G. R. No. 93173 September 15, 1993 9.

Honorio Saavedra, Jr.,

Petitioner,
-versus-

Department of Justice,
RTC of Pasig Br. 67 and
Gregorio Ramos,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x

Facts:
Private respondent including the owners of Pine Philippines Inc., (PPI) sold their
shares of stock to Saavedra, Jr for Php. 1.2 million payable in instalments with an automatic
rescission clause in case of failure to pay.

Petitioner withheld payment since seller failed to comply with the warranties, it was
deposition in escrow and will only be released once the warranties were complied but on
November 1987 petitioner filed a civil complaint alleging he was the president of PPI.
Respondent questioned the same, claiming that petitioner ceased to be its president when
the sale of PPI shares of stock was automatically rescinded.

Ramos filed a perjury case against Saavedra when he declares that he is the
president of PPI. The prosecutor found probable cause and was uphold by the Secretary of
Justice. The petitioner contends that the SEC has not resolved the question on the automatic
rescission, the DOJ must defer the proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether DOJ acted on grave abuse on its discretion to found probable cause
although a question of actual rescission is still pending with the SEC?

RULING:
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, Courts cannot and will not determine
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
having special competence, in such instances judicial process is suspended pending
administrative resolution.

Courts cannot resolve question within the legal competence of an administrative body
much less can the provincial prosecutor. DOJ avers that they are empowered to make
preliminary ruling for the purpose of finding probable cause is not persuading to the Court.

Even if Ramos succeeds in proving the validity of automatic rescission of sale, it does
not necessarily mean that the criminal prosecution has basis. Mere assertion of falsehood is
not enough to amount to perjury.

Moreover, as a rule, pleadings need not be verified unless otherwise required by the
Rules of Court, and no rule requires complaints for damages, as in the case before us, to be
under oath. Since the complaint filed by petitioner against private respondent is not required
to be verified, another essential element of the crime of perjury is absent, i.e., that the sworn
statement containing the falsity is required by law. Consequently, petitioner cannot be
prosecuted on the basis of an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading which is not
mandated by law to be verified.
G. R. No. L-65192 April 27, 1988 10.

RODOLFO DELA CRUZ,

Petitioner,
-versus-

HON. FELIX MOYA &

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------x

FACTS:

On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo dela Cruz, a member of AFP together with PC men,
received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pagi, Maco, Sto tomas, Davao to verify and
apprehend persons who allegedly engaged on illegal cockfighting.

In compliance with the order, Dela Cruz with the other men proceeded and caught in
flagrante the operators of illegal cock fighting but resisted arrest, they were followed and in
the scuffle, Eusebio Cabilto was shot by Dela Cruz.

While pending trial, the president promulgated and vesting in court-martial jurisdiction
over crimes committed by members of AFP or PC in performance of their duty. Dela Cruz
claims that his charged was committed in relation to the performance of his duties and moved
to transfer the case to the military authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the civil courts has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?

RULING:

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the crime.

In this case, it is not disputed that at the time of commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner was a member of the PC and that the shooting was committed while executing the
mission order. Even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was
presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7. by

In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by
virtue of General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, military tribunals created under General
Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official
duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty.
By virtue of Gen. Order No. 59, military tribunals exercised exclusive jurisdiction over their
military personnel while in performance of official duty or which arose out of any act or
omission done, the fact that petitioner acted the acts in relation to his mission order, the
Higher Court declares the jurisdiction of the civil court was without jurisdiction.

PD 1822 and 1822-a are inapplicable, however Gen. Order no. 59 applies.
G. R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993 11.
Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Petitioner,
-versus-

Conrado Vasquez , Ombudsman

Et. Al.,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------x

FACTS:

Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with violation of Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act
3019 known as Anti Graft and corrupt practices act before Sandiganbayan. An order of
arrest was issued against her with a bail.

She filed an Urgent Motion to accept cash bond and she was authorized to post a
cash bond but she asked for cancellation of her bail and allowed provisional release on
recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment but meanwhile issued a hold
departure order because of her announcement of leaving for the US to accept fellowship at
Harvard University.

She directly filed a Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from enforcing its hold
departure order and the sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over her person as she
has not been arrested nor voluntarily surrendered.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

Whether Sandiganbayan erred in issuing a hold departure order without prosecution

motion and without notice and hearing?

RULING:

It was held that jurisdiction was acquired either voluntarily surrender of the accused
or by her arrest. The voluntary appearance whereby acquires jurisdiction over his person is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the

court upon filing of her motion.

The hold departure order is but an exercise of the courts inherent power to preserve
and maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Since she assumed in her bail bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the
orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited from leaving the country
during the pendency of the case.
G. R. No. 169588 October 7, 2013 12.

Jadewell Parking Systems Corp.,

Petitioner,
-versus-

Hon. Judge Nelson F. Lidua Sr.,et al.,

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

FACTS:
Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000 was authorized to render any motor
vehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Balajadia and the other respondent dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to
the wheel of their vehicles. Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery. However, an Information
was filed before the MTC. The respondents filed a motion to quash.

Jadewell contends that the filing of the criminal complaint with the office of the city
prosecutor of Baguio, not the filing of the criminal information before the court is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the action had prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the complaint with the office of the City prosecutor tolled the
prescription period of the commission of the offense.

RULING:
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary procedure, only the filing of an
information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
The respondent judge was correct when he applied the ruling in Zaldivia vs. Reyes.

The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it

resulted in the dismissal of the case. The doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinance and
their prescription period.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if
the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays
the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility
should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as
reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
G. R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008 13.

Luis Panaguiton Jr.,

Petitioner,
-versus-

DOJ, Ramon Tongson et. Al.,

Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------x

FACTS:

Cawili borrowed money from the petitioner and issued checks as payment signed by
Cawili and Tongson but the checks were dishonoured. Panaguiton filed a complaint for
Violation of B. P. 22 before Quezon City Prosecutor office.

Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming he has been justly included. He averred
that he was not Cawilis business partner. On December 1995, the prosecutor found
probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the prosecutor dismissed the complaint
against Tongson. The DOJ ruled that the offense has already prescribed since B. P. 22, as a
special act does not provide for the prescription of offense it defines and punishes. Act No.
3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription
of offenses penalized thereunder.

ISSUES:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violation of B. P. 22?

RULING:

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels the prescribed periods from the
time petitioner filed the complaint with the prosecutor office and issuance of resolution, nine
years has elapsed.

The Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal office for preliminary
investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be
this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the
four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson.

However, the delay was beyond petitioners control but that of the DOJ flip-flopping
resolution and misapplication of Act. 3326.

The court ruled and hold that the offense has not yet prescribed and ordered the
refilling of the Information.
G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012 14.

Dante LA Jimenez,
Petitoner,
-versus-

Hon. Edwin Sorongon et. Al.,

Respondents.
x------------------------------------------x

FACTS:

Jimenez is the president of Unlad Shipping, a local manning agency while

respondents listed are some of the incorporators of Taskos Maritime Service, a local manning
agency.
The petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment. An Information was filed before RTC-Mandaluyong.

Petitioner filed a motion for opposition and to expunge on the judicial determination of
probable cause filed by respondent Alamil.

The CA dismissed the petition for lack of legal personality to file in behalf of the
Philippines, only the Solicitor General has the legal personality since petitioner was not the
real party in interest since he is not the victim but a mere competitor.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the case?

Whether the respondent voluntarily submitted on the jurisdiction of the court?

RULING:

The Court held that the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of
the criminal case.

All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by Information shall be prosecuted

under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.

The people is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can
represent the people in criminal proceedings before the CA or before the Supreme Court.

The court further held that Alamil is not a fugitive justice and he voluntarily submitted
to the courts jurisdiction by seeking an affirmative relief constitutes voluntarily appearance,
and the consequent jurisdiction of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. Custody of the
law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.
G. R. No. 153979 February 6, 2006 15.

Regino Sy Catiis,
Petitioner,
-versus-

Court of Appeals,
Reynaldo Patacsil, et. Al.,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------x

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against private respondents for Viol of Art. 315 , no. 2 (a)
in relation to Pres. Decree no. 1689 (syndicated estafa). The prosecutor find a probable
cause for syndicated estafa and with no bail recommended.

Judge Bersamin set the case for arraignment and on the same date, an urgent
Motion to fix bail was filed by respondents. On December 18, 2001, Judge Bersamin issued
an order reconsidering his previous order and grant accused to bail.

Private respondent filed with CA a temporary restraining order but unknown to them
the private respondent had already posted their surety bond and was grant release. The CA
dismissed the petition hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Judge Bersamin is correct in finding that the crime is bailable despite that
the impossable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua?

RULING:

The Court held that since the crime charged was not committed by a syndicate as
define under the law, the penalty of life imprisonment to death cannot be imposed and Judge
Bersamin is correct when he ruled that private respondents could only be punishable with
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua in case of conviction since the amount fraud
exceeds Php. 100,000.00.

In this case, the Information specifically charged only four persons without specifying
any other person who had participated in the commission of the crime charged, thus, based
on the definition of syndicate under the law, the crime charged was not committed by a
syndicate.

Clearly, it is a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying

circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or Information.
Otherwise, it cannot be considered by the trial court in their judgment, even if it is
subsequently proved during the trial. A reading of the Information shows that there was no
allegation of any aggravating circumstance, thus Judge Bersamin is correct when he found
that the lesser penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposable in case of conviction.
G.R. No. 128888 December 3, 1999 16.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus-

CHARITO ISUG-MAGBANUA,
Accused-Appellant.
x-----------------------------------------------------x

FACTS:

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a not guilty plea. Poblica Magbanua, the
complaining witness testified that she is the eldest of the appellant with his wife, Aniceta.

She narrated that she was sexually abused and from this she became pregnant. The
trial court believes the narration of Poblica and decided against appellant.

Appellant faults the trial court in convicting him on the basis of an allegedly
insufficient information for its failure to specify the exact dates when the rapes were
perpetrated because it merely stated that these rapes were committed "sometimes (sic) on
(sic) the year 1991 and the days thereafter." He asserts that since each sexual act is
considered a separate crime, each of these acts should have been established as executed
on certain dates or times and set forth in the information as such. He further argues that the
indefiniteness of the information with respect to time could not have been cured by evidence
presented by the prosecution in derogation of his right to be informed of the nature of the
crime charged against him.

ISSUE:

Whether the Information is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for its

failure to state the precise date of the offense, it being an essential ingredient of the crime?

RULING:
The Court held that the allegation of insufficiency of the information contention
devoid of merit. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not
ipso facto make the Information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission
when the rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime. The precise time when the rape
takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission.

It is sufficient that the complaint or Information states that the crime has been
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. The purpose
of the requirement is to give the accused an opportunity to defend himself.

It is already too late in the day for appellant to question the sufficiency of the
information. He had all the time to raise this issue during the course of the trial, particularly
during his arraignment. He could have filed for a bill of particulars in order to be properly
informed of the dates of the alleged rapes. However, appellant chose to be silent and never
lifted a finger to question the information. As a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever
objections he had and he cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief. Furthermore,
objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first
time on appeal.
G.R. No. L-548881 July 31, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff appellee,
-versus-

RODOLFO QUIBATE,
Defendant- appellant.
x------------------------------------------------x

FACTS:
Accused- appellant stabbed his wife Prima Baltar to death out of jealousy. He
testified that two months before the incident, he caught his wife having sexual intercourse
with their neighbour Gabi, he insisted on having sexual intercourse with her but his wife
refused.

He was sentenced to indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years to 17 years

for the crime of parricide. The trial court promulgated its decision on March 4, 1980
sentencing the accused to an indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12 years minimum to
17 years maximum. However, immediately after promulgating it on that day, the court had
second thoughts and issued the an order considering that counsel of the accused is not
around and that there was a typographical error on its decision and furthermore set a new
date of promulgation.

The promulgation was reset to June 13, 1980 on which date the questioned decision
imposing reclusion perpetua instead of the earlier indeterminate period of imprisonment of 12
years as minimum and 17 years as maximum was rendered.

ISSUE:
Whether the promulgation of the judgment without the counsel of the accused is
valid?

Whether the decision whose promulgation was cancelled become final and executor
fifteen days later?

RULING:

It is not required that counsel for the accused must be present when judgment is
promulgated for it to be valid and effective. However, considering the level of accused
intelligence and the serious of the offense, the court has reason to require counsels
presence. The procedure followed by the lower court is not most appropriate but it does not
constitute a ground to nullify the decision.

On the imposition of the sentence it is unlikely that the 12 to 17 years imprisonment

instead of reclusion perpetua would be a typographical error. It was not. It was an error of
hasty judgment based on a misapprehension of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
applicable to the facts of the case. The lower court made a mistake and it should have taken
immediate steps to rectify it instead of waiting for more than three months.

What was the effect of the cancellation of the promulgation. In this case, since the
promulgation was set aside, the period for perfecting an appeal had not lapsed and the
accused had not waived his right to appeal.

Considering the factual circumstances of the case, it was the duty of the lower court
to ascertain, whether or not the detention prisoner whose sentence of conviction had just
been read intended to appeal.