1. MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B.

ABEJO, represented by his

Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
2003 Oct 8 1st Division G.R. No. 120864

CASE DOCTRINES

Co-owner may file an action against a co-owner; purpose

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action
is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as
co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.

Co-ownership; right of enjoyment

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote
common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the
co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the
entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot
demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the
co-owner who dwells in the house.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DEGUIA.
Abejos contentions:
1. he is the owner of the undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond registered Register of Deeds of Bulacan.
2. ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters.

3. DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and
prejudice.
4. DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIAs
sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired.
5. asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay damages.
In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged:
1. the complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed.
2. the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir.
3. ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire
FISHPOND.
4. ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion
of the FISHPOND for himself.
5. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.

RTC decision: in favor of Abejo.

CA decision: affirmed the RTC.
Issue 1: WON a co-owner may file an action for ejectment against a co-owner.

Ruling:

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial courts
within one year from dispossession. However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls
under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de
reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner
who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of
the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property
because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.

In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the
rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
 It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner
has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete,
specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is
represented only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to
possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when
they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building in favor of private respondent.

xxxx

Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND
quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are
owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time individual
owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified.
As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions. Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA,
judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to
laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-
ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by
law.

To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-
ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial
partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the
proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such
recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.

Issue 2: WON it is proper for a co-owner to pay for rents while using the property.

Ruling:

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot
devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house,
all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies
the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot
demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the
co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these
options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their
silence have allowed him to use the property.
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the
proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry,
the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits.
 2. VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents. G.R. No. 76351 October
29, 1993

CASE DOCTRINES

Co-owners may demand partition at any time; indivisible to be sold and proceeds divided accordingly (Art. 494, 498)
This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of
the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners
are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of
the co-owners.

Action to compel the sale of a co-owned property which is granted by the court terminates the co-ownership
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not
refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately.
xxx
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari.

Virgilio and Senen are brothers. Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October
1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was
two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio
and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his
possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father.

Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be
executed and the title registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take
care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.

After their father died in 1974, petitioner (Virgilio) demanded from respondent (Senen) that the latter vacate the
house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. Senen refused.

On 12 January 1979, Virgilio filed an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they could divide the
proceeds between them.

Petitioners prayers:

1. the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent.

2. for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died.

Respondents counterclaims:

1. that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained

2. that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and,

3. being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.
RTC decision: rendered judgment by default against defendant. It ruled:

1. Senen and Virgilio are co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement.

2. that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the
house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition.

3. upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition.

CA decision: set aside the RTC decision.

RULING:

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE 2: WON Virgilio and Senen are co-owners of the house in equal shares.

RULING:

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not
touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence
presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter
the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

xxx

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals
by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners
cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-
owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or
assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, this Court upheld the order
of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the
Civil Code.

However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to
petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than
that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective
share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership
over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent
has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the
premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal
interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property appertaining to petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered
the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly
also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and
from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

HELD: Petition is GRANTED.

3. LEONOR B. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.TEOFILA M. CATAPANG, respondent. G.R. No. 164110 February 12, 2008

CASE DOCTRINES

Alteration; needs concurrence of all co-owners

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners,
validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.

Entry into the property without the consent of other co-owners is stealth; getting only the consent of one of the co-
owners is strategy.

Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine
act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the
land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be categorized as possession by
stealth. Moreover, respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and
allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order
to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

FACTS:

This petition for review.

Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square
meters located at Taal, Batangas. With the consent of Norma Maligaya, Teofila M. Catapang built a house on a lot
adjacent to the parcel of land sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of the co-owned
property.

In 1995, Leonor B. Cruz visited the property and was surprised to see a part of Catapangs house was intruding unto a
portion of the co-owned property. She then made several demands upon respondent to demolish the intruding
structure and to vacate the portion encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused and disregarded
her demands.

On January 25, 1996, the Cruz filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang.

MCTC decision: in favor of Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify defendants
construction of the house and possession of the portion of the lot in question.
RTC decision: affirmed the MCTC. MR was also denied.

CA decision: reversed the RTC. It held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case because
respondents entry into the property, considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.

Petitioners contention/s:

1. the consent and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the action for forcible entry since it is a
basic principle in the law of co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the
land or thing owned in common until partition.

Respondents contention/s:

1. the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her entry into the property was not through strategy or
stealth due to the consent of one of the co-owners.

2. since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the issue is not just possession de facto but also one of
possession de jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.

ISSUE 1: WON the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by another co-
owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property.

RULING:

As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed
by another co-owner against the person who was given the consent to construct a house on the co-owned property,
we have held that a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-
ownership. In our view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a house on the co-owned property,
which is an act tantamount to devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.

Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-
owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement,
express or implied.

Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common, even though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by one or
more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.

Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third person to construct a house on the
co-owned property will injure the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners from using the property
in accordance with their rights.

Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners,
validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all co-owners,
respondent had no right to construct her house on the co-owned property.

ISSUE 2: WON there was valid ground for forcible entry.

Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against the
builder. The consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest
upon respondent any right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the property still falls under the
classification "through strategy or stealth."

The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because respondents entry into the property was not
through strategy or stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners. We cannot give our imprimatur
to this sweeping conclusion. Respondents entry into the property without the permission of petitioner could appear
to be a secret and clandestine act done in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent allowed to
stay in her house. Entry into the land effected clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners could be
categorized as possession by stealth. Moreover, respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her
sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy
which she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.

4. Plasabas v. CA

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with damages against respondents. In the said
complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the sole of owners of said property.

Respondents denied petitioners allegation and contended it was inherited by all the parties from their common
ancestor, Francisco Plasabas.

Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land. Based
on the testimonies of petitioners witnesses, the property passed on from Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita
Talam, petitioner Nieves grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her siblingsJose,
Victor and Victoria.

Respondents then argued that the case should have been terminated for petitioners failure to implead her siblings as
indispensable parties.

CFI dismissed the complaint.

CA affirmed CFI and stated that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not be applied considering that the complaint was
not for ejectment, but for recovery of title or a reivindicatory action; MR denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 487 is applicable only to the case of ejectment and not to reivindicatory action.

RULING:

No. Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment. The article
covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A
co-owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-
owners, but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners.

With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners complaint is one for ejectment or for
recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of the Civil Code applies to both actions. Thus, petitioners, in their complaint,
do not have to implead their co-owners as parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. In such a case,
the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole owners of the property in litigation is
immaterial, considering that they acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her
siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue the case on the latters behalf.

Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore, not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.

In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when they summarily dismissed the case, after
both parties had rested their cases following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to
implead indispensable parties.

The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiffs/petitioner's failure to comply therewith.

5. Marmo vs. Anacay

FACTS:

Respondent alleged that he and his wife (now deceased) own a parcel of land and a house built thereon,
covered by TCT No. T-815595.
They authorized petitioner Josephine to sell the subject property. So, Josephine sold the same to petitioner
Danilo payable in monthly installments. However, Danilo defaulted in his installment payments.
Subsequently, respondent discovered that TCT No. T-815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was
issued in the name of Josephine by virtue of falsified Deed of Absolute Sale.
Then, Josephine transferred her to title to Danilo and TCT No. T-991035 was issued in latters name.
So, the respondent filed a case of Annulment of Sale and Recovery of Title with Damages against the
petitioners.

Josephine stated in her Answer that respondents children should have been included as plaintiffs as co-
owners of the property, making them an indispensable parties. Petitioners submit that respondents children
succeeded their deceased mother as co-owners and thus indispensable parties.

Respondent argued that his children are not indispensable parties because the issue involved is whether the
signatures of the respondent and his wife in the Deed of Absolute Sale were falsified - can be resolved without the
participation of the respondents children.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. MR denied
CA RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. MR failed.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents children are indispensable parties

RULING:

No.

When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any
one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This includes suit for forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
recovery of possession, recovery of ownership, or reivindicatory actions.

If the suit is brought by a co-owner, without repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for
the benefit of the other co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-owners. However, where the
co-owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit is brought against
a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded as party-defendants, as the suit affects
the rights and interests of these other co-owners.

In the present case, the respondent, as the plaintiff in the court below, never disputed the existence of a co-
ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. But the issue is falsification, an issue
which does not require the participation of the respondents co-owners at the trial; it can be determined without their
presence because they are not parties to the document; their signatures do not appear therein.

Their rights and interests as co-owners are adequately protected by their co-owner and father respondent, since the
complaint was made precisely to recover ownership and possession of the properties owned in common, and, as
such, will redound to the benefit of all the co-owners.

6. CASE DIGEST: Baloloy v Hular

(Note: This case have several issues but only the issue about co-ownership was presented in this digest)

FACTS: Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay
Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property was agricultural,
while the rest was residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow,
Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, ( 15,906
sqm) and the residential portion of the property (287 sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado
asked Hulars permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the latter
agreed.

Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of the residential portion of Lot 3347 Lot No. 3353
(9302 sqm) and registered the same. Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353. He and his
family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.

In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however,
occupied a big portion of Lot No. 3353.

Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children continued residing in the property,
while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his
deceased father. When Astrologo died, he was survived by his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo,
Teresita, and the respondent, among others, who continued to reside in their house.

Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and discovered that the residential area deeded by
Lagata to Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square meters only.

Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of real property against the children and heirs of
Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He
prayed among others that he be declared the absolute owner of the property in question.

ISSUE: Whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the respondent in the trial court (NO)

RULING: Respondent adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they were survived by their
children, the respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita.

Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under
Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all
kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. If the
action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and
praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co- owners had waived their
rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the
case in the trial court.

7. Arcelona vs. CA

FACTS:

Petitioners Marcelino Arcelona, Tomasa Arcelona-Chiang and Ruth Arcelona, with their three sisters Olanday,
et al., are co-owners of a fishpond which they inherited from their deceased parents.
A contract of lease over the fishpond was executed by Cipriano Tandoc and Olanday, et al.
Private respondent Moses Farnacio was appointed by Tandoc as caretaker-tenant of the fishpond.
When the lease contract has been terminated, Tandoc surrendered the fishpond to Olanday, et al.
Three days after, private respondent instituted Civil Case D-7240 peaceful possession, maintenance of
security of tenure plus damages, with motion for the issuance of an interlocutory order against Olanday, et al., in
order to maintain private respondent as tenant.

RTC - ruled in favor of the latter.

Intermediate appellate court - affirmed with slight modification the ruling of RTC.
SC - affirmed IAC.

Petitioners then filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the aforesaid judgment against private respondent.

CA dismissed the petition, declaring that only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud, which is
absent in Civil Case D-7240.

Petitioners that CA that the sole and only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud, and in thereby
ignoring various Supreme Court rulings that a final judgment may also be annulled for a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; b) lack of jurisdiction over the persons of necessary or indispensable parties; and c) lack of due
process.
 Petitioners argue that, being co-owners of the subject property, they are indispensable parties. Inasmuch as
they were not impleaded in Civil Case D-7240, the questioned judgment of the lower court is void insofar as the
petitioners are concerned for want of jurisdiction over their persons and [for] lack of due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in ruling that that only ground for annulment of judgment is extrinsic fraud.

RULING:

Yes. To set aside a final and executory judgment, there are three remedies available to a litigant: first, a petition for
relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake and excusable
negligence filed within sixty (60) days from the time petitioner learns of the judgment but not more than six (6)
months from the entry thereof; second, a direct action to annul the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud;
and third, a direct action for certiorari or collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by
virtue of its own recitals.

Basic considerations of due process, however, impel a similar holding in cases involving jurisdiction over the persons
of indispensable parties which a court must acquire before it can validly pronounce judgments personal to said
defendants. Courts acquire jurisdiction over a party plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of a party defendant is assured upon the service of summons in the manner required by
law or otherwise by his voluntary appearance. As a rule, if a defendant has not been summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over his person, and a personal judgment rendered against such defendant is null and void. A decision that
is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court is not a decision in the contemplation of law and,
hence, it can never become final and executory.

Formerly, Article 487 of the old Civil Code provided that any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. It
was subsequently held that a co-owner could not maintain an action in ejectment without joining all the other co-
owners. Former Chief Justice Moran, an eminent authority on remedial law, explains:

x x x. As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be maintained by a person
having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be
conclusive as against the other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in possession of the property
might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted
against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right
against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all persons standing in the same
position, so that the whole matter in dispute may be determined once and for all in one litigation.

Contrariwise, it is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-
owners; in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a tenant who fails to
implead all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.

Co-owners in an action for the security of tenure of a tenant are encompassed within the definition of indispensable
parties; thus, all of them must be impleaded.

Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. Private respondent does not deny this fact, and the Court of Appeals did not
make any contrary finding. The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property is owned by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over
which portion the tenancy relation of private respondent has been established and ruled upon in Civil Case D-
7240. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties.

Clearly, the decision in Civil Case D-7240 cannot bind petitioners and cannot adjudicate the entire co-owned property,
not even that portion belonging to Olanday et al., ownership of the property being still pro-indiviso. Obviously, the
failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final adjudication. Without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, a judgment therein cannot attain finality.

8. Taghoy vs. Tigol

FACTS:

Spouses Filomeno Taghoy and Margarita Amit owned a parcel of land. They executed a special
power of attorney, appointing Felixberto Tigol, Jr. as their attorney-in-fact.
Felixberto, as attorney-in-fact, executed a real estate mortgage over the subject property to secure a
loan of P22,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank (PNB). The Spouses obtained the loan to finance the
shellcraft business of their children.
Filomeno died intestate. So, Margarita and their 7 children, as heirs of the deceased, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale, adjudicating to themselves the subject property and selling the
same to Rosita and her husband Felixberto (respondents). 2 Deeds of Confirmation of sale was executed by
the hiers.
Simultaneous with the execution of the deeds, however, the respondents executed explanatory Joint
Affidavits attesting that the sale was without any consideration, and was only executed to secure a loan.
A TCT was issued in respondents names.
Then, respondents availed a loan with the Philippine Banking Corporation, mortgaging the subject
property as security.
7 years later, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for declaration of nullity of the
respondents' TCT and for judicial partition, alleging that the sale was fictitious or simulated, as evidenced by
the respondents' own explanatory joint affidavits attesting that the transfer was for the purpose only of
convenience in securing a loan, not for absolute conveyance or sale.
Respondents claimed that when Filomeno died without the PNB loan being paid, the heirs agreed
that the respondents will advance payment of the loan, subject to reimbursement, to save the foreclosure
of the subject property; the heirs then executed the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale in the respondents'
favor as their way of reimbursing the amount respondent paid. But since when the heirs failed to reimburse
the amounts advanced by them, registered the title in their names.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.

CA reversed RTCs decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are entitled for the ownership of the subject property due to petitioners
failure to reimburse them.

RULING:

No. The failure of the other heirs to reimburse the amounts advanced by the respondents in payment of the loan did
not entitle the latter to claim full ownership of the co-owned property. It only gave them the right to claim
reimbursement for the amounts they advanced in behalf of the co-ownership. The respondents' advance payments
are in the nature of necessary expenses for the preservation of the co-ownership.

Article 488 of the Civil Code provides that necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to
collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. Until reimbursed, the respondents hold a lien upon the subject
property for the amount they advanced.

9. Cruz vs. Leis

FACTS:

Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a widow. Leis
only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.

Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the land from DANR,
but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed of Absolute Sale and a Contract
indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so she consolidated the
ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.

When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint with the RTC
averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC found in favor of
the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because Cruz failed to get a judicial
order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply with the requirements of the right to
repurchase (Art. 1607).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on co-ownership?

HELD:

Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis death, the conjugal property regime ceased, and
gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Co-ownership of the land
then began.

However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the land transferred to
Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer back to the heirs, for
compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens System.
 10. Sanchez vs. CA

FACTS:

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered
under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez
married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando
Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.

On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co-owners in her
favor.

Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot,
thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC.

MeTC decision: in favor of Teria, declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6
remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been
established as a forgery.

RTC decision: affirmed the RTC, because they failed to submit their pleadings.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private Virginia
Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon
petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioners house without any special permit of demolition
from the court.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of
the premises that used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry area.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was
not bound by the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners appeal memorandum.

RTC decision: denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

CA (Petition for Certiorari): dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner has a right to the property.

RULING:

Yes. Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a
spiritual part of a thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as the manifestation of the private
right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner over the things subject to it,
is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material
indivision, which means that there is a single object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which
binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights and obligations of the co-
owners.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute.
Whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed
with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do
any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among
the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the
others.

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite
portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or
thing.

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of
the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned
in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical
adjudication.

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been
designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her
right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share
and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

11. Heirs of Protacio, Sr. vs. Go

FACTS:

Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr.

23 years later, the latter executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath
that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
Protacio Go Sr.s wife died. Then Protacio Sr. and his son respondent Rito Go, sold the portion of the property
to respondent Servacio.
The petitioners demanded the return of the property but Servacio refused. Thus, petitioners sued Servacio
and Rito for the annulment of the sale. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code.
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased
it with his own money. And that the want of the liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because
the sale was valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale
did not also prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the
aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.

The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

RULING:

No. Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, and
an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share
in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly characterized as one of conjugal partnership
governed by the Civil Code.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership,
could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual partition of the property
being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in
Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and
Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-
owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of
the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership
is without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing
owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but
the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed
and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-
heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her.

15. Domingo vs. Spouses Molina

FACTS: On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling,
Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land which was
annotated on the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.
Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina all
throughout his life. Ten years after the death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the
spouses Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
2729677 and the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was transferred to the them.
One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery
of Ownership against the spouses Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims
that it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father has borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio
could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Floras consent, as she was
already dead at the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to
answer for his debts and told them that they already own half of the land. They have been in
possession of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have
religiously paid the propertys real estate taxes.
The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted them when they died during the
pendency of the case.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim
that his father did not sell the property to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could dispose
of conjugal property to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it denied Melecios motion for
reconsideration of the RTC ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant
evidence that there was fraud in the conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave credence
to the OCT annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that Floras death is immaterial because
Anastacio only sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding Floras interest. Finally, the CA
held that Melecios action has prescribed because he failed to file the action within one year after entry of the
decree of registration.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Floras consent is
valid and legal; and 2. Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses
Molina.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the
spouses Molina is void without Floras consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.
Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Codes effectivity which was on August
3, 1988 and so their property relation is a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in 1968,
pursuant to now Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.
The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties
pending liquidation and partition. This will also include Anastacio with respect to Floras share of the conjugal
partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties
without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial decree. On the other hand,
Anastacio owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an
undivided interest. As a consequence, he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided
interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios
interest. Anastactios sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally
void, for his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred. The spouses Molina would be a
trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs
after liquidation and partition. Melecios recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed
property to the spouses Molina. The notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT executed
between Anastacio and the spouses Molina negated Melecios argument that no document was executed for
the sale of the disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioners belief that his father, Anastacio, could not
have sold the property without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the
spouses Molina's registered title over the subject property.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 9,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94160 is AFFIRMED.