Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Table of Contents
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Rosalynn Whiteley
1
Kaplan, P., 2014. The Few: Preparation for the Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, Page 86.
2
Kaplan, P., 2014. The Few: Preparation for the Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, Page 86.
3
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 449.
4
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 478.
5
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 478.
6
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 51.
7
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
8
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
9
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 71.
10
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 65.
11
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 72.
12
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 68.
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Operation Sealion, the German invasion of Britain, detailed the need for the RAF to
first be neutralised. 13
Goering claimed that the RAF could be defeated easily within only a few weeks. 14
Mistakes and Decisions of the Luftwaffe
Although Hitler had forbidden attacks on London, bombs accidentally fell upon
central London on August 24th -25th 1940, as a result of poor navigation. 15
On August 25th 26th 1940, the RAF retaliated by bombing Berlin, damaging
residential property. 16
The bombings on Berlin caused discontent within the Germans as it was thought that
their capital would remain safe. 17
At the beginning of September, the Luftwaffe concentrated its forces on the airfields
of No. 11 Group, located in the South East of England (as shown in the appendix),
sending 1,000 aircraft against Fighter Command every day.18
On September 7th 1940 the focus of Luftwaffe bombings switched from RAF airfields
to London. 19
On September 15th 1940 a heavy Luftwaffe assault on London was met by RAF
attacks. 60 Luftwaffe aircraft were lost. 20
On September 17th 1940, Hitler postponed Operation Sealion indefinitely. 21
13
Turner, J. F, 2010. The Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, page 38.
14
McKinstry, L., 2014. Operation Sea Lion. New York: Overlook Books, page 295.
15
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, page 212.
16
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, page 192.
17
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 51.
18
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
19
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, pages 214-219.
20
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, pages 231 232.
21
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 54.
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Rosalynn Whiteley
This source is a document published by the Royal Air Force, available through the
organisations official website. The origins of the source strengthen its value as the
researchers and writers would have been able to easily access primary sources and documents
produced by the Royal Air Force itself. However, the exact origins of the specific writer or
even the date of publication are not available through the Royal Air Forces website. This
serves to limit the document as a source as it is impossible to determine the breadth of
knowledge and experience the writer has with the subject matter. Additionally, from the title
A Short History of the Royal Air Force and the accessibility of the document, it can be
determined that the purpose of the source is to provide the general public with an
understanding of the Royal Air Force. This further limits the source as it is unlikely to go into
great depths of detail, considering the target audience, and that it is not an academic
document.
This source is a book on the Battle of Britain, written by James Holland, a historian whose
publications specialise in the years of the Second World War, having written seven books on
the topic. This provides great value to this source as it can be determined that the author is
likely to be very well researched and knowledgeable within his area of study, as well as being
able to write about the event within the context of the time. The purpose of this source, as an
academic document, will be to inform other historians of the events of the Battle of Britain,
as well as propose arguments regarding the authors specific point of view. This may become
a limitation of the source as the information will be manipulated and selected to support the
writers intentions, however, this may also be valuable in understanding and analysing the
information.
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Section D: Analysis
A key factor influencing Britains victory in the Battle of Britain was the use of radar and
organisation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). The RAFs defensive system of The Royal
Observer Corps (ROC), created in 192522 was a key advantage in the Battle of Britain.
Civilian members of the ROC had been trained by professional officers to assist with
detection and identification of enemy aircraft23. This use of initiative prepared the RAF to be
able to respond to incoming attacks. A further system of detecting aircraft through radar had
been established prior to the start of the Battle of Britain, with a radar training school opening
in 193724. As such, by the time battle commenced, Britain was well prepared to detect
aircraft. All such radar plots were received at Fighter Command Headquarters at RAF
Bentley Priory from which orders were issued25. Through centralising the radar plots, Britain
was able to respond to threats in a more organised and efficient manner. Hugh Dowding,
head of Fighter Command, issued a standardised set of code for simple orders, including
scramble to mean take off as soon as possible26, further improving the efficiency of the
RAFs response to incoming aircraft. The RAF was able to reorganise itself to adapt to new
situations as in, following the unsustainable loss of pilots at the beginning of September,
reducing the training time of RAF pilots to only 10 hours on a single-seat fighter at the
beginning of September27. The strengths of the RAFs organisation and use of radar therefore
contribute greatly to the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
The relative strengths and weaknesses each air force were a significant factor in the outcome
of the Battle of Britain, as the planes of the RAF had key advantages over those of the
Luftwaffe. The RAFs Hurricanes and Spitfires were much more manoeuvrable than the
German Messerschmitts, enabling the British planes to make tighter and more successful
turns28, a matter of much importance in air warfare in order to get on the tail of the enemy
aircraft. Additionally, the British pilots were fighting over native territory so would be able to
be returned to service much more quickly than German pilots should either need to bail out
during battle29. The strength of the RAF is also recognised in the fact that Hitlers Operation
Sealion, German invasion of Britain, detailed the necessity of eliminating the RAF before it
could begin30. This suggests that the RAF was perceived to be a very strong defensive unit.
As such, it appears that the strengths of the RAF were a significant cause of the outcome of
the Battle of Britain.
However, despite Britains clear strengths on an individual basis, the RAF was severely
outnumbered by the size of the Luftwaffe. Whilst the Luftwaffe situated about 3,500 aircraft
separated into three air fleets within France, with as many as 2/3 of these serviceable on any
day31, Britains air force was comparatively smaller, having only 700 operational aircraft,
22
Kaplan, P., 2014. The Few: Preparation for the Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, Page 86.
23
Kaplan, P., 2014. The Few: Preparation for the Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, Page 86.
24
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 449.
25
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 478.
26
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 478.
27
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 51.
28
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 65.
29
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 68.
30
Turner, J. F, 2010. The Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation, page 38.
31
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
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Rosalynn Whiteley
organised into 60 squadrons32. Further, only 400 of these aircraft were Hurricanes and 200
were Spitfires and the rest were Blenheims, Defiants and Galdiators who were less equipped
to match the Messerschmitts33, particularly the Defiants who were not equipped with forward
firing guns, making them much more vulnerable to attacks from the front34. In actuality, the
armament of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 was much more powerful than that of the Spitfire Mk
I, with its two 20 mm cannons and four 0.31 inch guns overpowering the Spitfires eight
0.303 inch Browning machine guns35. Despite perceiving the RAF to be threat, Goering
claimed the RAF could be easily defeated within only a few weeks36. This suggests either a
confidence in the strength of the Luftwaffe or weaknesses of the RAF. As such, the
advantages of the German planes as well as the sheer mass of the German air force suggest
that the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Luftwaffe and RAF were not necessarily the
prime reason for the outcome of the Battle of Britain.
The conclusion of the Battle of Britain was ultimately a mistake of the Luftwaffe. Despite
Hitler forbidding attacks on London, bombs accidentally fell upon central London on August
24th -25th 1940, as a result of poor navigation37. In retaliation, the RAF bombed Berlin the
following night, damaging residential property38. Facing the discontent of the German people
who had been told that their capital would remain safe39, the Luftwaffe, who had at the
beginning of September been sending 1,000 aircraft against Fighter Command at the airfields
of No. 11 Group in the South East of England (as shown in the appendix) daily40, refocused
their bombings to London on September 7th 194041. As such, instead of damaging the RAFs
aircraft, the Luftwaffe were now damaging the capital which would have lowered British
morale but ineffective in destroying Britains air force. As such, when the Luftwaffes assault
on London on 15th September was met by RAF attacks, the Luftwaffe lost 60 aircraft42, a
decisive victory for Britain. This success, was proven to be a major event within the Battle of
Britain as only two days later Hitler postponed Operation Sealion indefinitely43, suggesting
German loses had been significant on this last day of immense battle.
32
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
33
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
34
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 71.
35
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale Books, page 72.
36
McKinstry, L., 2014. Operation Sea Lion. New York: Overlook Books, page 295.
37
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, page 212.
38
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, page 192.
39
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 51.
40
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
41
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, pages 214-219.
42
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited, pages 231-231.
43
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association Limited, page 54.
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Rosalynn Whiteley
Section E: Conclusion
It seems the key factor allowing Britain to win the Battle of Britain was due to the use of
radar and the organisation of the Royal Air Force. Although, the relative strengths of the RAF
did indeed allow Britain some advantages and the mistakes of the Luftwaffe were significant
in ultimately securing the victory in the final moments of the battle, the pre-emptive action
taken by the RAF as in the establishment of the Royal Observer Corps and radar system were
crucial in allowing the RAF to prepare defensively against the Luftwaffe. Without such a
strong defensive organisation it would have been much harder from Britain to win the Battle
of Britain.
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Bibliography
Books
Bishop, C, 2001. The Encyclopaedia of 20th Century Air Warfare. Leicester: Silverdale
Books.
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing.
Kaplan, P, 2014. The Few: Preparation for the Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation.
McKinstry, L., 2014. Operation Sea Lion. New York: Overlook Books
The Reader's Digest , 1989. The World At Arms. London: The Reader's Digest Association
Limited.
Turner, J. F, 2010. The Battle of Britain. UK: Pen & Sword Aviation.
Wood, D., & Dempster, D, 1969. The Narrow Margin. London: Arrow Books Limited.
Web Documents
The Royal Air Force. A Short History of the Royal Air Force. Retrieved from Royal Air
Force:
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/F21D57C4_9913_5321_BB9830F0BB762
B4E.pdf (Retrieved 2015)
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Rosalynn Whiteley
Appendix
44
44
Holland, J, 2010. The Battle of Britain. London: Corgi Publishing, page 14.