RPR Review of Policy Research

No Identification Without Representation: Constraints

on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems ropr_535 5..20

Emilio Mordini
Centre for Science, Society & Citizenship

Andrew P. Rebera
Centre for Science, Society & Citizenship

Abstract
The human species is again becoming nomadic. Each year, about two billion persons move across large
geographic distances (not to mention people in virtual mobility through information and communication
technology). Many of these people have weak or unreliable identification documentsand many poorer
people in developing countries do not even have these documents. In 2000, the United Nations Childrens
Fund (UNICEF) calculated that 50 million babies (41% of births worldwide) were not registered at birth.
In this scenario, a personal identification scheme based on birth registration and state-issued passports is less
and less tenable. Biometrics appears to offer a viable technological solution. However, the technology itself
is subject to popular critique, warning of dystopian futures of overwhelming surveillance and loss of
privacy. The best answer to those who fear an Orwellian future is to engage with the technology and seek
to ensure that biometric identification systems are developed in positive ways. We suggest that identification
schemes become problematic when the reciprocity of identification goes unnoticed, forgotten, or (what is
worse) is intentionally bypassed. The dynamics of identification should be reciprocal, dialogical, and
involving mutual recognition. In the traditional political domain, this is the recognition by the state of a
citizen and by the citizen of the state. In the digital age, identification systems must increasingly transcend
geopolitical borders. A globally recognized identification scheme is therefore a necessity. However, it is merely
the nature of the borders that has changed herenot the nature of identification. Our call will be: no
identification without representation.
KEY WORDS: biometrics, identification, globalization, civil liberties, fundamental rights, reciprocity,
political representation

1. Introduction

The development of methods for establishing, communicating, and authenticating

the identity of individuals has been driven by a number of factors, not least the
desire of governments to efficiently exercise power over their subjects. No doubt
this was spurred by the development of concepts of the state, the individual, the
citizen (and so forth). The modern state presupposes, in addition to technologies
of identification, the creation of a [. . .] people open to the scrutiny of officialdom
(Caplan & Torpey, 2001, p. 1).
That the need for reliable methods of identification arose at all is presumably
connected with the birth of the first urban societies during the so-called Neolithic
Revolution (Childe, 1950). At this point, the human species, hitherto nomadic,
began to settle down (so to speak). Societies developed robust geographical roots,
population densities increased, and social hierarchies developed. Growing societal
complexity, alongside developments in artisanship and intrasocietal and inter-
societal trade, would have made the identification of the trustworthyas well as
the detection of the untrustworthyincreasingly vital to the normal functioning of
these early societies.
Review of Policy Research, Volume 29, Number 1 (2012)
2012 by The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.
6 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

Of course it remains true that the major interventions of the state into the lives
of its subjectse.g., taxation, conscription, and the administration of authority/
justiceneed not proceed at the level of the individual. The necessity for individual
identification is less severe when taxes, conscription, and so on are imposed collec-
tively (Caplan & Torpey, 2001, p. 1). Specific individual identification has been more
closely tied up with mass literacy and increased state bureaucracy (Goody, 1986).
The Roman Empire, which was the first cosmopolitan society in the West, provided
the first example of a universal identification system through a tripartite codified
name scheme. In Europe during the Middle Ages, individuals were chiefly identi-
fied through passes and safe conducts issued by religious and civil authorities. Seals
and handwriting mainly enforced the authenticity of these documents. The Modern
era, which saw increased mobility associated with urbanization and industrializa-
tion, required more effective recognition schemes. These were administered by
nation states. Indeed, the development of more robust identification schemes has
to some extent progressed in parallel with the development of post-Westphalian
polities, marking the passage from feudal to industrial society. Thus, as Valentin
Groebner (2001, p. 16) notes: by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the
failure to carry [documents of origin and identity] while travelling was already an
offense that could attract considerable penalties.
After World War I, most European countries introduced systems of identity
cards, incorporating facial photography (and, in some cases, also fingerprinting), as
a tool for identifying people within their state borders. Yet even in countries where
identity cards did not become mandatory, a new powerful driver for personal
identification emerged: the need to identify and authenticate people entitled to
receive social benefits. The welfare state, which first emerged in Northern Europe
after World War II, is based on the provision of services via redistributionist
taxation. Taxation and welfare provision both rely on robust and reliable systems of
personal identification.
Following the agricultural, industrial, and welfare revolutions, we are now
on the verge of a new epochal transition. The human species is again becoming
nomadic. Each year, about two billion persons move across large geographic dis-
tances (not to mention people in virtual mobility through information and com-
munication technology); approximately half cross international boundaries. The
International Air Transport Association reported that their members carried 1.6
billion passengers in 2007, among which 699 million flew internationally (Inter-
national Air Transportation Association, 2010). The United Nations World Tourism
Organization (2009) estimated 924 million international tourist arrivals in 2008.
International movements for permanent resettlement by immigrants, refugees, or
asylum seekers, and temporary movement by migrant workers and others augment
the total international movements each year. The International Labour Organiza-
tion stated that in 2004, an estimated 175 million persons (3% of the worlds
population) lived permanently outside their country of birth and that there were
81 million migrant workers (excluding refugees) globally (International Labour
Organization, 2004).
Globalization has been characterized by the development of technologies dra-
matically transcending national control and regulation. This is not without conse-
quence for traditional identification schemes. The globalized world is confronted
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 7

with a huge mass of people with weak or absent identities. Most developing coun-
tries have weak or and unreliable documentsand many poorer people in these
countries do not even have these documents. In 2000, UNICEF calculated that 50
million babies (41% of births worldwide) were not registered at birth. In Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Nepal, child registration at birth is not even mandatory. In this
scenario, a personal identification scheme based on birth registration and state-
issued passports is less and less tenable.
The tourist hoping to use her credit card in any part of the globe, the asylum
seeker hoping to access social benefits in her host country, the banker hoping to
move money from one stock market to another in real timeall have the same need.
They must prove their identities and be certain of others. Traditional means of
proving identities are not dependable enough in most parts of the world and hence
unfit for global digital networks. In this context, biometrics appears to offer a viable
technological solution. However, the technology itself is subject to popular critique,
warning of dystopian futures of overwhelming surveillance and loss of privacy.
For better or worse, biometric technologies are, it would seem, here to stay.
The best answer to those who fear an Orwellian future is not merely to provide
optimistic reassurances (which rarely reassure anyone) but rather to engage with
the technology and seek to ensure that biometric identification systems are devel-
oped in positive ways. Our aim in this article is to articulate the positive potential of
biometric identification schemes.
Orwellian fears are not unjustified, as we shall discuss. However, we will suggest
that identification schemes become problematic when the reciprocity of identification
goes unnoticed, forgotten, or (what is worse) is intentionally bypassed. The dynam-
ics of identification should be reciprocal, dialogical, and involving mutual recog-
nition. In the traditional political domain, this is the recognition by the state of a
citizen and by the citizen of the state. In the digital age, identification systems must
increasingly transcend geopolitical borders. A globally recognized identification
scheme is therefore a necessity. However, it is merely the nature of the borders
that has changed here, not the nature of identification. In this article, we will set
out a framework for a system of identification. We begin in the following section by
considering some objections to biometric identification systems. We will argue that
where the objections are reasonable, this is not specifically attributable to the use of
biometrics. We then (section 3) offer a partial defense of biometrics as a desirable
candidate for a global identification system in the digital age. We do so by diag-
nosing the cause of the undesirable consequences associated with biometrics, dis-
cussed in section 2. Having identified the root problem, we conclude by proposing
a guiding principle for the implementation of a global biometric identification
system: no identification without representation.

2. Biometric Identification
Let us suppose that there is a grouprelatively small in numberwho would
prefer that biometric systems of identification were not employedthat the tech-
nology had not been developed, or that other less intrusive forms of identification
were more robustly suited to the digital age. For the sake of having a name, call this
group the anti-biometrics camp. (We are speaking hypothetically here but it is not
8 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

unreasonable to suppose that such a group exists.1) The anti-biometrics camp calls
for the outlawing of biometric identification systems, or at least for such severe
restrictions as to amount to a de facto outlawing of the technology. We will consider
two arguments in the anti-biometrics camps arsenal: (i) that the technology is
inherently demeaning and (ii) that the technology is a tool of the surveillance
society.2

(i) Biometrics is Inherently Demeaning

To identify is a transitive verb. Correspondingly, the activity of identifying is

relational: A identifies B, or, in the present case, A biometrically identifies B. The
question then, is what in this particular relational structure demeans B?
Standard means of gathering biometric data include: fingerprinting, facial
scans, iris scans, voice recognition, hand vein recognition, gait analysis, keystroke
pattern, and so on. Some of these means, it should be noted, areif not inherently
demeaningat least conventionally associated with negative connotations. Finger-
printing is a clear example, being primarily associated with criminality (at least in
some cultural areas). Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that most
other biometricsindeed the domain in generalare largely bound up in the
popular imagination with criminality and crime detection. This is witnessed by the
popularity of television shows centering on forensic pathology and criminology
(e.g., CSI in the United States, or Silent Witness in the United Kingdom); while
historically speaking, the associations trace back to the pioneers of anthropometrics
such as Francis Galton (18221911) in the United Kingdom and Alphonse Bertillon
(18531914) in France.3
In this respect, biometrics has something of an image problem. The problem is
only deepened by high-profile examples in which biometrics plays a rolethough it
should be noted, for this is indicative of the extent of the image problem, that in many
of these cases biometrics is incidental to the story.4 In a well-known case, Italian
philosopher Georgio Agamben refused to enter the United States in protest at the
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator (US-VISIT) programs
requirement for visitors to be fingerprinted and photographed (Agamben, 2008). In
other cases too, U.S. immigration officials have been accused of heavy-handedness.
In May 2011, 2000 elderly cruise passengers were fingerprinted and had retina scans
during a 7-hour security check (Bloxham & Bingham, 2011); while Amir Khan,
boxings IBF and WBA World Light Welterweight Champion, has complained of
profiling and extensive security checks upon entering and re-entering the United
States (Davies, 2011). Similarly, the use of biometrics was reported in connection with
the recent controversy concerning the French government and the Roma commu-
nity (Fraser, 2010). The biometrics connection was that the French authorities
recorded biometric details of Roma migrants prior to repatriation. However, the
primary newsworthy issue was not the use of biometrics but the alleged profiling of
Roma communities, in apparent contravention of the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights (BBC News, 2010a).
In only one of these cases (Agambens) is there any real suggestion that biometric
technologies are themselves inherently demeaning. What is demeaning in the other
cases is the way in which individuals are treated by the authorities. In the Agamben
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 9

case, it is claimed that the gathering of biometric data is a form of bio-political

tattooing, akin to the tattooing of Jews during the Holocaust. The implications of
that association, if sound, are of course horrific. However, it is not entirely clear
what Agambens argument really is. We will be brief as this is not the place (and even
if it were, we have not the space) for detailed discussion. The difficulty is this.
Agamben writes:
The problem [. . .] concerns the juridical-political status (it would be simpler, perhaps, to
say bio-political) of citizens of the so-called democratic states where we live. [. . .] There
has been an attempt the last few years to convince us to accept as the humane and normal
dimensions of our existence, practices of control that had always been properly considered
inhumane and exceptional. (2008, p. 201)
However, in and of itself, biometric identification is not obviously inhumane or
exceptional. At root, biometric identification is nothing more than the identification
of an individual by way of their physical or behavioral traits. This is something that
we all do every day in normal interactions with our fellows. Here Agamben would
probably argue that the body features that we use in everyday life to identify our
fellows are biographical signs, embodied languages, hot media, which tell the
biography of the subject. This is the case with human faces, body gestures, voices,
odors, even wrinkles and scars, which are signatures of time on our skin. Biometrics
are instead artificial signatures mechanically extracted from our bodies by imper-
sonal technologies. They are cool media, which speak of our biology rather than
our biography, so depersonalizing the subject. Biometricsor so Agamben would
argueturn the persona into a bare body that becomes soma, as per the original
meaning of this word in ancient Greek (roughly: corpse). However, Agamben would
be wrong in two respects. First, the current trend in biometrics is to use more and
more hot bodily features like face dynamics, gestures, behavioral traits, and so on.
Second, the very notion of bare body is misleading. Human bodies are never pure
bodies, they are always languages that tell stories: even the more remote physical
features, even DNA, tell us much more than biological details, as is well illustrated
by the huge amount of personal and medical information that can be elicited by any
biometric signature (Mordini & Massari, 2008). Hence, it would seem that biometric
identification is only inherently demeaning if normal interpersonal relationships are
inherently demeaningand while interpersonal relations can be demeaning, in the
vast majority of cases, they are quite the opposite.
There is certainly some truth in what Agamben says, although we would suggest
that he has mislocated it. As he says, this is a problem of juridical-political statusof
bio-power relations; however, the core problem is not of biometrics. We can explore
this by considering a response one might offer on behalf of the anti-biometrics
camp. The analogy between identification in the sphere of interpersonal relation-
ships and biometric identification is, the response goes, fundamentally flawed.
True, normal interpersonal relationships are not demeaning, but then again ones
relationship to biometric identification devicessay, fingerprint scannersis not
interpersonal: fingerprint scanners are not persons, and our relations to them are
not analogous to our relations to people. This is an important point with which we
entirely agree.
Notice however that it does not support Agambens position. Agamben evokes
Foucault, alluding to a new bio-political era (Agamben, 2008, p. 201). Foucault
10 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

had articulated biopower as a set of mechanisms through which the basic biological
features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general
strategy of power (Foucault, 2009, p. 1). However, he also pointed out that his
analysis of the mechanisms of power involved, inter alia, investigating between
whom (Foucault, 2009, p. 2) power is appliedthat is to say (although Foucault
may not have put it this way) that the power relations here are, in the final analysis,
personal.5 So what is objectionable about U.S. immigration procedure is not, pace
Agamben, the use of biometrics per se; rather, it is the way that they are deployed as
an arbiter and medium of interpersonal relations.

(ii) Biometrics as a Tool of the Surveillance Society

Just as it would be wrong to suppose that biometric identification is in itself

demeaning, so it would be wrong to suppose that biometric identification systems
are inevitably geared toward surveillance. Or rather, it would be wrong to suppose
that they are any more inevitably geared toward surveillance than are other forms of
identification (any means of identificationbiometrics, passports, proper names
can be used to keep track of an individual). However, the concerns regarding
surveillance are perhaps more tangible than those discussed above, for the signs of
surveillance are, in a physical sense, all around us.
The iconic technology of the surveillance society is probably the closed-circuit TV
camera. Popular statistical folklore has it that there is one CCTV camera for every
14 British citizens and that the average Briton is caught on CCTV 300 times a day.6
In combination with CCTV, biometric identification technologies open the door to
an enormous potential for surveillance. Facial recognition technology is the obvious
candidate here, although recent work on identification by gait pattern has great
potential too. As surveillancespurred mainly by developments in biometrics
becomes increasingly automated, it inevitably becomes less and less focused. That is
to say, we are not now dealing solely with the surveillance of antecedently identified
suspects, but with the mass surveillance of society with the aim of identifying
the suspicious among us. As an illustration of the dangers here, consider the use of
search warrants. If authorities wish to search someones property, they need a
warrant, which will, if all is working well, be issued only if sufficient evidentiary
justification of reasonable suspicion can be produced. However, compare the sur-
veillance of the 2001 Super Bowl. This measure identified, from a crowd of 100,000,
just 19 individuals with criminal records. To have a criminal record is not a crime.
And in a civilized country, to have a criminal record could not be considered
sufficient evidentiary justification of reasonable suspicion that one might commit
some (unspecified) crime. There is, it would seem, cause for concern here.
In the West, the United Kingdom and the United States have particularly poor
records in this regard. In 2007, Privacy International rated the United Kingdom
the worst performing European Union (EU) state in terms of privacy protection
and surveillance, categorizing it alongside the United States, China, and Russia as
endemic surveillance societies (Privacy International, 2007). The dangers have
not gone unrecognized. In its response to the House of Commons Home Affairs
Committees report, A Surveillance Society (Home Affairs Committee, 2008), the
UK Government articulated a number of commitments to increase data minimiza-
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 11

tion and protection and to ensure balance, responsibility, and transparency in the
employment of surveillance technologies (Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, 2008). This was a welcome pronouncement in the light of Privacy Interna-
tionals findings. (By 2010, the United Kingdoms ranking had been downgraded
from endemic to merely extensive surveillance [Privacy International, 2010].
This is better but still not good.)
Orwellian fears of all-pervasive surveillance are exacerbated by a number of
factors. As mentioned above, developments in biometric technologies mean that
identification can increasingly take place at a distance, via gait, for example (BBC
News, 2010b). Second, biometrics and surveillance are increasingly commercial
domains and, through publicprivate interaction, this can give rise to the impres-
sion that responsibility for good practice is passed from directly elected, and hence
accountable, public officials, to businessmen and executives, whose primary goals
are not best practice but profit, and whose responsibilities are to shareholders first,
citizens second. (Note that this is not an objection to commercialization or the
private sector in general; we merely note that different structures of accountability
apply in the public and private sectors.) A further concern is with the speed with
which new surveillance technologies are implementedthe worry being that insuf-
ficient consultation takes place. Examples include the case of the Visionics Corpo-
ration, which offered their facial recognition systems to the Tampa Police
Department for a year free of charge in an effort to build a market among
municipalities, prompting the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida to
comment that This is yet another example of technology outpacing the protection
of peoples civil liberties (Canedy, 2001). While in the United Kingdom, biometrics
and CCTV in schools have been a cause of consternation. The Guardian, to give just
one example, recently carried a story reporting various problematic cases of CCTV
in schools (not only in classrooms but also in the bathrooms). A teachers union
officer is reported to have commented: There are lots of schools that install CCTV
and dont know the rulesand the companies who supply it dont feel the need to
tell them (Harris, 2011).
Whatever may be the facts of the cases mentioned above, the fears are real. And
the retort that if you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear does not hold water.
Privacy, secrecy, and freedom from surveillance have no necessary connection with
shame or wrongdoing (Bok, 1989). Moreover, as the example of Brandon Mayfield
(who was wrongly connected to the 2004 Madrid bombings on the basis of a
false-positive fingerprint match) attests, it may well happen that you have nothing
to hide but everything to fear; Mayfield was arrested, imprisoned, and claims to
have been threatened with the death penalty. Eventually the U.S. government
agreed to compensate him to the tune of $2 million (Eggen, 2006).
Fears of a surveillance society are not, then, unjustified. However, to reiterate, as
with the objection in section (i), there is no necessary connection between biometrics
and surveillance. The anti-biometrics camp is, we argue, misguided. Their position
is vulnerable to two telling objections. First, in practical terms, their proposal is
extremely unrealistic. The biometrics industry is well established: it has gained much
support at governmental level (if not at public level), and although the technology is
not flawless, it is advancing rapidly and appears to be the most likely candidate for
a global identification system in the digital age. Second, the anti-biometrics camp
12 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

misconstrues the conceptual link between biometrics and the potential undesirable
consequences (individuals being demeaned and subject to surveillance) mentioned
above. The source of the trouble is not, we will claim, biometric identification systems
themselves but the way in which they are implemented.

3. Biometric Identification as a Reciprocal Relation

In this section, we make a partial defense of biometrics as a desirable candidate
for a global identification system in the digital age, diagnosing the cause of the
undesirable consequences associated with biometrics, as discussed above. Having
identified the root problem, we will conclude by proposing a guiding principle
for the implementation of a global identification system based on biometrics: no
identification without representation.
Are biometric identification schemes desirable? We think they can be, if suitably
regulated. As described above, biometrics can lead to bad outcomes. However,
that does not seem to be a solid reason for opposing them. Consider the following
analogy (or rather: disanalogy). The anti-biometrics camp associates biometrics with
a number of undesirable consequences and argues that since the consequences are
so undesirable, the benefits of biometrics do not outweigh the risks: therefore,
biometrics should be outlawed. Compare the controversy in the United States over
the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Guns dont kill people, people kill people, or so the bumper sticker goes.
There is a clearbut limitedsense in which this is obviously true: guns do not
normally kill people unless somebody pulls the trigger (and notice that we
do not normally punish the gun). However, as the comedian Eddie Izzard notes, If
you just stood there and yelled BANG, I dont think youd kill too many people
(Izzard, Jordan, & Swanson, 2004). When somebody is shot, the gun obviously plays
a rather important role: they would not have been shot without it. To oppose
restrictions on gun ownership on the basis that guns do not kill people, people kill
people, is plainly wrongheaded. Other things being equal, the fewer guns at large,
the less likely one is to be a victim of gun crime. Indeed, it is trivially true that if
there were no gunsif Mr. Gunpowder had never invented the stuffthere would
be no gun crime. Hence, it would seem, abstracting from complexities, that there is
a prima facie case to be made for banning guns.7 It is alas true that even if there were
no gun crime, there would still be crime and people would still get murdered.
However, if there are fewer murderseven just one fewerthat is definitely a good
thing.
An evangelical biometrician might adorn her bumper with a sticker reading
biometrics dont identify people, people identify people (it is not so catchy as its
cousin, but zealotry sees past such trifles). Will the Izzard response work here? It is
true that if contemporary automated biometric identification systems did not exist,
less identification would occur (for one of the claims of biometrics is that it provides
a potential mode of identity management to those who currently have no identity
documents at all). So in the absence of biometrics, there would, trivially, be no
biometric identification and there would very likely be less identification overall.
However, while lowering the murder rate is highly desirable, lowering the identi-
fication rate is not desirable. In the developed world, most of us do not want to be
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 13

without identity management. We need secure identification systems in order to

travel, to communicate and transact across the internet, and to claim welfare or
tax-relief. We do not want no identification, we simply want a more reliable, less
objectionable system than we have at present. And in the developing world, people
with weak identity documents need robust alternatives. Thus, the point of this
dis-analogy between guns and biometrics is that while shooting people is inherently
undesirable, identifying people is not.8
If we accept that identification is desirable and that biometrics are neither inher-
ently demeaning, nor any more geared toward surveillance than other identifica-
tion systems, it behooves us to investigate biometric identification more carefully.
What positives can it bring?
The advantages of biometric identification systems are a function of limitations
of more traditional schemes. Mariana Muzzi (2010, p. 2) reports that Around 51
million births go unregistered every year in developing countries, which translates
to one in three children globally. Recording the identity of these children is
important: Children whose births are not registered at birth are not able to claim
the services and protection to which they have a right on a full and equal basis with
children who are registered at birth (Muzzi, 2010, p. 3). That is, one needs to
establish ones identity in order to claim and secure access to ones rights. This is
also the rhetoric behind Indias Unique Identification Number scheme (although what
the reality is apart from the rhetoric is a matter of disputesee, e.g., Ramakumar
[2010]). Moreover, it is, to some extent, borne out by the transfer of welfare and
entitlements direct to individuals in a large number of African counties (Devarajan
& Giugale, 2011; Gelb & Decker, 2012)such services being made cheaper and
more secure by biometric means.
In such cases as these, we observe a reciprocal relation between identifier and
identified. Schematically, we may put the point like this. A identifies B, but within
this relational structure is the potential for reciprocity: As identification of B can
imply Bs acknowledgement of A. This reciprocity is not essential. For example, if A
is a geologist and B a fossil, the fossil does not acknowledge the geologist. However,
where there is agency on the parts of both A and B, the relational structure A
identifies B can imply reciprocity. Our claim is that A identifies B not only can
imply reciprocity but should imply reciprocity. Let us try to be a little more specific.
What exactly do we mean by reciprocity?

(i) Symmetry

By the reciprocity of identification we mean to imply a certain symmetry: if A identifies

B, A should also be identified to B. This is a sort of exchange of information, but it
grounds only a weak symmetry since no specifics as to the balance of information are
implied. A may demand from B moreor at any rate differentinformation than A
divulges. The rights and wrongs of the balance here will depend on circumstances.

(ii) Bestowal and Acknowledgment of Rights

In identifying B, A must bestow rights upon B, of which B is aware (or of which she
can reasonably be expected to come to be aware).9 The system of registering
14 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

children at birth is a fine example of this imperative. The child is registered and in
that very act is documented as a bearer of rights. The provision of birth certificates
may be thought of as the initial bestowal of rights. Subsequent identification trans-
actions between A and B cannot, in general, be thought of as bestowing rights
(although some may: e.g., As issuing B a driving license could be thought of as A
bestowing the legal right to driveidentifying B as a legal driver). However, these
subsequent transactions may be thought of as As acknowledging (explicitly or implic-
itly) the rights previously bestowed upon B (alternatively they might be thought of
as premised upon As earlier bestowal of rights upon B10).

(iii) Transparency

In normal circumstances, formal identificationi.e., identification by governments,

commercial operations, and othersshould be transparent. That is to say, it should
be clear to B that they are being identified by A. The demands of transparency may
depend on circumstances. For instance, if a border control agent asks for your
passport, you do not normally ask them for proof of their identity and position
their identity and position are sufficiently clear in the context (they have the
uniform, they are sitting in the booth at the airport, and so on). Or again, a
store using CCTV to identify shoplifters need not be so transparent as to ask each
customer to sign an informed consent form. However, they should, for example,
display signs informing customers that they are being recorded. What level of
transparency is appropriate to different contexts is a difficult issue which we have
no intention of addressing here. We make the point in rather vague terms: identi-
fication should be tolerably transparent, given the circumstances.
Certainly, there is more to be said here. However, for present purposes, the above
should suffice. In short, we argue that, at a minimum, the process of identification
should: (i) be symmetrical; (ii) involve the bestowal upon, and acknowledgement of,
the rights of the identified; and (iii) be transparent and open to the identified.
We conclude by looking at three problematic applications of biometric identifica-
tion technologies. In each there is something objectionable. We will argue that what
is objectionable is attributable to the failure to satisfy the reciprocity of identification.

Case 1: The Surveillance SocietyAbove, we identified a number of concerns regard-

ing ubiquitous surveillance in a biometric future. The extent of CCTV coverage
in public places is one cause for concern. However, the fact that you are often on
film is not, in and of itself, any more objectionable than the fact that other people
often observe you. Moreover, the fact that data regarding your whereabouts can be
retrieved many years later is not, in and of itself, objectionable (if we were more
observant and had better memories, the same data would be retrievable by testi-
mony). Rather, what is objectionable about the profusion of CCTV cameras in public
places is that, first, one does not know who is identifying one (although one knows
that it is a formal identificationi.e., that it is a government or commercial agency,
and so the situation is quite unlike being observed by a passerby in the street);
second, it is not always apparent where the cameras are, so that one is not necessarily
aware that one is under observation. These two problems are, respectively, failures
to honor (i), the symmetry requirement, and (iii), the transparency requirement.
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 15

Similarly, the increased administration of surveillance by the private sector can be

understood as objectionable in virtue of a failure to respect requirements (i) and (ii).
Do the students in classrooms observed by cameras know which company is record-
ing their images? If not, symmetry is not respected (or at least the symmetry is too
weak given the context). Moreover, it will tend to be the case that if requirement (i)
is not sufficiently well respected, requirement (ii) will not be either. Do private
companies bestow any rights upon the students they identify? No.
To continue with the example of cameras in schools, one may object that the
identification transactions do not involve the private companies. The private com-
panies merely facilitate a transaction between the school and its students. If so, the use
of CCTV in classrooms is, in some respects, less objectionable. Indeed, it is less
objectionable to the extent that the situation is more in accord with requirements
(i)(iii).11
Finally, the concern that surveillance technologies are implemented too quickly,
in advance of detailed consultation, may be understood as the concern that there is
insufficient understanding of whether the administration of the new technology
complies with requirements (i)(iii). If the employment of new technology outstrips
consultation as to its merits and demerits, the framework imposed by requirements
(i)(iii) cannot be guaranteed.

Case 2: The Afghan VillagerThe New York Times reports that information on 1.5
million Afghans and 2.2 million Iraqis is now held in databases administered by
U.S., NATO, and local forces (Shanker, 2011). In general, militarycivilian identi-
fication transactions are liable to be problematic. This is evidenced by the prima facie
double standards reported in the story: While the systems [employed in Afghani-
stan and Iraq] are attractive to American law enforcement agencies, there is serious
legal and political opposition to imposing routine collection on American citizens
(Shanker, 2011). We do not wish to comment on the specifics of the Afghan or Iraqi
cases but speak, rather, about identification transactions between military forces and
civilians in general, taking as inspiration the arresting image that accompanies the
New York Times article.
The photograph shows an aged, grey-bearded Afghan villager having his iris
scanned. His right eye is shut, while the left is held open by the gloved hand of an
American soldier. There are three soldiers in the picture: one holds the eye open,
one holds the camera capturing the iris scan, and the other holds his hand above the
villagers forehead for shade. This shading hand is the only American flesh we see,
all else is khaki, and we see no faces. It seems somehow significant that the
uncovered hand casts a shadow not for the benefit of the villager, but in order that
the iris camera is not blinded by the sunlight. It is a poignant image. What makes
it so striking is the imbalance it portrays: they are soldiers, he is a civilian; they are
three, he is one; his one eye is shut, the other held open.
Leaving aside the politics of the war in Afghanistan, as well as the particulars of
the actual facts depicted in the photograph, this imageas a symbolic evocation
can only sound warning bells to those who are wary of biometrics. They will view it,
not unreasonably, as a representation of the individual utterly overcome by faceless
forces he is powerless to resist. Viewed in this way, what is objectionable about the
image can be understood in terms of requirements (i)(iii). First, this identification
16 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

transaction is not symmetrical: the soldiers in the photo appear as anonymous.12

Second, the military cannot normally (in democratic societies at least) bestow rights
upon individuals. Hence, requirement (ii) is not met.13 Third, it is entirely possible
that military personnel operating overseas do not speak the local language. If so, it
is not difficult to see how requirement (iii) might fail to be met. How can you explain
to someone that they are being enrolled in a biometric database for whatever
purpose, if you share no languages?14
The image of the Afghan villager is startling and, from a certain perspective,
disturbing. What is disturbing about it is, we claim, that it is easy to read the story
of the picture as if it involved the violation of the three requirements of the
reciprocity of identification as described above.

Case 3: Bio-Political TattooingRecall that Agamben claims that the biometric enroll-
ment required by the US-VISIT program is part of an attempt to convince us to
accept as the humane and normal dimensions of our existence, practices of control
that had always been properly considered inhumane and exceptional (Agamben,
2008, p. 201). We suggested that, in and of itself, biometric identification is neither
inhumane nor exceptional. Rather, what is objectionable about U.S. immigration
procedure is the manner in which it functions as an arbiter and medium of inter-
personal relations. We are now in a position to make this a little clearer, with
reference to requirements (i)(iii).
Transparency does not appear to be an issue here. The procedures required as
a condition of entry were sufficiently transparent that Agamben could consider
them, judge them unreasonable, and decline to enter (although of course it is
inconvenient not to enter a country having crossed the Atlantic to reach it). One
could also make a case that symmetry is respected. The heart of the problem is
requirement (ii), the bestowal and acknowledgment of rights.
Agamben is correct that there is something exceptional about the US-VISIT
program. In broad terms, US-VISIT is simply an identification scheme: visitors
must have their identities recorded upon entry. That is not exceptional: travel to
almost any country and you will be identified as you cross the border. What is
exceptionalwhat is not common to all border crossingsis that US-VISIT is not
satisfied with the standard identity documents issued by other states but wishes to
enrol individuals in a database wholly unconnected with their home state. This is
an additional identification transaction, distinct from the presentation of a passport
or visa. (We acknowledge of course that the United States is not the only state to
request additional documentation or information to enter.) As such, if we are
correct that identification should be governed by reciprocity as per requirements
(i)(iii), one ought to have some rights bestowed or acknowledged in the course of
this additional identification transaction. But what rights does the entrant receive?
She receives the privilege of entering the United States and enjoys the protection of
the laws. However, that is something that, in pre-US-VISIT times, she would have
received by virtue of the standard passport-based identification transaction; and
(mutatis mutandis) it is something she still receives in most other countries by virtue
of nothing more than a passport-based identification transaction. In this way,
requirement (ii) is not met in the case of the additional biometric identification
transaction that US-VISIT demands. However, pace Agamben, what is objectionable
 Constraints on the Use of Biometric Identification Systems 17

about the additional biometric identification transaction is a failure of reciprocity

not anything specifically to do with biometric identification itself.
In insisting that the relational structure of identification be understood as
reciprocali.e., that it involve symmetry adequate to the context; that it involve the
bestowal upon, or acknowledgment of, rights of the identified individual; and that it
be transparentwe are, in effect, insisting that identification be tightly bound to
recognition of rights. If A may legitimately demand identifying data of B, A must
acknowledge the rights of B. A owes something to B, which B may legitimately
demand.
To speak in such terms is, of course, somewhat theoretical. In slightly more
practical terms, our point can be made using the example of birth certificates.
Registering births is a good thing because, as the childs identity is registered,
it becomes a bearer of rights; the child is, from the point of registration, hence,
entitled to various protections by the state. However, as the statistics of birth
registration attest, traditional means of identification are failing; and even where
identification methods succeed, they are pressurized by the transition to the digital
age. Biometric identification systems promise to be, from a technological point of
view, adequate to the challenges of the digital age; and if they can be rolled out in
accordance with the ideal of the reciprocity of identification, they will be a force for
good. Rights will be protected because they will be enshrined in the very process of
the states identification of its citizens. The state represents its citizens as bearers of
rights. The power relations here may not be exactly equal, but they are at least
reciprocal. Abuses of power arise where the reciprocity of identification falters.
Civil liberty advocates should not be frightened if it happensas it has (Giroday,
2010)that the head of Interpol calls for a globally verifiable electronic identity
card (e-ID) system for migrant workers. This is a challenge and an opportunity
because a global system of electronic identification is ethically and politically tenable
only if it is sided by a global system for claiming fundamental rights and civil
liberties; and this becomes increasingly feasible as we can provide everybody with
secure and reliable identification. You can tax people, or alternatively identify them,
only provided that you give them a political representation. In other words, iden-
tification is legitimate as far as it becomes instrumental to the enforcement of their
political and civil rights. Identification without civil liberties would be no less
abusive than taxation without representation. This is a lesson thatin a time of tea
party protestersit is worth remembering.15

Notes
1 We intend no reference to any actual group of that name, should such exist.
2 We do not discuss the other major concern, namely that the technology could be highly invasive of
privacy and has the potential to reveal a huge amount of sensitive personal information regarding,
say, health, background, lifestyle, and others. In this regard, there is some overlap with the issues
discussed in section 2(ii).
3 See, e.g., Kaluszynski (2001), Joseph (2001), as well as Project Bertillon at http://www.crimino
corpus.cnrs.fr/bertillon/enter_uk.html.
4 In all cases bar the first of the following, biometrics is fairly obviously incidental. Even in the first
(concerning Agamben) we feel that, ultimately, what is objectionable does not pertain to biometrics.
5 We are here using the word personal (and cognates) in a very wide sense, according to which
relations between the state and an individual may be described as personal.
18 Emilio Mordini and Andrew P. Rebera

6 In the spirit of the (tongue in cheek) adage that 88.5% of statistics are made up, the veracity of these
statistics is explored in Aaronovitch (2009) and Channel 4 News (2008).
7 There are of course a variety of issues at play in this controversy. Our point is merely that there is a
prima facie case to be answered. Whether it can be answered and how is not a point of interest here.
8 It is of course the case that if the primary goal of bearing arms is not to shoot people but, say, to shoot
targets for sport, or to have something nice to hang above the mantelpiece, then we might construe
the analogy differently. As mentioned in an earlier note, we are not really concerned with the rights
and wrongs of gun ownership here.
9 How strongly one reads bestow here is likely to depend upon ones answers to antecedent questions
in political philosophy. A certain variety of social contract theorist might suppose that the citizen
is, in some sense, born of identification by the state; in which case bestowal here is more or less literal:
the state creates the citizen as a bearer of rights. Alternatively, if one holds that rights accrue to the
individual independently of the state, identification by the state will involve less of a bestowal and
more of an acknowledgment of rights. Our use of bestow is not intended to prejudge any of these
foundational matters in political ontology and philosophy.
10 In the Kantian mode: the initial bestowal of rights serves as a condition of the possibility of all
subsequent legitimate identification transactions between A and B, state and citizen.
11 The use of CCTV in classes would still be objectionable on the grounds of data minimization. What
need is there for cameras in classes? If it is for discipline, or for teacher-training, these ends could be
met by less intrusive methods. We will not explore the issues.
12 The soldiers appear in the photograph as anonymous. In reality they are (presumably) not, but have
at least their names or numbers shown on their uniforms. Let us emphasize again that we are not
discussing what or who is literally depicted in the photo, but its wider symbolic significance as an
iconic image of the dark side of biometric identification transactions.
13 Again, the facts in Afghanistan may be different, but we are not discussing Afghanistan.
14 Once more: we are not discussing Afghanistan. Perhaps the actual soldiers in the photograph speak
the villagers languageperhaps he speaks theirs. Perhaps there has been a huge publicity campaign
about the identification system.
15 This work has been funded by two European Commission research grants, RISERising panEuro-
pean and International Awareness of Biometrics and Security Ethics (GA230389), and TABULA
RASATrusted Biometrics under Spoofing Attacks (GA 257289).

About the Authors

Emilio Mordini is the founding director of the Centre for Science, Society and Citizenship in
Rome, Italy. He was Professor of Bioethics in the Medical School of the University of Rome
La Sapienza (19942005), and a member (19942000) and secretary (20002004) of the
Bioethical Commission of the Italian National Research Council. Since 1992 he has served as
a contractor in quite a number of European Commission (EC) funded projects. His current
board participations include: the Biometric Sector Federation of the Italian Confederation of
Education and Knowledge Companies; the Committee for Standardization in ICT Focus
Group on Biometrics; and the EC expert group on ethical and regulatory challenges to
science and research policy at the global level. His research interests include ethical and
social implications of security technology policies, and the ethics and policy of biometrics and
emerging identification technology. His main publications include Ageing and Invisibility (IOS
Press, 2010, edited with P. de Hert), and Second Generation Biometrics: the Ethical and Social
Context (Springer, 2011, edited with D. Tzovaras).
Andrew P. Rebera (DPhil, University of Sussex) is a researcher at the Centre for Science, Society
and Citizenship in Rome, Italy. His research interests include identity, privacy and data
protection, surveillance and security, as well as philosophical issues in logic and metaphysics.

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