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Kochumuttom
A BUDDHIST
DOCTRINE OF
EXPERIENCE
A BUDDHIST DOCTRINE
OF E X P E R I E N C E
T H O M A S A. K O C H U M U T T O M
M O T IL A L B A N A R S ID A S S P U B L IS H E R S
P R IV A T E L IM IT E D
DELHI
First Published: Delhi, 1982
Reprinted: Delhi, 1989
ISBN: 81-208-0662-x
Also available a t :
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P R IN T E D IN IN D IA
BY JA IN E N D R A P R A K A S H JA IN A T S H R I J AIN EN D R A P R E SS, A-45 N A R A IN A IN D U ST R IA L
A R E A , PH A S E I , N E W D E L H I 110028 AND P U B L IS H E D BY N A R E N D R A P R A K A S H JA IN
F O R M O T IL A L BANARSIDASS PU B L ISH E R S P V T . L T D ., B U N G A L O W R O A D ,
JA W A H A R N A O A R , D ELH I 110007.
FOR MY FATHER
CO N TEN TS
P refa ce x i - x x ii
A b b r e v ia t io n s x x i ii
C H A PTER
O ne IN T R O D U C T IO N : A G ENERAL STA TE
M EN T O F T H E T H E S IS AND A R G U M EN T S 1-26
1 . Introduction 27
2. T he Im agination of the U nreal 29
Term s explained 29
Neither void nor non-void 41
Forms of the im agination of the unreal 45
( Viii )
F iv e A T R E A T IS E IN TW E N TY STANZAS
(VIM SAT1KA) 164-196
1. Introduction 164
2. V asubandhus Thesis 165
3. Argument from Illusory Experience 166
An objection 167
V asubandhus reply 167
4. Non-substantiality of Atman and Dharma 170
5. V asubandhus Criticism of Realism 174
6. Refutation of the Correspondence Theory of
Knowledge 181
7. Inter-action and Inter-relation Between Indivi
duals 188
8. Conclusion 195
TR A N S L A T IO N O F T H E TEX TS
A PPE N D IX I
T h e Verses on Discrimination between
M iddle and Extremes 235-246
APPEN D IX I I
A Treatise on the T hree Natures 247-253
A PPE N D IX I I I
A Treatise in T h irty Stanzas 254-259
A PPEN D IX IV
A Treatise in Tw enty Stanzas 260-275
IND EX 281-287
PREFACE
2. E. Frauwallner, Ort the Date o f the Buddhist Master o f the Law Vasubandhu
(R om e : Serie Orientale Roma, I I I , 1951).
3. P. S. Jaini, O n the Theory of Two Vasubandhus**, Bulletin o f the
School o f Oriental and African Studies, X X I (1958), p. 49.
notably those by Stefan Anacker4 and D.N.G. M acleod,5 also
see little point in Frauw allners theory o f two Vasubandhus*.
W hat is more, the latter him self is suggested to have later given
up this theory.6
As far as the present work is concerned, as it is strictly a
textual analysis, the questions o f V asubandhus date and other
biographical details are of little im portance. I m ay, however,
point out by way of a suggestion that an alm ost spontaneous
transition from Abhtdharma-kofa to the Yogacara system is not
altogether unwarranted. For instance, the theory of store
consciousness (<alaya-vijftana) which is universally recognized as
a basic innovation by the Yogacarins, is after all only the
christening o f the theory o f the seeds (bija) in the Abhidharma-
ko$a. This latter theory has been given there in answer to
questions such as : how are defilements associated with a
previous moment of consciousness carried over to the next
moment of consciousness ? How does a past deed produce its
effect in the future ? How is it possible that a past experience
can be recalled in the future ? In answering these questions, all
of which concern the continuity between the past, present
and future, V asubandhu the author of Abhidharma-koia, following
the Sautrantika point o f view, drew on the im agery of the seed-
fruit relationship, and said th at the present and future are
determined by the seeds left behind by the past : the seeds of
the defilements associated with a previous moment of conscious
ness are carried over to the next moment of consciousness; the
seeds o f the past deeds produce their fruits in the future; and
the seeds of the past experiences enable one to recall those
experiences.7 Then w hat the Yogacarins later called alaya-vijhana,
is for all practical purposes ju st the collection of those seeds of
the past determining the present and future behaviour o f an
that nowhere in the texts I have analysed, which are in any case
the basic works in this system, is there an explicit statement of
such a position. Moreover, the only sort of distinction the
authors object to is that between graspable and grasper (grahya-
grahaka-vikalpa). For example, the whole of Madhyanta-vibhdga
in general, and particularly its first chapter, is devoted to show
that the distinction between graspable and grasper is unreal or
rather non-existent (abhQta). T h a t the dualism between gras
pable and grasper is merely m ental construction (parikalpa) and
that ft is, therefore, non-existent (ndsti or na vidyate or na bhavati)
is repeated time and again, while not even once is there a posi
tive denial of a plurality of beings. T h at means, w hat the
Yogacarins are concerned about is the problem of duality, not
of plurality. T h a t there is a plurality o f beings is taken for
granted, while the dualistic view of reality is em phatically
denied.
It should be emphasized th at for the Yogacarins dualism
means basically the dualism between grahya (graspable) and
grahaka (grasper),1 which being merely m ental construction,2
is nothing existent.3 To say that duality is denied while accept
ing plurality, might sound a contradiction in terms. However,
it should be by now clear th at the plurality and duality under
discussion refer to two different universes o f discourse: the for
mer refers to the ontological universe of discourse and stands
for plurality o f beings, while the latter refers to the epistemolo-
gical/experiential universe of discourse and stands for duality
o f understanding. Therefore, there is no contradiction in accept
ing plurality of beings while denying duality of understanding.
For the Yogacarins, there can be and there is, a plurality of
beings, although they do not tolerate the distinction of those
beings into graspable and grasper, enjoyable and enjoyer,
experience-able and experienced, knowable and knower, or object
and subject. Each of those m any beings has to be understood
as characterized neither by subjectivity nor by objectivity; it
is empty of both subjectivity and objectivity as well. This
These passages clearly show that the terms vijhapti and artha do
not stand for any ontological states of reality, but merely denote
two polar concepts, namely those of subjectivity and objectivity
respectively. I call them polar concepts in the sense that each of
them is essentially contrasted with the other; indeed, it gets its
sense by way of this contrast .1 In other words, they do not make
sense without referring to each other. If, therefore, any one of them
could be proved to be non-sensical, the other one, too, is at once
proved to be non-sensical. This is exactly w hat the above quoted
passages get across: vijhapti and artha are contrasted to each
other as standing for the polar concepts of subjectivity and
objectivity; then the non-sensical character of the concept of
mtha is established from the fact that there is only vijhapti; then,
finally, from the non-sensical character of the concept of artha,
is established the non-sensical character of the concept of vijhapti
itself.2 Thus the concepts of both vijhapti and artha turn out to
be non-sensical and, therefore, irrelevant, too. Incidentally, it
m ust be noted that this is the whole point and central argum ent
of the Yogacara philosophy: the entire lot of sarnsara experience
hinges on the polar concepts of subjectivity and objectivity
(grahakatva and grahyatva) namely th at one is the subject of
experience (bhoktr), -while all else are object of ones experience
(bhojya); then the concept of objectivity is proved to be mere
imagination, which will in turn prove the concept of subjectivity
as well to be mere im agination;3 thus the concepts of subjectivity
and objectivity collapsing, the whole samsara experience, too,
collapses, and there autom atically results release (mok$a or mukti
or nirvana). I shall return to this point a little later. W hat in
terests me at the moment are the following facts: (i) the terms
vijhapti and artha under discussion do not refer to anything onto
H " 3
27 S o ca ( p u d g a l a dharma-abhinwiah = upadanam) dvayapalilatvul porikalpUah
svabhcvah MVKBT. Ill- 6. Here dvayam means grahya and grahaka.
A General Statement o f the Thesis and Arguments 13
7. T h e S am e O ld R e a listic P lu ra lism
Let me once again m ake my position clear : I hold that the
Yogacarins retain the B uddhas pluralistic and realistic concep
tion of reality. T he Buddha and his immediate disciples analysed
existence into an interplay of a plurality o f subtle, ultim ate, not
further analysable elements ( dharma) o f m atter (rupa)> m ind
(ndma = citta) and force (samskara). For the Yogacarins, too, exist
ence is composed o f so m any discrete, mutually independent,
further unanalysable elements. As already mentioned, nowhere
in the Yogacara writings does one come across a conclusively
monistic conception of the world. Instead, there are m any
passages which are unintelligible without presupposing a plural
istic view o f reality. For example, a repeatedly raised question
is how the same objects are experienced differently by different
individuals : objects appearing in dreams are seen only by the
dream er, not by others;2 extraordinary objects are seen by
people having bad eyes, not by others;3 rivers in hell appear to
ghosts as filled with putrid stuffs, excrements and urine, whereas
the same rivers appear to ordinary hum an beings as filled with
clear, cool, w ater with nothing unpleasant about it.4 In all these
instances the basic presupposition is th at there are different
individuals having different experiences. Then the question is
how, the circumstances and objective conditions being the same,
they come to have different experiences. Unless one supposes
th at there are different experiencing individuals, this question
would be redundant. O n the other hand, supposing that there
are different individuals, the Yogacarins have very cleverly
answered it saying th at experience differs from one individual
to another according to his psychological disposition an d his
torical past. Sthiram ati says : Each individual stream of m ind
1. MVKBT. III. 3.
2. Kim-atra svabhava-traye tattvam-ifyaU? MVKB. III. 3.
4. Tlfis* answer may paraphrased as follows: T he truth
the three natures, namely parikalpita-svabhava, Pra* ntra~b^
.anna-svabhava, is that they are, respecUvely, permanently non-existent {asnt
nityam) , existent but not really (sad-apiatattuatah) and existent as well as non-
'Chapter on Reality from the M adhyantavi-
bhagasastra , Monumcnta Nipponica, Vol. IX (1953), p. 289.
A General Statement o f the Thesis and Arguments 21
1. asad-artha-avabhdsana. Vims. 1.
2. (same as preceding three notes).
3. Some examples are : anabhildpyena-atmana yo buddhandm visayah iti.
( Vims. Vr. 10); nirabhildpyena-dtmand buddhandm gocarah (Ibid. 21). I am>
however, aware that the plural form buddhah need not necessarily refer to a
plurality of beings, but that it may well be just a reverential way o f
addressing the enlightened one. So a plural form like buddhah cannot be by
itself a conclusive argum ent for a plurality of beings. It can, however, serve
as a persuasive argument.
4. anabhildpya-dtman (Vims. Vr. 10); nirabhildpya-dtman (Ibid. 21).
5. Na khalu sarvatha dharmo nasti-iti-evam dharma-nairdtmya-praveio bhavatL
Api-tu, kalpita-dtmand' (Vimi. 10). To balair-dharmdtidm svabhdvo grdhya*
grahakddih parikalpitas-tena kalpitena-atmana tefdm nairatmyam na tu-anabhilapyena
atmand yo buddhandm vijaya iti. Evam vijRapti-mdtrafya-api vijRapti-antara-
24 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
1. In trod uction
H aving paid homage to the founder o f this science,
Son of the well-gone,
And also to its expositor for people like me,
M ay I now endeavour to analyse its m eaning.1
[M V K I. 1] T he definition,
T he coverings,
T he truths
M editation of the opposite,
Its stages,
A ttainm ent o f result,
And the pre-eminence of the p ath .2
Terms explained
Verse 2, which opens the m ain discussion, makes a few
crucial statements, which along with V asubandhus com m entary
on them, should be considered the key-stones of the whole
system. There, beginning with the definitions, [the text]
says :
1. Abhuta-parikalpo'sti. M V K 1.2.
2. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpo grahya-grdhaka-vikalpah. MVKB I. 2.
3. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. M V K I. 2.
4. Dvayam grahyam grahakam ca. MVKB 1.2.
5. Sunyata, vidyate tu-atra. M V K 1.2.
6 . Sunyatd tosya abh uta-parikalpasya grahya-gr&haka-bhavena virahitata.
MVKB 1.2.
7. Tasyam-apt sa vidyate. M V K 1. 2; tasyam-api sa vidyata iti-abhuta-
parikalpah. M VKB 1.2.
8. Eoamyadyalra nasti tat tena iunyam-iti yatha-bhutam samanupajyati, yat
ptmar atra-avaiiftam bhavali tat sad iha-asti-iti yatha-bhutam prajananti-iti-auiparitam
Sunyata-lakia^am-udbhavitam bhavati. M VKB I. 2.
32 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
1. See note 10 on p. 35
Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes 37
Thus, observes Sthiram ati, on the one hand denying the grasp-
able-grasper duality, and, on ihe other, asserting the fact of the
imagination of the unreal, the present stanza is simply restat
ing what has already been said in M V K 1.2: There exists the
im agination of the unreal; however there is no p air .1
has already been stated. Now the question is how one can realize
it. The next stanza answers this question. Introducing it Vasu-
bandhu says, Now is shown a definition which can be used as
an instrument in comprehending the negative definition of the
same im agination of the unreal. 1 Sthiram ati further comments,
The im agination of the unreal, unaware of the negative defini
tion, works in favour of the defilement of kiefa, karma and janma.
Hence the present stanza to show an instrum ent of knowing the
negative definition.' 2 The stanza says:
1. Idanlm tamin~eva-abhuta-parikalpeysal-laksana-anupravefa-updya-lak}a{iam
paridipayati. MVKB 1.7
2. AparijMta-asal-laksa.no hi-abh uta-parikalpah kleia-kamna-janma sankleidya
sampravartate. MVKBT 1.7
3. Upalabdhim-samaJritya nopalabdhih prajdyate
Nopalabdhim samdiritya nopalabdhih prajdyate. M VK 1.7
4. Vijhapti-mdlra-upalabdhim niiritya-artha-anupalabdhirjayate. Arlha-anupalabdhim
nisritya vijhapti-mdtrasya api-anupalabdhirjayate. Evam-asallakfaiiam grdhya-
grdhakayoh praviiati. MVKB 1.7
62 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
Sthiram ati places this stanza and the following one in the
context of life-process. Pravrtti for him means process/movement.
W hen it is applied to life, he recognises two levels of move
m en t: (i) movem ent from one m om ent to the next forming a
series o f moments which is responsible for defilements and
enjoyments in the present life; (ii) movement from one life to
the next, which is responsible for the defilements o f kleia, karma
an d janma. The present stanza, says Sthiram ati, deals with the
former type of movement, leaving the latter for the next stanza.
T he concept o f movement involves that of cause-effect rela
tionship. In Buddhism, causality means, to put it rather naively,
one moment giving way to the next, or, in technical terms, the
rising of one moment depending on the previous one (pratitya-
samutpada). In any case such a view of causality presupposes
the distinction between the causal moment and the resultant
moment. There being only the imagination of the unreal
( abhuta-parikalpa-matra) how could one account for the distinc
tion between cause and result (hetu-phala-prabhedam)? This,
according to Sthiram ati, is the concern of the present stanza.3
The life-circle
Now it remains to explain in terms of the same imagination
of the unreal how one moves from one life to the next (janma-
antara-pravrtti) . This is done in the next two stanzas, which
according to Vasubandhu, state the defilment-definition 6 of
the im agination of the unreal. It shows how by the operation of
the imagination o f the unreal the defilements (sanklesa) , namely
kleta, karma and janma, bring about the sufferings of the world.7
[ M V K 1.12 T h e oppressives/defilements,
contd. ] All proceeding from the im agination of the
unreal,
Could be classified
Either into three groups,
O r into two groups,
O r into seven groups.1
Tri-pariccheddtsparkna.
Upabhogat vedanaya.
Kar$aiwtTr$iwyd karma-dk$iptasya punar-bhavasya.
Nibandhanatupaddnair-vijHdnasya-utpatti-anuk ule$u kdmadifu.
Abhimukhy&l bhavena krtasya karmanah punar-bhave vipdkadan&ya-abhirnukhi-
karanat.
Duhkhandt-jdtya jard-maraivma ca parikltiyaU jagat.
1. Tredha dvedhd ca sankleiah saptadha-abhutakalpandt VK 1.12
Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes 71
3. The Emptiness
From the next stanza onwards one has the discussion on th e
emptiness {nyat), which has already been described as that
state of the imagination of the unreal which is lacking in the
form of being the graspable and grasper.52 Introducing the next
stanza, Vasubandu says, Thus having explained the im agina
tion o f the Unreal, the author now shows how the emptiness
should be understood.553
is further stated:
1. Na-prthaktva-eka-laksanam. M VK 1.14
2. Prthaktve saii dhamnad-anya dharmata-iti na yujyate, anityata-duhkhatd-
vat. Ekatve sati vihiddhi-alambanam jhdnam na syat sdmdrtya-laksanam-ca. Elena
tattva-anyatva-vinirmuktam laksapam paridlpilam bhavati. MVKB 1.14
Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes 75
1. LakfaQO-vyafljana-apUrye. M V K 1.20
2. Mahdpurufa-lakafapdndm sa-anwyahjanandm-prdptayc. MVKB 1.20
3. Suddhayc Buddha-dharamdpam bodhisattvah prapadyatc. M V K 1.20
4. Balavaiidrcufya-dvepikadindm. M VKB 1.20
5. Exam tavac-caturdaidndm iunyatdndm vyaxasdidnam veditauyam. MVKB 1.20
6. Kd punar-aira j tinyaid ? M VKB 1.21
7. Pudgalasya-atha dharmapdm-abhdoah iunyaid-atra hi
Tadabhdvasya sad-bhdoas-tasmin sd iunyatd-opard, M V K 1.21
Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes 83
Evidently, this line does not fit in with the context, because
it abruptly suggests citta to be another name for inyat, the
absolute state of reality. Nowhere before, not even on the list o f
the synonyms of fnyat* was citta mentioned as another nam e
for inyatd. O n the contrary Vasubandhu has always used
the term citta to mean dlaya-vijndna, or in conjunction w ith
caitta. Therefore, the present line sounds very much out of
context. It is, therefore, difficult to believe th at this is part o f
the original text. S. Yamaguchi, in his edition of Madhydnta-
vibhdga-tikd (Nagoya 1934) does not in fact consider it as p art
o f the original stanza. T h. Stcherbatsky treats it as a Scrip
tural quotation cited by V asubandhu.5 It is quite possible,
indeed, that the original line is lost, and th at the present
one is only a Scriptural quotation occurring in Vasu-
bandhus commentary, as Stcherbatskys translation suggests
Even so the problem about considering citta as another name for
nyat remains unsolved. Is it possible that Vasubandhu really
means that citta is another name for inyat? No, because it would
contradict his other passages which treat citta only as dlaya-
vijndna, whiph operates only on the samsric sphere. So, how
is one to understand the present line? Sthiram ati, as if sensing
the problem, says that the term citta in the present context
should be taken to mean citta-dharmatd.6 This interpretation
solves the problem partly, for any elem ent (dharma) in its abstract
state (dharmata) is for the Yogacarins another nam e for the
absolute state o f lunyatd. Consequently, the element citta, in its
abstract state o f existence is no more the phenom enal intellect nor
the dlayavijnana, but is the absolute state o f fQnyatd. I t is ju st
like the case o f abhuta-parikalpa which, once it is rid of the
subject-object characterizations, turns out to be identical w ith
fdnyata.1 Thus, S thiram atis interpretation of citta as citta-dhar-
mata somehow solves the problem at issue. However, it m ay be
still asked how the attrib u te shining {prabhasvara) can be validly
applied to citta, which here means citta-dharmatdjlunyata, for the
explanation o f the different kinds of iunyata (stanzas 18-22)
implied that no attrib ute whatsoever can validly be applied to
the thing-in-itself, for which the term lunyatd stands.2 I f so, how
can the attribute shining* (prabhasvara) be meaningfully
applied to citta-dkarmatd/funyata. A possible answer to this
question m ay be th a t V asubandhu, while quoting a traditional
passage, does not take the attrib ute shining in its literal sense,
but only in its m etaphorical sense o f p a r excellence/ However,
I feel th at the entire line under discussion can be interpreted in
a m uch simpler way. T h a t the citta is of shining n atu re can
be understood literally to m ean th at citta, i.e. dlaya-vijiiana, is o
shining nature (prabhasvara) s6 that, it leaves its reflections on
the things around, w hich consequently would look different
from w hat they really are. T h en the first three lines of the
present stanza would m ean the following:
A T R E A T ISE O N T H E T H R E E NA TU RES
(TRI-SVABH AVA-NIRD E$A)
1. In trod uction
Tri-svabhava-nirdefa is a small treatise of thirty eight stanzas con
centrating on the doctrine of three natures. A theoretical expla
nation o f the doctrine of three natures, it sheds light on m any
otherwise obscure points of V asubandhus view of reality. It
states clearly w hat each of the three natures stands for.
W hat interests me most in this text is th at the entire doctrine
of three natures hinges on the subject-object duality; T h a t is,
the text explains each o f the three natures w ith reference to the
subject-object duality. Thus, for example,
forces of ones own past deeds and habits, is called the other-
dependent (paratantra-svabhdva); the forms of sujectivity and ob
jectivity th at are projected on to the things by the individual in
the other-dependent state of existence, are the imagined nature
(parikalpita-svabhdva) .
O f the three natures only parinifpanna and parikalpita have
any ontological pretensions. The former is the absolute state
of existence, while the latter is the samsaric (phenomenal) state
ui cxiViViYee. in e paratantra svabfiava, on the contrary, refers
essentially to the very act of projecting the forms of subjectivity
and objectivity, which every individual in the samsaric state is
bound to do. Hence it is variously called as parikalpa (the act
of im agination), abhuta-parikalpa (the act of imagining the un
real form s), or simply as asat-kalpa (the act of imagining the
non-existent). My point is further confirmed by the fact th at the
terms parinifpannd and parikalpita are past participles indicating
something concretely accomplished, while the term parikalpa is
only a verbal noun referring: to an action.
However, in the last analysis, parinispanna-svabhdva alone has
any ontological status. Para-tantra-svabhdva is but a character
istic w ith which ones samsaric existence is marked, and parikat-
pitasvabhdva refers to the imaginary forms of subjectivity and ob
jectivity superimposed on things. Therefore, para-tantra-svabhdva
and parikalpita-svabhava are both far from being ontological,
while parinispanna-svabhdva is the ontological mode o f things.
1. TSN. 5
2. See below Chapt. 4, see 3.
3. Tad-hetu-phala-bhvena cittam dvi-vidham ifyatc
Yad-laya-khyam vijnam praurtti-khyam ca saptadh. TSN.6
4. SamkUa-vsan-b\jais-citatoc-citlam-ucyate
Cittam-dyam dvitiyom tu cilra-kra-pravrUitah. TSN. 7
A Treatise on the Three Natures 95
4, D ifferen t, Y et N on -d ifferen t
In the next few stanzas V asubandhu shows how the three
natures are different from each other, but at the same tim enon-
different from each other. This is shown mostly by applying the
same terms to all three natures, but with different meanings or
senses. So apparently the description turns out to be a play on
words, although behind those words there are certain basic
convictions of Vasubandhu. The central point seems to be that
an individual going through the three natures, does not ever
lose his continuity o f existence, only he is assuming different
modes of existence. So it is the same individual, but different
modes o f existence. Again, the difference is more a question o f
the way in which one looks at things, than any substantial change
of being : one in parinifpanna-svabhdva looks at things as they are
iyaihd^bhuta) , while one in para-tanlra and parikalpila'Svabhdvas
looks at them as subjects and objects. This in turn means that
the distinction between nirvana and samsnra is basically only a
1. See a b o v e , p . 31
2. Abhuta-parikalpo1sli. M VK. 1.2
3. Tatra-abhuta-parikalpo grdhya-grdhaka-vikalpah. M VKB. 1.2
4. Dvayam tatra na vidyate. M V K 1.2
5 . Dvayam grahyam grdhakam ca. M V K B . 1.2
6 . Advayatvena-yac-ca-asti dvayasya-abhdva-eva ca
Suabhauas-tena nispannah sad-asal-laksano matah. T S N . 13
A Treatise on the Three Natures 101
For, as it is imagined
A thing has two forms,
But as those two forms do not exist,
It is unitary.1
T h a t is, the imagined nature is real only for the ignorant (bdlah),
for it is just their m ental creation. They imagine it as divided
into subjects and objects, and in this sense the imagined nature
is dual (dvaya). But as already established,2 subject-object
duality has no extra-m ental reality, and therefore the imagined
natu re is unitary (ek a).
1. Dvaividhyat-kalpita-arthasya tad-asatva-ek.a-bhava.lah
Svabhdvah kalpito balair-dvaya-ekatvdtmako matah. TSN. 14
2. Yatha-ea kalpayati-artham tatha-atyanlamna indyale. TSN. 5
3. Prakhydn&d-dvaya-bhdvena bhrdntimatra-ekabhdvalah
Svabhava paratantra-akhyo dvaya-ekatva-atmako. TSN. 15
4. Katham khydti ? dvqyatmand. TSN.4
5. Dvayam grdhyam grdhakam ca. MVKB. 1.2
6. Dvayain tatra na vidyate. MVK. 1.2
102 A Buddhist Doctnne o f Experience
1. Dvcya-abhva-mabhwtvd-advaya-eka-svabhvatah
Svabhvah parinifpanno dvaya-ckatva-atmako nua&h. TSN.16
2. S. Mukhopadhyaya, op.cit., p. 3, n.6
3. Ibid.
A Treatise on the Three Natures 103
1. A sad-dvaya-svabhavatvat-lad-abhava-svabhavatah
Svabhavat-kalpitdj-jteyo parimfparmo'bhinna-laksanah. TSN.18
2. See above, page 93
3. See above,page 93
A Treatise on the Three Natures 105
1. Advayatva-svabhavatvad-dvaya-abhava-svabhavatah
Nispanndl-kalpitai-ca-eva vijneyo' bhinna-lakfapah. TSN. 19
2. Yathd-akhydndm-asad-bhdvdt-tathd satva-svabhdvatah
Svabhdvdt-para-tantrdkhydn-nifpanno9bhinna-lakfartah. T SN .20
106 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
ir0*parah
1, Kalpilo vyavahdra-atma vyavananr-um^ ^ afg TSN. 23
V y z v z h d r c - Lamuth*sl/I- er,nh A/ifp/rr.
A Treatise on the Three Natures 109
my asatkalpa/
(magical power) abh Qta-parikalpa
(creative (them a-
imagination/ terial
mind) source)
hasti-tman/ doaya-tman/
hasti-kraj vikalpa
hasti doaya
PARIKALPITA (magically (phenomenally
manifested manifested dua
elephant) lity between sub
ject and object)
A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
hasti-abh&vaj dvaya-abhavaj
PARINISPANN A kdytha tathatd
( piece o f wood) (suchness)
First o f all, the three definitions referred to here are the three
natures, namely the im agined, the other-dependent and the abso
lutely accomplished. T hen, the term translated here as truth
of things is artha-sattua. Discussing the concept of mula-tattva in
M V. H I I have explained why the term tattva has to be under
stood as meaning truth*.2 Further, in the same chapter it was
said th at the basic tru th about things is that they take on three
natures, namely the im agined, the other-dependent and the ab
solutely accomplished.2 O r, m ore precisely, the threefold
nature is the basic tru th about things. 4 This makes the former
Thus, finally,
A T R E A T IS E IN T H IR T Y STANZAS
( T R IM SA T IK A )
1 In trod u ction
Trimfatika, a treatise in thirty stanzas, is the epitome of
V asubandhus view o f life. To be sure, it is an analysis o f
consciousness throughout. Traditionally it is interpreted as
dealing with the process o f the evolution of the world from
consciousness.1 I cannot agree w ith th at interpretation, though.
Instead I am suggesting th a t this text should be understood as
a n investigation into the origin, contents and operation o f an
individual consciousness. F ar from being an analysis of the world
process, it is an attem pt to explain the experience o f an indivi
d u al in the state o f sarpsdra, and then to suggest a way out of it.
I t is an analysis o f m ind, not o f the cosmos; again, it is an
analysis of the individual mind, not of any cosmic mind. I t is
the individual m ind th at is said to be subject to evolution, not
th e world. This evolution of m ind is said to result in the con
struction of a world-picture. But th at does not imply that there
is no real world ap art from this m entally constructed (pari-
kalpita) world-picture.
T he question before the author of Trirpiatikd, therefore, is,
*what is consciousness m ade o f ? , or what are the contents o f
1. For example, P. T . R aju says, The Trim satika deals with the
process of the evolution of the world, the nature of Buddha, and so forth ,
(iIdealistic Thought o f Jndia> [George Allen and Unwin L td., 1953; reprinted
with the subtitle V edanta and Buddhism in the Light of W estern Idealism ,
N ew York: Johnson R eprint Corporation, 1973], p. 269). Later, on the same
page, apparently referring again to Trirpdatikd, he says, V asubandhu main
tains that the world is due to the parifidma or transformation of the pure
V ijnana .
128 A Buddhist.Doctrine o f Experience
The first rem ark to be m ade about this statem ent is th a t the
terms dtman and dharma stand respectively for the categories of
subjectivity and objectivity. I t has aireaciy dc^Ti VuA Z
th at subjectivity and objectivity (grdhakatva and grdhyatva) are
the basic categories o f thought recognised by the Yogacarins.
All other categories can be classified u n d er them . I n other
words, all imaginable categories present themselves to th e m ind
either as subjects or as objects.* Everything th at presents itself
as a subject o f experience is referred to in the present stanza as
dtman, and everything that presents itself as an object o f experi-
i* rpferrrH tn as dhnrntn. Even a simerficial reading o f the
all, that neither dtman nor dharma is m eant in its ordinary sense.
Further, commenting on those terms Sthiram ati says, T h e usages
of the term dtman include dtman, jiva, jantu, manuja, mdnava etc., and
those of dharma include skandha, dhdtu, ayatana, rUpa, vedanay sahjnd,
samskdra, vijnana etc. 1 This grouping implies that whatever can
become the subject of some sort of experience is denoted by
dtman, and that whatever can become the object of some sort
o f experience, is denoted by dharma. This does not mean that
one and the same being cannot become both subject and object
o f experience. For example, I am obviously the subject of so
m any experiences. But I am also the object of m any experiences
of other people. But my subjectivity and objectivity refer to two
different aspects of my being : I become the subject of ex
perience only under the aspect of a living {jiva), sentient (jantu) y
hum an ( manuja) etc. being. O n the other hand, to become a
subject of experience it is not enough for me to be just a bundle
of elements (skandha or dhdtu) or of sense-data [ayatana etc.).
O n the contrary, I become the object of experience only under
the aspect of a bundle o f elements (skandha or dhdtu) or o f
sense-data ( ayatana etc.). T h a t is, although I am a living,
sentient, hum an being, nobody is able to experience me as such.
As an object of experience I am only a bundle of elements or
sense-data, and as such I become the object of touch, sight, taste
and hearing. O n the other hand, th at I am a living, sentient
hum an being is only inferred by others, it is not experienced by
them. Thus, the above quoted classification of categories into
dtman and dharma is evidently based on what is capable o f
becoming a subject or object of experience : anything that can
become a subject of experience is an dtman, and anything that
can become an object of experience is a dharma. O r rather, the
terms dtman and dharma stand for two aspects, namely subjecti
vity and objectivity respectively, in which things appear in ones
experience. Things just appear in those aspects, because
the latter are, as it shall be explained later, mere m ental
constructions ( parikalpa) or transformations of consciousness
(vijnana parinama) .
1. He has m ade an analysis of the term dharma in his The Central Concep
tion o f Buddhism and the Meaning o f the Word 'Dharma\ 2nd ed., (Calcutta:
Susil G upta (India) Ltd., 1956).
2- F o r example, V. S. Apte, The Practical S a n s k r it English Dictionary, 3rd
rev . enl. e d . , (D elhi, V aranasi, P atn a: M edial B a n a r s i d a s s , 1 965), p. 283
quotes from Ramdyaoa: vdkyopacdre kuiala, and translates it as skilled in the
employment of words*.
132 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
Consciousness (vijnana)
The store-consciousness
(alaya-vijnana)
[Trims. 2 There the m aturing [consciousness]
contd.] Is otherwise called the store-consciousness,
Which carries the seeds of all [past experiences] A
1. . . . tad-iritya pravariate
Tad-lambam mano-nma vijftrtam manantmokam. Trims. 5
2. Klefais-caturbhih sahitam nivrta-avykrta 5ad
lma-drffi-tma-moha-tma mna-tma-sneha-sajitai. bid. 6
3. Yatrajas-tanmayair-anyaih sparja-dyais-ca. Ibid. 7
A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas 137
1. . . .arhato na tat
Na nirodha-samapattau marge lokottare na ca.
Dvitiyah parinamo'yam. .. Ibid. 7-8
2. See Sthiramatis commentary on TrimS. 5
3. Atma-pratibhdsam kliptam manah, atma-mohadi-samprayogat. MVKB. I. 4
4. Alaya-vijMna-dlambanam-eva sat-kdya-dr$ti-adibhih samprayogad-aham-mama-
ili-dlayavijfidna-dlambanalvdt. Trims. Eh. 5
5. Tan-mayair-iti yatra dhatau bhumau va jdtas-tad-dhatukaih tad- bhumikair-
-eva ca samprayujyate, na-anya-dhdtukair-anya-bhumikair-va. Ibid. 7
138 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
1. Mano-vijfldna-sambhutih sarvada-asafijflikdd-r/*,
Samdpatti-dvayan-murchanad-api acittakdt. Ibid. 16
2. Trims. 2; see above p. 134, note 3.
3. Trims. 8; see above p. 138 note 1.
A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas 141
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142 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
changing from time to time,and from place to place, and thus can
provide for different and m ultiple sense-consciousnesses. M y con
clusion th at the object (vi$aya or alambana)of sense-consciousness
is an external object, is sufficiently justified by the way Vasuban-
dhu and Sthiram ati introduce this point. In the case of alaya-
vijhdna and manana-vijnana they specified the respective objects:
alaya-vijndna has for its object w hat it carries within itself, and
the place where it is located,1 while manana-vijndna has alaya-
vijndna itself for its object.2 But they do not at all specify the
object of sense-consciousnesses. Instead, they use the general
term such as 4vifaya and calambana\z thereby implying that the
reader should understand those terms in their usual, ordinary,
sense as when a layman says, object (vi$aya) o f eye.*4 H aving
said that, I must recall w hat was said under M V.I. 4 : namely,
that what the consciousness apparently grasps are the forms con
structed and imposed by it on the things concerned. In other
words, although there are external things, the consciousness
never succeeds in reaching and grasping them as they are in
themselves, but only as they appear (pratibhasa). Being con
ditioned by innate bijas%vdsanas and samskaras, the consciousness
can make only approximations of things, and that too under
the aspects of subjectivity and objectivity.
I have mentioned above that all transformations of conscious
ness refer either to psychological or to epistemological categories.
They are citta and caittas> not bhUta and bhautikas. T o sub
stantiate this I shall now produce a list of the transformations
and their associates mentioned in the text. It is only a list o f
all the terms involved in their English alphabetical, not any
conceptual, order :
1. Upadi-sthdnavijnaptikam. Trims. 3
2. Tad ( =dlaya-mjndna)-dlambam mano-ndma vijndnam. Ibid. 5
3. vijfiaptir-vi$ayasya ca. Ibid. 2; $ad-vidhasya yd vifayasya-upalabdhih.
Ibid. 8; alambana-sadbhdve paficandm-api ca-utpattir-iti abhyupeyam. Trims. Bh. 15
4. Hsuan Tsang, the great Chinese interpreter of Trimiatikd commenting
on stanza 15 says, This means that the five consciousnesses are dependent
internally upon the mula-vijnana (Alaya), and that, externally, they can
only manifest themselves by conforming to a concatenation o f conditions,
such as the act o f attention (manaskdsa), the five sense-organs ( indriyas), the
A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas 145
Introducing this stanza Sthiram ati says : what has been said
above, namely that all upacaras of atma and dharma being just
transformations of consciousness, have no independent existence,
is further clarified here.2 This is w hat he means : the upacaras
o f atma and dharmay namely, citta and caittas9 are transformations
of consciousness, and, therefore, do not have extra-mental
existence. In any case, what the stanza describes as representa
tions of consciousness cannot include anything more than (i)
subjectivity and objectivity (atma and dharma), (ii) the distinc
tion (vikalpa) between them, and (iii) citta and caittas. It does
not include any of the bhutas and bhautikas. However, citta and
caittas m ay belong to any o f the three worlds depending on where
the individual concerned happens to be : T he above mentioned
threefold transformation of consciousness is just the distinction
[between subject and object]. They [subjects and objects] are
citta and caitta belonging to three worlds, and have for their
objects m entally constructed forms , says Sthiram ati.3
7. T he T h reefold N a tu re lessn e ss
Having explained the three natures of reality, the author is
now turning to the negative aspects of the same natures. Accord
ing to Sthiramati, he is thereby trying to reconcile the theory of
three natures with the view that every dharma is without own-
nature, origin and destruction.6
1. See Trims.Bh.22
2. Yadi grahya-grahaka-bhdva-rahitah para-tanlrah katham-asau grhyate,
agrahyamdno vd kalham-asti-iti vijilayate? Trims.Bh.22
3. j\fa-adrste asmin sa driyate. Trirps.22
4. Na-adrste asmin-iti. Parinispanna-svabhave sa drsyale iti para-tantra
svabhavah. Trims. Bh. 22
5. Piirvikalpa-lokottaTa-jHana-drsye parinispanne s v a b h d v e . . Ibid.
6. Yadi dravyam eva para-tantrah kalham s litre sarva-dharma nihsvabhava
anutpannd aniruddha iti nirdiiyale. Nasti virodhahyasmat Trims. Bh.23
A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas 157
[Trims. 25] T h at from which all elements have their ultim ate
reality,
[Is the third naturelessness,]
I t is also called suchness,
Because it remains always as such;
T h at is itself the state [in which one realizes
the meaning]
O f mere representation of consciousness, too.2
W hat the above stanzas insist is that (i) only the eradication
o f subject-object idiosyncrasy (graha-dvaya-anuSaya) can effect the
realization of the fact th at all forms of subjectivity and objecti
vity are merely mental representations and (ii) that it can be
eradicated not by merely fancying (upalambhatah = grahanatah =
citrikaranatah) 2 that the objects, as they are perceived, are only
mental representations. W hen can, then, one be assured of the
realization that all subject-object designations are mental
representations ?
9. C on clu sion
I may conclude this analysis of Trirjiiatikd by referring to the
introductory remarks o f Sthiram ati. Explaining the purpose o f
the entire text he said : This text is intended to explain the
meaning of pudgala-nairatmya and dharma-nairdtmya.8 How has the
A TR EA TISE IN TW EN TY STANZAS
(V IM S A T IK A y
1. In trod uction
Vitfiiatikiy a treatise in twenty stanzas, is a thorough defence
of Vasubandhus own theory o f knowledge against the cor
respondence theory of knowledge. By this latter theory I mean
the thesis that every thing that we perceive is part o f the surface
of a material objecta thesis th at is too naive even to w arrant
consideration .1 VirpSatikd is often interpreted as providing
answers to realism* and thus as showing that the universe as
representation-only is still a serious and tenable conception*.8
But I am suggesting that far from providing answers to realism*
it provides answers to the realistic theory of knowledge, which
says that there is one-to-one correspondence between concepts
and extra-mental obiects. W hat Vasubandhu is trying to
show is not that the universe is representation-only but
that what are taken to be the objects o f experience are
representation-only. In short, Virplatika is polemics not against
realism, but against the realistic theory of knowledge.
1. G. H. Hamilton, op.cit., p. 19
2. Vijftapti-matram-etad-asadartha-avabhdsandt. Vims. 1
3. Tathd taimirakasya-asatkeia-candTa-&di darianam. lbid .l
A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas 167
An objection
The proponents o f the correspondence-theory immediately
raise the following objection :
Vasubandhu's reply
[Vims. 3] D eterm ination of space etc., is obtained
Just as [in] the case of a dreamy
Again, indeterminacy [of experience] with regard
to streams [i. e. individuals] is obtained
Just as [in] the case [of the experience] of ghosts :
All of them have the same vision of pus-river etc.3
T he impressions of deeds
Along with those of the twofold grasping
Engender the next stage of m aturation.2
Further,
[Vims. 13 There can be no joining of atoms,
contd.] Not because they have no parts.4
Vasubandhu replies:
[Vims. 18] The representations of consciousness
Are determined by m utual influence
O f one [individual] on another.2
and that representations issuing from one m ind can act on those
issuing from other minds, the real nature of the individuals still
remaining unaffected.
Even the phenom enon of death is explained along the same
line of thought. V asubandhu describes death as the disruption
of the individual stream-consciousness, which would otherwise
keep flowing homogeneously (sabhaga-santati-viccheda-dkhyammara-
narn). Such a disruption of the stream-consciousness is caused
by a fatal alteration o f the vital organ (jivita-indriya-virodhini
kacid-vikriya). Such a fatal alteration of the vital organ, again,
says Vasubandhu, can be effected by the m ental representations
issuing from other individuals (para-vijnapti-vife$a-ddhipatydt) A
Thus, Vasubandhu m aintains that death as well as the fact th at
it can be caused by others, is real experience of the phenom enal
level of existence, nam ely samsara. An individual stream of con
sciousness, if left to itself, will keep flowing homogeneously.
But it can be interrupted, and its m om entum disturbed, by
e t e r n a l forces. Yogic practices can stop it altogether, w hich will
m ean liberation and enlightenm ent of the individual concerned.
O r, some inimical force, issuing from other individual streams,
can interfere and break it off abruptly, which will m ean death
resulting in another birth on the phenom enal level itself.
To show that m ental pow er is something really effective on the
phenomenal level, Vasubandhu cites various scriptural stories :
stories o f demons causing loss of memory, dream-visions etc.,
the story of a certain m agician who worked wonders by his
thought-power, the story o f a certain king, who under the m ental
influence of a sage had dream-visions, the story of another king
put to flight by the m ental power o f some sages, the story of
the evacuation of D andaka forest attributed to the m ental rage
of the sages therein, and, finally the belief that m ental torture
is the greatest of punishm ents.2 It may be further noted th at in
the yogic tradition o f India, m ental power is the greatest force
that can be used for the advantage or disadvantage of others. So
it is quite natural for Vasubandhu to m ake so much o f it.
1. Para-vijfiapti-viiesa-ddhipaly&t paresdm jivita-indriya-virodhini kacid-
vikriyd-utpadyate yaya sabhdga-santati-vicchcda-dkhyam maranam bhavati. Vims.
Vr.19
2. Cf. Vims, and Vims. Vr. 19-20.
194 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
8. C on clu sin
Vasubandhu concludes the treatise with a note of warning
that the theory of representations-only is so incomprehensible
that it can be properly understood only by the enlightened ones,
and that, therefore, his own presentation of it is subject to
limitations :
ID E A LISM O R R EA LISM ?
1. In troduction
Now th at I have finished analysing some of the basic texts of
the Yogacara school, it is time I checked on my initial statement
that the Yogacara-writings, especially those under discussion,
are open to interpretation in terms of realistic pluralism .1 I
feel that my analysis of the text has undeniably proved the
validity of this statement. However, I do not mean to censure
outright other possible ways oflooking at the same texts. All
that I positively claim is that the four texts I have chosen for
my study are open to interpretation h \ terms of realistic plu
ralism, and this I have shown in the previous four chapters by
giving an analysis of those texts. To say the least, to make sense
of those texts one does not have to assume that consciousness or
idea is the final mode of existence, nor that ultimately there is
only one being. O n the contrary, it is quite possible, and at some
points even easier, for one to make sense of them assuming that
consciousness or idea is not the final mode of existence, and that
there is a plurality of beings, even in the state of nirvana. This
is what I have been trying to establish in the previous four
chapters, and 1 hope to have achieved my goal.
To make my own position clearer it may be useful at this
stage if I consider the points on which I disagree with other
interpreters of Vasubandhu. All through this work I have been
rather diffident in saying that the many interpreters of Vasu
bandhu in the past have all gone wrong, however explicit might
be the difference between my findings and theirs. Even now I
do not m ean to say that their interpretations are totally
unacceptable. Instead, I am only interested to find out how my
[V asubandhus commentary ]:
1. See a b ov e, p. 146
2. S ee V iip.17
Idealism or Realism ? 207
T he representations of consciousness
Are determined by m utual influence of one [individual] on
another.4
Buddhi , 1 .
A laya-vijhdna
Ahahkara Manana-vijhdna
1. See my analysis of Trimjatikd 1-16 above, pp. 128ff
2. See MV. 1.4
Idealism or Rkalism ? 221
I
Malms 5 Jfosia- 5 Karma- 5 Tan- Mano-vijndna 5 Indriya-vijMna
indriyd indriya mdtras
5 BhUtas
evolving prakrti there exists a num ber of real beings called punifas.
I f so, there are still greater reasons why V asubandhus system
should not be called idealism. First of all, the evolving conscious
ness (vijhana) about which he speaks, does not cover the
physical world of bhdtas and bhautikas, but only the psychic
world of citta and caittas. Secondly, besides the psycho-physical
phenomena Vasubandhu does adm it the noum enal (yatha-bhuta)
realities called simply suchness (tathata) >which are inexpressible
(anabhildpya) even in terms of consciousness. This latter point I
have referred to several times,1 and I will return to it again
shortly.2
As it is, therefore, V asubandhus discussion of consciousness,
far from having any idealistic claims, is only an analysis of the
psyche, which m ay be compared to any o f the psychological
systems of the modern times. It is a depth analysis of the
psyche with a view to identifying the dynamics ( such as sarriskdras
an d vdsands) o f motivation (tr$na) , which the Buddha had long
ago said to be the root cause (samudayasatya) of the hum an malaise
(duhkha). T he factors into which the Yogacarins analysed the
psyche are not very different from those suggested in the early
Buddhism. It was, however, an original contribution on the
part of the Yogacarins that they traced all the psychic variations
to the unconscious level called dlaya-vijnana (store-consciousness),
from where given the opportunities they rise to the conscious
level called pravrtti-vijnana (active consciousness) through the
m edium of the pre-conscious level called manana-vijnana (thinking
consciousness). Here I am obviously suggesting a rough com
parison between the Yogacara and Freudian models of psycho
analysis, without, however, claim ing any expert knowledge of
the latter.
1. See, for example, the analysis of Vimfatikd 10, 21 and 22, above,
pp. 172 ff and 194 ff. See also pp. 23 ff.
2. Sec below p. 224.
Idealism or Realism ? 223
6. T he In effa b le (A nabhilapya)
The distinction between the ineffable and the imagined n atu re
of things seems to have received little attention from those who
interpret the Yogacara system as an idealism. V asubandhu
8. V iinatk : C ritiq u e o f th e
C orresp ond en ce T heory o f K n ow led ge
Vimfalika, a treatise in twenty stanzas, taken by itself is likely
to appear as a plain case for idealism. It will be little surprising
if a random reader of this text rushes to the conclusion that
Vasubandhu is an idealist. O n the contrary, if one reads it in the
overall perspective of V asubandhus other writings such as
Madhydnta-vidhaga-bhd$yay Trisvabhva-nirdea and Trirjatik,
one will easily see that it is only a critique of the correspon
dence theory of knowledge, which says th at every bit of knowl
edge necessarily refers to an extra-m ental object, and that,
therefore, a knowledge o f something is a valid proof for the
extra-mental existence of th at thing. Therefore, what I am
suggesting, and what I have followed in my study of Vasu
bandhu, is that in evaluating Vimiatika one should take into
account that
1. W alpola Rahula, Z en and the Taming o f the Bully Towards the Definition
o f Buddhist Thoughty (London : Gordon Fraser, 1978), p. 79.
2. Ibid. p. 79.
234 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
1. Walpola R ahula, %en and the Taming o f the Bull, Towards the Definition
o f Buddhist Thought, (London : Gordon Fraser, 1978), pp. 82-83.
2. In fact he has clearly objected to comparing it to Berkeleys
idealism. (Ibid. pp. 83-84).
A p p e n d ix I
T H E VERSES ON
D IS C R IM IN A T IO N BETWEEN M IDD LE AND E X T R E M E S
AND
VASUBANDHUS C O M M EN TA R Y ON T H E M
A C H A PTER ON D E F IN IT IO N S
*T h e num bers in square brackets refer to pages ab ove w here the respective
stanzas and passages are analysed.
236 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
T he oppressives / defilements,
All proceeding from the im agination of the unreal,
Gould be classified
Either into three groups,
O r into two groups,
O r into seven groups.
A T R E A T IS E O N T H E T H R E E N A TU RES
1. T he imagined,
[ 92 ] T he other-dependent,
T h e absolutely accom plished:
These are the three natures,
W hich should be thoroughly known by the wise.
A TR EA T ISE IN T H IR T Y STANZAS
Here it is asked,
I f each atom did not have different parts, then how is it that
at sunrise there is shadow in one place, and sunshine in another
place ? For, it [i.e. an ato m ] does not have a n other side
where there would not be any sunshine. If, again, difference o f
sides is not recognized, how can there be concealment of one
atom by another? No single atom has indeed an other side
where, the arrival of one [a to m ] would cause the obscuration
of another. It amounts to saying that there being no obscuration
[ o f any ato m ], an aggregate of atoms would not be anything
more than a single atom, because all atoms would occupy the
same place a t once.
Why not, then, recognize that the shadow and concealment
belong to the aggregate [ o f atom s], rather than to an atom. Is
then the aggregate of atoms, to which they [ i.e. shadow and
concealm ent] would belong, recognized as different from those
atoms ? It is said,
abdhtu, 77 lambaparks, 25
bhsa, 5 laya-vijnna, 19, 65, 67, 86-8, 95-7,
abhva, 51-4 112-3, 115-6,134-6, 141,143-5,147-
abhva-snyat, 84 51, 172, 211, 219-22
abbva-svabhva, 83 alobha, 141, 145
abhva-svabhva- sny at, 84 ampha, 141, 145
abhvasya bhva, 73 anabhilpy2 173, 181, 222, 225, 229,
abhvt, 111 231
abhinivesa, 12 anabhilpya-tma, 26, 188, 214, 226
abhinna-laksana, 104 anabhilpyena-tman, 214
abhrnti-darsana, 15 anabhilpyena-tman yo buddh-
abhta, 3, 31-2, 40, 44, 92, 97, 111, nm viayah, 173
223
ankratvt, 55
abhta-artha-pratibhsa, 63, 202-3 antm at, 156
abhta-kalpa, 95 animittam, 6
abhta-parikalpa, 4, 7, 13, 29, 30-1, anitya-dharma, 74
33, 35, 38-9,41,43-7, 52, 58, 64-5, anityat, 74, 156
74,87,91,95,97,99,101,109,115-6,
121, 154, 202, 222, 224, 226, 229, anivrtam, 136
231-2 antar-vypra-purusa-rahitat, 37
anupalabdhi, 121
abhta-parikalpa-mtra, 65-6 anupalambha, 120, 122
abhta-parikalpasya grhya-grhaka- anusaya, 208
bhvena virahitat, 202
anuttarm bodhim, 126, 227
abhuta-parikalpc'sti, 33 anyath, 266
cra-upacra, 131 anyonya-vijnapti-dhipatyena, 18
cchdana, 14 apariksna, 57
adhi-moksa, 141, 145 apatrap, 141, 145
adhv, 16 apram dik, 141, 145
adhytma, 78
advaita, 32 arhat, 137
arhato na tat, 137
advaya-dharmat, 92, 104, 106 arhattva, 136, 254
advaya-eka-svabhva, 102 artha, 7-10, 21, 40, 47-8, 50, 53-4,
advayatvena yac-ca asti, 32 56, 58, 60, 65, 209-11, 218
advesa, 141, 145
advitiya, 32 artha-anupalabdhi, 203-4, 209
advitlya-vastu, 32 artha-bheda, 107
gantuka, 77 arthh, 207
gantuka-malb, 77 artha-m tra, 65
ahankra, 219-21 artha-sattva, 119
hankrika, 96 artha-vis'esa, 65
abirns, 141, 145 asad-artha-avabbsant, 21
akalpita asad-dvaya-svabhva, 32
kra, 51-3, 111, 116-7, 152 asal-laksana, 13, 45, 60
akra-mtram tatra-asti, 114 asal-laksana-anupravesa-upya-laksa-
kratva, 11, 52 nam paridipayati, 202
khyna, 121-2 asal-laksanam grhya-grhakayoh
aklistam-ajnnam, 162 pravisati, 209
kiti, 113, 116 asamprajanya, 145
akusala, 136 asamskrta, 43-4
lambanam vijnnam, 51, 96, 143-4, asamskrta-dharma, 44
160, 209 asat, 92, 97, 104-5
lambana-pratyaya, 143 asat-kalpa, 91, 95, 112-3, 115-6, 121
282 A Buddhist Doctrine o f Experience
asattva, 13 bhta-darana, 14
asatyam, 141 bhta-koti, 6
asraddh, 145 bhta-bhautika, 228
raya, 96 bija, 16, 38, 143-4, 149-50
asthna, 16 brahm a-parim a-vda, 1,23
asti, 180 buddha-dharm a, 152
asti-krti-mtram, 114 buddhh, 23-4, 188, 213, 228
asti nsti-iti ca ucyate, I l 4 buddhnm gocarah, 119, 194, 225
asukha-aduhkha, 136 buddhat, 98
asnya, 41-4 buddhi, 219, 220-1
asya, 55 buddhy vaiyyarthya-darsana, 123
atah, 55-56
atath-bhvt, 111 caitash, 65, 67, 141
tma-dharma-nairtmya, 165, 172 caitta, 39, 44, 47, 64-5, 67, 71, 86,
tm a-dharm a-upacra, 132 144-6, 153, 165-6, 205-7, 215-6,
tma-drsfi, 137, 145 222, 224, 238
tma-mna, 137, 145 caksur-vijna, 141
tma-moha, 137, 145 caksus, 171
tman, 40, 47-8, 56, 128-34, 137,146, cetan, 135, 137, 141, 145
162, 172-3, 205,209-11,216,254, chanda, 141, 145
265 cintm ay-pa, 123
tma-sneha, 137, 145 citrikaraijatah, 159
tmatvena-abhva, 56 citta, 6, 10, 17, 39, 44, 47, 64-5, 71,
tm a-upacra, 133 86-8, 91-2, 94-5, 97, 144-6, 153,
atrap , 145 165-6, 192, 205-7, 215-6. 222,
atyanta-abhva, 53-4, 99 224, 226, 233, 238, 246, 248, 260
atyanto nsti, 118 citta-caitth, 35, 44-5, 224, 228,
aupabhogikam vijnnam, 67 231-2
varana, 14-6, 44-5, 136 citta-caittebhyc^nyatra, 36
avastu, 26 citta-dharm at, 86-7
avidy, 14-5 citta-m tra, 6, 198, 201, 204, 209,
avihims, 141, 145 213, 233-4
aviparto hi tattvrthah, 19 citta-m trat 5, 200, 233
avisesena, 39
avykrtam, 136 darsana-bhga,
yatana, 16, 129, 170-3 dham m a-yatana, 130
ayatnatah, 123 dham m a-dhtu, 130, 200
dharm a, 12, 17, 23-4, 43, 74, 77-8,
82-5, 87, 128-34, 156, 162, 172-3,
bahutva, 32 199, 205, 214, 216, 225, 242, 245,
bhya, 78 254, 265-6
blh, 101 dharm a-dhtu, 6, 125
blnm asatyarthertha-upalam bhah dharma-kya, 161, 199-200
202 dharm a-nairtm ya, 23, 161, 162,
bandha, 57 173
bhagavn buddhah, l61 dharm nm param rthah, 207
bhagavantah, 228 dharm at, 74, 85, 87, 155, 242
bhautika, 65, 144, 146, 165, 206, 222 dharm a-upacra, 134
bhsva, 27 dhtu, 16, 76, 129, 161, 243
bhva dhtu-bhumi, 137
bhvanm ay a-par a, 123 dhi, 141, 145
bhvatva, 10 drasfavya, 172
bheda, 107 dravya, 36, 131-2
bhogya-samm ata, 83 dravyatah, 7, 163, 173
bhojya, 9, 12, 83, 149 dravyatvena santi, 35
bhoktr, 9, 12, 83, 149 drk, 141, 145
bhoktr-sam mata, 83 drsfa, 65
bhrnti, 4, 16, 37, 56 duhkha, 12, 74, 136, 222
bhta, 65, 144-6, 165, 206, 221-2 duhkhat, 74, 156
Index 283
Mountain Path
Vol. 21 No. IV
October, 1984