Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Course Outline
PASEI vs. Torres, G.R. NO. 101279,Aug. 06, 1992 212 SCRA 298
Although the questioned circulars are a valid exercise of the police power
as delegated to the executive branch of Government, they are legally
invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and
filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1)
and 4 , Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
Rep. vs. Extelcom, G.R. NO. 147096,Jan. 15, 2002 373 SCRA 316
1
of 1987 which implies that the filing of t h e rules with the UP Law Center
is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs . Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov. 27,2012 686 SCRA
472
In this case, w hile it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco AG.R.eement by
reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact
terms of the contract in the decree. Neith er was acopy thereof attach ed to
the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said
AG.R.eement the status of a law.
The accused is p r osecuted for the crime of bigamy for not obtaining a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into
another marriage. Ignorance of the existence of article 40 of the Family
Code canno enve be successfully invoked as an excuse.
2
Whether or not, an alien, who is qualified to adopt at the time of filing
the petition, can be disqualified by the new provisions of the family code.
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a
vested r ight which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of
a new law d isqualifying him. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption
from new obligations created a fter the right has vested.
3
The Supreme Court declared the moratorium law unconstitutional but it
did not allow to toll the prescriptive period of the right to foreclose the
mortgage. The court adopted the view that before an act is declared
unconstitutional it is an operative fact which can be the source of rights
and duties.
Article 8. Stare Decisis; Case Law; See also Article 36, FC; article 9 ,
10, 11, 12 , 13, 14 NCC
Ting v . Velez-Ting, G.R. NO. 166562, Mar. 31, 2009 582 SCRA 694
The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible, whether it shall be followed or
departed from, is a question entirely w ith in the discretion of the court,
which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. It is only
when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is
adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex
prospicit, non respicit
Articles 15, 16, 17, 50, 51 (New Civil Code); Article 26, Family Code
Van Dorn vs. Romillo G.R. NO.L-68470 October 8 , 1985 139 SCRA
139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
4
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
Pilapil vs . !bay-Somera, G.R. NO. 80116 June 30, 1989 174 SCRA
652
Whether or not, the complainant, a foreigner, qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law
prior to h is filing the c riminal complaint. The person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
Recio vs . Recio G.R. NO. 138322. October 2 , 2001 366 SCRA 437
Roehr v. Rodriguez,G.R. NO. 142820 ,Jun. 30, 2003 404 SCRA 495
Morigo v . People , G.R. NO. 145226 , Feb. 6 , 2004 422 SCRA 376
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472 SCRA 114 -
Whether or not, a Filipino Spouse can remarry under ARTICLE 26 OF
THE FAMILY CODE where his,her spouse is later naturalized as a foreign
c itizen and obtains a valid d ivorce decree capacitating h im or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
5
Corpuz v . Sto. Tomas, G.R.NO. 186571 , Aug. 11 , 2010 628 SCRA
266
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national
law of the alien, recognizing h is or her capacity to obtain a divorce ,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either
by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a} accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b}
authenticated by the seal of h is office.
Dionela filed a complaint for damages against RCPI alleging that the
defamatory words on the telegram sent to him not only wounded his
feelings but also caused him undue embarrassment and affected his
business as well as because other people have come to know of said
defamatory words. There is a clear case of breach of contract by the
petitioner in adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent
to Dionela.
6
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to article 2 1
of the new civil code not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
Figueroa vs. Barranco, SBC Case NO. 519. July 31, 1997 276 5CRA
445 - His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but
the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
University of the East vs Jader, G.R. NO. 132344, Feb. 7, 2000 325
SCRA 805
A law student was allowed to graduate by his school with a failing grade
but was later on prohibited by the said school to take the bar exams. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school,
for instance by not promptly submitting a student's grade, is not only
imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his
employer.
UP v . Philab, G.R. NO. 152411, Sept. 29, 2004 439 SCRA 467
Whether or not UP is liable to pay PHILAB considering that it is only a
donee of FEMF, FEMF being the one which funded the project, and
despite being a donee, unjust enrichment still applies to UP . In order
that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be
present: (1) that the defendant has been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff
has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without
just or legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action
based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.
Beumer vs. Amores, G.R. NO. 195670, Dec. 03, 2012 686 SCRA 770
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
7
Padalhin vs. Lavina, G.R. NO. 183026,Nov. 14, 2012 685 SCRA 549
Civil Personality; Birth; Death; Arts 37, 38, 39 40, 41, 42; 390, 391,
712, 777 NCC; Art. 41, 96 &124, 99 & 126, 142 FC
8
Marriage
Definition, Marriage as contract and social institution, Presumption
of Marriage, Proof of Marriage,Offer of Marriage
It is the union (and inviolable social institution) of one man with one
woman for the reciprocal blessings of a domestic home life, and for the
birth, rearing, and education of children. In one case, the Supreme Court
ruled that marriage is also a new relation in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested.
The offer of the accused to marry the victim establishes his guilt. As a
rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an admission of guilt
Appellant's own admission that she was married to the victim was a
confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption
that a man and a woman so deporting themselves as husband and wife
had verily acted into a lawful contract of marriage.
9
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract. A
marriage contract renders unnecessary the presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.
The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of
marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration
thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy
of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
The Supreme Court held that the following may be presented as proof of
marriage: (a) testimony of a w itness to the matrimony; (b) the couple's
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged
wedlock; (c) the b irth and baptismal certificate of children born during
such union; and (d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent
documents.
The law favors the validity of marriage because the State is interested in
the preservation of the family and sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon the party seeking its nullity
10
The birth certificate of Sylvia was presented to prove the marriage
between Isabel and John despite the absence of the marriage certificate.
The court held that the birth certificate may serve as evidence to prove
the marriage between Isabel and John , as it contains the following
notable entries: (a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and (b)
that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.
Carino v. Carino, G.R. NO. 132529 ' Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
Whether or not the certification by the registrar of the non-existence of
marriage license is enough to prove non-issuance thereof. The records
reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license.
Requirements of Marriage
Essential requisite
Legal Capacity and Consent
Formal Requisite
Marriage License Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of
Civil Registrar;
Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. NO. 167746 , Aug. 28,2007 531 SCRA
446
Whether or not, a marriage license issued by a municipality or city to a
non-resident invalidates the license. Issuance of a marriage license in a
c ity or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties,
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
11
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage
Abbas v . Abbas, G.R. NO. 183896 , Jan. 30, 2013 689 SCRA 636
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to
the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued,
and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another
couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. The fact that the names
in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search
of the records of her office.
The affidavit is for the purpose of proving the basis for exemption from
the marriage license. Even if there is failure on the part of the
solemnizing officer to execute the necessary affidavit, such irregularity
will not invalidate the marriage for the affidavit is not being required of
the parties.
12
Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, 5 (2001)
Marriage Ceremony
Morigo vs People, 422 SCRA 376 (2004)
13
Persons who may solemnize Marriages
Aranes v. Occiano, A.M. 02-1390 , April 11, 2002 380 SCRA 402
The respondent Judge solemnized marriage w ithout the requisite
marriage license. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in article 3 , which while it may not affect the validity
of marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Compare the ruling of the court in the case of Carino v. Carino and
OCA vs. J. Necessario et al as to the duty of the solemnizing officer
to examine the validity of marriage license .
Marriage in good faith
Effect of Absence of Essential and Formal requisite
Arts. 15-17,50-5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino; Foreigner;
Parenting; Children, Property Rights; Succession rights]; Declaratory
Relief; Rule 108;; Art. 412 NCC
Rep. v. Orbecido, G.R. NO. 154380, Oct. 05, 2005 472 SCRA 114 -
Whether or not, a Filipino spouse of an alien, who is a Filipino at the
time of marriage , remarry after the latter acquires a foreign divorce that
allows her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
c itizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Corpuz v . Sto. Tomas, G.R. NO. 186571, Aug. 11, 2010 628 SCRA
266
A judgment of d ivorce is a judicial decree , although a foreign one,
affecting a person's legal capacity and status that must be recorded. But
while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
14
the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto
authorize the decree 's registration.
Void
Terminable
Others Classifications
Legal Separation
Separation in Fact
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code Necessarily, therefore , the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether
Cresenciano had any descendants , ascendants , or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court,
for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
15
Juliano-Llave v . Republic, G.R. NO. 169766 , Mar. 30, 2011 646
SCRA 637
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated
in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims
alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time.
Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. NO. 186400 , Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 429
Whether or not A.M. NO. 02 -1 1-1 0 -SC "RULE ON DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" is applicable to marriages solemnized before
the effectivity of Family Code. NO. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as
contained in A.M. NO. 02 - 11 -1 0 -SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15 , 2003
Article 36, FC; AM 02-11-10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68-71 , 220-221
& 225 FC
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for
fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee
would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis ,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological d isciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the c ivil courts, may be given persuasive effect
s ince the provision was taken from Canon Law."
16
Santos v . Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 ( 1995)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In this case, there was no sexual contact between the parties s ince their
marriage on May 22 , 1988 up to Mar. 15, 1989 or for almost a year. The
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties of sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Marable v. Marable G.R. NO. 178741, Jan. 17, 2011 639 SCRA 557
The appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag failed to
explain the root cause of petitioner's alleged psychological incapacity.
The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that
17
petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there
was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially
deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
Ochosa v. Alano, G.R. NO. 167459 , Jan. 26, 2011 640 SCRA 517
In this case the court proved that respondent was the sex partner of
many military officials. In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bona's
alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period of time after
her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the said marriage.
Yambao v. REP. , G.R. NO. 184063 , Jan. 24, 2011 640 SCRA 355
Rep. v. Galang G.R. NO. 168335 , Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 524
In like manner, Juvy's acts of falsifying the respondent's signature to
encash a check, of stealing the respondent's ATM, and of squandering a
huge portion of the P l5,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her,
while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological d isorder, especially when the evidence shows that these
were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts.
Aurelio v. Aurelio, G.R. NO. 175367, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 561
Whether or not a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity may be dismiss for failure to comply with the
guidelines set forth in the Molina Ruling. Let it be remembered that each
case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Kalaw v. Fernandez, G.R. NO. 166357, Sept 19, 2011 657 SCRA 822
He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or
behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Sexual
18
infidelity per se is a G.R.ound for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Toring v . Toring, G.R . NO. 165321 , Aug. 03, 2010 626 SCRA 389
In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient
to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noel's evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual
intercourse with him after their marriage , and that she left him after
their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
Agraviador v. Agraviador G.R .N0. 170729 , Dec. 08, 2010 637 SCRA
519
In the present case, the petitioner's testimony failed to establish that the
respondent's condition is a manifestation of a d isordered personality
rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent
had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that
the respondent's defects existed at the inception of the marriage.
19
Republic v. Encelan, G.R. NO. 170022 , Jan. 9, 2013 688 SCRA 215
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling,
even if true, do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these
are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment
are manifestations of a d isordered personality that completely prevented
the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.
Evidentiary requirement
Marcos vs Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000)
The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act
of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done
deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her
disability and yet willfully concealed the same.
Prescription
Niiial v. Bayadog G.R. NO. 133778=, Mar. 14, 2000 328 SCRA 122
20
Other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
Morigo v . People, G.R. NO. 145226, Feb. 06, 2004 422 SCRA 376
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of.
Jarillo v .People, G.R. N0 . 164435 , Sept. 29, 2009 601 SCRA 236
Whether or not the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity is a defense for the crime of
bigamy. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration
that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
Tenebro v . CA, G.R. NO. 150758 , Feb. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272
Whether or not, the nullity of the second marriage on the G.R.ound of PI
is a valid defense for the crime of bigamy. The declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity.
Antone v . Beronilla, G.R. N0 . 183824, Dec. 08, 2010 637 SCRA 615
21
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is , therefore , immaterial for the purpose of
establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not
constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such
defense be interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way
of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the allegations
in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only
during the presentation of evidence.
Teves v . People, G.R. NO. 188775, Aug 24, 2011 656 SCRA 307
Nollora v. People, G.R. N0. 191425, Sept. 7 , 2011 657 SCRA 330
Indeed , Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that
"[i]n case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized
not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order NO. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply. " Thus , regardless of his professed religion,
Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
Villatuya v . Tabalingcos, A.C. NO. 6622 , July 10, 2012 676 SCRA 37
22
83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent
court."
23
m issing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, m accordance w ith
pertinent provisions of law.
Rep. v. Bermudez-Lorino, G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449
SCRA 57
Although the result of the Court of Appeals' denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big d iffe rence between having the
supposed appeal d ismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact
that the RTC decision sought to be appealed is immediately final and
executory, and t h e denial of the appeal for lack of merit. In the former,
the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry
of Judgment in the RTC , whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still
raise the matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC
judgment cannot be executed until this Court makes the final
pronouncement.
Rep. v. Granada, G.R. NO. 187512, June 13, 2012 672 SCRA 432
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an agG.R.ieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Terminable Marriage; Art. 43 - 44 FC
Effects of termination of subsequent marriage
Definition
Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760, 771 (1998)
A voidable marriage is considered valid and produces all its civil effects
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action
for annulment. The terms "annul" and "null and void" have different legal
connotations and implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; to
nullify; to abolish; to do away with; whereas, null and void is something
that does not exist from the beginning.
24
Characteristics of Voidable Marriages
Proper party to file annulment of Marriage
G.R.ounds
Ratification and prescription -
Procedural rules of annulment of marriage and declaration of nullity
Tuazon vs . Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996)
The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment (or declaration of nullity of marriages) through
the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced
is dubious and fabricated.
SSS v . Aguas, G.R. NO. 165546 , Feb. 27, 2006 483 SCRA 383
25
On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a
primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse
dependent for support from the employee, whether one is actually
dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown;
it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. The obvious
conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband , absent any showing to the contrary.
In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
Somosa-Ramos vs. Vamenta, Jr. , G.R. NO. L-34132, July 29, 1972
During this period, the court where the action is pending shall remain
passive and is precluded from hearing the suit.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, G.R. NO. 53880, Mar. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321
Whether or not, the order declaring in default a respondent in a legal
separation case amounts to grave abuse of discretion. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the
State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
Quiao vs. Quiao, G.R. N0.176556 , July 4 , 2012 675 SCRA 642
26
When the trial court issued its order dated November 8 , 2006, it held
that although the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory, it may still consider the Motion for Clarification because the
petitioner s imply wanted to clarify the meaning of "net profit earned. "
Go vs. CA G.R. N0. 114791 , May 29, 1997 272 SCRA 752
Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code) ,
the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business
without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, we are
convin ced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the
contract with private respondent.
Marriage settlement
Parties to Marriage settlement
27
The following donations are not donations propter nuptias: ( 1) those made
in favor of the spouses after the celebration of marriage; (2) those
executed in favor of the future spouses but not in consideration of the
marriage; and (3) those Ggranted to persons other than the spouses even
though they may be founded on the marriage
Even if the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with
formal requisites, it could still constitute as legal basis for adverse
possession.
Valencia v . Locquiao, G.R. NO. 122134, Oct. 3 , 200 412 SCRA 600
Under the Old Civil Cod e, donations p r opter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the valid ity of such gifts ". In
oth er words, the celebration of the marriage between the ben eficiary
couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough
to effectuate the donation propter nuptias u n der the Old Civil Code.
Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. N0 . 146683 , Nov.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414
Respon dents having proven by a p reponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as h usband and wife without a valid
marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Ar t. 87 of the Family Code.
28
CHAPTER 3 . SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY (Articles 88-104);
R.A. 8369
Section 1. General Provisions (Articles 88-90)
Section 2. What constitutes Community Property (Articles 91-93)
Section 3. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Absolute Community
(Articles 94-95)
Section 4 . Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6 . Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3 , Rule 87
Rules governing ACP
Commencement of the ACP
29
Section 4 . Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment & Disposition of
the Community Property (Articles 96-98)
Section 5. Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime (Arts 99-101)
Section 6 . Liquidation of the Absolute Community Assets &
Liabilities (Arts 102-104); Succession; Probate;
Sec. 3 , Rule 87
Concept
Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank vs. Dailo, 453 SCRA 283, 290
(2005)
Commencement of CPG
General Provisions
Dewara v . Lamela G.R. NO. 179010, Apr. 11 , 2011 647 SCRA 483
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the
wife alone does not destroy this presumption.
De Leon v . De Leon G.R. NO. 185063 , Jul. 23, 2009 593 SCRA 768 -
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and
covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only
30
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. Evidently, title to
the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after he had fully paid
the purchase price on June 22, 1970.
For the presumption to apply, it is not even necessary to prove that the
property was acquired with funds of the partnership. In fact, even when
the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear, the
presumption applies and it will be considered conjugal property.
The party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of
the conjugal partnership.
Pisueiia vs. Heirs of Petra Unating, G.R. NO. 132803 , Aug. 31, 1999
313 SCRA 384
The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Petra Unating's status
at the time the lot was awarded and registered in her name. Since Petra
Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in
1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her children, Felix
and Catalina Villar; and her husband , Aquilino Villar.
31
Improvement on Separate Property
Determination of Ownership
Ferrer v . Ferrer, G.R. N0. 166496 , Nov. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570
Homeowner's Savings & Loan Bank vs. Daito, 453 SCRA 283 (2005)
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of t h e
conjugal partnership of gains lies with the c reditor-party litigant claiming
as such .
Ching vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642 , Feb. 23, 2004 423 SCRA 356
Carlos vs . Abelardo, G.R. NO. 146504 , Apr. 09, 2002 380 SCRA 361
On the same p rinciple, acknowledgment of the loan made by t h e
defendant-w ife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
32
redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and
defendant-w ife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan.
SBTC v . Mar Tierra Corp., G.R. NO. 143382 , Nov. 29, 2006 508
SCRA 419
To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the
solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The underlying concern
of the law is t h e conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it limits
the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ros v . PNB Laoag Br. , G.R. N0. 170166, Apr. 06, 2011 647 SCRA 334
Pana v. Heirs of Jose Juanite G.R. NO. 164201 ,Dec. 10, 2012 687
SCRA 414
Contrary to Efren's contention, Article 12 1 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his w ife , Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states t h at such
indemnities "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered."
No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
33
This is one instance where the w ife's consent is not required and,
impliedly, no judicial intervention is necessary.
Spouses Guiang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172. June 26,
1998,
Roxas vs. CA G.R. NO. 92245, Jun. 26, 1991 198 SCRA 541
Guiang vs. CA, G.R. NO. 125172, Jun. 26, 1998 291 SCRA 372
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband
and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and
void, w h ile the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the
latter case can ratification cure the defect.
Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa, G.R. NO. 147978, Jan. 23, 2002 374
SCRA 498
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly d id not give her written consent
to the sale. Even G.R.anting that respondent Norma actively partic ipated
in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied,
her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to s ign the
contracts to sell.
34
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In
this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an
incompetent" who was in comatose.
Ravina v . Villa Abrille G.R. NO. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009 604 SCRA
120
De la Cru.z v . Segovia, G.R. NO. 149801, Jun. 26, 2008 555 SCRA
453
While Florinda's husband did not affix his signature to the above-
mentioned Agreement, we find no ground to disturb the uniform findings
of the trial court and appellate court that Renato , by his actuations,
agreed and gave his conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts
below, Renato's consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that
he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters and their
witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him
for his signature, although he did not sign the same because his w ife
Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband;
Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned
savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the
purchase price of the properties in question in the total amount of
P180,000.00.
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the
Nature of Conjugal Ownership. While the declared nullity of marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before
such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and
after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.
35
has no basis because Section 19 (1) of the Rule does not apply to cases
governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
Espinosa v . Omana, AC. 9081 , Oct 12, 2011 659 SCRA 1
Extrajudic ial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should
not facilitate the d isintegration of a marriage and the family by
encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially d issolving
the conjugal partnership , which is exactly what Omafl.a did in this case.
The ''Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no legal effect and is against
public policy.
Section 7 . Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets &
Liabilities (Articles 129-133);
Agtarap v . Agtarap, G.R. NO. 177099, Jun. 8 , 2011 651SCRA455
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue.
More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties
are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court's jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin.
36
Voluntary Separation of Property
Maquilan v . Maquilan, G.R. NO. 155409, Jun. 08, 2007 524 SCRA
166-
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be
effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval.
The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is
exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law.
(Articles 147-148)
Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC G.R. NO. 122749, Jul. 31, 1996 260
SCRA 221
Whether or not, Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and
129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage
declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership
that exists between common-law spouses.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, G.R. NO . 136803, Jun. 16, 2000 333 SCRA
628-
The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists
between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage , likewise provides that, if the parties are
incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through
their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal.
37
are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the
property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 14 7 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance w ith the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, partition may be made by
aG.R.eement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Lacbayan v. Samoy, G.R. NO. 165427, Mar. 21, 2011 645 SCRA 677
Carino v . Carino, G.R. NO. 132529, Feb. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage , but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other
reasons, like the absence of a marriage license
San Luis v. San Luis G.R. NO. 133743, Feb. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294
38
Tuason vs . CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996)
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract but a social institution in which the state is vitally interested.
Hontiveros vs. RTC Iloilo City, G.R . NO. 125465, Jun. 29, 1999 309
SCRA 340
Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal
effect in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who
is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros,
and petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the
Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151.
Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and
the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his
wife's brother, but not to the wife of his w ife's brother. There is no affinity
between the husband's b rother and the wife's s ister; this is called
affinitas affinitatis. "
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162)
39
which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to
enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it
and his heirs.
Taneo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. NO. 108562, Mar. 09 , 1999 304
SCRA 308
By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling
house where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is
s ituated," it is understood that the house should be constructed on a
land not belonging to another.
Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. NO. 177703, Jan. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666
Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
family h ome not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides
but also to the lot on w hich it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which
it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back
Modequillo vs . Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990.
Cabang v . Basay, G.R. NO. 180587, Mar. 20, 2009 582 SCRA 172
40
on p roperty held in co -ownership with third persons. However, it can be
established partly on community property, or conjugal property and
partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the
latter.
Olivia De Mesa v . Acero, G.R. NO. 185064 Jan. 16, 2012 663 SCRA
40
The family home's exemption from execution must be set up and proved
to t h e Sh eriff befor e the sale of the p roperty at public auction. The
petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do so estop
them fro m later claiming the said exemption .
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code do not h ave a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and a r e exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of t h e Family Code.
Benitez-Badua vs. CA G.R. NO. 105625, Jan. 24, 1994 229 SCRA 468
Article 170 of t h e Family Code is inapplicable to this case because this is
not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their
c h ildless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of t h e deceased, but that s h e is not
the decedent's child at all.
41
Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao,G.R. NO. 138961, Mar. 07, 2002 378 SCRA
563
The grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262
of the Civil Code.
Labagla vs. Santiago, G.R. NO. 132305, Dec. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.
In this case the husband and the wife continued to live in the same
province after their alleged separation, the Court did not discount the
possibility of physical access to each other considering their proximity to
each other and considering further that the wife still visited and
recuperated in her mother's house where her spouse resided with their
children.
The court held that just because tuberculosis is advanced in a man does
not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There
are cases where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal
act even in the most crucial stage of health because then they seemed to
be more inclined to sexual intercourse.
Solinap vs. Locsin Jr. G.R. NO. 146737 , Dec. 10, 2001 371 SCRA
711
Whether or not the certificate of live birth (Exhibit D) as presented by the
respondent, including the photograph showing that he and his mother
attended the deceased funeral, is sufficient to proof filiation of the
42
petitioner to the deceased. A birth certificate offers only prima facie
evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
Verceles v. Posada, G.R. N0.159785, Apr. 27, 2007 522 SCRA 518
The court held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is , in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child,
and no further court action is required
De Asis vs CA, 303 SCRA 176
Lucas v . Lucas, G.R. NO. 190710, Jun. 6, 2011 650 SCRA 667
Although a paternity action is civil, not c riminal, the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test.
Rodriguez vs. CA, G.R. NO. 85723, Jun. 19, 1995 245 SCRA 150
When a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other
parent may be revealed in an action by the child to compel such other
parent to recognize him also.
Heirs of Cabais vs. CA, G.R. NO . 106314-15,0ct. 08, 1999 316 SCRA
338
A baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not
a conclusive proof of filiation.
Cenido vs. Apacionado, G.R .NO. 132474, Nov. 19, 1999 318 SCRA
688
Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent
himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, or
if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or
maternity of children born outside wedlock.
43
Tayag v . Tayag-Gallor, G.R. NO. 174680, Mar. 24, 2008 549 SCRA 68
Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc., G.R. NO. 177066, Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA
585
Gotardo v. Buling, G.R. NO. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012 678 SCRA 436
We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which [his] name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pediG.R.ee, admission
by s ilence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." In this case, the
respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the
putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception.
Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.
Lucas v . Lucas, G.R. NO. 190710, Jun. 6 , 2011 650 SCRA 667
44
CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176)
Tonog vs. CA, G.R . NO. 122906 , Feb. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523
In the case at bar, bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as
the controlling factor, the appellate court d id not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile,
the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Guy v . CA, G.R. NO. 163707, Sept. 15, 2006 502 SCRA 151
De La Cruz v . Gracia G.R. NO. 177728, Jul. 31 , 2009 594 SCRA 648
Where the private handwritten instrument is t h e lone piece of evidence
submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance w ith the
requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent.
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other
relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Uy v . Chu, G.R. NO. 183965, Sept. 18, 2009 600 SCRA 806
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation
of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that there be
no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and
filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judic ially
established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or aG.R.eement of the parties.
45
See RA 9858
Legitimation
Concept and Definition
Who can be Legitimated
Procedure and effects of Legitimation
Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M NO. MTJ-92-716 , Oct. 25, 1995 249
SCRA 447
Whether or not, a child born out of wedlock, by parents who have a legal
impediment to marry each other, can be legitimated. As a lawyer and a
judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage
to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an
existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran.
Republic vs. Vergara, G.R. NO. 95551, Mar. 20, 1997 270 SCRA 206
The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former
Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative
46
by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not
adopt.
Rosalina Dye cannot, on h er own, adopt h er brother and sister for the
law m andates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions.
Republic vs. Miller, G.R. N0. 125932, Apr. 21 , 1999 306 5CRA 183
An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
which was in force at the time of t h e filing of the petition, acquired a
vested right which could not be affec ted by the subsequent en actment of
a new law disqualifying him .
Republic vs. Toledano, G.R. N0.94147, Jun. 08, 1994 233 SCRA 9
The Family Code reiterated the rule by requir ing that husband and wife
"must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the
said new law, joint adoption by husband and w ife is mandatory
Cang vs. CA, G.R. N0.105308, Sept. 25, 1998 296 SCRA 128
Republic vs. CA & Bobiles, G.R. NO. 92326, Jan. 24, 1992 205 SCRA
356
Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the
r ight to file a petition for adoption by herself, w ithout join ing her
47
husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was
exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law.
Concept of Support
Right to support
Lim v. Lim, G.R. NO . 163209, Oct. 30, 2009 604 SCRA 691
The inability of the parents to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree , both
in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in
Article 199.
Gan vs. Reyes , G.R. N0.145527, May.28, 2002 382 SCRA 357
A judgment ordering for support is immediately executory despite
pendency of appeal.
De Asis vs. CA, G.R. N0.127578, Feb. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176
48
Concept
Effects of Parental Authority
Santos Sr. v . CA, G.R. NO. 113054, Mar. 16, 1995 242 SCRA 407
When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a
friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still
disallows the same.
Parents who exercises Parental Authority
Joint Parental Authority
Rule in case of Separation of Parents
Perez v. CA, G.R. NO. 118870, Mar. 29, 1996 255 SCRA 661
Only the most compelling of reasons shall justify the court's awarding
the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as
her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following
grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a mother of
custody and parental authority: neglect, abandonment, unemploy ment
and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable d isease.
49
shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
It is a rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of t h e natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy.
Duty of Representation
50
Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22 , 2001, when
she was presented before respondent's sala to affirm the execution of her
affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have
been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not
validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is
incompetent to execute such an instrument.
(Articles 225-227)
Lindain v . CA, G.R. NO. 95305 , Aug. 20, 199 212 SCRA 725
Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished
from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children,
does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said
children without judicial approval.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and
the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any
act of disposition or alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the
patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, a father or
mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority,
does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter
Bondagjy vs . Bondagjy, G .R. NO. 140817, Dec. 07, 2001 371 SCRA
64
Indeed, what determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to
the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and
the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and
financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the parents.
51
Cang vs CA,296 SCRA 128
52
Uy (Jardeleza) vs. CA, G.R. NO. 109557, Nov. 29, 2000 346 SCRA
246
Rule 95 of the ROC, not the Rule on Summary Proceedings in the Family
Code, shall apply in a sale of a conjugal property where one spouse is is
an incompetent. A comatose spouse is incompetent.
Republic v. Tango , G.R. N0. 161062, Jul. 31, 2009 594 SCRA 560
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of
course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment
in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Rep. v . Bermudez-Lorino G.R. NO. 160258 , Jan. 19, 2005 449 SCRA
5
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was
erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the
case to the Court of Appeals.
53
176 of the Family Code)"; IRR of 9255; Passport Law (RA 8239)
Title XIV. ABSENCE (Articles 381-396, NCC);
Arts. 774 & 777; Art. 1456; Arts 22, 2142-2175; Wills & Succession
PROPERTY
Concept of Property
Classification of Property
54
The words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word "take" in t h e law. The statutory
definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be t h e proper subjects of theft. The general rule
is that, only movable properties which have physical or material
existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft.
In the instant case, the parties: (1) executed a contract styled as "Real
Estate Mortgage and Chattel Mortgage,'' instead of just "Real Estate
Mortgage" if indeed their intention is to treat all properties included
therein as immovable, and (2) attached to the said contract a separate
"LIST OF MACHINERIES & EQUIPMENT''. These facts, taken together,
evince the conclusion that the parties' intention is to treat these units of
machinery as chattels.
55
While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may,
nevertheless, be considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its
utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the
two tanks have been installed with some deG.R.ee of permanence as
receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
Rights as property
Concept
Jura Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all
lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus,
pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those
acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether
express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had
been let into private ownership through the State's imprimatur, such
land is presumed to belong to the State
56
Public Service vs Public Use
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
57
Kinds of Properties of Public Dominion
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to
the flow of the tide. The land's proximity to the waters alone does n ot
automatically make it a foreshore land.
The buyer did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the eastern
branch of t h e Cagayan River even if it was included in the deeds of
absolute sale executed by t h e sellers s ince the sellers "could not have
validly sold land that constituted p r operty of public domin ion."
Reclaimed Properties
The subject reclaimed lands are still part of t h e public dom ain,
owned by the State and, therefore , exempt from payment of real
estate taxes. Here , the subject lands are reclaimed lands,
58
specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of
the public domain.
Title II Ownership
Ownership in General
Concept of Ownership
Attributes of Ownership
Recovery of Property
59
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity
of the land he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof. Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimant's title over the
disputed area, the rule is that a par ty can claim a right of owner ship only
over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed .
In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and t h e only
issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer,
possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession
is t h e one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in
actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of
the defendant's right to continue in possession.
German Management & Services, Inc. v . CA. 177 SCRA 495 (1989)
Limitations on Ownership
60
Right to sub-surface and airspace
General Provision
Accession
Definition
Kinds of Accession
Accession Discreta
61
Kinds of Fruits
Accession Continua
Fundamental rules
Industrial Accession
The rule under article 448 of the NCC applies only when the builder,
planter or sower believes he had the right so to build, plant or sow
because he thinks he owns the land or believes himself to have a claim of
title.
Article 448 applies only to a case where one builds on land in the belief
that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply where one's only
interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental contract.
62
The value of the useful improvements consisting of various fruits,
bamboos, a house a nd camarin made of strong materials based on the
market value of the said improvements.
Natural Accession
A11uvion
Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from owner s, the latter
being owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea or lakes or other
tidal waters.
Since the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust
by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion was man-made, hence, Art.
457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject land is part of the public domain.
63
The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to the accretion
which they receive by virtue of the action of the waters of the river is ipso
jure and there is no need of an action of the owner of the bank to possess
the new addition s ince it belongs to him by the very fact of the addition.
Avulsion
Definition
Avulsion vs Alluvion
There need be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership , as it is subject thereto ipso Jure from the moment the mode of
acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal act of
acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the private ownership
of the owner of the land through which the new r iver bed passes even
without any formal act of his will and any unauthorized occupant thereof
will be considered as a trespasser.
Formation of Island
Adjunction or Conjunction
Commixtion or Confusion
Specification
64
Chapter 3 Quieting of Title
Requisites
The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff
need to prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) t h at the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of valid ity or
legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a
legal or at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and
that some deed or p roceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. "
Under Ar ticles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, the two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title are: ( 1) that the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action ; and (2) that a deed, claim, en cumbrance
or proceeding is claimed to be casting cloud on his title.
In this case, an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy because
petitioner no longer had a n y legal or equitable t itle to or interest in the
lots. The petition er's status as possessor and owner of t h e lots had been
settled in the final and executory December 4, 1985 decision of the
Bureau of La n ds that t h e DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on
appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and
owner ship of the lots.
'An action for quieting of title may not be brought for t h e purpose of
settling a boundary dispu te.
65
Title III- Co-ownership
Definition
Requisites
Nature of Co-ownership
Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 536, 548, Sept. 17, 1998
Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners.
Sources of Co-ownership
Extinguishment of Co-ownership
66
Sanchez v . Court of Appeals, 404 SCRA 541, 548, June 20, 2003
Pangan v . Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 375, 382, Oct. 17, 1988
If the co-owner actually h olding the property asserts exclusive domin ion
over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he
can acquire sole title to it after the lapse of the prescribed prescriptive
period.
From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership
The first phase of a partition and,or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be
made by voluntary aG.R.eement of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co -ownership does not exist,
or partition is legally prohibited.
67
Cruz v . Catapang G.R. 164110, Feb. 12, 2008
Title V Possession
Concept of Possession
Elements of Possession
Kinds of Possession
Parilla v. Pilar, G.R. NO. 167680, Nov. 30, 2006 - One whose interest
is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary,
is not qualified to become a possessor builder in good faith.
68
Bunyi v. Factor, G.R. NO. 172547, Jun. 30, 2009
591 SCRA 350
Effects of Possession
Actual delivery of the books having been made , Cruz acquired ownership
over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private
respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
69
matter between him and EDCA and d id not impair the title acquired by
the private respondents to the books.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports
a dish onest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. We have held that it is a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill w ill.
Title VI Usufruct
Restrictive Covenant
70
Because of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be
acquired by virtue of a title.
Classification of Nuisance
Remedies
Telmo v. Bustamante, G.R. NO . 182567, Jul. 13, 2009
71
Perez v. Madrona G.R. NO. 184478, Mar. 21 , 2012
Respondents' fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not
injur ious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built
primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders
from entering it.
Donation
Nature of Donations
Classification of Donations
Persons who may giver or receive a Donation
Formalities of Donation
Effects and limitation of Donation
Villanueva vs. Spouses Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
When the donor used the words that the gift "does not pass title during
my lifetime; but when I d ie , she shall be the true owner of the two
aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she
reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of
land until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of
them freely.
Central Philippines University vs. CA, G.R. No. 112127 July 17,
1995
72
In essence, a life insurance policy is no d ifferent from a civil donation
insofar as the beneficiary is concerned. Both are founded upon the same
consideration: liberality. A beneficiary is like a donee, because from the
premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the
beneficiary will receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance.
Since no period was imposed by the donor on when must the donee
comply with the condition, the latter remains t h e owner so long as he
has tried to comply with the condition w ithin a reasonable period. Only
then - when the non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition was brought
to the donor's knowledge - that ownership of the donated property
reverted to the donor as provided in the automatic reversion clause of the
deed of donation.
PRESCRI PTION
OBLIGATIONS
I. DEFINITION
MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE vs. CAMPOS, G.R. NO. 138814, April 16,
2009
73
Respondent used the terms "right and obligation" in his Petition from
which he c oncluded that that such Petition sufficiently states a cause of
action. Right and obligation are legal terms with specific legal meaning;
A right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law, while an obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a
juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do and in the words of Arias
Ramos "An obligation is a juridical relation whereby a person (called the
creditor) may demand from another (called the debtor) the observance of
a determinative conduct (the giving, doing or not doing) , and in case of
breach, may demand satisfaction from the assets of the latter."
For failure to pay on time the amortization, SSS imposed the 12%
penalty contained in the penal clause of the contract entered into
between the parties. Inpositive obligations, (to give and to do) , the
74
penalty is demandable when the debtor is in mora; hence, the necessity
of demand by the debtor unless the same is excused.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or
natural, "Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their
performance, while Natural obligations, not being based on positive law
but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to enforce
their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what h as been delivered or rendered by reason
thereof'.
75
enforced by the creditor but a new contract recognizing and assuming
the prescribed debt with full knowledge of the prescription would be valid
and enforceable and he thereby waives the benefit of prescription.
2 . CIVIL OBLIGATIONS
V. SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS
Delfin, t h e father, was held jointly and severally liable with his minor son
Dante arising from the criminal act committed by the latter. The civil
liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
m inor children who live with t h em, is a necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon t h e
parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping t h em in their company,
76
educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand,
gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" .
Cruz alleged that Tuason had been enriched at the expense of Cruz by
virtue of an agreement made by Cruz and the Deudors in the clearing,
improving, subdividing and selling the large tract of land for the reasons
that said improvements are being used and enjoyed by Tuason. A
presumed quasi-contract cannot emerge as against one party when the
subject matter thereof is already covered by an existing contract with
another party.
A. NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
77
ADILLE vs. CA, G.R . NO. L-44546 January 29, 1988
B . SOLUTIO INDEBITI
PUYAT & SONS, INC. vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. L-17447, April
30, 1963
The City Treasurer of Manila refused to refund the retail dealer's tax
erroneously paid by the petitioner on it's belief that it was not exempted
from such, on the ground that the tax was voluntarily paid and not
under protest which was a condition s ine qua non in order that a legal
basis may arise. Voluntariness is incompatible with mistake being a
case of solutio indebiti, protest is not required as a condition sine qua
non for its application.
78
CINCO vs . CANONOY, G.R. NO. L-33171 , May 31 , 1979
NPC as a result of its inability to maintain the level of water in its dam
brought damages to defendants but asserts that the damages , if any,
were due to the heavy rains and should be regarded as a fo r tuitous
event. Negligence or imprudence is human factor which makes the
whole occurrence humanized, as it were , and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. NO. 71049 , May 29, 1987
79
Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under
Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R . NO. 71049 , May 29, 1987
Petitioner fell into the open drainage holes, causing him physical
injuries, in a public market being managed by Asiatic Integrated
Corporation but such public market is still under the control and
supervision of the City of Manila. As a defense against liability on the
basis of a quasi-delict, one must have exercised the d iligence of a good
father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code).
80
GAISANO CAGAYAN, INC. vs INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH
AMERICA, G . R. NO. 147839, June 8, 2006
B. FAILURE OF PERFORMANCE
ART 1170
It is clear upon the records that the sole and principal reason for the
can cellation of the allocation of rice contracted by the appellee herein in
Burma, was the failure of the letter of credit to be opened by NARIC
within the contemplated period which resulted in the consequent
damage. Every debtor who fails in performance of his obligations due to
fraud , negligence, or delay is bound to indemnify for the losses and
damages caused thereby.
C . DELAY
1. MORA SOLVENDI
ART 11
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC., vs. SANTOS, G.R .
NO. 153004, November5, 2004
81
When respondents wrote a demand letter to petitioner, the obligation was
already due and demandable , and when the petitioner failed to pay its
due obligation after the demand was made, it incurred delay. Delay as
used in this article is synonymous to default or mora solvendi which
means delay in the fulfillment of obligations with respect to time and in
order for the debtor to be in default, it is necessary that the following
requisites be present: (1) that the obligation be demandable and already
liquidated ; (2) that the debtor delays performance; and (3) that the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially.
2 . MORA ACCIPIENDI
Petitioner contends that private respondents are in mora accip iendi. The
failure of the owners to collect or their refusal to accept the rentals are
not valid defenses , s ince consignation under such circumstances, is
necessary, and by this we mean one that is effected in full compliance
with the specific requirements of the law therefor.
3. COMPENSATIO MORAE
Cortes' admission agreed that the Corporation's full payment of the sum
would depend upon his delivery of the TCTs of the three lots.
Considering that their obligation was reciprocal, performance thereof
must be simultaneous and the mutual inaction of Cortes and the
Corporation therefore gave rise to a compensation morae or default on
the part of both parties because neither has completed their part in their
reciprocal obligation.
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents ' failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
82
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the rescission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
D . NEGLIGENCE
1. DEGREE OF DILIGENCE
Sicam exempts himself from liability on the ground that the robbery of
his pawnshop is a fortuitous event which is by definition is an
extraordinary event not foreseeable or avoidable. In order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss and
robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event for it does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
83
diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation
then that which is expected of a good father of a family or ordinary
diligence shall be required.
2 . FORTUITOUS EVENT
NAKPIL & SONS v . CA, G.R. NO. L-47851 April 15, 1988
There was an earthquake which caused the building heavy damage but
the other nearby structures had less damages as compared to the said
building, the architects , engineers and contractors are claiming
fortuitous event as a defense. To be exempt from liability due to an act of
God, the ff must occur:
3 . EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION
84
Respondent patentee was d ismissed as the permanent chief chemist of
the corporation without any fault or negligence on h is part after the
execution of the Bill of Assignment, prompting him to rescind the
contract. The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and
fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in
making the agreement.
A . PURE OBLIGATIONS
ART 1179
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORP. vs. BROQUEZA, G .R .
NO. 178610 November 17, 2010
B . CONDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS
SUSPENSIVE CONDITION
183 SCRA 171
Art. 1181
85
not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation
had never existed.
In view of our finding in the present case that the aG.R.eement between
the parties is a contract to sell, it follows that the appellate court erred
when it decreed that a judicial rescission of said aG.R.eement was
necessary. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a
positive suspensive condition and failure to pay the price agreed upon is
86
not a mere breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.
CONDITION PRECEDENT
RESOLUTORY CONDITION
ART 1181
87
Petitioner claimed that respondents are liable for the whole amount of
their debt and the interest thereon, after t h ey defaulted on the monthly
installments, due to acceleration clause t h erein. Respondents, on the
oth er h and, countered that t h e installments were not yet due and
demandable, evidenced by the blank space left for t h e date on which the
installments should have commenced and theorized that fulfillment of
the obligation is dependent on the sole w ill of the debtor, hence proper
court should first fix a period for payment. The act of leaving blank the
due date of the first installment d id not necessarily mean that the
debtors were allowed to pay as a n d w h en they could, since the presence
of an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, showed t h e
intention of the parties that t h e installments should be paid at a defin ite
date, this is an obligation w ith a period.
Petitioner seeks t h e r ever sal of the decision of the lower cour t which
convicted h er of the crime of Estafa when she failed to give t h e proceeds
of the sale of the tobacco in accordance w ith t h eir agreement which says
that " ... payment should be given as soon as the tobaccos are sold ... " and
contended t h at t h e court should fir st fix the period. It is clear in the
aG.R.eement, that the obligation was im mediately demandable as soon
as the tobacco was disposed of h ence, Article 11 97 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that the courts m ay fix the duration of the obligation if it
does not fix a period, does not apply.
ART 1197
Araneta, who was not able to comply with his obligation to create side
streets on the sides of the land which were sold to the PSE due to t h e
presence of squatters, qu estions the decision of the lower court ordering
him to comply with his obligation within 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It m u st be recalled that Article 1197 of the Civil Code involves a
two -step process, the Court must first determine t h at "the obligation
does not fix a period", or from the nature and the circumstances it can be
inferred t h at a period was in tended, because courts can not fix a period
merely because in its opinion it is or should be reasonable and the
complaint not h aving sought t h at the court s h ould set a period, but must
set the time that the par ties are shown to have intended.
88
4 . OBLIGATIONS WITH A PENAL CLAUSE
THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. ESPIRITU, G.R. NO. L-28497
November 6 , 1928
Defendant alleged that the decision of the lower court to pay 25 percent
of the amount of the trucks in addition to the amount of the trucks plus
12 per cent per annum is unconscionable and exceeds the rate fixed by
law. The penalty agreed upon does not include the interest, and which
may be demanded separetely and the penalty is not to be added to the
interest for the determination of whether the interest exceeds the rate
fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed only for the interest.
5 . RECIPROCAL OBLIGATION
89
GSIS sold a house to Agcaoili, and required him to immediately occupy it
under pain of cancellation of the sale, but Agcaoili found out that the
house was uninhabitable hence payment was suspended which
prompted GSIS to cancel the sale. It is axiomatic that "(i)n reciprocal
obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or
is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon
him. "
Petitioners contend that they have fully complied with their obligation
under the Memorandum of Agreement but due to respondents ' failure to
increase the capital stock of the corporation to an amount that will
accommodate their undertaking, it had become impossible for them to
perform their end of the Agreement. In reciprocal obligations, failure of
the other party to perform the obligation renders the other party to
demand fulfillment of the obligation or asked for the resc ission of the
contract, but not simply not performing their part of the Agreement.
SOLIDARY OBLIGATION
90
The absence of the word "solidary" in the dispositive portion of the
Decision, renders the liability joint. Well-entrenched is the rule that
solidary obligation cannot lightly be inferred, and there is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
PNB assails the order of dismissal of the lower court dismissing its
complaint against several solidary debtors on the gr.ound that one of the
defendants d ied dur ing the pendency of the case and therefore the
complaint, being a money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted
in the testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased. The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to
determine against whom he will enforce collection and in case of the
death of one of the solidary debtors, the creditor may, if he so chooses,
proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing
a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors.
JOINT OBLIGATIONS
TOPIC: JOINT and SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS
Philtranco Bus has been held solidarily liable w ith its bus driver, Calang,
when Calang accidentally collided with a jeepney killing a bystander and
91
two jeepney passengers while other passengers were seriously injured.
Since the cause of action again st Calang was based on delict, Philtranco
cannot be held j ointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-
delict under Articles 2 176 and 2180 of the Civil Code w hich pertain to
the vicarious liability of an employer fo r quasi-delicts that an employee
has committed.
RFC turned down t h e request of Saura, Inc. for an additional loan w h ich
prompted Saura, Inc. to ask that the mortgage be cancelled, which was
done. The action thus taken by both parties was in the nature mutual
desistance - what Manresa terms "mutuo disenso" - which is a mode of
extinguishing obligations, a concept that derives from the principle that
s ince mutual aG.R.eement can create a contract, mutual disaG.R.eement
by the parties can cause its extinguishment.
J. M . Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Javier, NO. L-28569, February 27, 1970
92
If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the
obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and complete
fulfillment, less damages suffered by the obligee.
ART 1240
TO WHOM PAYMENT SHOULD BE MADE
All dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of judgment
belonged to Aranas but UTEX paid the co-defendants despite its
knowledge and understanding of the final judgment. It is elementary
that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot
extinguish the obligation of such debtor to its creditor.
93
The promissory note in question p rovided on its face for payment of the
obligation in Philippine currency, but the aG.R.eement between the
parties originally involved a dollar transaction.
Appellant claims that lower court erred in declaring and holding that the
balance owing from defendant-appellant to plaintiff-appellee on the IRRI
Project should be paid on the basis of the rate of exchange of the U.S.
dollar to the Philippine peso at the time of payment of judgment. Even if
the obligation assumed by the defendant was to pay the p laintiff a sum of
money expressed in American currency, the indemnity to be allowed
s h ould be expressed in Philippine currency at the rate of exchange at the
time of judgment rather than at the rate of exchange prevailing on the
date of defendant's breach.
LEGAL TENDER
Checks representing deposit money do not have legal tender power and
their acceptance in the payment of debts , both public and private, is at
the option of the creditor.
94
after 10 years. Respondents, on the other hand, want the petitioner to
deliver to them the owner's duplicate of the title and the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the lot in question.
The geneal rule is delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only
when it is cashed, pursuant to Art. 1249 of the Civil Code. The rule does
not apply, however, if the debtor is prejudiced by the creditor's
unreasonable delay in the presentment of the check. Acceptance of a
check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for
payment, and if he from whom it is received sustains loss by want of
such d iligence , it will be held to operate as actual payment of the debt or
obligation for which it was given.
B . CONSIGNATION
ART 1257
SOCO vs. MILITANTE, G.R. NO. L-58961 June 28, 1983
ART 1258
95
If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without
just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by
consignation which is the act of depositing the thing due with the court
or judicial authorities but it generally requires a prior tender of payment.
ART 1259
The decision subject of the present petition for review holds the view that
there was substantial compliance with the requisites of consignation and
so ruled in favo r of private respon dent. Substantial compliance is not
enough and the essential requisites of a valid consignation, under
Articles 1256 to 1261 of t h e New Civil Code must be complied with fully
and strictly in accordance with the law and must be accorded a
mandatory construction.
Respon dents alleged that the offer to redeem was not sincere, because
there was no consignation. The right to redeem is a RIGHT, not an
obligation , therefore, ther e is no consignation required to p reserve the
r ight to redeem.
TENDER OF PAYMENT
96
incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due; or when,
without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt; or when two or more
persons claim the same r ight to collect; or when the title of the obligation
has been lost.
SPOUSES TEOFILO vs. REYES, G.R . NO. 150913, February 20, 2003
In order that consignation may be effective the debtor must show that (a)
there was a debt due; (b) the consignation of the obligation had been
made because the creditor to whom a valid tender of payment was made
refused to accept it; (c) previous notice of the consignation had been
given to the person interested in the perfor mance of the obligation; (d)
the amount due was placed at the disposal of the court; and, (e) after the
consignation had been made the person interested was notified thereof.
Article 1256 authorizes consignation alone, with out need of prior tender
of payment, where the ground for consignation is that the creditor is
unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment; or is incapacitated
to receive the payment at the time it is due; or w h en, without j ust cause,
he refuses to give a receipt; or when two or more persons claim the same
r ight to collect; or when the title of t h e obligation has been lost.
C . DACION EN PAGO
97
totally extinguished only when the parties, by aG.R.eement, express or
implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the
obligation.
In opposing the money claim, Respondent alleged that the surety bonds
and the indemnity agreements had been extinguished by the execution of
the deed of assignment, because this amounted to dation in payment
whereby the former is considered to have alienated his property in favor
of the latter in satisfaction of a monetary debt (Article 1245) . The
transaction could not be dation in payment because the deed of
assignment was executed on December 4 , 1959, the obligation of the
assignor to refund the assignee had not yet arisen, hence, there was no
obligation yet on the part of the petitioner.
D . COMPENSATION
SOLINAP vs. DEL ROSARIO, G.R. No. L-50638 July 25, 1983
98
ART 1980
BPI vs CA, G.R . NO. 136202, January 25, 2007
A bank generally has a right of set-off over the deposits therein for the
payment of any w ithdrawals on the part of a depositor, because fixed,
savings, and current deposits of money in banks and s imilar institutions
are governed by the provisions concerning simple loan, hence, the
relationship between banks and depositors is that of cr editor and debtor.
Legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code may take place
when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 are present.
GAN TION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R . NO. L-22490, May 21 ,
1969
The award for attorney's fees is made in favor of the litigant, not of his
counsel, h ence, it is the litigant, not his counsel, who is the judgment
c reditor and who may enforce the judgment by ex ecution, such credit,
therefore, may properly be the subject of legal compensation.
ART 1278
PNB vs VDA. DE ONG ACERO, G.R . NO. L-69255, February 27, 1987
PNB 's main thesis is that when it open ed a savings account for ISABELA,
it (PNB) became indebted to ISABELA, so that when ISABELA itself
subsequently came to be indebted to it on account of ISABELA's breach
of the terms of the Credit Agreement, ISABE LA and PNB became at the
same time creditors and debtors of each other, thus compensation
automatically took place between them, in accordance w ith Article 1278
of the Civil Code.
Compensation shall take when two per sons, in their own right, a re
creditors and debtors of each other and that compensation may transpire
by operation of law, as when all the requisites therefor, set out in Article
1279, are present. Noneth eless these legal provisions can not apply if it
has not proven by competent evidence that PNB is a creditor of ISABELA.
99
FRANCIA vs. IAC, G.R. NO. L-67649 June 28, 1988
Francia contends that his tax delinquency has been extinguished by legal
compensation and claims that the government owed him when a portion
of his land was expropriated, hence, his tax obligation had been set-off
by operation of law.
100
Petitioner contended that, after extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage,
private respondent still owes the former an amount, by way of deficiency.
Petitioner also claimed that it has the right to apply or set off private
respondent's money market claim despite the fact that the valid ity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale and petitioner's claim for deficien cy are still
in question.
Article 1279 of the Civil Code requires among others, that in order that
legal compensation shall take place, "the two debts be due" and "they be
liquidated and demandable ", because compensation is not proper where
the claim of the person asserting the set-off against the other is not clear
nor liquidated.
E . NOVATION
LBP vs. ONG, , G .R . NO. 190755, November 24, 2010
Land Bank faults the CA for finding that novation given that substitution
of debtors was made without its consent, t h us, it was not bound to
recognize the substitution under the rules on novation. Novation which
101
consists in substituting a new debtor in t h e place of the original one,
may be made even without the knowledge or against the w ill of the latter,
but not without the consent of the creditor.
102
F . RESCISSION
ART 1191
In the present case, the failure of respondents to pay the balance of the
purchase price within ten years from the ex ecution of the Deed did not
amount to a substantial breach . Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
the r ight to rescind an obligation is predicated on the violation of the
reciprocity between parties, brought about by a breach of faith by one of
them however, rescission is allowed only where the breach is substantial
and fundamental to the fulfillment of the obligation.
103
SOLAR HARVEST, INC. , vs DAVAO CORRUGATED CARTON
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 176868. July 26, 2010
The CA added that even assuming that the agreement was for
respondent to deliver the boxes, respondent would not be liable for
breach of contract as petitioner had not yet demanded from it the
delivery of the boxes. Without a previous demand for the fulfillment of
the obligation, petitioner would not have a cause of action for rescission
against respondent as the latter would not yet be considered in breach of
its contractual obligation, since the right to rescind a contract anses
once the other party defaults in the performance of his obligation.
104
this remains true notwithstanding the absence of express stipulations in
the agreement indicating the consequences of breaches which the parties
may commit.
Defendants contend (1) that the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation in reciprocal ones are alternative remedies, and plaintiff
having chosen fulfillment in the Civil Case, she cannot now seek
rescission; and (2) that even if plaintiff could seek rescission the action to
rescind the obligation has prescribed. The rule that the injured party
can only choose between fulfillment and rescission of the obligation, and
cannot have both, applies when the obligation is possible of fulfillment, if
the fulfillment has become impossible, Article 1191 (3) allows the injured
party to seek rescission even after he has chosen fulfillment.
ART 1234
ANGELES, ET AL vs. CALASANZ, G.R . NO. L-42283, March 18, 1985
The party who deems the contract violated may consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it
proceeds at its own risk, for it is only the final judgment of the
corresponding court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the
action taken was or was not correct in law.
G . RESTITUTION
105
UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
MAGDALO V . FRANCISCO, SR. , and VICTORIANO N . FRANCISCO,
G .R . NO. L-29155 , May 13, 1970
CONTRACTS
I . A. DEFINITION
SPOUSES BALILA vs. IAC, G.R . NO. L-68477 October 29, 1987
106
In the present case, there is no question that the subject matter of the
sale is the 364-square meter Davao lot owned by the Spouses Tongson
and the selling price agreed upon by the parties is P3,000,000, but the
existence of the remaining element, whic h is consent of the contracting
parties, to sell the property, claiming that their consent was vitiated by
fraud , renders the contract of sale void.
A . CONSENT
Pending resolution of the case, both parties freely and voluntarily entered
into an agreement for the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this
case. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent,
however, a judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the
parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved by the
court and reduced to a judgment.
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the
Agreement because of private respondent's demand, for payment for the
"exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call
a press conference declaring the whole p icture as a fake, fraud and a
hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio, television
and that they were going to Court to stop the picture. " It is necessary to
distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present when
one gives his consent reluctantly because a contract is valid even though
one of the parties entered into it against his own wish and desires , or
even against his better judgment.
107
Appellant made a qualified acceptance of appellee's letter-offer of a parcel
of land but appellee made a new proposal to pay the amount in staggered
amounts w ithin two years in quarterly amortizations. To convert the
offer into a contract, the acceptance must be absolute and must not
qualify the terms of the offer, for a qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer and is a rejection of the original offer and such acceptance
is not sufficient to generate consent.
B . CAUSE OF CONTRACTS
ART 1354
LAW vs. OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO., G.R. NO. L-30771 , May 28, 1984
The defendants admitted the principal obligation but claimed that the
additional amount constituted usurious interest. Under Article 1354 of
the Civil Code, the agreement of the parties relative to the additional
amount is presumed to exist and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary. S ince no evidentiary hearing had been held, the defendants
therefore had not proven that the obligation was illegal.
C . CONSIDERATION
ART. 1354
Although the contract states that the purchase price of P2 ,000.00 was
paid by Policronio to Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been
108
proven that no such payment was made. It is well-settled that where a
deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has
never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of
consideration.
III. FORMALITIES
ART 1724
DUE OBSERVANCE OF PRESCRIBED FORMALITIES
In the absence of a written authority by the owner for the changes in the
plans and specifications of the building and of a written agreement
between the parties on the additional price to be paid to the contractor,
as required by Article 1724, the claim for the cost of additional works
must be denied.
Petitioner Lao Sok promised to give his employees their separation pay,
as soon as he receives the insurance proceeds for his burned building,
but contends that the contract was orally made hence unenforceable
s ince it does not comply with the Statute of Frauds. Contracts in
whatever form they may have been entered into are binding on the
parties unless form is essential for the validity and enforceability of that
particular contract.
ART 1356
GALLARDO vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
G .R . NO. L-67742 October 29, 1987
The issue here is whether or not the unnotarized deed of sale can be
considered as a valid instrument for effecting the alienation by way of
sale of a parcel of land registerd under the Torrens System.
The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are
obligatory, in w h atever form they may have been entered, provided all the
109
essential requisites for their validity are present, except when the law so
requires requ1nng a contract to be in some form for valid ity or
enforceability.
From the exchange of telegrams between the two parties, there was not
yet a meeting of the minds as to the cause of the contract. The cause of a
contract has been defined "as the essential reason which moves the
contracting parties to enter into it (8 Manresa, 5th Edition, p. 450). In
other words, the cause is the immediate, direct and proximate reason
which justifies the creation of an obligation thru the will of the
contracting parties (3 Castan, 4th Edition, p. 347). " (General Enterprises,
Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. , 11 SCRA 733, 739). For the private
respondent, the cause of the contract was the repair of its vessel
Zamboanga-J while for the petitioner the cause would be its commitment
to repair the vessel and make it seaworthy. The telegrams dated January
17, January 20, and January 28, 197 5 sent by the petitioner to the
private respondent, however, indicate that the former had not accepted
the repair of Zamboanga-J, the reason being that the extent of the repair
to be made necessitated a major expense so that the petitioner insisted
on the presence of the private respondent for evaluation before it
accepted the repair of the wooden vessel. That the petitioner had not yet
consented to the contract is evident when on January 28, 1975, it sent a
telegram stating: "... NO AGREEMENT AS TO THE EX TENT OF REPAIRS
AND PAYMENT WILL UNDOCK VESSEL. " The fact that the private
respondent who received this telegram ignored it, confirms that there
was no perfected contract to repair Zamboanga-J.
110
SANCHEZ vs. RIGOS, G.R. NO. L-25494 June 14, 1972
V. INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
111
ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE AND LEASING CORPORATION vs.
SPOUSES G.R.AVADOR et al, G.R. NO. 186550, July 5 , 2010
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R . NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
URETA vs. URETA, G.R . No. 165748, September 14, 2011 -Lacking in
an absolutely s imulated con tract is consent which is essential to a valid
and enforceable contract. Thus, where a person, in order to place his
property beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to
another, h e does not really intend to divest h imself of his title and control
of the proper ty; hence, the deed of t ransfer is but a sham. Similarly, in
this case, Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation
purposes, w ithout intending to transfer ownership over the subject
lands.
The lower court held that the purchase by a lawyer of the property in
litigation from his client is categorically prohibited by Article 149 1,
paragraph (5) of the Philippin e Civil Code, and that consequently,
plaintiffs purchase of the property in litigation from h is client was void
112
and could produce no legal effect, by virtue of Article 1409, paragraph (7)
of our Civil Code. Contracts "expressly prohibited or declared void by
law' are "inexistent and that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified, neither
can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived. "
ART 1410
TONGOY vs . THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G .R . NO. L-
45645 June 28, 1983
The issue in this case is whether or not the rights of herein respondents
over subject proper ties , which were the subjects of simulated or fictitious
transactions, have already prescribed. A void or inexistent contract is one
whic h h as no force and effect from the very beginning, as if it had never
been entered into, and which cannot be validated e ither by time or by
ratification.
LITA ENTERPRISES, INC.,vs. IAC, G.R . NO. L-64693 April 27, 1984
113
former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject proper ty,
and the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the probate
court.
Respondent, through fraudulent means was able to transfer the lot from
his parents to himself without consideration or cause through a
purported deed of The IAC held that the action had already prescribed
because an action to annul a con tract based on fraud prescribes in four
years. The SC, however, held that the alleged contract of sale is vitiated
by the total absence of a valid cause or consideration which is an
indispensable requisite for t h e existence of a valid contract. Thus, Article
1410 of the Civil Code provides that '(T)he action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not p rescribe.
The illicit purpose becomes the illegal causa rendering the contracts void.
B . VOIDABLE CONTRACTS
ART 1327
The vendor Eligio, Sr. entered into an agreement with petitioner, but that
the fa rmer's capacity to consent was vitiated by senile dementia. Insane
or demented persons cannot give consent to a contrac t , but if an insane
114
or demented person does enter into a contract, the legal effect is that the
contract is voidable or annullable.
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of t h e Civil Code, the Court of Appeals
ruled that through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are
considered to h ave ratified the aforesaid sale of the subj ect property by
their mother. Ratification means that one under no d isability voluntarily
adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective
proceedin g, which w ithout his san ction would not be b inding on h im ,
hence , an alleged s ilence and inaction may not be interpreted as an act
of ratification on their part.
C . UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Atty. Adolfo Amor was entrusted,
as receiver, with the administration of BISTRANCO and it business, but
the act of entering into a contract is one which requires the authorization
of the court which appointed him receiver. The questioned contracts can
r ightfully be classified as unenforceable for having been entered into by
one who had acted beyond his powers, due to Receiver Amor's failure to
secure the court's approval of said Contracts.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
115
The contract of sale between Eugenia and Concepcion was evidenced by
a receipt signed by Eugenia. The verbal contract of sale between did not
violate the provisions of the Statute of Frauds because when a verbal
contract h as been completed, executed or partially consummated, its
enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies
only to an executory agreement, thus, where one party has performed his
obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove the agreement.
Gabriel Sr., during his lifetime, sold t he subject property to Antonita, the
purchase price payable on installment basis, thus, Gabriel Sr. appeared
to have been a recipient of some partial payments but after his death, his
son questions the verbal sale contract between Gabriel Sr. and Antonita,
and alleged that the contract is unenforceable for non-compliance with
the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a
contract for the sale of real proper ty or of an interest therein shall be
unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum thereof is in
writing and subscribed by t h e party or his agent. Where the verbal
contract of sale, however, has been partially executed through the partial
payments made by one party duly received by the vendor, as in the
present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of the Statute.
Both courts were of the view essen tially that the evidence did not bear
out the claim of fraud; t h at under the Statute of Frauds, the parties'
covenant as to their p roperties' metes and bounds was unenforceable
s ince it was not reduced to writing. Not every agreement "a ffecting land"
must be put in writing to attain enforceability, under the Statute of
Frauds, Article 1403(2) (e) of the Civil Code, such formality is only
required of contracts involving leases for longer than one year, or for the
sale of r eal property or of an interest therein.
D . RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS
116
against h im in and without paying any part of that judgment, Sadorra
sold the only two parcels o f land belonging to the conjugal partnership to
his son-in-law. Contracts by virtue of which the debtor alienates
property by gratuitous title or alienations by onerous title when made by
persons against whom some judgment has been rendered in any
instance or some writ of attachment has been issued, are presumed to be
made in fraud of creditors, and the decision or attachment need not refer
to the property alienated and need not have been obtained by the party
seeking rescission.
1. CONSENSUALITY OF CONTRACTS
ART 1306 , 1336 , 1337
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PLDT G.R . NO. L-18841
January 27, 1969
2 . AUTONOMY OF CONTRACTS
ART 1306
WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs.
117
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, G.R. NO. 142830
March 24, 2006
TIU vs. PLATINUM PLANS PHIL., INC., G.R . NO. 163512 February 28,
2007
It is admitted by both parties that the phrase "they shall not sell to
others these three lots but only to the seller Vicente Santiago or to h is
heirs or successors" is an express prohibition against the sale of the lots
described in the "Compraventa" to t hird persons or strangers to the
contract. Parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
118
A contract is the law between the contracting parties, and when there is
nothing in it which is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
ART 1159
OCCENA vs. HON. JABSON, G.R. NO. L-44349, October 29, 1976
3 . MUTUALITY OF CONTRACTS
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS vs. NAVARRO, G.R. NO. L-46591, July 28,
1987
119
SPOUSES FLORENDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 101771
December 1 7 , 1996
In order that obligations arising from contracts may have the force of law
between the parties, there must be mutuality between the parties based
on their essential equality, hence, a contract containing a condition
which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled
will of one of the contracting parties, is void.
ART 1308
The spouses Rocamora posit that their loan would not have bloated to
more than double the original amount if PNB had not increased the
interest rates and had it immediately foreclosed the mortgages. Any
increase in the rate of interest made pursuant to an escalation clause
must not be left solely to the will of one of the parties, but must be the
result of a mutual agreement between the parties, hence, a de -escalation
clause that would authorize a reduction in the interest rates
corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the Monetary
Board must be included, otherwise, the change carries no binding effect.
Being an heir t here is privity of interest between the heir and the
deceased, hence, heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising
therefrom are not transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3)
provision of law.
120
"contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot
favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and
has acted with knowledge thereof."
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
and if a contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a third
person, the contracting parties must have clearly and deliberately
conferred a favor upon the third person.
A . INNOMINATE CONTRACTS
ART 1307
CORPUS vs . COURT OF APPEALS, G .R . NO. L-40424 June 30, 1980
There was no express contract between the parties for the payment of
attorney's fees, but the respondent rendered legal services to petitioner.
The payment of a ttorney's fees to respondent may be justified by virtue of
the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based
on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another" and under Article 1307 such contracts shall be regulated by
the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of
obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous
nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people.
B . DIVISIBLE CONTRACTS
BRIONES vs. CAMMAYO, ET AL. , G .R. NO. L-23559 , October 4 , 1971
C . CONTRACT OF ADHESION
ART 1750
121
ONG YIU vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L-40597
June 29, 1979
ART 1326
C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs . MENOR, G .R . NO. L-28360
January 27, 1983
ART 1332
TANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G .R . NO. L-48563 May 25, 1979
It is the position of the petitioner that because Lee See Guat was illiterate
and spoke only Chinese, she could not be held guilty of concealment of
her health history because the applications for insurance were in English
and the insurer has not proved that the terms thereof had been fully
explained to her. The obligation to show that the terms of the contract
had been fully explained to the party who is unable to read or
understand the language of the contract, when fraud or mistake is
alleged, devolves on the party seeking to enforce it.
122
s ignature or h is "adhesion" thereto hen ce must be construed against the
party causin g it.
123