10 Chapter 5

Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response (1984-1992)
Chapter- 5
Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response

(Operation Blue Star and The Aftermath: 1984-1992)
A dominant identity seeking subjugation, assimilation or submergence of other

identities and self assertion of a non-dominant identity, seeking a share in the state
power, controlled by the former is inherently imbued with the risk (and potential) of
violence (Behra, 2000:29). In such a volatile situation, in the event of state power
becoming increasingly ineffective to contain ethnicity politicaly, violence esclates
(Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:371). Such an esclation at many a times especially in
South Asian states have witnessed an increasing use of sophisticated military
hardware both by the state apparatus as well as by the ethnic insurgents, sidetracking
the moderate leadership of the community (Phadnis and Ganguly, 2001:371). As long
as neither side gives in, the inbuilt potential of violence endures. Much of this
violence consists of the use of visible physical force. Violence by state and minority
groups mutually reinforces each other in an extraordinary way. When the state
unleashes its coersive power to suppress a political movement the entire community
bears the brunt of state violence (Behra, 2000: 26). This strengthens the psychological
bonds of the community and also vindicates its own use of violence against the state.
Likewise an identities indiscriminate use of violence; particularly terrorism against
the state as well as the general public, legitimizes the governments rationale to
suppress the uprisings by force (Behra, 2000: 26).
While violence comes into play it narrows down the space for political
accommodation between the two. It makes an identity more exclusive which in turn
makes the tone of its demands more strident and a political compromise becomes
increasingly difficult. The state on the other hand loses political legitimacy by
excessive reliance on coersive means (Behra, 2000: 27). Anthony D. Smith has
accorded central role to the problem of legitimacy arising out of the institution of the
scientific state. He argues that the displacement of the religiously sanctioned
dynastic state by the scientific state lead to a moral crisis (Smith, 1981:78). Here
Ishtiaq Ahmed argues that the conflicts at different scales taking place within a state
need not be interpreted necessarily as destabilizing anti-national forces bent upon
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destroying the country. On the contrary these should be considered as constituting

the very stuff out of which a nation- state will get galvanized (Ahmed, 1995:28).
In this chapter it has been analysed that how the state on its part had pursued a
policy of resistance and confrontation in countering the violent Sikh assertions. Were
the repressive and coercive tactics of state bureaucracy and para-military apparatus
were responsible for suppression of movement or loss of peoples support resulted in
its decline? In what way the state was able to contain the movement in a short span of
two or three years, which was hanging on for past so many years. It has been failure
on the part of state institutions to contain and solve such issues which later had gone
out of control. In order to cover-up its misadventures and incapacity the state had
often responded in violent manner to reinforce its legitimacy. The state had
responded by suppression through its ruthless state machinery: bureaucratic and
military setup, law enforcing agencies, special forces and new laws, rules and
regulations to cope with the situations. Inapt handling of these ethnic assertions by the
state had kept the grievances festering and at the same time it had given a chance to
foreign interests in fuming up of these ethnic assertions. Either external support has
come by supporting their demands as legitimate ones or clandestine help through
smuggling of weapons, money and even mercenaries. At the international level,
human rights groups had often questioned the working of state authority countering
these ethno-national upsurges as common masses are on target on both sides.
Operation Blue Star: Its Repercussions

In a late night address to the nation on June 2, 1984 over the electronic media,
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi dwell at great length on the grim situation prevailing in
Punjab. She held the Akali leaders responsible for the failure of long series of talks
with the government. Already on June 2, 1984 the army was called in Punjab and was
given the task of checking and controlling the Sikh militancy and ethnic violence. A
thirty six hours curfew was imposed all over Punjab (Kumar, Suneel, 2007: 171).
Publications and transmission of material which might had the adverse effect on
ethnic passions was prohibited under the Punjab Press Special Power Act (Rai, 1986:
330). On June 3, 1984 the Indian army launched Operation Blue Star against the
Sikh militants holding in the Golden Temple complex and thirty eight other
gurudwaras throughout the state.
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Troops equipped with tanks and heavy armour took up strategic positions
around the Golden Temple. A large number of pilgrims had gathered on that day to
pay obeisance and participate in the special program to mark the anniversary of
martyrdom of Guru Arjan Dev. According to one estimate there were ten thousand
pilgrims including a large jatha of thirteen hundred volunteers who had come to
court arrest regarding Dharmyudh Morcha (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:336). In the first
phase of Operation Blue Star the Akali leaders inside the Golden Temple were
flushed out and detained. The impending military action in the bastion of Sikhism
prompted the agitated Sikh peasantry. It converged upon Amritsar in large numbers.
Army tanks blocked the movement of about 30,000 Sikhs near Amritsar and many
were killed in the action (Singh and Nayar, 1984: 100). As such the government
feared the outbreak of a Sikh uprising and decided to launch a full scale attack on
Darbar Sahib. The army took control of the Golden Temple on June 6. A large
number of innocent pilgrims including women and children, officially described as
the enemy, were killed in the heavy gun-fire. The troops shot scores of young Sikh
men with their hands tied back at point-blank range (Waraich, 2010:19-21).
Governments White Paper on Punjab Agitation puts the figure at five hundred and
fifty four civilians/militants killed and one hundred and twenty one injured in the
Golden Temple area and other religious places. On the army side a total of four
officers, four JCOs and eighty four other ranks died while fifteen officers, nineteen
JCOs and two hundred and fifty three other ranks sustained injuries in the course of
entire operation in the state (White Paper, Government of India: 1984). The exact
figures are not avaliable as different soures give different amount of casualities. Most
of the accounts put the number of civilian causalities around five thousand and seven
hundred military personal were estimated to have lost their life duing the army action
(Grewal, 1990:227). The bombs fired by the artillery and armour brought down the
edifice of the Akal Takht; the seat of Sikh temporal power. Bhindranwale got killed
in the Operation Blue Star. The bodies of Bhindranwale, Shabegh Singh and Amrik
Singh, ridden with bullets were found at the basement of the Akal Takht. Officers of
the Indian army had commented that Bhindranwale and his followers had fought with
courage and commitment (Punjabi, 1991:23). Even Sikh Reference Library situated
in the premises of Golden Temple was deliberately set on fire by the Indian army
troops (Pettigrew, 1995: 35)
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The entire Sikh community was enraged not so much on the death of
Bhindranwale but on the all out assault on the Golden Temple by the Indian army. On
hearing of the army action Sikh troops deserted their regiments in several parts of the
country and many Sikh soldiers tried to march towards Amritsar to defend their place
of faith. They were intercepted by the authorities and scores of them were killed and
large number of them were court martialed later. The actions of the central
government gave credence to wide spread belief that Operation Blue Star was a
deliberate attempt to humiliate the Sikhs. It was alleged that the Congress party had
itself brought Bhindranwale to prominence and that the government could have
chosen some other way to arrest Bhindranwale and his followers. The army action
widened the gulf between the Hindus who had welcomed it, and the Sikhs who
condemned it and gave the Khalistan movement its first martyr in Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:378). It provoked a wave of deep anguish and
resentment among the Sikhs. It constituted a watershed in Sikh history and it hurt
deep the Sikh psyche. It also affected the other minorities who felt that if this can be
done to Sikhs they could be the next targets (Singh, Sangat 2005: 409). In reaction to
armed action prominent Sikh personalities like Khuswant Singh a renowned Sikh
scholar and other Sikhs renounced their Padama Bhushan, Padama Shree and other
prestigious awards given to them by the Indian state. The Congress Sikh
parliamentarians like Amarinder Singh and Davinder Singh Garcha resigned from
Lok Sabha (Singh, and Nayar, 1984: 109). Simranjeet Singh Mann resigned from
Indian Police Service. Bhindranwale and his followers killed in Operation Blue Star
had earned the status of martyrs by the Sikh masses and Sikhs relied that they died
for the cause of Sikhism protecting the Golden Temple from the invasion of Indian
Army.
After the attack on the Golden temple between June and September, 1984
Operation Woodrose was conducted by the government. It was an attempt to prevent
outbreak of widespread public protest in the province. It was a mopping up operation
in the rural areas to capture the absconders. Through this operation whole villages
were searched and combed to flush out the militants. Operation Woodrose completely
alienated the Sikhs from the government and the security forces. Major Akali leaders
were detained and ban was imposed on All India Sikh Student Federation. The army
combed the whole countryside and thousands of Sikhs especially the young ones were
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detained for interrogation and many were tortured and killed. The harassment of Sikh
youth and fear of being killed made them to go underground. It was during this period
that a substantial number of rural Sikh youths crossed over to neighboring Pakistan
(Singh, Gopal, 1994:105). As a matter of fact this operation proved more instrumental
in making more militants than capturing and containing them (Singh, Birinderpal,
2002: 136).
With the Sikh anguish simmering, on October 31, 1984 Indira Gandhi was
assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards (Satwant Singh and Beant Singh). When her
assassination was made public a segment of Hindu population led by some of the
leaders of ruling party rioted against the Sikhs all over India (Kumar, Suneel: 173).
Rajiv Gandhi when came out of AIIMS, after seeing the dead body of his mother was
greeted with slogan khoon ka badla khoon (blood for blood) (Sharma, 1987:117). As
such after Indira Gandhis assassination, anti-Sikh riots broke out in various parts of
the country. Sikhs were singled out, lynched and burnt alive. Delhi was worst affected
and Sikhs became the target of brutality of mob violence. Of the ten thousand Sikhs
massacred in the pogrom, some six thousand to eight thousand Sikhs including thirty
officers in uniform were killed in Delhi alone (Tambiah, 1996:109). Sikh property
worth rupees three hundred crore was looted and burnt and in Delhi over fifty
thousand Sikhs were rendered refugees (Singh, Khuswant, 1991:385). The police and
other state agencies stood as mute spectators and even connived with the violent mobs
against the Sikhs. The actions of the government helped in compounding alienation
felt by the Sikhs and gave ample credence to the wide spread belief of an official
conspiracy against the Sikhs (Deol, 2000: 109).
Reference has been made of one hundred and nineteen incidents of violence,
incendiarism, and killing of the Sikhs, including damage to thirteen Gurudwaras on
October 31, 1984 before Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission (Report of Justice
Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry, Vol-1 p-11). This commission was
constituted to enquire into the Delhi carnage of the Sikhs in Delhi, some ministers of
Congress party themselves led the mob to massacre the Sikhs. Several meetings were
held all over Delhi in the late hours of October 31, 1984, to give final touches to the
plan with meticulous care with an eye over every minute detail that nothing was left
out to successfully exterminate the Sikhs (Rao, 1985: X). Indira Gandhi was depicted
as a martyr in the cause of Indian unity. The attitude of the leaders at the centre to the
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Sikh carnage can be judged when in November, 1984 while addressing a rally Rajiv
Gandhi said that when a big banyan tree falls, the earth below shakes, relating it to
the carnage of Sikhs in India, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi (Singh,
Patwant, 2004:193). The Congress (I) in its election campaign, sought to convert the
anti-Sikh pogrom into votes in Lok Sabha elections scheduled in December, 1984.
One of the main themes of the campaign was the threat posed to the Indian unity by
the Sikhs. Due to this electoral manipulation Rajiv Gandhi was able to win 401 out of
508 seats; the largest ever number of seats in the Lok Sabha by a party since
independence (Singh, Khushwant, 1992: 101). H.K.L. Bhagat, who was accused of
arousing the mob against the Sikhs and in whose constituency major destruction of
life and property of the Sikhs was done, won the seat with very high margin of over
five lakh votes (Sangat, 2005:403). The Sikhs felt that the majority community had
given its verdict in support of brutal genocide of innocent Sikhs.
Taking stock of the situation, Rajiv Gandhi as Prime Minister of India tried on
the process of conflict management. In a nationwide broadcast he said that he gave
top most priority to the settlement of Punjab problem (The Hindustan Times,
January 6, 1985). On the other hand by Basant Panchmi in early February, 1985
which signified a change in season, the rising Sikh anger was reflected in the spread
of Kesari (saffron) coloured turbans signifying the spirit of sacrifice at public
meetings and functions all over Punjab (Ajit, February 6-9, 1985). It was more glaring
at the hola-mohalla celebrations at Anandpur Sahib. Songs were sung eulogizing
Bhindranwale, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh for their sacrifices. Through audio
cassettes the strength of a war cry by committed ones was projected. Meanwhile
ragis (minstrels) and Kaveeshars (ballad singers) went going around the villages
praising Sant Bhindranwale, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh for their heroic deeds.
They drew great response and gathering from the Sikhs. The government had
honoured the army men for there role in Operation Blue Star. In response the radical
Sikhs honoured the family members of Beant Singh and Satwant Singh. Even at the
Kirtan Darbar broadcast from Jalandhar Radio Station the slogans Bhindranwale
Amar Rahe and Khalistan Zindabad came through clearly (on March 22-23, 1985
as cited in Singh, Sangat, 2005: 405). This tradition of martyrdom and self-sacrifice
made the militant ideology attractive to the Sikh youth. Due to prevailing situation the
dividing line between the extremists and non-extremists got thinner. With the
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hardening of attitudes Akali Dal and SGPC issued an ultimatum to the government, to
institute a judicial enquiry into the anti-Sikh carnage in November, 1984, and release
their leaders by Baisakhi day i.e. April 13, 1985 or face an agitation named
Genocide Week (Jaijee, 1999: 174).
As a result of Sikh assertions the union government announced its willingness

to institute a judicial enquiry into November, 1984, killings in Delhi. Justice
Ranganath Mishra a sitting judge of Supreme Court was named to head the enquiry.
The government lifted the ban on All India Sikh Student Federation (AISSF) and also
agreed to review the cases of Sikh detainees. Rajiv Gandhi realizing the situation
resorted to selective release of the Sikh leaders. As part of the policy, Arjun Singh
was appointed as Governor of Punjab. He acted as a main advisor to Rajiv Gandhi on
Punjab situation. Censorship on the press was relaxed and army control in certain
districts was withdrawn. On his first visit to Punjab in March, 1985 Rajiv gave a sop
to Punjab, announcing his decision to set up a Rail Coach Factory at Kapurthala to
meet the employment and developmental needs of the province (Punjab Kesari,
March 24, 1985).
Rajiv- Longowal Accord: Its Implications

Against the backdrop of Indira Gandhis assassination, the election of Rajiv
Gandhi as Congress (I) leader and his landmark victory in the 1984 elections, the
Rajiv- Longowal Accord appeared a landmark development and centres new
departure in its Punjab policy. The demands that fuelled the Sikh agitation before
1984 and which were held to be non- negotiable by former Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi were now recognized. For moderates (Akali Dal (L)) it provided a return to
democratic politics. At the same time state terrorism was growing side by side with
the growth of Sikh militancy. Some members of the ruling party at the centre, and
police/intelligence setups had developed a vested interest in proliferation of acts of
terrorism conveniently attributed to the Sikh militants (Singh, Sangat, 1985: 408).
The police took to the methods of killing the Sikh youth in police encounters or
during interrogation. There was sharp increase and rise in the cases of mysterious
deaths of Sikh youth in police custody. Punjab had become a police state in real
terms. The army, the paramilitary forces, and the Punjab police had converted an
otherwise curable disease into a cancer (Gaur, 1985:32). The Sikhs celebrated the
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Ghallughara (holocaust) week from June 1-7, 1985, marking the first anniversary of
the Operation Blue Star. Various Ragis and Dhadis sang folksy songs, recalling
the valiant fight put up by Bhindranwale and others. It tried to arouse the Khalsa
martial spirit to unite and defend the faith, which was under attack (Thukral,
1985:41).
Side by side, behind the growth of state terrorism and Sikh militancy, there
was a series of secret meetings between Sant Harchand Singh Longowal and Arjun
Singh. Arjun Singh the Governor of Punjab had a series of consecutive meetings
with Akali leaders. These steps were precursors of the Rajiv and Longowal meeting
and the two signed the memorandum of settlement. It came to be called as Rajiv-
Longowal Accord or Punjab Accord of 1985 (The Indian Express, July 24-25,
1985). It made provisions for rehabilitation of the army deserters, enactment of All
India Gurudwara Act, withdrawal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act, transfer of
Chandigarh to Punjab by January 26, 1986, and the time bound adjudication of
territorial and river water claims (Singh, Gopal (ed.), 1994:217). For executing the
provisions of the accord the Union Home Ministry formed Mathew Commission
under former Supreme Court judge K.K. Mathew. The commission was to determine
the transfer of areas in the terms of references of the accord. In the meantime
Harchand Singh Longowal was assassinated. Surjeet Singh Barnala emerged as
Longowals successor as acting President of Akali Dal. To find a solution through
the ballot box, the centre made announcement of elections in Punjab. It was for the
first time since independence that in the Assembly elections held in September, 1985
Akali Dal gained an absolute majority. It took seventy three out of a total of one
hundred and seventeen seats (Singh, Khushwant, 1992: 145). Moderates Akalis were
successful in securing more Hindu votes in this election than in the past. They were
successful in projecting themselves as a regional, than a religious party (Dhami,
1985:292). The militants move to boycott the elections met half hearted response.
Surjit Singh Barnala, as the leader of Akali Party took oath as the Chief
Minister of Punjab. After coming to power the main issues that confronted Barnala
government were; firstly, the release of Sikh army personal and their rehabilitation;
the release of the youth and the innocent persons including women and children held
in Jodhpur after the Operation Blue Star; stoppage of false encounters and killing of
the Sikh youth by the police and security forces and finally the settlement of Punjab
206
problem, or implementation of Rajiv-Longowal Accord in its true spirit, to the

satisfaction of the people (Purewal, 2000:189). For it, Barnala was in a need of
goodwill of the Central Government which was a party to the accord. But during his
tenure, Barnala was seen wanting and he was not having a free hand to do his job.
He set up a committee headed by Justice Ajit Singh Bains a retired judge of Punjab
and Haryana High Court to enquire into the arrests made in the state during the past
four years (The Tribune, October 2, 1985). The police during enquiry admitted that it
had implicated innocent people to escape pressure from higher ups. It resulted in
disclosing of many false encounters (Singh, Sangat, 2005:415). The committee
recommended release of over two thousands detainees, including one hundred and
fifty Hindu Suraksha Samiti workers. The committee was able to look into eighty
percent of cases and found that ninety percent of police encounters were bogus
(Singh, Tavleen, 1985: 130). Rajiv Gandhi charged the Barnala government of
indiscriminate release of detainees (Kaur, 1992:138). Against it, Barnala set up a
police committee to screen the recommendations of Bains committee itself. This led
to a dispute between justice Bains and the state police, which was accused by him of
indulging in state terrorism (Dhillon, 2006: 415). Barnala governments
pusillanimity in not accepting the recommendations of its own committee further
alienated the Sikh Youth (Thukral, 1986: 43). Mathew Commission also averred in
giving any decision; reason being he was unable to recommended any area in Abohar
and Fazilka to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh. Result being whole process of Rajiv-
Longowal Accord got subverted. On January 26, 1986 the transfer of Chandigarh to
Punjab also got aborted.
Barnala as Chief Minister of Punjab was in a miserable position. Two other

commissions were also formed to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab. But they were
unable to give any solid recommendations. The Punjab cabinet expressed a deep sense
of anguish to find that commissions had made unwarranted recommendations. The
Mathew Commission inspite of two extensions of tenure was not able to complete the
task of identifying villages that were to be given to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh.
Reason being if Rajiv Gandhi had given Chandigarh to Punjab he would lose the
Hindu vote in the scheduled Haryana elections in the same year (Singh, Khuswant,
2006: 305.). Barnalas experience with the Eradi Commission on river waters was
no different. The commission was to give its report in six months on Ravi-Beas
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waters. But to constitute the Commission itself it took six months (Mitra, The Times
of India, May 27, 1987). Eradi commission also hoodwinked the Rajiv-Longowal
Accord. As a course of Rajiv-Longowal Accord, Mishra Commission in April, 1985
was extended to enquire into the organized violence in Delhi, while also covering
Kanpur and Bokaro and Chas tehsil in Bihar. Mishra placed the major part of
responsibility for the riots on the police, besides anti-social elements and Congress (I)
workers (Report of Justice Ranganath Mishra Commission of Inquiry, Vol I, p. 65).
After a great deal of struggle, various Congress (I) leaders, including the then MPs,
police officers, and other individuals were identified for their acts of omission and
commission. But because of various pulls and pressures, with the involvement of
judiciary, nothing much practical was achieved. Cry for justice remains unheard even
now. One of the accussed Jagdish Tyteler has been acquited recently (The Tribune,
May 4, 2010).
In retrospect, the accord far from making a new departure in Punjab politics
was a continuity of the centres policy from independence itself of symbolic
agreements accompanied by non implementation. It was formulated in a hurry by
Rajiv Gandhis advisors and the Akali Dal (L); party to the agreement was groomed
by New Delhi along the familiar pattern of tactical concessions of political power at
the state level (Gurharpal, 1996:412). Gurharpal while commenting on it says:
This effort was a continuation of a process in which

secular and Indian nationalist Sikh leaders have been
regularly hailed by New Delhi only to be nailed
when they had served their purpose. This role proved
difficult for Akali Dal Longowal later on (Singh,
Gurharpal, 1996:413).
Overall a written Accord, signed in a most solemen ceremony was rendered

useless. Not a single article was implemented in its true spirit. Barnala kept mum on
the breach of trust. He accepted the Prime Ministers excuse that he had to take others
along. Barnala also exposed himself to his critics as a puppet of the central
government. The central government was obstructing the process of any healthy
solution and was also trying to check Barnalas ability to handle the situation. As a
result the extremists were gaining a upper hand. As the extremists took control of the
Akal Takht, the central government got alarmed and decided to prepare itself for
further action. The Akali government which came to power in September 1985, had
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rapidly disintegrated as Rajivs commitment to the accord waned and the Congress (I)
government at the centre reverted to interference in the administration of Punjab for
short term gains.
During this time many Sikhs living in England, Canada and the United States
were vocal in favour of Khalistan. The militant groups working in Punjab also openly
made public their political objectives. The continuity was mainly provided by two
important organizations; the AISSF and the other was Damdami Taksal. On the
initiative of these organizations the meeting of Sarbat Khalsa was held in Golden
Temple in January 26, 1986. A flag of Khalistan was hoisted and Akal Takht rebuild
by the government was demolished (The Tribune, January 27, 1986). The moderate
leaders also took a hardened stand and at the Sarbat Khalsa, held at Anandpur Sahib
in February 26, 1986 Tohra announced his resignation and Badal warned against any
move to send the police into the Golden Temple complex to arrest the extremists as it
would inflame the Sikh opinion in Punjab (SGPC White Paper, 1996 also see The
Tribune, Feburary 27, 1986). Barnala, who was under pressure from the centre,
disagreed with them and asserted for police action. As a result there was spurt in
incidents of violence in Punjab.
Congress (I) leaders started harping on the growing violence in Punjab. Press
also played its part. Even small incident of violence was splashed disproportionately
in the newspapers and T.V. and other electronic media. The police sources, despite
confessions about Pakistans involvement in abetting the violent activities, blamed
Damdami Taksal and the AISSF for the anti-national activities but was not having any
concrete evidence against them. Damdami Taksal and AISSF in February-March,
1986 themselves had repeatedly condemned the killing of innocent persons. Now the
question that came to the minds of simple folk was that apart from the hand of
Pakistan, who was behind the violence in Punjab? It was being apprehended that even
a central lobby which was against the present Akali government in Punjab could be
backing the terrorists in this sinister move (Sunday, March 2, 1986: 50-52).
Articulation in favour of Khalistan had become more pronounced after the

death of Sant Bhindranwale. Many reasons like Operation Blue Star and anti-Sikh
riots in Delhi and other parts of India in the wake of assassination of Indira Gandhi
were there. One of the main reasons was failure of Rajiv-Longowal Accord. The
number of militant groups and number of young men who joined the violent
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movement during seven years after the death of Bhindranwale appears to be far larger
than their number during the seven years of Bhindranwales own activity from 1977
to 1984 (Grewal, 2002; 74). After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, due to massacre
of the Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of India, the Sikhs had started migrating in large
numbers towards Punjab. The Congress (I) ruled states were more affected than others
(Singh, Birinderpal, 2002:137). The phase from 1986 to 1992 was the most significant
one; from the perpective of militant violence. The absconding militants gradually
returned from across the border, well trained and fully armed. They also received aid
from the Sikhs settled abroad; USA, Canada and England; who were also aspiring for
a separate independent homeland especially after Operation Bluestar and massacre of
the Sikhs in Delhi. This phase started with a bang. The five members Panthic
Committee which led the violent struggle in the subsequent years was nominated in
the Sarbat Khalsa held at Akal Takht on January 26, 1986. It adopted a gurmatta to
adopt a strategy to tackle the problems faced by the whole Sikh world. It was a type of
declaration for the liberation of Sikhs made on the republic day of India. Two
important decisions were taken by it. One was that it rejected the Rajiv- Longowal
Accord as it was no where near Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Secondly, it was decided
to hand over the Kar Sewa of the Akal Takht to Damdami Taksal after the
demolition of Akal Takht built by the government. The five members Panthic
Committee constituted in the Sarbat Khalsa released a document for the
declaration of Khalistan on April 29, 1986 at the Akal Takht. It was claimed to fulfill
the most cherished dreams of the Sikhs. It was the realization of the statement of
Bhindranwale that the foundation of Khalistan would be laid on the day army enters
Harmandir Sahib. It was also announced that Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)
under Hari Singh, would serve as the pivot of defence organization of Khalistan
(Singh, Birinderpal, 2002:141). The militant violence picked up with the formal
acceptance of Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) as an official militia for Khalistan.
As militancy grew the militant groups also multiplied. New groups were raised while
the older ones broke up into factions.
Where as the centre increasingly viewed the Akali Dal administration in terms
of containing militancy, the latters capacity to do so was undermined by New Delhis
reluctance to implement the provisions of the Rajiv-Longowal accord. The transfer of
Chandigarh to Punjab was delayed first, then postponed and eventually suspended for
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indefinite period. Other provisions were either nullified or the outcomes were
incompatiable with the original agreement. There was ultimate reversal of policy at
the centre which was marked by the Congress (I) factional penetration of the Akali
Dal government from April, 1986 onwards. There was appointment of a highly
partisan Governer Sidharth Shanker Ray and the installation of Julio Francis Ribiero
as DGP with a wide range of powers to undertake anti-terrorist operations (Singh,
Gurharpal, 1996:412). In the end of March, 1986 the central government launched its
new policy in Punjab. Julio Francis Ribeiro as Director General of Punjab Police was
also to head BSF and CRPF forces in Punjab. Ribiero spoke of Bullet for Bullet
policy for the militants. As the declaration of Khalistan was made at Golden Temple
Amritsar, Rajiv Gandhi wanted Barnala to take police action or resign (Singh,
Raminder, 1986: 30-31). Barnala took to the course of police action and police force
entered the Golden Temple complex. It was an opportunity for the central government
to justify Operation Blue Star, and secondly to split Akali Dal (Bhanwar in Ajit,
May 14, 1986). On hearing about police action akali leaders Sukhjinder Singh,
Amarinder Singh and Sucha Singh Chotepur resigned from the Barnala cabinet. Badal
and Tohra resigned from Akali Dal working committee and Akali Dal got split.
Governer Ray, as being dictated by the centre, rallied Congress (I) and other
opposition parties to pledge their support to Barnala to remain power in case of split
of Akali Dal (Singh, Khuswant, 1986: 12). As a result Barnala became a lameduck
Chief Minister totally dependent on Congress (I) support.
This period saw a various angled interplay of forces of Sikh militancy, Hindu
revivalism and state terrorism. The militants obviously stepped up their activity. The
militants sought to take on both the Hindus and Sikhs opposed to them and their
ideology. The unrelated incidents of violence also were played up by the press.
Violence in Punjab was actually overstated. Barnala was also aware of the linkage
between Congress (I)s volte face and revival of terrorist acts in Punjab. He saw that if
there were two incidents by militants, there were ten by others, complicating the
situation (Panchnanda, 2002:154).
Here no attempt was made to differentiate between extremists Sikhs and

militants, and militants and terrorists. All the Sikhs were kept in the same category.
The government didnt emphasize on caution and didnt try to differentiate between
extremists and others. The authorities, particularly in Punjab did the opposite. There
211
was thoughtless use of force by the government. At the same time sharpened Trishul
formed part of Hindu revivalism in all parts of India. It had its impact in Punjab also
and it helped in creating a clear schism between Hindus and Sikhs in cities, where
Hindus were in a majority. It resulted in communal clashes in Patiala, Ludhiana,
Jalandhar, Nakodar, Batala and Amritsar. Curfew became a part of daily life in these
areas. State terrorism with Ribero at its helm of affairs and getting instructions of
Buta Singh as Union Home Minister took the prominent seat. Ribiero had prepared a
hit list of thirty eight A category (top terrorists) and list of four hundred B category
terrorists (Ribiero, 1998: 189). Districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur were handed to
CRPF and BSF, result being militants shifted their activity to Hoshiarpur, Ludhiana
and Sangrur districts. With the stepping up of violence the Union Home Ministry
brought in K.P.S. Gill an Assam cadre IPS officer, as Inspector General of CRPF to
help the police in Punjab. With Ribiero assuring quick distribution of rewards held
on militants, security agencies started gearing up for the offensive and even did
innocent killing of the Sikhs in greed of awards.
The reign of false encounters picked up. State terrorism started gearing up.
As a part of strategy Operation Mand was started by security forces to clear the
Mand (bushy area nearby the junction of river Sutlej and Beas) where the militants
were thought to be taking shelter. It was termed as operation Pakhand (charade) by
the populace as through it innocent Sikhs and women were harassed and tortured by
the central security forces. People termed it as Police Raj (Chauhan, 1999:31).
Besides Punjab Ministers, Prakash Singh Badal, Baba Joginder Singh and others
leaders rallied the Sikh masses, against the oppressive machinery of state. They
attended the Bhog ceremonies of those killed in false encounters by police and
security agencies. It also gave a fillip to Amrit parchar (baptism). But those who
took to baptism straightly came under police surveillance (Thukral, 1986 (May): 27).
Overall the militant activity picked up. During this time even an attempt was made on
the life of police chief Ribiero itself in Punjab Armed Police headquarters, Jalandhar
(The Tribune, October 4, 1986). In August, 1986 militants had also killed General
A.S. Vaidya chief of the Indian army during Operation Blue Star. Militants also
met with a series of setbacks with more than a quarter of Ribieros A and B hit
lists being eliminated. But there was no letup in militant activities. On the eve of
Diwali 1986, extremists of Damdami Taksal and AISSF honoured publicaly the
212
relatives of assassins of Indira Gandhi (The Indian Express, November 2, 1986). At

the Sarbat Khalsa held on the same day an appeal was made to Amnesty International
to expose the fake encounters, resorted to by the police and security agencies for
eliminating the Sikh youths (Ajit, January 12, 1999). Professor Darshan Singh Ragi;
the Jathedar (the head priest) of Akal Takht was in forefront in highlighting the
atrocities of the CRPF in several areas. He had stated that Chief Minister Barnala was
being controlled by a remote control from Delhi (Mitra, 1987: 24).
During the Sarbat Khalsa saffron coloured flags with words of Khalistan
Zindabad were raised on the top of Golden Temple complex in open defiance of
central authority (Chima, 2009: 128). The government had got panicked over such
activities and arrested about five hundred AISSF workers. It was followed by the
arrest of Damdami Taksal men. Ribiero was working as sword arm of union
government. In order to facilitate his extension of service, the central government
dismissed Barnala government with a bundle of charges as Chief Minister Barnala
was in no mood to extend his deputation. The Akali government was dismissed on the
grounds that it was unable to control chaos and anarchy in Punjab. Presidents rule
was imposed in Punjab in May, 1987 (The Tribune, May 13-14, 1987). Sidharath
Shanker Ray; the person who had crushed the naxalites in Bengal was inducted as the
governer of Punjab. As a result Ray-Ribero regime started. Even Barnala
governments minister and head of Akali partys youth wing Prem Singh
Chandumajra was arrested immediately after the dismissal of Barnala goverment and
tortured hung upside down and beaten (Dhillon, 1992: 274). Anti-terrorism now
became the main instrument in the state policy which succeeded without making
major political concessions, either to militants or the moderate Akali leadership.
Whole Punjab was soon subjected to criss-cross currents. The gun-trotting

militants were pursued by gun-trotting policemen. In November, 1986 militants had
massacred twenty four (Hindu) bus passengers on Jalandhar-Pathankot highway (Jag
Bani, December 1, 1986). It had caused a furore among the Hindus sections. The
militants again struck in a big way in Delhi and killed fourteen people (Punjab Kesari,
June 14, 1987). A bus was waylaid at Lalru in Patiala district and thirty eight Hindu
passengers were killed. Within next twenty four hours thirty two bus passengers were
killed at Fatehabad in Haryana. On the other hand security forces also took to more
hardcore methods. Besides the rise in state repression, there was widening of
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infiltrators network by security forces into militant organizations. Due to such

activities of the security forces, the unity of the militant groups started withering
away. At the same time due to immoral acts of the infiltrators against the ideology of
militant groups, it started defamation of the groups in general populace. It forced a
reappraisalof militants ranks by the respective group leaders. The Khalistan
Commando Force, the Khalistan Liberation Force, the Akal Federation and two wings
of AISSF took a unified stand to continue their activities against the state (Frontline,
March 31, 1987:38). Professor Darshan Singh the Akal Takht Jathedar, even
accused some elements in the Union Government for providing tacit support to some
militant factions, to play havoc with established Sikh institutions and promote inter
group rivalry, with a hidden intent to divide and weaken the Sikh Quam (India
Today, October 15, 1987:77).
This period also saw the emergence of social reform movement sponsored
by militant group Khalistan Commando Force (KCF). They gave a thirteen point
code of conduct, to be revered by the people in Punjab. It wanted baptized Sikhs to
live upto the Gurus commandments; no intoxicants, no disrespect to hair, no dancing
or filmy music at weddings, no marriage party of more than eleven persons, no
dowry, no fraternization with Radhasoamis by the Sikhs, no school uniforms that
are not saffron for boys, black and white for girls, no bribe; giving or taking. It
warned all those who served as informers against the militants and indulged in looting
of the Sikh houses at the instance of police and other malpractices. It had its
immediate impact in both rural and urban areas of Punjab- especially Majha and
Doaba areas (Judge, 2005:197). It was in this intense phase of the militancy that
militants ruled the roost. They issued various diktats to various quarters of
population for the implementation of various measures and socio-cultural reforms.
They also dictated the realization of their politico-religious objectives (Punjabi
Tribune, December 3, 1990). According to them these measures were necessary for
formation of the state of Khalistan. It was during this phase that the militants held
courts, open darbars and tried to implement their code of conduct. The defaulters
were asked by them to explain their conduct or face punishment (Singh, Birinderpal,
2002:142). The militants were gaining a upper hand over police and state government.
They were running a type of parrellel government especially at night in the
214
countryside (Singh, Gopal, 1994:102). Dipanker Gupta describing the reply of some
of them writes:
I asked him what a parallel government implied. I was

told that the streets at night would be deserted. The
Singhs then emerge with their AK-47s, so it is best
not to be caught in the crossfire between the Singhs
and the police or the Singhs and the looteras (Gupta,
1992:233).
The ordinary people; farmers, artisans, especially the rural middle class was
caught between two extreme ends the militants and the state (police). The former
came to them for hideouts and food during the night while the latter harassed them
during daytime for giving shelter to the militants. The young Sikhs were often carried
away for interrogation. But during later period, the police cats, the infiltrators, the
looteras of all types in the garb of militants, with the connivance of police harassed
people beyond limits. Regarding their ongoing struggle as a war against the Indian
state, the militants attacked CRPF and BSF installations, police stations and variety of
economic targets such as government transport vehicles and electricity generating
stations, godowns of Food Corporation of India, petrol depots etc. The foremost
item on the agenda of the militants to neutralize the state power was to terrorize the
Punjab police and afterwards CRPF and other security forces including the army. In
the later phase of militancy (1990-91) not only policemen but even their families and
kins were kidnapped and many times killed. The militants created a set of parallel
institutions like dissolving SGPC and creating five members Panthic Committee
under the guidance of Akal Takht to challenge and supercede the traditional Akali
leadership found in Akali Dal and SGPC (Chima, 2009:128). The Sikh extremists
wanted to capture key political and religious institutes in order to gain increased
authority over the Sikh community and give their renewed struggle added legitimacy
(Chima, 2009:128).
Identities are never constructed in vaccum, there is always need for the other
(Singh, Birinderpal, 2002: 60). The self- perception of the Sikh militants was also
constructed likewise. The Indian state provided them an other to define themselves.
The official (state controlled) and allied media called them terrorists who indulged
in random killing to spread anarchy. They were dubbed as criminals, smugglers and
looteras (plunders), who carried out such activites at the instance of hostile
215
neighbors in the process posing threat to the unity and integrity of India. They were
said to be causing a serious problem of law and order for the state. On the other
hand militants disclaimed this characterization. They called themselves
revolutionaries fight for a cause the liberation of the Sikhs. They termed their
violence inerratic and meaningful. It was not an end in itself but a means to an end for
the creation of an independent sovereign state of Khalistan, where the Sikhs could live
with grace and dignity (Pettigrew 1996: 150). They also issued a code of conduct to
the press and other media with a strong directive to address themselves as kharkus
(militants) and not as attwadi (terrorists). They claimed that they were neither
separatists nor vakhvadi (disintegarists) as often projected by the media (Singh,
Birinderpal, 2002: 61). It was asserted by them that violence was not their creed but
they had been coerced to take to arms by the Indian state (Mahmood, 1996: 138-39).
They were of the opinion that degenerated state could understand no language other
than of violence.
Operation Black Thunder

By the end of 1987, Punjab was witnessing deterioration of civil rights,
arrests, detentions, fake encounters. Gun and Lathi Raj was being discussed by all
sections of the society. Police became corrupt to a great extent and even there were
reports of widespread extortions from innocent persons arrested on false charges. The
manpower pool from which the militants draw fresh recruits continued to get larger.
Result being, from the beginning of 1988 there was spurt in violence in Punjab. It was
noticed that higher degree of media gave much coverage to these incidents in a
highlighted manner. The militants continued to get the blame in the media for all
these subversive activities (Singh, Sangat, 2005: 439). A large number of people got
killed daily and even the Sikhs from rural areas started migrating to towns and cities.
As a show of friendly gesture in March, 1988 the government released a

number of Jodhpur detainees; forty of them were released including Jasbir Singh
Rode (Sant Bhindranwales nephew) with three high priests. Rode was to be installed
as Jathedar of Akal Takht (The Tribune, March 10, 1987). This installation
ceremony of Rode was used by NSG officers (at the pickets) for watching every
movement, counting heads, guns and identifying faces inside the Golden Temple.
There were around eighty militants inside in the Golden Temple (Gupta and Mudgal,
216
1988: 78). From now onwards some officers started gathering information for
conducting another surgical operation in and around Golden Temple i:e Operation
Black Thunder (Gupta and Mudgal, 1988: 78 also see Sunday, May 22, 1988).
In the meantime Rajiv Gandhi announced the union governments interest to

initiate dialogue with all or anyone on Punjab, within the framework of Indian
constitution (The Tribune, March 12, 1988). Side by side the centre decided to push in
the parliament the Fifty Nineth Amendment Bill providing for the state of
emergency in Punjab. The passage of bill got support of a major incident in which a
Soviet built Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) was launched on CRPF post. Getting
the support of such incidents the Bill was passed and Punjab was again kept under
Presidents Rule. K.P.S. Gill was inducted as Director General of Punjab police to
oversee the control of the prevailing scenario in Punjab (Gill, 1997:98). With the
growing incidents of violence, government at the centre conducted Operation Black
Thunder at Golden Temple at Amritsar. The media was asked to behave according to
the whims of the centre or otherwise face the consequences (Jain, 1995:117).
Special Action Group (SAG) of one thousand commandos of national security guards
(NSG) was used in this operation. There was heavy exchange of firing. In response to
the repeated appeals by Inspector General of police (Border range) Chaman Lal and
Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, Sarabjit Singh, one hundred and fifty one persons
surrendered. These included some marked militants like Surjit Singh Penta. The
Government of India especially the Home Ministry was directly monitoring the
happenings in the Golden Temple (Singh, Sarabjit, 2002:192).
As a backlash to the on-going in and around Golden Temple, militants of KCF

killed thirty migrant labourers at a workplace on Sutlej-Yamuna canal in Ropar
district. A note was left back by Labh Singh of KCF that other labourers from outside
Punjab should leave, or they will meet a similar fate. As a result large amount of
labour from Bihar, U.P., Rajasthan and other places fled back (Lal, in The Times of
India, February 10, 1991). Again forty five persons were gunned down by militants in
Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. Seven powerful blasts hit Pathankot and curfew was
imposed on various ocassions. Many militants were also killed. Overall a couple of
Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) units and splinter groups of militants got
liquidated at the hands of security forces. Punjab continued to be a victim of lack of a
clear cut policy.
217
Rajiv Gandhi in earlier times was reconciled to state terrorist setups and police
using criminals and smugglers to fight against the militancy. He, as such, gave a nod
to the police strategy of counter insurgency in which all type of violent incidents
were accredited to the militants; either they had done it or not. In a major departure of
his policy, later he desisted from attributing all violence to the militants (The
Illustrated Weekly of India, March 31, 1989: 20-31). As a damage control measure
he announced the release of all Jodhpur detenues, withdrawal of Punjab Disturbed
Areas Act and Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act (except
for Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozpur Districts), removal of all restriction on entry of
foreigners in Punjab, and withdrawal of special powers under NSA. But here also
government was not sincere to chalk out any solution as it was silent on the fate of
three hundred and nine Sikh army men who had been court martialled. Jodhpur
detaines were released in March and eighty four of them were re-arrested, on the
charges pending against them (The Indian Express, March 7, 1989).
In the general elections held in November, 1989 in Punjab, Simranjeet Singh

Mann a radical Sikh leader leading Akali Dal (Mann) won six out of thirteen seats,
with another four going to candidates backed by it (The Indian Express, December 6,
1989). Akali Dal (Mann) having won six seats redefined its goals within the
framework of united India. In one of its resolutions it demanded an autonomous Sikh
region in North India comprising Punjab and some adjoining areas of Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan, with the right to frame its own internal
constitution, having all powers, except foreign relations, defence, currency and
general communications (Ajit, December 11, 1989 also see Singh, Sangat, 2005: 457
and The Indian Express, December 12, 1989).
In the meantime an all party meeting was convened by Union Home Minister
Mufti Mohammad Sayeed at Delhi. It adopted a consensus on Punjab. Its three main
topics were; firstly, resolution of Punjab problem within the framework of the
constitution without sacrificing the unity and integrity of the country. Secondly, steps
to secure conviction of the guilty persons involved in 1984, in violence against the
Sikhs, and thirdly, repeal of fifty ninth amendment of the constitution (The Indian
Express, December 18, 1989). Congress (I) not being the part of consensus (Singh,
Gurbhagat, 1994:360). Mann welcomed the steps evolving the national consensus and
extended his support to Prime Minister V.P. Singh. He wanted the centre to announce
218
general amnesty and release of all the Sikhs lodged in jails, reinstatement of army
deserters, repeal of all black laws and stoppage of fake encounters. He, along with
Parkash Singh Badal tried to trace M.P. Baldev Singh Khudian, who was missing
since December, 1989 (He was killed by the police) (The Times of India, January 3,
1990). During this time in some of the major incidents certain government officials
were killed in various bomb blasts and firing incidents. Joyce Pettigrew says that
these were mostly government planned to deteriorate the situation further
(Pettigrew,1995: 93). Mann met Prime Minister V.P.Singh and asked for recall of
paramilitary forces from Punjab and also askeded the administration to provide a list
of those wanted by the state for acts of terrorism (The Hindu, January 12, 1990). He
took out a protest march, for restoration of democrate processes covering several
villages, in the borders of Amritsar and Gurdaspur. The Sikhs masses observed
Ghallughara week in June, 1990. He listened to the peoples grievances and
attended Bhog ceremonies of the militants killed.
Most credit for restoration of order in Punjab has been given to security forces.
Anti-terrorism measures became the main thrust of the centres policy after May
1987. This policy was vigorously pursued by DGP Ribiero which he termed as bullet
for bullet. It led to a number of changes. The security apparatus especially the Punjab
police was reorganized resulting in the increase of its personal from about 20,000 in
early 1980s period to approximately 60,000 later in 1994 and its expenditure
increased from rupees thirty crores in 1981 to about rupees three hundred twenty one
crore sixty one lakh and thirty five thousands in 1994 (Nath, 2008: 253). As additional
support there was CRPF and BSF with the use of regular army also. Punjab police
was strengthened with the creation of new senior posts and mass recruitment at
constable and spos (special police officer) level. It was supplemented by anti-
terrorist legislation; The National Security Act (1980), Anti- Highjacking Act (1982),
Punjab Disturbed Areas Ordinance (1983), Terrorist Areas Special Courts Act (1984)
and The Terrorists, Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) (1985) and
Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Ordinance (1988). They were
rigourously enforced with official approval for shoot to kill policy when any of the
known offenders were apprehended (Kumar, 2008:38-39). Counter-insurgency was
given high priority with employment of irregular hit squads intended to infiltrate and
liquidate terrorist organizations. The police again took a preponderant role. As a part
of policy the police now started showing civilians and militants being killed in inter-
219
gang rivalries (Mahmood, 1996: 210). The central government inducted National
Security Guards (NSGs) in the borders districts in July, 1990 to supplement the police
and para-military forces. Then the government took the decision to order army, to
mount exercises against militants on border areas. It was termed as Operation
Rakshak-I. A number of new steps, like night ambushes was taken up (Gill, 2001:
139).
The political backing for anti-terrorism had began to wither during the
National Front government in 1989 and with the election of eight radical Sikh MPs
from Punjab out of thirteen seats. While Prime Minister V.P.Singh had sought to
introduce more accountability in the operating style of security forces, his successor
Chander Shekar himself opened a direct dialogue with the militants that eventually led
to the holding of assembly elections in 1991in Punjab. Chander Shekhar, the New
Prime-Minister tried to take peaceful recourse of action. He sent K.P.S. Gill as
Director General CRPF and General (retd) O.P. Malhotra was inducted as the
Governor of Punjab. He even promised for the restoration of democratic process in
Punjab. In the meantime Simranjit Singh Mann met Chandra Shekhar (The Tribune,
December 29, 1990). Mann wanted the government to withdraw the army by the end
of February 1991 and stop the various search operations which were actually done
to harass the common Sikh masses and in which the Sikh lawyers and intellectuals
were insulted if they uttered a word against the high handedness of the security forces
(The Hindustan Times, February 28, 1991). The police excesses had the counter
reactions from common masses also. It found expressions in a series of Gheraos of
police stations and higway blockades following reports of false encounters by the
police. Feeling the pulse of the populace the centre announced that it will go by
democratic will of the people in Punjab to solve all the issues. In order to find a
democratic solution to the problem the centre government announced elections in
Assam and Punjab both for parliamentary seats and for provincial assemblies. These
states were insurgency infected areas, as such elections in them were detached from
rest of the country i;e in June. The reason was given that the security forces will get
relieved from polling duty from other parts of the country and it will help in proper
security during polls in Punjab and Assam, as large number of security personal will
be available to conduct the polling in a healthy manner. On May 20, 1991 Rajiv
Gandhi was assasinated. Polling in Punjab to Assembly and Lok Sabha seats was
fixed for June 22, 1991 but on night of June 21, the elections were postponed to
220
September 25, 1991 (Ajit, June 22-23, 1991). Governor O.P. Malhotra got
disappointed and resigned in protest. Again the government had played its trick. Akali
Dal (Mann) called it as a fascist act. The daily Tribune also wrote, that it will be
seen as an act of betrayal, one more in the chain of such acts (The Tribune, June 23,
1991).
Prime Minister Chander Shekhar was trying to push Punjab towards
democracy. But all the political parties led by Congress had oppossed his decision to
hold elections in Punjab. The Election Commission also played a trick that later undid
Chander Shekhars calculations. It tried to invoke law and order situation to hold the
elections later on in Punjab. This decision helped the Congress party which later on
succeded Chander Shekhars caretaker government to cancel the polls in the nick of
time, in order to apply its policy to counter Sikh insurgency (Kumar, 2008:291-92)
The Final Reckoning
In 1991 general elections Congress (I) came back to power. A mulitpronged

policy for Punjab was initiated by it. P.V. Narsimha Rao took oath as the Prime
Minister of India. Surendra Nath a retired I.P.S. officer was appointed as the
Governor of Punjab. He was the first IPS officer to be appointed as Governer of any
state. K.P.S. Gill was brought back as Director General of Punjab Police. But the real
power lay with Director General (Intelligence) O.P. Sharma who got orders directly
from the Intelligence Bureaus headquarters in New Delhi. Joyce Pettigrew supports
the point that in Punjab law and order issues are controlled by Delhi (Pettigrew,
1995: 109). The security forces became more offensive with the co-operation of army.
Nine more divisions of the Indian army were moved into the province to contain
militancy. The armys deployment was at its peak in Feburary 1992. During the
Punjab legislative assembly elections also, it covered whole of the state with security.
In addition to 1,20,000 army personal, there were 53,000 Punjab Police, 28,000 Home
Guards, 10,000 special police force and over 70,000 para-military personal. After
1984 the army was deployed in Punjab in Operation Rakshak (I) in May 1990,
during which its role was to seal the border with Pakistan and assist the police in
anti- terrorist operations. In Operation Rakhshak (II) launched in November 1991
the army took the backstage role by providing support to the police and administration
to re-establish the authority of the state. In Operation Rakshak (II) troops from I, II
and IV corps were used to encircle the state with a security cordon prior to the holding
221
of Punjab assembly elections (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:415). This was done by

relieving the police from routine duties to undertake more offensive actions and by
sealing the Indo-Pakistan borders. By July 1991 the police turned the tables on the
militants. The militants chose to move out into some convenient places in Haryana,
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. In a major decision the central government
refused to go by the electoral process in Punjab. The government first wanted to
intensify its policy against the militancy before chosing to go in for elections. Gill
reshuffled the police set up. He handpicked young I.P.S. officers, mainly from
outside Punjab and appointed them as SSPs or heads of districts. Also appointed
were the promotees, who were the hot shots during various police operations. The
police policy of summary execution of the suspects got a thrust with the blessings of
some key officials at the centre (Singh, Sangat, 2005: 471).
The lumpenization of the militant ranks through infiltration both strategic
and otherwise is a normal feature with such struggles the world over (Singh,
Birinderpal, 2002:144). The police infiltration takes place for spying the movements
and hideouts of the militant groups while the criminals and other miscreants infiltrate
them for self enrichment. As such the lumpenisation of Sikh movement occurred in
terms of extortions and innocent killings; rising since 1988. There was also
proliferation of undercover gangs and the police cats. Both K.P.S. Gill and Ribiero
defended as well as held them legitimate (Srivastva, 1997:115). The kale
kacchianwale (those wearing black underwears) gang got active in rural Punjab in
the early 1990s. Many of them were captured or killed by the villagers; later
identified as cats of police (The Indian Express, September 14, 1989 also see
Punjabi Tribune, October 10, 1989). As such police sponsored gangs started striking
terror in the villages, especially in Doaba region. They even looted the people of their
cash jewellery and other valuables, like imported cameras and tape recorders; VCRs
and watches (The Hindustan Times, November 21, 1991). Through Operation
Rakshak II the army took to plug in the loopholes in international border of Punjab.
The militants chose the areas in Ludhiana, Sangrur and Ropar and gave thrust to the
activities there. The army actively helped police in picking up the youth. But in order
to escape from direct blame for disappearances that occurred subsequently in police or
paramilitary forces custody, it worked in a manner that various sections of the society
thought, that the major offensive is coming from Punjab police. On the other hand in
order to make an impression ; of trying to put a balm on the injury and show of care, it
222
offered people medical facilities and canteen provision through Army Canteens
Stores Department.
All governmental bodies, including the Punjab Police, paramilitary units and
the armed forces, systematically violated the Human Rights that are internationally
recognized, vis--vis the international convenent of civil and political rights (Raeflaub
and Spaas, 1993:38-50). People were arrested illegally, systematically subjected to
torture, and those arrested were re-arrested on minor grounds. During house searches,
the women, relatives and childrens were systematically beaten up, maltreated,
sexually abused and even raped. The civil and judicial authority reduced to virtual
standstill and completely powerless (Amnesty International Report (1992): 1-44 also
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (India), 2003). There was a growing
sense of psychological insecurity among the Sikhs, who faced the risk of
discrimination in treatment everywhere in the country. Khuswant Singh concedes that
while the Sikhs in Punjab got wild justice, in Haryana they were victims of an
insensate desire to revenge, at the hands of most of the populace (Singh, Khuswant,
1992:76).
It was the worst time. The security personal disguised themselves as militants,
knocked at peoples houses committed atrocities on them, resorted to extortions for
private gains. Then there were depredations by former militants, mentioned as cats
by people. Even some persons with criminal background and even police personal
were inducted into the militant ranks to cause anathema against the militants. As
Chandan Mitra in Hindustan Times says, the police undercover operations added to
the confusion over genuine and fake militancy (The Hindustan Times, February 4,
1992). The result of this policy was that ideological aspect of the movement started
deteriorating rapidly which helped in breaking the mass support overt or covert,
which became a major factor in the decline of the movement later on.
Assembly Elections (1992) and Containment of Militancy

The government decided to go for Assembly elections in Punjab in Feburary,
1992. Prominent leaders like Parkash Singh Badal, Simranjit Singh Mann, Baba
Joginder Singh, Bhai Manjit Singh, Kartar Singh Narang and Sukhbir Singh Khalsa
(who was held under TADA, but later on released), met at Chandigarh (Singh, Sangat,
2005:473). They unanimously decided to boycott the forthcoming elections. The
central government fixed the elections for February 19, 1992. Fear had stalked the
223
countryside, as militants had pleaded with the people for boycotting the elections. It
was low key campaign and villagers also feared repression at the hands of security
forces, which pressurized the people to cast their votes. Despite the large scale efforts
by the security forces only 21.6 percent voters exercised their franchise (The Times of
India, February 22, 1992). In urban areas, opposition including Janata Dal and leftists
both CPI and CPM, alleged massive rigging and manipulation of results (The Times
of India, February 22, 1992). Congress polled nearly ten percent votes but secured
eighty seven out of the one hundred and seventeen seats in the Assembly and twelve
out of the thirteen seats in the Parliament.
Congress (I) formed the government in Punjab. Beant Singh of Congress (I)
was sworn in as Chief Minister of Punjab. It provided for the faade of restoration of
the civil government. The fifty seven months long Presidents rule the longest ever in
any state came to a formal end. Various leaders raising voice against state tyranny
were put behind bars. The police and paramilitary forces continued to operate under
the direct orders of Intelligence Bureau and Union Home Ministry. On being asked as
to how many persons had been detained under TADA, in the legislative assembly
Chief Minister Beant Singh disclosed that there were 9, 394 detainees under TADA
at the end of 1989. They rose to 10, 619 in 1990, and to 14,255 at the end of 1991
respectively, and the number stood at 13,516, as on February 29, 1992 (The
Hindustan Times, April 11, 1992, also see Grewal, 1998). In contrast the government
of India had mentioned a figure of 1,218 persons detained in Punjab as on June 15,
1991 to the Amnesty International. Side by side the actual member of persons
detained in Punjab jails, did not tally with these figures. It also gave credence to
Amnesty International, which had contended that there were between 15,000 to
20,000 persons detained in the Punjab jails (The Times of India, April 11, 1992.). The
Union Home Ministry lent good support to Gills thesis that in Punjab there is mere
law and order problem.
Militants on Beant Singhs induction also followed a multi-pronged policy.

They tried to scare away non-Punjabis and continued to make their presence felt. It
made many Hindus to says that if the government cannot control the situation,
separation is a solution (The Indian Express, September 12, 1998). They also asked
the farmers, not to sell wheat to government agencies. They tried to revive Khalsa
Panchayats, on resignation of Panches and Sarpanches and also tried to bend the
224
instruments of state by diktats to civil and political officials. It was having a

significant effect. In one such incident an appeal was issued to the militants by the
engineers and staff of Bhakra mainline seeking forgiveness of any mistake,
committed intentionally or un-intentionally in the past (The Times of India, May 1,
1992). The Babbar Khalsa International issued a code of conduct to local Radio and
TV units to accord Punjabi language the same status as was given to Tamil in Tamil
Nadu or Bengali in Bengal. It was accorded in a proper manner when the militants
killed M.L. Manchanda Station Engineer of Patiala Radio unit in May, 1992.
Soon the militants met a severe set back. The security forces achieved a major
breakthrough in cracking militant setups. It can be attributed to some main reasons.
Firstly, some of the militant setups when they held talks with Prime Minister Chandra
Shekhar in 1991, on assurances of safe passage they had exposed their contacts. As
militants were not having any liberated zone for their operations, the security forces
worked upon the lead, provided by the militants for next one and half year (Grewal,
1998:148). Secondly, there was transition in leadership from time to time; either due
to main militant leaders killed in police operations or they went underground. It
caused loosening of control in some of the key militant groups. The genuine
militants made efforts to discipline their cadres. They tried to restore an ideological
content but were not so successfull. Before the militants could fill up their loopholes
the security forces successfully penetrated the major setups. By mid 1992, the militant
leadership was reduced to the position of sitting ducks (Singh, Sangat, 2005: 475).
The police in July-August, 1992 in major search operations, took over to a score of
leading militants mostly killed in cold blood. Some of the listed militants killed
during this period were Khalistan Liberation force(KCF): Gurjant Singh
Budhsinghwala, Gurbachan Singh (Lt. General) Chief and area commander; Babbar
Khalsa International (BKI)-Sukhdev Singh Babbar (Chief) and Dr. Sahibi (Lt
General), Bhindranwale Tiger Force(BTF) Rachpal Singh Chhandra, Jagdish Singh
Disha, Devender Singh, Sukhram Sigh Mazhbi (all Lt Generals), Hardev Singh Kalia,
Jaspal Singh Pala, Khalistan Commando Force (KCF)- Sukhwinder Singh Sangha,
Jarnail Singh Bool (Lt General), Surinderjit Singh Shinda, Jagroop Singh Roopa,
Paramjit Singh Pamma and Dilsher Singh Shera (all Lt Generals).
Police made long stories about the encounters, but on many occasions the
reality was something else. There were many holes in the police theory that some
225
top militants had died in encounters (The Hindustan Times, August 14, 1992). There
were many cases of mistaken identity. In a major strategy on the death of Sukhdev
Singh Babbar in August, 1992, militants in retaliation killed forty seven relatives of
policemen in two days (The Tribune, August 10-11, 1992). In a village Palasaur
near Tarn Taran eight houses of policemen were set on fire in a single day. It caused a
lot of demoralization of the police force. It led to certain developments. With the
assistance of army and paramilitary forces, police chief K.P.S. Gill started the
Operaton Night Dominance. Army surrounded the villages, while the police and
paramilitary forces combed the villages. Night ambushes and patrols were
strenghtened. Due to such operations, groups like Bhindranwale Tiger Force of
Gurbachan Singh Manochahal were wiped out. Besides Gurbachan Singh
Manochahal, other prominent militants were also killed like KCF (Zaffarwal)
additional chief Khazan Singh Sattowal in September, 1992, BTKF (Sangha) chief
Balwant Singh, KCF (Panjwar) chief Sukhdev Singh Sukha in September, 1992 (The
Times of India, September 13 to 18, 1992). With these, police claimed that, it had
eliminated all the known militants. At the same time police also reported about the
surrender by a large number of militants (The Indian Express, August 23 and
September 6, 1992).
Encouraged by the showdown of the police and downward trend of militancy,

villagers also started standing up to the terrorists hovering the country side. On
many occasions they came face to face with policemen in the garb of militants
indulging in acts of rape and extortions. It was reported in newspapers about such
incidents in Jagraon, Samrala and Ropar police districts and other parts of Punjab as
well wherein the villagers in close combat killed, injured and caught policemen along
with their AK 47s (The Hindustan Times, September 26, 1992). Overall the
government took a hardened stand against the militants. Beside it the mode of
functioning of militants was heavily influenced by the existing social structure (Singh,
Gurharpal, 1996:419). The militants became daily ensnared in the existing social
networks including local feuds and factional enimities, kinship retribution and the
social underworld of criminality as well as the private accumulation of wealth and
personal aggrandizement. Joyce Pettigrew in her field study had analysed that:
The militant movement had been ideological in intent

and a peoples struggle. What distorted it was the rural
226
society, where it was located, gave primary importance

to the personal bond and to the individual . Guerillas
working within a framework based entirely on personal
connections rather than associational ties were fighting
a modern war with primitive forms of organization
(Pettigrew, 1995:152).
These characterstics made the militant movement easy prey for the infiltration,
counter-insurgency strategy and manipulation by the security forces. Local and
personal vendettas were exploited in good manner by the police and the unofficial
counter-insurgency forces. The whole militant movement was thoroughly infiltrated
by the counter- insurgency agencies. With quite ease the security forces penetrated the
militants setups, it also revived speculations that troubles in Punjab were carefully
maneuvered, representing a form of managed disorder (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:
415). Analyzing the events before and after 1984, this point was strongly held by
main political group of the Sikhs the Akalis. Few persons had ever doubted the
Indian states capacity to impose its authority in the province. Unlike other peripheral
regions like North-East and Kashmir, Punjab hardly constitutes ideal territory for
guerilla warfare. In the militants campaign for Khalistan, the sources within the
central government actively supported the secessionists later to put them to the
sword. The Machiavellian actions of Indira Gandhi lead to operations like Blue Star
in1984 (Tully and Jacob, 1985:89). Even if the militants led by Bhindranwale
developed a relative autonomy of their own, they could not avoid the final reckoning
(Tully and Jacob, 1985:90).
The policy of infiltrating and using militant organizations by elements of the

centre and the security forces which had started in early 1980s continued even after
Rajiv-Longowal accord. Evidence which emerged later, on the secret war against
militancy, points to the direct involvement of sections of the security and counter-
insurgency intelligence agencies in the setting up control and actions of certain
militant organizations (Singh, Gurmit (Vol-4),1989:87). In addition to the high costs
of such a policy there was brutalization of the administration and civil society on large
scale. Such brutalization was simply sustained on the argument that it results from the
conditions in the war against militancy (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:418). A liberal
democratic system duplicates the methods of terrorists in its own foundations (Singh,
Gurharpal, 1996:418). As such the security set up in Punjab established a degree of
227
paramountancy over the civil administration which was also resented by state
bureaucracy. For achievement of New Delhis wider objectives, it was essential that
the police should maintain its supremacy over the civil administration (Brass,
1991:189). It openly justified the coersion of non-militant opposition, politicians and
it resented formal scrutiny either by its own internal systems or outside bodies i:e
judiciary and human rights organizations (Pettigrew, 1995:134). The Sikh ethno-
nationalist movement was in essence potentially undermining itself during later
periods. This did not necessarily translate into popular Sikh support for the Congress
(I), but it did increase the general public yearning for the return of normalcy in Punjab
without the daily threats posed by either the militants or the Indian security forces-
especially in the rural areas where a sense of lawlessness and near anarchy prevailed
(Chima, 2009:223). The militants were at the height of their power in the spring of
1992 but their movement was in many ways also becoming weak as a result of the
pattern of their leadership which got progressively worse over time.
On October, 1992, Sukhdev Singh Sukha and Harjinder Singh Jinda of

Khalistan Commando Force were hanged for killing General (Retd) A.S. Vaidya (The
Tribune, October 10, 1992). Akalis gave a bandh call for three days. The same day
victims of 1984 riots in New Delhi staged a demonstration at the Boat Club, seeking
action against the guilty of Sikh massacre of November, 1984. The police and security
forces continued their operations in Punjab undeterred. Police even went to states of
Rajasthan and Bengal and killed alleged militants (The Hindustan Times, January 6,
1993). The major success of the security forces was the killing of Gurbachan Singh
Manochahal near Tarn Taran. With the announcement of Manochahals death Punjab
Police announced the surrender of one hundred and one militants including half a
dozen A category militants (The Hindustan Times, March 3, 1993). Later, the police
shot dead deputy chief of KCF (Panjwar) Bachittar Singh Sensera in Amritsar district
and two days later it claimed killing of Dasmesh Regiments Chief Lakwinder Singh
alias Kehar Singh in a fierce encounter at Batala (The Hindustan Times, March 11,
1993). The police also seized large amonts of arms and ammunitions. The seizure of
weapons from militants in 1992 included 539 AK series rifles, 34 Rocket launchers,
22 Carbines, 324 rifles, 380 guns and 1600 Kg of explosive and large qualities of
ammunition. It being a large amount of arsenal by any means (Grewal, 1998:113). A
report based on the monthly intelligence summary of the Punjab government for
228
November, 1993 estimated the holdings of major type of weapons by terrorist

groups in Punjab as 1543 AK 47s., 106 Rocket launchers, 112 general purpose
machine guns (GPMs), and several quintals of explosives. The number of hardcore
and non-hardcore terrorists operating in Punjab and elsewhere was put at 144 and
963 respectively. There were reports of fresh recruitment to the ranks of militants
Khalistan Liberation Force, Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar), and Babbar
Khalsa International, as also fresh re-groupings and re-alignments during this period.
Despite the sealing of Punjab borders, the militants managed to smuggle over 400 AK
47s, 60 revolvers and pistols, and 8 quintals of explosive. About one hundred twenty
militants, including twenty eight frontline activists, were reported killed in 1992
(Grewal, 1998:113). The government claimed the arrest of fifteen hundred militants
and another six hundred were reported to have surrendered. A total of one thousand
five hundred and ten civilians, including two hundred fifty police personal, died at
the hands of militants during 1992 (The Times of India, January 2, 1993). The Punjab
Police shortly afterwards shot a number of Babbars in fierce encounters. This way
the entire militant network was shaken up and government was able to suppress the
movement with ruthless state bureaucratic machinery.
Concludingly it can be summarized that in Indian context, the centre, which

possessed the state authority has exercised its political influence for pursuing its goal
of nation-building and its economic interests as well. The nation-building approach
has not been applied in a well balanced manner. As a result, on the one hand the
authority of the Indian state has been challenged from within its own frontiers; on the
other the foreign powers had also played their role in exploiting such assertions which
has aggravated the situations further. Consequently, the claims to national self-
determination and for autonomous status have been staked against the Indian state by
various groups on ethnic, religious and regional basis. It has given rise to various
skirmishes between the state and various ethnic groups in North-East, Kashmir and
Punjab etc.
The policy of nation-building in order to prosper requires a national consensus

on the institutions and mechanisms of the state; as such the state has to act as a
mediator and a mechanism for articulation and resolving of social conflicts. But the
Indian state has been unable to apply properly its so called secular or integrationist
approach. Result has been internal strife and conflicts on various issues of
229
exploitation, discrimination, deprivation and oppression. These groups, due to

progress in modern means of mass communication has been able to create their own
parochial political consciousness on ethnic, religious, racial and other social lines and
have asserted through raising their demands. These ethnic assertions have been given
a respectable place by respective group members. The attempts on part of state elites
to depoliticize and demarginalse these ethnic claims had lost their appeal to a great
extent. In the case of Sikhs, the ethnic assertions have been portrayed as legitimate
ones in order to gain communitarian empowerment, cultural justice, minority group
rights and for ethno-regional autonomy. This had led to a situation of crises of state
legitimacy.
From the time of independence itself, the Indian state and the Sikhs as an
ethnic minority community located on its western periphery had involved themselves
in a see saw puzzle. There has been ensuing game between the Sikh leaders and the
central elite; which is at the helm of state affairs. It has been a sorry state of affairs on
the part of Sikh leaders; the Akalis, as they were themselves divided into various
factions. These factional divisions on most of the occasions obstructed any consensus
formation over the genuine demands of the Sikh community to be put before the
Indian state. As such, the Akalis lost ground and gave way to the extremist Sikh
leaders like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his violent activities. The Akalis as
well as the radical Sikhs were having no common strategy and were akin to diverse
course of actions and opinions regarding the attainment of their goal. In contrast to the
moderate policy of the Akalis, the radical group was eager to give direct and violent
fight by strking at the very nerves of the Indian state and challenge its political
authority. As the moderate leaders were unable to gain any thing through peacefull
means, the extremist wing of the Sikhs projected that violence will be the only
instrument to change the situation in their favour.
The Indian state in the beginning of these uprisings, due to its characterstic
careless attitude towards minority group demands, thought it as a mere rhetoric by a
small segment of Sikhs. The state took it as a usual course of action, without being
conscious of the fact that its disregard and ignorance of the rights of the volatile
minorities like the Sikhs will lead to highly conflictual situation. The centre, playing
its own power game left the situation to deteriorate further; to pay a heavy price for it
later on. Playing its petty political gimmicks, due to lack of proper foresight into the
230
gravity of the situation the states political leadership termed the growing crisis as a
mere law and order problem. When the situation went out of control due to its own
misadventures, the state in order to reinforce its legitimacy, acted in a haphazard
manner. The centre took to policy decisions and actions without taking into account
the long term consequences.
The Indian state had adopted the western secular approach, which envisaged
integration and assimilation of diverse cultural elements into a grand Indian nation
in the long run. One of the reasons for such an approach was the trauma of partition of
India, which made the central elite oversensitive to the question of unity. As such
from the very start the Indian state overreacted to all these uprisings. The central elite
took into account long drawn political manipulative strategies to remain in power. As
the conflict between the radical Sikhs and the centre worsened and took a violent turn,
violence itself became the focal point and demands in the meantime were relegated to
the backyard. The state being the primary authority of power; being controlled by the
majority Hindu community, the minorities like the Sikhs were left with no alternative
avenues for political expressions. This type of situation forced the Sikhs to try for
their own political space where they were constituting a majority i:e Punjab.
The problem of recognising and accommodating the necessary autonomies

and rights of defined social groups or segments of people e.g. ethnic, regional,
linguistic or religious, is one of the major issue of the contemporary politics of states
and international organizations. But the government on its part, in the states and at the
centre pursued a policy of resistance and confrontation, punctuated at times by
accommodation. The Indian state responded to the demands of the Sikhs with a
political manipulative mood. It did not try to analytically search out the root cause of
the problem. The Akalis representing Sikh cause also demonstrated the same kind of
unprincipled electoral opportunism. It led to the theocratic fundamentalist movement
with all its attendant consequences: the Operation Blue Star, the assassination of
Indira Gandhi and the politically directed massacre of large numbers of Sikh in New
Delhi and elsewhere in India. This failure to tackle the demands of the Sikhs entered
as a factor in the rise of militancy, associated with the movement for Khalistan. The
Sikhs resorted to violence, after they had exhausted political and constitutional means
and they perceived that only through violent means they will be able to get their dues.
As such the extremists like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and after him the
231
extremist Sikh militant groups mobilized the Sikh community by arousing its past
ethnic traditions. Its past struggles and memoirs were resurrected with historical
narratives of the times of subjugation and oppression at the hands of tyrannical state
from time to time. They subscribed to the heroic deeds, conquests and victories of the
Sikh community against the enemy. They also tried to create a sense of belonging in
the community and tried to change the mindset from individualistic thinking to that of
common and collective cause. Violence was projected by them as a cleansing force.
Police excesses and atrocities were used for transforming individual misery to
misfortunes of the whole community. As such the militants Sikhs justified the
killings and murders and framed them in the canvas of the communities fight for
justice.
Military operations are by their very nature, cruel and ruthless. In this volatile
situation, as the state power became increasingly ineffective and weak to contain the
Sikh ethnic assertions politically, the violence escalated. As such the Indian state
indulged in the increasing use of military hardware. In the meantime the moderate
leadership was sidelined. Acute harassment and untold atrocities, rough handling and
humiliating behaviour on the part of non-Sikh troops during various military
operations/ actions became a particularly sore point with the Sikh community.
Although several cases of such nature were duly looked into by the authorities and
disciplinary action was also taken. But the wounds inflicted during operation Blue
Star and Woodrose were not healed. It generated serious unrest and resentment
among the Sikhs troops also, many of whom mutinied. In the post Operation Blue
Star phase after 1985, Sikh extremism got a major boost. It seemed to be invincible
and soon enveloped almost the entire Punjab and parts of Haryana, Delhi, UP and
Rajasthan. The violent activities of Sikh terrorists in the Punjab continued to escalate
till the middle of 1992. After which they started to decline.
In such a situation the main sufferers had been the common masses coming in
the crossfire of the conflict. As the state unleashed its coercive power to reinforce its
legitimacy, the entire Sikh community faced its brunt. In the process thousands of
innocent lives were lost. Against this, the militant groups did indiscriminate use of
violence terrorism against the state as well as the general public. The ruling elite at
the centre created such a situation as to make people believe that it was legitimate to
use state repression; in the name of unity and integrity of the country or the nation-
232
state. As a result the militant movement lost its legitimacy in common masses. People
did not mind if the target of the militants is state agencies or establishments, but the
moment innocent peoples suffer, the movement starts losing its legitimacy. As such
the movement lost mass appeal; this in turn supported and legitimized the
governments rationale to suppress the movement by force.
Though characteristively with the restoration of normalcy all the references to

the political solutions have ceased. This is hardly an indication of administrative
maturity. Though violence and terrorism was eliminated, political grievances still
remain. A mature, informed and statesman like approach was urgently called for. For
too long has the handling of terrorism and insurgency in India suffered from basic
inadequacies, misconceptions, bloated thought of state power, political disagreements,
lack of vision and statesmanship, electoral politics, corruption and inefficiency
rampant in different organs of the government. An alternative strategy must take note
of these weaknesses, transcend petty partisan interests, and treat terrorism and
insurgency as the most powerful threat ever to the political stability and territorial
integrity of India to be handled through accommodative mode and not through mere
use of ruthless force.
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Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response (1984-1992)

Violent Phase of Sikh Assertions and State Response

A dominant identity seeking subjugation, assimilation or submergence of other

destroying the country. On the contrary these should be considered as constituting

Operation Blue Star: Its Repercussions

As a result of Sikh assertions the union government announced its willingness

Rajiv- Longowal Accord: Its Implications

problem, or implementation of Rajiv-Longowal Accord in its true spirit, to the

Barnala as Chief Minister of Punjab was in a miserable position. Two other

This effort was a continuation of a process in which

Overall a written Accord, signed in a most solemen ceremony was rendered

Articulation in favour of Khalistan had become more pronounced after the

Here no attempt was made to differentiate between extremists Sikhs and

relatives of assassins of Indira Gandhi (The Indian Express, November 2, 1986). At

Whole Punjab was soon subjected to criss-cross currents. The gun-trotting

infiltrators network by security forces into militant organizations. Due to such

I asked him what a parallel government implied. I was

Operation Black Thunder

As a show of friendly gesture in March, 1988 the government released a

In the meantime Rajiv Gandhi announced the union governments interest to

As a backlash to the on-going in and around Golden Temple, militants of KCF

In the general elections held in November, 1989 in Punjab, Simranjeet Singh

The Final Reckoning

In 1991 general elections Congress (I) came back to power. A mulitpronged

of Punjab assembly elections (Singh, Gurharpal, 1996:415). This was done by

Assembly Elections (1992) and Containment of Militancy

Militants on Beant Singhs induction also followed a multi-pronged policy.

instruments of state by diktats to civil and political officials. It was having a

Encouraged by the showdown of the police and downward trend of militancy,

The militant movement had been ideological in intent

society, where it was located, gave primary importance

The policy of infiltrating and using militant organizations by elements of the

On October, 1992, Sukhdev Singh Sukha and Harjinder Singh Jinda of

November, 1993 estimated the holdings of major type of weapons by terrorist

Concludingly it can be summarized that in Indian context, the centre, which

The policy of nation-building in order to prosper requires a national consensus

exploitation, discrimination, deprivation and oppression. These groups, due to

The problem of recognising and accommodating the necessary autonomies

Though characteristively with the restoration of normalcy all the references to

Brass, Paul R. (1991), Ethnicity And Nationalism: Theory And Comparison,

India Today, July 15, 1991.

Singh, Gopal (1994), Politics of Sikh Homeland, 1940-1990, New Delhi:

Smith, Anthony D. (1981), The Ethnic Revival, Cambridge: Cambridge

The Times of India, April 11, 1992.

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