WhenOpiumMet(h)Myanmar:DrugsandEthnicConflictinMyanmar

Authors:
JinkyCeciliaEsguerra
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UniversityofthePhilippinesDiliman
esguerra.jinkycdc@gmail.com

BeaCzarinaNavarro
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UniversityofthePhilippinesDiliman
beasarinna@gmail.com/ebanirazc19@yahoo.com.ph

FranzRaphaelVelasco
DepartmentofPoliticalScience
UniversityofthePhilippinesDiliman
velascofranz@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT:

The conflict in Myanmar is mainly betweenthegovernmentandthearmedethnicgroups

who claimed to represent theirrespectiveethnicminority.Therootoftheirconflictcanbetraced
through countrys history, especially during its colonial period. The conflict continues to
aggravate the country due to the inability of both parties, the ethnic armed groups and the
government of Myanmar, to respond to the requests of the other, the disagreement on the peace
process and ceasefire agreements, and the continuity of the instigation of violence among the
ethnicgroupswhichforcesthemtoseekrefugeinothercountries.

The outcome of the conflict is the proliferation of shadow economies such as illegal
logging, mining, and drug production. Drug trafficking is the focus since it has considerable
effects on the ethnicconflict.OpiumandMethamphetaminearetwoofthemanycommoditiesin
the drug trade of Myanmar sold to support their cause. One of these ethnic armed groups is the
United Wa State Army, one of the biggest drugproducing organization fighting for autonomy
within the borders of Myanmar. Others are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army
and the They have been known to finance their arms through the production of said drugs,
exportingtocountrieslikeChina.

There were many efforts from the government to manage and to end the said conflict.
Even groups from the civil society and international level are doing their part, continuously

initiating and implementing peacebuilding projectsandtheyhavecomealongwayintheirquest

to peace and democracy. One of the issues their peacebuildingagreementshouldaddressarethe
drug trades financing their cause with plans ready when peace is finally achieved to secure
sustainablepeace.

Keywords:drugs,conflict,ethnicarmedgroups

INTRODUCTION

The conflict in Myanmar is known as the longest and most protracted civil war in the
world (Korybko, 2015). This can be traced back before its independence in 1948 as Great
Britain, its former colonizer, failedtounitetheareasinthehighlanddominatedbydiverseethnic
minorities and the lowland areas occupied by the Burmans (Ganesan 2014). The ethnic groups
include the following: Karen, Kachin, Karenni, Chin, Mon, Rhakine, Shan, Wa and Rohingya.
These groups asked for social, economic, and political equality with the Burmans. However,
their demands were not met. Instead, they were discriminated, marginalized, and deprived of
their ethnic rights. This led them to seek refuge in the neighboring countries like Thailand,
China,andIndia.

The conflict was further intensified when the Tatmadaw, Myanmars nationalarmy,took
over the government through a military coup in 1962. Under their military rule, minority rights
were further curtailed, resulting to theriseofvariousethnicarmedgroups(Kramer2015).These
groups opposed the government with the goal of gaining autonomy and asserting their right to
selfdetermination(Tripathi2014).

For their counterinsurgency plan, the national army followed a divideandrule strategy
wherein they would take on groups individually and weaken them through military, political,
and economic means (Kramer 2015). They offered ceasefire agreements to some groups while
continued to fight the others. Through this strategy, the Tatmadaw successfully prevented the
creation of alliance among the opposing groups. It became easy for them to establish their
militarypowerintheentiretyofMyanmar.

As mentioned earlier, some groups agreed to sign ceasefire agreements in 1989. It

temporarily ended the war between the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed groups. It also
facilitated easier travel and communicationamongcommunitiesinwaraffectedareas,andhave
led to some improvements in health and education services (Jelsma, Kramer, and Ververst
2003). The main shortcoming of these agreements was the lack of an inclusive peace process
and subsequent political dialogue to build national peace and reconciliation (Krammer 2015).

They did not make any serious step to really address the conflict and to later achieve peace. In
fact,thesaidlimitationfurtherbroughtnewcomplications.

Under the ceasefire agreements,thegroupswerenotallowedtoparticipateinlegaltrades

and business. Because of this, most of them started to engage in shadow economies such as
illegal logging, mining, and drug trafficking. Also, the ceasefire agreements relatively gave the
groups the opportunity to freely grow and transportopium(Jelsma,Kramer,andVerverst2003).
In fact, records show that the opium production in Myanmar significantly increased after 1989
because farmers were freed from fear of being shot while in the poppy fields (Jelsma, Kramer,
and Ververst 2003). The drug trade has become the main financial source of the groups to
support their cause. One of the most prominent armed groups involved in the drug trade is the
United Wa State Army of the Wa region. There are also claims that even the national army has
been involved in the drug trade. However, these assumptions remain unclear as of today given
the complexity of the drug operation itself. No member of the national army has been proven
guiltyoftheaccusation.

Theinvolvementofarmedgroupsindrugtraffickinghasaggravatedtheongoingconflict.
This statement will be explained further on the next parts of this paper. This paper will explore
the relation between drugs and the ethnicarmedgroups,andtheirroleinthesaidconflict.Itwill
include the economic, social, and political impact of drug trafficking in Myanmar, and the
assessment of its drug policies. Moreover, this paper will evaluate the success and/or failure of
the peacebuilding and antidrug projects of the government, international organizations, and
other parties. Lastly, this paper will provide some recommendations on how Myanmar could
addresstheissuespresented.

II.HISTORYOFTHEETHNICCONFLICT

The conflict parties involved are the different ethnic armed groups and the government.
There are sixteen to seventeen ethnic armed groups, claiming to represent different ethnic
minorities (refer to the table below). They opposed the government with the goal of gaining
autonomyandassertingtheirrighttoselfdetermination(Tripathi,2014).

 Table2.ListofEthnicArmedGroups(Durand,n.d.)

These groups, the NSAIGs (NonState Armed Insurgent Groups), said to have emerged
after the split or disintegration of the CPB (Communist Party of Burma) in 1989 (Tripathi
2014) and intensified by the military authoritarian rule that came after the fall of the BSPP
government in 1988 (Ganesan 2015). We canseethatthestrifebetweenpartiesdidnotexistina
vacuum, but rather it is a conflict that was intensified through the time when different ethnic
minorities are denied of their rights through a military rule and laterexclusionfrompoliticsand
discrimination.

Before the emergence ofthesegroups,Myanmarhasalreadybeenexperiencingproblems

with the heterogeneity of ethnicity. Thiscanbetracedbackbeforetheirindependencein1948as
Great Britain, its former colonizer, failed to uniteareasinthehighlanddominatedbythediverse
ethnic minorities and the lowland areas controlled by the Burmans (Ganesan, 2014). And this
problem was especially felt after the British granted Myanmar its independence. Since its
independence in 1948, the country wasplaguedwithethnicconflictsandcivilwars,andfurther
worsened after the military coup in 1962 when minority rights were further curtailed (Kramer,
2015),resultingtothedifferentethnicarmedgroupsweknowtoday.

Up to the present, these ethnic minority groups felt discriminated, marginalized, and
deprived of their ethnic rights. This lead to a great mistrust towards their Burman dominated
government. And we can see this in the difficulty to process the Nationwide Ceasefire
Agreement (NCA). The Thein Sein government aimed to let all the sixteen armed groups sign
the agreement but only managed to get eight to sign it. According to Ganesan (2015), there are
two reasons why they have been unsuccessful. First is because of theongoingfightbetweenthe
Myanmar military and the armed groups. Second is the unwillingness of the army, who are
influential in the executive, to include the different groups to the ceasefireprocessandthesame
withthearmedgroupsthemselves,atleastgiventheircurrentsituation.

Their unwillingness and mistrust is telling of the way theycouldhavebeentreatingeach

other, the army in particular, outside the context of combat. In termsofpolicy,ethnicminorities
perceive the military governments Burmanization of policy. This translatedintorepressionof
theethnicgroupsculturalrightsandreligiousfreedom(Kramer2015).

As stated above, Myanmar has experienced years and years ofwar.Also,itismentioned

that it created mistrust between the National Army andthedifferentethnicarmedgroups.Along
the periphery of the core conflict between the two are conflicts between ethnic minorities
themselves. Regardless who are fightingorinconflict,theburdenisontheothers thosewho
are part of theethnicminoritiesbutarenotengagedintakinguparms.Forexample,peoplefrom
different countries may perceive the Karen people as rebels fighting the government of
Myanmar. However, there are the other Karens who are victimized by the conflict itself
(Renard, 2013). According to UNOCHA, there are currently 100,000 internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in Kachin and northern Shan states because of the ongoing armed conflict
[approximately] 400,000 IDPs in the conflictaffected areas in the southeastern region of
Myanmar, in the Kayah, Karen, and Mon states 120, 000 seek refuge in Thailand and some

30,000 crossed to China (Kramer, 2015). If the armed ethnic groups represent these ethnic
groupsastheyclaimed,thentheycouldusethesesituationstojustifytheircause.

Aside from their lack of influence in decisionmaking, lack of economic and social
development in their respective, and lack of trust between parties, land rightshasalsobecomea
concern to the ethnic minorities (Kramer,2015).Forthepastsixtyyears,thecentralgovernment
has been confiscating lands in ethnic areas. Recently, farmers have been protesting because of
landgrabbinghappeninginthecentralpartsofMyanmar.

Below isacomprehensivediagramexplainingtheconflictdynamicsinMyanmarsourced
out from the Conflicts in Myanmar: A systemic approach to conflict analysis and
transformationbyLaurenDurand(n.d.).

III.DRUGTRAFFICKINGINMYANMAR

A. DrugProductioninMyanmar

As stated above,inhistory,theBritishcolonydividedBurmaintotworegions:theBurma
Proper and the Periphery wherein the Burma Proper is the central government while the
Periphery consists of the local areas such as the Shan state (Durand, n.d.). Discriminatory

national policies were employed against the Periphery thus, the people resisted and foughtback
for their rights (Durand, n.d. Othman, 2004). When the British left Burmain1948,thedivision
betweenthegovernmentandethnicgroupsdidnotdisappearbutonlyworsened.

Drug production in Myanmar is a direct outcome of poverty and the exclusion of the
peripheral States from the political affairs of the center (ALTSEAN, 2004). Many ethnic armed
groups use drugtraffickingtoaggravatetheirfightagainsttheBurmesegovernment.Beingaway
from the city center, some ethnic armed groups use it for livelihood in order to buy food and
weapons (Othman, 2004 Kreutzmann, 2007). In short, survival islargelydependentonthedrug
production business (Othman, 2004 Sarno, 2009). Efforts on the eradication of drugtrafficking
have not been successful in Myanmar because the root cause of the predicament has not been
solved yet, and institutions like the SPDC are involved in the drug trafficking which tries to
maintain a symbiotic relationshipwiththedruglordsandtriestopreservenationalstabilitysince
theonesinvolvedindrugtraffickingareethnicarmedgroups(Othman,2004).

Myanmar is known to be the largest producer of methamphetamines in Asia and the

second largest exporter and producer of heroinintheworld(Chin,2009Meehan,2011).Heroin
is produced in the fields of Shan State since 92% of opium is grown in that area (ALTSEAN,
2004). Five reasons why it is desirable for Burmese people to cultivate opium are: (1) opium
cultivationisacceptedinMyanmarasawayoflife,(2)Myanmarisaconduciveenvironmentfor
heroin production, (3) the form of government provides conditions wherein illicit drug
trafficking information are kept, (4) the economic situation in Myanmar have developed these
shadow economies, and (5) international influence (such as the British colonial rule) and
opportunities (international demand for these drugs) also has effects on drug production
(Othman,2004).

Heroin production undergoes four stages, which are harvest, refinement,domestictransit
and international transit (ALTSEAN, 2004). The process of harvesting involves the tending of
opium fields from October until its harvest in the late February or early March.Farmersdrythe
opium after to lower its water content and sold to local merchandise wholesaler. Next, opium
refinement involves the processingwithothersubstancestobecomeheroinwhenanordercomes
through. Militias such as the UWSA then takeplacetotransportheroinfromtherefineriesanda
UWSA flag or logo in the front window of the cab gives them free passage through official
checkpoints (ALTSEAN,2004:56).Theinternationaltransitstageisthetransportofheroininto
different regional countries such as North America, East Asia and Australia. The routes for
transport are mainly through Southern China, Northwest India, Thailand and the borders of
Myanmar(ALTSEAN,2004).

 Although there has been a considerable decline in the production of heroin, a probable
cause is not mainly based on the prohibitive policies of the SPDC but based on the shift to
methamphetamine production (ALTSEAN, 2004). This caused a decline also in the cost of
heroinwhichisbefore200,000bahtperkgto120,000bahtperkg(ALTSEAN,2004).

Methamphetamine is a type of Amphetamine TypeStimulants(ATS).Itisalsotwotimes
stronger than standard amphetamines and the effects of the high lasts longer than usual
(ALTSEAN, 2004). Other potent types of ATS include ecstasy and ice (also known as shabu in
the Philippines). The production of methamphetamine has emerged because these stimulants
proved to be a great alternative for heroin since it is cheap, easy to produce and transport
(ALTSEAN 2004). Production of these substances involves three different stages, which are
precursorchemicals,manufactureandregionaltransit(ALTSEAN,2004).

The first stage is mainly about the precursor chemicals, which are utilized for the
production of methamphetamine as a synthetic drug (ALTSEAN, 2004). These substances are
synthetic ephedrine, caffeine and ethylvanilin.Themanufacturestagecontainstheprocessingof
methamphetamine pills throughasmallmachine(ALTSEAN,2004).Thesemachinesonaverage
produce 800 pills a day. Compared to opium production, ATS production is relatively easier to
produce since no extensive manpower or expertise is needed in ATSproducing laboratories
(Sarno,2009).Lastly,theregionaltransitstageinvolvesthetransportofATStoThailandthrough
inaccessible jungle trails in small groups (ALTSEAN, 2004: 63). When it reaches the Thai
market, involvement of Burmese syndicates end. Some countries that import these Burmese
manufactured ATS are Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,Singapore,Taiwan,Vietnam
andSwitzerland.

B. TheGoldenTriangle

The Golden Triangle, which is the center of opium and methamphetamine production
(Chin 2009 Chouvy, 2013 Steinberg, 2010), refers to the delta between the Mekong River and
the Mae Sai River (Lijun, 2006). It is composed of mainland Southeast Asian countries such as
Myanmar, Thailand and Laos (Lijun, 2006). Myanmar focused on the growing of poppies and
heroin production, Thailand on production of marijuana and amphetamines, and Laos on
cultivation and production of heroin. It flourished for years because the concentration on the
triborder region, which is mountainous, has heavy monsoon rains and lacks transportation,
protectedthedrugproductionfromthegovernmentandantidrugagencies(Chouvy,2013).

The Golden Triangle began a hundred years ago whenArabtradersbroughtopiumtothe
region (Othman, 2004). Since the British colonized Myanmar, the British East India Company
has found that the drug market inMyanmarisveryprofitable(Renard,1996,Boucad&Boucad,

1992 cited in Othman, 2004 Sarno, 2009). Since the early 1950s to 1990s, theGoldenTriangle
is where most of the worlds illegal opium is accumulated, however, Afghanistan has surpassed
itsdrugproduction(Chouvy,2013).

In the late 1980s, the Golden Triangle is 100,000 sq. kilometers in size which produces
80100 tons of heroin. Three main armies protect the tradeintheGoldenTriangle:theKMT,Lo
HsingHan, and the Khun Sa (Lijun, 2006). However, these armies collapsed and wereseverely
batteredbythegovernmentofMyanmar.

In the 1990s, the Golden Triangle continued to expandanditssizedoubledwith200,000
sq. kilometers, whichencompassesanapproximateof3,000townsandvillages(Lijun,2006).Its
main production base is the Shan State, which is Myanmars largest region and is uncontrolled
by the government (Lijun, 2006). New armies also emerge (mostly from the former Peoples
Army of Burma Communist Party (BCP)) during this time: (1) the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) which evolved from the Northeast Military Region, (2)
the Mongu National Protection Army (MNPA) whichbranchedfromtheKokantAllianceArmy,
(3) the New Democratic Army(NDA),Kachin,whichwasfromthe101MilitaryRegion,(4)the
National DemocraticAllianceArmy(NDAA),whichcamefromthe815MilitaryRegion,(5)the
Kachin Protection Army (not necessarily related to BCP) which was formed in January 1991,
and last but not the least, (6) the Myanmar National Solidarity Army (MNSA) or United Wa
StateArmy(UWSA)fromtheCentralMilitaryRegion(Lijun,2006).

C. TheGovernment,EthnicMilitiasandDrugTrade

Myanmar has very strong cultural identities possessed by different minority groups,
which are based partly on their region. This strong sense of identity has led to division and
segregation among these minority groups (Othman, 2004), which resulted in the internal armed
conflict in Myanmar. These antagonisms have hindered the necessary unity amongtheBurmese
people in order to solve its serious social predicaments, andthatleavethewayopentomilitary
dictatorshipsasseemingtobeperhapstheonlyviableformofgovernment(Othman,2004:39).

The problem of the ethnic groups and armed militias in Myanmar is to find financial
backing for their armed struggle against the military junta (Lintner, 2000). Inordertofundtheir
activities, Kachin insurgents took control of thejademiningbusinessaroundHpakaninthewest
part of the Kachin state. On the otherhand,inShanState,therewasnosimilareconomythatthe
Shan people can exploit. Opium was the only readily available commodity for
incomegeneration(Lintner,2000).

 The United Wa State Army has been known to be the largest narcotics producing
organization in SoutheastAsia(ALTSEAN,2004).ItwascreatedfromtheunionofNorthernWa
(at Panghsang) and Sourthern Wa troops (at Mong Yawn) (ALTSEAN, 2004). Its members
ranges from 20,00025,000, the largest among other armies. ATS production commenced in the
Wa region and sold in Thailand and China (Sarno, 2009). The UWSA is among those heavily
armed ethnic groups treated as a business and military partner by the government through
ceasefire agreements (Steinberg, 2009). In exchange for battling other political insurgents, the
UWSA is allowed to invest its money in the legal economy (ALTSEAN, 2004). Later on, the
UWSA also engaged inothershadoweconomiessuchasarmstrade,sellingofcounterfeitDVDs
andcigarettes(ALTSEAN,2004).

Other ethnic militias benefiting from drug trafficking are the Myanmar National
DemocraticAllianceArmy(MNDAA)andtheDemocraticKarenBuddhistParty(DKBA).

The Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army was formed in the Kokang region by SLORC
intelligence Chief Lt Gen. Khin Nyunt with LoHsingHan,formerKKYcommanderinKokang
and semiretired opium dealer of the Golden Triangle (ALTSEAN, 2004). It came from the
Northeast MilitaryRegion.Itdominatesabout1,960sq.kilometersoftheSpecialRegionIofthe
Shan State which is situated between the Mekong and Salween Rivers (Lijun,2006).In2000,it
possesses more than 11,000 hectares of land for cultivation of opium and produces 160 tons
annually(Lijun,2006).

The MNDAAs distinct characteristic compared to other insurgent groups is its
relationshipwiththeethnicChinesewarlordsintheKokangregionandtheChineseauthoritiesin
Yunnan. Despite this special relationship with the Chinese authorities Yunnan,theMNDAAhas
notbeengrantedcompleteimmunityondrugshipmentsintoSouthernChina(ALTSEAN,2004).

Similar to UWSA, despitehavingpronouncedthattheMNDAAisassistingtheeffortsod
the government in opium eradication, its main objective is still to protect its narcotics empire
(ALTSEAN,2004).

The Democractic Karen Buddhist Army was organized in December 1994 and it was
divided into four brigades: the 333 Brigade, 777 Brigade, and the 999 Brigade. This insurgent
groups relationship with the Tatmadaw is complicated and mostly, it is dependent on the
Tatmadaw for weapons and uniforms wherein they serve as support for government affairs and
operations (ALTSEAN, 2004). The actions of the DKBA, however, show that they are more
interested in personal power and loot than anything else, but there are also those who want to
protectKarenpeoplefromtheSPDCsabusesasmuchastheycan(ALTSEAN,2004:78).

 In terms of drug trafficking, like the UWSA,DKBAhasthepermitfromthegovernment

to have logging operations and also smuggling in drugs like opium and methamphetamines
(ALTSEAN, 2004). It is said that Tatmadaw, UWSA and DKBA are connivingsincefactspoint
out thattheheadquartersoftheTatmadawsMilitaryIntelligenceBattalion25(MI25)issituated
next to the DKBA headquarters. Also, the UWSA base is also located on the same street
(ALTSEAN,2004).

IV.EFFECTSOFDRUGTRAFFICKING

Myanmar is known as the second largest opium producer in the world next to
Afghanistan1, and the main source of worlds yaba2. Opium is a bitter brownish addictive
narcotic drug that consists of the dried latexobtainedfromimmatureseedcapsulesoftheopium
poppy3. Yaba, on the other hand, is a Thai term for methamphetamine pill or the crazy
medicine.

Despite its illegality, many people still choose to engage in drugs. Poverty is one ofthe
major reasons why many continue to participate in drug production. A large part of Myanmars
population, especially those living in its borders, is opiumdependent. In 2015, around 173,000
households are involved in poppy cultivation.4 According tothesurveyconductedbytheUnited
Nations Office on Drugs andCrimeinMyanmar,thepoppyprovidesincometothefarmersina
shorter period of time compared to other crops.5 The profit coming from their poppy farms is
just enough for these householdstosecuretheirbasicneeds(food,shelter,education,health)and
to pay their debts. They also pay taxes to the local police, the Tatmadaw, and the armed group
controlling theregion(Lone2015).However,itmustbeclearedthatpoppyfarmersarenotdrug
dealers they are poverty stricken communities with very littlecentralgovernmentinfrastructure
like schools, clinics and electricity (ALTSEAN 2004).Itisthedrugtraffickers,notthefarmers,
who benefit mostindrugtrades.Infact,somefarmersfallvictimtodrugtraffickers,andendup
growing drug crops for low economic returns (UNRISD 1994). Even though they wanted to
shift to other alternatives, they have received no support from the central government. It has
failed to offer alternative sources of income to the farmers. Thisgivesthefarmersnochoicebut
tocontinuetendingtheiropiumfields.

Although the drug trade somehow benefit the marginalized sector, economic loss is still
inevitable.Someofitseffectsincludethedisplacementoflegalindustries,decreasecontrolover

1
U
NODCSoutheastAsiaOpiumSurvey2015
2
U
NODCTraffickingofMethamphetaminesfromMyanmarandChinatotheRegion
3
D
efinitionofopiumfromMerriamWebsterDictionary
4
U
NODCSoutheastAsiaOpiumSurvey2015
5
U
NODCSoutheastAsiaOpiumSurvey2015

the economy, and fiscal problems related to an inability to tax the drug economy (UNRISD
1994). This economic loss has also become the basis ofsomecallstolegalizetheproductionof
opium in order for the government to benefit from it. However, given the pressure from the
internationalcommunitytobanopiumproduction,thegovernmentdidnotconsidertheidea.

As already mentioned earlier, armed groups also gain profit from drugs. Armed groups,
especially from the Shan state, relied onincometheygetfromdrugstosurvive(Jelsma,Kramer,
and Ververst 2003). It has been their aid in buying food and firearms. They earn by taxing
farmers (usually in kind), providing armed escorts to opium caravans, providing sanctuary to
heroin laboratories, or setting up tollgates at important trade routes (Jelsma, Kramer, and
Ververst2003).TheUnitedWaStateArmyisanexample.Infact:

The UWSA has been demonized by the US and international media as the biggest
drugs armyintheworld.TheUWSAhasbeenaccusedoflargescaleinvolvementin
the opium and methamphetamine trade. [The UWSA is] a formidable force of
tribal soldiers dubbed by the US State Department as the worlds most heavily
armednarcotraffickers...(Jelsma,Kramer,andVerverst2003)

Even though this has been the case, the central government does not consider it as a threat to
nationalsecurity.

The said involvement of ethnic armed groups exacerbates theongoingconflict.Afterthe

ceasefire agreements, some armed groupshaveprioritizedlesstheirpoliticalobjectivesandhave
transformed into commercially motivated insurgents whose primary concern is profit over the
protection and development of their people (ALTSEAN 2004). However, they argue that they
are not the only one to blame. Even the counterinsurgency armed groups under the Tatmadaw
are involved in the illicit drug trade, and it has resulted to increasing general lawlessness and
chaosinShanstate(Verbruggen2016).

Health has also been a major concern in Myanmar in relation to the drug issue. The
country has the most number of HIV/AIDS cases in Southeast Asia, and intravenous drug use
(IDU) is seen as the major cause ofitsspread(ALTSEAN2004).Despitetheabsenceofreliable
data on the drug consumption in Myanmar, the continuous increase in the rate of HIV/AIDS
infection only shows that drug abuse is tremendous among its population. The poor health
services offered by the government also adds up to this health problem. The drug tradehasalso
been blamed for the growing drugconsumptionanduserpopulation,andtheincreasinglevelof
HIVinfectioninitsneighboringcountries(ALTSEAN2004).

 Aside from health concerns, Myanmars drug trade also poses another threat to
international security. Drug trades go beyond producing and selling drugs both in the domestic
and international market. Largescale drug traders often expandtheirbusiness.Theyutilizetheir
resources to engage in arms trade with transnational syndicates, human trafficking and money
laundering,makingtheirprofitmuchbigger(ALTSEAN2004).

It would be an understatementforacountrytotreattheissueondrugsassimpleandeasy
to eradicate. It is more complicated than it seems. If not given enough attention and serious
dedication,thiscouldleadtoamuchworseproblemsuchasterrorism.

On the next section of this paper, we will look on how thegovernment,theinternational

community, and other groups responded to the situation. Its drug policies and peacebuilding
projects will be assessed according totheireffectivityandlimitations.Toconcludethepaper,we
will provide some recommendations that would fillinthegapswehaveidentifiedinMyanmars
approachtosolveitsissuesondrugsandethnicconflict.

V.ACTIONSTAKENBYTHEGOVERNMENTTOATTEMPTTOSOLVEDRUG
TRAFFICKINGANDETHNICCONFLICT

After reading the effects of drug trafficking, and its impact on the ongoing ethnic
conflictinMyanmar,wecouldsaythatthedrugtradehasbeendetrimentaltodevelopmentofthe
country as a whole. The government of Myanmar has taken actions and adopted policies to
counter this problem. But after years and years of trying, we could say that the current policies
they used hasbeenineffective.Thus,therearepressures,specificallyfromtheUnitedNations,to
rethinkontheirpolicies.

A.DrugPolicies

The current drug policies are labeled repressive and outdated, with an ineffective focus
on arresting drug users and eradicating poppy fields (Kramer, 2016). These policies are based
on The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law (1993) as it sets up the main
framework, and The Rules relating to Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1995) as it
defines the specific details on how the 1993 drug law should be implemented (Transnational
Institute, 2015). The 1993 drug law creates, as stated in chapter 3, number 4, the Central Body
forthepreventionoftheDangerofNarcoticDrugsandPsychotropicSubstances.

The Central Body is responsible for every aspect of the drug policies and programmes
they would lay down. According to law, it would be the directing body and oversight of these
policies, and over the regional and working bodies that would carrythemout(Chapter3and4).

The 1993 drug law continues onwithchaptersandprovisionsonregistration,medicaltreatment,

rehabilitation,search,arrest,andseizure(Chapters5,6,and7).

Thedisputeonthe1993druglaw,and1995rulesondrugs,startsonchapter8,discussing
the offences and the matching penalties each awaits. Various articleswouldcriticizeMyanmars
drug policies based on this part of the law. Below are some of the provisionsunderchapter8of
the1993druglaw:

A drug user who fails to register at the place prescribed by the Ministry of Health (as
discussed on Chapter 5) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extendfromaminimumof3yearstoamaximumof5years.

Whoever is guilty of any of the following acts shall, on conviction be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extendfromaminimumof5yearstomaximumof10
yearsandmayalsobeliabletoafine:

a. Cultivation of poppy plant,cocaplant,cannabisplantoranykindofplantwhichthe

MinistryofHealthhas,bynotificationdeclaredtobeanarcoticdrug
b. Possession, transportation, distribution and sale without permission under thisLaw
of materials, implements and chemicals which the relevant Ministry has, by
notification declared to be materials used in the production of a narcotic drug or
psychotropicsubstance
c. Possession, transportation, transmission and transfer of a narcotic drug or
psychotropicsubstance
d. Transfer of anarcoticdrugorpsychotropicsubstancebyapersonwhopossessesthe
samewithpermissioninaccordancewithlawtoapersonwhoisnotsopermitted
e. Inciting, inducing, deceiving, coercing, using undue influenceoranyothermeansto
causeabuseofanarcoticdrugorpsychotropicsubstance
f. Misappropriating, causing to disappear, destroying, removing or transferring any
propertywhichhasbeenseizedorattachedunderthisLaw

The problem with the law, like some of the articles (Kramer, 2016 Transnational
Institute, 2015)wouldsuggest,isthatthelawsanctionsaheavypenaltynotmatchingtheoffence
such as on possession of drugs. This leads to mass incarceration. Kramer (2016) used the
provisions above as an example in his article. Three to five years, or five to ten years of
imprisonment as penalty seems unfair for the offence of not registering, or possession of small
amount of drugs. The 1917 Burma Excise Act is another law that establishes the foundationfor
sanctioning penalties for cases concerning alcohol and intoxicating drugs, including cannabis

(Transnational Institute, 2015). Under the said law, possession of needles by nonmedical
personnelisacrime(Kramer,2016).

The intensity of these laws and policies was perhaps a product of the pressure drawn
from the 1998 ASEAN meeting wherein the countries agreed to be drugfree by 2020,andlater
moved it to 2015. However, Myanmar set the pressure even higher through its 15year Drug
Eradication Plan in 1999, targeting the country to be drugfree by 2014 (TransnationalInstitute,
2015). This deadline mentality has given the ASEAN memberstates the illusion that they are
doing something to address the drug problem (Kramer, 2016). Because of such pressures,
Myanmar is pushed to continue whatever actions it has taken to counter its drug problem. And
theseactionsaremanifested,again,becauseofthe1993druglaw.Operatingundertheruleofthe
repressive SLORC and later the SPCDC, it was said that such law was designed more for
international show than as a legal basis for pursuing effective drug suppression (ALTSEAN,
2004).

Basically, the three laws, namely: 1)The1917BurmaExciseAct,2)TheNarcoticDrugs

and Psychotropic Substances Law (1993), and 3) The Rules relating to Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1995), are ineffective and has led tomassincarceration,matchedwith
unjust and heavy penalties on the convicts. Such laws criminalize drug use butfailtoofferlong
term solution to the drug problem. The high number of people imprisoned with long term
sentences has put pressure on prisons, further burningouttheirresourcesforotheraspectsofthe
law (e.g. rehabilitation, medical center,etc.) (Transnationalinstitute,2015). Aslongastheyfail
to see drug trafficking as a health issue or a problem stemming out from poverty, they will
continueongoingthroughthesameloopwithincreasingintensityfromtheirproblems,including
theethnicconflict,athand.

The drug policies mentioned above victimize the poor population in the periphery. Poor
farmers are resorting to cultivating opium to cope with their poor condition to get their basic
needs (Transnational Institute, 2015). These farmers face five to ten years in prison if ever
caught. Given their poor conditions, far away from the center,someofthemwouldresorttothis
kind of business. Opium has also been part of their culture. They use it as an offering in
ceremonies like funeral and marriages (Kramer, 2016). They also use opium as painkiller and
treatmenttodiarrhea(Kramer,2016TransnationalInstitute,2015).

International actors are also doing their part in trying to build sustainable peace in the
country. In terms of security, international actors such as USA are giving financial aid to the
Burmese government to propagate its antidrugs policies and eradicate drug and trafficking.
However, efforts on drug eradication have not been successful since the military government is
particularly having a symbiotic relationship with the producers of drugs. Also, the Burmese

governmentissaidtobeusingthedrugsproblemasexcusetogetfinancialaidfrominternational
actors(ALTSEAN,2004).

B.PeacebuildingProjects

So what about the ethnic conflict? What steps should be taken to solve both the drug
problem and the conflict, and possibly poverty? Though Myanmar could continue on using the
military approach, it should alsoconsiderpoliticalreconcilliation(ALTSEAN,2004).According
to ALTSEAN in their book Failing Grade (2004), they recommended that the government of
Myanmar should give recognition to the Shan state, the region where most of the drugs are
produced. But why stop there? Right now there are numerous ethnic armed groups in the
periphery,andbytheborderiswherethedrugtradeismostactive.

The Myanmar governmentshouldmakepeacewiththesearmedgroupsandtogetherthey
could rid of drugs and poverty all together in the country. Currently there are a number of
peacebuilding projecs initiated by the government, by actors in civil society such as CSOs and
CBOs, and by international organizations like the United Nations and the Worldbank. Their
projects and programmes can be classified into four categories depending on the strategy they
adapted to achieve peace: security, political transtion, development, and social rehabilitation
(Jeong, 2005). Though, the peacebuilding activities listed below are meant to address the direct
violenceoftheconflict.

Government

The government has initiated some programs and establishedinstitutionstoaddresstheir
conflict with the countrys diverse ethnic minorities,allthroughtheMyanmarPeaceCenter.The
Myanmar Peace Center which was inaugurated in October 2012 in Yangon. Itcurrentlyserves
as the governmets vehicle for negotiating meeting with ethnic armedgroupsinordertoachieve
longtermaccomodationandpeace(Ganesan2014).

MPC implemented peacebuilding projects such as the following: 1) the Ceasefire
Negotiation and Implementation, which facilitates the governments ceasefire initiatives with
ethnic armed groups. And 2) the Peace Dialogue Programme, that focuses on undertaking
preparatoryworkforpoliticaldialoguebeweenthestakeholders.(MyanmarPeaceCenter,n.d.).

As we know, Myanmar is moving towards a more democraticgovernmentsointermsof
political transition, the government have been trying to include more people as possible in the
peace process through consultations of the wider public and coordination with all the
stakeholders. The government have implemented Public Outreach Programme and Public
Diplomacy to garner public support and participation in the peace process (Myanmar Peace
Center, n.d.). TheOfficeofPublicDiplomacy,willalsoassuretransparencyontheactivitiesand
targetsoftheMPC(Gaesan,2014).


The Peace Building Operations Cooperation, on the other hand, aims to get confidence
from stakeholders in the peace process and democratic transition by developing strategies for
wellcoordinated, conflict sensitive peacebuilding programs and development and humanitarian
assitance(MyanmarPeaceCenter,n.d.)

And all of these projects are guided by the established Legal Support Office that takes
care the legal aspect of the peacemaking process (Myanmar Peace Center, n.d.). Throughout its
existence the MPC had its setbacks but it is, as for now, Myanmars strongest bet to achieve
peace as it isdifferentfromotherorganizationswithinthecountry,asitisaccountabledirectlyto
thePresidentofMyanmarandthegovernment(Ganesan,2014).

CivilSociety

In the article Civil Society Contributions to Myanmars Peace Process (Lahtaw et al,
2014) there are actions taken by Myanmars civil society organizations (CSOs) and
communitybased organizations (CBOs) that are potentially can be classified as a form of
peacemaking,peacekeeping,andevenpeacebuilding.

ListofCSOsandCBOs:
YangonbasedKarenDevelopmentNetworks
GaiaSustainableManagementInstitute(GSMI)
KarenAffairsCommittee
NewGenerationShanState
KayahStatePeaceMonitoringNetworks
ChinPeaceandTranquilityCommittee
WomensPeaceNetwork
TheKachinPeaceNetwork
PeaceNetwork
SittaungThansin(CBO)

In the context of a Nationwide CeasefireAgreement,theseCSOsandCBOsareactiveas
ceasefire monitors, researchers, advocates of justice andwomensrightsintheirspecificconflict
areas. The CSOs and CBOs, at this point, can be said to have adapted a peacemaking and,
especially, peacekeeping (ceasefire monitoring) functions in their respected areas and the same
shouldgowithpeacebuilding.

For example,TheGaiaSustainableManagementInstitutebasedinYangonhaveprovided
participatory awareness training, sustainable development advocacy training, and local level
peace seminars. Whom according to Lahtaw etal.(2014)enhance(d)publicparticipationsuch
as civilian ceasefire monitor. These are potential peacebuilding projects because the nature of
the projects is participatory, based on the local level, in the conflict area and is conducive to
building trust and confidence within the region. The Sittaung Thansin, a local CBO for
peacebuilding in the Bago region also does the same functions. The group conducts

awarenessraising campaigns to increase public participation in the current peace process and
otherpeacetrainingincollaborationwithnationalNGOs.

Another, based on the same article (Lahtaw et al., 2014), is the Chin Peace and
Tranquility Committee (CPTC) whoactedasafacilitatingbodybetweenthegovernmentandthe
Chin National Front (CNF). Can be classified as peacemaking but at the same time, potentially,
peacebuilding, since the group can act as an access to politics for the CNF oratleastanavenue
fortheirgrievances.

We still cannot assess whether these peace projects are successful or not because of the
ongoing conflicts still happening in specific areas or regions but we could say that they have
been successful so fare given some limitations. Namely, 1) history of a repressive military
government, 2) hostile environment, given theyareworkingwithintheconflictarea,and3)their
lack of direct links to the peace table whichmakesitinconvenientforthemtocoordinatewith
thegovernment(Lahtawetal.,2014).

InternationalActors

To alleviate poverty, there is the UN Development Programme, providing support the
national and socioeconomic reforms that underpin the countrys transition towards a
government with strong yet democratic institution (United Nations Development Programme,
2012).

The WorldBankalsotookthedevelopmentroutebysupportingreformsthatwillbenefit
all of the people of Mayamar includingthatunderpinthecountrystransition.TheWBG,orthe
World Bank Group, used a full country strategy which they called the CPF, or Country
Partnership Framework, from 1984 to its completion in 2015. The CPF focuses on three areas:
1) Reducing rural poverty, 2) Investing in social services and state institutions to empower its
people, and 3) Supporting a dynamic private sector to create jobs. ThroughtheCPF,WBGcan
support Myanmar and its people in transforming their country, reducing extreme poverty and
boostingsharedprosperity(TheWorldBankGroup,2016).

C.FailedPeacemakingActivities

Little effort was made to manage the ethnic conflict in Myanmar even after gaining its
independence. Its seven ethnic states were left behind in terms of economic development. This
economic problem was further intensified by high exploitative industries such as mining and
loggingaswellasdrugproductionandtheirconsequentenvironmentaldamage(Cooper,2012).

This conflict issue was only given emphasis during President TheinSeinsleadership.In
his announcement last 2011, he has pledged to make the ethnic issue a national priority. The
following year, the government proposed for a nationwide ceasefire agreement. A unionlevel
peace team was created and it was headed by the president. It was made up of a central
committee for making policies associated with ceasefire negotiations (Burma News

International). The peace team created a ThreePhase Plan. This plan includes the following
stages:

In state level, ceasefire will be observed. Liason offices will be set up and conflicting
parties will be mandated to travel to each others territory without carrying arms. In the
union level, confidencebuildingwillbedone.Politicaldialoguewillalsobeanimportant
activity. Regional development tasks in terms of education, health and communication
will also be implemented. Lastly, ethnic armed groups will be required to sign an
agreementforeternalpeace.(BurmaNewsInternational)

Despite the efforts of the government to manage the ongoing conflict, ethnic armed
groups remained to be doubtful over the government's true motive. This is evident when only
eight of them agreed to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement in 2015. The other groups,
especially the larger ones such as the KIO, chose not to participate because of distrust to the
government. Theyclaimedthat"themilitaryhascontinuedtoattackorpositiontheirtroopsclose
to their bases" (Burma News International). Also, they believed that agreeing to these ceasefire
agreements would only be a winlose situation for them. Only the government would benefit
fromtheseandtherewouldbenoincentiveforthemiftheywouldsurrendertheirweapons.

Foreign observers shared the same sentiment. They thought that "the recent attempts at
peacemaking are merely a smokescreen and economic growth and development are the real
motivationoftheBurmeseturnaround"(Durandn.d.).

The fact that the conflict is still ongoing, we can say that the attempts to solve the
conflictthroughpeacemakingactivitiesdonebypreviousgovernmentsofMyanmarhadfailed.

VI.RECOMMENDATION

According to Galtung, thepeaceprocessshouldfocusonattainingbothnegativepeaceor

the absence of direct violence, and positive peace or the absence of structural violence. In the
case of Myanmar, evidence has shown that the previous governments have been so focused on
addressing direct violence. They overlooked the presence of structural violence suchaspoverty.
Poverty has been one of the major reasons why a large part of its population were forced to
engage in shadow economies, especially in drug trade. Even some of the ethnic armed groups
have involved themselves inthistypeofactivitythusresultingtothefurthercomplicationofthe
conflict. In order to eradicateopiumproduction,sustainabledevelopmentmustbethelongterm
goal(ALTSEAN,2004).

Most of the drug production occurs in the conflictaffected areas and by the border
(Kramer, 2016). Peacebuilding by means of development could be more effective, as far as the
ethnic conflict is concerned. Eradicating the poppy farms without making the conditions of the

opiumdependent population better would only result to the worsening of the conflictgiventhat
theyarelivingintheconflictaffectedareas(Kramer,2016).

As already been discussed, Myanmars antinarcotics policy hasprovenitself ineffective.
Criminalizing the offenders is not the way to go. It is time that they do away from mass
incarceration and unjust sanctions. Kramer (2016) has recommended ways to solve the drug
problem, and at the same time to avoid further conflict. He suggested to: (1) prioritize
alternative livelihood for poppy farmers so that they will no longerresorttoopiumcultivation
(2) provide voluntary treatment as a step to treating users as patients not criminals (3) focus
on using positive indicatorsthatreflectshumandevelopmentratherthannegativeindicators(e.g.
number of users arrested) (4) initiate harm reduction projects, decriminalize drug use, and
reduce sentence for other drugrelated offense (5) focus more on ATSrelated problem (e.g.
methampethamine) (6)allowresearchonthedrugtrendsinthecountryforbetterpoliciesand
lastly,(7)makethedrugproblemhighonthepeaceagenda.

Strategies and projects on empowering the Burmese people, regardless of which ethnic
group they belong, must be employed. Making peace andfindingcompromisewiththedifferent
ethnic armed groups could be the key in solving the drug problem. And drugs could become a
commonenemyinthiscase.QuotingALTSEAN(2004):

Renewing a genuinemovetowardsnationalreconcilliation wouldgrantmany
of the groups in the Shan State [or in any region]therecognitiontheydesire.
The necessity of revenue from thenarcoticstradewouldgraduallybewhittled
awayatthesametimeasthecentralgovernmentslegitimacyincreases.

Solving the drug problem alone or the ethnic conflict will not result to the end of the
other. If the country would be determinedtofinishboth,alongtermplanwithanalternativeand
anuancedapproachisrequiredtoendbothissue.

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APPENDIX 1. MAP OF MYANMAR AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES INVOLVED

INDRUGTRAFFICKING

(Source:http://apjjf.org/data/shan_state_map.png)