G. R. No. 195002 January 25, 2012
00 to
HECTOR TREAS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its
proceedings, courts must keep strictly within
the limits of the law authorizing them to take
jurisdiction and to try the case and render
judgment thereon.1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set
aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
dated 9 July 20102 and Resolution dated 4
January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are
as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita
Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-
and-lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No.
109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank.
The bank manager Joselito Palma
recommended the appellant Hector Treas
(Hector) to private complainant Elizabeth, who
was an employee and niece of Margarita, for
advice regarding the transfer of the title in the
latters name. Hector informed Elizabeth that
for the titling of the property in the name of her
aunt Margarita, the following expenses would
be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorneys fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.
Hector who issued a corresponding receipt
dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a]
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth
Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00.
However, when she consulted with the BIR,
she was informed that the receipts were fake.
When confronted, Hector admitted to her that
the receipts were fake and that he used the
P120,000.00 for his other transactions.
Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector
issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of
Commerce check No. 0042856 dated
November 10, 2000 in the amount of
P120,000.00, deducting from P150,000.00 the
P30,000.00 as attorneys fees. When the
check was deposited with the PCIBank,
Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for
the reason that the account was closed.
Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal
demands, appellant failed to pay. Thus, the
instant case of Estafa was filed against him.3
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati
City. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December,
1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA
the amount of P150,000.00 which money was
given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja,
with the express obligation on the part of the
accused to use the said amount for expenses
and fees in connection with the purchase of a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266,
but the said accused, once in possession of
the said amount, with the intent to gain and
abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
own personal use and benefit the amount of
P130,000.00 less attorneys fees and the said
accused failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and
Margarita Alocilja in the aforementioned
amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During arraignment on 26 April 2002,
petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered
a plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age
and poor health, and the fact that he lives in
Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the
pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a
Decision5 finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is rendered finding accused Hector
Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse
of confidence as penalized under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense
was committed in the manner described in the
aforementioned information. As a
consequence of this judgment, accused
Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty
of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4)
Months of Reclusion Temporal. Moreover, he
is ordered to indemnify private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja the amount of P130,000.00
with interest at the legal rate of 12% per
annum, reckoned from the date this case was
filed until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.6
We note at this point that petitioner has been
variably called Treas and Trenas in the
pleadings and court issuances, but for
consistency, we use the name "Treas",
under which he was accused in the
Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration,7 which was denied by the
RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.8
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal before the RTC.9 The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On
9 July 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision10 affirming that of the RTC. On 4
August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011.11
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari12 before this Court. He
asked for a period of 15 days within which to
file a petition for review, and the Court granted
his motion in a Resolution dated 9 February
2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his
Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
DEFENSE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK
OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN
THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND
MADE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN
THE AGGRIEVED PARTY
SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF
DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE
OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;13
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that
nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that P150,000 was
given to and received by petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence shows that the
Receipt issued by petitioner for the money
was dated 22 December 1999, without any
indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption
of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22
December 1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was
actually delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence and office were
situated there as well. Absent any direct proof
as to the place of delivery, one must rely on
the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life. The only
time Makati City was mentioned was with
respect to the time when the check provided
by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI
Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada Branch in Makati.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness
failed to allege that any of the acts material to
the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati
City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not
required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already
indicated in the prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that
the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to
Margarita. Assuming there was
misappropriation, it was actually she not
Elizabeth who was the offended party. Thus,
the latters demand does not satisfy the
requirement of prior demand by the offended
party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming
that the demand could have been properly
made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to
the amount of P120,000, instead of P150,000.
Finally, there is no showing that the demand
was actually received by petitioner. The
signature on the Registry Return Receipt was
not proven to be that of petitioners.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a
Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file the latters Comment on
the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, praying for an additional
period of 60 days within which to submit its
Comment. This motion was granted in a
Resolution dated 12 September 2011. On 23
September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for
Special Extension, requesting an additional
period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it
filed its Comment on the Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the
RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as
charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does
not dispute the factual findings of the trial
court with respect to the delivery of P150,000
to him, and that there was a relationship of
trust and confidence between him and
Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the
Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City,
his claim was not supported by any piece of
evidence, as he did not present any. Further,
petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the prosecution
witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial courts
assessment of the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great weight, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG
stresses that the defense of "no valid
demand" was not raised in the lower court.
Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to
Elizabeth suffices, as she is also one of the
complainants alleged in the Information, as an
agent of Margarita. Moreover, no proof was
adduced as to the genuineness of petitioners
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the
demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court
may recommend petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his advanced age and
failing health.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the
resolution of the Petition requires a review of
the factual findings of the lower courts and the
evidence upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. In many instances, however,
this Court has laid down exceptions to this
general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court
are contradictory;
 (2) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the
Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in
making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case, and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed
to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are
themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of the
specific evidence on which they are
based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence but such findings
are contradicted by the evidence on
record.14
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial
court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions
without any citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; they are grounded on
conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the
commission of the offense without any finding
as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution through private complainant
Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that
accused Trenas had committed the offense of
Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that
he could misappropriate for his own personal
benefit the amount entrusted to him for
payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant
Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained
the amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave
her two receipts purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent
purpose of fooling her and making her believe
that he had complied with his duty to pay the
aforementioned taxes. Eventually, private
complainant Luciaja discovered that said
receipts were fabricated documents.15
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the
RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it had
no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The
trial court denied the motion, without citing any
specific evidence upon which its findings were
based, and by relying on conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treas] in
Makati City was incontrovertibly established
by the prosecution. Accused Treas, on the
other hand, never appeared in Court to
present countervailing evidence. It is only now
that he is suggesting another possible
scenario, not based on the evidence, but on
mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay
his assertions, the same would still not
warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment.
Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999
in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact that
the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by
private complainant Luciaja in Makati City the
following day. His reasoning the money must
have been delivered to him in Iloilo City
because it was to be used for paying the taxes
with the BIR office in that city does not inspire
concurrence. The records show that he did
not even pay the taxes because the BIR
receipts he gave to private complainant were
fake documents. Thus, his argumentation in
this regard is too specious to consider
favorably.16
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the
trial courts jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will
not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did
not comment on the formal offer of
prosecutions evidence nor present any
evidence on his behalf. He failed to
substantiate his allegations that he had
received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo
City. Hence, Hectors allegations cannot be
given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance
of weight and influence which would appear to
have been overlooked and, if considered,
could affect the outcome of the case, the
factual findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court
remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are
entitled to great weight and respect and will
not be disturbed on review.17
The instant case is thus an exception allowing
a review of the factual findings of the lower
courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is
the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory.
In Isip v. People,18 this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action
but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is
a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over
a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information.
And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not
only prove that the offense was committed, it
must also prove the identity of the accused
and the fact that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,19 this Court dismissed
a Complaint for estafa, wherein the
prosecution failed to prove that the essential
elements of the offense took place within the
trial courts jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct
or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he
gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted
business with him with respect to the subject
aluminum scrap wires inside or within the
premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in
Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information
against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by
the RTC of Makati. He was charged with
estafa as defined under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as
having been committed in Makati. However,
aside from the sworn statement executed by
Yu on April 19, 1994, the prosecution
presented no other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, to corroborate Yu's sworn
statement or to prove that any of the above-
enumerated elements of the offense charged
was committed in Makati. Indeed, the
prosecution failed to establish that any of the
subsequent payments made by Yu in the
amounts of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,
P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 and P170,000.00 on
October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither
was there proof to show that the certifications
purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its
custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and
that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to
sell the same were given by Fukuzume to Yu
in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu
established that all the elements of the
offense charged had been committed in
Paraaque, to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu
went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque;
that with the intention of selling the subject
aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended
that he is a representative of Furukawa who is
authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that
based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu
agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap
wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial
amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu
suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime
of estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and
Fukuzume met at the latter's house in
Paraaque and, by falsely pretending to sell
aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to
induce Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the
prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that
any of the essential ingredients of the offense
took place in the said city. Hence, the
judgment of the trial court convicting
Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction, without
prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate
charges with the court of competent
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show
that the offense of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City
was alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December,
1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA
the amount of P150,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)20
Ordinarily, this statement would have been
sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint
executed by Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was
committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999,
[Elizabeth] personally entrusted to
ATTY. HECTOR TREAS the sum of
P150,000.00 to be expended as
agreed and ATTY. HECTOR TREAS
issued to me a receipt, a photo copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex
"B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups
with ATTY. HECTOR TREAS, the
latter failed to transfer the title of
aforesaid property to MRS.
MARGARITA ALOCILJA. He also
failed to pay the capital gains tax,
documentary stamps and BIR-related
expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR
TREAS accomplished was only the
preparation of the Deed of Sale
covering aforesaid property. A copy of
said Deed of Sale is hereto attached
as Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my persistent
follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREAS
issued to me a check for refund of the
sum given to him less the attorneys
fee of P20,000.00 and the sum of
P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in
the net sum of P120,000.00. x x x
7. THAT when said check was
deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK
dela Rosa-Rada Branch at Makati
 City, the same was dishonored by the
drawee bank for the reason:
ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x21
Aside from the lone allegation in the
Information, no other evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the offense or
any of its elements was committed in Makati
City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the
elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial
on his part of such receipt; (3) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) there is
demand by the offended party to the
offender.22
There is nothing in the documentary evidence
offered by the prosecution23 that points to
where the offense, or any of its elements, was
committed. A review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there was no
mention of the place where the offense was
allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank
referred Atty. Treas to you, what
happened next?
A We have met and he explained to
the expenses and what we will have
to and she will work for the Deed of
Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when
you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to
you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his
Attorneys fee, NINETY THOUSAND
is for the capital gain tax TWENTY
FOUR THOUSAND is intended for
documentary sum (sic) and TEN
THOUSAND PESOS is for other
expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by
Atty. Treas for this ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND, will you be able to
identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document,
madam witness, already identified
during the pre-trial as exhibit "B". This
appears to be a receipt dated
December 22, 1999. Will you please
go over this document and inform this
court what relation has this to the
receipt which you said Atty. Treas
issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty.
Hector Treas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was
 given to Atty. Treas by you, what
happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he
failed to do his job.24
Although the prosecution alleged that the
check issued by petitioner was dishonored in
a bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an
element of the offense of estafa under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the
information, there is nothing in the prosecution
evidence which even mentions that any of the
elements of the offense were committed in
Makati. The rule is settled that an objection
may be raised based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged, or it may be considered motu proprio
by the court at any stage of the proceedings
or on appeal.25 Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be
conferred upon the court by the accused, by
express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction
is conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the
court and is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law.26
It has been consistently held by this Court that
it is unfair to require a defendant or accused
to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense or it is not the court of
proper venue.27 Section 15 (a) of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of
2000 provides that "[s]ubject to existing laws,
the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred." This
fundamental principle is to ensure that the
defendant is not compelled to move to, and
appear in, a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed as it
would cause him great inconvenience in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence
in another place.28 This principle echoes more
strongly in this case, where, due to distance
constraints, coupled with his advanced age
and failing health, petitioner was unable to
present his defense in the charges against
him.
There being no showing that the offense was
committed within Makati, the RTC of that city
has no jurisdiction over the case.29
As such, there is no more need to discuss the
other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note
that the Code of Professional Responsibility
strongly militates against the petitioners
conduct in handling the funds of his client.
Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or
from the client.1w phi 1
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of
each client separate and apart from his own
and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money
from his client for a particular purpose (such
as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money
was spent.30 If he does not use the money for
its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the money
(if the intended purpose of the money does
not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard
of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.31
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his
client's funds or properties as they fall due or
upon demand.32 His failure to return the
client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for
his own use to the prejudice of and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by the client.33 It is
a gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics; it impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.34
In Cuizon v. Macalino,35 this Court ruled that
the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a
closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence, and constitutes a ground
for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In
any case, should there be a finding that
petitioner has failed to account for the funds
received by him in trust, the recommendation
should include an order to immediately return
the amount of P 130,000 to his client, with the
appropriate rate of interest from the time of
demand until full payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the
Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case
No. 01-2409 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and
recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170298 June 26, 2007
MANUEL S. ISIP, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals dated 26 October 2004 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 21275 entitled, "People of the
Philippines v. Manuel S. Isip and Marietta M.
Isip" to the extent that it affirmed with
modifications petitioner Manuel S. Isips
conviction for Estafa in Criminal Case No.
136-84 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch XVII, Cavite City, and its Amended
Decision2 dated 26 October 2005 denying his
Partial Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedents are the following:
Petitioner was charged with Estafa in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 before Branch XVII of the
RTC of Cavite City, under the following
information:
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of
Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, received from
Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat
diamond (mens ring), valued at P200,000.00,
for the purpose of selling the same on
commission basis and to deliver the proceeds
of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not
sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the
herein accused once in possession of the
above-described articles, with intent to
defraud and with grave abuse of confidence,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert the same to his own personal use and
benefit and notwithstanding repeated
demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the
return of the jewelry or the delivery of the
proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount
of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency.3
Petitioners wife, Marietta M. Isip, was indicted
before the same court for seven counts of
Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law. The cases were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84,
155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. The accusatory
portion of the information in Criminal Case No.
146-84 reads:
That on or about March 27, 1984, in the City within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and the above-named accused, conspiring,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, confederating together and mutually helping
the above-named accused, knowing fully well one another, received from one Leonardo A.
that her account with the bank is insufficient, Jose the following pieces of jewelry, to wit:
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, one (1) set dome shape ring and earrings
feloniously and knowingly issue Pacific valued at P120,000.00, with the obligation of
Banking Corporation Check No. 518672 in the selling the same on commission basis and
amount of P562,000.00, in payment for deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
assorted pieces of jewelry, received from return them if not sold, on or before March 21,
Leonardo A. Jose, which check upon 1984, but the herein accused, once in
presentation with the drawee bank for possession of the said jewelry by means of
payment was dishonored for insufficiency of false pretenses, with intent to defraud and
funds and notwithstanding repeated demands with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and
made by Leonardo A. Jose for the redemption there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
of the said check, accused refused and still misappropriate, misapply and convert them to
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice their own personal use and benefit and paid
of the aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the the same with Check Nos. 518646 and
above-stated amount of P562,000.00, 518669, dated March 29, 1984 and April 1,
Philippine Currency.4 1984, respectively, in the amount of P90,000
and P25,000, respectively, which upon
The six other Informations are similarly presentation with the bank was dishonored for
worded except for the date when the offense insufficiency of funds and notwithstanding
was committed, the number and amount of repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose
the check. The pertinent data in the other for the redemption of the said check, failed to
informations are as follows: do so, to his damage and prejudice in the
abovestated amount of P120,000.00,
Philippine Currency.6
Crim. Case No. Date of Commission No. of Check Amount of Check
Except for the description and value of the
147-84 17 March 1984 518644 P50,000.00
pieces of jewelry involved, date of receipt and
agreed date of return, and the number, date
148-84 30 March 1984 518645
and amount of the checks P50,000.00
issued in payment
thereof, the four other informations are
149-84 12 March 1984 030086worded.
similarly
5 P150,000.00
The specifics thereof are as
follows:
155-84 25 March 1984 518674 P95,000.00
Crim. Case No. Value of Date of Agreed Date of
156-84 29 March 1984 518646 P90,000.00Receipt
Jewelry Return
257-84
157-84 1 April 1984 518669 P25,000.00
P150,000 03-07-84 03-30-84
260-84
The spouses Isip were likewise charged P95,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
before the same court with five (5) counts of 261-84
Estafa. The cases were docketed as Criminal P562,000 03-20-84 03-27-84
Cases No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 378-84
and 378-84. The Estafa charged in Crim. P200,000 02-03-84 -
Case No. 256-84 was allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about March 20, 1984, in the City When arraigned on the charges, petitioner
of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and and Marietta Isip pleaded not guilty. There
being only one complainant in all the cases,
joint trial of the cases followed.
The versions of the prosecution and the
defense, as taken by the Court of Appeals in
the parties respective briefs, are the following:
i) Prosecution Version.
Sometime in 1982, appellant spouses Manuel
and Marietta Isip were introduced to
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose. The
introduction was made by complainants
father, Nemesio, business associate of the
Isips. Nemesio and the Isips were then
engaged in the buy and sell of pledged and
unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling
habitus (pp. 8-16, tsn, June 8, 1993).
Needing a bigger capital to finance the
growing operation, the Isips convinced
complainant to be their capitalist, a proposition
to which complainant acceded to (p. 14, ibid).
Thus, the operation went smoothly that was
before February, 1984 (pp. 14-18, tsn, ibid).
On February 3, 1984, at complainants
residence in Caridad, Cavite City, appellant
spouses received from complainant a 6 carat
mens ring valued at P200,000.00 with the
condition that they are going to sell said
jewelry x x x on commission basis
for P200,000.00 and if they are not able to sell
the same, they have to return the ring if sold
on or before March 3, 1984 (p. 8, tsn, October
15, 1993).
On March 3, 1984, the Isips did not return the
ring or the proceeds thereof. Instead, Marietta
Isip issued two (2) personal checks dated
March 17 and 30, 1984, respectively,
for P50,000.00 each as partial payment for the
jewelry. The receipt of the jewelry was
acknowledged by Marietta Isip with Manuel
acting as a witness (pp. 9-11, tsn, ibid).
This particular mens ring is the subject of
Criminal Case No. 378-84 for Estafa while
Check Nos. 518644 and 518645 (Pacific
Banking Corp.) dated March 17 and 30,
respectively, are the subject of Criminal Case
Nos. 147-84 and 148-84.
In the morning of March 7, 1984, the Isip
couple went again to complainants residence
in Caridad, Cavite City where complainant
delivered one (1) Choker Pearl with 35 pieces
of south sea pearls with diamond
worth P150,000.00. The condition was that
the proceeds be turned over to complainant
on or before March 30, 1984 (pp. 27-29, tsn,
ibid). March 30, 1984 came, but instead of
turning over the proceeds or return the Choker
Pearl, Mrs. Isip issued a check dated March
12, 1984 for P150,000.00 (RCBC check No.
030086) as payment (p. 34, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No. 254-
84 for Estafa against the spouses and
Criminal Case No. 149-84 for violation of BP
22 against Marietta Isip.
In the afternoon of the same day, Mr. Manuel
Isip went to complainants residence in Cavite
City and got from the latter a mens ring (7
carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a
receipt with the condition that he return the
ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or
before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came,
but Mr. Isip sought an extension which fell due
on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went
by, but Mr. Isip defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid).
The above is the subject matter of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for Estafa against Manuel
Isip.
On March 20, 1984, the Isips went again to
Cavite City and got from complainant one (1)
Dome shaped ring with matching earring with
diamonds valued at P120,000.00. As with
their previous agreement, the item was to be
returned or the proceeds of the sale be
delivered on March 21, 1984 (pp. 48-52, tsn,
ibid). The following morning, however, Mrs.
Isip issued two (2) personal checks (Check
Nos. 518646 and 518669 dated March 29,
1984 for P90,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively) in payment for the Dome shaped
ring (p. 53, tsn, ibid).
This is the subject of Criminal Case No.
256084 for Estafa against the spouses Isip
and Criminal Case Nos. 156-84 and and (sic)
157-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta
Isip.
At noontime on the same day, the Isip couple
went back to the residence of complainant
and got from him one (1) collar heart shaped
necklace and one (1) baguette necklace
worth P95,000.00 (p. 60, tsn, ibid). As agreed
upon, Marietta Isip signed a receipt with the
condition that the jewelry or the proceeds
thereof be delivered to complainant on March
27, 1984. The Isips defaulted and instead,
Mrs. Isip issued a check (Check No. 518647)
dated March 27, 1984 in the amount
of P90,000.00 (pp. 3-5, tsn, October 22,
1993).
The subject pieces of jewelry are the subject
of Criminal Case No. 260-84 for Estafa
against the Isip couple and Criminal Case No.
155-84 for Violation of BP 22 against Marietta
Isip.
Again, in the early evening of March 20, 1984,
the Isips went to complainant informing him
that Balikbayan doctors are having a
convention in Vigan, Ilocos Sur saying that,
that was the most opportune time to sell
jewelries. Assorted pieces of jewelry were
delivered to Mrs. Isip as reflected in a receipt
duly signed by her (Exhibit O) acknowledging
the value thereof to the tune of P562,000.00.
Exhibit O contained the promise that the
jewelry or proceeds thereof will be delivered
on March 27, 1984. Inspite of the promise
contained in Exhibit O, Mrs. Isip issued a
postdated check (Check No. 51867) dated
March 27, 1984 in the amount of P562,000.00
as payment for the assorted pieces of jewelry
(pp. 8-12, tsn, October 22, 1993).
This is the subject matter of Criminal Case
No. 261-84 for Estafa against the couple and
Criminal Case No. 146-84 against Marietta
Isip for Violation of BP 22.
All of the checks covered by the above
transactions were deposited on April 6, 1984
(p. 14, tsn, ibid), but all of them bounced for
being drawn against insufficient funds.
Demand letters sent to the couple proved
futile (pp. 15-20, ibid).
ii) Defense Version.
During all the times material to these cases,
complainant Leonardo Jose, who had his
residence at Room 411, 4th Floor, Plaza
Towers Condominium on (sic) 3375 Guerrero
Street, Ermita, Manila, but claims he had his
ancestral home at 506 P. Burgos Street,
Caridad, Cavite, was an employee of the
Bureau of Customs, having been so since
1964 (Tr., 6/8/93, 7). Upon the other hand,
appellants Manuel S. Isip (Manuel hereafter)
and Marietta M. Isip (Marietta hereafter) are
spouses, residents at 3635 M. Arellano Street,
Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila (Tr., 8/29/93, 4)
and engaged in various business
undertakings in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija,
Baguio City, Olongapo City and Bataan (Tr.,
Idem, 9; Tr., 10/2/95, 13) appellant Manuel,
in the brokerage and trucking business; while
appellant Marietta, in that of selling jewelry
and financing, as well as in PX goods, real
estate and cars, which she started when she
was still single (Tr., Idem, 9-10; Tr., 10/2/95,
12). In 1982, at the casino in Olongapo City,
appellant Marietta started obtaining jewelry
from losing or financially-strapped players
which she repledged as security for financing
she obtained from one Nemesio Jose, father
of complainant Leonardo Jose (Tr., Idem, 11-
12; Tr., Idem, 14). After about a year, when
Nemesio Jose ran short of capital, he referred
appellants to his son, complainant Leonardo
Jose, with address at the Plaza Towers
Condominium aforesaid for needed financing
(Tr., Idem, 13-14; Tr., Idem, 17-19). Beginning
early 1983, at complainants residence at
Plaza Tower Condominium in Manila,
appellant Marietta, accompanied by her
husband who participated only as a witness,
started having transactions with complainant
who, on different dates in February, March
and April, 1984, extended various amounts to
her for which appellant Marietta pledged
jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between
her and complainant to be sold on
commission and to turn over the proceeds
thereof or return the jewelry to complainant
(Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the
transactions, appellant Marietta had issued
several checks to complainant as guarantee
for the payment of the subject jewelry which
have either been paid or redeemed, had
returned the unsold jewelry to complainant
and had conveyed, by way of payment for
other jewelry, some personal properties, like
brass and antics, and real properties in
Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga,
to complainant who caused the same to be
registered in the names of his son, Christian
Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1,
2, 2-A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result
that all the obligations of appellants to
complainant have already been paid for or
offset (Tr., Idem, 23; Tr., Idem, 24, 34-36, 37-
39; Tr., 3/4/96, 7-8). Also, all the checks that
appellant Marietta issued which were initially
dishonored have already been (sic) (Tr.,
10/2/95, 25-30; Tr., 3/4/96, 8-9). In fact,
complainant caused the dismissal of some
cases he filed against appellants.
Complainant however failed to return some of
the redeemed and/or paid checks issued to
him by appellant Marietta on the pretext that
he did not bring them (Tr., 3/4/96, 20).
Inasmuch as appellant Marietta incurred some
default in payment and complainant
suspected that she would not be able to
redeem the checks or pay for the pledged
jewelry, complainant demanded that
appellants sign certain documents to avoid
any misunderstanding, with threat of
prosecution before the Cavite courts if they do
not comply (Tr., Idem, 19-20; Tr., 3/4/96, 5-6).
So, in order to maintain good relations with
complainant, appellant Marietta signed the
document acknowledging obligations to him in
one sitting, which appellant Manuel witnessed
(Tr., Idem, 21-22). Later, appellants learned
that, although all the transactions were
entered into in Manila, complainant filed the
cases herein before the Cavite Regional Trial
Court (Tr., Idem, 23-24).7
On November 25, 1996, the trial court
rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
thereof reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Court finds the accused Dra. Marietta M. Isip
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a (sic)
violation of B.P. 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 146-
84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84
and 157-84 and she is hereby sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of One (1) year of
prision correctional (sic) in each case; and of
Estafa in the following Crim. Cases: No. 256-
84 where she is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to Twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of P120,000.00 for the value
of the articles misappropriated; Crim. Case
No. 257-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and to indemnify the complainant
Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P150,000.00; Crim. Case No. 260-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of,
from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to Seventeen (17)
years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and
to indemnify the complainant Atty. Leonardo
Jose the amount of P95,000.00; Crim. Case
No. 261-84 where she is sentenced to
undergo imprisonment of, from Twelve (12)
years and One (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose the amount
of P562,000.00; Crim. Case No. 378-84 where
she is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of,
from Twelve (12) years and One (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and to indemnify the complainant Atty.
Leonardo Jose the amount of P200,000.00
and to pay the costs.
Likewise, accused Manuel Isip is acquitted in
Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84,
261-84 and 378-84. However, in Crim. Case
No. 136-84, he is hereby found guilty of Estafa
and he is hereby sentenced to undergo
imprisonment of, from Twelve (12) years and
One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the
complainant Atty. Leonardo Jose in the
amount of P200,000.00 value of the jewelry
misappropriated, and to pay the costs.8
In ruling the way it did, the RTC found that the
transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at
complainant Atty. Leonardo Joses ancestral
house in Cavite City when the latter was on
leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs
where he was connected. It said the defense
failed to substantially prove its allegations that
the transactions occurred in Manila,
particularly in the Towers Condominium, and
that complainant is a resident of Bigasan,
Makati. It added that the testimony of Marietta
Isip that the money with which the
complainant initially agreed to finance their
transactions was withdrawn from the
Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further
refuted the defenses claim that the
transactions happened in Manila. The trial
court likewise found the defenses contention,
that the obligations were already paid and set-
off with the turnover to complainant of
personal and real properties, to be untenable
for it is contrary to human nature to demand
payment when the same had already been
made and the alleged set-offs were for other
cases which were settled amicably and
subsequently dismissed upon motion of the
City Prosecutors Office at the instance of the
complainant.
The trial court was convinced that accused
Marietta Isip misappropriated the pieces of
jewelry involved in Criminal Cases No. 256-
84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84 and
violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 when she
issued the checks mentioned in Criminal
Cases No. 146-84, 147-84, 148-84, 149-84,
155-84, 156-84 and 157-84. As to petitioner,
the trial court acquitted him in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-
84 finding him to have acted as a mere
witness when he signed the receipts involved
in said cases, but found him liable in Criminal
Case No. 136-84 for misappropriating a 7-
carat diamond mens ring which he secured
from the complainant.
Aggrieved, petitioner and spouse appealed to
the Court of Appeals assigning the following
as errors:
-I-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING
COGNIZANCE OF AND DECIDING THE
CASES AGAINST APPELLANTS AND IN
NOT DISMISSING THE SAME UPON THE
GROUND THAT NONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED THEREIN WAS COMMITTED
WITH (SIC) ITS TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION.
- II -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING IT HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASES BELOW,
ERRD IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO
CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 WAS INCURRED BY
APPELLANT MARIETTA M. ISIP FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS
INASMUCH AS SAID CHECKS WERE
ISSUED AS MERE GUARANTY FOR
OBLIGATIONS INCURRED.
- III -
THE TRIAL COURT, ASSUMING ANY
INCIPIENT LIABILITY FOR THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA HAD BEEN INCURRED BY
APPELLANTS IN THE PREMISES, ERRED
IN NOT HOLDING THAT SUCH INCIPIENT
LIABILITY HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENTS/REDEMPTIONS MADE AND/OR
NOVATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN
COMPLAINANT AND SAID APPELLANTS.
- IV -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
APPELLANTS MANUEL S. ISIP AND
MARIETTA M. ISIP GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES OF
ESTAFA AND VIOLATION OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BLG. 22 RESPECTFULLY
IMPUTED UPON THEM AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING THEM UPON THE GROUND
THAT THEIR GUILT THEREOF, OR OF ANY
CRIME FOR THAT MATTER, HAD NOT
BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND/OR THAT THE
LIABILITY INCURRED BY THEM, IF ANY, IS
MERELY CIVIL.9
Before the Court of Appeals could have
decided the case, Marietta Isip died thereby
extinguishing her criminal and civil liability, if
any.
In a decision promulgated 26 October 2004,
the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City (Branch
XVII)
1. In Crim. Case No. 136-84 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATIONS that the sentence
imposed on accused-appellant Manuel S. Isip
shall be two (2) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and that the sum
of P200,000.00 he was ordered to pay to
Leonardo A. Jose shall bear interest at the
legal rate from filing of the information until
fully paid;
2. In Crim. Cases Nos. 146-84, 147-84, 148-
84, 149-84, 155-84, 156-84 and 157-84 is
REVERSED and accused-appellant Marietta
M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes charged;
and
3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED and
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and
Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged, but ordering them to pay to
Leonardo A. Jose, jointly and severally, the
sums
of P120,000.00, P150,000.00, P95,000.00, P5
62,000.00 and P200,000.00 representing the
amounts involved in said cases, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate from filing of the
information until fully paid.10
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts
finding that the venue was properly laid and
that the checks were delivered by the two
accused and/or that the transactions
transpired at complainants ancestral home in
Cavite City, and that, consequently, the
offenses charged took place within its
territorial jurisdiction. With respect to the
seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, the appellate court acquitted Marietta
Isip of the charges on the ground that since
the checks involved were issued prior to 8
August 1984, the dishonor thereof did not give
rise to a criminal liability pursuant to Ministry
Circular No. 4 of the Ministry of Justice.
As to the Estafa cases (Criminal Cases No.
256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84),
the Court of Appeals ruled that since the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for
the pieces of jewelry were dishonored, there
was no payment to speak of. It also found the
defenses claim of redemption/dacion en pago
that real and personal properties were
conveyed to complainant who executed
affidavits of desistance and caused the
dismissal of some of the cases to be
unmeritorious. However, the appellate court
ruled that though novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of
such liability as long at it occurs prior to the
filing of the criminal information in court. In
these five cases, it ruled that there was
novation because complainant accepted the
checks issued by Marietta Isip as payment for
the pieces of jewelry involved in said cases.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals acquitted
Marietta and petitioner,11 but held them liable
to complainant for the value of the jewelry
involved.
As regards Criminal Case No. 136-84 for
estafa against petitioner, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts ruling of conviction. It
found petitioners claims that he did not
receive the jewelry worth P200,000.00
mentioned in the information; that the receipt
he issued for said jewelry was among those
documents which were forced upon him to
sign under threat of criminal prosecution; and
that he signed the same to preserve his
friendship with complainant, to be not
persuasive.
On 17 November 2004, petitioner, for himself
and in representation of his deceased wife,
Marietta Isip, filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration insofar as it affirmed his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and
adjudged him civilly liable, jointly and
severally, with Marietta Isip in Criminal Cases
No. 256-84, 257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-
84.12
On 26 October 2005, the Court of Appeals,
taking into account the death of Marietta M.
Isip prior to the promulgation of its decision,
rendered an Amended Decision with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October
26, 2004 is AMENDED in respect to par. 3 of
the dispositive portion thereof which shall now
read as follows:
"3. In Crim. Cases Nos. 256-84, 257-84, 260-
84, 261-84 and 378-84 is REVERSED,
accused-appellants Manuel S. Isip and
Marietta M. Isip ACQUITTED of the crimes
charged and the civil aspect of those cases
DISMISSED."13
Petitioner is now before us appealing his
conviction in Criminal Case No. 136-84. He
raises the following issues:
First WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL
COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE IMPUTED TO PETITIONER AND
FOR WHICH HE WAS CONVICTED;
Second WHETHER THE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENTLY SHOWS THAT PETITIONER
RECEIVED THE SUBJECT OF SAID
OFFENSE OR THAT HE RECEIVED IT IN
CAVITE CITY; and
Third, WHETHER THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL
LIABILITY ARISING FROM SAID OFFENSE,
IS (sic) ANY, WAS EXTINGUISHED BY
NOVATION.
On the first issue, petitioner maintains that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the estafa
charge in Criminal Case No. 136-84 and it is
pure speculation and conjectural, if not
altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to
suppose that any of the essential elements of
the Estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 136-
84 took place in Cavite City. First, he states
that the residence of the parties is immaterial
and that it is the situs of the transaction that
counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that
simply because complainant had an alleged
ancestral house in Caridad, Cavite,
complainant actually lived there and had the
transactions there with him when he and his
late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere
convenience suggests that their transaction
was entered into in Manila. He adds that the
source of the fund used to finance the
transactions is likewise inconsequential
because it is where the subject item was
delivered and received by petitioner and/or
where it was to be accounted for that
determines venue where Estafa, if any, may
be charged and tried. Second, he further
argues that it does not follow that because
complainant may have been on leave from the
Bureau of Customs, the transactions were
necessarily entered into during that leave and
in Cavite City. He asserts that there is no
competent proof showing that during his leave
of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that
the transactions involved, including the
subject of Criminal Case 136-84 covering
roughly the period from February to April
1984, coincided with his alleged leave.
The concept of venue of actions in criminal
cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional.14 The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.15 It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case.
However, if the evidence adduced during the
trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction.16
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the
Court of Appeals, are convinced that the
venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite
City. The complainant had sufficiently shown
that the transaction covered by Criminal Case
No. 136-84 took place in his ancestral home in
Cavite City when he was on approved leave of
absence17 from the Bureau of Customs. Since
it has been shown that venue was properly
laid, it is now petitioners task to prove
otherwise, for it is his claim that the
transaction involved was entered into in
Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he
who alleges must prove his allegations
applies.18
In the instant case, petitioner failed to
establish by sufficient and competent
evidence that the transaction happened in
Manila. Petitioner argues that since he and his
late wife actually resided in Manila,
convenience alone unerringly suggests that
the transaction was entered into in Manila. We
are not persuaded. The fact that Cavite City is
a bit far from Manila does not necessarily
mean that the transaction cannot or did not
happen there. Distance will not prevent any
person from going to a distant place where he
can procure goods that he can sell so that he
can earn a living. This is true in the case at
bar. It is not improbable or impossible for
petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once,
but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is
the number of times they received pieces of
jewelry from complainant. Moreover, the fact
that the checks issued by petitioners late wife
in all the transactions with complainant were
drawn against accounts with banks in Manila
or Makati likewise cannot lead to the
conclusion that the transactions were not
entered into in Cavite City.
It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility,
the trial courts assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if
not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court to evaluate properly
testimonial evidence.19 It is to be pointed out
that the findings of fact of the trial court have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is
settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon this Court.20 In the case at bar, we find
no compelling reason to reverse the findings
of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, and to apply the exception. We so
hold that there is sufficient evidence to show
that the particular transaction took place in
Cavite City.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that
the Court of Appeals holding that the ring
subject of Crim. Case No. 136-84 was
delivered to and received by petitioner is
seriously flawed. He argues that assuming he
signed the receipt evidencing delivery of the
ring, not due to the threat of prosecution but
merely to preserve his friendship with
complainant, the fact remains that there is no
showing that the ring was actually delivered to
him. Petitioner insists there is no competent
evidence that the ring subject of Criminal
Case No. 136-84 was ever actually received
by, or delivered to, him.
We find his contentions untenable. The finding
of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
received the ring subject of Criminal Case No.
136-84 is supported by the evidence on
record. The acknowledgment
receipt21 executed by petitioner is very clear
evidence that he received the ring in question.
Petitioners claim that he did not receive any
ring and merely executed said receipt in order
to preserve his friendship with the complainant
deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner, an astute businessman as he is,
knows the significance, import and obligation
of what he executed and signed. The following
disputable presumptions weigh heavily
against petitioner, namely: (a) That a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act; (b) That a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns; (c) That private
transactions have been fair and regular; and
(d) That the ordinary course of business has
been followed 22Thus, it is presumed that one
does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and
consequences. We know that petitioner
understood fully well the ramification of the
acknowledgment receipt he executed. It
devolves upon him then to overcome these
presumptions. We, however, find that he failed
to do so. Aside from his self-serving allegation
that he signed the receipt to preserve his
friendship with complainant, there is no
competent evidence that would rebut said
presumptions. It is clear from the evidence
that petitioner signed the acknowledgment
receipt when he received the ring from
complainant in Cavite City.
Petitioners argument that he did not receive
the subject ring23 is further belied by the
testimony of his wife when the latter testified
that said ring was borrowed by him on 7
March 1984.24 In all, the delivery of the ring
and the transaction regarding the same
occurred in Cavite City.
Anent the third issue, petitioner argues that,
assuming gratia argumenti that any criminal
liability was incurred by petitioner respecting
the ring subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84,
the same was incipient, at best, and was
effectively extinguished by novation. The
personal and real properties
delivered/conveyed to complainant were more
than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred
as shown by the fact that complainant
executed Affidavits of Desistance and caused
the dismissal of some of the cases filed. He
maintains that the Court of Appeals did not
apply the rule of novation as regards the ring
subject of Criminal Case No. 136-84 because
it rejected his denial of receipt of said ring and
his claim that he signed the receipt
supposedly covering the same under threat of
prosecution and merely to preserve their good
relations. He claims the Court should not have
denied the application of the rule of novation
on said case because the rejected initial claim
(that he did not receive the ring and that he
signed the receipt to preserve their good
relations) was but an alternative defense and
its rejection is not a reason to deny the
application of the novation rule in said case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that
novation25 cannot be applied in Criminal Case
No. 136-84. The claim of petitioner that the
personal and real properties conveyed to
complainant and/or to his family were more
than sufficient to cover or offset whatever
balance remained of the obligations incurred
has no basis. If it were true that the properties
delivered to complainant were sufficient, the
latter would have caused the dismissal of all,
not some as in this instance, the cases
against petitioner and his late wife. This,
complainant did not do for the simple reason
that the properties conveyed to him were not
enough to cover all the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his deceased wife. Complainant
testified that the properties he received were
in settlement of cases other than the cases
being tried herein.26 In particular, he said that
petitioner and his spouse settled eight cases
which were subsequently dismissed when
they delivered properties as payment.27 It
follows then that the obligations incurred by
petitioner and his spouse were not yet settled
when the criminal cases herein tried were
filed.
His contention, that the Court of Appeals did
not apply the rule of novation in Criminal Case
No. 136-84 because it rejected or did not
believe his (alternative) defense of denial, is
untenable. The main reason why the Court of
Appeals did not apply novation in said case
was that not all the elements of novation are
present. For novation to take place, four
essential requisites have to be met, namely,
(1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an
agreement of all parties concerned to a new
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old
obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new
obligation. In Criminal Case No. 136-84, only
the first element is extant. What distinguishes
this case from Criminal Cases No. 256-84,
257-84, 260-84, 261-84 and 378-84, where
the Court of Appeals applied the rule of
novation, was that there were checks issued
as payment, though subsequently dishonored,
for the pieces of jewelry involved. In Criminal
Case No. 136-84, it is very clear that neither
petitioner nor his wife issued any check as
payment for the subject ring that could have
extinguished his old obligation and brought to
life a new obligation.
From the allegations of the information in
Criminal Case No. 136-84, it is clear that
petitioner was charged with Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b), of the Revised
Penal Code. The elements of estafa with
abuse of confidence are: (1) the offender
receives the money, goods or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (2) the offender misappropriates or
converts such money or property or denies
receiving such money or property; (3) the
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to
the prejudice of another; and (4) the offended
party demands that the offender return the
money or property.28 All these are present in
this case. Petitioner received from
complainant a seven-carat diamond (mens
ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose
of selling the same on commission basis and
to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof or
return the jewelry if not sold. Petitioner
misappropriated or converted said ring for his
own benefit and even denied receiving the
same. Despite repeated demands from
complainant, petitioner failed to return the ring
or the proceeds of the sale thereof causing
damage and prejudice to complainant in the
amount of P200,000.00.
As to the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals on petitioner, we find the same to be
in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision and amended
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 21275 dated 26 October 2004 dated 26
October 2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167764 October 9, 2009
VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G.
FAJARDO, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24,
2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated
December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also
assailed is the CA Resolution2dated April 8,
2005 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
In an Information3 dated October 17, 1994
filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners
Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were
charged with the crime of libel committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in
the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively,
of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner
in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write
and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to
wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,
COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do
all their best to promote the health of their
patients. Especially if they are employed by a
company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be
happening in the Local San Miguel
Corporation office, SMC employees are
fuming mad about their company physician,
Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing
well in his sworn obligation in looking after the
health problems of employees, reports
reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee
Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about
Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19
last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr.
Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her
under observation, taking seven months to
conclude that she had rectum myoma and
must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services
of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr.
Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got
angry, sources said, after knowing that the
family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their
own without his nod as he had one to
recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last
March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again
complained of difficulty in urinating and
defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted
to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's
recommendee, was devastating to the family
and the patient herself who woke to find out
her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a
catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had
cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation,
this time to bore another hole on the left side
of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the
referral frankly turned it down because it
would only be a waste of money since the
disease was already on the terminal state.
The company and the family spent
some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the
good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your
side, May the Healer of all healers likewise
touch the conscience of physicians to remind
them that their profession is no license for
self-enrichment at the expense of the poor.
But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2,
1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar
experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to
act like agents of multinational corporations
prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are
equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much
lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals,
owned by a so-called charitable religious
institutions and so-called civic groups, too
greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-
and mother-friendly practices which are
cheaper and more effective, they still prefer
the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote
infant milk formula although mother's milk is
many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic)
than the brands they peddle. These hospitals
separate newly born from their moms for
days, conditioning the former to milk formula
while at the same time stunting the mother's
mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to
death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family
of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994,
Her body lies at the Payunan residence
located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City.
May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as
wanting in high sense of professional integrity,
trust and responsibility expected of him as a
physician, which imputation and insinuation as
both accused knew were entirely false and
malicious and without foundation in fact and
therefore highly libelous, offensive and
derogatory to the good name, character and
reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon being arraigned5 on March 1, 1995,
petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its
Decision6 finding petitioners guilty as charged.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts
obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both
accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr.
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for
the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and
punishable under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to
One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-
One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as
Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00
each.7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
denied in an Order8 dated February 20, 1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with
the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its
assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners
based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE
"LIBELOUS" WITHIN THE MEANING
AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FINDING THE
EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS
CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
AS PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE
MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY
NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY
SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE
NEWSPAPER'S OPINION
COLUMNISTS.9
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding
that the element of defamatory imputation was
satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist,
portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent
doctor and an opportunist who enriched
himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners
pose the question of whether a newspaper
opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a
patient and her family and expresses the
family's outrage in print, commits libel when
the columnist criticizes the doctor's
competence or lack of it, and such criticism
turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely
false. Petitioners claim that the article was
written in good faith in the belief that it would
serve the public good. They contend that the
CA erred in finding the existence of malice in
the publication of the article; that no malice in
law or actual malice was proven by the
prosecution; and that the article was printed
pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to
report matters of public interest. Petitioners
further contend that the subject article was an
opinion column, which was the columnists
exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo,
as the editor and publisher of Panay News,
did not have to share those views and should
not be held responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment,
alleging that only errors of law are reviewable
by this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners
are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not
the element of malice required in every
indictment for libel was established by the
prosecution, which would require the weighing
anew of the evidence already passed upon by
the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings
of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are
accorded finality, unless there appears on
records some facts or circumstance of weight
which the court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated, and which,
if properly considered, may alter the result of
the case a situation that is not, however,
obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first
two issues presented in their petition do not
require the evaluation of evidence submitted
in court; that malice, as an element of libel,
has always been discussed whenever raised
as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time
the issue that the information charging them
with libel did not contain allegations sufficient
to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for
resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the
offense of libel as charged in the Information
dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the
first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction
over the offense charged only in their Reply
filed before this Court and finds that
petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,10 the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with
the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the
trial courts jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that
an objection based on the ground that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the offense
charged may be raised or considered motu
proprio by the court at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the
court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred
by the sovereign authority which organized
the court, and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law. While an
exception to this rule was recognized by this
Court beginning with the landmark case of
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense
of lack of jurisdiction by the court which
rendered the questioned ruling was
considered to be barred by laches, we find
that the factual circumstances involved in said
case, a civil case, which justified the departure
from the general rule are not present in the
instant criminal case.11
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. The Court held in
Macasaet v. People12 that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to
be acquired by courts in criminal cases the
offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal
case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the
evidence adduced during the trial show that
the offense was committed somewhere else,
the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)13
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides
the specific rules as to the venue in cases of
written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.Any
person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in
writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or
the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of
first instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided, however, That where
one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time
of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first
published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed
and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous matter is
printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,14 the rules on venue in
Article 360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a
public official or a private person, the
criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private
individual, the criminal action may also
be filed in the Court of First Instance
of the province where he actually
resided at the time of the commission
of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public
officer whose office is in Manila at the
time of the commission of the offense,
the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public
officer holding office outside of Manila,
the action may be filed in the Court of
First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense.15
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since
Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of
the publication of the alleged libelous article,
the venue of the libel case may be in the
province or city where the libelous article was
printed and first published, or in the province
where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel
filed in this case which for convenience the
Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in
the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as
columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively,
of Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
malicious intent of impeaching the virtue,
honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar
Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner
in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of
injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write
and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article
entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN...."
The allegations in the Information that "Panay
News, a daily publication with a considerable
circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout
the region" only showed that Iloilo was the
place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said
publication was printed and first published in
Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,16 which
involved a libel case filed by a private
individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of
the Information of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and
confederating with others whose true names,
real identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another, with
malicious intent of impeaching the honesty,
virtue, character and reputation of one
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor
General of the Philippines, and with the
evident purpose of injuring and exposing him
to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
maliciously cause to be published in "Smart
File," a magazine of general circulation in
Manila, and in their respective capacity as
Editor-in-Chief and Author-Reporter, ....17
the Court ruled that the Information did not
sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance
with Article 360. The Court made the following
disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this
case reveals that the word "published" is
utilized in the precise context of noting that the
defendants "cause[d] to be published in
'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation
in Manila." The Information states that the
libelous articles were published in Smart File,
and not that they were published in Manila.
The place "Manila" is in turn employed to
situate where Smart File was in general
circulation, and not where the libel was
published or first printed. The fact that Smart
File was in general circulation in Manila does
not necessarily establish that it was published
and first printed in Manila, in the same way
that while leading national dailies such as the
Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star
are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not
mean that these newspapers are published
and first printed in Cebu.1avv phi 1
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand
sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts
since the publication is in general circulation in
Manila, there would be no impediment to the
filing of the libel action in other locations
where Smart File is in general circulation.
Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star,
the granting of this petition would allow a
resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for
libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply
because these newspapers are in general
circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is
precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to
avoid.18
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,19 which also involved
a libel case filed by a private individual, the
Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City
where the Information therein alleged that the
libelous article was "published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of
general circulation in the City of Baguio and
the entire Philippines," the Court did not
consider the Information sufficient to show
that Baguio City was the venue of the printing
and first publication of the alleged libelous
article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended provides that a private individual
may also file the libel case in the RTC of the
province where he actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense. The
Information filed against petitioners failed to
allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the
Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo
City," such allegation did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually
residing in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offense. It is possible that
Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another
place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,20 where the
Information for libel alleged that the "offended
party was the Acting General Manager of the
Baguio Country Club and of good standing
and reputation in the community," the Court
did not find such allegation sufficient to
establish that the offended party was actually
residing in Baguio City. The Court explained WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
its ruling in this wise: Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of
The residence of a person is his personal, Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET
actual or physical habitation or his actual ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
residence or place of abode provided he the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
resides therein with continuity and 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527
consistency; no particular length of time of is DISMISSED without prejudice.
residence is required. However, the residence
must be more than temporary. The term SO ORDERED.
residence involves the idea of something
beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be
a resident, one must abide in a place where
he had a house therein. To create a residence
in a particular place, two fundamental
elements are essential: The actual bodily
presence in the place, combined with a freely
exercised intention of remaining there
permanently or for an indefinite time. While it
is possible that as the Acting General
Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the
petitioner may have been actually residing in
Baguio City, the Informations did not state that
he was actually residing therein when the
alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely
possible that the private complainant may
have been actually residing in another place.
One who transacts business in a place and
spends considerable time thereat does not
render such person a resident therein. Where
one may have or own a business does not of
itself constitute residence within the meaning
of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is
not conclusive of residence there for purposes
of venue.21

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court

over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information,
and the offense must have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.22 Considering that the Information failed
to allege the venue requirements for a libel
case under Article 360, the Court finds that
the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to
hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting
petitioners of the crime of libel should be set
aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice
to its filing with the court of competent
jurisdiction.