Acabal V Acabal

9/25/2016 ELibraryInformationAtYourFingertips:PrinterFriendly
494Phil.528
THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.NO.148376,March31,2005]
LEONARDOACABALANDRAMONNICOLAS,PETITIONERS,VS.
VILLANERACABAL,EDUARDOACABAL,SOLOMONACABAL,GRACE
ACABAL,MELBAACABAL,EVELYNACABAL,ARMINACABAL,RAMIL
ACABAL,ANDBYRONACABAL,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIOMORALES,J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the February 15, 2001
Decision[1]oftheCourtofAppealsreversingthatoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)of
DumagueteCity,Branch35.[2]
In dispute is the exact nature of the document[3] which respondent Villaner Acabal
(Villaner) executed in favor of his godsonnephewpetitioner Leonardo Acabal
(Leonardo)onApril19,1990.
Villaners parents, Alejandro Acabal and Felicidad Balasabas, owned a parcel of land
situated in Barrio Tanglad, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, containing an area of 18.15
hectares more or less, described in Tax Declaration No. 15856.[4] By a Deed of
AbsoluteSaledatedJuly6,1971,[5] his parents transferred for P2,000.00 ownership
ofthesaidlandtohim,whowasthenmarriedtoJustinianaLipajan.[6]
Sometimeaftertheforegoingtransfer,itappearsthatVillanerbecameawidower.
Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed[7] conveying the same

property [8]infavorofLeonardo.
Villaner was later to claim that while the April 19, 1990 document he executed now
appears to be a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly witnessed by a Bais City trial
court clerk Carmelo Cadalin and his wife Lacorte, what he signed was a document
captionedLeaseContract[9](modeledafteraJuly1976leaseagreement[10]hehad
previously executed with previous lessee, Maria Luisa Montenegro[11]) wherein he
leased for 3 years the property to Leonardo at P1,000.00 per hectare[12] and which
waswitnessedbytwowomenemployeesofoneJudgeVillegasofBaisCity.
VillanerthusfiledonOctober11,1993acomplaint[13]beforetheDumagueteRTC
against Leonardo and Ramon Nicolas to whom Leonardo in turn conveyed the
property,forannulmentofthedeedsofsale.
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/43774 1/23
Atthewitnessstand,Villanerdeclared:
Q: It appears, Mr. Acabal, that you have signed a document of

sale with the defendant Leonardo Acabal on April 19, 1990,
pleasetellthecourtwhetheryouhavereallyagreedtosellthis
propertytothedefendantonorbeforeApril19,1990?
A: We had some agreement but not about the selling of this

property.
Q: What was your agreement with the defendant Leonardo
Acabal?
A:Ouragreement[was]thathewilljustrent.[14]
xxx
Q: Now, please tell the court how were you able to sign this
documentonApril19,1990?
A:IdonotknowwhyIsignedthat,thatiswhyIampuzzled.
Q:Why,didyounotreadthecontentsofthisdocument?
A:Ihavenotreadthat.Ionlyhappenedtoreadthetitleofthe
LeaseContract.
Q:Anddoyourecallwhowerethewitnessesofthedocument
whichyousignedinfavorofLeonardoAcabal?
A:EmployeesofJudgeVillegasofBaisCity.
Q:Didyouseethemsignthatdocument?
A:Yes,sir.
Q: These signatures appearing in this document marked as

Exhibit C for the plaintiff and Exhibit 1 for the defendant,
please examine over (sic) these signatures if these were the
signaturesofthesewitnesseswhosignedthisdocument?
A:Thesearenotthesignaturesofthetwowomen.
Q: And after signing this document on April 19, 1990, did you appear
beforeanotarypublictohavethisnotarized?
A:No,IwenthometoSanCarlos.[15]
xxx
Q: According to this document, you sell (sic) this property at

P10,000.00,didyousellthispropertytoLeonardoAcabal?
A:No,sir.
Q:HowaboutafterApril19,1990,didyoureceivethisamountfrom
LeonardoAcabal?
A:No,sir.[16]
xxx
Q:NowyousaidthatonMay25,1990,LeonardoAcabaldidnot
pay the amount that he promised to you, what did you do of
(sic)hisrefusaltopaythatamount?
A:IwenttoMr.[Carmelo]MellieCadalinbecausehewas
the one who prepared the papers and to ask Leonardo
Acabalwhyhewillnotcomplywithouragreement.
Q:Bytheway,whoisthisMellieCadalin?
A:MellieCadalinisalsoworkinginthesalaofJudgeVillegas.
Q:WhorequestedMellieCadalintopreparethisdocument?
A:MaybeitwasLeonardoAcabal.
Q:Bytheway,whenforthefirsttimedidyoutalktoLeonardo
Acabalregardingyouragreementtoleasethispropertytohim?
A:March14,1990,inSanCarlos.
Q: And what document did you give to him in order that that
documentwillbeprepared?
A:Ihavegiven(sic)somepapersandcontractofleasethatI
have signed to (sic) Mrs. Montenegro.[17] (Emphasis and
underscoringsupplied)
xxx
Q: Now, Carmelo Cadalin [Mellie] also testified before this court

thatinfactheidentifiedthedocumentmarkedasExhibitCforthe
plaintiffthatwhatyouexecutedonApril19,1990wasadeedofsale
andnotacontractoflease,whatcanyousaytothatstatement?
A:Thatisalie.
Q:Andwhatsthetruththen?
A: What really (sic) I have signed was the document of lease

contract.
Q: Now, can you explain to the Honorable Court why it so

happened that on April 19, you were able to sign a deed of
sale?
A:WhatIcanseenowisthatperhapsthosecopiesofthedeed
ofsalewereplacedbyMr.Cadalinunderthedocumentswhich
Isignedtheleasecontract.Butwhyisitthatithasalreadyadeed
ofsalewhenwhatIhavesignedwasonlytheleaseofcontractorthe
contractoflease.
Q:Now,Mr.Cadalinalsostatedbeforethiscourtthathehandedover
toyouthisDeedofSalemarkedasExhibitCandaccordingtohim
youreadthisdocument,whatcanyousaytothisstatement?
A:Yes,therewasadocumentthathegavemetoreadit(sic)butit
wasacontractoflease.
Q: How sure are you that what you signed on April 19, 1990 was
reallyacontractofleaseandnotacontractofsale?
A:Because when I signed the contract of lease the witnesses

that witnessed my signing the document were the employees
ofJudgeVillegasandthenIamnowsurprisedwhyinthedeed
of sale which I purportedly signed are witnessed by Carmelo
Cadalin and his wife Lacorte.[18] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Ontheotherhand,LeonardoassertsthatwhatVillanerexecutedwasaDeedof
AbsoluteSaleforaconsiderationofP10,000.00whichhehadalreadypaid,[19]andas
hehadbecometheabsoluteowneroftheproperty,hevalidlytransferredittoRamon
NicolasonMay19,1990.[20]
CarmeloCadalinwhoadmittedlypreparedthedeedofabsolutesaleandwhoappears
asawitness,alongwithhiswife,totheexecutionofthedocumentcorroborated
Leonardosclaim:
Q:Mr.Cadalin,doyouknowtheplaintiffVillanerAcabal?
A:Yes,Iknow.[21]
xxx
Q:AndIwouldliketoaskyouMr.witnesswhydoyouknow
VillanerAcabal?
A:Atthetimethathewenttoourhousetogetherwith
LeonardoAcabalherequestedmetoprepareadeedofsaleas
regardstoasaleoftheproperty.[22]
xxx
Q:Andaftertheyrequestedyoutoprepareadocumentofsale,
whatdidyoudo?
A:AtfirstIrefusedto[do]itbecauseIhavesomanyworksto
do,butthentheyinsistedsoIpreparedthedeed.
Q:Afteryoupreparedthedocument,whatdidyoudo?
A:AfterIprepareditIgaveittohimsothathecouldreadthe
same.
Q:Whenyousayhim,whomdoyoureferto?
A:VillanerAcabal.
Q:AnddidVillanerAcabalreadthedocumentyouprepared?
A:Yes,hereadit.
Q:AndafterreadingitwhatdidVillanerAcabaldo?
A:Hesignedthedocument.
Q:ShowingtoyouadocumentwhichismarkedExhibitCfor
theplaintiffandExhibit1forthedefendants,pleasetellthe
HonorableCourtwhatrelationthisdocumenthastothe
documentwhichyoudescribedearlier?
COURTINTERPRETER:
Witnessisconfrontedwiththesaiddocumentearliermarkedas
ExhibitCfortheprosecutionandExhibit1forthedefense.
A:Yes,thisistheone.[23]
xxx
Q:AlsostatedinthedocumentisthephraseSignedinthe
presenceofandthereisanumberandthentwosignatures,
couldyoupleaseexaminethedocumentandsaywhether
thesesignaturesarefamiliartoyou?
A:Yes,numberoneismysignatureandnumber2isthe
signatureofmywifeaswitness.[24]
xxx
Q:AfterVillanerAcabalsignedthedocument,whatdidVillaner
Acabaldo?
A:HewasgiventhepaymentbyLeonardoAcabal.[25]
xxx
Q:Asidefromthedocument,deedofabsolutesale,thatyou
mentionedearlierthatyoupreparedforVillanerAcabalandLeonardo
Acabal,whatotherdocuments,ifany,didyouprepareforthem?
A:Affidavitofnontenancyandaggregatearea.[26](Emphasisand
Thecomplaintwaslateramended[27]toimpleadVillanerseightchildrenasparty
plaintiffs,theybeingheirsofhisdeceasedwife.
ByDecisionofAugust8,1996,thetrialcourtfoundforthethereindefendantsherein
petitionersLeonardoandRamonNicolasandaccordinglydismissedthecomplaint.
Villaneretal.thereuponbroughtthecaseonappealtotheCourtofAppealswhich
reversedthetrialcourt,itholdingthattheDeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyVillaner
infavorofLeonardowassimulatedandfictitious.[28]
Hence,LeonardoandRamonNicolaspresentpetitionforreviewoncertiorari,[29]
anchoredonthefollowingassignmentsoferror:
I.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDAREVERSIBLEERRORWHENIT
RULEDTHATRESPONDENTVILLANERACABALWASDECEIVEDINTO
SIGNINGTHEDEEDOFABSOLUTESALEWHENTHELATTERKNOWINGLY,
FREELYANDVOLUNTARILYEXECUTEDTHESAMEINFAVOROFPETITIONER
LEONARDOACABAL.
II.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDWHENITRULEDTHATTHE
CONSIDERATIONOFTHEDEEDOFABSOLUTESALEINTHEAMOUNTOFTEN
THOUSANDPESOS(P10,0000.00)WASUNUSUALLYLOWAND
INADEQUATE,ESPECIALLYTAKINGINTOACCOUNTTHELOCATIONOFTHE
SUBJECTPROPERTY.
III.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDWHENITFAILEDTOCONSIDERWHY
RESPONDENTVILLANERACABALONLYQUESTIONEDTHEPOSSESSIONAND
OWNERSHIPOFPETITIONERRAMONNICOLASINCOURTAFTERTHE
LATTERWASINOPEN,CONTINUOUSANDPEACEFULPOSSESSIONOFTHE
SUBJECTPROPERTYFORALMOSTTHREE(3)YEARS.
IV.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDAREVERSIBLEERRORINLAWWHEN
ITFAILEDTODECLAREPETITIONERRAMONNICOLASASABUYERINGOOD
FAITHASTHELATTERTOOKTHENECESSARYSTEPSANORDINARYAND
PRUDENTMANWOULDHAVETAKENBEFOREBUYINGTHEQUESTIONED
PROPERTY.
V.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINRULINGINFAVOROFRESPONDENT
VILLANERACABALWHENTHELATTERDIDNOTPRESENTASINGLE
WITNESSTOTESTIFYONTHEALLEGEDCONTRACTOFLEASEWHICHHE
ALLEGEDLYSIGNEDANDWITNESSEDBYTHEEMPLOYEESOFJUDGE
VILLEGAS.
VI.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSCOMMITTEDAREVERSIBLEERRORINLAWWHEN
ITRULEDTHATRULE8,SECTION8OFTHE1987(sic)RULE(sic)OFCIVIL
PROCEDUREISNOTAPPLICABLEINTHECASEATBAR,CONTRARYTOTHE
RULINGOFTHELOWERCOURT.
VII.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDWHENITORDEREDPETITIONERSTOPAY
RESPONDENTSJOINTLYANDSEVERALLYBYWAYOFRENTALTHESUMOF
P10,000.00PERYEARFROM1990UPTOTHETIMETHEYVACATETHE
PREMISES.[30]
Procedurally,petitionerscontendthattheCourtofAppealserredwhenitfailedto
applySection8,Rule8oftheRulesofCourt,respondentVillanerhavingfailedto
denyunderoaththegenuinenessanddueexecutionoftheApril19,1990Deedof
AbsoluteSale.
Petitionerscontentiondoesnotpersuade.Thefailuretodenythegenuinenessand
dueexecutionofanactionabledocumentdoesnotprecludeapartyfromarguing
againstitbyevidenceoffraud,mistake,compromise,payment,statuteoflimitations,
estoppel,andwantofconsideration.[31]
Onthemerits,thisCourtrulesinpetitionersfavor.
Itisabasicruleinevidencethattheburdenofproofliesonthepartywhomakesthe
allegations [32]eiincumbitprobatio,quidicit,nonquinegatcumperrerumnaturam
factumnegantisprobationullasit.[33]Ifheclaimsarightgrantedbylaw,hemust
proveitbycompetentevidence,relyingonthestrengthofhisownevidenceandnot
upontheweaknessofthatofhisopponent.
Morespecifically,allegationsofadefectinorlackofvalidconsenttoacontractby
reasonoffraudorundueinfluenceareneverpresumedbutmustbeestablishednot
bymerepreponderanceofevidencebutbyclearandconvincingevidence.[34]Forthe
circumstancesevidencingfraudandmisrepresentationareasvariedasthepeople
whoperpetrateitineachcase,assumingdifferentshapesandformsandmaybe
committedinasmanydifferentways.[35]
Inthecaseatbar,itwasincumbentontheplaintiffhereinrespondentVillanerto
provethathewasdeceivedintoexecutingtheDeedofAbsoluteSale.Exceptforhis
bareallegationthatthetransactionwasoneoflease,hefailedtoadduceevidencein
supportthereof.Hisconjecturethatperhapsthosecopiesofthedeedofsalewere
placedbyMr.CadalinunderthedocumentswhichIsignedthecontractoflease,[36]
mustfail,forfactsnotconjecturesdecidecases.
Attemptingtoseekcorroborationofhisaccount,VillanerpresentedAtty.VicenteReal
whonotarizedthedocument.Whileondirectexamination,Atty.Realvirtually
corroboratedVillanersclaimthathedidnotbringthedocumenttohimfor
notarization,[37]oncrossexamination,Atty.Realconcededthatitwasimpossibleto
remembereverypersonwhowouldaskhimtonotarizedocuments:
Q:Andinthecourseofyournotarization,canyou
remembereachandeveryfacethatcome(sic)toyoufor
notarization?
A:No,itisimpossible.
Q:InthecaseofVillanerAcabalwhichyouhavehisdocument
notarized(sic)in1990,canyourememberhisfacewhenhe
cametoyou?
A:No.
Q:Andcanyoualsosay,ifapersonwhocametoyou
havingadocumenttobenotarizedandifhewillappear
againafteramonth,canyourememberwhetherhewas
theonewhocametoyou?
A:Notsomuchbecauseeverydaytherearemanypeople
whoappearwithdocumentstobenotarized,Q:So,itis
safetosaythatifVillanerAcabalcametoyouonApril25
orratherApril16,1990andhave(sic)hisdocument
notarizedifhecomesbackin,sayMay25,canyoustill
rememberifhewastheonewhocametoyou?
A:Icannotbesurebutatleast,therearetimesIcan
rememberpersonsbecauseheseemstobeclosetome
already.
Q:IsthisVillanerclosetoyou?
A:Becausehehasbeenfrequentingthehouse/askingfora
copyofthedocument.
Q:So,hebecameclosetoyouafteryounotarizedthe
document?
A:Yes.[38](Emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
OnVillanersclaimthattwowomenemployeesofJudgeVillegassignedaswitnesses
tothedeed[39]butthatthesignaturesappearingthereonarenotthoseofsaid
witnesses,[40]thesamemustbediscreditedinlightofhisunexplainedfailureto
presentsuchallegedwomenemployeewitnesses.
Inanothervein,VillanerzeroesinonthepurchasepriceofthepropertyP10,000.00
whichtohimwasunusuallylowifthetransactionwereoneofsale.Tosubstantiate
hisclaim,VillanerpresentedTaxDeclarationscoveringthepropertyfortheyears
1971,[41]1974,[42]1977,[43]1980,[44]1983,[45]1985,[46]aswellasaDeclarationof
RealPropertyexecutedin1994.[47]
Itbearsnoting,however,thatVillanerfailedtopresentevidenceonthefairmarket
valueofthepropertyasofApril19,1990,thedateofexecutionofthedisputeddeed.
Absentanyevidenceofthefairmarketvalueofalandasofthetimeofitssale,it
cannotbeconcludedthatthepriceatwhichitwassoldwasinadequate.[48]
Inadequacyofpricemustbeprovenbecausemerespeculationorconjecturehasno
placeinourjudicialsystem.[49]
VictorRagay,whowasappointedbythetrialcourttoconductanocularinspection[50]
ofthepropertyandtoinvestigatemattersrelativetothecase,[51]gavean
instructivereportdatedDecember3,1994,[52]thepertinentportionsofwhichare
herebyreproducedverbatim:
a)Onlythree(3)tofour(4)hectaresoftheeighteen(18)wereplantedto
sugarcane,therestwasnevercultivated
b)thesoilisreddishandsomewhatsandyincomposition
c)thesoilcontainssomuchlimestones(rocksconsistingmainlyofcalcium
carbonate)
d)nopartofthelandinquestionisplainorflat,contrarytoclaimofthe
plaintiffthatalmost10hectaresofthelandinquestionisplainorflat
e)someareas,eastwardofandadjacentofthelandinquestion
(mistakenlytobeownedbythedefendantNicolas)wereplantedtosugar
canebytheownersKadusales
f)theroadgoingtothelandinquestion(asclaimedtobetheroad)isno
longerpassablebecauseithasbeenabandonedandnotmaintainedby
anyone,thusitmakeseverythingimpossibleforanybodytogetandhaul
thesugarcanefromthearea
g)theCommissionerhasdiscoveredsomestockpilesofabandoned
harvestedsugarcaneslefttorot,alongthesideoftheroad,undeliveredto
themillingsitebecauseofthedifficultyinbringinguptruckstothescene
oftheharvest
h)thesugarcanespresentlyplantedonthelandinquestionatthetimeof
theocularinspectionwerethree(3)feetinheightandtheirstructuralbuilt
wasthinorlean
i)Mostofthepartofthe18hectaresisnotplantedorcultivatedbecause
thesameistoorockyandnotsuitableforplantingtosugarcane.[53]
Additionally,RagayreportedthatoneAnatolioCabusogrecentlypurchaseda6
hectarepropertyadjoiningthatofthesubjectpropertyforonlyP1,600.00[54]or
P266.67perhectare.Giventhat,hadthe18hectaresubjectpropertybeensoldat
aboutthesametime,itwouldhavefetchedtheamountofP4,800.00,[55]hence,the
P10,000.00purchasepriceappearinginthequestionedApril19,1990documentis
morethanreasonable.
Even,however,ontheassumptionthatthepriceofP10,000.00wasbelowthefair
marketvalueofthepropertyin1990,mereinadequacyofthepricepersewillnot
ruleoutthetransactionasoneofsale.Forthepricemustbegrosslyinadequateor
shockingtotheconsciencesuchthatthemindrevoltsatitandsuchthata
reasonablemanwouldneitherdirectlynorindirectlybelikelytoconsenttoit.[56]
Stillinanothervein,VillanersubmitsthatLeonardostransferofthepropertyto
NicolasinaspanofonemonthforaprofitofP30,000.00conclusivelyreflects
Leonardosfraudulentintent.Thissubmissionisanonsequitur.
AsforVillanersargumentthatthesaleofthepropertytoLeonardoandthe
subsequentsalethereoftoNicolasarevoidforbeingviolativeoftheretentionlimits
imposedbyRepublicActNo.6657,otherwiseknownastheComprehensiveAgrarian
ReformLaw,thesamefails.Thepertinentprovisionsofsaidlawread:
SECTION6.RetentionLimits.ExceptasotherwiseprovidedinthisAct,noperson
mayretain,directlyorindirectly,anypublicoragriculturalland,thesizeofwhichmay
varyaccordingtofactorsgoverningaviablefamilysizedfarm,suchascommodity
produced,terrain,infrastructure,andsoilfertilityasdeterminedbythePresidential
AgrarianReformCouncil(PARC)createdhereunder,butinnocaseshallretention
bythelandownerexceedfive(5)hectares.Three(3)hectaresmaybeawarded
toeachchildofthelandowner,subjecttothefollowingqualifications:(1)thatheisat
leastfifteen(15)yearsofageand(2)thatheistillingthelandordirectlymanaging
thefarm:Provided,ThatlandownerswhoselandshavebeencoveredbyPresidential
DecreeNo.27shallbeallowedtokeeptheareasoriginallyretainedbythem
thereunder: [57]Providedfurther,Thatoriginalhomesteadgranteesordirect
compulsoryheirswhostillowntheoriginalhomesteadatthetimeoftheapprovalof
thisActshallretainthesameareasaslongastheycontinuetocultivatesaid
homestead.
xxx
UpontheeffectivityofthisAct,anysale,disposition,lease,management,
contractortransferofpossessionofprivatelandsexecutedbytheoriginal
landownerinviolationofthisActshallbenullandvoid:Provided,however,that
thoseexecutedpriortothisActshallbevalidonlywhenregisteredwiththeRegister
ofDeedswithinaperiodofthree(3)monthsaftertheeffectivityofthisAct.
Thereafter,allRegistersofDeedsshallinformtheDARwithinthirty(30)daysofany
transactioninvolvingagriculturallandsinexcessoffive(5)hectares.
xxx
SECTION70.DispositionofPrivateAgriculturalLands.Thesaleordispositionof
agriculturallandsretainedbyalandownerasaconsequenceofSection6hereofshall
bevalidaslongasthetotallandholdingsthatshallbeownedbythetransferee
thereofinclusiveofthelandtobeacquiredshallnotexceedthelandholdingceilings
providedforinthisAct.
AnysaleordispositionofagriculturallandsaftertheeffectivityofthisAct
foundtobecontrarytotheprovisionshereofshallbenullandvoid.
TransfereesofagriculturallandsshallfurnishtheappropriateRegisterofDeedsand
theBARCanaffidavitattestingthathistotallandholdingsasaresultofthesaid
acquisitiondonotexceedthelandholdingceiling.TheRegisterofDeedsshallnot
registerthetransferofanyagriculturallandwithoutthesubmissionofhissworn
statementtogetherwithproofofserviceofacopythereoftotheBARC.(Emphasis
andunderscoringsupplied)
AstheabovequotedprovisionsoftheComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawshow,
onlythoseprivatelandsdevotedtoorsuitableforagriculturearecoveredbyit.[58]
Aspriorlyrelated,VictorRagay,whowasappointedbythetrialcourttoconductan
ocularinspectionoftheproperty,observedinhisreportthatonlythree(3)tofour(4)
hectareswereplantedwithsugarcanewhiletherestofthepropertywasnotsuitable
forplantingasthesoilwasfulloflimestone.[59]Healsoremarkedthatthe
sugarcaneswereonly3feetinheightandverylean,[60]whereassugarcanesusually
growtoaheightof3to6meters(about8to20feet)andhavestems2to5
centimeters(12inches)thick.[61]
Itisthusgatheredthatthepropertywasnotsuitableforagriculturalpurposes.Inany
event,sincetheareadevotedtotheplantingofsugarcane,hence,suitablefor
agriculturalpurposes,comprisesonly4hectaresatthemost,itislessthanthe
maximumretentionlimitprescribedbylaw.Therewasthennoviolationofthe
ComprehensiveAgrarianReformLaw.
EvenassumingthatthedispositionofthepropertybyVillanerwascontrarytolaw,he
wouldstillhavenoremedyunderthelawasheandLeonardowereinparidelicto,
hence,heisnotentitledtoafirmativereliefonewhoseeksequityandjusticemust
cometocourtwithcleanhands.Inparidelictopotiorestconditiodefendentis.[62]
Thepropositionisuniversalthatnoactionarises,inequityoratlaw,froman
illegalcontractnosuitcanbemaintainedforitsspecificperformance,orto
recoverthepropertyagreedtobesoldordelivered,orthemoneyagreedto
bepaid,ordamagesforitsviolation.Therulehassometimesbeenlaiddownas
thoughitwereequallyuniversal,thatwherethepartiesareinparidelicto,no
affirmativereliefofanykindwillbegiventooneagainsttheother.[63](Emphasisand
Theprincipleofparidelictoisgroundedontwopremises:first,thatcourtsshouldnot
lendtheirgoodofficestomediatingdisputesamongwrongdoers [64]andsecond,that
denyingjudicialrelieftoanadmittedwrongdoerisaneffectivemeansofdeterring
illegality.[65]Thisdoctrineofancientvintageisnotaprincipleofjusticebutoneof
policyasarticulatedin1775byLordMansfieldinHolmanv.Johnson: [66]
Theobjection,thatacontractisimmoralorillegalasbetweentheplaintiffand
defendant,soundsatalltimesveryillinthemouthofthedefendant.Itisnotforhis
sake,however,thattheobjectioniseverallowedbutitisfoundedingeneral
principlesofpolicy,whichthedefendanthastheadvantageof,contrarytothereal
justice,asbetweenhimandtheplaintiff,byaccident,ifImaysosay.Theprincipleof
publicpolicyisthisexdolomalononorituractio.[67]Nocourtwilllenditsaidtoa
manwhofoundshiscauseofactionuponanimmoraloranillegalact.If,fromthe
plaintiffsownstatingorotherwise,thecauseofactionappearstoariseexturpi
causa,[68]orthetransgressionofapositivelawofthiscountry,therethecourtsays
hehasnorighttobeassisted.Itisuponthatgroundthecourtgoesnotforthesake
ofthedefendant,butbecausetheywillnotlendtheiraidtosuchaplaintiff.Soifthe
plaintiffandthedefendantweretochangesides,andthedefendantwastobringhis
actionagainsttheplaintiff,thelatterwouldthenhavetheadvantageofitforwhere
bothareequallyinfaultpotiorestconditiodefendentis.[69]
Thus,toserveasbothasanctionandasadeterrent,thelawwillnotaideitherparty
toanillegalagreementandwillleavethemwhereitfindsthem.
Theprincipleofparidelicto,however,isnotabsolute,admittinganexceptionunder
Article1416oftheCivilCode.
ART.1416.Whentheagreementisnotillegalpersebutismerelyprohibited,andthe
prohibitionbythelawisdesignedfortheprotectionoftheplaintiff,hemay,ifpublic
policyistherebyenhanced,recoverwhathehaspaidordelivered.
Underthisarticle,recoveryforwhathasbeenpaidordeliveredpursuanttoan
inexistentcontractisallowedonlywhenthefollowingrequisitesaremet:(1)the
contractisnotillegalpersebutmerelyprohibited(2)theprohibitionisforthe
protectionoftheplaintiffsand(3)ifpublicpolicyisenhancedthereby.[70]The
exceptionisunavailingintheinstantcase,however,sincetheprohibitionisclearly
notfortheprotectionoftheplaintifflandownerbutforthebeneficiaryfarmers.[71]
Infine,Villanerisestoppedfromassailingandannullinghisowndeliberateacts.[72]
More.Villanercannotfeignignoranceofthelaw,norclaimthatheactedingoodfaith,
letaloneassertthatheislessguiltythanLeonardo.UnderArticle3oftheCivilCode,
ignoranceofthelawexcusesnoonefromcompliancetherewith.
Andnow,Villanerscoheirsclaimthatascoownersoftheproperty,theDeedof
AbsoluteSaleexecutedbyVillanerinfavorofLeonardodoesnotbindthemasthey
didnotconsenttosuchanundertaking.Thereisnoquestionthatthepropertyis
conjugal.Article160oftheCivilCode[73]provides:
ART.160.Allpropertyofthemarriageispresumedtobelongtotheconjugal
partnership,unlessitbeprovedthatitpertainsexclusivelytothehusbandortothe
wife.[74]
Thepresumption,thisCourthasheld,appliestoallpropertiesacquiredduring
marriage.Forthepresumptiontobeinvoked,therefore,thepropertymustbeshown
tohavebeenacquiredduringthemarriage.[75]
Inthecaseatbar,thepropertywasacquiredonJuly6,1971duringVillaners
marriagewithJustinianaLipajan.Itcannotbeseriouslycontendedthatsimply
becausethetaxdeclarationscoveringthepropertywassolelyinthenameofVillaner
itishispersonalandexclusiveproperty.
InBucoyv.Paulino[76]andMendozav.Reyes [77]whichbothapplybyanalogy,this
Courtheldthatregistrationaloneofthepropertiesinthenameofthehusbanddoes
notdestroytheconjugalnatureoftheproperties.[78]Whatismaterialisthetime
whenthelandwasacquiredbyVillaner,andthatwasduringthelawfulexistenceof
hismarriagetoJustiniana.
SincethepropertywasacquiredduringtheexistenceofthemarriageofVillanerand
Justiniana,thepresumptionunderArticle160oftheCivilCodeisthatitisthe
couplesconjugalproperty.Theburdenisonpetitionersthentoprovethatitisnot.
Thistheyfailedtodo.
Thepropertybeingconjugal,uponthedeathofJustinianaLipajan,theconjugal
partnershipwasterminated.[79]Withthedissolutionoftheconjugalpartnership,
Villanersinterestintheconjugalpartnershipbecameactualandvestedwithrespect
toanundividedonehalfportion.[80]Justiniana'srightstotheotherhalf,inturn,
vesteduponherdeathtoherheirs [81]includingVillanerwhoisentitledtothesame
shareasthatofeachoftheireightlegitimatechildren.[82]Asaresultthenofthe
deathofJustiniana,aregimeofcoownershiparosebetweenVillanerandhiscoheirs
inrelationtotheproperty.[83]
WithrespecttoJustinianasonehalfshareintheconjugalpartnershipwhichherheirs
inherited,applyingtheprovisionsonthelawofsuccession,hereightchildrenand
Villanereachreceivesoneninth(1/9)thereof.Havinginheritedoneninth(1/9)ofhis
wifesshareintheconjugalpartnershiporoneeighteenth(1/18) [84]oftheentire
conjugalpartnershipandishimselfalreadytheownerofonehalf(1/2)ornine
eighteenths(9/18),Villanerstotalinterestamountstoteneighteenths(10/18)or
fiveninths(5/9).
WhileVillanerownsfiveninths(5/9)ofthedisputedproperty,hecouldnotclaimtitle
toanydefiniteportionofthecommunitypropertyuntilitsactualpartitionby
agreementorjudicialdecree.Priortopartition,allthathehasisanidealorabstract
quotaorproportionateshareintheproperty.[85]Villaner,however,asacoownerof
thepropertyhastherighttosellhisundividedsharethereof.TheCivilCodeprovides
so:
ART.493.Eachcoownershallhavethefullownershipofhispartandofthefruitsand
benefitspertainingthereto,andhemaythereforealienate,assignormortgageit,and
evensubstituteanotherpersoninitsenjoyment,exceptwhenpersonalrightsare
involved.Buttheeffectofthealienationorthemortgage,withrespecttotheco
owners,shallbelimitedtotheportionwhichmaybeallottedtohiminthedivision
upontheterminationofthecoownership.
Thus,everycoownerhasabsoluteownershipofhisundividedinterestintheco
ownedpropertyandisfreetoalienate,assignormortgagehisinterestexceptasto
purelypersonalrights.Whileacoownerhastherighttofreelysellanddisposeofhis
undividedinterest,nevertheless,asacoowner,hecannotalienatethesharesofhis
othercoownersnemodatquinonhabet.[86]
Villaner,however,soldtheentirepropertywithoutobtainingtheconsentoftheother
coowners.Followingthewellestablishedprinciplethatthebindingforceofacontract
mustberecognizedasfarasitislegallypossibletodosoquandoresnonvaletut
ago,valeatquantumvalerepotest[87]thedispositionaffectsonlyVillanersshare
proindiviso,andthetransfereegetsonlywhatcorrespondstohisgrantorssharein
thepartitionofthepropertyownedincommon.[88]
Asearlyas1923,thisCourthasruledthatevenifacoownersellsthewholeproperty
ashis,thesalewillaffectonlyhisownsharebutnotthoseoftheothercoowners
whodidnotconsenttothesale.Thisisbecauseundertheaforementionedcodal
provision,thesaleorotherdispositionaffectsonlyhisundividedshareandthe
transfereegetsonlywhatwouldcorrespondtothisgrantorinthepartitionofthe
thingownedincommon.Consequently,byvirtueofthesalesmadebyRosaliaand
GaudencioBailonwhicharevalidwithrespecttotheirproportionateshares,andthe
subsequenttransferswhichculminatedinthesaletoprivaterespondentCelestino
Afable,thesaidAfabletherebybecameacoownerofthedisputedparceloflandas
correctlyheldbythelowercourtsincethesalesproducedtheeffectofsubstituting
thebuyersintheenjoymentthereof.
Fromtheforegoing,itmaybededucedthatsinceacoownerisentitledtosellhis
undividedshare,asaleoftheentirepropertybyonecoownerwithouttheconsentof
theothercoownersisnotnullandvoid.However,onlytherightsofthecoowner
selleraretransferred.,therebymakingthebuyeracoowneroftheproperty.
Theproperactionincaseslikethisisnotforthenullificationofthesaleorthe
recoveryofpossessionofthethingownedincommonfromthethirdpersonwho
substitutedthecoownerorcoownerswhoalienatedtheirshares,buttheDIVISION
ofthecommonpropertyasifitcontinuedtoremaininthepossessionoftheco
ownerswhopossessedandadministeredit.[89]
Thus,itisnowsettledthattheappropriaterecourseofcoownersincaseswhere
theirconsentwerenotsecuredinasaleoftheentirepropertyaswellasinasale
merelyoftheundividedsharesofsomeofthecoownersisanactionforPARTITION
underRule69oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.Neitherrecoveryofpossessionnor
restitutioncanbegrantedsincethedefendantbuyersarelegitimateproprietorsand
possessorsinjointownershipofthecommonpropertyclaimed.[90](Italicsinthe
originalcitationsomittedunderscoringsupplied)
ThisCourtisnotunmindfulofitsrulinginCruzv.Leis [91]whereitheld:
Itisconcededthat,asarule,acoownersuchasGertrudescouldonlydisposeofher
shareinthepropertyownedincommon.Article493oftheCivilCodeprovides:
xxx
Unfortunatelyforprivaterespondents,however,thepropertywasregisteredinTCT
No.43100solelyinthenameofGertrudesIsidro,widow.Whereaparcelofland,
formingpartoftheundistributedpropertiesofthedissolvedconjugalpartnershipof
gains,issoldbyawidowtoapurchaserwhomerelyreliedonthefaceofthe
certificateoftitlethereto,issuedsolelyinthenameofthewidow,thepurchaser
acquiresavalidtitletothelandevenasagainsttheheirsofthedeceasedspouse.
Therationaleforthisruleisthatapersondealingwithregisteredlandisnotrequired
togobehindtheregistertodeterminetheconditionoftheproperty.Heisonly
chargedwithnoticeoftheburdensonthepropertywhicharenotedonthefaceofthe
registerorthecertificateoftitle.Torequirehimtodomoreistodefeatoneofthe
primaryobjectsoftheTorrenssystem.[92](Citationomitted)
Cruz,however,isnotapplicableforthesimplereasonthatinthecaseatbarthe
propertyindisputeisunregistered.Theissueofgoodfaithorbadfaithofabuyeris
relevantonlywherethesubjectofthesaleisaregisteredlandbutnotwherethe
propertyisanunregisteredland.[93]Onewhopurchasesanunregisteredlanddoesso
athisperil.[94]Nicolasclaimofhavingboughtthelandingoodfaithisthus
irrelevant.[95]
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheCourtofAppealsFebruary15,2001
DecisioninCAG.R.CVNo.56148isREVERSEDandSETASIDEandanotheris
rendereddeclaringthesaleinfavorofpetitionerLeonardoAcabalandthesubsequent
saleinfavorofpetitionerRamonNicolasvalidbutonlyinsofarasfiveninths(5/9)of
thesubjectpropertyisconcerned.
Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.Panganiban,(Chairman),SandovalGutierrez,Corona,andGarcia,JJ.,
concur.
[1]CourtofAppeals(CA)Rolloat5865.
[2]RecordsVol.Iat224227.
[3]ExhibitsCand1.
[4]ExhibitH.
[5]ExhibitF.
[6]TheDeedofAbsoluteSalestatesthatatthetimethecontractwasenteredinto
respondentVillanerAcabalwasmarriedtoJustinianaLipajan.
[7]ExhibitsCand1.Thedocumentstatesthatatthetimethecontractwas
enteredintorespondentVillanerAcabalwasawidower.
[8]TheDeedofAbsoluteSalestatesthatthepropertyisdescribedbyTaxDeclaration
No.16878(ExhibitI)andhasanareaof186,000squaremetersmoreorless.In
contrast,theDeedofAbsoluteSalebetweenVillanerAcabalandhisparentsstates
thatthepropertyhasanareaof18.15hectares.1hectareisequalto10,000square
meters.
[9]TranscriptofStenographicNotes(TSN),March16,1994at17.
[10]ExhibitQ.Itshouldbenotedthatthattheleaseagreementwasnotsignedby
MariaLuisaMontenegro.Theleaseagreementwasalsonotsignedbyanywitnessnor
isitnotarized.OnlythesignatureofVillanerAcabalappearsonthedocument.
[11]TSN,March16,1994at2223.
[12]Id.at16.
[14]TSN,March16,1994at16.
[15]Id.at1718.
[16]Id.at18.
[17]Id.at2223.
[18]TSN,November23,1994at45.
[19]ThedocumentstatesthatVillanerAcabelacknowledgesreceiptofthe
considerationofP10,000.00.
[20]ExhibitsDand3.
[21]TSN,July18,1994at4.
[22]Id.at5.
[23]Id.at56.
[24]Id.at7.
[25]Id.at78.
[26]Id.at8.
[27]Recordsat204205.
[28]CARolloat103.
[29]Rolloat2554.
[30]Id.at3233.
[31]Republicv.CourtofAppeals,296SCRA171,181182(1998)BoughandBoughv.
CantiverosandHanopol,40Phil.209,213214(1919)Hibberdv.Rohdeand
McMillian,32Phil.476,480(1915).
[32]Citibank,N.A.Mastercardv.Teodoro,411SCRA577,583(2003)Manongsongv.
Estimo,404SCRA683,693(2003)Nocedav.CourtofAppeals,313SCRA504,520
(1999)Pimentelv.CourtofAppeals,307SCRA38,46(1999)LuxuriaHomes,Inc.v.
CourtofAppeals,302SCRA315,325(1999)PacificBankingCorporationEmployees
Organizationv.CourtofAppeals,288SCRA197,206(1998)Jisonv.Courtof
Appeals,286SCRA495,532(1998)P.T.CernaCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,221
SCRA19,25(1993).
[33]Theproofliesuponhimwhoaffirms,notuponhimwhodeniessincebythe
natureofthings,hewhodeniesafactcannotproduceanyproof.(BlacksLaw
Dictionary516[1991],6thed.)
[34]HeirsofWilliamSevillav.Sevilla,402SCRA501,511(2003)Cenidov.
Apacionado,318SCRA688,702(1999)Palmaresv.CourtofAppeals,288SCRA422,
434(1998)Inciong,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,257SCRA578,586(1996)Samsonv.
CourtofAppeals,238SCRA397,408(1994)Cuv.CourtofAppeals,195SCRA647,
657(1991)Carenanv.CourtofAppeals,173SCRA711,715(1989).
[35]SpousesMorandartev.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.123586,August12,2004.
[36]TSN,November23,1994at4.
[37]TSN,April26,1994at11.
[38]Id.at1314.
[39]TSN,March16,1994at1718.
[40]Ibid.
[41]TaxDeclarationNo.15856,ExhibitH.
[42]TaxDeclarationNo.16878,ExhibitI.
[43]TaxDeclarationNo.10237,ExhibitJ.
[44]TaxDeclarationNo.2963,ExhibitK.
[45]TaxDeclarationNo.27107,ExhibitL.
[46]TaxDeclarationNo.27185,ExhibitM,andTaxDeclarationNo.27184,Exhibit
N.
[47]DeclarationofRealPropertyNo.120270136,ExhibitO.
[48]SanPedrov.Lee,G.R.No.156522,May28,2004Fernandezv.Tarun,391SCRA
653,662(2002)
[49]NgChoCiov.NgDiong,1SCRA275,282(1961).
[51]Id.at134.
[52]Id.at145153.
[53]Id.at150151.
[54]Id.at152.
[55]P266.67perhectarex18hectares=4,800.06.
[56]SanPedrov.Lee,supraFernandezv.Tarun,supraCachola,Sr.v.Courtof
Appeals,208SCRA496,501(1992).
[57]PresidentialDecreeNo.27allowsforamaximumretentionareaofnotmorethan
seven(7)hectares.
[58]Rep.ActNo.6657(1988),sec.4.
[60]Id.at151.
[61]http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761573379/Sugarcane.html.
[62]Incaseofequalormutualfault[betweentwoparties]theconditionoftheparty
defendingisthebetterone.Whereeachpartyisequallyinfault,thelawfavorshim
whoisactuallyinpossession.Wherethefaultismutual,thelawwillleavethecaseas
itfindsit.(BlacksLawDictionary791[1991],6thed.)
[63]Silaganv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,196SCRA774,785(1991).
[64]BatemanEichler,HillRichards,Inc.v.Berner,472U.S.299,306(1985).
[65]Id.InMcMullenv.Hoffman,174U.S.639,669670(1899),theU.S.Supreme
Courtsaid:
Torefusetogranteitherpartytoanillegalcontractjudicialaidfortheenforcementof
hisallegedrightsunderittendsstronglytowardsreducingthenumberofsuch
transactionstoaminimum.Themoreplainlypartiesunderstandthatwhentheyenter
intocontractsofthisnaturetheyplacethemselvesoutsidetheprotectionofthelaw,
sofarasthatprotectionconsistsinaidingthemtoenforcesuchcontracts,theless
inclinedwilltheybetoenterintothem.Inthatwaythepublicsecuresthebenefitofa
rigidadherencetothelaw.
[66]1Cowp.341(1775).
[67]Outoffraudnoactionarisesfraudnevergivesarightofaction.Nocourtwill
lenditsaidtoamanwhofoundshiscauseofactionuponanimmoralorillegalact.
(BlacksLawDictionary567[1991],6thed.)
[68]Outofabase[illegal,orimmoral]consideration.(BlacksLawDictionary589
[1991],6thed.)
[69]1Cowp.341,343(1775).
[70]PhilippineNationalBankv.DelosReyes,179SCRA619,628(1989)Guiangv.
Kintanar,106SCRA49,92(1981).
[71]AnexampleofaprohibitionbeneficialtoaplaintiffistheprohibitioninthePublic
LandActwhichprohibitsthealienationofhomesteadsgrantedbytheStatewithinthe
5yearprohibitiveperiod.Theprimordialaimofthisprohibitionistopreserveand
keepinthefamilyofthehomesteaderthepieceoflandthattheStatehad
gratuitouslygiven.Thus,inSantosv.RomanCatholicChurchofMidsayap,etal.(94
Phil.405,411[1954])thisCourtheld:
Thecaseunderconsiderationcomeswithintheexceptionaboveadvertedto.Here
appelleedesirestonullifyatransactionwhichwasdoneinviolationofthelaw.
Ordinarilytheprincipleofparidelictowouldapplytoherbecauseherpredecessorin
interesthascarriedoutthesalewiththepresumedknowledgeofitsillegality,but
becausethesubjectofthetransactionisapieceofpublicland,publicpolicyrequires
thatshe,asheir,benotpreventedfromreacquiringitbecauseitwasgivenbylawto
herfamilyforherhomeandcultivation.Thisisthepolicyonwhichourhomesteadlaw
ispredicated.Thisrightcannotbewaived.Itisnotwithinthecompetenceofany
citizentobarterawaywhatpublicpolicybylawseekstopreserve.Weare,
therefore,constrainedtoholdthatappelleecanmaintainthepresentactionitbeing
infurtheranceofthisfundamentalaimofourhomesteadlaw.(Citationsomitted)
[72]SanAgustinv.CourtofAppeals,371SCRA348,359(2001)Sarmientov.Salud,
45SCRA213,216(1972).
[73]ThegoverninglawinthiscaseisArticle160oftheCivilCodesincethemarriage
betweenVillanerAcabalandJustinianaLipajanandLipajansdeathwasbeforeAugust
3,1988theeffectivityoftheFamilyCode.Incidentally,Art.119oftheCivilCode
provides:
ART.119.Thefuturespousesmayinthemarriagesettlementsagreeuponabsoluteor
relativecommunityofproperty,oruponcompleteseparationofproperty,oruponany
otherregime.Intheabsenceofmarriagesettlements,orwhenthesamearevoid,
thesystemofrelativecommunityorconjugalpartnershipofgainsasestablishedin
thisCode,shallgovernthepropertyrelationsbetweenhusbandandwife.
Thus,beforetheeffectivityoftheFamilyCode,intheabsenceofevidencetothe
contrary,thereisapresumptionthatthepropertyrelationsofthehusbandandwife
areundertheregimeofconjugalpartnershipofgains.
[74]Article116oftheFamilyCodestates:Allpropertyacquiredduringthemarriage,
whethertheacquisitionappearstohavebeenmade,contractedorregisteredinthe
nameofoneorbothspouses,ispresumedtobeconjugalunlessthecontraryis
proved.
[75]Torelav.Torela,93SCRA391,396(1979)PoncedeLeonv.Rehabilitation
FinanceCorporation,36SCRA289,310(1970)CobbPerezv.Lantin,23SCRA637,
644645(1968)Marambav.Lozano,20SCRA474,478(1967).
[76]23SCRA248(1968).
[77]124SCRA154(1983)
[78]Id.at16523SCRA248,257(1968).
[79]CivilCode,art.175(1).
[80]CivilCode,art.185.
[83]Carvajalv.CourtofAppeals,112SCRA237,239(1982)Pamplonav.Moreto,96
SCRA775,781(1980)Taningcov.RegisterofDeedsofLaguna,5SCRA381,382
383(1962).
[84]1/2x1/9=1/18,onehalfrepresentingJustinianasshareintheconjugal
partnershipandoneninthsrepresentingeachheirsshareinJustinianassaidhalf.
Thiswasdoneinordertogeteachheirssharewithrespecttotheentireconjugal
partnership.
[85]CityofMandaluyongv.Aguilar,350SCRA487,499(2001)Oliverasv.Lopez,168
SCRA431,437(1988)Carvajalv.CourtofAppeals,supraat240DiversifiedCredit
Corporationv.Rosado,26SCRA470,474(1968).
[86]Hewhohathnotcannotgive.(BlacksLawDictionary1037[1991],6thed.)
[87]WhenathingisofnoeffectasIdoit,itshallhaveeffectasfaras[orin
whateverway]itcan.(BlacksLawDictionary1243[1991],6thed.)
[88]Aguirrev.CourtofAppeals,421SCRA310,323324(2004)CorinthianRealty,
Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,394SCRA260,268(2002)TomasClaudioMemorialCollege,
Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,316SCRA502,509(1999)Paulmitanv.CourtofAppeals,
215SCRA866,872873(1992)BailonCasilaov.CourtofAppeals,160SCRA738,
745(1988).
[89]Enpassant,coownersinsteadoffilingacaseforpartitionmayresorttolegal
redemptionunderArticle1623oftheCivilCode.Article1623provides:
ART.1623.Therightoflegalpreemptionorredemptionshallnotbe
exercisedexceptwithinthirtydaysfromthenoticeinwritingbythe
prospectivevendor,orbythevendor,asthecasemaybe.Thedeedofsale
shallnotberecordedintheRegistryofProperty,unlessaccompaniedby
anaffidavitofthevendorthathehasgivenwrittennoticethereoftoall
possibleredemptioners.
Therightofredemptionofcoownersexcludesthatofadjoiningowners.
UnderArticle1623,whenavendorsellsrealproperty,hemustnotifyin
writinghiscoownerswhomayredeemthesamewithinthirty(30)days
fromnotice.Thegeneralruleisthatwrittennoticeofthesaletoall
possibleredemptionersisindispensable.The30dayperiodwhichisa
conditionprecedenttotheexerciseoftherightoflegalredemptionis
countedfromthewrittennotice.However,inAlonzov.Intermediate
AppellateCourt(150SCRA259),thisCourtheldthatasanexceptionto
thegeneralrulethecoheirswholivedwiththevendorsinthesamelot
aredeemedtohavereceivedactualnoticeofthesale.Alonzoisapplicable
inthiscasesincethecoheirsaredeemedtohavereceivedactualnotice
ofthesalesincetheyliveinthesamehouseasthevendor.Hence,they
maynolongerexercisetheirrightofredemption.
[90]BailonCasilaov.CourtofAppeals,supra.
[91]327SCRA570(2000).
[92]Id.at577578.
[93]Salesv.CourtofAppeals,211SCRA858,865866(1992).
[94]Aguirrev.CourtofAppeals,supraat321322.
[95]Davidv.Bandin,149SCRA140,150(1987).

Source:SupremeCourtELibrary
Thispagewasdynamicallygenerated
bytheELibraryContentManagementSystem(ELibCMS)

Acabal V Acabal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Acabal V Acabal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

9/25/2016 ELibraryInformationAtYourFingertips:PrinterFriendly

Subsequently, he executed on April 19, 1990 a deed[7] conveying the same

Q: It appears, Mr. Acabal, that you have signed a document of

A: We had some agreement but not about the selling of this

Q: These signatures appearing in this document marked as

Q: According to this document, you sell (sic) this property at

Q: Now, Carmelo Cadalin [Mellie] also testified before this court

A: What really (sic) I have signed was the document of lease

Q: Now, can you explain to the Honorable Court why it so

A:Because when I signed the contract of lease the witnesses

You might also like