Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Review
Author(s): Eliot Deutsch
Review by: Eliot Deutsch
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 8 (Apr. 20, 1972), pp. 224-227
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2024890
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224 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

even supported. Because he assumes that the Intentionalityof

mental states is the main obstacle to an escape from dualism,
Dennett's alternativesto dualism leave the core of the problem
untouched.
Dennett goes on to discussperception,imagination,thought,ac-
tion and intention. He is motivated throughoutby the aim of
accounting for these phenomena in ways that do not simply re-
introducethe analysanduminto the analysis,by assumingin one
way or anothera littleman or committeeof men in the brain. He
observes(134):
If an imageis to function
as an elementin perception, it willhaveto
function as therawmaterialand not theend product,forif we sup-
pose thattheproductof theperceptualprocessis an image,we shall
have to designa perceiver-analogueto sit in frontof the imageand
yetanotherto sit in frontof theimagewhichis theend productof
perceptionin the perceiver-analogueand so forthad infinitum.
Much of what he says about mental conceptsis imaginativeand
convincing.But his fundamentalenterpriseis to reduce our onto-
logical commitmentto the mentalby explainingon the subpersonal
level, "where people, thoughts,experiences and introspectivere-
ports are simplynot part of the subject matter" (113), how there
can be truthsthat are nonreferentially "about" these thingson the
personal level. This enterpriseremains unfulfilled,and the con-
ditions of its success remain cloudy. It is possible to say a great
deal that is true about the mind and its relationto the body,while
leaving the mind-bodyproblem fundamentallyundisturbed.
THOMAS NAGEL
PrincetonUniversity

Consciousnessand Freedom: Three Views.PRATIMA BOWES. London:

Methuen; New York: Barnes 8cNoble, 1971. xx, 230 p. $8.75.
Philosophicalproblemsassociatedwiththe conceptsand phenomena
of consciousnessand freedomare not, as many Western philoso-
phersbelieve, exhaustedeitherby analysesof the mind/bodyprob-
lem and the free-will/determinism issue or by phenomenological-
existentialistconcernswith the intentionalityof consciousnessand
the persistenceof freedomas a basic conditionof man. Other philo-
sophical traditionshave much to contributeto our understanding
of theseproblems,and the authoris to be commendedforhis splen-

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 BOOK REVIEWS 225

in workingfroma more genuine (though far fromcom-

did efforts
plete) world perspectivein philosophy. His "three views" in the
view; (2) the phenomeno-
subtitleare (1) the materialist-behaviorist
view; and (3) thatof two Indian traditions-
logical-existentialist
theSaffkhya and theVedanta.For themostpartBowesexhibitsa
soundunderstanding of the basic philosophicalprinciplesinform-
ing the "threeviews"and an impressive knowledgeof the details
ofand arguments forand againstthevariouspositionshe considers.
The workas a whole,though,is ratherunbalanced.The first
viewis given110 pages,the second56, and the third48. Also in
manynonquantitative waysthelastviewsare in factpresented as
onlysupplementary to the materialist-behavioristposition,which
theauthortakesas centralto thewholediscussion. The book,how-
ever,is morethanjust a presentation of theseviews.Bowesputs
forwarda positionof his own and explicatescritically each view
fromthe standpointof this position.He wishesthroughout the
workto stressthatthehumanmindhas a specialand uniquefunc-
tion-"its capacityto have a consciousawarenessthatit is having
an experience."This capacityof consciousawarenessmust,Bowes
insists,be clearlydifferentiatedfrom,and be understood independ-
entlyof,thoseaspectsof the mentalwhichcan be adequatelyac-
countedforin termsof dispositional propertiesof thebody.Neu-
rophysiology, he believes,proves"the identity with physicalstates
ofthatparticular dimension in
ofmindwhichconsists dispositional
and behaviouralproperties" (x). This dimensionof mind,which
includesintelligence and purposiveness, is thussubject-tomuch
thatthematerialist-behaviorists (e.g.,in theirdifferingways,Arm-
strong,Feigl,Smart,Rorty)claimforit. But apartfromthese"dis-
positionalcharacteristicsof brainstates"thereare the "rawfeels"
of awareness whichcannot,he arguesconvincingly, be madeintelli-
gible in neurophysiological terms.There is no way by whichthe
basic experienceof consciousness can be identified with,or be re-
ducedto,specific brainstates.
On thefree-will/determinism issueBowesstrikesagain a middle
way.He givesto the (hard)determinists whattheymaintaincon-
cerningthecausesofbehavior, and yethe holdsto thepositionthat
mancan act consciously byreasonswhichseldom,ifever,enterinto
law-governed relationshipswithactions(thatX reasonwill always
produceY action).
Bowes' treatment of the phenomenological-existentialist view is
oftenbrilliant(hisexplicationof Sartre'smurkydoctrinethatcon-
sciousnessis "nothing"is excellent),but he is not so careful(or

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226 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

competent)with Husserl and Merleau-Pontyas one might wish.

Bowes findsthis view to be somewhatone-sided,since it neglects
the solid factsof mentallifeas articulatedin the behavioralsciences.
Bowes maintains that "Samkhya and Samkara Vedanta throw
some light . . . on the problem of consciousness and freedom and
they may be thoughtof as furtherextensionsof certain notions
found in the phenomenologicaland existentialistdoctrines"(167).
He presentsthe essential teachingsof the Indian traditions(but
withoutcitingany texts)in a freshand illuminatingway. He points
out how the concept "material" in Indian thoughtis wider than
our generaluse of 'physical'and how Indian thoughtmakes a clear
distinctionbetween mind and consciousness;"mind" (the senses,
intelligence)being thoroughlymaterial, and "consciousness"(that
which representsthe "knowledgethat p"), ratherthan the will as
such, being free and unconditioned.Consciousnessin the Indian
view is not a state of one's mind,but a unique function;a function
for "self-manifestation." ("like that of light
It is self-illuminating
which illumines itselfas well as objects just by being there") and
it is a witnessto all othermental activities.
Bowes rejects the metaphysicsof absolute freedom and tran-
scendencethat is put forward,in differing ways,in both S&Ihkhya
and Vedanta, but he findsthat theseschoolsof thoughtadd signifi-
cantlyto our knowledgeof the nature of consciousness.His rejec-
tion is basicallyin value terms-and when he argues in these terms
he strikes,I think,his weakest philosophical stance. He remarks:
But whatif a man does not wantthisfreedom, whatif he wantsto
thatgo withbeinga partof thematerial
live withinthelimitations
world?To tell him,as Sdmkhya would,thathe wantsthisonlybe-
causehe is mistakenabouthis real statusas an unconditionedbeing
is onlyto revealSdmkhya'sown presuppositions as to whatis worth-
while(187).
And later continuesin a similarvein:
It seemsto me thatboththeidealistdoctrinethatour empiricalex-
doctrinethat
real and the materialistic
periencesare not ultimately
therecannotbe any such thingas experienceof pure consciousness
are notso muchfactualassertionsthatcan claimexperiential
validity
as concealedvalue judgments(202).
Now of coursevalue judgmentsare operativein theoriesof mind;
with the Vedanta explicitly maintaining that the realization of
freedomin the depthsof consciousnessis preciselythe highestvalue
for man (and also that it is indeed an experiential attainment).

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 BOOK REVIEWS 227

To argue that,because this or some other similar value mightbe

unimportantfor a man who doesn't want to realize the fullnessof
his potentialities,the teachingis thereforeessentiallyonly a value
assumptionis obvious (and quite sheer) nonsense.
In his concludingremarkBowes states:
Once thevaluationalcharacter ofmindis understood
of theories there
need not be any rigideither/or about the dimensionof mindone
ascribesto man,forit is possibleforone to recognizethattheother
dimensionis thereand yetfindthatit has no importance or interest
forone'sparticular
purposes(223).
If this means, as it and other statementsseem to suggest,that one
can simplychoose one's theoryof mind accordingas it best fitsone's
own life interestsand purposes,then clearly one must throw out
all truthvalues and replace thementirelywith axiological concerns.
As his very careful analysis of argumentsthroughoutthe work
shows,however,Bowes does not really believe this.
ELIOT DEUTSCH
Universityof Hawaii

Between Philosophyand History; The Resurrectionof Speculative

Philosophy of History within the Analytic Tradition. HASKELL
FAIN. Princeton:UniversityPress, 1970. xi, 329 p. $10.

I findthisbook verydifficult.But althoughI am not at all sure that

I understandit all, I do have a hunch as to whyit is so perplexing.
And while I shall brieflydiscusswhat I take to be the book's main
thesis,I want firstto tryto articulatewhat I thinkis the source of
my discomfort.Mr. Fain will, I hope, forgiveme for this order of
priorities.Not onlydo I wish to justifymyinabilityto come to grips
with his essay,but I also believe that this book is symptomaticof
a malady that is infectingan increasinglylarge proportionof our
profession;it may thus be worthwhile to dwell on a diagnosis of
myconfusion.
Between Philosophyand Historyis writtenin a lively,colloquial
and wittystyle,freeof jargon and the sortof cumbersomemachin-
erythat can be so hard to keep trackof. Rather than being austere,
the book is full of examples,analogies, and quotations,both from
philosophersand historians.In no obvious way is the styleallusive
or revelatory;with each sentence,Fain comes out and says what
he has to say. Nevertheless,entirechapterscan only be called allu-

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