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BPI EXPRESS CARD
CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
RICARDO J. MARASIGAN.
FACTS: Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card
holder. His contractual relations with BPI went on
smoothly until October 1989, when his statement of
account amounting to P8,987.84 was not paid in due
time. BPI demanded immediate payment, and required
him to issue a check in favor of BPI, otherwise his card
will be suspended. Marasigan issued a post-dated check
(PDC) in favor of BPI.
BPI, having been informed of the PDC only a week after
receipt, already sent a letter to Marasigan, informing him
of the temporary suspension of the privileges of his card.
He was also told to refrain from using his card to avoid
any inconvenience/embarrassment and that unless he
settles his outstanding account within 5 days from receipt
of the letter, his membership will be permanently
cancelled.
On the other hand, confident that he had settled his
account with the issuance of the postdated check,
Marasigan invited some guests at Caf Adriatico (there is
also no showing that he received the letter from BPI
before he went to Caf Adriatico). When he presented
his credit card to paythe bill, the it was dishonored and
one of his guests paid the bill by using her own credit
card.
Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his
postdated check and to return the said check to him
because according to him, BPI violated their agreement
that once Marasigan issues the check to the to cover
his unpaid account, BPI will not suspend the
effectivity of the card.
Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI
before the trial court, and the trial court ruled in favor of
him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card
of the Marasigan
2. W/N the trial court and CA erred in holding BPI
liable for damages
HELD:
1. YES
2. YES
RATIO:
Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed
by Marasigan, any card with outstanding balances after
30 days from original billing shall automatically be
suspended. Marasigan admitted that he did not pay within
30 days for his original billing. BPI could automatically
suspend his credit card.
Even though there was an arrangement between the
parties (that upon issuance of a check, the card
wouldnt be suspended) the court found that
Marasigan was not able to comply with his obligation.
The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was
for the immediate payment of Marasigans outstanding
account, in order that his credit card would not be
suspended. As agreed upon by the parties, on the
following day, private respondent did issue a
check. However, the check was postdated 15
December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is
only a substitute for money and not money, the
delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself
operate as payment. This is especially true in the case
of a postdated check.
Thus, the issuance by the private respondent of the
postdated check was not effective payment. It did not
comply with his obligation under the arrangement
with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore justified in
suspending his credit card.
While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card, there is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt,
or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in
those instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which
he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff. In the case at bar, it was Marasigan's failure to
settle his obligation which caused the suspension of his
credit card and subsequent dishonor at Caf Adriatico.
MAYO vs PEOPLE
PRINCIPLE: MORAL DAMAGES
FACTS: Petitioner Mayo was charged with the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
with Multiple Serious, Less Serious, and Slight Physical

Injuries. This charge arose from an Information which
states that sometime in August of 1982 at 4pm, Mayo was
driving a Philippine Rabbit bus along the McArthur
Hway in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Private respondent (PR)
Linda Navarette, on the other hand, was aboard a
Mitsubishi Lancer along with several others including
two children. The Lancer was driven by June Navarette
and was cruising steadily at the right lane of the road
while the Rabbit bus was trailing closely behind the
Lancer. Behind the bus is a Tamaraw jeep. At first, the
Tamaraw jeep was ahead, followed by the Lancer, and
behind it is the Rabbit bus, all travelling towards Manila.
The Lancer as well as the Rabbit bus following one after
the other overtook the Tamaraw jeep. As the vehicles
approached the Mabalacat Institute, the Rabbit bus,
picked up speed and swerved to the left lane to overtake
the Lancer however an oncoming vehicle from the
opposite lane appeared and flashed its headlights to warn
the Rabbit bus to give way. The Rabbit bus then suddenly
swerved to the right in an effort to return to the correct
lane and avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle. In the
process however, it hit and bumped the left rear side of
the Lancer causing its driver to lose control of the wheel
and it swerved across the left lane and hit a bystander then
crashed against a concrete fence of another person. The
Lancer was heavily damaged and the passengers
including the driver sustained physical injuries in varying
degrees.
RTC RULING: Mayo was convicted and charged and
the civil aspect of the case was heard in the criminal case.
The complainants therein including PR Navarette were
awarded damages wherein the amount of moral damages
awarded to her was Php700,000.00 (while to others
ranged from 5k to 60k).
CA RULING: Mayo appealed with the CA which
affirmed the RTC Decision with the modification only
with respect to the imprisonment aspect. Mayos MR
denied, hence, the Petition.
Mayos contention was that the CA did not discuss the
specific factual circumstances which would justify the
award of arbitrary and exorbitant amount of moral
damages and instead stated only general terms.
The CA, on the other hand, cited the provisions of the
NCC, specifically Arts. 2217 and 2219 to justify the legal
basis of moral damages and based thereon concluded that
the amount is not excessive and is in accord with the law
and the facts of the case.
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ISSUE/s: The sole issue in this case is whether or not the
findings of the lower court justify the award of Php700k
as moral damages in favor of PR Navarette.
SC RULING: To arrive at its Decision, the SC examined
the records of the case and established that prior to the
accident, PR Navarette was an Economist by profession
and a graduate of BS Home Economics at UP. She was
an Asst VP and Resident Manager of Club Solviento in
QC as well as a Food consultant receiving a gross income
of Php17k. As a result of the accident, she suffered from
a permanent partial facial disfigurement and total loss of
vision of her right eye which was replaced by a false eye.
According to the doctor, PR Navarettes right eye could
not be saved since the right eyeball needed to be removed
as it was heavily lacerated and there was a necessity of an
artificial eye placement in the socket. Upon advice of her
doctor in Makati Med, she had to go to San Francisco,
USA for further treatment. She went twice to San
Francisco and incurred expenses around Php60k to 80k.
Furthermore, PR Navarette declared that she had a
boyfriend whom she lost after the accident. She broke
down over the misfortune and placed a value of her
mental, psychological, and moral sufferings in the
amount of Php500k as moral damages and asked the
lower court to double the amount making it Php1M
stating as reason that her boyfriend would have been her
lifetime partner and her guide of her eye forever had she
not lost him.
The foregoing findings form the only basis for the award
of moral damages in favor of PR Navarette by the RTC
and the CA.
RATIO PART: According to the SC, there is no
question that moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission. Moreover, Art.
2219 of the NCC provides that:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
1. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries.
2. Quasi-delicto causing physical injuries.
3. Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
4. Adultery or concubinage.
5. Illegal search.
6. Libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
7. Malicious prosecution.
8. Acts mentioned in article 309.
9. Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
SC agrees that PR Navarette is entitled to moral damages.
She suffered injuries as a result of the criminal offense by
Mayo. Moreover, her injuries resulting in a permanent
scar at her forehead and the loss of her right eye
undoubtedly gave her mental anguish, wounded feelings
and shock. The psychological effect on her as regards the
scar and her false eye must have devastated her
considering that women in general are fastidious on how
they look. More importantly, the loss of her eyesight
resulted to her giving up her job not only because of her
prolonged absences but because of the physical handicap
she suffered.
Nevertheless, the SC finds no justification to award moral
damages to PR Navarette for the loss of her boyfriend.
No doubt, the loss of her boyfriend after the accident
added to her mental and emotional sufferings and
psychologically affected and disturbed her. However,
there is no clear evidence on record to show that her
boyfriend left her after the accident due to her physical
injuries. He may have left her even if she did not suffer
the slightest injury. The reasons for the break-up of a
courtship are too many and too complicated such that
they should not form the basis of damages arising from a
vehicular accident. Moreover, granting that her boyfriend
left her due to her physical injuries, we still find no legal
basis for the award of moral damages in her favor because
of the loss of a boyfriend. Art. 2219 quoted above
enumerates cases wherein moral damages may be
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granted. Loss of a boyfriend as a result of physical
injuries after an accident is not one of them. Neither can
it be categorized as an analogous case.
Heading on to the propriety of the amount of Php700k as
moral damages, the SC ruled that the well-entrenched
principle is that moral damages depend upon the
discretion of the trial courts based on the facts and
circumstances of each case. This discretion is, however,
conditioned in that the amount awarded should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive so as to indicate
that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part
of the trial court. In determining the amount of moral
damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved
party and the gravity of the injuries must be considered.
Finally, moral damages are emphatically not intended to
enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant.
They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason
of the defendants culpable action.
Applying these principles in the instant case, the SC finds
that the award of Php700k as moral damages in favor of
PR Navarette is unconscionable and excessive. SC
further rejects Navarettes claim for Php1M for the loss
of her boyfriend. The SC notes that she asked for the
amount of Php500k as moral damages for her physical
injuries and therefore, the award for moral damages
should not exceed such amount. The SC rules that under
the circumstances of the instant case, the amount of
Php200k as moral damages in favor of PR Navarette is
reasonable, just and fair.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is partly GRANTED. The questioned decision of
the CA is MODIFIED in that the amount of Php700k as
moral damages granted to complainant Navarette is
reduced to Php200k.
Marikina Auto Line vs People
FACTS:
1. Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door
commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line
Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-

operator of a passenger bus, its employee, was
assigned as the regular driver of the bus.
2. At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto
was driving the passenger bus along Kamias
Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards
EDSA. The bus suddenly swerved to the right
and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon. Upon
Valdellons request, the court ordered Sergio
Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection
Officer of the City Engineers Office, to inspect
the damaged terrace.
3. He recommended that since the structural
members made of concrete had been displaced,
the terrace would have to be demolished "to keep
its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and
stability of the building."
4. In a letter addressed to the bus company and
Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of
P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt
thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the
terrace. he bus company and Suelto offered a
P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused.
5. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property
against Suelto. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, an Information was filed with the
RTC of Quezon City.
6. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint
against Suelto and the bus company for damages.
She prayed that after due proceedings, judgment
be rendered in her favor.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence
which resulted in the damage of Valdellons property
HELD:
1. Yes. Respondent People of the Philippines
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the
right with recklessness, thereby causing
damage to the terrace of private respondents
apartment.
RATIO:
Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as
it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this
in his answer to the complaint and when he testified
in the trial court.
Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to
the right of the road causing it to hit the column of
the terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were
burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of
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private respondent was not the fault of petitioner
Suelto. We have reviewed the evidence on record and
find that petitioners failed to prove that petitioner
acted on an emergency caused by the sudden
intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the
bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove
petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an
emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the
right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming
from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into the lane of the bus.
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the
prosecution that the commercial apartment of Dr.
Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus
being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable
that the said damages were not caused by a strong
impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that,
at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a
high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger
jeepney."
The damages could not have been caused except by
a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding,
he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a
full stop when he noticed the jeep. Were he more
prudent in driving, he could have avoided the
incident or even if he could not avoid the incident,
the damages would have been less severe.
The severe damages sustained could not have
resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and
prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as
he claims to be. What is more probable is that the
accused had to swerve to the right and hit the
commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he
could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast
in a usually crowded street.
Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC,
Doctrine:
When a carrier fails to establish any caso fortuito, the
presumption by law of fault or negligence on the part of
the carrier applies.
FACTS:
Carrier Eastern Shipping Lines Inc

Shipper/Consignee Stresstek Post Tensioning
Philippines Inc
Insurer - First Nationwide Assurance Corporation
Arrastre Operator E. Razon Inc. (not significant)
Eastern Shipping Lines Inc shipped uncoated 7-wire
stress relieved wire strand for prestressed concretewere
shipped on board the vessel "Japri Venture,". Upon
arrival at the port of Manila, it discharged thecargo to the
custody of the defendant E. Razon, Inc. from whom the
consignee's customs brokerreceived it for delivery to the
consignee's warehouse. First Nationwide Assurance,
indemnified theconsignee in the amount of P171,923.00
for damage and loss to the insured cargo, whereupon
theformer was subrogated for the latter. The insurer now
seeks to recover from the defendants what ithas
indemnified the consignee. The petitioner protested
alleging that it should not be hel liable to
answer for damages for the event that caused the rusting
of the goods was due to the encounteredvery rough seas
and stormy weather classified as force majeure, hence
relieving them of any liability.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a case against petitioner.
RTC dismissed the case
CA set aside RTCs decision and ordered petitioner to
pay respondent
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner was negligent and should be held liable
for the payment of damages.
HELD:
YES. Plainly, the heavy seas and rains referred to
in the master's report were not
caso fortuito, but normal occurrences that an ocean-going
vessel, particularly in the month of September which,
in our area, is a month of rains and heavy seas would
encounter as a matter of routine. They are not unforeseen
nor unforeseeable. These are conditions that ocean-going
vessels would encounter and provide for, in the ordinary
course of a voyage. That rain water (not sea water) found
its way into the holds of the Jupri Venture is a clear
indication that care and foresight did not attend the
closing of the ship's hatches so that rainwater would not
find its way into the cargo holds of the ship.
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Moreover, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
common carriers are bound to observe "extra-ordinary
vigilance over goods . . . .according to all circumstances
of each case," and Article 1735 of the same Code states,
to wit:
Art. 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned
in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if
the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as required in article 1733.
Since the carrier has failed to establish any caso
fortuito, the presumption by law of fault or negligence on
the part of the carrier applies; and the carrier must present
evidence that it has observed the extraordinary diligence
required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code in order
to escape liability for damage or destruction to the goods
that it had admittedly carried in this case. No such
evidence exists of record. Thus, the carrier cannot escape
liability.
The presumption, therefore, that the cargo was in
apparent good condition when it was delivered by the
vessel to the arrastre operator by the clean tally sheets has
been overturned and traversed. The evidence is clear to
the effect that the damage to the cargo was suffered while
aboard petitioner's vessel.
BORJAL V COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed
before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing
and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and
offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on
transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any
of the articles nor was the conference he was organizing.
The lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the
private respondent for damages which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. A petition for review was filed
before the SC contending that private respondent was not
sufficiently identified to be the subject of the published
articles.
Issue: Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to
constitute guilt of petitioners for libel.
Held: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that

he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended
party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. These requisites have not been complied
with in the case at bar. The element of identifiability was
not met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was the
organizer of said conference and had he not done so the
public would not have known.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in
the freedom of the press and that privileged
communications must be protective of public
opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means
that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to
a public official may be actionable, it must either be a
false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the
opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
The questioned article dealt with matters of public
interest as the declared objective of the conference, the
composition of its members and participants, and the
manner by which it was intended to be funded no doubt
lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with
public interest. Respondent is also deemed to be a public
figure and even otherwise is involved in a public issue.
The court held that freedom of expression is
constitutionally guaranteed and protected with the
reminder among media members to practice highest
ethical standards in the exercise thereof.
Filipinas Broadcasting vs. Ago Medical Center
FACTS:
Rima & Alegre were host of FBNI radio program
Expose. Respondent Ago was the owner of the Medical
& Educational center, subject of the radio program
Expose. AMEC claimed that the broadcasts were
defamatory and owner Ago and school AMEC claimed
for damages. The complaint further alleged that AMEC
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is a reputable learning institution. With the supposed
expose, FBNI, Rima and Alegre transmitted malicious
imputations and as such, destroyed plaintiffs reputation.
FBNI was included as defendant for allegedly failing to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its employees. The trial court found Rimas statements to
be within the bounds of freedom of speech and ruled that
the broadcast was libelous. It ordered the defendants
Alegre and FBNI to pay AMEC 300k for moral
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot
experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or
moral shock. Nevertheless, AMECs claim, or moral
damages fall under item 7 of Art 2219 of the NCC.
This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral
damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Art 2219 (7) does not qualify whether the
plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of defamation and
claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast
is libelous per se, the law implied damages. In such a
case, evidence of an honest mistake or the want of
character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in
mitigation of damages. In this case, the broadcasts are
libelous per se. thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award P500,000 moral damages
unreasonable. The record shows that even though the
broadcasts were libelous, per se, AMEC has not suffered
any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages to
P150k.
v JOIN TORT FEASORS are all the persons who
command, instigate, promote, encourage, advice
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of
a tort, as who approve of it after it is done, for its benefit.