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The Legislative Game: The Politics of Game Theory in a Legislative Standing Committee
Abstract
This paper will introduce significant variations to the simple cooperative or coalitional game in a
legislative setting. It should also be a substantial contribution and update to the political science
literature in the subfield of game theory in legislative standing committees. Most existing
research in political science concerning game theory is focused on international trade, bargaining
Seminal works on game theory and public choice in political science publications include
(Downs 1957), who examined decision making by politicians as they react to voters at the micro
level. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) set the standard for explaining game theory in business and
politics to the general public. One political science case study stands out in their work. The
authors described a cooperative game with President Ronald Reagan and Congress in 1981 in
which they explained dominant strategies used in a simple game of two strategies and four
outcomes pertaining to tax policy and budgets. Since Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) used mainly case
studies from the 1980s, an updated version with newer case studies of this nature would be a
Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) examined a solution with a perfect Bayesian equilibrium after
members who build a certain specialization and expertise were found to seek more complete
information. The authors concluded that even though perfect Bayesian equilibrium usually
assumes information is perfect, players in a dynamic game at perfect Bayesian equilibrium can
Baron and Ferejohn (1989) found that a model of legislative equilibrium will emerge from
certain parliamentary rules. Equilibrium in this construct may also appear in these games
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depending on the structure of the legislature. Baron (1991) continued to focus on parliamentary
Ordeshook (1986) wrote one of the most comprehensive works in political science on decision
making with his textbook on game theory and political theory that included relevant sections of
cooperative games within legislatures. Jackson and Moselle (2002) investigated decisions in a
legislative game that included ideological and distributive proportions. The authors found that
competing groups of legislators have more than one ideological decision that has a positive
probability of being proposed and approveshowing that legislators can gain from forming
political parties, and consider examples where predictions can be made about the composition of
It appears that the game theory literature needs to be updated in this subfield of political science
regarding decision making in legislatures with standing committees. The aforementioned works
are dated in the 1980s and early 1990s, except for Jackson and Moselle (2002). This presents a
significant gap in the government game theory literature that calls for a more current
This paper will introduce a coalitional game based on a fictional state legislature. Its focus will
be based on a notional State Senate Rules Committee. This Rules Committee is a standing
committee in the State Senate that serves as the gate keeper for bills that are introduced by other
senators.
Jackson and Moselle (2002) refer to their own Legislative Game. For purposes of clarity
Legislative Game 2017 will be used in this paper to differentiate from Jackson and Moselle
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(2002). The Legislative Game 2017 is a cooperative game that has coalitions of players, in this
case Republicans and Democrats. The cooperative game in a legislative or voting bloc setting is
sometimes better described as a coalitional game. The Legislative Game 2017 is also a simple
game since the game has a winning coalition and a losing coalition. These games are also called
profit games. In profit games, the payoffs are either 1 or 0, in other words, either a winning
coalition of 1 or a losing coalition of 0. This payoff can also be called a Boolean Domain.
Winning coalitions in the Legislative Game 2017 who serve in standing committees can either
coalitions of Republicans and Democrats with a winning payoff of either passing a bill or
defeating a bill. This simple legislative game can be mathematically defined with a few
definitions and notations borrowed from authors such as Bilbao (2000), Driessen (1988),
Where M is a member of the legislature; WC is the winning coalition; LC is the losing coalition;
and L is a subset of the whole legislature, I then include the following mathematical notations for
M L means that the member of the legislature is a subset of the whole legislature.
M WC means that the individual member of the legislature is part of the winning
coalition.
M LC means that the individual member of the legislature is part of the losing
coalition.
L WC means a subset of the whole legislature is part of the winning coalition.
L LC means a subset of the whole legislature is part of the losing coalition.
Generally notated, where RC is the Rules Committee, then RC L implies that the Rules
In this legislature for the purposes of the game, each new bill is first assigned to the Senate Rules
Committee. The chairman decides to hear the bill which means that the sponsor of the
legislation must testify in front of the whole Rules Committee and discuss the bills merits,
strengths, and public policy advantages. The Rules Committee can oppose a bill by refusing to
hear the bill and allowing it to die in committee. Or it can allow the bill to pass the committee
This fictional Rules Committee in the Legislative Game has nine members. Six members are
Democrats and three members are Republicans. The chairman of the committee is a Democrat
and the chairman can allow a motion to vote on advancing the bill with a Do Pass ruling or
stop the bill from advancing with a Do Not Pass ruling. The Rules Committee may also vote to
table a bill or to pass the bill with no recommendations. For the purposes of this game, the focus
will be on a simple outcome of either a Do Pass or Do Not Pass ruling which will then be a
During the game, the nine members of the committee will form a winning coalition or a losing
philosophy. The winning coalition advances or passes the bill. The losing coalition sees the bill
fail to advance.
Where D is a Democratic Party member of the committee (RC) and where R is a Republican
Party member of the committee, then D RC and R RC means that Republican members
This Rules Committee often votes along party lines. The Democrats enjoy a 6-3 majority and are
able to set a liberal agenda by allowing left-leaning bills to advance while opposing or killing
right-leaning bills. Thus, Democrats are usually on the winning coalition and Republicans are the
losing coalition.
In this construct with the nine members voting ideologically along party lines it would seem that
only liberal bills would advance and conservative bills would always be defeated. However, the
Legislative Game 2017 has an interesting wrinkle. There is a game within the game. Instead of
the committee acting completely autonomously, there is one extra player. This extra player is the
sponsor of the bill. The sponsor of the bill gets to testify and attempt to change the voting
patterns of the Rules Committee if he or she has the strategic skill and rationally analyzes
Let S be the sponsor of the legislation, so that S RC WC means that the sponsor is a subset
of the Rules Committee and is part of the winning coalition. S RC LC means that the
sponsor is a subset of the Rules Committee and is part of the losing coalition.
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Therefore, the Rules Committee members have coalitional strategy profiles and the sponsor has
individual strategy profiles. The sponsor can make decisions within his strategy profile.
Meanwhile, the members of the Rules Committee get to form coalitions based on the sponsors
testimonial strategy.
This is a difficult political situation for a Republican sponsor of conservative legislation who
goes in front of the Rules Committee to testify. The sponsor must flip or change at least two
Democrat votes to win a majority of 5-4, otherwise the bill can fail 6-3 or worse. The sponsor
then must play a winning hand skillfully and execute very persuasive testimony, especially if
his bill is seen by the Democrats as a conservative bill. The Democrats simply have to form a
coalition of five or six members to kill unfavorable legislation in the Rules Committee.
Those are the ground rules of the Legislative Game. Now examine an outline of a sample game
Committee.
In this sample game, the sponsor has a bill that favors business by reducing regulations. The
sponsor currently does not have the votes for passage as the tally is 6-3 against his bill along
party lines. The Democrats do not favor reducing regulations for businesses as a general
principle. It should be easy for the Democrats to form a coalition and vote on party lines to kill
this bill. Examine the following table for an initial summary before testimony at the beginning of
the game.
Table One: Composition, Party Affiliation, Political Philosophy, and Voting Preference for the Rules Committee
Now the sponsor must testify. His legislation is fundamentally conservative as the bill supports
business and seeks to reduce regulation. He currently does not have the votes so he plans his
Before the sponsor testifies in this iteration of the game, let me also introduce three new features
or assumptions of this game that affects all players. In most simple coalitional games the players
would have perfect information and unlimited time. First, under the assumption of perfect
information, players would know everything there is to know about the bill. Each player would
have unlimited use of legislative staff to educate the committee members on all the information
that is in the bill. Second, time would be unlimited and the scheduling necessities of the
legislative calendar would not be a factor. The players would be able to hear testimony for as
long as they want. Third, all players would ideally be fully engaged, rested, relaxed, and
attentive.
However, in the Legislative Game 2017, reality rears its head. Time is a factor as the members of
the Rules Committee must hear more bills then they have time for. Information is not perfect.
The members do not always understand or have the expertise to master all aspects of the bills
they hear. Committee members may be tired, disengaged, dispassionate, frustrated, agitated,
hungry, bored, or otherwise inattentive and indifferent. These constraints and limitations on
legislative behavior can be referred to as the mood of the committee. To recap, the committee
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members in the Legislative Game 2017 do not have perfect information; they do not have
unlimited time; and some may not even care about their vote.
Turn your attention to the sponsor. The sponsor clearly has problems with the legislation and
has a complicated and tedious bill that can confuse most legislators with its complexity and
detail. In this Democratically-controlled committee, most members will oppose his bills on
partisan, ideological, or philosophic grounds. He counts the votes and it looks like his bill will
die at the hands of the Rules Committee 6-3. However, he decides to proceed with the following
strategy.
For simplicity, the sponsors strategy profile for testifying has two moves. The first move is
Cerebral and Intellectual. The sponsor decides to first summarize his very long and detailed
bill point by point and appeal to the committee members intellectual disposition by focusing on
His second move is Cerebral and Divisive. He attempts to anticipate his opponents opposition
and refute each of their points of contention in a combative and partisan manner by dividing the
opposition. The information for the committee is imperfect, time is limited, and some members
The first iteration is not surprising. The sponsors bill receives a Do Not Pass ruling with a 6-3
The sponsors testimony was ideologically divisive, boring, tedious, and even the Republicans
tuned him out. His testimony took too much time and time is precious to the committee. The
committee members wanted to move on to other bills or adjourn. The sponsor also tried to argue
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points against liberal orthodoxy. That failed to flip any votes because the Democrats stopped
listening and they were not happy with his incendiary, discordant, and partisan remarks.
In that iteration, the sponsor also failed to consider that the committee members time is limited,
their appetite for partisan dialogue is waning, their information is imperfect, and that some
For the second iteration, the sponsor has formulated a new strategy called Strategy Profile
Two. This is also a pure strategy that he will use in all situations (there is zero probability that
This time the sponsor realizes the committee members are pressed for time and that time is of the
essence. The sponsor also knows that his bill is complex and lengthy. He judges correctly that
the committee members want him to be concise in his testimony. He also understands that the
committee members may not be totally engaged. They may be tired, bored, or dispassionate.
Therefore, he decides on a new strategy with two different moves. The first move is Emotional
and Instinctual. He skips the detailed summary, ignores the partisan bickering, and appeals to
the law makers gut instincts. He makes his testimony short and to the point.
This second strategy profile is Emotional and Abstract. The sponsor speaks about the higher
philosophical calling of entrepreneurship and how small businesses are the pillars of
communities and drivers of job growth. He appeals to their instincts, emotions, nostalgia, and
sentimentality. With this strategy, the sponsor is inclusive instead of divisive. This argument is
What transpired after the second iteration of the game? The sponsors second strategy profile
worked. The sponsor realized the committee members were short on time. He kept his testimony
brief. His more direct speaking style helped improve the mood of the committee. He knew that
partisan bickering would not work when there are six Democrats on the committee, so he used a
more inclusive tone that was less divisive. He also appealed to their emotions and sense of
After his testimony, the committee voted. To the sponsors surprise, one of the Democrats
admitted that she was a small business owner and she voted with the Republicans. Another
Democrat was so relieved that the sponsor kept his testimony brief that he voted with the
Republicans as well. With two flipped votes the final vote was 5-4 in favor of passing the
In this iteration, the change of strategy worked for the sponsor. He received a favorable outcome
for taking the human element of politics seriously. In other words, he realized that in the real
world, time is limited, information is imperfect, and an opposing players mood (engagement,
passion, attention) can affect the oppositions strategy. The sponsor also learned to make an
This is a description of one small legislative game that is merely a snapshot of what goes on in
standing committees in legislatures around the world, but it explains a high level of game
theoretic political behavior. It is a good lesson in legislative strategy for even the most seasoned
The Legislative Game 2017 has made a significant contribution to the game theory literature by
offering an updated and more modern strategic lesson that incorporates the elements of time,
information, and mood. It considers the strategic realities of legislative politics and agenda
setting to account for when time is limited, when information is imperfect, and when a
More significantly, this paper constitutes a novel approach and addition to the political science
literature in game theory and legislatures. It also elucidates legislative communication strategies
that rely on cerebral and emotional appeal and explains their inclusion into various incentive
analyses strategy profiles and decisions. It goes even further to clarify the use of strategic
profiles and tactical moves based on division or inclusion, gut instinct, partisanship, shared
Works Cited
Baron, David P. and John A. Ferejohn. 1989. Bargaining in Legislatures. The American
Political Science Review. Vol. 83: No. 4 (Dec. 1989), 1181-1206.
Bilbao, Jess Mario. 2000. Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures. Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Dixit, Avinash K. and Barry J. Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in
Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
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Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. The Journal
of Political Economy. Vol. 65: No. 2,135-150.
Driessen, Theo. 1988. Cooperative Games, Solutions and Applications, Kluwer Academic
Publishers.
Gilligan, Thomas and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Collective Decision Making and Standing
Committees: An Informational Rational for Restrictive Amendment Procedures. Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization. Vol.3: 287.
Jackson, Matthew O. and Boaz Moselle. 2002. Coalition and Party Formation in a Legislative
Voting Game. Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 103: 1, March 2012, 49-87.
Ordeshook, Peter C. 1986. Game Theory and Political Theory: An Introduction. Cambridge,
MA: University Press.
Osborne, M.J. and A. Rubinstein. 1994. A Course in Game Theory, Boston: MIT Press.
Owen, Guillermo. 1995. Game Theory. Third Edition. San Diego: Academic Press.