RULE 114

LEVISTE v CA

FACTS:
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically
begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.
Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his
advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course
of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Petitioner now
questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none
of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

ISSUE:
In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty
of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail
pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?

HELD:
NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 does not mean
automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to
judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the
trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and
the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial
courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws.
This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing
in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces
a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other
release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and
time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.

RODRIGUEZ VS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC MANILA

[G.R. NO. 157977: February 27, 2006]

FACTS

On March 12, 2001 the Government of the United States of America (US government) through the
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a petition for extradition against the petitioners.

After their arrest, petitioners applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. The
bail was set for one million pesos for each. Petitioners then posted cash bonds.

The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the
trial court.

Unsatisfied, the US government filed a petition for certiorari with the SC. The SC directed the trial
court to resolve the matter of bail subject to the SC ruling in the similar case of Mark Jimenez
entitled Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, docketed as G.R No. 148571.

In compliance with SC directive, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash
bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest following the En Banc Decision
of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 148571 to the effect that extraditees are not entitled to bail' while
the extradition proceedings are pending.

Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail. The
motion was heard and denied on May 9, 2003.

Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition directed against the orders of the RTC of
Manila, Branch 17, which cancelled the bail of petitioners and denied their motion for reconsideration,
respectively.

ISSUES:

I. Whether a prospective extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before the cancellation of his or
her bail.

II. What constitutes a "special circumstance" to be exempt from the no-bail rule in extradition cases? cralaw

III. Was the order to issue warrant of arrest against petitioners and to cancel the bail of extraditees a
grave abuse of discretion of the trial court?

RULING:

I. The issue has become moot and academic insofar as petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez is concerned
because he is now in the USA facing the charges against him. But with co-petitioner Imelda Gener
Rodriguez, the SC agrees that her bail should be restored, because the cancellation of co-petitioner's
bail, without prior notice and hearing, could be considered a violation of co-petitioner's right to due
process.
The trial court's immediate cancellation of the bail of petitioners is contrary to our ruling in Purganan,
and it had misread and misapplied our directive therein.

In Purganan, we said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending
arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a
bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The grant
of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be
on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had
already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to
provisional release.

II. We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

(***Circumstances specific in the case, which led the SC to conclude that petitioners fall under
"special circumstance" exempt from the no-bail rule in extradition cases: Co-petitioner has offered to
go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that
her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial;
that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never
attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in
her sixties, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary
liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-
petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be
discontinued.***)

III. Yes. Grave abuse of discretion is capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law. Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is
entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record, we find that,
absent prior notice and hearing, the bail's cancellation was in violation of her right to due process,
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 17
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, as far as petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ is concerned. We
hereby (1) declare IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ entitled to bail, (2) order her cancelled bail restored,
and (3) order the warrant for her arrest revoked.

SO ORDERED.

YUSOP v SANDIGANDYAN
G.R. No. 138859-60 - February 22, 2001

Facts:
In a Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, the
prosecution of Benjamin Arao, Fredireck Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren
Sissay and the city jail warden of Pagadian City as respondents was recommended for
violating Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code (unlawful arrest) and Section 3-a in
relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended. Petitioner Alvarez Yusop
was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of the
original respondents mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano
A. Desierto approved the recommendation. Subsequently, an Order of Arrest was issued
by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524 but the petitioner posted a bail bond
before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolos City on May 20 of the same year. On the same
day, a "Motion To Remand Case To The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation was filed but the Sandiganbayan denied the same for failure to submit the
petitioner himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. With this, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss. The respondent Sandiganbayan, however resolved not to take action
on the motion. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner contended that he had not been accorded preliminary investigation, thereby,
requested for the dismissal of those charges. Meanwhile, respondent Sandiganbayan
argued that the claim of accused Yusop that he was not notified with respect to one of
the cases on an identical set of facts herein is not [of] particular significance since this
would be indulging in a superfluity.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of the lack of
preliminary investigation with respect to petitioner, committed grave abuse of discretion
in proceeding with his arraignment.

Held:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of disretion. The Court held that
there is no basis for the Sandiganbayan's ruling that petitioner "had not given timely notice
nor any statement of the alleged inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
Information. First, there was no showing that petitioner was notified of the charges filed
by Erlinda Fadri. Second, petitioner immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard to him. In fact, moments before
his arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the preliminary investigation be conducted.
Third, petitioner cannot be expected to know of the investigator's subsequent act of
charging him. Lastly, neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of
petitioner's right to preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, "[a]n application for or admission to bail;
shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality
of the warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he
raises them before entering his plea. xxx. The right to preliminary investigation is
substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to petitioner would deprive him of
the full measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation with regard
to him must be conducted.
The Court, on the other hand, ruled that petitioners claim for the dismissal of cases due
to lack of preliminary investigation is untenable. Nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a
motion to quash. Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the absence of
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the
regularity of the proceedings. We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v.
Gomez: f there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering
their plea, invite the attention of the court of their absence, the court, instead of dismissing
the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand
the case to the inferior court so the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Orders are REVERSED,
and the Office of the Ombudsman is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019 against Petitioner
Alvarez Aro Yusop. The trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 24524 shall be
SUSPENDED in regard to petitioner until the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

ESTEBAN VS ALHAMBRA
G.R. No. 135012
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez

FACTS:

1. The case came to the SC as a petition for certiorari filed by Anita Esteban, sister in law of the
accused, to reverse the two petitions for the annulment of cash bail of Gerardo Esteban
amounting to P20,000 each.

2. Anita, originally posted the bail for Gerardo, however, he committed another crime while out on
bail; she got "fed up", and moved for the cancellation of the posted money to the court and
surrendered the accused to the City Jail Warden. However this was denied, so was her motion
for reconsideration.

3. Anita now pleas that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and that the issue is one of "first impression". She cites that under Sec 19,
now Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the bail may be cancelled upon
surrender of the accused.

ISSUE: WON Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it refused to cancel the bail upon petition of Anita

HELD: No

1. Anita misapplies the provision; the cash bail cannot be cancelled because Gerardo was not
surrendered for the four criminal cases he was originally charged with, he was acquired
because of the subsequent case filed against him

2. The court also cites section 14 which states:

Section 14. Deposit of cash as bail. The accused or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city
or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the
prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate
of deposit and a written undertaking showing compliance with the requirements of
 Section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be discharged from custody. The money
deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs,
while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the
deposit. (Underscoring supplied)

A cash bond is treated as the money of the accused (even if it was supplied by another
person in his behalf). The money of the accused shall than applied as payment for any
fine or cost imposed by the court. It is treated in the nature of a lien. In the cited case
of Esler vs. Ledesma, between the accused and the third party (the one who posted the
bond) the residue of the cash bail is not subject to the claim of a creditor to property.
RUIZ VS BELDIA

Facts: Shirley Ruiz charged Judge Rolindo Beldia with gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority in connection of the grant of bail and issuance of a release order in favor of Lourdes Estrella
Santos, who was arrested during an entrapment operations relative to the carnapping of the petitioners
car. After Santos arrest,she was detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City pending the filing of formal
charges in court. Upon inquest,she executed a waiver of the provisions of Art 125 of the RPC inrelation
to Rule 112,sec 7 of Rules of Criminal Procedure. The preliminary investigation was set on May 31, 2000.
However on May 30,2000, Santos obtained an order of release signed by the respondent Judge Beldia
who was an assisting judge in the RTC Branch 272 Marikina City. The respondent granted bail to Santos
and approved the corresponding bail bond without serving notice to the prosecutor.

As a result, Ruiz filed instant administrative complaint against Judge Beldia contending that he had no
authority to grant bail to Santos since the Investigating Prosecutor has not yet conclude the preliminary
investigation. Judge Beldia contends that Section 1 (c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court allows any person
in custody, even if not formally charged in court, to apply for bail.

Meanwhile, OCA directed the clerk of court Atty. Adarlo to confirm whether a formal petition for
admission to bail was filed by Santos and whether the presiding judge was absent or not on the day
Beldia issued the release order. After, Atty. Adarlo informed OCA that the recordsof release order and
bailbond did not include the subject release order issued. OCA recommended that Judge Beldia be held
liable for gross ignorance of the law and fined in the amount of P5,000.00.

Issue: whether there was ignorance of the law on the part of Judge Beldia in granting bail to Santos

Held: Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a judge could grant bail
to a person lawfully arrested but without a warrant, upon waiver of his right under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as Santos had done upon her inquest.
Undeniably too, Santos was entitled to bail as a matter of right since the offense with which she was
charged does not carry the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua or death. Notwithstanding, it
was incumbent upon respondent Judge Beldia to grant bail to Santos in accordance with established rules
and procedure. Respondent Judge Beldia failed in this respect and must thus be held administratively
liable.
Section 17, par. (c) of Rule 114 distinctly states: (c) Any person in custody who is not yet charged in court
may apply for bail with any court in the province, city, or municipality where he is held. The Certificate
of Detention issued by the PNP shows that Santos was detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. Thus, the
application for bail should have been filed before the proper Quezon City court and not in Marikina City.
Also, it appears that no formal application or petition for the grant of bail was filed before the RTC-
Marikina City. There were no records of the application or the release order issued by respondent Judge
Beldia. Neither was there a hearing conducted thereon nor the prosecutor notified of the bail application.
Judge Beldia disregarded basic procedural rules when he granted bail to Santos without the latter having
filed a formal petition for bail. Accordingly, the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process for
which respondent Judge Beldia must be held accountable.
 RULE 115
MARCOS vs RUIZ

FACTS:

After conducting a preliminary investigation, Asst, Fiscal of Tagbilaran City filed to RTC
Bohol 2 information against Marcos for violation of BP 22.

Marcos appeared during the scheduled arraignment but asked for resetting because his
lawyer has just withdrawn from the case. The court granted his request.

Later, Marcos was able to settle his obligation with the complainants and the latter
executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Because of that, Asst. City Fiscal filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case because without the testimony of the complainants who withdrew, he
cannot successfully prosecute the case.

During the arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. When the case was called for hearing,
Marcos and his lawyer already left. The prosecution proceeded in the presentation of its
evidence and rested its case.

Because Marcos did not attend the trial, the court forfeited his bail bond. Counsel
explained that he was unable to attend the trial because he had attended urgent matter
which needed his personal attention. He also explained that Marcos left in belief that
there would no presentation of evidence since an Affidavit of Desistance was already filed
before the court.

Essentially, the 2nd information was the same as the 1st so the counsel of the accused
offered that reading of information is waived and plea of not guilty be directly entered.

ISSUE:
WON the court erred in in forfeiting the petitioners bail bond for his non-appearance
during trial. Stated otherwise, what are the instances where the presence of the accused
during trial is indispensable? May a counsel enter a plea in behalf of the accused?

RULING:

The forfeiture of the bail bond was inappropriate. A bail bond may be forfeited only in
instances where the presence of the accused is specifically required by the court of the
Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him before the court
on a given date, the accused fails to appear in person as so required.
Under the Rules of Court, the accused has to be present:

1. At the arraignment pursuant to par. (b), Section 1, Rule 116;

2. At the promulgation of judgment, except when conviction is for a light offense, in which
case the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative
pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 120, or unless promulgation in absentia is allowed under
3rd par of said Section; and
3. When the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.

Thus, the petitioners appearance was not required at the subject trial. It is true that he
has the right to be present at every stage of the proceeding (from arraignment to
promulgation), but he can waive his presence. The failure of the accused to appear at the
trial despite due notice and without justification is deemed an express waiver of his right
to be present. As such, the trial may proceed in absentia.

With regard to the 2nd information, the court made no ruling on the manifestation and
offer by petitioners counsel that the reading of the information is waived and a plea of
not guilty is entered. The petitioner was neither made to confirm the manifestation nor
directed to personally make the plea. There was no valid arraignment as it is required that
the accused would personally enter his plea.

ALMARIO VS CA
FACTS:

Almario is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of public
document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the offended
party in both cases. The hearing was reset several times due to the elevation of the Presiding
Judge to a higher court, lack of trial judge immediately appointed to the hearing, and lack of
proof of notice to all the accused and their counsel.
On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon
motion of Almarios counsel, the respondent court issued an order dismissing the case for
failure to prosecute and considering Almarios right to a speedy trial.
Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of Almario, respondent court
ordered that there has been no vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified
postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to lapse without the party having his case
tried which would constitute a violation of the right of Almario to speedy trial.
After arraignment of the accused, the pre-trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October
25, 1994. On June 21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service of
the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995, counsel for the accused did
not interpose objection to private prosecutors motion to postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July
24, 1995, the trial could not proceed as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other
accused were not present. There were only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial for
the prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid reasons. Furthermore, the
dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of the accused since the
right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and its dismissal having been made upon the
motion of the accused there is no double jeopardy.

The order dismissing the charge/case against Almario is reconsidered and set aside. Almario
then moved for a reconsideration which was denied and so Almario filed before the CA a
petition for certiorari which the appellate court denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition. Almario asserts that this reversal was a violation of the doctrine of double
jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an alleged violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
ISSUE:

Whether double jeopardy had set in so that Almarios constitutional right against such jeopardy
had been violated?
RULING: NO.

Clearly, under Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, double jeopardy attaches only
(1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a
valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was
made upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance
of the accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a
criminal case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two
exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.
Delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the control of the parties and of the trial
court. There were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for
unreasonable lengths of time. It follows that Almario cannot invoke the constitutional right
against double jeopardy when that order was reconsidered seasonably. For as Almarios right to
speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy that
the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused was not met. The trial courts initial order of
dismissal was upon motion of petitioners counsel, hence made with the express consent of
petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said order, double jeopardy did
not attach.

CANCERAN VS PEOPLE
Facts:

The records disclose that Canceran, together with Frederick Vequizo and Marcial Diaz, Jr., was charged with
"Frustrated Theft." The Information reads:

That on or about October 6, 2002, at more or less 12:00 noon, at Ororama Mega Center Grocery Department,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Jovito Canceran, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another with
his co-accused Frederick Vequizo, URC Merchandiser, and Marcial Diaz, Jr., a Unilever Philippines
merchandiser both of Ororama Mega Center, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away 14
cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at 28,627,20, belonging to Ororama Mega Center

The RTC found Canceran guilty beyond reasonable doubt of consummated Theft in line with
the ruling of the Court in Valenzuela v. People[8] that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), there is no crime of "Frustrated Theft." Canceran was sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years,
eight (8) months of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

ISSUE: Whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the
information.

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

Constitutional Right of the

Accused to be Informed of
the Nature and Cause of
Accusation against Him.

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.16 It is fundamental that every element of which
the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.17

Under Article 308 of the RPC, the essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the
property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done
without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things. "Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is
the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking
as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all."18

"It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the
concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control
over the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its
attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been
completed, the "taking not having been accomplished."19

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with
"Frustrated Theft" only.

As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran
of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the
Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being charged with theft in its attempted stage
only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint
or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt
may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense
higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized
denial of that right."20 Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is
alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him.21 An offense charged necessarily includes
the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter.22

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage. In this
case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated Theft, he could be
convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to convict him for
consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot
do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against
him, as he so protests.
 RULE 116
PEOPLE vs DY, et al., GR Nos.115236-37, Jan. 16, 2003
Facts:

Bryan Dy and Giovan Bernardino were charged of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness in a complaint
initiated by Gina Marie Mobley, the victim. The two cases were tried jointly. Accused refused to be
arraigned and enter a plea; hence, a plea of "not guilty" was entered on their behalf. The prosecution
presented expert witness to corroborate the victims statement which the accused rebutted by
presenting their own witnesses. The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
On appeal, the accused stated that the courts decision should be reversed and set aside because
no valid arraignment took place. They contended that there was no valid arraignment since they
were not furnished a copy of the complaint or information. Moreover, the complaint or information
was not read in a dialect or language known to them. While they waived their right to enter a plea,
they claim that they never waived their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them.
Isue:
Whether the accused were validly arraigned or not.
Held:
The accused were substantially informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them
when their counsel received a copy of the Prosecutors resolution maintaining the charge for rape
and acts of lasciviousness. The failure to read the complaint or information in a language or dialect
known to them was essentially a procedural infirmity that was eventually non-prejudicial to the
accused. Not only did they receive a copy of the information, they likewise participated in the trial,
cross-examined the complainant and her witnesses and presented their own witnesses to debunk
and deny the charges against them. The conduct of the defense (the accused), particularly their
participation in the trial, clearly indicates that they were fully aware of the nature and cause of the
accusations against them. The accused themselves refuse to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them. The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the
reading of the complaint or information.

PEOPLE vs PADERNAL

Facts:

Panfilo Padernal was charged by the RTC of Ormoc City with the crime of homicide in connection
with the death of Brigido Rodila. The accused entered the plea of guilty but invoked the presence of
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, lack of education and instruction, voluntary
surrender, and spontaneous plea of guilty. Thereafter, the defense presented its evidence to prove the
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender.

When the case was called for continuation on January 27, 1961, upon realizing from the testimony
of the accused that he was invoking complete self-defense, the judge ordered that a plea of not guilty be
entered by the accused and called for trial on merits on January 31, 1961.

During the scheduled trial, both parties submitted the case without presenting any further
evidence. The court decided that the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense during the
time the case was heard for the purpose of determining presence of incomplete self-defense shall be
considered as evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt of the accused, by virtue of which the
case was deemed submitted for decision. Thereafter, the Judge promulgated a decision acquitting
accused Panfilo Padernal of the crime of homicide with which he was charged 'on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether the court may enter a plea of not guilty for the accused

Ruling:

In the case, the court a quo caused a plea of not guilty to be entered in place of the plea of guilty of the
accused after presenting evidence to prove the mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Section 1(d), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that when the accused pleads guilty but presents
exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for
him.

GONZALES VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

GR 196231 Sept 4, 2012

FACTS: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Omb charged M/G Carlos F. Garcia and
several others with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan denied Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence
militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the government, thru SP Wendell
Barreras-Sulit, the petitioner, sought the SB's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered
into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding the change of plea
warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.

Outraged by the backroom deal, the House conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. The committee
recommended to the Opthe dismissal of the petitioner from the service. The OP initiated the case against
petitioner. In her written explanation, petitioner raised the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to
the administrative disciplinary proceeding against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case,
setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011. Hence, this petition.

HELD: (NOTE: THE FIRST PART OF THE DECISION: WHETHER THE OP HAS A CONCURRENT POWER TO
CONDUCT ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS OVER OFFICERS IN THE OMB)
RA 6770 granted full statutory power to conduct administrative investigations (Section 21) to all
appointive and elective positions in the government with the exception of those officials removable by
impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, thus such authority is by no means exclusive.

Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For Section 8(2) grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor.
However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent authority with respect to
removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions
pursuant to Section 8(2) of RA 6670 expressly granting the President to exercise the power of
administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government officials and
employees.

THIS IS THE SECOND PART WHERE THE PLEA WAS DISCUSSED BY THE SC. SC DID NOT FOCUS ON THE
PLEA BUT ON THE CONSEQUENCE WHERE A PLEA IS ENTERED INTO DESPITE THE STRENGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT
As to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA)

Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. The essence of a plea bargaining
agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense than that charged against
him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure therefor. (CITE
THE SAID PROVISION ) Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, the petitioner still entered
into a plea bargaining with the accused.

At this juncture, the SC said, it is not amiss to emphasize that the "standard of strong evidence of
guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case." Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against
accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys
and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout in the case.

Note: The Court allowed the continuance of the investigation lodged before the OP.

BARRERAS-SULIT VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

G.R. No. 196232

FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia and several others
before SB with plunder and money laundering. The Office of the Ombudsman, through Special
Prosecutor Sulit and her prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining agreement with
Garcia and in exchange, he would convey to the government his ownership, rights and other
interests over the real and personal properties enumerated in the Agreement and the bank
deposits alleged in the information.
The Agreements apparent one-sidedness drew public outrage and prompted the Committee
on Justice of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, Sulit
her deputies and assistants were found to have committed culpable violations of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.

The Committee recommended to the President the dismissal of Sulit. Accordingly, the Office
of the President (OP) initiated an administrative disciplinary proceeding. Sulit later filed her Written
Explanation, questioning the OPs jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction notwithstanding, the OP
set the case for preliminary investigation prompting Sulit to seek relief from this Court.
ISSUE:

Whether the Office of the President has Administrative Disciplinary Jurisdiction over a
Special Prosecutor

RULING:
YES. The Ombudsmans administrative disciplinary power over a Special Prosecutor is
not exclusive. While the Ombudsmans authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioner cannot insist
that OP has no jurisdiction. For while Sec 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsmans
disciplinary authority over all government officials, Sec 8(2), on the other hand, grants the
president express power of removal over a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of
these two apparently conflicting provisions of R.A. No. 6770 leads to inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioner.
 RULE 117
LONEY VS PEOPLE GR NO. 152644

Facts:

Loney, Reid and Hernandez are the President, CEO and Senior Manager and Resident Manager for
Mining Operation of Marcopper in Marinduque. Marcopper built concrete plug at the tunnels
discharging tons of tailing into Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

DOJ then filed separate charges against the petitioners in MTC Marinduque for violation of Art. 19 of PD
1067 or the Water code of the Philippines, Section 8 of PD 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree,
Section 108 of RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 2005 and Art. 365 of the RPC for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property.

Petitioners moved to quash the information saying that the (1) information was duplicitous for it
charges more than one offense for a single act, (2) that Loney and Reid were not yet officers when this
incident took place and (3) that the informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or
justification.

MTC: partially granted the quashing of the informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 but
maintained violation of RA 7942 and RPC. MTC then issued a consolidated order in so far as the offense
against RPC. With such, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with RTC-Marinduque assailing the
Consolidated Order.

RTC: granted appeal but denied the petition for certiorari. Consolidated Order was affirmed and ordered
the reinstatement of the informations pertaining to the violation of PD 1967 and PD 984. Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion reiterating the defense that
the informations were made out from a single act.

CA: affirmed RTC

Issues: Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of
charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.

Ruling:

No duplicity. Duplicity of charges means a single complaint or information charges more than on
offense. The filing of several charges is proper. A single act or incident might offend two or more entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution for more than one offense. The
only limit is double jeopardy.

BORLONGAN vs PENA G.R. No. 143591

FACTS: Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses,
damagesand attorneys fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a
Motion to dismiss, including several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were
falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found
probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for the
petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail
as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. Onthe scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not
Guilty for them. The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court
ruled that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail? YES

HELD: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto. Moreover, considering the conduct of
the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to
question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the
respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention
to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent
to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct
is possible. Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest
and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On
the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on
the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of
not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with
the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to
avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their arrest.

CIRON VS GUTIERREZ G.R. Nos. 194339-41, April 20, 2015

FACTS

Pursuant to the criminal complaints filed by Ortega, Jr., the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iriga City (OCP-
Iriga) found probable cause to indict Ciron, then Credit and Collection Officer of the University of Saint
Anthony (USANT), of two (2) counts of estafa. Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC).

Ciron filed the following motions: (a) motion for a bill of particulars alleging that both Informations were
deficient because they simply state that the estafa was committed "during the period from June, 2001 to
May 31, 2002" without specifying when she received the money; and (b) supplement motion for re-
investigation.

The RTC issued Orders directing the prosecution to amend said Informations and state therein the
particulars sought for by Ciron, as well as to conduct re-investigation of the charges against her.

The OCP-Iriga insisted the sufficiency of its Informations, and ordered the elevation of the case back to the
RTC. The RTC issued an Order dismissing both Criminal Case without prejudice to their re-filing. Such Order
attained finality on September 2, 2006.

In view of the dismissals without prejudice, the OCP-Iriga reviewed the evidence on hand resulting in its
issuance of two (2) Supplemental Resolutions. In these Supplemental Resolutions, the OCP-Iriga
recommended the filing of a total of 21 Informations for estafa against Ciron.
Aggrieved by the actions of the OCP-Iriga, Ciron filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Beltran, Contreras, and
Ortega, Jr. before the Ombudsman, accusing them of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

In her complaint, Ciron contended that Order had already attained finality, the OCP-Iriga could no longer
revive nor reinstate the estafa charges against her without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before it. Ciron
also concludes that Beltran and Contreras' acts of issuing the Supplemental Resolutions and filing the
Informations for estafa before the RTC were made with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
negligence and gave unwarranted preference to Ortega, Jr., to her prejudice since she had to post bail to
secure her temporary liberty.

In her counter-affidavit, Beltran denied the charges against her and maintained that she issued the
Supplemental Resolutions after reviewing all the evidence.

Ortega, Jr. denied conspiring with Beltran and Contreras. While Contreras, did not submit his counter-
affidavit.

The Ombudsman found no probable cause to indict Beltran, Contreras, and Ortega, Jr. of the violations
charged, and accordingly, dismissed the complaint against them.

Dissatisfied, Ciron moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
respondents of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019

RULING

The petition is without merit.

The Court finds that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaints
against respondent for lack of probable cause.

The Ombudsman correctly found that Beltran and Contreras' acts of issuing the Supplemental Resolutions
and filing of new Informations before the RTC, even without Ortega, Jr. filing a new complaint before the
OCP-Iriga, is in accordance with prevailing rules and jurisprudence and, thus, were not tainted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

Cirons reliance on Baares II and Ortiga is misplaced.

The Court clarified, that Baares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary
investigation in order to revive a criminal case. In this regard, the "complaint" for purposes of reviving a
criminal case must then refer to Informations.

The Court disagrees with Ciron's view that a new complaint for preliminary investigation had to be filed
before the charges against her could be revived.

It is settled that the new PI is only required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-
affidavits and evidence in the following instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or
some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new
witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged
under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new
criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the
criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal. Since none of the
foregoing instances obtain in this case, the Court holds there is need to conduct another preliminary
investigation before it can issue the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent
Informations in court.

On a final note, the Court emphasizes that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor, which is the
Office of the Ombudsman in this case, exercises wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal
case should be filed in court. Courts cannot interfere with the Ombudsman's discretion in the conduct of
preliminary investigations and in the determination of probable cause where the Ombudsman's discretion
prevails over judicial discretion except when there is grave abuse of discretion, which does not obtain in this
case.cralawred

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Joint Resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED