
US&R team from Lincoln, Nebraska, had to construct shoring beneath each silo to stem
the flow of grain, and allow the removal of grain by vacuum, as they searched. The
rescue effort was scaled back on Saturday June 13, 1998. Rescuers then focused on
making the facility safe to conduct a recovery operation for the one remaining worker
who was located on July 22, 1998. Smoldering fires that had continued to burn in several
silos remote from the area where rescuers were operating were extinguished.
The entire facility suffered varying degrees of damage. As of the release of this report
production at the facility is back in partial operation utilizing about one-half of the
original capacity of the facility. The headhouse has been demolished. Temporary,
exterior bucket elevators are being used to transport the grain product.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 4
II. Background
The Facility 5
Fire Department 7
Grain Storage and Handling 8
III. The Incident

Discovery and Occupant Activities 14
Fire Department Response/Operations 19
The Investigation 27
Damage 28
IV. Analysis
Origin and Cause 30
Discussion 30
V. Summary 35
VI. NFPA Documents 36
Appendix A - Abstract from Lenoir Dust Explosion Report 40

Appendix B - Reported Dust Explosions in US - 1997 41
Tables:
Table No. 1 - Probable Location of Primary Dust Explosion 42
Table No. 2 - Probable Ignition Sources in Grain Elevator
Dust Explosions 43
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has a long-standing fire investigations
program. Under this program NFPA documents incidents and analyzes the significant
factors that result in the loss of life and property. NFPA also reports lessons learned that
will affect life safety in the future, and prevention of property losses.
The NFPA became aware of the grain elevator incident on the day of the incident.
Robert Duval, Fire Investigator, traveled to Haysville, Kansas to perform an on-site study
of the incident. That five-day, on-site study and subsequent analysis of the incident were
the basis for this report. Entry to the fire scene and data collection activities were made
possible through the cooperation of the Sedgwick County Fire Department (SCFD) and
the Kansas State Fire Marshal's Office (KSFMO).
This report is another of the NFPA's studies of fires and other incidents that have
particular important educational or technical interest. All information and details
regarding fire safety conditions are based on the best available data, observations made
during the on-site data collection phase, and on any additional information provided
during the report development process. It is not the intention of the NFPA that this report
pass judgement on, or fix liability for, the loss of life and property resulting from the
grain elevator explosion. Rather, NFPA intends that this report present the findings of
the NFPA data collection and analysis effort and highlight factors that contributed to the
loss of life and property.
Current NFPA codes and standards were used as criteria for this analysis so that
conditions at the grain elevator on the day of the explosions could be compared with
state-of-the-art fire protection practices. It is recognized, however, that these codes and
standards may not have been in effect in Kansas during the construction or operation of
the facility. The NFPA has not analyzed the Haysville facility regarding its compliance
with local codes and standards that were in existence when the facility was constructed
and during its operations.
The cooperation of the Sedgwick County Fire Department; Wichita Fire Department; the
Kansas State Fire Marshal's Office; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency is greatly appreciated. All of these
agencies provided significant support and assistance in the on-scene and subsequent
report development portions of this process.
II. BACKGROUND
THE FACILITY
The grain elevator was constructed in 1953. The facility was a terminal-type elevator
with a capability of loading and unloading of both rail cars and over-the-road trucks. The
structure consisted of a total of 246 concrete silos, each measuring 30 feet (9.1 m) in
diameter. Each silo was 120 feet (36.6 m) high and had a capacity of 70,000 bushels
(2,464 m3) of grain. Interstitial spaces (fan bins) between silos at the ends of silo sections
were also utilized for grain storage. The total capacity of the facility was approximately
21 million bushels (739,200 m3). (The headhouse contained 16 bins with a total capacity
of approximately 7 million bushels (246,400 m3). The total length of the facility was
over 2,700 feet (823 m).
Diagram of facility Fig No. 1
The reinforced concrete headhouse structure located in the center of the facility stood
approximately 214 feet (65.2 m) high. The headhouse contained four bucket-type
elevators (legs) for transporting product to the upper levels of the facility. This
structure contained a single "manlift" for the movement of personnel to the upper reaches
of the structure. The headhouse structure consisted of multiple levels. The lowest level
referred to as the "boot pit," is where grain from both the truck and rail off-loading
operations was directed. The grain was then routed into the four legs for transport up to
the garner and scale levels. At the garner and scale levels in the upper portion of the
headhouse, the grain was weighed and routed onto conveyor belts for placement into
silos.
Fig. No. 2 - Typical concrete grain elevator (Fig-3-26F from Fire Protection
Handbook 18th Edition p 3-287)
The conveyor system at this facility consisted of four independent belts (two north and
two south). The fiber- reinforced rubber belts were routed through tunnels beneath the
silos and through gallery houses at the top of the silos. The four tunnels measured 8 feet
(2.4 m) wide and 7 feet, 3 inches (2.2 m) high and were constructed with walls and
ceilings of 8 inch to 16 inch (200 mm to 400 mm) thick concrete. Each tunnel was
approximately 1,050 feet (320 m) in length. There were several locations within the
tunnels where a worker could pass between two parallel tunnels. Access to the tunnels
was provided through hatches at numerous locations throughout the facility. The tunnels
contained the 42 inch (1.1 m) wide conveyor belts and associated drives and rollers.
The gallery houses were constructed of corrugated metal panels on steel frames. The
gallery houses measured 48 feet (14.6 m) wide and 12 feet (3.6 m) high. A single access
path (25 feet (7.6 m) wide) ran between the belts in the gallery houses.
The loading areas consisted of a rail siding on the west side of the facility and a truck
loading area on the east side. Rail cars or trucks could unload through chutes at the
bottom of the trailer or rail cars or be loaded via an overhead chute, in either facility. The
rail loading area had a corrugated metal roof on steel frame and was open on four sides.
The truck loading station consisted of two bays, one of which was enclosed and one
which was open-air.
A storage building was located alongside the southern half of the facility on the east side.
This structure consisted of a single-slope roof structure of corrugated metal panels on
steel frame. The building was approximately 1,200 feet (365.7 m) long and 50 feet (15.2
m) high at its highest point. This building was used to store maintenance equipment and
supplies. Eight warehouse structures were located on the east side of the northern portion
of the structure. These buildings were formerly used for grain storage. Tenants,
including a public warehouse and a metal materials dealer, occupied the buildings. The
warehouse buildings were 120 feet (36.6 m) wide and ranged from 500 feet to 750 feet
(152 m to 229 m) in length and were approximately 50 feet (15.2 m) high at the peak.
The facility office was located approximately 100 feet (30.5 m) east of the headhouse.
This single-story building was constructed of concrete block walls with a wood-frame
roof structure. This building measured approximately 100 feet by 30 feet (30.5 m by 9.1
m).
Dust collection in the facility was completed through a series of units located throughout
the complex. The main collection units were located outside at the loading/unloading
points of the complex. These units consisted of two cyclone-type collectors at ground
level and a bag-type collector located on top of the truck trailer loading station. A
collection bin, 20 feet (6.1 m) in diameter and 50 feet (15.2 m) high, was located adjacent
to the bag collector near the truck station. These units provided collection for the lower
levels of the loading stations (rail and truck) as well as the lower portion of the
headhouse. Numerous other ventilation fans and blowers were located on the east and
west sides of the silos. A dust collector was located on the roof of the headhouse. (This
unit was reported to be out of service at the time of the explosions.) Details on the dust
collection equipment are minimal due to the location of some of the units and the damage
incurred by the units.
FIRE DEPARTMENT
The Sedgwick County Fire Department (SCFD) is a full-time department with 139
members. The department staffs eight stations with 40 members assigned to each shift.
The department has seven engines and two aerial units and two special units. Emergency
medical coverage is provided by the Sedgwick County Department of Emergency
Medical Services, which staffs ten ambulances with 140 personnel.
Sedgwick County encompasses 640 square miles (1657.6-sq km) around the area of the
City of Wichita.
The SCFD responded to 5436 calls in 1997.
GRAIN STORAGE AND HANDLING
Raw Materials
Grains consist of many components that are combustible under certain conditions. The
components include starch, fibers, and oils. As whole grain kernels are broken during
handling and processing, the probability of a fire or explosion increases as the starch and
other particles are released. As the particle or kernels size decreases, the potential for
fire or explosions increases. The reduction of the kernel size occurs through the handling
of the products as well as milling and other processing steps.1
Storage
Grain in bulk commodities is stored in numerous types of facilities and configurations.

The most common configurations are upright structures such as concrete silos and steel
tanks. These installations utilize gravity for loading and unloading of product. The size
of these storage units can range from 1,000 bushels (35.2 m3) to upwards of 2 million
bushels (70,400 m3).
Belt Conveyors
The main function of grain elevators, other than the storage of the product, is the moving
of product both vertically and horizontally through a series of conveyors and other
methods.2
The trough-belt conveyor is the most common method of product transfer in the grain
industry. Based on the capacity of the operation, different belt widths and drive speeds
are available with this method. The Haysville facility was equipped with four continuous
trough-belt type conveyors (Conveyors Nos. 1 - 4). Belt conveyors are reliable and pose
limited maintenance requirements. However, the belts and associated drives are
susceptible to mechanical failure when poorly maintained. The hazards associated with
this type of product transfer are the fire hazard posed by the combustible rubber belting,
and the amount of dust generated at distribution points.3
1
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) pp. .3-2843-285
2
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) p. 3-286
3
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) pp. 3-2863-287
Bucket Elevators
Grain elevators are designed to use gravity by transporting the product to a high point and
allowing the grain to flow down through hoppers, garners, scales, and cleaning screens
before entering chutes that direct the product into storage bins or silos. Using gravity
reduces the handling of the grain, thus reducing the amount of breakage in the grain
kernels.
The bucket elevator is referred to as a "leg" in the grain industry. This method is the
main means by which elevation is achieved in a processing and storage facility. The
Haysville facility was equipped with four-bucket elevators in the headhouse structure. 4
Receiving and Shipping
The first and last distribution point in a grain processing facility is the load/off-load area.
Trucks and railcars are utilized to transport products. ( Barges and ocean going vessels
are utilized in port-based facilities.) The loading/off-loading areas can be enclosed or
completely in the open. These areas are connected with the main storage facility by
underground tunnels or overhead conveyor systems dependent on the type of vehicle or
vessel being accommodated.5
Dust Control
Each point in the distribution process can produce suspended dust. A complete dust
control system in a grain elevator facility contains different methods of control. Proper
housekeeping and maintenance of grain-handling equipment (controlling leaks in chutes
and other equipment), combined with the enclosure of handling equipment, the control of
belt speeds as well as the use of mechanical dust collection systems, can reduce the
amounts of dust released. Additives such as oil sprayed on grain products, are also
utilized to reduce dust emissions during handling. At the time of the incident, additives
were not used at the Haysville facility.
Mechanical dust control is the primary method of dust collection. The most common
type of collection is a baghouse installation. The baghouse consists of a series of fabric
filters to collect particles from air forced through the filter unit. The dust recovered from
the "bags" is collected and stored in a separate container or bin. Prior to the common use
of baghouse collectors, cyclone-type collectors were prominent. For this particular
application, cyclones are not as efficient as baghouse collectors in collecting smaller
particles. Cyclone collectors are sometimes used in series with a fabric filter system to
allow for the capture of larger particles, prior to the fabric collectors.6
4
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) p. 3287
5
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) p. 3-288
6
Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) p. 3290
Dust collection systems can pose a fire or explosion hazard due to the fact that the dust
accumulations are concentrated in the equipment and can serve as an avenue for flame or
explosion.
The Haysville facility contained a combination of baghouse and cyclone-type collection

systems. The dust collection systems were reportedly in the process of being upgraded
and repaired at the time of the explosions.
The Explosion Hazard
Dust explosions are a leading hazard in the grain industry. According to information
provided to NFPA from Kansas State University, there were a total of 16 agricultural dust
explosions in the United States in 1997. The 10-year average is 13 explosions per year.
A total of 14 people were injured in these explosions and there was one fatality. Nine of
the sixteen incidents occurred in grain elevators.
The primary explosion, in these cases, occurred in
Bucket elevators in eight incidents

Hammer mills in two incidents
Inside wood-frame elevators in two incidents
Inside a wood feed mill that was on fire
One each in a dust collector, distributor and storage silo
Wheat was listed as the fuel source in three of the incidents. Property damage was listed
at $11.4 million. (See Appendix B Reported Dust Explosions in US 1997)
Following the primary explosion, a secondary explosion occurs when the pressure wave
from the first explosion disturbs layers of dust, creating a dust cloud that is ignited by the
advancing flame front, causing a more severe and damaging explosion. The flame front
travels much slower than the pressure wave, thus can allow reaction time to avoid fire
and explosion hazards. This chain of events can occur several times in the course of a few
seconds resulting in widespread damage.
Elements of a Dust Explosion
NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and
Food Products Facilities lists four conditions that have to exist for a dust explosion to
occur:
The dust has to be combustible.
The dust particles have to form a cloud at or exceeding the minimum explosive
concentration (MEC) in air.
A source of ignition must be present.
The dust has to be confined within a piece of equipment, building, or other enclosure.
Confinement is the component of the explosion that contains the rapidly expanding
heated gases of combustion within an enclosure until the pressures exceed the ultimate
strength of the enclosure.
The conditions under which a grain dust explosion will occur consist of a complex
combination of dust particle size; the concentration in the air [oz/ft3 (g/m3)]; the energy of
the ignition source; and the moisture content of the dust (or percent relative humidity of
the air), and the actual composition of the dust.
Hot work operations, fires, overheated bearings, and electrical failures are among the
most frequent explosion ignition sources, according to information gathered by US
Department of Agriculture and Kansas State University. (Refer to Table No. 2 in
Appendix Section)
Each agricultural product has its own explosion characteristics. Studies of the
explosibility of agricultural dust show that minimum explosible concentration (MEC) for
dust concentrations needed for an explosion ranges from 0.025 to 0.500 oz./ft3 (25 to 500
g/m3). Grain dust generally varies from 0.025 to 0.060 oz/ft3 (25 to 60 g/m3).7
In comparison, suspended dust concentrations similar to those described above represent

a cloud dense enough that a 100-watt light bulb cannot be seen at a distance of
approximately 10 feet (3 m) or such that one's hand cannot be seen at arm's length. Such
dust concentrations would also make breathing extremely difficult without a respirator.8
Studies show that the highest dust concentrations often occur inside bucket elevators,
grain bins, scales, garners, and other enclosures. Maximum explosion pressures can
exceed 100 psig (690 kPa), with the maximum rate-of-rise of pressure approaching up to
8,500 psig/sec (58,608 kPa/sec). This rate-of-rise is an indication of the intensity and
speed of a grain dust explosion. When the rate-of-rise of pressure is higher, explosions
are more severe.9
The fuel: Dust particles from points within a grain elevator vary in size and composition.
Particles less than 100 microns pose the greatest hazard. A large amount of the dust
within the elevator environment is smaller than 100 microns. Larger particles tend to
settle quickly rather than stay suspended. Dust particles at or below 420 microns in size
can contribute to the density of a dust cloud.
7
R.K. Eckhoff Dust Explosions in Process Industries (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991), pp. 563
566.
8
Fire Protection Handbook 18th Edition (NFPA, 1997) p. 3-293
9
High concentrations of dust can occur in the enclosures of bucket elevators, conveyor
passages or tunnels, bins that are being loaded, silos, dust collecting systems, and
connecting ductwork.
A dust explosion is dependent on the release of heat from burning particles igniting near-
by particles. The spread of flame between particles creates pressure waves and thermal
expansion in air, which results in a shockwave strong enough to damage reinforced
concrete structures. U.S. Bureau of Mines studies have shown that a corn dust explosion
can produce a maximum pressure of greater than 100 psig (690 kPa). Concrete structures
can normally withstand up to 25 psig (172 kPa). Other enclosures can fail at pressures
less than 6 psig (41.4 kPa).
Dust in suspension is not the only fuel that may be available. Accumulation of dust on
surfaces such as floors, fixtures, and structural supports can become suspended by
vibrations or the primary explosion. Once this settled dust is suspended in air, the
resulting dust cloud can be ignited and result in additional explosions that may proceed
throughout the entire structure.10
Ignition sources: Once the dust is in suspension, an ignition source is required to

complete the explosion cycle. This ignition source must be of sufficient energy and
duration to ignite the dust cloud.
The ignition source that has been identified as a leading cause of explosions in
agricultural settings are those that occur during hot work operations. [By far the largest
percentages of grain elevator explosions (43.4 percent) are attributed to unknown ignition
sources.]11
Other ignition sources include, but are not limited to the following:
Fires and heat caused by the frictional energy of mechanical equipment, such as
bucket elevators, bearings, and belt drives
Heat or arcing caused by the failure of electrical equipment, such as lighting, motors,
and wiring
Open flames from matches or smoking, space heaters, lightning, and internal
combustion engines on vehicles such as industrial trucks
The majority of identified locations of explosions in grain elevators are associated with
the bucket elevator. This single piece of operational equipment presents the most serious
ignition hazard to the grain handler. The elevator equipment produces ignition energy in
several ways. Malfunctions such as overloading or stalling of the belt generate frictional
10
Fire Protection Handbook 18th Edition (NFPA,1997) p. 3-294
11
Table 3-26D Fire Protection Handbook 18th Edition
heat on the revolving drive pulleys. This has been known to burn the belt material to the
point of failure, allowing the severed and flaming pieces to drop within its housing. 12
Another source of ignition in bucket elevator assemblies is overheated bearings. When

bearings overheat, enough energy is often produced to ignite stationary or suspended
dust.13
Foreign material such as scrap metal, tools, pieces of wood, stone, or concrete can result
in clogging portions of the elevator or conveyor systems and result in equipment
malfunction that can produce sparks or heat energy. Grates, screens, pneumatic
separators, and magnets are often used to remove such materials before they find their
way into the product stream. Such equipment is required in Paragraphs 5-5.1.1 and 5-
5.1.2 of NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions in
Agricultural and Food Products Facilities, 1995 Edition.14
Oxygen: Atmospheric oxygen concentrations are sufficient to sustain a dust explosion.
Confinement: The pressures generated during dust explosions increase until the oxygen
is consumed or the explosion is vented. With no confinement, pressures remain low.
When the pressures are confined, they can build to over 100 psig (690 kPa). Elevator
structures cannot withstand pressures of this magnitude and serious damage often results.
Constructing elevator structures to withstand pressures of this magnitude is often not
practical.15
If a dust explosion hazard exists in an enclosure, explosion venting should be provided.

This venting should be distributed over the exterior of the structure and should direct the
forces of a blast to a safe, outside location away from platforms, means of egress or other
potentially occupied areas. The design of explosion relief venting shall consider the
limitations imposed by the structural design of the enclosure and shall offer the least
possible resistance to explosion pressures, with the following exceptions: tunnels and pits
where explosion venting is not practical due to soil confinement or building constraints,
and bins and silos where explosion venting is not practical due to bin or silo geometry or
building constraints.16
12
13
14
15
16
NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Product
Facilities, 1995 Edition.
III. THE INCIDENT
Diagram of location of personnel at the time of the explosion Fig No.3
DISCOVERY AND OCCUPANT ACTIVITIES
The incident occurred on Monday morning, June 8, 1998, at approximately 9:20 a.m. At
the time of the incident there were 27 employees, contractors, and drivers on-site.
Location of Personnel
Four employees were in Tunnel No. 1 (southwest) at the time of the incident. Three
were removing spilled grain from the tunnel floor, while the fourth was greasing
bearings on Conveyor No. 1. These four were working in the area of the 400-800
series numbered silos. Two additional employees were assisting in the clean-up
operation from the ground level, outside, by removing and lowering the buckets being
used to remove the waste grain from the tunnels.
Two employees and two contractors were located at the south end of the structure off-
loading fertilizer from rail cars.
Three maintenance contractors and one employee were in the maintenance shop
completing the fabrication of some sheet metal parts.
Four employees were on the scale level (near the top of the structure) of the
headhouse, cleaning and performing other maintenance duties. Another employee
was in the south gallery house, near the 200-400 series of silos, performing cleaning
and maintenance functions.
Three truck drivers were on the property at the time of the blast; one was in the truck-
loading bay adjacent to the base of the headhouse, while the other two were waiting
to be off-loaded. One employee was in the scale office weighing trucks as they
entered the complex.
A single employee was performing cleaning tasks near the trailer-loading bay, while
the truck was being off-loaded. This cleaning consisted of sweeping and shoveling
waste grain and debris into a small bucket loader for disposal.
Two employees were located in the train-loading portion of the facility on the west
side of the facility. These employees were sitting in the office under the train-shed
canopy.
The facility superintendent was in his office in the office building, 100 feet east of the
headhouse.
At or about 9:20 a.m., the truck driver off-loading grain in the trailer bay reported hearing
a "metallic" sound from within the headhouse and then saw a flash of flame coming from
the pit below the floor of the off-loading station. The flames shot out of the space below
the floor and toward the driver. He indicated that he instinctively backed away and fled
the trailer bay as an explosion occurred around him, sending dust and debris flying in all
directions. The driver reported being thrown to the ground. After regaining his balance,
he blindly fled the scene stumbling in the direction of the office. This driver suffered
cuts, scrapes and bruises.
Photo No. 1 - Truck loading area at the base of the headhouse. (NFPA)
Photo No. 2 - Truck loading area, facing south showing area where worker was killed.
(NFPA)
The employee that was working adjacent to the trailer off-loading bay was thrown against
the trailer bay by the force of the blast as the pressure destroyed the base of the
headhouse. He was killed instantly.
The employee in the gallery house reported feeling the structure shake under his feet.
When he glanced up he saw a "cloud of dust" traveling toward him in the gallery
enclosure. As the dust passed over him, he says he felt a blast of air, but little heat and no
flame. He was able to escape out onto the roof of a nearby silo, where he waited to be
rescued. (The blast had destroyed all of the ladders that provided an alternative means of
egress from the top of the silos.)
The employees in the train office reported hearing several smaller blasts before a large
blast that sent debris, along with large
sections of the headhouse base, hurtling
toward the office, destroying the train shed
canopy. They ducked and braced
themselves as the debris struck the office.
The four men loading fertilizer in the south

end of the facility reported hearing and
feeling several smaller blasts prior to the
large blast that sent large sections of the
south end wall of the silos flying toward
them. The sections of concrete and
reinforcing steel bars struck the trucks and
the loader that they were using, seriously
damaging both.
Photo No. 3 - Train shed area after the

blasts. (NFPA)
The men in the maintenance shop reported hearing several small explosions and then the
large blast that seemed to come from the headhouse. They were able to take cover in the
maintenance shop area. The superintendent, seated in his office was startled by the initial
blasts and then took cover in his office as the large blast sent large pieces of concrete and
metal flying toward the office building, breaking windows, and damaging outside walls.
The two other truck drivers in the yard stated that they felt the ground shake before they
witnessed the final blast that blew the headhouse apart.
One of the employees assisting in the removal of the waste grain from the tunnels, stated
that he had just turned to remove a bucket when a tremendous blast lifted the 400-pound
(182-kg) metal cover of Tunnel 2 and threw it upward. The cover wrapped around the
bottom of the steel structure that made up the floor of the gallery house, 120 feet (36.6 m)
above. The force from the blast threw him backward and onto the ground, burning his
face and upper body in the process. The other employee that was assisting aboveground
in this same area caught the full force of the blast as he stood over the access to Tunnel 1.
The blast threw his body upward approximately 20 feet (6.1 m). His body struck a silo
and was thrown to the ground several feet southwest. He was killed instantly.
Photo No. 4 - Upper levels of headhouse where three workers were rescued (NFPA)
The four men working in the scale level at the upper reaches of the headhouse reported
seeing flames at the east side of the structure, as they felt the initial blasts rock the
structure. One employee was able to scramble through a hatch as the large blast tore
though the scale level, literally blowing the east and west walls open. He was able to
escape out on the roof of one of the silos nearby. It was here that he was rescued hours
later. The other three employees in the scale office were badly burned and were trapped
in the office until rescue crews removed them.
The bodies of the four employees working in the tunnel were eventually found in the
tunnel, near the point where they were working. The coroner's report indicated that the
men died in the blast, when the explosion tore the equipment from the supports in the
tunnels and threw it long distances within the tunnel enclosures. Three of the men were
found in the days immediately following the blast. The body of the fourth man was
located on July 22, more than six weeks after the blast.
A man standing in his yard, approximately one-half mile southwest of the facility
reported feeling a blast wave that knocked him to his knees. When he looked in the
direction of the facility he reported seeing flames rolling through the gallery house on the
north side of the structure, destroying much of the structure.
One of the first calls to 911 reporting the blast was from the electric power station located
across 55th Street (South), (one-half mile north). The caller reported a large blast and
that it was hard to determine the damage to the facility from the distance and with the
cloud of dust that now surrounded the entire complex.
Drivers in the yard of a metal supply company located on the grounds of the facility (a
quarter mile north of the headhouse) reported seeing fire rolling through the gallery
house, from north to south, at the time of the blasts.
FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE / OPERATIONS
The calls began to flood the local 911 center, immediately following the blast. In the first
five minutes following the explosion, the Sedgwick County Emergency Communications
Center, received 55 calls, in a matter of minutes, reporting the blast. (The center
normally receives 50 calls an hour.) One of the calls received was from the father of one
of the victims. The employee that had scrambled out onto the silo roof from the scale
office had his cellular phone with him and had placed a call to this father stating that he
was stranded on the roof of the facility and was injured. This information was passed on
to the incident commander (IC).
Sedgwick County Division Chief Gary Denny was overseeing the transfer of equipment
from an engine to a reserve unit at Station 34, which is located at the junction of 71st
Street (South) and West Street, four miles southeast of the scene. As the changeover was
taking place, Chief Denny reported a "cold rain shower" swept through the area that had
just departed. As he went inside the station, a Lieutenant came to him and asked him to
come back outside to take a look at something.
The grain elevator was visible from the rear of the station. The elevator now appeared to
have steam rising from the top of it. Chief Denny initially attributed this "steam" to the
rain that had just occurred hitting the hot concrete roofs of the silos. Upon closer
observation, Chief Denny said that the headhouse "didn't look right."
Prior to seeing the "steam" rising from the elevator, the crews in Station 34 reported
feeling what they thought was thunder. This turned out to be the vibrations from the blast
moments before.
While observing the elevator, Station 34 was dispatched, as part of a first alarm
assignment, to respond to the elevator for a possible collapse. Chief Denny responded
ahead of the other units in the chief's vehicle and arrived within minutes. As he neared
the complex Chief Denny reported that he could see that the building had suffered serious
damage and he requested a second alarm.
Note: First Alarm Assignment for SCFD consists of 3 engines, 1 ladder
company, an EMS unit, and a Division Chief. The technical rescue teams
from both Sedgwick County and City of Wichita were dispatched as well,
due to the reported collapse. The rescue teams consist of 5 members from
the SCFD and 5 members from Wichita FD per shift, as well as apparatus
from both departments. The second alarm assignment was a duplication of
the first alarm assignment.
Rescue Teams: All members are certified SCUBA divers and are also
The original command post was established inside the entrance to the facility on
trained at different competency levels in High Angle, Confined Space,
Hoover Road. From this vantage point Chief Denny could see the devastation. He
Trench, Building Collapse, Water Rescue, and Extrication.
requested additional staff Chiefs to assist in setting up the Incident Command System.
He also requested that the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) be opened at the
courthouse in Wichita, due to the fact that this was a large-scale incident that was most
likely going to be a long-term operation. SCFD Chief Gary Curmode responded to the
EOC.
Responding apparatus were staged at the entrance to the facility at Hoover Road. Chief
Denny moved the command post closer to the facility, on the access road, and began
assigning units to specific tasks. Station 34 units were designated as the Rescue Group,
and were told by Chief Denny to complete a survey of the facility and determine the need
for additional resources. Chief Denny then requested two additional EMS units. He also
requested a helicopter from the local U.S. Air Force base (McConnell Air Base).
However, there were only fixed-wing aircraft based there. The closest U.S. Army base,
Fort Riley, was then contacted. A rescue helicopter team was dispatched from the base,
to the scene. The Army helicopter had a 45 to 60 minute response time. A regional
hospital-based medical helicopter was sent to the scene, as well.
Chief Denny began to receive reports of fatalities and numerous injured and trapped
employees. Chief Denny reports that among his concerns at this point were additional
explosions. The first reports from the facility staff were that there were a total of 18
people missing. This number was reduced as workers made their way out from behind
the massive complex and began to report to the office. The first "firm count" conducted
by FD and EMS personnel was that there were two confirmed fatalities, nine missing or
unaccounted-for employees (five above grade and four below grade) and several with
injuries ranging from cuts and bruises to fractures and internal injuries.
As the scope of the incident became clearer, additional resources from the surrounding
area were called. The nearby city of Wichita dispatched 8 units and personnel to the
scene.
Construction cranes responded voluntarily to the scene from local construction sites after
hearing of the blast. These cranes were used to rescue those workers trapped on the silos
and in the upper reaches of the headhouse.
The Wichita FD Command Van arrived and the Command Post was moved to this
vehicle. The van is equipped with communication gear, including radios and cellular
phones, as well as large windows on one side to allow a better view of the scene.
At a point one hour into the incident, the IMS consisted of the following:
Haysville Grain Elevator IMS Chart
One Hour into the Incident
Incident Command
Sedgwick Cty Fire Chief
EOC
Safety Staging
Liaison
Operations Branch Law Enforcement Branch

SCFD Divsion Chief State and Local PD
Rescue Group EMS Group Fire Suppression Group

Technical Rescue Teams Sedgwick Cty EMS Sedgwick Cty FD
SCFD
Wichita FD
A staging area was set up on-site using the many access roads on the property. Liaisons
were assigned to work with the police, coroner, Red Cross, and Salvation Army, and the
media.
Due to the scale of the damage and the unique rescue challenges faced by the responders,
a decision was made to contact an Urban Search and Rescue Team (US&R) to assist in
what was most likely going to be a long-term operation. Command contacted the
Oklahoma City FD for such a team. The OCFD team responded the 165 miles (265.6-
km) north to the scene and arrived at approximately 12:00 p.m.
Additional technical rescue resources were requested through the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA deployed the Nebraska Task Force (NE-TF1) to
the scene. An advance team of incident support personnel (IST) arrived at 9:00 p.m. that
evening, with the remainder of the team arriving hours later.
FEMA US&R Program
FEMA developed the US&R program following Hurricane Hugo and the Loma
Prieta earthquake in 1989, when the need for a cadre of trained rescuers that
could be quickly mobilized to respond to such disasters became apparent. The
program currently consists of 27 task forces located throughout the country,
each composed of 62 members drawn from a variety of disciplines and divided
into four major branches: Search, Rescue, Medical, and Technical. Each
multidisciplinary task force is self-sufficient and can be en route to a disaster
with a full complement of personnel and equipment within 6 hours of
notification.
The search component of each task force is responsible for locating trapped
victims using a combination of technical search equipment, such as cameras
and listening devices, and canine search teams. The rescue component, which
is responsible for rescuing the victims the search teams locate, is made up of
personnel trained in skills such as shoring, rope rescue, and confined space
operations. The medical component, composed of paramedics and physicians,
is primarily responsible for supporting task force members, rather than victims.
And the technical component, one of the most diverse teams, is made up of
specialists in the areas of documentation, structural engineering, hazardous
materials, logistics, and communications.
Each task force brings with it a standard cache of equipment that provides the
task force with everything it needs to operate at a disaster scene for up to 72
hours. This includes such items as generators, concrete cutting saws, hydraulic
lifting equipment, ropes, a wide variety of hand tools, wheel barrows, lighting,
communications, and so on. Task Forces also come prepared to house and
feedRescue
The themselves for up to 72 hours so that they won't strain the local resources,
Operations
which are already pushed to the limit by the disaster. The cache includes tents,
food, water, and sleeping bags.
Once the members of the SCFD and WFD technical rescue teams arrived, they were
divided into teams and given the task of surveying the entire complex to search for
victims and potential hazards to rescuers. As the military helicopter completed aerial
reconnaissance, the technical rescue teams circled the complex on foot and began to
encounter casualties. The first fatality was located earlier on the southwest side of the
complex. This was the worker assisting the tunnel cleaning operation at an access point
to Tunnel Nos. 1 and 2.
Shortly after the victim was located at the tunnel access point, another victim was spotted
on the top of the silos south of the headhouse. A team from the technical rescue group
gained access to the top of the silos in the area north of the headhouse by using a
construction crane. The team of four rescuers was brought to the top of an intact silo just
north of the headhouse. From this location this team rescued the badly burned victim.
After removing the first victim at this location, the team then began to enter the top levels
of the severely damaged headhouse. They first accessed the roof of the structure and
began to work downward. On a level just above the silo roofs (over 135 feet from ground
level), they located two more badly burned victims in a control room. These victims
were lowered down a central ladder in the headhouse and then to the silo roof so that the
crane basket could lower them to the ground.
One of the victims from the control room told rescuers that he thought that someone was
on a level above where he was found. The rescue team made one final entry into the
headhouse and worked upward through twisted debris. They located another victim on a
level 50 feet above where the previous victims had been located. This victims condition
was deteriorating rapidly and he needed to be removed quickly. He was placed in one of
the rescuers harnesses and lowered to another team of rescuers and was then lowered to
the ground where he was flown by medical helicopter to the nearest trauma center.
Meanwhile, on the ground, access to Tunnel Nos. 1 and 2 had been gained at two points
on the west side of the facility. These points were referred to as Access Point Nos. 1 and
2. No.1 was the normal access point to the tunnels used by the workers located near the
south end of the facility. No. 2 was a point in between Nos. 12 and 13 silos south of the
headhouse. These points were the normal access points for maintenance work. They had
to be shored up completely before entry could be made. Before the arrival of the OCFD
and the NE-TF1, the local rescue teams (SCFD and WFD) began operations in these
areas. The rescuers encountered tons of grain that had spilled in each of the tunnels.
The force of the blasts tore the metal "drain-off" chutes from the bottom of many of the
silos in the south end of the facility. The concrete bottom of each silo contained an 18-
inch square opening that was equipped with a chute to control the flow of grain to the
conveyor belts in the tunnels. Without the chutes, there was nothing to hold back the
thousands of bushels of grain from spilling into the tunnels.
Photo No. 5 - Rescuers entering Tunnel No. 1 (NFPA)
As rescuers entered the tunnels, they not only encountered the spilled grain but also had
to work around the damaged and displaced machinery within the limited area of the
tunnels. Shoring was placed at the "drain-off" points to slow and eventually stop the flow
of grain. This plywood shoring was originally held in place with screw-type jacks placed
horizontally in the tunnels, until the grain below could be vacuumed out. Then vertical
wood shoring (four by four-inch timbers) was installed. Work was conducted with non-
sparking tools due to the possibility of another explosion in the dust-laden atmosphere.
Access to the tunnels was controlled; logs were being kept of personnel entering the
tunnels and how long they spent in the confined space. Air monitoring was conducted
throughout the operation. Crews were rotated frequently and groups worked in 12-hour
shifts.
Eventually three large vacuums were brought to the scene to assist in the grain removal.
The grain was transferred to railcars by the vacuum units.
Photo Nos. 6a/6b - Photos of grain vacuum operations - NFPA
Canine teams from both the local and FEMA US&R teams were brought in to locate the
missing workers. The dogs and their handlers had to traverse the grain piles and debris in
the tunnels while searching for the missing men. When a dog would "hit" on a certain
area, that area would be marked and the rescue teams would concentrate on that area,
until a victim was found or the area was ruled out. Often pieces of clothing or other
belongings of the missing workers were located in this manner.
During rescue operations on Wednesday, June 10, some grain shifted and a piece of
shoring moved, temporarily trapping two rescuers in the tunnel. They were cut-off from
the remainder of the team working in the tunnels by the displaced plywood and grain.
The other teams in the tunnel quickly replaced the dislodged shoring and removed
enough grain to free the two rescuers, who were unharmed.
Two additional access points were created by cutting through 8-inch to 14-inch (200 mm
by 350 mm) thick concrete walls and floors. One access point consisted of cutting
through the top of the tunnel at a point 21 silos south of the headhouse. This was known
as Access No 3. The concrete in this area was 12 inches (300 mm) thick. As soon as the
concrete was removed, the crews were faced with a pile of grain 8 feet (2.4 m) deep.
More vacuuming commenced at this point. The other access point was through the floor
of a "screen house." This is an open space at the bottom of the silo that was nearly 20 feet
(6.1 m) high. Filter and collection equipment was located in the space. A 2 feet by 4 feet
(50 mm by 100 mm) hole was cut in the floor of this space to create Access Point No. 4.
Photo Nos. 7a/7b - Access Point Nos. 3 and 4 (NFPA)
Three of the missing employees were located on Wednesday, June 10, near where they
were last reported working, in Tunnel No. 1 in the 800 series of silos. The coroner
determined by the condition of the bodies that they had died instantly in the blast.
Rescue operations continued non-stop until early morning on Saturday, June 13, when
Tunnel No. 1 had been searched from Access Point No.1 in the south through to Access
Point No. 2, approximately 800 feet (244 m) to the north. By this time the search canines
had again been sent through, and this time there were no "hits." It was decided that the
operation had become one of recovery and was no longer a rescue effort.
Saturday morning at 8:00 a.m., a crane was again used to lift rescuers to the top of the
silos to search for the remains of the last worker and to allow for another survey of the
silos.
Fires that had been smoldering within several silos were located during this phase of the
operation as well. The extinguishment of the fires within the silos continued for several
weeks after the incident. Cranes were used in this effort. In some cases fire hoses were
lifted up while fire fighters wet the smoldering grain piles from above. A wrecking ball
was also used to punch holes in the sides of the silos containing burning grain. As the
grain spilled out, the fires were then extinguished. For the interior silos, holes were
breached in the walls of the outer silo, the silo cleaned out and a small loader was driven
inside as the wall to the interior silo was breached. The product from the inner silo was
removed by the loader and then brought outside for extinguishment.
During the rescue
operations the fires within
the silos were constantly
monitored. However, they
were not extinguished for
fear that disturbing the
product in the silos and
pouring thousands of
gallons of water into the
structure would impact the
rescue operations.
Photo No. 8 Burning silo

on June 12, 1998. (NFPA)
The visible fires were located north of the headhouse structure and several hundred feet
from where the rescue operations were taking place.
One of the injured workers from the scale office area died on Friday, June 19, from
complications from the injuries he sustained in the blast. This brought the death toll to
six confirmed fatalities with one worker still missing.
While elevator workers were removing grain from the remaining silos, on July 22, they
discovered the remains of the last worker, in Tunnel No. 1, near Silo No. 626. This
brought the final death toll to seven.
Demolition of the headhouse structure began on Wednesday, June 24, 1998. A crane was
used to remove sections of the upper portions of the structure and hanging pieces of
concrete were trimmed off. Eventually, the entire headhouse structure was dismantled by
late July.
THE INVESTIGATION
The investigation into the explosions at the grain elevator began upon the arrival of the
fire department. Sedgwick County Fire Investigator, Walter Rooney, arrived at the site at
10:12 a.m. and began surveying the damage. Due to the scope of the incident,
Investigator Rooney requested assistance from the City of Wichita and the Kansas State
Fire Marshal's office. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms also sent an agent
to assist in the investigation.
The team of nine investigators began to document the damage at the scene, including an
aerial reconnaissance by helicopter to photograph the upper portions of the structure. The
locations of the two confirmed fatalities were photographed and otherwise documented in
the early moments of the investigation.
The investigators began interviewing employees and other witnesses regarding what they
had seen and heard in the time before and during the explosions. Injured victims were
interviewed in the hospital or in their homes. The investigators frequently conferred and
shared information when returning to the scene. The interviews continued through
Thursday, June 11.
Upon the arrival of the NFPA investigator, the team briefed him on the status of the
investigation and Investigator Rooney brought the NFPA investigator on a tour of the
site.
Two explosion specialists, brought in by FEMA to assist in the rescue operations, were
interviewed by the investigation team as to their theories regarding the blasts. These
experts were able to clarify many facts about dust explosions for the investigation team.
They were also able to explain the forces at work in selected areas of the facility by
viewing the damage.
Access to the tunnel areas, the base of the headhouse, and the "boot pit" area was very
limited due to safety concerns. Therefore, the investigation team was not able to directly
view much of the severely damaged areas of the facility. Interviews conducted with
rescue workers that had access to the damaged areas gave investigators insight into the
extent of damage in these areas. The NFPA investigator was granted access to Tunnel
No. 1 during search operations and was able to view some of the damaged areas
firsthand.
DAMAGE
The following physical damage occurred in the

blasts.
Headhouse: Severe structural damage was

suffered on all levels. Large holes were blown
in the east and west walls of the scale and
garner levels. Long tears in the concrete walls
were found on all sides of the structure. The
base of the structure as well as the below-grade
areas were seriously damaged, with all
equipment in these areas destroyed. Each of
the four legs within the structure suffered
extensive damage. Leg No. 1 appeared to have
been exposed to pressure from within, with the
bottom of the leg being distorted outward.
Photo No. 9 - Damaged Headhouse Structure

(NFPA)
It appears from aerial
photographs that the
vents at the top of each
leg were not blown off in
the blasts. More detailed
damage estimates are not
available due to the
limited access to the
structure. The entire
headhouse was
demolished within weeks
of the incident.
Photo No. 10 -
Headhouse Damage
(NFPA)
Silos: Several silos suffered major structural damage. Six silos in the north section of the
facility had large portions blown out in the blasts, causing the contents of the silos to spill
outside the structure. Many other silos had sections of concrete walls removed by the
force of the blasts. Many silo tops were blown off or displaced during the blast. Several
of these tops collapsed into the affected silos. The displaced tops hung over the sides of
the silos. Both the north and south ends of the silos suffered similar damage. The fan bin
spaces on each end, where the conveyor belts run, were blown open, exposing the belts.
All other silos suffered varying amounts of damage.
Photo Nos. 11a/b - Damage to Silos (north end of elevator) (NFPA)
VI. ANALYSIS
ORIGIN AND CAUSE
As of this writing, the specific origin and cause of the series of explosions have not been
determined. Access to many areas of the site was difficult, if not impossible, during this
investigation. In the weeks following, as the most severely damaged portions of the
complex were demolished or dismantled, investigators had opportunities to view the most
damaged areas. Until the many sources of ignition can be examined and ruled out, an
exact cause may not be known. (Refer to Table Nos. 1 and 2 in the Appendix section.)
OSHA investigators have released preliminary information stating that a worn

concentrator roller bearing in Tunnel No. 2 caused the roller to seize resulting in
frictional heat that ignited grain dust around the roller. This initial ignition of dust
resulted in the series of explosions.
The blasts and associated

pressure waves and flame
fronts passed horizontally
through all four of the
tunnels beneath the silos,
as well as vertically
through the headhouse
structure. The silo tops
and gallery house
structures on the north
side of the headhouse
suffered more serious
damage than did the
southern portions.
Photo No. 12 - Aerial View of Silo Damage (Kansas State Fire Marshals Office- Used
with Permission)
DISCUSSION
Dust Control/Collection - There were conflicting reports as to the amount of dust

accumulations in different areas of the facility. When interviewed, employees were
asked about dust control/dust accumulations and the answers ranged from "very good" to
excessive amounts of the dust throughout. One of the collectors was reported to be out of
service at the time of the explosion. However, this was not in the area where the
explosions began.
Past history has shown a need for dust control in grain elevators. This control should not
be limited to the installation of dust control/collection equipment. A systematic approach
to the control of dust is necessary to reduce the potential of an explosion. This approach
should include system designs that control the amounts of liberated dust, including
mechanical dust collection at transfer points within the system, maintenance of dust
collection equipment, as well as a high standard of housekeeping throughout the facility.
The following material was taken from the Fire Protection Handbook, 18th Edition
Chapter 3, Section 26, Storage and Handling of Grain Mill Products.
The design of dust collection systems must provide sufficient capture

velocity at the point of emission, particularly at conveyor loading and
discharge points. Design must also provide sufficient air velocity
[typically between 3,500 and 4,000 ft per min (1068 to 1220 m/min)]
within the ducts to prevent settlement of the particles and subsequent
plugging. Blast gates and fresh-air inlet dampers are necessary to balance
the airflow to all points served by the system so that starving of some
remote emission points is avoided. Operators must understand the dust
collection systems, so that they can monitor and maintain their
effectiveness on a daily basis.
If a baghouse or fabric filter is used, the porosity of the filter media must
be maintained to avoid diminishing the airflow. High humidity and fine
dust particles often form a cake on the bags and reduce the air passage. In
such instances, replacement or laundering of the bags is necessary. (See
NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Materials,
and NFPA 650, Standard for Pneumatic Conveying Systems for Handling
Combustible Particulate Solids, for further information on the application
and design of air-moving systems.)
Containment of dust to selected points or the proper return of the dust

downstream of the capture point not only makes the mechanical dust
collection system more effective, but also limits the amount of manual
housekeeping effort needed to reduce accumulated dust.
Typical methods to reduce dust liberation from grain include reducing the
distance and velocity grain is allowed to free fall onto conveyors or from
spouting. (Choke feeding, where possible, is the best approach to limit
grain velocity.) Reduction of conveyor belt speeds and adequate belt
tension can both be effective dust control methods where horizontal belt
conveyors are used. Well-designed transition points that do not have
abrupt changes in direction can also limit the amount of dust liberated
from the grain. Additives, such as soybean or mineral oil, have been
proposed as an additional method to control dust. Research is being
conducted to determine whether these additives deteriorate grain quality
for the end-user and whether grain so treated can meet the grading
standards of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
Regardless of the facility design or amount of mechanical dust collection,

manual housekeeping efforts are important in grain elevator facilities.
Although safe levels of accumulated dust are impossible to determine,
housekeeping programs at each facility should be designed to keep the
dust accumulation at the lowest feasible level. This housekeeping program
should focus on not only grain dust but also any type of combustibles to
reduce the possibility of their providing an ignition source for a dust
explosion. Good maintenance to spouts and other equipment leaking grain
dust is also an essential element to explosion prevention. In addition,
proper safety procedures must be followed to avoid ignition sources while
blowing down overhead ledges. Some in industry use vacuum systems to
clean overhead and floor areas in lieu of blow down, or they use periodic
wash down of some areas, such as reclaim tunnels. Further, new
techniques are sometimes used to pressurize key areas of a facility to
prevent dust from escaping the equipment.17
Venting - The actual deflagration-venting configuration at this facility was difficult to

examine due to the extent of damage throughout the complex. It appeared from a review
of aerial photos and reconnaissance that the vents at the top of the headhouse did not
open completely during the blasts.
Explosion venting must be directed to the outside of the structure to avoid secondary
explosions or employee injury. It would be difficult to redesign existing elevator
installations with adequate deflagration venting. However, recently designed structures
can often be adapted for increased venting.
An alternative method to venting is the installation of an explosion suppression system.

Explosion suppression consists of the injection of an inert gas (i.e., CO2) or water into
equipment in the early stages of the deflagrations development to slow and then stop the
process.18
Equipment Maintenance - A program of preventive maintenance should be established

to monitor, maintain, and repair vital equipment, as needed. Such a program would
reduce breakdowns, and disruptions to production, and allow for the reduction of ignition
sources. The program should include regularly scheduled lubrication of bearings and
other rotating equipment. Belts and chains should be examined for tightness. Damaged
equipment should be repaired or replaced. Dust collection equipment and filters should
be frequently checked, cleaned, or replaced.
17
18
The use of high-speed grinding equipment should be closely monitored due to the large
number of sparks created during any cutting or grinding.
The examination and maintenance of dust collection/control equipment should also be

included in the maintenance plan.
Electrical equipment should be kept clean, and fixtures kept tight against dust. Lighting
fixtures should have protective globes in place. Qualified personnel should complete
electrical maintenance. The power should be secured and hazardous dust accumulations
cleaned before such maintenance.
The energy inherent in electrical systems is extremely high, but can be minimized as an
ignition source by strict adherence to the provisions of NFPA 70, National Electrical
Code (NEC ), for the appropriate hazardous area classification. For areas that have an
exposure to higher levels of airborne and layered dust, electrical equipment is normally
rated as explosion-proof for Class II, Division 1, Group G areas. Other areas can be rated
for electrical equipment that is suitable for Class II, Division 2 (dusttight), Group G
locations. Many in the industry choose to utilize electrical equipment that has a dual
rating for Class II, Division 1 and 2, Group G areas to avoid the problem of the wrong
equipment getting in an area. The importance of proper electrical equipment applies to
both fixed and portable equipment. This consideration is important for portable electrical
devices, lighting, low-voltage control circuitry, extension droplights, and
communications equipment.19
Hot work operations should be rigidly controlled and monitored. A "Hot Work Permit"
system should be instituted to allow management to oversee such work. Outside
contractors should be closely monitored when conducting cutting or welding and other
spark producing operations (i.e. grinding or drilling). These contractors are not usually
familiar with the grain handling operations and may not be aware of the hazards
presented by conducting these operations in some areas of the facility. 20
Grain Fires - After the initial rescue/recovery phase was completed, the fire department
was then confronted with extinguishing several fires burning deep within grain bins and
silos.
Grain bin fires are particularly difficult to deal with depending upon location or the fires
and the quantity of grain involved. In addition to the fire hazard, silo fires should be
approached as a potential explosion hazard. Openings, such as aeration fans, portals, and
ductwork should be sealed off to limit the source of oxygen. If water is applied into the
bin, a fog spray is recommended to wet down the dust on top of the silo, including any
accumulations under the silo top roof; care should be taken not to create a dust cloud.
19
20
Small surface fires can be extinguished using a fog nozzle and removed from the top
manually.
If burning or suspect grain is allowed to flow from the bin, it should be directed to the
outside by spouting or conveyed to the outside using portable augers or evacuators.
Suspect grain should never be handled in bucket elevators or other enclosed equipment.
This would increase the explosion hazard potential.
Deep-seated fires in grain bins or inside large grain storage structures are the most
difficult to deal with because of the amount of grain to be handled and the difficulty of
locating and accessing the fire. If a pipe or fire hose can be extended into the fire area, it
is possible to apply water to that portion of the grain mass. It is nearly impossible to
apply water to the grain surface to put out deep-seated fires, and the application of
excessive amounts of water can create structural hazards and can destroy grain that can
otherwise be reclaimed.
In all cases of dealing with a grain fire in storage structures, a careful plan should first be
established to deal with such fires, following these principles:
Shut off the grain flow

Seal off all openings that allow oxygen to reach the fire, including shutting down
aeration or roof exhaust fans
Use fogging nozzles to wet down dust and grain
Do not allow high-pressure water streams to be applied that could create dust clouds
Carefully consider how suspect or burning grain will be removed from storage
Do not needlessly expose anyone to the fire or a dust explosion hazard21
Fire Control Systems
There are few applications within a grain elevator where automatic sprinkler protection
would provide efficient protection. This is due to the potential damage to piping and
equipment from explosion shockwaves. The speed in which a deflagration and flame
front would move through the facility would not allow time for the fusible links on the
sprinkler heads to react and activate.
The location of fire extinguishers throughout the facility, near potential ignition sources,
would allow personnel to combat fires in the incipient stage.22
21
22
V. SUMMARY
Grain elevator explosions and fatalities associated with those explosions have been
reduced in recent years. As new facilities are constructed, modern methods of dust
collection, and fire/explosion suppression and prevention are implemented, reducing the
hazards posed by fire or explosion.
However, the potential for these hazards continues to exist at many older facilities where
modern technology has not been implemented. These facilities must rely on the human
factors of proper housekeeping and preventive maintenance programs to limit the
potential for fire or explosion.
The basic method of limiting the explosion hazard is to reduce the potential fuel load.
This is accomplished through a comprehensive housekeeping program, where dust
accumulations are promptly and regularly cleaned. This should include a complete dust
collection system as well as manual housekeeping, such as removing dust from
inaccessible places where dust collection systems cannot reach.
The fact that dust provides a powerful fuel source must be stressed in training employees
and contractors in the hazards of dust handling and collection. A combination of respect
for the power of dust explosions and appreciation for the effect that a thorough
housekeeping and maintenance program will have on reducing the potential of an
explosion is an important factor in employee training.
Dust will always be present in grain handling facilities. The control and removal of this
dust and the control or removal of potential ignition sources are the keys to eliminating
the explosion hazard.
VI. NFPA DOCUMENTS
The following is a list of the NFPA documents that contain information relating to grain
processing, control of dust, cutting and welding processes, and electrical installations.
This standard prescribes requirements for

NFPA 61, Standard for the Prevention of safety to life and property from fire and
Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural explosion and to minimize the resulting
and Food Products Facilities damage if a fire or explosion occurs.
The standard applies to all facilities that

handle, process, blend, mill, receive, load,
ship, package, store, or unload dry
agricultural bulks materials, their by-
products, or dusts that include grains,
oilseeds, agricultural seeds, legumes, sugar,
spices, feeds and other related materials.
This standard provides minimum

NFPA 91, Standard for Exhaust Systems requirements for the design, construction,
for Air Conveying of Materials installation, operation, testing and
maintenance of exhaust systems for air
conveying of materials except as modified
or amplified by other applicable NFPA
standards.
The purpose of this standard is to eliminate

or reduce known fire and explosion hazards
inherent in the use of exhaust systems and
to prevent them from becoming a means
for spreading fire.
This standard shall apply to all pneumatic

NFPA 650, Standard for Pneumatic conveying systems that transport combustible
Conveying Systems for Handling particulate solids, combustible dusts, or hybrid
Combustible Particulate Solids mixtures containing dusts, regardless of
concentration or particulate size, including
systems that convey nuisance or fugitive
combustible dusts.
The purpose of this standard shall be to provide

the technical requirements for pneumatic
conveying systems that will provide safety to
life and property from fires and deflagrations,
and minimize the damage in the event that they
occur.
This standard has been prepared for the
NFPA 51B, Standard for Fire Prevention guidance of cutters and welders (including
in Use of Cutting and Welding Processes persons who perform welding and cutting),
fire watchers, their supervisors (including
outside contractors), and those in
management on whose property cutting and
welding is to be performed.
This standard covers provisions to prevent

loss of life and property from fire in the use
of oxy-fuel gas and electric arc cutting and
welding equipment where such equipment
is used for cutting and welding.
The purpose of this code is the practical

NFPA 70, National Electric Code safeguarding of persons and property from
hazards arising from the use of electricity.
The National Electrical Code (NEC) is the

most widely adopted set of electrical safety
requirements in the world and is offered for
use in law and fore regulatory purposes in
the interest of life and property protection.
The NEC covers:
1) Installation of electric conductors and

equipment within or on public and private
building or other structures, including
mobile homes, recreational vehicles, and
floating buildings, and other premises such
as yards, carnival, parking and other lots,
and industrial substations.
2) Installation of conductors and equipment

that connect to the supply of electricity.
3) Installations of other outside conductors

and equipment on the premises.

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code 4) Installations of optical fiber cable.
5) Installations in buildings used by the

electric utility, such as office buildings,
warehouses, garages, machine shops,
recreational buildings that are not an
integral part of a generating plant,
substation, or control center.
The following is the document containing information on the management system for the
operation of fire and rescue personnel at emergency incidents.
This standard establishes minimum

NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire performance requirements for an incident
Department Incident Management System management system based on concerns for
the safety and health of fire department
personnel. The benefits of an incident
management system extend far beyond this
single concern, but personnel health and
safety is considered to be the most
important reason to implement an incident
management system. This standard also
may be permitted to be used for guidance
in meeting the requirements for an incident
command system as outlined in other
NFPA documents, including NFPA 471,
Recommended Practice for Responding to
Hazardous Materials Incidents, and NFPA
472, Standard for Professional
Competence of Responders to Hazardous
Materials Incidents.
The incident commander has the ultimate

responsibility for the safety of all fire
department personnel operating at an
incident and for any and all other persons
whose safety is affected by fire department
operations. Risk management provided a
basis for the following:
(a) Standard evaluation of the situation

(b) Strategic decision-making
(c) Tactical planning
(d) Plan evaluation and revision
NFPA 1561, Standard on Fire (e) Operational command and control
Department Incident Management System
Many of the requirements of this standard
could be satisfied by adopting a model
system (such as the Incident Command
System) that is intended to provide for a
uniform approach to incident management
while providing for some variations to
meet local requirements.
An incident management system is

intended to provide a standard approach to
the management of emergency incidents.
The primary objective is always to manage
the incident, not to fully implement and
utilize the incident management system.
The command officer should be able to
apply the incident management system in a
manner that supports effective and efficient
management of the incident. The use of
the system should not create an additional
challenge for the incident commander.
APPENDIX A
Abstract from Lenoir Dust Explosion Report
On Sunday, November 20, 1994, at approximately 3:41 p.m., a series of explosions

occurred at a furniture manufacturing facility in Lenoir, North Carolina. There were two
fatalities and four injuries as a result of this incident.
The North Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health invited the NFPA Fire
Investigations Department to participate in the investigation of this incident. On Tuesday,
November 29, 1994, Ed Comeau, Chief Fire Investigator, and Martha Curtis, Senior
Chemical Specialist, arrived at the facility. Mark Chubb, Fire Code Coordinator
from the Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI), was on site
participating in the investigation as part of the agreement between SBCCI and NFPA.
Prior to the arrival of the NFPA investigation team, the North Carolina State Bureau of
Investigations (SBI) had been at the scene and had investigated the incident. SBI has
responsibility for investigating all fire-related homicides in order to determine if there has
been criminal intent. SBI determined that the nature of the incident was accidental and
not criminal.
The incident occurred in the particleboard-manufacturing portion of the plant. Raw dust
was taken in and refined into finished sheets of particleboard that was used in the
construction of furniture in other portions of the plant. This manufacturing line was the
sole source of particleboard for the plant's furniture-making operations. Based on NFPA's
site inspection and subsequent analysis, it was determined that there were three potential
sources of ignition: a stray piece of metal in a grinding machine that sparked, a leak in an
overhead oil line that atomized and subsequently ignited, or a natural gas leak in the
vicinity of the thermal transfer unit that was ignited explosively.
Following the initiating event, four explosions occurred throughout the facility. These
explosions were caused by dust in the facility that was placed into suspension in the air
by each prior explosion. The dust in suspension then came into contact with an ignition
source and ignited explosively. It was observed that there were large amounts of dust
throughout the facility, and there were minimal efforts to control electrical ignition
sources.
Two employees were killed and four were injured. Damage to the facility covered
139,000 square feet. Production will be interrupted for over nine months. An estimate of
the property damage is not available. However, much of the building, as well as the
production equipment, will have to be replaced.
APPENDIX B
Reported Dust Explosions in US 1997
Date Location Facility Type Damage* Killed/Injured
April 7 Laurinburg, Feed Mill Minor 0/0

NC
May 16 Vinita, OK Bakery Minor 0/1
May 18 Richfield, CA Walnut Severe 0/6
Shelling
May 21 Stanton, NE Grain Elevator Minor 0/0
May 21 Grainton, NE Grain Elevator Minor 0/2
May 31 Meade, NE Grain Elevator Severe 0/0
June 17 Toledo, OH Cereal Plant Minor 0/0
July 7 Mt. Joy, PA Flour Mill Minor 0/0
July 12 Shelbyville, IL Grain Elevator Moderate 0/0
July 19 Ogden, IA Grain Elevator Minor 0/0
July 23 Huron, SD Grain Elevator Moderate 0/0
August 12 Conroy, IA Feed Mill Severe 0/3
August 22 Elm Creek, Grain Elevator Severe 1/2
NE
October 10 Mankato, MN Soybean Moderate 0/0
Processor
December 5 Sutton, NE Grain Elevator Moderate 0/0
December 29 Readlyn, IA Grain Elevator Severe 0/0
*Minor Damage < $50,000

Moderate Damage $50,000-$500,000
Severe Damage > $500,000
Information compiled by: Robert W. Schoeff

February 27, 1998 Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas 66506-2201
TABLES
Table No. 1
Probable Location of Primary Dust Explosion [(1958-78)* and (1984-85,

1988-89, 1991, 1992-95)]** (Fire Protection Handbook,18th Edition Table
No. 3-26C)
Location No. of Facilities Percent of Facilities
Unknown 146 41.2

Bucket elevator 105 29.6
Storage bins or tanks 19 5.4
Hammer mills, roller 18 5.1
mills, or other grinding
equipment
Dust collector 14 3.9
Other area inside the 12 3.3
elevator
Other areas inside 11 3.0
equipment
Headhouse 9 2.5
Adjacent or attached feed 8 2.2
mill
Grain dryer 3 0.8
Inside electrical 2 0.6
equipment
Outside and adjacent to 2 0.6
facility
Pellet collector 2 0.6
Tunnel 2 0.6
Other 2 0.6
Total 355 100.0
*Prevention of Grain Elevator Explosions An Achievable Goal, U.S.

Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1979
** Schoeff, R., unpublished data released by Kansas State University, in

conjunction with USDAs Federal Grain Inspection Service, compiled along with
reference noted above.
Table No. 2
Probable Ignition Sources in Grain Elevator Dust Explosions [(1958-78)*

and (1984-85, 1988-89, 1991, 1992-95)]** (Fire Protection Handbook,18th
Edition Table No. 3-26D)
Source No. of Facilities Percent of Facilities
Unknown 154 43.4

Welding 51 14.4
Fire other than welding or 22 6.1
cutting
Overheated bearings 17 4.7
Miscellaneous 15 4.3
Tramp metal 13 3.6
Friction sparks 13 3.6
Other spark 12 3.3
Electrical failure 12 3.3
Unidentified foreign 10 3.0
objects
Friction from choked leg 8 2.3
Lightning 7 2.0
Faulty motors 5 1.5
Extension cords in legs 4 1.2
Static electricity 4 1.2
Fire from friction of 3 0.8
slipping belt in leg
Rubbing pulley 3 0.8
Smoking material 2 0.5
Total 355 100.0
*Prevention of Grain Elevator Explosions An Achievable Goal, U.S.

Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., 1979
** Schoeff, R., unpublished data released by Kansas State University, in

conjunction with USDAs Federal Grain Inspection Service, compiled along with
reference noted above.
R
NFPA One-Stop Data Shop

Quick Look-Up Tables
The following tables provide fire loss data for structure, home, residential
and non-residential fires. This material is from NFPAs One-Stop Data Shop.
If you would like a copy of the 1997 fire loss report, please contact Nancy
Schwartz at 617-984-7450 (phone) or osds@nfpa.org (e-mail). There is no
charge for the report.
National Fire Protection Association, #1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02269

Fire Analysis and Research Division
1997 U.S. FIRE RATES BY UNIT OF TIME
Civilian Civilian Direct Dollar

Fires Deaths Injuries Damage
Property Class per Hour per Day per Day per Hour
All residential 46.4 9.3 48.7 $523,400

Homes* 45.1 9.2 48.6 $508,300
One- and two- family
dwellings 34.5 7.4 33.7 $426,000
Apartments 10.6 1.8 13.7 $ 82,000
Other residential 1.3 $ 15,000
Public assembly 1.7 $ 37,000
Educational 0.9 $ 7,000
Institutional 1.0 $ 3,000
Stores and offices 3.1 $ 70,000
Industry, utilities, and defense

1.9 $ 83,000
Storage 4.2 $ 66,000
Special structure 3.9 $ 21,000
All non-residential 16.7 0.3 7.1 $286,000
All structures 63.0 9.6 55.8 $809,000
Vehicles 45.3 1.3 5.8 $145,000
Outdoor and other (not structure or vehicle)

96.6 0.2 3.4 $ 19,000
All fires 204.9 11.1 65.1 $973,000
(or 3.4 per (or one (or one (or $16,000

minute, or every 130 every 22) per minute,
one every minutes) minutes) or $270 per
18 seconds) second)
*Homes include dwellings and apartments.
Direct property damage is expressed to the nearest thousand dollars. All figures are based on
NFPA's annual National Fire Experience Survey. Updated 8/98

THE U.S. FIRE PROBLEM
Fire Fire Direct

Civilian Civilian Fighter Fighter Property
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Deaths Injuries Damage
1977 3,264,000 7,395 31,190 157 112,540 $4,709,000,000

1978 2,817,500 7,710 29,825 172 101,100 $4,498,000,000
1979 2,845,500 7,575 31,325 125 95,780 $5,750,000,000
1980 2,988,000 6,505 30,200 138 98,070 $6,254,000,000
1981 2,893,500 6,700 30,450 136 103,340 $6,676,000,000
1982 2,538,000 6,020 30,525 127 98,150 $6,432,000,000
1983 2,326,500 5,920 31,275 113 103,150 $6,598,000,000
1984 2,343,000 5,240 28,125 119 102,300 $6,707,000,000
1985 2,371,000 6,185 28,425 127 100,900 $7,324,000,000
1986 2,271,500 5,850 26,825 120 96,450 $6,709,000,000
1987 2,330,000 5,810 28,215 131 102,600 $7,159,000,000
1988 2,436,500 6,215 30,800 136 102,900 $8,352,000,000
1989 2,115,000 5,410 28,250 118 100,700 $8,655,000,000
1990 2,019,000 5,195 28,600 107 100,300 $7,818,000,000
1991 2,041,500 4,465 29,375 108 103,300 $9,467,000,000
1992 1,964,500 4,730 28,700 75 97,700 $8,295,000,000
1993 1,952,500 4,635 30,475 78 101,500 $8,546,000,000
1994 2,054,500 4,275 27,250 104 95,400 $8,151,000,000
1995 1,965,500 4,585 25,775 96 94,500 $8,918,000,000
1996 1,975,000 4,990 25,550 96 87,150 $9,406,000,000
1997 1,795,000 4,050 23,750 96 85,400 $8,525,000,000
All but firefighter deaths are estimates of losses in fires reported to fire
departments, based on data reported to NFPA's annual National Fire Experience
Survey.
Direct property damage figures do not include indirect losses, like business
interruption, and have not been adjusted for inflation.
Updated: 12/98

THE U.S. RESIDENTIAL FIRE PROBLEM
Direct
Civilian Civilian Property
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Damage
1977 750,000 6,135 22,600 $2,179,000,000

1978 730,500 6,185 21,260 $2,192,000,000
1979 721,500 5,765 20,450 $2,529,000,000
1980 757,500 5,446 21,100 $3,042,000,000
1981 733,000 5,540 20,375 $3,259,000,000
1982 676,500 4,940 21,100 $3,253,000,000
1983 641,500 4,820 21,450 $3,306,000,000
1984 623,000 4,240 19,275 $3,440,000,000
1985 622,000 5,025 19,825 $3,774,000,000
1986 581,500 4,770 19,025 $3,556,000,000
1987 551,500 4,660 20,440 $3,699,000,000
1988 552,500 5,065 22,600 $4,020,000,000
1989 513,500 4,435 20,750 $3,998,000,000
1990 467,000 4,115 20,650 $4,253,000,000
1991 478,000 3,575 21,850 $5,552,000,000 1
1992 472,000 3,765 21,600 $3,880,000,000
1993 470,000 3,825 22,600 $4,843,000,000 2
1994 451,000 3,465 20,025 $4,317,000,000
1995 425,500 3,695 19,125 $4,363,000,000
1996 428,000 4,080 19,300 $4,962,000,000
1997 406,500 3,390 17,775 $4,585,000,000
1Includes $1.5 billion in damage caused by the Oakland Fire Storm, most of which was lost to
homes but for which no detailed breakdown by property type was available.
2Includes $809 million in damage caused by Southern California wildfires.
All are estimates of losses in fires reported to fire departments, based on data reported to NFPA's
annual National Fire Experience Survey. Direct property damage figures have not been adjusted for
inflation. Residential structures include homes, hotels and motels, dormitories, barracks, and the
like but do not include hospitals, nursing homes, residential schools jails or prisons, among other
properties that provide sleeping accommodations.
Updated: 8/98

THE U.S. NON-RESIDENTIAL FIRE PROBLEM
Direct
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Damage1
1977 348,000 370 2 3,710 $1,946,000,000

1978 331,500 165 3,725 $1,830,000,000
1979 315,000 205 4,400 $2,435,000,000
1980 307,500 229 3,625 $2,412,000,000
1981 294,500 220 5,325 $2,717,000,000
1982 270,000 260 4,475 $2,478,000,000
1983 227,000 270 4,700 $2,520,000,000
1984 225,000 285 3,750 $2,451,000,000
1985 237,500 240 3,525 $2,663,000,000
1986 218,500 215 3,725 $2,281,000,000
1987 206,500 220 3,375 $2,527,000,000
1988 192,500 215 3,675 $3,168,000,000
1989 174,500 220 3,275 $3,520,000,000
1990 157,000 285 3 3,425 $2,460,000,000
1991 162,500 190 3,125 $2,768,000,000
1992 165,500 175 2,725 $3,077,000,000
1993 151,500 155 3,950 4 $2,563,000,000
1994 163,000 125 3,100 $2,550,000,000
1995 148,000 290 5 2,600 $3,257,000,000
1996 150,500 140 2,575 $2,971,000,000
1997 145,500 120 2,600 $2,502,000,000
1Individual incidents with large loss can affect the total for a given year. Note the following:
The 1988 figure includes a Norco, Louisiana petroleum refinery with a loss of $330 million. The
1989 figure includes a Pasadena, Texas polyolefin plant with a loss of $750 million.
The 1992 figure includes the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance with a loss of $567 million.
2Includes 165 deaths at the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Southgate, Kentucky.
3Includes 87 deaths at the Happy Land social club fire in New York City (N.Y.C.).
4Includes 1,024 injuries that occurred at the World Trade Center explosion and fire in N.Y.C.
5Includes 168 deaths that occurred at the federal office building fire in Oklahoma City, OK.
The 1995 figure includes an Oklahoma City, OK office building with a loss of $135 million, a
Georgia manufacturing plant fire with a loss of $200 million and a Massachusetts industrial
complex fire with a loss of $500 million.
All figures are estimates of losses in fires reported to fire departments, based on data reported to
NFPA's annual National Fire Experience Survey. Direct property damage figures do not include
indirect losses (business interruption, etc.), and have not been adjusted for inflation.
Updated 8/98

THE U.S. STRUCTURE FIRE PROBLEM
Direct
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Damage1
1977 1,098,000 6,505 26,310 $4,125,000,000

1978 1,062,000 6,350 24,985 $4,022,000,000
1979 1,036,500 5,970 24,850 $4,964,000,000
1980 1,065,000 5,675 24,725 $5,454,000,000
1981 1,027,500 5,760 25,700 $5,976,000,000
1982 946,500 5,200 25,575 $5,731,000,000
1983 868,500 5,090 26,150 $5,826,000,000
1984 848,000 4,525 23,025 $5,891,000,000
1985 859,500 5,265 23,350 $6,437,000,000
1986 800,000 4,985 22,750 $5,837,000,000
1987 758,000 4,880 23,815 $6,226,000,000
1988 745,000 5,280 26,275 $7,188,000,000
1989 688,000 4,655 24,025 $7,518,000,000
1990 624,000 4,400 24,075 $6,713,000,000
1991 640,500 3,765 24,975 $8,320,000,000
1992 637,500 3,940 24,325 $6,957,000,000
1993 621,500 3,980 26,550 $7,406,000,000
1994 614,000 3,590 23,125 $6,867,000,000
1995 573,500 3,9852 21,725 $7,620,000,000
1996 578,500 4,220 21,875 $7,933,000,000
1997 552,000 3,510 20,375 $7,087,000,000
1Individual incidents with large loss can affect the total for a given year.
2Includes 168 deaths that occurred at the federal office building fire in Oklahoma City, OK.
The 1988 figure includes a Norco, Louisiana petroleum refinery with a loss of $330 million. The
1989 figure includes a Pasadena, Texas polyolefin plant with a loss of $750 million.
The 1991 figure includes the Oakland fire storm with a loss of $1.5 billion and the Meridien Plaza
high-rise fire in Philadelphia with a loss of $325 million.
The 1992 figure includes the Los Angeles Civil Disturbance with a loss of $567 million
The 1993 figure includes Southern California wildfires with a loss of $809 million.
All figures are estimates of losses in fires reported to fire departments, based on data reported to
NFPA's annual National Fire Experience Survey. Direct property damage figures do not include
indirect losses, like business interruption, and have not been adjusted for inflation.
Updated 8/98

THE U.S. HOME FIRE PROBLEM
Direct
Year Fires Deaths Injuries Damage
1977 723,500 5,865 21,640 $2,037,000,000

1978 706,500 6,015 20,400 $2,094,000,000
1979 696,500 5,500 18,825 $2,377,000,000
1980 734,000 5,200 19,700 $2,848,000,000
1981 711,000 5,400 19,125 $3,128,000,000
1982 654,500 4,820 20,450 $3,147,000,000
1983 625,500 4,670 20,750 $3,205,000,000
1984 605,500 4,075 18,750 $3,362,000,000
1985 606,000 4,885 19,175 $3,693,000,000
1986 565,500 4,655 18,575 $3,464,000,000
1987 536,500 4,570 19,965 $3,599,000,000
1988 538,500 4,955 22,075 $3,897,000,000
1989 498,500 4,335 20,275 $3,876,000,000
1990 454,500 4,050 20,225 $4,157,000,000
1991 464,500 3,500 21,275 $5,463,000,000 1
1992 459,000 3,705 21,100 $3,775,000,000
1993 458,000 3,720 22,000 $4,764,000,000 2
1994 438,000 3,425 19,475 $4,215,000,000
1995 414,000 3,640 18,650 $4,264,000,000
1996 417,000 4,035 18,875 $4,869,000,000
1997 395,500 3,360 17,300 $4,453,000,000
1Includes $1.5 billion in damage caused by the Oakland Fire Storm, most of which was lost to
homes but for which no detailed breakdown by property type was available.
2Includes $809 million in damage caused by Southern California wildfires.
All are estimates of losses in fires reported to fire departments, based on data reported to NFPA's
annual National Fire Experience Survey. Direct property damage figures have not been adjusted for
inflation. "Homes" are dwellings, duplexes, manufactured homes (also called mobile homes),
apartments, rowhouses, townhouses, and condominiums. Other residential properties, such as
hotels and motels, dormitories, barracks, rooming and boarding homes, and the like, are not
included.
Updated 8/98


Fire Investigation Summary 2-1998

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Fire Investigation Summary

Dust explosions are a leading

National Fire Protection Association

Grain elevator explosions and fatalities

However, the potential for these hazards

Explosion NFPA Fire Investigations Department

One Batterymarch Park

Related reports published by the Full copies of this report, or any

Lenoir, North Carolina Dust Explosion 1-617-984-7445 (tel)

On Monday, June 8, 1998, at approximately 9:20 a.m., a series of explosions occurred at

III. The Incident

VI. NFPA Documents 36

Appendix A - Abstract from Lenoir Dust Explosion Report 40

Diagram of facility Fig No. 1

The SCFD responded to 5436 calls in 1997.

GRAIN STORAGE AND HANDLING

Grain in bulk commodities is stored in numerous types of facilities and configurations.

Receiving and Shipping

The Haysville facility contained a combination of baghouse and cyclone-type collection

The Explosion Hazard

The primary explosion, in these cases, occurred in

Bucket elevators in eight incidents

Elements of a Dust Explosion

The dust has to be combustible.

In comparison, suspended dust concentrations similar to those described above represent

Ignition sources: Once the dust is in suspension, an ignition source is required to

Another source of ignition in bucket elevator assemblies is overheated bearings. When

Oxygen: Atmospheric oxygen concentrations are sufficient to sustain a dust explosion.

If a dust explosion hazard exists in an enclosure, explosion venting should be provided.

Diagram of location of personnel at the time of the explosion Fig No.3

DISCOVERY AND OCCUPANT ACTIVITIES

The four men loading fertilizer in the south

Photo No. 3 - Train shed area after the

FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE / OPERATIONS

Operations Branch Law Enforcement Branch

Rescue Group EMS Group Fire Suppression Group

Photo No. 8 Burning silo

The following physical damage occurred in the

Headhouse: Severe structural damage was

Photo No. 9 - Damaged Headhouse Structure

Photo Nos. 11a/b - Damage to Silos (north end of elevator) (NFPA)

ORIGIN AND CAUSE

OSHA investigators have released preliminary information stating that a worn

The blasts and associated

Dust Control/Collection - There were conflicting reports as to the amount of dust

The design of dust collection systems must provide sufficient capture

Containment of dust to selected points or the proper return of the dust

Regardless of the facility design or amount of mechanical dust collection,

Venting - The actual deflagration-venting configuration at this facility was difficult to

An alternative method to venting is the installation of an explosion suppression system.

Equipment Maintenance - A program of preventive maintenance should be established

The examination and maintenance of dust collection/control equipment should also be

Shut off the grain flow

Fire Control Systems

This standard prescribes requirements for

The standard applies to all facilities that

This standard provides minimum

The purpose of this standard is to eliminate

This standard shall apply to all pneumatic

The purpose of this standard shall be to provide

This standard covers provisions to prevent

The purpose of this code is the practical

The National Electrical Code (NEC) is the

The NEC covers: