EN BANC ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new
ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case
of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers
find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases.
In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14,
1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent
Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by
respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was
born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime
in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that
in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of
which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in
Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their
child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with
essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to
be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have
their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he
and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were
due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were
stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on
April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert
Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more
than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and
her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony
and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla
as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits
"A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family
Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in
effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court
relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between
the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended
to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view
psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one
spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with
the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave
the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge
committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus
made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the
Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties
to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in COURT
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties." Q It is therefore the
recommendation of the psychiatrist
The Court's Ruling based on your findings that it is
better for the Court to annul (sic) the
The petition is meritorious. marriage?

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. A Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that Q There is no hope for the
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to marriage?
confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter A There is no hope, the man is also
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the living with another woman.
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Q Is it also the stand of the
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic psychiatrist that the parties are
Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological
psychologically unfit for each other
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
but they are psychologically fit with
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
other parties?

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to A Yes, Your Honor.
us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere Q Neither are they psychologically
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" unfit for their professions?
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties A Yes, Your Honor.
as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) The Court has no
illness. more questions.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and
her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged
personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was
made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part
of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel,
such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary
blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely
ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code
and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the
Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the
Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to
thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting
discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of
the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it
"as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included
in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It
is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already
ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: SO ORDERED.

Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco,
psychological nature. 14 Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed
as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and

purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and
the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO
BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial
provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended
by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance
of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above
provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of
Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his
attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent,
Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First
Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later
proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September
1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge
Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the
J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The
ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into
the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would
also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from Julia's
parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to
work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States,
where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with
the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed,
Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main,
that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and
incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity
of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the
decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very
least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel
asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him)
because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the
petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five
years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity."
The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an
insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon
Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed
that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that
one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking
in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment
is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and
yet the latter would make the marriage null and void
and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to
read:
"That contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was
wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers
to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is
also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of
consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in
subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted,
with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy,
however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7)
refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with
another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies
in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment
in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages
under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in
Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean
Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the
defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why
is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while
psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the
phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or
incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time
of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two
interpretations of the phrase "psychological or
mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is
vitiation of consent because one does not know all
the consequences of the marriages, and if he had
known these completely, he might not have
consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making
psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who
really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit
added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the
case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental
faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect
in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be
a ground for voidable marriage because there is the
appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.)
Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in
general is effected but he stressed that his point is
that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since
there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration
and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are
completely different from each other, because they
require a different capacity, which is eighteen years
of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different.
Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological
incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it
should not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it should be
convalidated but there should be no prescription. In
other words, as long as the defect has not been
cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage
and if the defect has been really cured, it should be
a defense in the action for annulment so that when
the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can
be raised that actually, although one might have
been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the
action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no
concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not
cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is
still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that
there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding
of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of
psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage
was contracted at the time when there is
understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical
incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some
instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to
a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked
that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that
"psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft
provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can
comply with the essential marital obligations, the
marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration
of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out
that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later
on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to
remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage
shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be
substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such
incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they
cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental
and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are
vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not
a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the
matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984
meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz
indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen
who are moralists but not canonists,
that is why it is considered a weak
phrase. He said that the Code of
Canon Law would rather express it
as "psychological or mental
incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word
"mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological
incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the
essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last
meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a
special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since
there having been annulments of marriages arising
from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not
reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new
ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common
provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the
effect that marriages annulled or declared void by
the church on the ground of psychological incapacity
is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37
should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity
because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under
the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche
of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a
vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero
were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof.
Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the
prescriptive period of ten years within which the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
should be filed in court. The Committee approved
the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in
ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice
Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of
psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers
in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting
marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of
judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights
and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that
persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence
under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an
aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal
provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account
on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not
leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed,
to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the
essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual
anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to
contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob
gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text
submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095,
3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob
causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect
to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any
precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written
by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the
following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a
true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other
disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms.
This particular type of incapacity consists of a
real inability to render what is due by the contract.
This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which
he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation
and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The
mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does
not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a
 person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person
is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment
of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the
possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo
Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who
opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity
must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association;
Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently
of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the
spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46,
Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the
disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree,
extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be
carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and
indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise
in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should
continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in
our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family
Code, is that
 Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
union between a man a woman entered into in Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the Feliciano, J., is on leave.
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code. (Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as

the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic

nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt
the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can

come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even
desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor
society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20,
2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated
August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72,
declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between
herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband
Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a
complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband
Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started
a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan
and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she
gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge
Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month
after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After
sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never
responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he
was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on
July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to
effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted
the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a
newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after
the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion
dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7,
1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a
report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He
prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter
offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage
between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National
Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
 the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this
judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios
psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent
spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs
and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of
the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack
of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a
very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be
traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of
entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a
quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their
daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and
returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two
months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with
them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the
other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically
asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an
unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as
a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be
made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is
not around and worse, left them without even helping
them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing
of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be
equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone
assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent
was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite
respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his
family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute
psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of
reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in
accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent,
reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of
the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus,
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the
bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13,
1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot
be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown
as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully
proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital
responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with,
care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month
after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several
letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but
did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving
that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his
marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to
be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence
was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for
an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through
an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The
decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not
just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal
separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the
mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements

in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.
We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated
happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used
for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any
person regardless of nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an

inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects.
While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage
to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C.
CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a
demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari
proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued
with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course is
not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed,
when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to
prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to
deny the demurrer and to require the defendant to present
evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial
constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and an
assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short,
such denial needlessly delays and, thus, effectively denies
justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981.
Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and
Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a
Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.Afterwards
he filed an Amended Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her
alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his
evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted his
Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998. Instead of
offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
(Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court
then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2,
1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held
that [respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the
[petitioner] must controvert.[10] After her Motion for
Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March 22, 1999
Order,[12] petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a
Petition for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense
to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was handed
down later, to take an appeal therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing
the assailed Orders.[15]
The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a
demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial]
courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the
issues in the court below [had] been resolved arbitrarily or without
basis.[17]
Hence, this Petition.[18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following
issues for our consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of
inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present
her evidence, and when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and
patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the
private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of marriage case,
grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family
Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to
evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard
in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in
Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and
Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to
correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its
denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating
or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to
Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency of
respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate
recourse of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Echoing the
CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari,
is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither
appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this
Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was
indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of
discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly
recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower court
acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an
interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxxxxxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this
exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
not available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be
subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are
patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy
of certiorari lies.[25]
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in
exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine
whether the present case falls under the exception; that is,
whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or grave abuse
of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or
exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in
point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or sustain
the issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27] In passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of
guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present
case, and we are convinced that the evidence against respondent
(herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of
psychological incapacity that would warrant a declaration of nullity
of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a
series of charges against him are proof of the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,[29] false testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and
deportation.[32] According to him, the filing and the prosecution of
these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner)
wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him
from the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife
who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband
as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33]
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent
during the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital
obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The
evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are
sufficient to establish her psychological incapacity is not only
totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on
absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by
itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings, sufficient to
prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in
these words:
Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do
you mean by psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the
family way, so at that time she even want it aborted
by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree,
and she lacked the intention of procreative
sexuality.[34]
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is
psychologically incapacitated? Will you please
elaborate on this what you mean by carefree
approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by
carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she
does not take care of the child, she wants me to
hire an attendant in order to take care of the child.
Even when the children were sick she does not
bother to let the children see a doctor.[35]
xxxxxxxxx
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty.
Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of
your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any
characteristic or traits which you consider as
psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she
gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I
call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me
to visit her everytime and even at the time when I
am busy with some other things. So, I think that is
all.[36]
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically
complains about three aspects of petitioners personality; namely,
her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity
and (3) lack of an intention of procreative sexuality. None of these
three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological
incapacity. Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the Court:
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions,
including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code
Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void
and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook
II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated.[39]
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the
psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent
merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each
other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital
union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the
psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts
cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity.The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.[41]
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the
intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that
two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is
absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of
the supposed expert testimony presented by respondent. His
witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and
prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the
incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony
are quoted thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached the
conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband
and the wife in the present case have a personality
which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of
normal personality, only that they are not
compatible with each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of
them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering
on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no
couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there
should be somebody who knows how to handle
marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be
needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of
them practises what we call maximum tolerance
and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be
harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both
of them are personally disordered. It cannot be
harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried
professional help to take care of their marital
problem, it could have been solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody
who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and
Harry could handle this. That means from the very
beginning they have personalities which they were
incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they
will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each
other. They should not have got married.[42]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was
sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both
are normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were
incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other,
which I mentioned there in my last page. That they
are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and
water, they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say
the husband told you about the frequent quarrels
had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a
serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty
quarrels.[43]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a
conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make
them reconcile?
 A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things
could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert
services, and the advise of those who possess the
necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family
therapy.[45]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is
psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46]
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an
incompatibility, a defect that could possibly be treated or
alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further
on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to establish the
psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon
was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In
fact, his Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f
what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48]The
expert witness testified thus:
ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you
gathered most of your material data from the
plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it
was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said,
he doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request
you to conduct the same personal interview and
written psychological examination on the part of the
wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?
WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them
reconcile.[49]
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the
facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and
secondhand information fed to him by one side. Consequently,
his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he
was able to assess petitioners character, not only through the
descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at
least fifteen hours[50] of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day
or a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find
his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely
insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons
testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised
thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already
ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on
appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the
whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.[51] assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological
examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to
psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence costs.
presented is enough to establish the incapacity
adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality of evidence presented SO ORDERED.
by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales,
psychiatric or psychological examination. JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official leave.
The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed
the evidence presented by respondent and taken into account the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily
concluded, as we conclude now, that it was useless to proceed
further with the tedious process of hearing contravening
proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient
to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave abuse of discretion
for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this
Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation
would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties
and an unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.
We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may
arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[53] Any decision,
order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a
very grave abuse of discretion.[54]
There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to
be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An
appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious
effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the baseless
action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly
through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court
dockets with another futile case.[55]
 [G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE
IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz
Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his
father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a
church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on
September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9,
1969;[4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired
neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be
an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and
later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for
treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner
alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. However,
when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner
bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his
own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner
to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon
would only return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon,
petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of
nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by
publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and
could not be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that
she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him
to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants
all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts
his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering
from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display
of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no
capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of
Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on
September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties
is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, appealed alleging that
I physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS
NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING
BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the
trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its
discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1)
respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform
her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is
not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls
short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of
the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent
is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant
sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the
term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code
which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like
the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders
the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur
only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
desirable.[13] circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [19] While we
sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.[20]
personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which
defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No
thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not costs.
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, SO ORDERED.
later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio,
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do JJ., concur.
not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the Azcuna, J., on official leave.
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely
due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds
for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the Family Code. However,
we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted
in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by
petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring
a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE
GRACIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLASBERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution3dated February
3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No.
69103 which affirmed the Decision4 dated October 17, 2000
of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch
11 (RTC) in Civil Case No. S665 declaring the marriage of
respondent Rodolfo O. De Gracia (Rodolfo) and Natividad N.
Rosalem (Natividad) void on the ground of psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines5 (Family Code).
The Facts
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969
at the Parish of St. Vincent Ferrer in Salug, Zamboanga del
Norte.6 They lived in Dapaon, Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte and have two (2) children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R.
De Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza R. De Gracia (Ma.
Rizza), who were born on August 20, 1969 and January 15,
1972, respectively.7
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified complaint
for declaration of nullity of marriage (complaint) before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. S665, alleging that
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations. In compliance with the
Order8 dated January 5, 1999 of the RTC, the public
prosecutor conducted an investigation to determine if
collusion exists between Rodolfo and Natividad and found
that there was none.9 Trial on the merits then ensued.
In support of his complaint, Rodolfo testified, among others,
that he first met Natividad when they were students at the
Barangay High School of Sindangan,10 and he was forced to
marry her barely three (3) months into their courtship in
light of her accidental pregnancy.11 At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while Natividad was 18
years of age. He had no stable job and merely worked in the
gambling cockpits as kristo and bangkero sa hantak.
When he decided to join and train with the
army,12 Natividad left their conjugal home and sold their
house without his consent.13 Thereafter, Natividad moved to
Dipolog City where she lived with a certain Engineer Terez
(Terez), and bore him a child named Julie Ann Terez. 14 After
cohabiting with Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with another man named
Antonio Mondarez and has lived since then with the latter in
Cagayan de Oro City.15 From the time Natividad abandoned
them in 1972, Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma. Reynilda
and Ma. Rizza16 and he exerted earnest efforts to save their
marriage which, however, proved futile because of
Natividads psychological incapacity that appeared to be
incurable.17
For her part, Natividad failed to file her answer, as well as
appear during trial, despite service of
summons.18 Nonetheless, she informed the court that she
submitted herself for psychiatric examination to Dr. Cheryl
T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos) in response to Rodolfos
claims.19 Rodolfo also underwent the same examination.20
In her twopage psychiatric evaluation report,21 Dr. Zalsos
stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations, finding that both parties suffered from utter
emotional immaturity [which] is unusual and unacceptable
behavior considered [as] deviant from persons who abide by
established norms of conduct.22 As for Natividad, Dr. Zalsos
also observed that she lacked the willful cooperation of
being a wife and a mother to her two daughters. Similarly,
Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband,
adding too that he sired a son with another woman. Further,
Dr. Zalsos noted that the mental condition of both parties
already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage,
although it only manifested after. Based on the foregoing,
Dr. Zalsos concluded that the couples union was bereft of
the mind, will and heart for the obligations of marriage. 23
On February 10, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), filed an opposition24 to the complaint,
contending that the acts committed by Natividad did not
demonstrate psychological incapacity as contemplated by
law, but are mere grounds for legal separation under the
Family Code.25
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision26 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC declared
the marriage between Rodolfo and Natividad void on the
ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings
and testimony of Dr. Zalsos, holding that Natividads
emotional immaturity exhibited a behavioral pattern which
in psychiatry constitutes a form of personality disorder that
existed at the time of the parties marriage but manifested
only thereafter. It likewise concurred with Dr. Zalsoss
observation that Natividads condition is incurable since it is
deeply rooted within the makeup of her personality.
Accordingly, it concluded that Natividad could not have
known, much more comprehend the marital obligations she
was assuming, or, knowing them, could not have given a
valid assumption thereof.27
The Republic appealed to the CA, averring that there was no
showing that Natividads personality traits constituted
psychological incapacity as envisaged under Article 36 of
the Family Code, and that the testimony of the expert
witness was not conclusive upon the court.28
The CA Ruling
In a Decision29 dated June 2, 2005, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC, finding that while Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and promiscuity by themselves
do not necessarily equate to psychological incapacity, their
degree or severity, as duly testified to by Dr. Zalsos, has
sufficiently established a case of psychological disorder so
profound as to render [Natividad] incapacitated to perform
her essential marital obligations.30
The Republic moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied in a Resolution31 dated February 3, 2006,
hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue in this case is whether or not the CA
erred in sustaining the RTCs finding of psychological
incapacity.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no
less than a mental not merely physical incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among
others,34include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological
incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.35 In Santos v.
CA36 (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it
must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved).37 The Court laid
down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of
the Phils. v. CA,38 whose salient points are footnoted
hereunder.39 These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements that the Court established in Santos.40
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v.
CA,41 held that therein respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated
with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which
make her completely unable to discharge the essential
marital obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.42 In the
same light, the Court, in the case of Pesca v.
Pesca43 (Pesca), ruled against a declaration of nullity, as
petitioner therein utterly failed, both in her allegations in
the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone
at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to
warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
significantly noting that the [e]motional immaturity and
irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. In Pesca, the Court upheld the
appellate courts finding that the petitioner therein had not
established that her husband showed signs of mental
incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of
the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded
the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet
his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not
physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has
been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven
by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and
incurable in nature.44
The Court maintains a similar view in this case. Based on
the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or
legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can
be equated with psychological incapacity.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, heavily relied on the
psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos which does not,
however, explain in reasonable detail how Natividads
condition could be characterized as grave, deeplyrooted,
and incurable within the parameters of psychological
incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the
types of psychological tests which she administered on
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root
cause of Natividads condition and to show that it existed at
the time of the parties marriage. Neither was the gravity or
seriousness of Natividads behavior in relation to her failure
to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
described in Dr. Zalsoss report. Further, the finding for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of
contained therein on the incurability of Natividads condition the Family Code is DISMISSED.
remains unsupported by any factual or scientific basis and,
hence, appears to be drawn out as a bare conclusion and SO ORDERED.
even selfserving. In the same vein, Dr. Zalsoss testimony
during trial, which is essentially a reiteration of her report, Carpio, J., (Chairperson), Brion, Del
also fails to convince the Court of her conclusion that Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.
Natividad was psychologically incapacitated. Verily, although
expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties are usually given
considerable weight by the courts, the existence of
psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent
evidence.45 After poring over the records, the Court,
however, does not find any such evidence sufficient enough
to uphold the court a quos nullity declaration. To the
Courts mind, Natividads refusal to live with Rodolfo and to
assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not
rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would
justify the nullification of the parties marriage. Indeed, to
be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to
refuse or be reluctant to perform ones duties is another. To
hark back to what has been earlier discussed, psychological
incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.46 In the final analysis, the Court does not
perceive a disorder of this nature to exist in the present
case. Thus, for these reasons, coupled too with the
recognition that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family,47 the instant petition is
hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated June 2, 2005 and Resolution dated February 3, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CV No. 69103
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint
FIRST DIVISION SO ORDERED.[4]

VALERIO E. KALAW, G.R. No. 166357

Petitioner, Factual Antecedents

Present:
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez
(Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and eventually married
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson, in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.They had four children, Valerio (Rio),
Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, (Jay).
BERSAMIN, Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital
DEL CASTILLO, and affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in March
1983.[5]
PEREZ, JJ.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws)
and her four children with Tyrone.[6] Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Promulgated: Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.[7]
Respondent. September 19, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------- In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their
-----------x children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in a rented
house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.[8] The househelp
DECISION would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got
sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed
DEL CASTILLO, J.: with Malyn on weekends.[9]

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established
facts. It is the plaintiffs burden to convince the court of the existence of these
facts.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) May
27, 2004 Decision[2] and December 15, 2004 Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64240, which reversed the trial courts declaration of nullity of the herein
parties marriage. The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyns permission to
go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only to learn later that
Tyrone brought the children to the US.[10] After just one year, Ria returned to
the Philippines and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and
resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy and
Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her
house on weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.[11]

WHEREFOREthe appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is
hereby DISMISSED.
Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife,
Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article
36 of the Family Code.[12] He alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her
psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and
irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation,
as shown by Malyns following acts:
1. she left the children without proper care and
attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
2. she left the house to party with male friends
and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985,
which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.[13]
During trial,[14] Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyns alleged
infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-law,
Ronald Fernandez (Malyns brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned
that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie Guevarra
(Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn
inside.[15] At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie was wearing only a
towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After
an exchange of words, he agreed not to charge Malyn with adultery when
the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights.[16] They put
their agreement in writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a
Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on
Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding
Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality
disorder (NPD).[17] NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her
wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.[18] Malyns NPD
is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.[19]
Dr. Gates reported that Malyns personality disorder may have been evident
even prior to her marriage because it is rooted in her family background and
upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and
without a proper maternal role model.[20]
Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with
Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrones sister-in-law), and the son Miggy. She also
read the transcript of Tyrones court testimony.[21]
Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates assessment. He concluded that Malyn
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.[22] He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the
breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated Malyns ego to the
point that her needs became priority, while her kids and husbands needs
became secondary.Malyn is so self-absorbed that she is incapable of
prioritizing her familys needs.
Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are
not disorders by themselves. They only constitute psychological incapacity
whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the
detriment of ones familial duties.[23] Fr. Healy characterized Malyns
psychological incapacity as grave and incurable.[24]
He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as
well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyns expert
witness.[25] He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual
allegations regarding Malyns habits because he believed it is the courts
duty to do so.[26] Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the
factual allegations are indeed true.
Malyns version
Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated.[27] While she admitted
playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone alleged. She
maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always
between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only.[28] And in those instances, she always had
Tyrones permission and would often bring the children and their
respective yayaswith her.[29] She maintained that she did not neglect her
duties as mother and wife.
Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however,
explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive
husband.[30] On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a
housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work. He called up
the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the
house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyns head and proceeded
to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of
their bedroom and into her mother-in-laws room. She blurted that Tyrone
would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her P300 to leave the
house.[31] She never returned to their conjugal home.
Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrones wishes,
because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from her
discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the
US with Jocelyn.[32]
Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only
booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so drunk after
partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at
the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but maintained being fully clothed at that
time.[33] Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal
and parental rights under duress.[34]
After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously
visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of the children as
an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which
action was subsequently dismissed for lack of interest).
As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was
suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his drug
dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence.[35] Malyn
presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her expert witness.
Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her
psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual narrations culled from
these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a lousy mother because of
her mahjong habit,[36] while Malyn was fed up with Tyrones sexual infidelity,
drug habit, and physical abuse.[37] Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone
and Malyn were behaviorally immature. They encountered problems
because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise
of their marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:
The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from
the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for
marriage even after two years of living together and
having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who
showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could
take him or leave him. But the minute she started to care,
she became a different person clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that
she was the most important person in his
life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that
her style then was when she begins to care for a man,
she puts all her energy into him and loses focus on
herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was
overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted that the thought of
commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he
was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other
women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex,
just for fun dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.
Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some
time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody
man with short temper and unresolved issues with
parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned
more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about
spending time with his family. Because of Malyns and
Tyrones backgrounds (both came from families with high
conflicts) they experienced turmoil and chaos in their
marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid
suddenly galloped out of control Their individual
personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of
their marriage.[38]
Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn
exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency, narcissism, and
compulsiveness.[39]
On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship
problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good relationship with her
kids.[40] As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from
committing himself to his duties as a husband. He is unable to remain
faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.[41]
Childrens version
The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for
their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would accompany their
mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her
friends. None of them reported being neglected or feeling abandoned.
The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was
only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse inflicted on her
mother.[42] The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their
mother would visit them only in school.[43]
The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and
driver during the time that their dad was abroad.[44] While they did not live
with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in
agreement that their mother took care of them on weekends and would see
to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would
call their mother to come and take care of them in Valle Verde whenever
any of them was sick.[45]
Other witnesses
Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrones attending psychiatrist at the Manila
Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrones confinement, the
couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she
gave to her spouse.[46] He likewise testified that Tyrone tested negative for
drugs and was not a drug dependent.[47]
Malyns brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrones allegation that they
found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary to Tyrones
version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed
in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing Benjie or Malyn half-
naked.[48]
Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of
Malyns group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would go on
nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend
afterwards.[49]
Social worker
The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to
conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor
children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor
children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrones live-in partner, Jocelyn;[50] and
Tyrone and Malyns only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially
stable and have positive relationships with their children, she recommended
that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the
interviews of family members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more
available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The
social worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal
home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in their
respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of
the children, it appeared that she made efforts to personally attend to their
needs and to devote time with them.[51]
On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the
couples de facto separation, simply left the children for several years with
only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second
family abroad.[52] The social worker found that Tyrone tended to prioritize his
second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history
during the formative years of the children, the social worker did not find
Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court[53]
After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The courts Decision is
encapsulated in this paragraph:
From the evidence, it appears that parties are both
suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as
much as understanding what it entails. They failed to
commit themselves to its essential obligations: the
 conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of their
children to become responsible individuals. Parties
psychological incapacity is grave, and serious such that
both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically
established and was found to be pervasive, grave and
incurable.[54]
The trial court then declared the parties marriage void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.[55]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals[56]
Malyn appealed the trial courts Decision to the CA. The CA reversed the
trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record. Both
parties allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a
finding of psychological incapacity. The parties faults tend only to picture
their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial
obligations.At most, there may be sufficient grounds for a legal
separation.[57] Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioners
expert witness, Dr. Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD
came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and
jurisprudential requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.[58]
Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration[59] but the same was denied
on December 15, 2004.[60]
Petitioners arguments
Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual
findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best position to
appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant
evidence to prove that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:
a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved
on the stand that respondents egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-
obsession and self-centeredness were manifestations of
respondents NPD;[61]
b) these expert witnesses proved that respondents NPD
is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her
essential martial obligations;[62] and
c) that respondents NPD existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing,
family background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage.[63]
Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void
because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioners part.[64]
Respondents arguments
Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving
her alleged psychological incapacity.[65] She argues that the testimonies of
her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she
was a good, loving, and attentive mother are sufficient to rebut Tyrones
allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.[66]
She assails Dr. Gatess report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates
did not interview her, their common children, or even Jocelyn. Moreover,
her report failed to state that Malyns alleged psychological incapacity was
grave and incurable.[67] Fr. Healys testimony, on the other hand, was based
only on Tyrones version of the facts.[68]
Malyn reiterates the appellate courts ruling that the trial court Decision is
intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of psychological
incapacity with factual findings.
Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had
a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to
Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.[69]She manifested that she was no
longer disputing the possibility that their marriage may really be void on the
basis of Tyrones psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to
dispose of the case with justice.[70] Her manifestation and motion were
noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution.[71]
Issue
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from
psychological incapacity
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting
aside the trial courts Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of
the Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations.[72] The burden of
proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.[73] The plaintiff must prove
that the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers
a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of
marriage, and must be incurable.[74]
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers
from psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two
supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were
premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven.Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.
Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed
constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her
duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form
of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong
and neglected their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played
mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently
that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the
permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at
home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their
mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions
were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated
that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this
episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that could have been
done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during
the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its
alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not
proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant
visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for
attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her
visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-
out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario
only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had
an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity
cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other
men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the
behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding
that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts
would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did
the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick,
and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real efforts
to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their
father.There was no testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and
neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio
and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors,
there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyns actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for
the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs
reversal of the trial courts ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The
trial courts Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies, and
evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity
of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as
bases for its legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps,

infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for
legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a
marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.