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People v. Aminnudin
Facts:
The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of
their informers that the accused was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City
and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip,
they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended
from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him
and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos
of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic
examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then
filed against Aminnudin.
Issue:
Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable
serach and seizure is violated
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in
flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed.
A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to
Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information
they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had determine on his own
authority that a search warrant was not necessary.
The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge
and not law enforcement agents.
ACQUITTED
People v Mengote
Facts:
The Western Police District received a telephone call from aninformer that
there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and
North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw
two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen.
They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other
lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them
the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in
it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them
and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An
information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the
fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the
weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for
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violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his
appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against
him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal
Held:
An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec
32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest
without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person
to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from
side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just beencommitted or
was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their
presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a
broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.
People v. Claudio
FACTS:
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted the accused
Anita Claudio y Bagtang for violating Sec. 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. Prosecutions witness Danel Obia, a policeman, testified that while
on board the Victory Liner heading back to his home in Olongapo, Claudio
boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after placing a
woven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables she was
carrying at the back of Obias seat. With the feeling that there was some
unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag so when they
reached San Fernando, Pampanga, he inserted one of his fingers in a plastic
bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. He could
recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the
ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he
discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused
until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus.
Obina intercepted her and showed her his ID Identifying himself as a
policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that
she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. Claudio replied, "Please go with
me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea
and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right
away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag
appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in
the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco, Obia, Claudio and Sgt. Leoncio
Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing
marijuana weighing about one kilo.
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ISSUE:
WON Claudios warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were
unlawful?
RULING:
NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for the in flagrante
delicto arrest, that is, a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search
incidental to lawful arrest to be lawful. In other words, a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Here, Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs.
Thus, Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio. The
warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful
(Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the
seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.
People v Tangliben
FACTS:
Patrolmen Quevedo and. Punzalan were conducting surveillance mission at
the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga. It was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen
noticed Medel Tangliben carrying a traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted Tangliben and requested to open the red
traveling bag but the latter refused, only to accede later on when the
patrolmen identified themselves. Marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less, were found inside the bag.
ISSUE:
WON the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an
unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
RULING:
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a
search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Section 12. Search incident to a
lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides: A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the
time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently
valid.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the
accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough
time to secure a search warrant.
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Umil v Ramos
Facts:
Separate motions before the Court, seeking reconsideration.
In the Umil case, the arresting officers had good reason to believe
that an NPA member (Rolando Dural, although using a fictitious
name) was indeed being treated at St. Agnes Hospital, QC for
gunshot wounds. The information was from the attending doctor
and hospital management, and therefore came from reliable
sources.
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the same admitted that he was
an NPA courier.
In the case of Amelia Roque, subversive documents and live
ammunition were found at the time of her arrest, and she admitted
to owning such documents.
As regards Domingo Anonuevo & Ramon Casiple, agents frisked
them and found subversive documents & loaded guns without
permits.
With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she arrived at a house subject to a
search warrant. Ammunition & subversive documents were found
in her car.
In the Nazareno case, Narciso Nazareno was identified by Ramil
Regala as the latters companion in killing Romulo Bunye II.
Issue:
Whether or not Rolando Dural (and other petitioners in the other
consolidated cases) was lawfully arrested
Ruling:
Dural and the other petitioners were lawfully arrested for being
members of the New Peoples Army (mere membership is
penalized), and for subversion (a continuing offense).
Subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness &
violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government
is attained.
Likewise, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed
the offense (based on actual facts), coupled with good faith in
making the arrest.
The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a Communist
Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the
validity of the arrests on the compliance with the requirements of a
long existing law; probable cause and good faith of the arresting
peace officers; and that the arrest be on the basis of actual facts
and circumstances.
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offensescommitted in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute directassaults against the state and are in the
nature of continuing crimes.
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Go v CA
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly
bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and
left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
petitioners car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the
scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he
was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation
as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had
allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been just
committed at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the personal knowledge required for
the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San
Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or detention
of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
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Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed
within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting
officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That
information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest
of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by
posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived their
right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial without previously claiming that they
did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on
bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge
approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12
July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the
Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioners claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
Padilla v CA
Facts:
Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on
apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high
powered firearms were found in his possession:
1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run
incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He
had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4
months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and
cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of
arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla
filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a
complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying
for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
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Issues:
1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest.
There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner,
but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was
actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers.
There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the
hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces
of evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:
? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior
valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally
present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by
police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search
(People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law
inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a
warrant)
? Search of moving vehicle
? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under
section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence
where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is
that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of
immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing
that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit
and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness
gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea.
2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond
dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from
petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of
the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On
this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation.
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Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the
Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform
personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which
would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the
M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a
civilian.
3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes
excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D.
1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and
adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on
illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under
P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4
months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and
excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of
appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not
be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to
reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity
of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.
The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the
appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this
case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by
this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on
illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the
Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed
penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within
the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to
interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA
sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple
illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as
min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.
Leviste v CA
Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was
convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the
RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail
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pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and claiming
the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and
only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application
for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail
under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when
the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
application for bail of Leviste.
Ruling:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the
RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more
than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight
if released on bail; or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during
the pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it
cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After
conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion.
Enrile v SB
FACTS:
On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in
an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan
denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
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Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not
yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only
be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk
due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its
assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.
a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be
convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
HELD:
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and
so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may
be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail
may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
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Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in
either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment,
or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens
vs. Elma, the court held: [S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose
of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing
with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should
primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
2. YES.
Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR
vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
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x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the
legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As
such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion
to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to
post bail].
Leonen Dissent
Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis
the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the
court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues that
[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the basis
for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, nor
were these grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.
Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our
Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.
Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special
accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to
wit:
[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on
their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.
xxx
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance,
whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension,
pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and
not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, and
other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...
Procedure for granting bail
Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts
in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in
denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme
Court held:
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It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be
besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges
involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic
principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its
Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in
the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate
the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application
for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court,
trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly.
Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if
not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this
Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot
justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.
Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without
any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to
present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to
Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in
denying the Motion based on prematurity.
Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons
at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to
develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal and factual basis
for this kind of bail.
The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail
merely on the basis of the certification of the attending physician, Dr.
Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from numerous
debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on
judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend
our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and
authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing
whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative
detention is possible.
xxx
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The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail
long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to can then be canceled.
determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined
when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced
filed by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR
pleaded and heard. vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to extradition cases, hence
its increased emphasis on international law. As applied to crimes charged
Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of
deliberated upon Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.
This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case
on a substantially different version of the opinion, one which did not use back to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not the
humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting of bail. The dissent accused was a flight risk.
explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail
is a matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was
substantially similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian
considerations as the basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it
clear that this was an irregularity.

The majority opinion offers no guidance

The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege
(humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who
have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only apply to
those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege can be
granted to those of advanced age only. The majority has perilously set an
unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.

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