ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA
Having given his conformity
1. ISABELO A. BRAZA vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: The Philippines was assigned the hosting rights for
the 12th ASEAN Leaders Summit. One of the ASEAN
Summit-related projects to be undertaken was the installation
of street lighting systems. Four street lighting projects were
awarded to FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply
Company, Inc. After the summit, a letter-complaint was filed
before Ombudsman Visayas, alleging that the ASEAN
Summit street lighting projects were overpriced. The OMB-
Visayas issued its Resolution, finding probable cause to indict
the concerned respondents for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practice Act. Several information were filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Braza was arraigned as a precondition to his
authorization to travel abroad, entered a plea of "not guilty.
Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation. Braza filed a
manifestation to make of record that he was maintaining his
previous plea of "not guilty" without any condition.
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution admitting
the Amended Information, and denying Braza's plea for
dismissal of the criminal case. Motion to Admit Attached
Amended Information was granted and set the date for the
new arraignment.
ISSUE: 1. Does sustaining the withdrawal of the Information in
violation of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, the petitioner having entered a valid plea and
vigorously objected to any further conduct of reinvestigation
and amendment of Information?
2. Does allowing the withdrawal and amendment of the
Information violated petitioner's constitutional right to speedy
disposition of his case, warranting his discharge with prejudice
regardless of the nature of his previous arraignment?
RULING: 1. A careful perusal of the record in the case at
bench would reveal that the arraignment of Braza under the
first information was conditional in nature as it was a mere
accommodation in his favor to enable him to travel abroad
without the Sandiganbayan losing its ability to conduct trial in
absentia in case he would abscond. The Sandiganbayan's
Order clearly and unequivocally states that the conditions for
Braza's arraignment as well as his travel abroad, that is, that if
the Information would be amended, he shall waive his
constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy and
shall allow himself to be arraigned on the amended information
without losing his right to question the same. It appeared that
these conditions were duly explained to Braza and his lawyer
by the anti-graft court. Thereafter, he voluntarily submitted
himself to such conditional arraignment and entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the offense charged.
and accepted the conditional arraignment and its legal
consequences, Braza is now estopped from assailing its
conditional nature just to conveniently avoid being arraigned
and prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information.
2. Indeed, the delay can hardly be considered as
"vexatious, capricious and oppressive." The
complexity of the factual and legal issues, the number
of persons charged, the various pleadings filed, and
the volume of documents submitted, prevent this
Court from yielding to the petitioners claim of
violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his
case. The delay in the determination of probable
cause in this case should not be cause for an
unfettered abdication by the anti-graft court of its duty
to try and determine the controversy in Case No. SB-
08-CRM-0275. The protection under the right to a
speedy disposition of cases should not operate to
deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in
prosecuting criminal cases.
2. CABO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: On June 24, 2000, Cabo and Bonifacio Balahay,
Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, were charged for violation
of Section 3(b) of RA 3019. In the information, it was alleged
that Mayor Balahay received from Cabo the amount of
P104,000, and that said mayor intervened in the undertaking
by Cabos company (OIDCI) for consultancy services with the
Municipality of Barobo. Cabo claimed that she was deprived
of her right to preliminary investigation so she filed a motion for
reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted her motion and
directed the Special Prosecutor to conduct one. Meanwhile,
Cabo filed another motion seeking permission to travel abroad
for a family vacation. The SB granted it in an order dated May
2004, which stated that, in light of the case still being under
reinvestigation, and considering that she had not yet been
arraigned, Cabo expressly consented to the order that she be
arraigned conditionally. [CONDITIONS:] If it is found that there
is no probable cause to proceed against her, the arraignment
will have no effect. However, if there is a need to amend the
present information, then Cabo would have then waived her
right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as well as her constitutional right against
double jeopardy. When she was arraigned, she was duly
assisted by her counsel and pleaded NOT GUILTY to the
offense charged. She also duly affixed her signature in the
minutes to signify her conformity to the conditional arraignment
and the legal consequence thereof. Thereafter, the Special
Prosecutor concluded his reinvestigation and found probable
cause to charge her with the violation of RA 3019. The SB then
set a new schedule for arraignment in October 2004. On the
day before arraignment, Cabo filed a motion (reiterate-not-
guilty motion) praying that she be allowed to reiterate her
previous plea in the conditional arraignment so that she may
be excused from attending the arraignment the next day. SB,
however, did not act on her said motion. Balahay, on the other
hand, filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
that the same did not charge any offense. It failed to allege that
Balahay had to intervene in the said contract under the law, in
his official capacity as mayor. The SB sustained Balahays
contention that the information was defective for lack of
necessary facts, but it did not immediately quash the
complaint. Instead, the court, in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, ordered only the amendment of
the information and ordered the prosecution to correct the
defect. The amended information was filed in February 2005
containing all the necessary elements of the crime charged.
Cabo was notified of her re-arraignment in April 2005, but she
filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the ground
that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the amended
information since amendment of the information based on the
substance is not allowed after the plea has been made. SB
denied petitioners motion. It held that her arraignment on the
original information was only conditional in nature to
accommodate her request to travel abroad so that she could
be tried in absentia. She agreed to the condition that should
the information be amended, she is deemed to waive her right
to object to the amendment and to waive her constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. She was considered
estopped from raising her objection to the amended
complaint.Petitioner filed an MR on the ground that double
jeopardy had set in. She asserted that her conditional
arraignment had been confirmed by her October motion
(reiterate-not-guilty motion) reiterating her plea of not guilty.
Thus, her arraignment on the original information was no
longer conditional, and double jeopardy must consequently
attach. SB denied her resolution.
ISSUE: W/N double jeopardy had attached on the basis of the
NOT GUILTY plea (which petitioner reiterated in her
October 2004 motion)
RULING: NO. Sandiganbayans practice of conditionally
arraigning the accused has no legal basis. It was only in
People vs. Espinosa that the Court recognized conditional
arraignment, provided that the conditions attached are
unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened. Otherwise,
the arraignment was considered simple and conditional. The
SB was declared to have unequivocally laid down petitioners
conditions for arraignment. Among those specified was that if
there was a need to amend the original information, she
forfeits her right to object and her RIGHT TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. She was assisted by counsel and thereby
informed of the legal consequences of such conditions. With
regard to her formal manifestation reiterating her not guilty plea
(reiterate-not-guilty motion), there was no showing that
Sandiganybayan affirmed her motion. Section 1(b), Rule 116
of the Rules of Court explicitly requires the accused to be
present at arraignment and personally enter his plea. With
respect to the applicability of double jeopardy to the case, two
requisites were absent: The first requisite of double jeopardy
was not present since the original information failed to allege
the essential elements for the violations allegedly committed
by petitioner and her co-accused. There was also NO
DISMISSAL OR TERMINATION OF THE CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER (fourth requisite). The SB merely ordered an
AMENDMENT. According to Section 4, Rule 117, the
prosecution is given an opportunity to amend the defective
information if the facts charged do not constitute an offense. It
is only when the prosecution fails to properly amend the
information that the motion to quash be granted. Contrary to
petitioners submission, the original information can be cured
by amendment even after she had pleaded thereto, since the
amendments ordered by the court below were only as to
matters of form and not of substance (Section 14, Rule 110).
The amended information did not change the nature of the
offense, which was for violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, but
it only made the facts more precise. The first information only
alleged that Balahay committed the offense with the use of his
influence as public official and together with petitioner, which
was too vague. The amended information now stated that he
did so in the performance of his official functions, taking
advantage of his official positionwith grave abusewhile
conspiringwith petitioner. The amended information also
simply specified that Balahay received the money from
petitioner for his own benefit and use. In People vs. Casey,
tests to determine whether defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of the information were set forth, among them are:
If the defenses of the accused in the original information are
still available in the amended information, and/or if the
amended information does not change the nature of the
offense chargedthe amendment is one of FORM AND NOT
SUBSTANCE, therefore not prohibited. Section 14, Rule 110 is
also not necessary, as petitioner suggested since there was no
mistake in the charging of the proper offense; the prosecution
merely failed to allege the appropriate facts necessary to
constitute the crime charged.
WHEN A PLEA OF GUILTY SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED
3. People v Strong | 63 SCRA 133 | March 14, 1975 |
Facts: As set forth in his manifestation and motion in lieu of
appellees brief, on February 6, 1974, during the continuation
of the arraignment, the accused Stephen Douglas Strong was
asked by Judge Occea: And it is also stated here, that on
the occasion and in pursuance of said robbery and to ensure
his felonious intent, the above-named accused with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a fork
and towel, attack, assault, stab, choke and strangle one
Cornelia Bartolaba, which caused her immediate death, what
do you say to that?2 His categorical answer: No. Then when
interrogated further to explain why he answered in the negative
considering that he had entered a guilty plea and specifically
queried as to whether he meant to say that he did not attack,
that he did not assault, that he did not stab, that he did not
choke and strangle the victim, Cornelia Bartolaba, to death,
there was an outright denial that he did any of those acts
attributed to him, answering no every time to each and every
question.
Issues:
1. What does giving an ambiguous plea constitute to?
2. What is required for a plea of guilty to be judicially
acceptable?
Ruling: Indefinite or ambiguous plea of guilty is equivalent to a
negative plea. When asked for comment on the allegations of
the information for robbery with homicide, the accused
categorically answered: No. Then when interrogated further
to explain why he answered in the negative considering that he
had entered a guilty plea and specifically queried as to whether
he meant to say that he did not attack, that he did not assault,
that he did not stab, that he did not choke and strangle the
victim, Cornelia Bartolaba, to death, there was an outright
denial that he did any of those acts attributed to him,
answering no every time to each and every question. It is
clear from a perusal of the afore-quoted portion of the
transcripts that the accused denied the allegations contained in
the information. It is well-settled that when a plea of guilty is
not definite or ambiguous, or not absolute, the same amounts
to a plea of not guilty. Accused must be fully made to
understand the meaning and consequences of a plea of
guilty.From and after August, 1968, when Apdu han was
promulgated, this Court has invariably referred to it as
furnishing the standard, and that in words too plain to be
misinterpreted. It could not be otherwise, if deference is to be
accorded to the constitutional right to due process as well as
the rudimentary procedural principles. The element of fairness
cannot be satisfied in any other manner. There must be, for a
plea of guilty to be judicially acceptable then, a showing of full
understanding of what is at stake. That is so even when an
accused does clearly admit the commission of the culpable
act. Here, on the contrary , while there was an admission of
guilt hastily made, it turned out, on his being sp ecifically
questioned, the accused denied most categorically the
allegations in the information.
4. People v. Balisacan
FACTS: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the
CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a
plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted by a counsel. At his
de oficio counsels petition, however, he was allowed to
present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances.
Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed
the deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling
him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the
basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus,
the prosecution appealed.
ISSUE: Whether an existence of plea is essential requisite in
order that accused may be in jeopardy
RULING: The existence of a plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. Where the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty and subsequently he was allowed to testify in order to
prove mitigating circumstances and he said that he acted in
complete self-defense, said testimony had the effect of
vacating his plea of guilty, and the court should have required
him to plea anew on the charge, or at least it should have
directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This
not having been done, there was no standing plea at the time
the court rendered its judgment of acquital, and it follows that
there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the present
appeal.
PLEA OF GUILT TO A LESSER OFFENSE
5. DAAN vs SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 163972-77, March
28, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner, together with Mayor Kuizon were charged
for three counts of malversation of public funds by falsifying the
time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that
some laborers worked on the construction of the new
municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte. In addition to the charge
for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
employee. In the falsification cases, the accused offered to
withdraw their plea of not guilty and substitute the same with a
plea of guilty, provided, the mitigating circumstances of
confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor. In the alternative, if such proposal is
not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to substitute
their plea of not guilty to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of guilty,
but to the lesser crime of falsification of a public document by a
private individual. On the other hand, in the malversation
cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of not guilty
thereto with a plea of guilty, but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts. Insofar as the
falsification cases are concerned, the prosecution found as
acceptable the proposal of the accused to plead guilty to the
lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private
individual for it will strengthen the cases against the principal
accused, Mayor Kuizon who appears to be the mastermind of
these criminal acts. However, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable
recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground that
no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval.
Likewise, it denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Is the lesser offense of falsification of a public
document by a private individual is necessary included in the
crime of falsification of public document by a public officer,
hence petitioner may plead guilty to the former?
RULING: YES. The lesser offenses of Falsification by Private
Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an Accountable
Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of
Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds,
respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged. An
offense may be said to necessarily include another when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former as
alleged in the complaint or information constitute the latter.
And vice versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter
(Art. 171 vis-a-vis Art. 172). In this case, the allegations in the
Informations filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold
petitioner liable for the lesser offenses. In the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty
to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage
of his official position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and
payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. In the same vein, he
may plead guilty for rendering account by an accountable
officer instead of malversation of public funds. Therefore, that
some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this
case likewise constitute the lesser offenses, then petitioner
may plead guilty to such lesser offenses. Moreover, petitioner
is not an accountable officer in that the nature of his duty as
foreman/timekeeper does not permit or require possession or
custody of local government funds, not to mention that
petitioner has already restituted the amount ofP18,860.00
involved in this case.
Additional Info:
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
6. People v Villarama, Jr., GR 99287, 23 Jun 1992
FACTS: Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of
Sec 16, RA 6425. During arraignment, the accused entered a
plea of not guilty. A few months after the prosecution rested its
case, the accused was willing to change his former plea to a
plea of guilt to a lesser offense. Respondent Judge postponed
the promulgation of the decision, and ordered the accused to
secure the consent of the prosecutor. Eventually, respondent
Judge granted the change of plea.
ISSUE: 1. Can the respondent Judge grant the request to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, even if the request was filed
out of time and the consent of the prosecutor and the offended
party was not obtained?
3. Is the consent of the fiscal the only thing needed in
crimes violation of RA 6425 for the trial court can
allow the accused to change his plea?
4. Can the accused invoke double jeopardy?
RULING:
1. NO. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or a
lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial
stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law
still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to
change his plea thereafter.However, the acceptance
of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the
aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused
as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed
entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved
to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the
prosecution had already rested its case. The trial
court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of
the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's
motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has
submitted his comment whether for or against the
said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously
study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his
changeof plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served. A reading of the
disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
strength or weakness of the prosecutions evidence.
Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the
 private respondent's change of plea is improper and
irregular.
2. NO. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The
consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. It would not also be correct to state that there
is no offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as
amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are
not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law
because they infringe upon the rights of others.
Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party,
i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal
who acts in behalf of the government.
3. NO. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Sec 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
applies in cases were both the fiscal and the offended
party consent to the private respondent's change of
plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead the
more pertinent and applicable provision is that found
in Sec 7, Rule 117. Under this rule, the private
respondent could still be prosecuted under the
original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425
as amended because of the lack of consent of the
Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e.,
the state. More importantly, the trial courts approval
of his change of plea was irregular and improper.
7. Gonzales III v. Office of the President
FACTS: The Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman charged Major General Garcia et.al with
Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.
However, the government, represented by petitioner, Special
Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit and her prosecutorial staff
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining
Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with the accused. On
December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused
Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the lesser offenses of
direct bribery and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as
amended.
ISSUE: Was the Plea bargaining agreement entered in this
case proper?
RULING: NO. Plea bargaining is allowable when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, if the basis
for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence
on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier
Resolution, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies
of twenty (20) prosecution witnesses and declared that "the
conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is
viewed by the Court to be of strong character that militates
against the grant of bail." Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by
the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea
bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its
evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction.
Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval.73 The
essence of a plea bargaining agreement is the allowance of an
accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged
against him.
8. People v. Garcia
Facts: Joint motion for approval of Plea Bargaining Agreement
by both the prosecution and accused Major Gen. Carlos
Garcia for plunder and for violation of the Anti-Money
Laundering law. Accused filed a motion for reconsideration
from the resolution of the court denying his petition for bail.
Accused invoked the allowing of plea bargaining after
arraignment.
Issue: whether there can be change of plea for plunder and
offer of a guilty plea to the lesser offense of indirect bribery?
Ruling: Yes. Considering that Indirect Bribery under Art 211,
RPC consists of receiving gifts in consideration of the office of
a public officer, and with the further consideration that position
of Gen. Garcia as Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership,
from which he purportedly received gifts, was not even alleged
in the information for Plunder, the court, in the exercise of its
sound discretion, allowed the guilty plea to the lesser offense
of Direct Bribery under Art. 210, par 3, RPC. On the other
hand, with respect to the change of negative plea for Anti
Money Laundering under Sec 4 (b) of the same law, the latter
offense is necessarily included in the first. Pursuant to the
foregoing premises, accused Gen. Garcia was re-arraigned
and pleaded guilty to the lesser offenses of Direct Bribery and
Violation of Sec. 4 (b) of RA 9160.
PLEA OF GUILT TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE
9. PEOPLE vs ERNAS
FACTS: Three separate Informations were filed with the trial
court charging appellant Rufino Ernas with the crime of rape
committed against his daughters Elsa and Celeste Ernas and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each case.
Upon his arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by his counsel,
entered a separate plea of not guilty. At the initial hearing Atty.
Capuno, counsel for the appellant, manifested the intention of
her client to withdraw his former plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
the Court granted the motion to withdraw his former plea and
ordered the re-arraignment of appellant. The three
Informations were again read to him in Tagalog, a language
spoken, read and understood by him, who, with the assistance
of Atty. Capuno, voluntarily pleaded guilty to the three counts
of rape. The Court then propounded additional questions to
appellant. Thereafter, trial court rendered its joint judgment
finding appellant guilty of three counts of rape and sentenced
him to the supreme penalty of death for each case.
ISSUE: Did the trial court err in not requiring the prosecution
to prove the guilt of the accused despite the plea of guilty to a
capital offense?
RULING: Yes. When an accused enters a plea of guilty to a
capital offense, the requirements under Section 3 of Rule 116
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure must be strictly
followed, to wit: When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of his culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf.
Under the rule, three things are enjoined of the trial court after
a plea of guilty to a capital offense has been entered by the
accused: (1) To conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea; (2) To require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability; and (3) To inquire from the accused if he desires to
present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.[15] This procedure is mandatory, and a judge who
fails to observe it commits a grave abuse of discretion.[16] The
rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that
innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.[17] The
primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the
part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he
might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeit his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.[18] Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on
appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of
the plea.
To assist the trial judges in the proper conduct of searching
inquiry, the Court, in People vs. Pastor, collated the following
guidelines which should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought
into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the assistance
of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
rule out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or
placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of
physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judges intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether
he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy
index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or
nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad
advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a
lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is
the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty
carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it,
that increase punishment.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do
so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him
and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language
known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
Tested with the above guidelines, the questions propounded
and the proceedings taken by the trial court were not sufficient
to apprise appellant of the consequences of his plea of guilty.
First, there was no effort on the part of the presiding judge to
comply with the guidelines enumerated above. While Atty.
Capuno manifested to the trial court that appellant intimated to
her the latters intention to withdraw his former plea of not
guilty, the trial court did not inquire from Atty. Capuno whether
she had conferred and explained to appellant the meaning and
consequences of the latters plea of guilt. Further, the records
do not show the age, socio-economic status as well as the
educational attainment of the appellant to assist the court a
quo as well as this Court in determining if appellant has full
understanding and capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty. Second, the records show that during the pre-trial
conference, appellant disputed the ages of the victims. The
trial judge should have pointed this out to appellant when he
was re-arraigned. The trial judge should have required the
prosecution to present its evidence on this matter considering
that the true age of the victims would determine the nature of
the crimes of rape and the proper imposition of the
corresponding penalty. Although both qualifying circumstances
of relationship and minority were alleged in the Informations,
they must be proved during the trial just as the crime of rape.
Third, appellant was not even asked why he had a change of
heart and decided to plead guilty to the charges. The judge did
not explain to him that in case of incestuous rape of a minor
child, the penalty is death under the law and his plea of guilt
would not under any circumstance affect or reduce his
sentence. Fourth, the Judge should have asked appellant to
recount what he exactly did to show that he fully understood
the nature of the crimes filed against him. Moreover, as
already stated, the trial judge failed to require the prosecution
to present its evidence. We have consistently held that the
taking of the testimony is the prudent and proper course to
follow for the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but also
the precise degree of culpability of the accused taking into
account the presence of other possible aggravating or
mitigating circumstances - and thereafter, to make the accused
present his own evidence, if he is so minded, for the same
purpose. A trial is meant to be a safeguard against putting an
innocent man in prison, and at the same time a guaranty that
the guilty obtains his just due, thus:the presentation of
evidence should be required in order to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme
Court on review, as to the possibility that there might have
been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to
the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to
ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of
the crime which justify or require the exercise of a greater or
lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the prescribed
penalties. It must be stressed that under the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest
alone on a plea of guilt. The prosecution evidence must be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independently of
the plea of guilt. The Court therefore cannot accept as valid the
plea of guilty entered by the appellant to the three charges of
rape. His re-arraignments as to the three charges are fatally
flawed. The trial court erred in believing that the questions
propounded to the appellant and the latters answers as well
as the documentary exhibits offered by the People would aid it
in determining whether the accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea. It likewise erred in allowing the
prosecution to dispense with the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses. As we have ruled, even if the trial court
is satisfied that the plea of guilty was entered with full
knowledge of its meaning and consequences, the introduction
of evidence to establish the guilt and the degree of culpability
of the accused is still required. Judges therefore must be
cautioned, toward this end, against the demands of sheer
speed in disposing of cases, for their mission after all, and as
has been time and again put, is to see that justice is done.
Finally, the decision of the trial court failed to express the facts
of the case as mandated under Section 14, Art VIII of the
Constitution which provides: No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.
10. People vs. Oden , G.R. Nos. 155511-22. April 14, 2004
FACTS: Appellant Mario Oden was charged with twelve (12)
counts of rape. Respondent is the father of the 15 years old
private complainant. On his arraignment, appellant, assisted by
counsel de officio, pleaded guilty to the charges. The trial court
rendered a decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged. In the review of his various cases
by this Court, appellant asserts that his plea of guilty has been
improvidently made on the mistaken belief that he would be
given a lighter penalty with his plea of guilt.
ISSUE: 1.Can the plea of the appellant under a mistaken belief
affect his conviction?
2.What are the procedures to be taken when the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense?
RULING: 1. While the records of the case are indeed bereft of
any indication that the rule has sufficiently been complied with,
the evidence for the prosecution outside of the plea of guilt,
nevertheless, would adequately establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The manner by which the plea of
guilt is made, whether improvidently or not, loses much of
great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged.
2. The trial court is mandated (1) to conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt, (2) to require the
prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire whether or
not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and
allow him to do so if he desires.
The process is mandatory and absent any showing that it has
been duly observed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to
have been aptly undertaken. The trial court must be extra
solicitous to see to it that the accused fully understands the
meaning and importance of his plea. In capital offenses
particularly, life being at stake, one cannot just lean on the
presumption that the accused has understood his plea.
11. People vs Gambao
FACTS:
The accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another and grouping themselves together, did then and
there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered
firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away
and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for
the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for
ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to
FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00) to the
damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan. During the hearing,
after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his
desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The
presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change
of plea. Upon hearing the change of plea, the other appellants
likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier
conferred with them and explained to each of them the
consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the
pleas they entered. Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-
arraignment. After they pleaded guilty, the trial court directed
the prosecution to present evidence, which it did. Both RTC
and CA rendered a decision convicting the accused.
ISSUE: Whether the plea of guilty to a capital offense was
validly entered.
RULING: No. The questions propounded by the trial court
judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood
the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent
from the records that Karim had the mistaken assumption that
his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that
both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that
such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned
by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single
and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.The duties of the trial
court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense are:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed
with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution
of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to
avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused
where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting
his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty
without having fully understood the meaning, significance and
consequence of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking
further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea. As a
general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the
trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence
to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction
must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on
the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the
offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance
where the conviction can be based on independent evidence
proving the commission of the crime by the accused. Contrary
to accused-appellants assertions, they were convicted by the
trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the
strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which
was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their
degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
12. People v Sevellino | 305 SCRA 519 | March 29, 1999 |
Facts: Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva invited his 9 year old
niece Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an to see a
show. After the father of Virginia learned that she went with the
accused to Sitio Guindali-an, he immediately went after them.
Rogelio, the father failed to find his daughter upon reaching
Sitio Guindali-an; instead, he bumped into the accused. When
asked about Virginia the accused denied knowing where she
was. However, Rogelio noticed that the accused had nail
scratches on his neck and a wound on his left cheek. Rogelio
continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio
Tiongson, a relative of the accused. The next day they met the
accused at the house of the former barangay captain of Sitio
Guindali-an, Paeng Lopez. Eugenio asked Paulino where
Virginia was. This time the accused replied that she was in a
sugarcane field known as Campo 9, still a part of Guadalupe,
like Sitio Guindali-an. Accompanied by some police officers,
Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to Campo 9. There they
found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress raised to
her armpits; the lower portion of her torso was naked; her legs
were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of her
body. She was dead. The local residents immediately arrested
the accused Paulino Sevilleno and turned him over to the
police authorities. Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused
was charged with rape with homicide for having carnal
knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a minor.
Issue: Is it mandatory for a judge to conduct a search inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences when an accused pleads guilty?
Ruling: Yes. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea. It must also require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. If the accused so
desires he may also present evidence in his behalf. This
procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it
commits grave abuse of discretion. Searching inquiry must not
only satisfy the trial judge himself but also aid the Supreme
Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance
and consequences of his plea. The questions propounded by
the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite
searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were only two (2)
questions propounded to the accused: First. Do you
understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your
plea of guilt could bring death penalty? In every case where
the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense,
especially where he is an ignorant person with little or no
education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take
such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the
material allegations of the information, including the
aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to
satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court
in determining whether the accused really and truly understood
and comprehended the meaning, full significance and
consequences of his plea.
13. PEOPLE VS. LAKINDANUM
FACTS: As the victim was only nine years old, her mother,
Lanie Calaguin, filed the complaint for rape. Upon arraignment,
accused pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. On
October 2, 1996, however, just before the direct examination of
the victim started, the defense counsel manifested that the
accused wanted to withdraw his original plea of "not guilty" and
replace it with a "guilty" plea. The Court gave defense counsel
time to confer with his client and apprise him of the
consequences of entering a guilty plea. At the next hearing,
the trial court judge examined the accused to determine the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the plea he was about
to make. Thereafter, Lakindanum was rearraigned and he
pleaded "guilty" to the charge. The trial court then proceeded
to hear the evidence of the prosecution to establish
Lakindanum's guilt and the precise degree of his culpability.
Since the defense already admitted the genuineness and
authenticity of the victim's birth certificate and the medical
certificate issued by the doctor who examined her, only the
victim, Catherine Calaguin, was presented as the lone
prosecution witness. In a decision dated October 10, 1996,
accused was convicted for the crime of statutory rape and was
meted out the capital punishment of death pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7659. The decision is now up for automatic
review.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in accepting the accused-
appellant's improvident plea of guilty to the crime charged and
in not requiring the accused-appellant to take the witness
stand to determine his degree of culpability considering that
the case involves a capital offense.
RULING: NO. The rule is that where the accused desires to
plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to
observe the following: 1. It must conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea; 2. The court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3. The
court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in
his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. From the
foregoing, it is clear that the judge can hardly be said to have
satisfied the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry into
the voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of
entering a guilty plea. Worse, the judge erroneously informed
Lakindanum that by pleading guilty, the latter forfeited his right
to testify and to adduce evidence in his defense. Section 4,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is clear on the matter:
Sec. 4. Plea of guilty to a capital offense; reception of
evidence.When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present
evidence in his behalf.
Considering that Lakindanum stands accused of a capital
offense for which he may be put to death, the trial judge should
have been more vigilant and solicitous in making sure that the
accused-appellant clearly understood the legal consequences
of the plea he was about to make. In People vs. Alicando, the
Court stressed that the plea of guilty to a capital offense is null
and void where the trial court inadequately discharged the duty
of conducting a searching inquiry. In that case, the Court
remanded the case to the trial court for rearraignment and trial
on the merits. It should be noted, however, that the
proceedings in the present case are not exactly the same as
those in Alicando because here, there is sufficient evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant
indeed committed the crime charged. We, therefore, find that
the trial court properly relied on the lone testimony of the child
victim to convict Lakindanum. The trial court relied on sufficient
and credible evidence to convict the accused-appellant, the
same must be sustained for the simple reason that the
conviction is predicated not on the guilty plea of the accused
but on the convincing evidence proving his commission of the
offense charged. This Court cannot, on mere procedural
grounds, allow the revolting perversion of the accused-
appellant to go unpunished.
14. PEOPLE vs ALICANDO 251 SCRA 293, December 12,
1995
FACTS: Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with
homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and during the
interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the
assistance of a counsel. By virtue of his uncounseled
confession the police came to know where to find the
evidences consisting of the victims personal things like clothes
stained with blood which was admitted to court as pieces of
evidence. The victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and
was convicted with the death penalty. The case was forwarded
to the SC for automatic review.
ISSUES:
1. Was the arraignment of Alicando valid?
2. Was the plea of guilt made by Alicando valid?
3. Were the pieces of physical evidence and the
confession gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan as a result of
custodial interrogations where appellant verbally confessed to
the crime without the benefit of counsel admissible as
evidence in court?
RULING:
1. NO, the arraignment is null and void. The trial judge
failed to follow section (1) (a) of Rule 116 on arraignment,
which implements the constitutional right of appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. It
also denied appellant of his consti right to due process of law.
According to the Supreme Court, the records do not reveal that
the Information against the appellant was read in the language
or dialect known to him.
2. NO, the plea of guilt is likewise null and void. The trial
court violated Section 3 Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of
guilt of the appellant. Section 3 Rule 116 states that the court
shall conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the appellant of the consequences of his
plea. The Trial Court records do not reveal any information
about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve
as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilt. The questions were also framed in
English yet there is no inkling that appellant understands
English. The trial court also did not bother to explain to the
appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with
homicide.
3. NO, the pieces of evidence and the confession of
Alicando were fruits of the poisonous tree,, gathered as a
result of the custodial interrogations where appellant verbally
confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel is
inadmissible as evidence in court. They are covered by the
exclusionary rule under Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
15. People v Serna, GR L-33294, 25 Jul 1984
FACTS: The accused Serna together with Cipriano were
charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Homicide, and
Serna was given the Deat penalty. After the information was
read to the accused in English and trnaslated in Smar dialect,
the accused pleaded guilty. Thereafter, the FIscal asked that
the plea of guilty be considered mitigating. Without explaining
the import of the plea of guilty and calling witnesses to
convince itself of the culpability of the accused, the court
redndered judgment convicting the accused and imposing the
penalty of death. The trial judge did not even bother to ask
appellant whether he understood his plea.
ISSUE: Can the judge convict the accused without requiring
the prosecution to present its evidence to prove the extent of
his culpability when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense?
RULING: NO.Considering that the appellant was charged with
an offense punishable by death, the trial court should have
required the prosecution to present its evidence to prove the
extent of his culpability. The taking of such testimony is the
prudent and proper course to follow for the purpose of
establishing not only the guilt but also the precise culpability of
the defendant. Where a plea of guilty is entered by the
defendant, in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed,
the court should make certain that defendant fully understands
the nature of the charge preferred against him and the
character of the punishment provided by law before it is
imposed. The trial court should therefore call witnesses for the
purposes of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of
the defendant, not only to satisfy the trial judge, but also to aid
the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really
and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea.
SEARCHING INQUIRY
16.) People v. Mendoza
FACTS: Accused Magalop, Fernandez and Dahilan were
charged of robbery with force upon things. At the arraignment,
Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not guilty."
The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was "not
mentally well." Respondent Judge acquitted accused
Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge. Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who
was assisted by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force
upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative but to
pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
ISSUE: Is Petitioner correct?
RULING: NO. This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be
a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence
points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that
simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that
his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence
independent of the plea may be considered to convince the
judge that it was intelligently made. Here it is evident, even
from the start that the case of the prosecution against the three
(3) accused was virtually non-existent as the asported articles
were found in the possession of a certain Babie Tan and yet,
quite inexplicably, the prosecution did not summon him to the
witness stand. Babie Tan could have positively identified those
who sold him the stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could
very well have been the perpetrator of the crime himself. In the
absence of an explanation of how one has come into
possession of stolen effects, the possessor is presumed to be
the author of the crime of robbery.
SUSPENSION OF ARRAIGNMENT
17. Reyes v. Rossi (2013)
Facts: Reyes and Advance Foundation, represented by Rossi,
executed a deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by
Reyes of equipment worth P10M. The parties agreed that
Reyes would pay the sum of P3M downpayment and the
balance of P7M thru four post-dated checks. Reyes complied,
however, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under
the deed of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated
checks with nine post-dated check. Advance foundation
agreed. However, two of the checks were denied payment.
With that, Reyes filed an action for rescission of contract and
damages in QC RTC. And Rossi filed Reyes with five counts of
estafa and five counts of violation of BP 22 in the Office of the
prosecutor of QC.
Issue: Was there a suspension of the criminal case?
Ruling: No. To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial
question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions,
reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. In
this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not
bar the continuation of the proceedings in the preliminary
investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question.
Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until
rescinded, the consideration and obligatory effect thereof are
also deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable.
Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time
when the subject checks were dishonored.(Emphasis supplied)
18. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES INC. vs PEREZ, Sep 4,
2013
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. purchased from
B.F. Homes, Inc. 2,130 residential lots situated in its
subdivision BF Homes Paraaque. The transactions were
embodied in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering
the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully
delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of
the 41 parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale,
were not delivered to San Miguel Properties. On its part, BF
Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale
because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation
receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile
replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on
May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes
refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, San
Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Pias charging respondent directors
and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation
of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential
Decree No. 957. At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued
BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to
compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor. San
Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the
OCP Las Pias, citing the pendency of BF Homes
receivership case in the SEC. In its comment/opposition, BF
Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime,
however, the SEC terminated BF Homes receivership on
September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel Properties to file
on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes
comment/opposition coupled with a motion to withdraw the
sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening
termination of the receivership. The OCP Las Pias rendered
its resolution, dismissing San Miguel Properties criminal
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on
several grounds, one of which was that there existed a
prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en
banc or by the HLURB.
ISSUE: Whether the HLURB administrative case brought to
compel the delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend
the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the violation of
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question
RULING: YES. A prejudicial question is understood in law to
be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is
determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so
intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle
of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The
determination of whether the proceedings ought to be
suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on
whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the
specific performance case were so related with the issues
raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential
Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the
former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the
criminal case. An examination of the nature of the two cases
involved is thus necessary. An action for specific performance
is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract
in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the
precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.
Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed
of, there must first be a breach of the contract. On the other
hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the
sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the
increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision
owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on
their representations and obligations to provide and maintain
properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well as of
reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators. Conformably with the
foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB
would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was
legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20
TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not
BF Homes directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must
obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold
San Miguel Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the
20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to
represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having
been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability
for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with
the criminal case. Worthy to note at this juncture is that a
prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial
question to simply test the sufficiency of the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the
criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is
deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet
presented a single piece of evidence on the indictment or may
not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-
criminal suit
19. VINCENT E. OMICTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of
Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for two counts of estafa
against private respondent Lagos. He alleged that private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to return the
two company vehicles entrusted to him. Public prosecutor
recommended the indictment of private respondent, and on the
same day, respondent was charged with the crime of estafa.
Private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on
the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending
petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
involving the same parties. Granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not a prejudicial question exists to warrant
the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the
resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was originally
filed with the SEC.
RULING: Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the
intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or innocence of
Lagos in the crime of estafa. One of the elements of estafa
with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the
RPC is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.
Logically, under the circumstances since the alleged offended
party is Saag Phils., Inc., the validity of the demand for the
delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
person making such demand on the companys behalf. Lagos
is challenging petitioners authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc.
in the corporate case. If the supposed authority of petitioner is
found to be defective, it is as if no demand was ever made,
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
20. HERNANI N. FABIA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
132684, August 20, 2001
Facts: Petitioner Hernani N. Fabia, until his resignation on 10
August 1994, was the President of private respondent MTCP,
a domestic corporation engaged in providing maritime courses
and seminars to prospective overseas contract workers and
seamen. He was likewise a Director and stockholder thereof.
MTCP through its new President Exequiel B. Tamayo filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa against Hernani N. Fabia alleging
that on various occasions Fabia drew cash advances from
MTCP, covered by cash vouchers, amounting to
P1,291,376.61 which he failed to liquidate despite repeated
demands. Petitioner Fabia in his Reply-Affidavit and Motion to
Dismiss admitted having received the various amounts
covered by the cash vouchers but reasoned that they were in
the nature of simple loans that had already been liquidated and
paid as shown by the receipts and vouchers which he had
attached to his pleadings. The Office of the City Prosecutor
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction for the reason
that the controversy pertained to the relationship between a
corporation and a former officer thereof, hence, it was the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
Department of Justice found no reversible error committed by
the Office of the City Prosecutor.The Court of Appeals held
that the amount subject of the estafa charge had in fact been
determined by an independent certified public accountant as
shown by the report from the accounting firm of Mendoza,
Ignacio, Corvera and Co. The CA further held that the instant
case comprehends a simple transaction where the requirement
of prior accounting and liquidation may be done away with, as
it is not essential. Petitioner now questions the jurisdiction of
the trial court arguing that the instant case involves an intra-
corporate controversy primarily cognizable by the SEC and, as
such, the public prosecutor had no authority to initially rule in
the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa filed
against him as it was barred under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction from exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case
without the prior resolution of the SEC on the matter.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has the jurisdiction to
decide issues involving intra-corporate controversies.
Held: Yes.Section 6, PD 902-A confines the jurisdiction of the
SEC to "intra-corporate disputes" defined as any act or
omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of corporations, or
of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their
stockholders, officers, or partners, including any fraudulent
devices, schemes or representations, in violation of any law or
rules and regulations administered and enforced by the
Commission.[9] This underscores the relationship of the party-
litigants with each other, and indicates that the nature of the
cause of action should be limited to fraudulent devices,
schemes or representations, in violation of any law, rules
and/or regulations administered and enforced by the
Commission for the cause of action to fall within the ambit of
authority of the SEC elements that are both present in the
instant case. Indeed, the charge against petitioner is for estafa,
an offense punishable under The Revised Penal Code (RPC),
and prosecution for the offense is presently before the regular
courts. However, as correctly pointed out by private
respondent MTCP, jurisdiction is determined not from the law
upon which the cause of action is based, nor the type of
proceedings initiated, but rather, it is gleaned from the
allegations stated in the complaint. It is evident from the
complaint that the acts charged are in the nature of an intra-
corporate dispute as they involve fraud committed by virtue of
the office assumed by petitioner as President, Director, and
stockholder in MTCP, and committed against the MTCP
Corporation. This sufficiently removes the action from the
jurisdiction of the regular courts, and transposes it into an intra-
corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of the SEC. The
fact that a complaint for estafa, a felony punishable under the
RPC, has been filed against petitioner does not negate and
nullify the intra-corporate nature of the cause of action, nor
does it transform the controversy from intra-corporate to a
criminal one. Accordingly, as the matter involves an intra-
corporate dispute within the jurisdiction of the SEC, the issue
of whether prior non-accounting precludes a finding of
probable cause for the charge of estafa no longer finds
relevance. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts us to
refer the instant case to the SEC for its resolution of the matter
in dispute. However, it should be noted that RA 8799, The
Securities Regulation Code, has amended PD 902-A, and
transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate
cases to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Courts.To transfer the present case to the SEC
would only result in a circuitous administration of justice. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila should dismiss Crim. Case
No. 98-162570 without prejudice to the filing of the proper
action which shall then be raffled off to the appropriate branch
of the court pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
21. People v Gutierrez | 91 Phil. 876 | August 30, 1952 |
Facts: Eugenio Gutierrez was charged with treason in an
information couched in the ff. terms: The undersigned special
prosecutor hereby accuses Eugenio Gutierrez of the crime of
treason under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows: That in or about the period comprised
between December 8, 1941, and September 2, 1945 in
Laguna and other provinces in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
not being a foreigner but a Filipino citizen owing loyalty and
allegiance to the United States of America and to the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, with the intention of
betraying his country and the United States of America, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and traitorously
adhere to their enemy, the EMPIRE OF JAPAN, against which
they were then at war, giving said enemy aid and comfort, to
wit: That during the period and in the place above-mentioned,
the herein accused, for the purpose of giving and with intent to
give aid and comfort to the enemy, then act there acted as its
informer or agent, bore arms, did guard duty for the enemy,
joined and accompanied Japanese soldiers on patrol in search
of and for the apprehension and arrest of guerrillas and in
commandeering vehicles, food and other provisions for the use
and benefit of the said enemy, helped and took part in
recruiting of forced labor for the enemy and finally joined and
fled with the enemy in the latter's retreat to the mountains.
CONTRARY TO LAW. Witnesses testified as to certain
instances when Gutierrez acted as a collaborator (resulting in
the death of many citizens and guerrillas) and encouraged
fellow Filipinos to cooperate with the Japanese. His counsel
moved to quash the information on the ground of amnesty but
the motion was denied. Instead of moving for specifications,
his counsel objected to the introduction of evidence showing
specific acts constituting the crime. CFI Laguna found him
guilty and gave the above sentence.
Issue: Can a defendant in a criminal case who believes or
feels that he is not sufficiently informed of the crime with which
he is charged and not in a position to defend himself properly
and adequately could move for specifications?
Ruling: Yes. A defendant in a criminal case who believes or
feels that he is not sufficiently informed of the crime with which
he is charged and not in a position to defend himself properly
and adequately could move for specifications. If he moved to
quash the information on the ground of amnesty and the
motion was denied; or if his counsel, instead of moving for
specifications, went to trial and objected to the introduction of
evidence showing specific acts which constitute the crime
charged and cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution
on such specific acts, it may well be said that defendant was
not taken by surprise. Failure to move for specifications or for
the quashing of the information on any of the grounds provided
for in the Rules of Court (sec. 2, Rule 113) deprives him of the
right to object to evidence which could be lawfully introduced
and admitted under an information of more of less general
terms but which sufficiently charges the defendant with definite
crime.
22 PEOPLE VS. ABAD SANTOS
FACTS: Joseph Arcache was charged with the crime of
treason. The information specified the different kinds of
properties alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese
imperial forces and other similar equipments. Arcache was
duly arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On the day of
the trial, counsel verbally petitioned respondent judges that the
prosecution make specific the phrase and other similar
equipments or have it stricken therefrom, unless the
prosecution should furnish a bill of particulars specifying what
the phrase means. Special prosecutor objected to said petition
as it was filed out of time or after the accused has entered a
plea of not guilty. Nevertheless, respondent judges granted the
petition due to the fact that the allegation was too broad. The
special prosecutor requested that trial be postponed to give
them time to prepare the bill of particulars. On the date of the
scheduled trial, instead of submitting such bill, the special
prosecutor filed an MR of said order of the court, stating that it
was contrary to law and that the judge acted in excess of its
jurisdiction. MR was denied.
ISSUE: WON a bill of particulars may be ordered after entering
of plea.
RULING: YES. In the absence of specific provisions of law
prohibiting the filing of specifications or bill of particulars in
criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they
cannot prejudice any substantial rights of the accused. On the
contrary, it will serve to apprise of the accused clearly of the
charges against him considering that conviction in criminal
cases involve the deprivation of the accused of his life and
liberty. In criminal cases, any defect in the accusation other
than lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be cured
by good and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution.
Ambiguous phrases therefore should not be permitted in
criminal complaints or informations and if such phrase has
been included therein, on motion of the defense and before the
commencement of trial, the court should order its elimination
as surplusage or the filing of the necessary specification, which
is but an amendment in mere matters of form.
23 People v Arlegui, GR L-62117, 2 Apr 1984
FACTS: Espaola was charged in an information for violating
PD 381 in relation to Sec 4-B of PD 189 as amended for
building/operating a beach resort without prior approval from
the Pgilippine Tourism Authority (PTA). Espaola sought
dismissal of the case via a motion to quash, accordingly, for its
failure to state a criminal offense. Espaola argues that the
accusation against him was merely administrative in nature.
The prosecution, however, argues that Espaola's allegations
are misleading in that he confuses the relevant provisions of
the PDs herein involved vis-a-vis the language of the
information. The respondent Judge agreed with Espaola and
granted the motion to quash. Accordinglym the case was
dismissed.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the case warranted?
RULING: NO. The respondent Judge should have ordered a
bill of particulars instead of dismissing the case. True, under
Sec 4-b of PD 189, no penalty let alone criminal liability is
provided. However, PD 189 has been amended by PD 259
and a new provision, "Section 4-B" has been added. On its
face, the information does not suffer from any material or
substantial defect or any so-called ambiguity or double
meaning as to warrant the dismissal of the case on account of
failure to state an offense. Assuming that the information was
indeed vauge, Espaola should have filed a motion for a bill of
particulars and not quashal. A bill of particulars while provided
for under Sec 6, Rule 116, is not a popular procedure amonf
lawyers for the accused in criminal cases. Be that as it may,
the bill of particulars should still be considered as it would
serve to clarify and correct, at an early stage, the exact kind of
doubt which Espaola alleged to ahve entertained. THe more
appropriate procedure under the circumstances would have
been an order from the lowere court for a bill of particulars and
subsequent direction to the Fiscal to amend the information on
account of the defect, if there ever was one, as it is curable by
the simplest of amendments or clarifications.