THIRD DIVISION

ADING QUIZON, BEN ZABLAN, PETER SIMBULAN and SILVESTRE VILLANUEVA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

LANIZA D. JUAN,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 171442

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

REYES, and

BRION,* JJ.
Promulgated:

June 17, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
filed by petitioners Ading Quizon (Quizon), Ben Zablan (Zablan), Peter Simbulan (Simbulan) and Silvestre
Villanueva (Villanueva), seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision[2] dated 15 March
2005 and the Resolution[3] dated 24 January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72921. The
appellate court, in its assailed Decision, found that petitioners forcibly entered and dispossessed
respondent Laniza Juan (Juan) of her property. Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Resolution[4]
dated 8 August 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Civil Case No. 527-
(01), reversing the Decision[5] dated 14 March 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Capas, Tarlac, in Civil Case No. 2207, which dismissed respondents complaint for ejectment on the
ground that petitioners have established prior physical possession over the disputed property. In its
assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals refused to reconsider its earlier Decision

In her Complaint, respondent alleged that she acquired a parcel of land situated in Sitio Bullhorn,
Aranguen, Capas, Tarlac, with an area of 10.2 hectares from Melencio Nuguid (Nuguid) by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed on 11 December 1996. Respondent claimed that on 9 August 2000, petitioners,
conspiring and confederating with each other and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a
portion of her property without her knowledge and consent. On 21 August 2000, petitioners once again
went back to the premises and destroyed the wooden fence set up by respondent, as well as the fruit-
bearing trees and rice plantation found therein. Four days later, petitioners supplanted respondents
wooden fence with an iron fence, enclosing an area of about one hectare (subject property), over which
they maintained control and possession up to the time of filing of respondents Complaint with the
MCTC.
In their Answer, petitioners countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2207 lacks cause of action,
for respondent does not have any legal right over the subject property. Petitioners Quizon and Zablan
insisted that they are the lawful owners and possessors of the subject property and it was the
respondent who, without any authority from petitioners Quizon and Zablan, invaded and occupied the
property.

During the Pre-Trial Conference held on 22 January 2001, the parties stipulated that the houses of
petitioners Quizon and Zablan were located outside the respondents property. The parties likewise
agreed that petitioners Simbulan and Villanueva have no possession or interest over the subject
property, but they were with petitioners Quizon and Zablan when the alleged encroachment over
respondents property took place.

On 14 March 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing Civil Case No. 2207, since respondent
failed to establish that petitioners forcibly entered the subject property. The MCTC observed that
petitioners Quizon and Zablan occupied the subject property long before the alleged sale occurred
between Nuguid and respondent. Hence, petitioners Quizon and Zablan had sufficiently proved prior
possession of the subject property. More importantly, upon ocular inspection, the MCTC found that the
subject property occupied by petitioners Quizon and Zablan were outside the property sold by Nuguid to
respondent. The dispositive portion of the MCTC Decision reads:

IN VIEW THEREOF, decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint with cost de officio.

[Petitioners] counterclaim is also dismissed.[6]

On appeal, docketed as Civil Case No. 527-C-2001, the RTC initially affirmed the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 2207 in its Decision dated 16 November 2001, ruling that the appealed MCTC Decision was based on
facts and law on the matter.

Upon respondents Motion for Reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed its Decision dated 16
November 2001. In its Resolution dated 20 May 2002, the RTC underscored the stipulations made by
petitioners Simbulan and Villanueva during the Pre-Trial Conference before the MCTC that they were
with petitioners Quizon and Zablan when the incident that led to the filing of Civil Case No. 2207
occurred, and construed such stipulation as admission that petitioners did unlawfully take over
possession of the subject property, as alleged by respondent. Thus, the RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, finding the [petitioners] to have ousted [respondent] of her possession of her one hectare
land at Bullhorn, Aranguren, Capas, Tarlac and the destruction of her plants therein, the Court hereby
reconsiders its decision on November 16, 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Capas, Tarlac; thereby reversing said decision and
hereby: orders [petitioners] to restore [respondent] to the possession of the one hectare land she had
been dispossessed; ordering the defendants to pay the amount of P50,000.00 for the destruction of the
[respondents] fence, crops and fruit bearing trees; ordering the defendants to reimburse the attorneys
fees and appearance fees paid by [respondent] to her counsel and to pay the cost.[7]

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the RTC in its Resolution dated 8
August 2002.

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 72921, arguing that the RTC erred in not upholding the dismissal by the MCTC of the
respondents complaint in Civil Case No. 2207 for its utter lack of merit. Petitioners asserted that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in reversing the MCTC Decision in Civil Case No. 2207, asserting that they
had a better right over the subject property. Petitioners likewise averred that the amount of P50,000.00
adjudged by the RTC as their liability for destroying the vegetables planted on the subject property was
excessive.

On 15 March 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, affirming the RTC Resolution dated 20
May 2002. The Court of Appeals declared that petitioners did commit forcible entry of the subject
property since the parties already made a stipulation to that effect during the Pre-Trial Conference
before the MCTC, to wit:

[Respondent] bought on December 11, 1996 from [Nuguid] a parcel of land consisting of 52,000 (sic) sq.
meters situated at Bullhorn, Brgy. Aranguren, Capas, Tarlac; it was also stipulated upon proposal of the
[petitioners] that [Simbulan] and [Villanueva] have no possession over the subject parcel of land but
they were with petitioners [Quizon] and [Zablan] when forcible entry was made leading to the ouster of
[respondents] possession and destruction [respondents] plants. That [petitioner Quizon] house is
outside the portion bought by [respondent] from [Nuguid].[8]

The appellate court further ruled that having voluntarily stipulated in the Pre-Trial Agreement that they
forcibly entered the subject property, petitioners can no longer deny the same. Once validly entered
into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. The party who validly made them can be
relieved therefrom only upon showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, undue
influence or such other sufficient cause as will serve justice in a particular case. There is no showing in
this case of any cause or ground which could be the basis for relieving petitioners of the quicksand of
admission which they voluntarily wallowed into. According to the decretal portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.[9]

In a Resolution dated 24 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration
interposed by petitioners, for it raised the same issues which were already considered and passed upon
by the appellate court in its assailed Decision.

Petitioners are now before this Court via the Petition at bar raising the sole issue of whether the Court
of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC Decision dated 16 November 2001, awarding possession of the
subject property to respondent.

Section 1, Rule 70[10] of the Revised Rules of Court requires that in actions for forcible entry, the
plaintiff must allege that he has been deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth and the action must have been filed within one year from the
time of such unlawful deprivation of possession. This requirement implies that in such cases, the
possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the beginning, as he acquires possession
thereof by unlawful means. The plaintiff must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the property in litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant.[11]

In Cajayon v. Batuyong,[12] this Court elucidated:

x x x [T]he complaint must allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived
of that possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential,
however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law. It would be sufficient
that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.

The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth" include every situation or condition under
which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession thereof. To constitute the use of "force" as contemplated in the above-mentioned provision,
the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even necessary that he use violence
against the person of the party in possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.

Hence, in actions for forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70
of the Revised Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

There is no dispute that respondent sufficiently alleged in her complaint the material facts constituting
forcible entry, as she explicitly claimed that she had prior possession of the subject property since its
purchase, and upon it built a wooden fence. She also particularly described in her Complaint how
petitioners encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed her of the same. Respondents
complaint contains the allegations that petitioners, abetting and conspiring with one another, without
respondents knowledge and consent and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of
her land; thereafter pulled out and destroyed the fence she had erected, including the fruit-bearing
trees planted thereon; and put their own iron fence enclosing an area of about one hectare. Petitioners
Quizon and Zablan then purportedly took possession and control of the subject property up to the time
Civil Case No. 2207 was filed with the MCTC. It is thus irrefutable that respondent sufficiently alleged
that the possession of the subject property was wrested from her through violence and force.

However, despite the sufficiency of her complaint, respondent miserably failed to prove her allegations
therein, most significantly the fact of her prior possession. Allegation is not tantamount to proof.[13] It
must be stressed that one who alleged a fact has the burden of proving it.[14] And mere allegation
without supporting evidence is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of prior physical possession.

We emphasize that absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants
the dismissal of his complaint.[15]

In a long line of cases,[16] this Court reiterated that the fact of prior physical possession is an
indispensable element in forcible entry cases. The plaintiff must prove that they were in prior physical
possession of the premises long before they were deprived thereof by the defendant.[17]

Possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to
the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.[18]
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, x x x execution and registration of public
instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles. For one to be considered in possession,
one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property at all times.[19]

During the ocular inspection, the MCTC had the opportunity to inquire from Nuguid the location of the
land he supposedly sold to respondent. Upon Nuguids representation, the court found that the lot upon
which the two adjacent houses of petitioner Quizon stood was not included in the property Nuguid sold
to respondent. On the same occasion, the MCTC also learned that petitioners Quizon and Zablan were
already occupying the subject premises long before the alleged sale between respondent and Nuguid
took place. It was based on the aforementioned finding that the MCTC dismissed Civil Case No. 2207 for
failure of respondent to establish prior physical possession of the subject property.

The findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals were largely anchored on the stipulation of facts, made
during the Pre-Trial Conference, that petitioners Simbulan and Villanueva were with petitioners Quizon
and Zablan when the latter two forcibly entered the subject property and destroyed respondents plants.
This is implying too much from a poorly worded stipulation of facts. If petitioners already did admit to
having forcibly entered the subject property, then there would have been no more need for a trial. The
reasonable interpretation of such stipulation of facts at the pre-trial would be that petitioners Simbulan
and Villanueva were with petitioners Quizon and Zablan when the latter two purportedly destroyed the
fence and plants of respondent found on the subject property, and surrounded the subject property
with an iron fence. Far from being an admission by the petitioners that respondent had prior possession
of the subject property, petitioners actuations are only consistent with the claim of petitioners Quizon
and Zablan that they were already in possession of the subject property and they were only protecting
the same from respondents repeated attempts to appropriate it to herself.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was no ouster or dispossession that took place in the
instant case. Petitioner Quizons material possession of the subject property preceded the alleged sale
between respondent and Nuguid. It was NEVER PROVEN that the subject property occupied by
petitioners Quizon and Zablan encroached upon or overlapped the property bought by respondent from
Nuguid. Quite interesting, was the testimony of Nuguid, a disinterested party, who had competent
knowledge of the metes and bounds of the property he ceded via sale to respondent. The testimony
undeniably established that the property subject of said sale is different from the subject property
possessed and occupied by petitioner Quizon.

This Court will not disturb the findings of the MCTC, which had the opportunity to physically inspect the
subject property, and personally hear the witnesses and examine their demeanor in the course of the
hearing. It is worthy to note that the appellate court should only delve into a recalibration of the
evidence on appeal if the findings of the trial court are not anchored on the witnesses credibility and
testimonies, but on the assessment of the documents that are available to appellate magistrates and
subject to their scrunity.[20] Regrettably, the instant case does not fall under this exception.

Verily, petitioners Quizon and Zablans possession of the subject property cannot be disturbed. We have
long settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is - who is
entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure? Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful
withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior possession.[21]

Hence, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to
physical possession.[22] While it may be true that the issue of ownership may incidentally be looked into
in an ejectment case to determine who has a better right to possession,[23] yet, it is crystal clear in this
case that the issue of ownership over the subject property has not been seriously and successfully
intertwined with the issue of possession. It has definitely been established by the testimony of Nuguid,
the vendor of the property, and by ocular inspection of the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac, that the subject land
is outside or not part of the lot sold to respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 March 2005
of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated 24 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72921 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 14 March 2001 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Capas Tarlac, in Civil Case No. 2207, dismissing respondents complaint for ejectment is hereby
REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Laniza D. Juan.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

* Per Special Order No. 507, dated 28 May 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, designating
Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion to replace Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, who is on
official leave under the Courts Wellness Program.

[1] Rollo, pp. 14-24.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and
Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring. Rollo, pp. 41-47.

[3] Rollo, pp. 53-54.

[4] Id. at 38-39.

[5] Id. at 25-31.

[6] Id. at 31.

[7] Id. at 36-37.

[8] Id. at 44.

[9] Id. at 45.

[10] SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

[11] Spouses Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053 (2001).

[12] G.R. No. 149118, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 461, 471-472.

[13] V.V. Soliven Realty Corporation v. Ong, G.R. No. 147869, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 339, 347.

[14] Machica v. Roosevelt, G.R. No. 168664, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA 534, 544.

[15] Sps. Gaza v. Lim, 443 Phil. 337, 349 (2003).

[16] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., G.R. No. 155110, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA
653; Sps. Gaza v. Lim, id.

[17] Sps. Gaza v. Lim, id. at 348-349.

[18] Spouses Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil 216, 222 (1997).

[19] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., supra note 16 at 671.

[20] Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895, 906
(2002).

[21] Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 510.

[22] Id. at 510-511.

[23] Aquino v. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, 18 February 2008.

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

NELSON LAGAZO, G.R. No. 170864

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
-versus- NACHURA,
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
GERALD B. SORIANO and
GALILEO B. SORIANO, February 16, 2010
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, praying that the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 80709, promulgated on October 28, 2005, granting herein respondents' petition
for review, and the CA Resolution[2] promulgated on December 20, 2005, denying
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
On January 16, 2001, respondents filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Tabuk,
Kalinga (MTC), a complaint for Forcible Entry with Application for Termporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against
petitioner. Respondents claimed they were the owners of a parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. P-665, Lot No. 816, Pls-93 with an area of
58,171 square meters. They allegedly acquired the same by purchase from their
grandfather, Arsenio Baac, on September 10, 1998, but even prior thereto, they
were already allowed by Arsenio Baac to cultivate said land. They paid real
property taxes for said property from 1990 to 1998 and had been in actual
possession from that time. However, on January 6, 2001, herein petitioner
allegedly unlawfully entered the property by means of force, stealth, and strategy
and began cultivating the land for himself.

On the other hand, petitioner insisted in his Answer that he, together with his
mother, brothers, and sisters, were the lawful owners of the land in question, being
the legal heirs of Alfredo Lagazo, the registered owner thereof. They denied that
the subject land was sold to Arsenio Baac, alleging instead that the agreement
between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac was merely one of
mortgage. Petitioner, likewise maintained that he and his co-heirs had always been
in possession of the disputed land. They allegedly tried several times to redeem the
property, but Baac increased the redemption price from P10,000.00
to P100,000.00. This prompted them to bring the matter before the Barangay
Lupon of Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga, but no agreement was reached.

On November 23, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Dismissing the complaint of Forcible Entry filed against defendant

Nelson Lagazo;

2. Ordering the plaintiffs, Gerald B. Soriano and Galileo B. Soriano

to surrender Original Certificate of Title No. P-665 in the name of Alfredo
Lagazo to the heirs of Lagazo which was given to Arsenio Baac by
Alfredo Lagazo when the Deed of Mortgage was executed between them;
 3. Ordering the heirs of Alfredo Lagazo to execute the deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs covering the one (1) hectare portion
subject of the mortgage between Alfredo Lagazo and Arsenio Baac and to
segregate the same from property covered by OCT P-665;

4. Plaintiffs to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The foregoing Decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tabuk, Kalinga. Said appellate court ruled that herein respondents failed to prove
prior physical possession, thus, it reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the
complaint against herein petitioner.

Respondents then filed with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court and on October 28, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision which disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. Physical

possession is hereby ordered returned to the petitioners, without prejudice to the
respondent's right to take recourse to remedies provided for under the law, if he is
so inclined. Actual, moral and exemplary damages cannot be granted because of
lack of substantive evidence to prove the same.However, we grant the amount
of P10,000.00 in attorney's fees plus P500.00 per appearance of petitioners'
counsel, as well as another P10,000.00 in litigation expenses as prayed for in their
complaint, conformably to par. 11 of Art. 2208 of the Civil Code, i.e. it is just and
equitable under the circumstances, and considering that the award is well deserved
by the petitioners who had shown evident good faith in, and respect for, the
judicial system.

SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied per CA
Resolution dated December 20, 2005. Hence, this petition where the following
issues are raised:

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THERE WAS IMPLIED ADMISSION ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER
THAT RESPONDENTS HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL POSSESSION
OF THE LOT IN CONTROVERSY SINCE 1979.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING

CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PETITIONER
 SUBSTANTIATING HIS PRIORITY IN POSSESSION OVER THE LOT IN
CONTROVERSY.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT

THE RESPONDENTS HAVE BETTER RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER THE
LOT IN CONTROVERSY.[5]

The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.

Prior physical possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry

[6]
cases. Thus, the ultimate question here is who had prior physical possession of
the disputed land.

Ordinarily, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, this Court only considers

questions of law, as it is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions to this
general rule, such as, when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary
to those of the trial court.[7] Such circumstance exists in this case, hence, the Court
is compelled to take a closer look at the records.

In Sudaria v. Quiambao,[8] the Court held that:

Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an

expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of
property. Title is not involved. The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to
the physical or material possession of the premises or possession de facto. On this
point, the pronouncements in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals are enlightening, thus:

xxxx

x x x Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the

property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out
by a strong hand, violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding
of property allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession.

Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover

such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the
 only issue that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to
physical possession.[9] (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, in De Grano v. Lacaba,[10] it was explained that:

x x x the word possession, as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer

cases, means nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law.When the law speaks of possession, the reference
is to prior physical possession or possession de facto, as contra-distinguished from
possession de jure. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue. Issues as
to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence
thereon is not admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)

Bearing the foregoing in mind, a thorough examination of the evidence

revealed that, indeed, the parties in last peaceable quiet possession of the property
in question were herein respondents.
The most important evidence for respondents was the testimony of Brgy.
Capt. Artemio Fontanilla, who stated that he was born and had continuously
resided in Balong, Tabuk, Kalinga; that the disputed land was only about three
kilometers from his house; that for the longest time, he had always known that it
was Arsenio Baac who was cultivating and occupying said property; and that it
was only sometime in January 2001, when the police asked him to accompany
them to the subject land, that he saw petitioner with some other men working said
land. [12]

On the other hand, what petitioner's evidence sought to establish was that he
and his co-heirs continued to be the owners of the land, as his predecessor never
intended to sell the property to Arsenio Baac, the true agreement being only one of
a mortgage. Petitioner never established the fact of his physical possession over the
disputed land.Ironically, the most telling pieces of evidence that doomed
petitioner's case were the testimonies of petitioner himself and his sister, Marina
Nialga. Their own admissions on the witness stand proved that respondents were
indeed the ones in physical possession of the subject property. Petitioner Lagazo
himself testified as follows:
 Q: So, at that time that you were at Alicia, Isabela and at that time that you
staying thereat, you have no knowledge to what is happening to the land
which is now the subject of this case, Am I correct?
A: I was only hearing stories from my father and my mother that they want to
regain back the land which was mortgaged, sir.

xxxx
Q: It is when only on January of 2001 that you allegedly claimed over the parcel
of land in question, am I correct Mr. Witness?
A: Was not only during that time but that was only the time we entered into the
land, sir.

Q: So, you are now admitting Mr. Witness, its only on January 6, 2001, you
entered the land in question?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And, prior to January 6 of 2001, you never possessed or cultivated the land in
question, Am I correct?

xxxx

Q: Who was an apparent heir of spouses Alfredo Lagaso, you never personally
cultivated or possessed the land in question prior to January 6, 2001, am I
correct?
A: No, sir because according to them it was mortgaged, Your Honor.

Q: But you never personally cultivated the land prior to January 6, 2001?
A: No, sir.[13]

Meanwhile, Marina Nialga also recounted that in 1979, they left the subject
property out of fear because Arsenio Baac allegedly wanted to grab the land for
himself. She testified that after they left in 1979, it was already Arsenio Baac who
cultivated said land. Despite such claim that Arsenio Baac took their land with
force and intimidation, Marina said they never reported the matter to the police,
and never filed any criminal action in court against Arsenio Baac.[14]
Verily, the foregoing leaves no doubt in our mind that it was only on January
6, 2001 that petitioner, believing himself to be the lawful owner of the disputed
land, entered the same, thereby disturbing respondents' peaceful possession
thereof.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is dismissed. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 2005 and
December 20, 2005, respectively, in CA G.R. SP No. 80709 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin (now Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring; rollo, pp. 234-291.
[2]
Id. at 300.
[3]
CA rollo, p. 125
[4]
Rollo, p. 291.
[5]
Id. at 15.
[6]
Acaylar, Jr. v. Harayo, G.R. No. 176995, July 30, 2008, 560 SCRA 624.
[7]
Id. at 641.
[8]
G.R. No. 164305, November 20, 2007, 537 SCRA 689.
[9]
Supra note 8, at 697-698.
[10]
G.R. No. 158877, June 16, 2009, 589 SCRA 148.
[11]
Id. at 158-159.
[12]
TSN, February 26, 2001, pp. 26, 47-52
[13]
TSN, June 26, 2001, pp. 220-222.
[14]
TSN, July 30, 2001, pp. 274-278.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented by G.R. No. 183822

Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C.
Agullana,

Petitioner,

-versus- Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and PEREZ,
JUSTA AGUSTIN, SERENO,
Respondents. REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 18, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag
City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed the
unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:

Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against Spouses Hilarion
and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the registered owner of two parcels of
land located in Santa Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on
October 29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical descriptions
as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with

improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa
Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x containing an area of
five thousand seven hundred and fifty nine (5,759) square meters more
or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag), with
the improvements thereon, situated in the barrio of Santa
 Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x, containing an area of
twenty thousand seven hundred and forty five (20,745) square meters,
more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in whose name
Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued. Duldulao sold said properties on
August 27, 1951 to Francisco D. Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz
allowed spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject property having
acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who executed a Deed of Quitclaim in
his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June 5, 1971
Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject property by executing a Deed
of Absolute Sale in their favor for a consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and dismissed the
complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which shows that

they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion
of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or owners, disproving the allegation of the
plaintiff that defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to
occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and considering
further the length of time that the defendants have been in possession,
as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711,
and have been continuously exercising their rights of ownership
thereon, this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is
concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the possession
of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is hereby
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed said dismissal, the
dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 01, Laoag City is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the
plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the
case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the
appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.[4] It noted
that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed
properties to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder
Corpuz in favor of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale
with respondents was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized
shortly after their execution.[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed
at the back of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October
1976,[6] resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980
in the name of petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was,
however, not annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained
unregistered.[7]

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of
the sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz,
petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz
to respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership.
Thus, in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of the
property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but
was in the exercise of ownership.[8]

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the properties
to respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale,
petitioner failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the
subject properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his contention that, as
registered owner of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession
thereof, compared to the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents
in their defense of the same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part
despite knowledge of the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of
respondents unregistered deed.[10] In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded
that respondents possession was not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any
of the grounds for forcible entry or unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for
ejectment must fail.[11]The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO
CLAIM BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION

OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE
BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.
 III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING THE

PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED BEFORE IT.[13]

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who
between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties --
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents,
who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.

Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to
discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in
relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the
determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful detainer
case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property
is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior
court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is
entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is
not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.[16]

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the
disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they
cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and
are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this
claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in
his name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts
that, having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of
property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is correct
that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner
and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate
court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by
respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the
elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious
possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and legal
issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an
unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had
a Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property
claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The
principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess
the subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who
had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the
following justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer
case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is
summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of
asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of
Appeals, nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties
upon a different cause of action involving possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the parties, it is the
petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property. Respondents merely showed their
unregistered deeds of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court
correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim
of ownership is established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and binding upon the
whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Under existing statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such
certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a
direct proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the

property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership. Respondents' argument that
petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having
the subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner,
 which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and
can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with
law. [19]

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual

v. Spouses Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et
al.,[21] wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[22]

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has
instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact
that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession
of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by
mere tolerance of petitioners father. Under these circumstances, petitioner
cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary
procedure of an ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful detainerare summary
proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession
or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is
questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be
decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject
property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case
filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the
building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for unlawful
detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding from another of the
possession of the real property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration
or termination of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, either
expressed or implied.
 A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that
possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must have turned
unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It must be shown that
the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession
must be established. If, as in this case, the claim is that such possession is by
mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued

possession of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except
by a mere allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when
respondents possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite for a valid
cause of action in an unlawful detainer case.

In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the

sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one

who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies

in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought within one year from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the
right to physical possession.

... ... ...

In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
 (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to

defendant of the termination of the latters right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and

deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint
against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the
entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties,
since their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership.
Thus, the courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father engaged

in a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it
took petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property
from his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused
the issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system.
Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties,
but without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their
ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that

petitioner's failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and
oust them from the disputed properties had the effect of registration of
respondents unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals [25]:
 (But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest which is
unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. Knowledge of an
unregistered sale is equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals [189 SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D. 1529), provides

that the registration of the deed is the operative act to bind or affect
the land insofar as third persons are concerned. But where the party has
knowledge of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time
he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. The
Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the commission of fraud
(Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442). [Emphasis supplied.]

In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of

petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale
of the subject properties by petitioners father to respondents cannot be
considered as a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the
transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the
existence of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege,
though, that the land title issued to him was an act of fraud [26] on his part. We
find this argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title
of petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the

subject of collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding.[28] It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.[29]Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case
wherein the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than
possession de jure, a collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title
is proscribed.
 Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the
better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the
subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be
ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we
cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack
of merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645 (dated
January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 3111-
13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No.
3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Designated as acting Member of the Second Division vice Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion per Special Order No.
1174 dated January 9, 2012.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by then Associate Justice Mariano
C. del Castillo and Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza.
[2]
Rollo, p. 43.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 36-38.
[4]
Rollo, p. 36.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 40.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Rollo, p. 88.
[8]
Rollo, p. 40.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id. at 41.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[14]
FLORENZ D. REGALADO, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM I (7th rev. ed. 2007).
[15]
David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).
[16]
Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003) as cited in Urieta vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, G.R. No. 164402, 05 July
2010, 623 SCRA 130.
[17]
Vicente v. Avera, G.R. No. 169970, 20 January 2009, 576 SCRA 634.
[18]
G..R. No. 149912, 29 January 2004, 421 SCRA 455.
[19]
Supra, citing Estrellita S.J. vda. de Villanueva v. Court of Appeals and Lina F. vda. de Santiago, G.R. No.
117971, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 12; citing NOBLEJAS AND NOBLEJAS, LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 210
(1992); citingChing v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9 (1990). (Ching v. Court of Appeals was erroneously cited as
G.R. Nos. 59568-76 in the original Decision in Co v. Militar).
[20]
G.R. No. 159292, 12 July 2007, 527 SCRA 474.
[21]
G.R. No. 166941, 14 December 2009, 608 SCRA 169.
[22]
Id.
[23]
G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.
[24]
G.R. No. 184285, 25 September 2009, 601 SCRA 147.
[25]
414 Phil. 311, 323 (2001).
[26]
Rollo, p. 291.
[27]
Spouses Marcos R. Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla v. Maria Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, 15 December 2010.
[28]
Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., G.R. No. 152440, 31 January 2005, 450 SCRA 315.
[29]
Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915); Magay v. Estiandan, G.R. No. L-28975, 27 February 1976;
69 SCRA 456 as cited in PENA, PENA, JR. & PENA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS (2008).
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES MANUEL AND G.R. No. 170575

FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioners,
Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION,
INC., Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of
the nature of the action[1] and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.[2]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for
Review before it.Also assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated November 15, 2005 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative
thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-A
of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession
and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by and
between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the
character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the respondent
to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such notices because it
still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of said land.[5]

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint[6] for Unlawful Detainer against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed
as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the following
significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land,
situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as
evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex A.

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs,

defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same
and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

xxxx

7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject
property is only by tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last
quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or pay
rentals for the use of the property.

xxxx
 10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and refused,
as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use and
occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-
day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully
withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners
thereof.[7]

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer[8] dated July 31, 2003
where it averred that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the

Complaint to the effect that the defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and has been using the premises in accordance with its
agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without
any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two
long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last part of
this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the property leased for
commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that the defendant has used and [is]
still using the property only for civic non-profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of
the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare,
protection, and upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and
elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the
compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and
that all the improvements, including a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of
the Foundation shall accrue to the CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation
whatsoever, upon the expiration of this Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex 2
hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;

xxxx

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of

the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject property
by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes 1 and 2 and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City
of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject
property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

xxxx

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the

Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate the
premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being that
defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or
lessors of the land occupied by defendant;
 xxxx

As and by way of

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of
the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs
way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is
hereto attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said
certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the
property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its delivery to
it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways specified in articles
1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the
Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof
shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. Upon execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex 3), the plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the
property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the
possession of the property subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the
City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession of the
same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes
1 and 2 hereof), which has the legal right to have possession of the subject property;[9]

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference,
respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum
Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was
filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for Surrender of
Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529
docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Roxas City. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to
the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

 On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order[10] resolving the respondents
Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant
is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no
previous contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas
Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the
possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of
the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the
termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already
sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as
vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely
defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale;
specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did
merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the
factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a
general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of presenting
evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either through a
judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under
Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the consent
and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so many
years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make representation to them regarding
the use of the subject property, but the same never happened.Plaintiff[s] have allowed the
defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal
basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

xxxx

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant took full
control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using
the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes
of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part
of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.
 That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract of
lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the true
and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundations
occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate
possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness
and authenticity of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping

interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied; this
Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of
action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision[12] dated July 9, 2004
affirming the MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA,
in a Decision[13] dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] which was, however,

denied in a Resolution[15] dated November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the following issues:

I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should

limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.[16]

 Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioners Complaint

constitute judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1)
sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial
purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondents
possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x

A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial

as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with
some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.[17] Correspondingly,
facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon
him.[18] The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader.[19]

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and
possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondents
use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis.
Nature of the action is determined by the
judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,[20] citing Caiza v. Court of

Appeals,[21] this Court held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,[22] differentiated the distinct causes of

action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the
party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.[23]

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property
and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom.[24] The foundation of the
action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has
entered without right.[25]

The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.[26] The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners
allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without
their consent and authority.
 Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission,[27]while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to
gain possession of the subject property.[28] The CA found that based on the petitioners
allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of the petitioners was by
stealth x x x.[29] However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not
availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be
with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their
complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and
considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor
of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual
right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of
the foundation using their property.[30] To this Courts mind, this allegation if true, also
illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the

Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by

means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[31] [W]here the defendants
possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.[32]

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.[33] Assuming that
these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from
the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible
entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right.[34] Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as
petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.[35]

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this
Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for

Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-
year period from the time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and
occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must
be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,[36] the action for forcible entry
has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence,
the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA
correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and
the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
 WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief
Justice

[1]
Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo, 453 Phil. 170, 176-177 (2003).
[2]
Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 683-684 (1946).
[3]
CA rollo, pp. 98-104; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices
Vicente L. Yap and Enrico A. Lanzanas.
[4]
Id. at 118-119
[5]
Id. at 99.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 139-141.
[7]
Id. at 140-141.
[8]
Id. at 129-138.
[9]
Id. at 129-132.
[10]
CA rollo, pp. 69-73; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Filpia D. Del Castillo.
[11]
Id. at 71-73.
[12]
Id. at 22-27; penned by Judge Edward B. Contreras. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant appeal is denied for lack of merit, and the questioned Order of
the court a quo in Civil Case No. V-2391 is affirmed.
[13]
Id. at 98-104. The dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the assailed decision and order of the RTC in Roxas City in Civil Case No. V-009-04.
[14]
Id. at 105-111.
[15]
Id. at 118-119.
[16]
Rollo, p. 9.
[17]
FRANCISCO VICENTE J., THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCE, Volume
VII Part I, 1997 edition, p. 90 citing 2 Jones on Evidence, sec. 894; Andersons Dict.; Bouv. Dict.; 1 Green on
Evidence, Sec. 27.
[18]
Federation of Free Farmers v. Court of Appeals, 194 Phil. 328, 401 (1981).
[19]
Alfelor v. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 451, 460.
[20]
Supra note 1 at 175. Emphasis supplied.
[21]
335 Phil. 1107 (1997).
[22]
G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.
[23]
Id. at 382-383, citing 3 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 312 (1980 ed.).
Emphasis supplied.
[24]
Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil 752, 756 (1918).
[25]
Id.
[26]
Id.
[27]
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 384.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Rollo, p. 23.
[30]
Id. Emphasis supplied.
[31]
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22 at 382.
[32]
Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565, 572 citing Emilia v. Bado, 131 Phil.
711 (1968).
[33]
Rollo, p. 21
[34]
Wong v. Carpio, G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118, 124.
[35]
Muoz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992, 214 SCRA 216, 224.
[36]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO

DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the June 13, 2012
Decision1 and the December 5, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
122153, entitled "Dionisio Ugay v. Anacleto C. Mangaser, represented by his Attorney-in-fact
Eustaquio Dugenia, "a case of forcible entry and damages.

The Facts

On October 30, 2007, petitioner Anacleto Mangaser, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Eustaquio
Dugenia (petitioner), filed a complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages against respondent Dionisio
Ugay (respondent) before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC). In his complaint,
petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated in
Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-
174 (FP-13 787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on October 31, 2006, petitioner,
discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by constructing a
residential house thereon without his knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the
Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa for conciliation, but no settlement was reached, hence, a
certification to file action was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were sent to respondent
but he still refused to vacate the premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial remedy.3

Respondent denied the material allegations of the complaint and put up the following defenses, to
wit: that he had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since birth and when he reached the
age of reason, he started occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta. Lucia, Aringay,
La Union; that years later, this parcel of land was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La
Union due to a survey made by the government; that he introduced more improvements on the
property by cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a "bahay kubo"; that in October 2006,
he installed a fence made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the fence, he was guided
by the concrete monuments which he knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's
property; that while he could not locate some of the monuments, he based the boundaries on his
recollection since he was around when these were installed; that he knew the boundaries of
petitioner's property because he knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a company
on the said property; that petitioner was never in actual possession of the property occupied by him,
and it was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the al legccl intrusion; that it was not
correct to say that he refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite receipt of the demand
letters because in his letter-reply, he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises
if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were
pointed out to him; and that instead of shmving the boundaries to him, petitioner filed an action for
forcible entry before the MTC.4

MTC Ruling

On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot titled under OCT No. RP-
174 (13 789). The MTC opined that petitioner could have presented a relocation survey, which would
have pinpointed the exact location of the house and fence put up by respondent, and resolved the
issue once and for all.6 It also explained that petitioner failed to prove his prior physical possession of
the subject property. The OCT No. RP-174(13789) registered under petitioner's name and the Tax
Declaration were not proof of actual possession of the property. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff (petitioner) having failed to establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.7

RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case
was raffled to Branch 33.

In its August 23, 2011 Decision,8 the RTC reversed the MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner.
It relied on the cases of Barba v. Court of Appeals9 and Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions,
Inc.,10 which held that in ejectment cases, possession of the land did not only mean actual or physical
possession but also included the subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper acts
and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The RTC stated that petitioner had clearly
shown his possession of the property as evidenced by his OCT No. RP-174(13 789) issued in March
1987 and tax declaration, dating back as early as 1995.11 It added that the boundaries of the property
were clearly indicated in the title, thus, there was no need to conduct a survey. As the owner,
petitioner knew the exact metes and bounds of his property so that when respondent intruded
stealthily, he filed the subject suit.12 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, after a thorough perusal of the facts and evidence in this case, this Court reverses
the decision of the MTC, Caba, La Union, dated April 26, 2011 and rules in favor of plaintiffappellant
(petitioner) and against defendant-appellee (respondent), ordering the latter and all other persons
claiming rights under him to:

1. VACATE the portion of the subject property encroached by him;

2. SURRENDER actual physical possession of the subject portion peacefully to plaintiff-

appellant;

3. REMOVE all the improvements he introduced therein;

4. PAY attorney's fees in the amount Php20,000.00 to plaintiff-appellant, and pay the cost of
suit.

SO ORDERED.13

Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.

 CA Ruling

The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. Citing Quizon v. Juan,14 it emphasized that
petitioner must allege and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in dispute.
The word "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, meant nothing more
than physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote
that petitioner was not in physical possession despite the presentation of the OCT No. RP-
174(13789) and his tax declarations.15 It reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in
forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto, as distinguished from
possession de Jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his prior physical possession.
Furthermore, the CA stated that the RTC misquoted Nunez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions16 by giving
the wrong notion of what kind of possession was contemplated in forcible entry cases. In other
words, physical possession was the crux in forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon
ownership.17 The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED, accordingly, the
Decision dated August 23, 2011 and Order dated October 25, 2011, of the RTC Branch 33, Bauang,
La Union in Civil Case No. 2029-BG are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC
dated April 26, 2011 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,19 dated July 6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by
the CA in a Resolution,20 dated December 5, 2012. It reads:

This Court, after a meticulous study of the arguments set forth in the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by respondent, finds no cogent reason to revise, amend, much less reverse, the assailed Decision
dated June 13, 2012. The Motion for Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, this petition, anchored on the following

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF

OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER WHICH MAY ESTABLISH PRIOR POSSESSION OVER THE
PROPERTY BY HEREIN PETITIONER.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.22

Petitioner argues that in ejectment cases, possession of the land does not only mean actual or
physical possession or occupation but also by the fact that a land is subject to the action of one's will
or by proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right; that the CA should have
considered OCT No. RP-174(13789) his tax declaration as proofs of prior physical possession over
the property; and that the issuance of the same are considered to by law as proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. Petitioner cited Tolentino, as one of the authors and
experts in Civil law, stating that the "proper acts and formalities" refer to juridical acts, or the
acquisition of possession by sufficient title, inter vivas or mortis causa, onerous or lucrative. These
are the acts which the law gives the force of acts of possession.

Petitioner also avers that the December 5, 2012 CA Resolution was not valid as it did not state the
legal basis required by the Constitution.

On May 28, 2013, respondent filed his Comment23 before this Court. He stated that the issues raised
and the arguments presented by petitioner have been thoroughly resolved and ruled upon by the
CA. The appellate court did not err in reversing the RTC decision because petitioner was never in
prior physical possession of the property in dispute. Respondent asserts that he has been in prior,
actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner
of the property in dispute.24

On March 28, 2014, petitioner filed his Reply,25 reiterating the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions, Inc.,26where a party was able to demonstrate that it had exercised acts of ownership over
the property by having it titled in its name and by paying real property taxes on it. Petitioner also
laments the wrongful insistence of respondent that his possession over the property was one in the
concept of an owner. To petitioner's mind, respondent failed to adequately adduce evidence to show
proof of his right to possess the property when his possession came under attack with the filing of
the subject case.27

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the
property.28

There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession
of the premises, that is, to possession de facto, not possession de Jure? Issues as to the right of
possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.29

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior
physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to
withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."30

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases31 that while prior physical
possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in
respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v.
Juan,32 which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts
of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public
instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like.33 The reason for this exceptional
rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.34 It is sufficient that petitioner
was able to subject the property to the action of his will.35 Here, respondent failed to show that he
falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased
to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the
boundaries of the titled lot.

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, inc., 36 the subject parcel was acquired by the
respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong
Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's
claim of prior possession was clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof
since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: Although it did not immediately put the
same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in
its name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the
sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently
did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003,
petitioner hml already been occupying the land since 1999.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Hence, in that case, the Court ruled that such juridical acts were sufficient to establish the
respondent's prior possession of the subject property.

The case of Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc.,37 also involves an action for
forcible entry. On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired a residential lot situated in Matin
a, Davao City, which was covered by TCT No. T-82338. On June 13, 1981, it transferred the said lot
to respondent DMC. Alleging that the petitioner forcibly entered the property in December 1993, the
respondent filed on March 28, 1994 a complaint for forcible entry. One of the issues raised therein
was whether respondent DMC had prior possession of the subject property, to which the Court
answered in the affirmative. It ruled that:

Prior possession of the lot by respondent's predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the
execution and registration of public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from
then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the premises and deprived the
former of possession thereof.

[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]

In the case at bench, the Court finds that pet1t1oner acquired possession of the subject property by
juridical act, specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.38

Before the Court continues any further, it must be determined first whether the issue of ownership is
material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The Rules of Court in fact expressly allow
this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be resolved
in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in this limited instance - to
determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership.39

This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be provisionally determined in this
case. First, the juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner arise would be the
registration of the free patent and the issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens
title suggests ownership over the land. Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the land
based on his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the
concept of an owner of the property in dispute.40 Because there are conflicting claims of ownership,
then it is proper to provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession
de facto.

Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789)
and his tax declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The issuance of an original certificate of
title to the petitioner evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession of the property flows.
Well-entrenched is the rule that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to the
possession thereof.41

Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax declarations. While tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or constructive possession.42 Together with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995
onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of possession over the land before his
dispossession on October 31, 2006 by respondent.

The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v. Lacaba43 to support its ruling. In that case, the
respondent tried to prove prior possession, by presenting only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a
certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real property tax from previous
years. The Court did not give credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty tax
payments are not conclusive proof of possession. The situation in the present case differs because
aside from presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted OCT No. RP-174(13 789) which
is the best evidence of ownership from where his right to possession arises.

Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner, the bare allegations of respondent that he
had prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession in the concept of
an owner, has no leg to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of ownership, the Court
is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of the subject property. When petitioner discovered
the stealthy intrusion of respondent over his registered prope1iy, he immediately filed a complaint
with the Lupong Tagapamayapa and subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC.
Instead of taking the law into his own hands and forcefully expelling respondent from his property,
petitioner composed himself and followed the established legal procedure to regain possession of
his land.

If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession,
then it would create an absurd situation. It would be putting premium in favor of land intruders
against Torrens title holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to register their land, and
who religiously paid real property taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their properties
simply because they have to prove their literal and physical possession of their property prior to the
controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort to ordinary civil procedure by filing either
an accion publiciana or accion reinvidicatoria and undergo arduous and protracted litigation while the
intruders continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's land. It will defeat the very
purpose of the summary procedure of an action for forcible entry.
The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal
disorder and to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain
what he claims is his. Ejectment proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can speedily
settle actions to recover possession because of the overriding need to quell social disturbances.44

As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, the Court agrees with the RTC that
petitioner had sufficiently complied with them. Petitioner proved that he was deprived of possession
of the property by stealth. The complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the one year
1wphi1

reglementary period counted from the discovery of the stealthy entry by respondent to the property
on October 31, 2006.

The second issue raised is the validity of the CA Resolution dated December 5, 2012. Petitioner
alleges that the CA denied his reconsideration without indicating its legal basis in violation of the
mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor. This requirement, however, was complied with when the CA, in its
resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, stated that it "finds no cogent reason to
reverse, amend, much less reverse the assailed Decision, dated June 13, 2012."45

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2012 Decision and the December 5, 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122153 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union, is
hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated Acti g Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order
No. 1888, dated November 28, 2014.

1
Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justice Marlene
Gonzales-Sison and Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, concwTing; rol!o, pp. 34-42.

2
Id. at 52-53.

3
Id. at 28-29.

4
Id. at 29-30.

5
MTC Decision, id. at 22-26. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Asuncion Fikingas-Mandia.

6
Id. at 24.

7
Id. at 26.

8
Id. at 27-32. Penned by Judge Rose Mary Molina-Alim.

9
426 Phil. 598, 607-608 (2002).

10
G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134, 143.

11
Rollo, p. 31.

12
Id. at 32.

13
Id.

14
577 Phil. 470 (2008).

15
Rollo, pp. 39-40.

16
Supra note 10.

17
Rollo, pp. 41-42.
18
Id. at 42.

19
Id. at 43-47.

20
Id. al 52-53.

21
Id. al 52.

22
Id. at 12.

23
Id. at 63-64.

24
Id. at 63.

25
Id. at 73-78.

26
Supra note 10.

27
Rollo. p. 75.

28
DeLa Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 539 Phil. 158, 170 (2006).

29
Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 619 (2005).

Nenita Quality Food Corporation v. Galabo, G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013, 689
30

SCRA 569, 581.

Nunez v. SLTEAS Pheonix Solutions, supra note 10, at 143; Bunyi v. Factor, 609 Phil. 134,
31

141 (2009); Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., supra note 29, at 619;
Spouses Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 216, 222 (1997).

32
Supra note 14, at 480.

33
Bunyi v. Factor, supra note 31, at 141.

Somodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82680 August 15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307, 312, citing
34

Romos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175, 180 (1918).

35
Id at 312.

36
Supra note 10.

37
Supra note 29.

38
Rollo, p. 54.

39
Supra note 30, at 584.

40
Rollo. p. 63.
 Heirs of Jose Maligaso, Sr. v. Spouses Encinas, G.R. No. 182716, June 20, 2012, 674
41

SCRA 215, 220.

42
Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr., G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516, 525.

43
G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516.

44
Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 512.

Areno, Jr, v. Skycable PCC-Baguio, G.R. No. 180302, February 5, 2010, 611 SCRA 721,
45

732-733.