1. G.R. No. 185829. April 25, 2012.

ARMANDO ALILING, petitioner, vs. JOSE B. FELICIANO, MANUEL F. SAN MATEO III, JOSEPH R. LARIOSA, and WIDE
WIDE WORLD EXPRESS CORPORATION, respondents.

Nature of the Case: This Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45 assails and seeks to set aside the July 3, 2008
Decision1 and December 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 101309,
entitled Armando Aliling v. National Labor Relations Commission, Wide Wide World Express Corporation, Jose B.
Feliciano, Manuel F. San Mateo III and Joseph R. Lariosa. The assailed issuances modified the Resolutions dated May
31, 20073 and August 31, 20074 rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No.
00-10-11166-2004, affirming the Decision dated April 25, 20065 of the Labor Arbiter.

FACTS:

Respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando
Aliling (Aliling) on June 2, 2004 as Account Executive (Seafreight Sales), with a compensation package of a monthly
salary of PhP 13,000, transportation allowance of PhP 3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of living allowance
of PhP 500, each payable on a per month basis and a 14th month pay depending on the profitability and availability
of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a six (6)-month probation period condition with this
express caveat: Performance during probationary period shall be made as basis for confirmation to Regular or
Permanent Status.

On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under the terms of conversion to regular
status shall be determined on the basis of work performance; and employment services may, at any time, be
terminated for just cause or in accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.

However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express (GX), a
new company product launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for Luzon. Marketing
this product and finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Alilings new assignment.

A month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed Aliling
to express dissatisfaction with the latters performance.

On September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources Manager of WWWEC, asked Aliling to
report to the Human Resources Department to explain his absence taken without leave from September 20, 2004.

Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in question, attaching to his reply-
letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004. Alilings
 explanation came with a query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to
25, 2004.

On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his resignation to San Mateo. While WWWEC took no action on his
tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated
October 1, 2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.

Lariosas response-letter of October 1, 2004, informed Aliling that his case was still in the process of being
evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his services
effective as of that date owing to his non-satisfactory performance during his probationary period. Records show
that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid his outstanding salary.

However, or on October 4, 2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation,
nonpayment of salaries as well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was Alilings
Affidavit dated November 12, 2004, in which he stated: 5. At the time of my engagement, respondents did not
make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular employee.

Refuting Alilings basic posture, WWWEC stated that in the letter offer and employment contract adverted
to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a letter of appointment on June 11, 2004 containing the terms of engagement.

WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September 20, 2004 in which San Mateo asked
Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected job performance, considering
that the load factor for the GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as opposed to the allegedly
agreed upon load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to WWWEC, Aliling, instead of explaining himself,
simply submitted a resignation letter.

On April 25, 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision declaring that the grounds upon which complainants
dismissal was based did not conform not only the standard but also the compliance required under Article 281 of
the Labor Code, Necessarily, complainants termination is not justified for failure to comply with the mandate the
law requires. Respondents should be ordered to pay salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract
of employment and all other benefits amounting to a total of P35,811.00 covering the period from October 6 to
December 7, 2004.

The Labor Arbiter explained that Aliling cannot be validly terminated for non-compliance with thw quota
threshold absent a prior advisory of the reasonable standards upon which his performance would be evaluated.

Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
separate motions for reconsideration were also denied by the NLRC.
 The CA anchored its assailed action on the strength of the following premises: (a) respondents failed to
prove that Alilings dismal performance constituted gross and habitual neglect necessary to justify his dismissal; (b)
not having been informed at the time of his engagement of the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as
a regular employee, Aliling was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee; and (c) the strained
relationship existing between the parties argues against the propriety of reinstatement.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: What is the effect once a decision was assailed for appeal?

HELD:

It is axiomatic that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that
this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.

Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not the function of the Supreme Court
to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual
findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. The more recent Peafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc., v. Sarmiento, 634 SCRA 279
(2010), has reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its
own the latters factual findings. Long-established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are
accorded respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they
are binding and conclusive upon this Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without
exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.

2. Areno, Jr. v. Skycable PCC-BaguioFebruary 5, 2010 G.R. No. 180302 611 SCRA 721

Facts:

Disciplinary action against an erring employee is a management prerogative which,generally, is not a subject to
judicial interference. However, this policy can be justified only if thedisciplinary action is dictated by legitimate
business reasons and is not oppressive.On January 17, 1995, petitioner was employed as a cable technician by
respondentSkycable PCC-Baguio. On January 17, 2002, an accounting clerk of respondent, HayacinthSoriano
(Soriano), sent to the human resource manager a letter-complaint against petitioneralleging that on two separate
occasions, the latter spread false rumors about her. On January 27,2002, she was again insulted by petitioner when
the latter approached her and said that she was seen going out with Aldrin Estrada, their field supervisor and uttered
Ikaw lang angnakakaalam ng totoo with malicious intent and in provocative manner. Soriano averred that
petitioners unscrupulous behaviour constituted serious and grave offense in violation of the companys Code of
Discipline. On the same day, respondent issued a Memorandum requiring petitioner to submit an explanation within
76 hours from notice thereof. Petitioner submitted his written-explanation denying all allegations in Sorianos letter-
complaint. An administrative investigation was accordingly conducted. The investigating committee found petitioner
guilty made malicious statements against Soriano which is categorized as an offense under the Company Code of
Discipline.Consequently, petitioner was suspended for 3 days without pay, however, petitioner stillreported for
work. By reason thereof, respondent sent petitioner a letter denominated as 1st

Notice of Termination. Petitioner inquired from respondent whether he is already dismissed or merely suspended
since he was refused entry to the company premises but the respondent replied that he was merely suspended.
Petitioner then wrote to respondent requesting forfurther investigation on his alleged act of spreading rumors but
his request was denied.Petitioner submitted to respondent his written explanation averring that he still reportedfor
work on the first day of his suspension because the accusation of Soriano is baseless and her testimony is hearsay.
Petitioner was dismissed from service on the ground of insubordination or wilful disobedience in complying with the
suspension order.Petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent assailing the legality of his suspensionand
eventual dismissal. He claimed that his suspension and dismissal were effected without any basis, and that he was
denied in his right to due process.

Issue: WON Areno Jr. was illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

No. The decision to suspend petitioner was rendered after investigation and a finding byrespondent that petitioner
has indeed made malicious statements against a co-employee. Thesuspension was imposed due to a repeated
infraction within a deactivation period set by thecompany relating to previous similar offense committed. It is
axiomatic that appropriatedisciplinary sanction is within the purview of management imposition. What should not
beoverlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe reasonable rules andregulations necessary
for the proper conduct of its business and to provide certain disciplinarymeasures in order to implement said rules
to assure that the same would be complied with.Respondent then acted within its rights as an employer when it
decided to exercise itsmanagement prerogative to impose disciplinary measure on its erring employee.

As a just cause for dismissal of an employee under Article 282 of the Labor Code, wilfuldisobedience of the
employers lawful orders requires the concurrence of two elements: 2) theemployees assailed conduct must have
been wilful; and 20 the order violated must have beenreasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must
pertain to the duties which he hadbeen engaged to discharge. Both requisites are present in the instant case.

3. Dacuital vs. L.M. Camus Engineering Corp.,G.R. No. 176748, September 1, 2010
Facts:

Petitioners (LMCEC Employees) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits
against respondent LM Camus Engineering Corp. before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The
employees alleged that they were illegally dismissed from employment and that their employer failed to pay them
their holiday pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay during the
existence and duration of their employment. They also averred that they were not provided with sick and vacation
leaves.

Respondents denied that petitioners were illegally dismissed from employment. They claimed that petitioners
were project employees and, upon the completion of each project, they were served notices of project
completion. They clarified that the termination of petitioners employment was due to the completion of the
projects for which they were hired.

Petitioners, however, countered that they were regular employees as they had been engaged to perform activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of LMCEC. They denied that they were
project or contractual employees because their employment was continuous and uninterrupted for more than one
(1) year. Finally, they maintained that they were part of a work pool from which LMCEC drew its workers for its
various projects.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of the complainant-employees as ILLEGAL and the
complainants are entitled to reinstatement without back wages. The NLRC modified the decision of the Labor
Arbiter and ordered the reinstatement of the complainants with limited backwages. The respondents appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals and the appellate court held that the complainants are PROJECT EMPLOYEES and
hence, there was no illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in concluding that the petitioners are PROJECT EMPLOYEES and that
their dismissal from employment was legal

RULING:

The Supreme Court speaking through Justice Nachura answered in the NEGATIVE. Article 280 of the Labor
Code distinguishes a "project employee" from a "regular employee" in this wise:
Article 280. Regular and casual employment.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season...xxx

The principal test used to determine whether employees are project employees is whether or not the employees
were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specified at the
time the employees were engaged for that project.

Even though the absence of a written contract does not by itself grant regular status to petitioners, such a contract
is evidence that petitioners were informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project
employees. In this case, where no other evidence was offered, the absence of the employment contracts raises a
serious question of whether the employees were properly informed at the onset of their employment of their
status as project employees.

While it is true that respondents presented the employment contract of Dacuital, the contract does not show that
he was informed of the nature, as well as the duration of his employment. In fact, the duration of the project for
which he was allegedly hired was not specified in the contract.

Hence, the Dismissal of the petitioners are declared ILLEGAL.

6. G.R. No. 172642 : June 13, 2012

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, Petitioner, v.
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Since 1986, Nelson Dulay was employed as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on contractual basis
by General Charters, Inc,, a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime. From September 3, 1999 up to July
19, 2000, Nelson was detailed in petitionersvessel, the MV Kickapoo Belle.

At the time of his death on August 13, 2000, he was a bona fide member of the AMOSUP, GCI collective
bargaining agent. Nelson widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for death benefits through the
grievance procedure of the CBA between AMOSUP and GCI. However, on January 29, 2001, the
grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as petitioners refused to grant the benefits sought by the
widow.

On March 5, 2001, Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC against GCI for death and medical
benefits and damages. Merridy Jane claimed $90,000.00 however, CGI awarded P20,000.00 to Nelson
brother. Merridy Jane is now claiming the $90,000.00 less the P20,000.00 that Nelson brother received.

Respondents asserted that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action on account of the absence of
employer-employee relationship between GCI and Nelson at the time of the latter death. Nelson also had
no claims against petitioners for sick leave allowance/medical benefit by reason of the completion of his
contract with GCI.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay P4,621,300.00, the
equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
the proximate cause of Nelson death was not work-related.

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA
but reversed the latter ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson death.

A special civil action for certiorari was filed with the CA. The appellate court granted the petition and
referred the case to the NCMB for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the applicable
CBA provision.

The CA ruled that while the suit filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves the
interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the
voluntary arbitrator and not the labor arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed error in ruling that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
case?

HELD:

Petitioner contends that Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, vests jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the NLRC to
entertain disputes regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement involving migrant or
overseas Filipino workers. Petitioner argues that the abovementioned Section amended Article 217 (c) of
the Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.

It is true that R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, there is no specific
provision thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the
interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042, which is cited by petitioner, simply
speaks, in general, of "claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages."

On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Stated differently, the instant case involves a situation where the special statute
(R.A. 8042) refers to a subject in general, which the general statute (Labor Code) treats in particular.

In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which
provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned.
The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue clearly involves the interpretation or
implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the
parties.

Upon this Court reading of the pertinent provisions of the CBA, it is clear that the parties really intended to
bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of the
provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure for resolving
grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly
observed.

It may not be amiss to point out that the CBA are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining
agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261 and 262
of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated by
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that
these departments were mandated to consult with the Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and
the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs.
In consultation with the counterparts of the DOLE in the respective committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving
claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the
dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is
only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to
either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and
are entitled to great respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as
binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.

DENIED.

7. Philippine Journalists, Inc.,vs. National Labor Relations Commission,G.R. No.

166421,September 5, 2006

Facts:

In NLRC's Resolution dated May 31, 2001. petitioner Philippine Journalists. Inc. (PJI) was adjudged liable
in the total amount of P6.447.008.57 for illegally dismissing 31 complainants-employees and that there
was no basis for the implementation of petitioners retrenchment program.

Thereafter, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement dated July 9, 2001, where PJI undertook to
reinstate the 31 complainant-employees effective July 1. 2001 without loss of seniority rights and benefits:
17 of them who were previously retrenched were agreed to be given full and complete payment of their
respective monetary claims. while 14 others would be paid their monetary claims minus what they
received by way of separation pay.

The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval. All the employees mentioned in the
agreement and in the NLRC Resolution affixed their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the Joint
Manifesto and Declaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been submitted for the
consideration of the labor tribunal.

The NLRC forthwith issued another Resolution on July 25. 2002 which among others declared that the
compromise agreement was approved and NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-00 was deemed closed and
terminated.

In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike on July 1, 2002. In an Order dated
September 16. 2002. the DOLE Secretary certified the case to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
The case was docketed as NCMB-NCR- NS-07-251-02.

In its Resolution dated July 31, 2003, the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed.
The May 31, 2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not attain finality as "it had
been academically mooted by the compromise agreement entered into between both parties on July 9.
2001."

The Union assailed the ruling of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In its
Decision dated August 17. 2004. the appellate court held that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
ruling for PJI. The compromise agreement referred only to the award given by the NLRC to the
complainants in the said case, that is. the obligation of the employer to the complainants. The CA pointed
out that the NLRC Resolution nevertheless declared that respondent failed to prove the validity of its
retrenchment program, which according to it. stands even after the compromise agreement was
executed; it was the reason why the agreement was reached in the first place.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioner's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
is a proper remedy in this case.

RULING:

At the outset, we note that this case was brought before us via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The proper remedy however was to file a petition under Rule 45. It
must be stressed that certiorari under Rule 65 is 'a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It
is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop: Moreover the special civil action for certiorari will lie only
when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Be that as it may, a petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45. Such
move is in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial
justice. As the instant petition was filed within the proscribed fifteen-day period and in view of the
substantial issues raised, the Court resolves to give due course to the petition and treat the same as a
petition for review on certiorari.

The agreement was later approved by the NLRC. The case was considered closed and
terminated and the Resolution dated May 31, 2001 fully implemented insofar as the employees
mentioned in paragraphs 2c and 2d of the compromise agreement were concerned. Hence, the CA was
correct in holding that the compromise agreement pertained only to the monetary obligation of the
employer to the dismissed employees, and in no way affected the Resolution in NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-
00 dated May 31, 2001 where the NLRC made the pronouncement that there was no basis for the
implementation of petitioners retrenchment program.

To reiterate, the rule is that when judgment is rendered based on a compromise agreement, the judgment
becomes immediately executory, there being an implied waiver of the parties right to appeal from the
decision. The judgment having become final, the Court can no longer reverse, much less modify it.

Petitioners argument that the CA is not a trier of facts is likewise erroneous. In the exercise of its power to
review decisions by the NLRC, the CA can review the factual findings or legal conclusions of the labor
tribunal. Thus, the CA is not proscribed from examining evidence anew to determine whether the factual
findings of the NLRC are supported by the evidence presented and the conclusions derived therefrom
accurately ascertained.