Republic of the Philippines

National Capital Judicial Region

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Branch 47, Pasay City

ANTONIA VILLANUEVA ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, CIVIL CASE NO. 482-01
FOR: RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
-versus-

LAURA PEREZ ET AL.,

Defendants.
x---------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

Before this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated October
24, 2009, penned by then Acting Presiding Judge Josephine Vito Cruz , the
dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING

the complaint for lack of merit.

The plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay the defendants the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

On February 5, 2010, a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated

October 24, 2009, was filed by the plaintiffs counsels Atty. June Ibones and Atty.
Montano Nazario, Jr. , which alleges the three (3) reasons for deciding in favor of the
defendants by then Acting Presiding Judge Josephine Vito Cruz: (1) Res judicata; (2)
Estoppel; and (3) Laches. According to plaintiffs counsels, there is no res judiciata
between the present case and the prior ejectment case because the present case is
totally different from the ejectment case filed in Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 48,
Pasay City docketed as Civil Case no. 667-97 titled Lydia Alarcon y Concepcion
represented by attorney-in-fact Roberto Alarcon vs. Laura Perez. There was a reversible
error committed when this Court declared that the plaintiff Antonia Villanueva is
estopped from disclaiming the affidavit of transfer of rights. The reason for this is that
the plaintiff Antonia Villanueva erroneously signed the transfer of rights. Also, it is only
plaintiffs husband Jorge Villanueva, the awardee of the property, who can enter into
contract of transfer of rights. Thus, the defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez
cannot derive anything from the transfer of rights mistakenly entered into by herein
plaintiff. Likewise, it was contended that plaintiff Antonia Villanueva was not guilty of
laches. The two (2) elements of laches, namely, knowledge of defendants acts as well
as the delay in the filing of such suit, are not present.

1
 In order to fully understand this Courts resolution of the instant motion, the
factual antecedent narrated in the decision is substantially stated as follows:

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Antonia Villanueva is the legitimate and rightful possessor of a particular

land consisting of more or less two hundred forty (240) square meters, particularly
known as Block 6, Lot 4, CAA Housing Project No. 1, Pasay City situated at the corner of
Bonanza and Beechcraft Streets, Don Carlos Village, MIA District, Pasay City by virtue
of an award of lease to the plaintiff in the name of husband Jorge Z. Villanueva (now
deceased) as evidenced by a copy of the contract of lease extended to them by the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA). She sub- leased the subject property to Lydia
Alarcon Concepcion as evidenced by a copy of the Contract of Sub-lease, the latter
therefore is her co-possessor of said lot, who constructed her own house thereon which
she eventually leased to the defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez. In August
1996, she signed a document, without knowing the contents thereof, made by defendant
Laura Perez, whom she met for the first time during a surprise visit, after the latter had
explained to her that she is the tenant of Lydia Alarcon Concepcion and after had
insinuated that Lydia Alarcon was already claiming and arrogating unto herself the right
of possession over the subject lot. It turned out later that the document granted the
herein defendants the rights to occupy the subject lot and that they were the one who
constructed a house thereon, which was complete fabrication because the plaintiff
Antonia Villanueva never knew the defendants Laura Perez and her husband Roberto
Perez, prior to their first meeting and it was not them who were allowed by her to
occupy the lot but Lydia Alarcon Concepcion who is the owner and the one who
constructed the house being occupied by the defendants, who are now claiming not only
the ownership of the house leased by them from Lydia Alarcon Concepcion but also the
ownership of the right possession over the subject lot outside the portion occupied by
the house of Lydia Alarcon Concepcion or the entire lot for that matter in derogation to
her claim of ownership. The herein defendants are constructing an additional house or
structure upon the lot which is no longer part of what they leased from Lydia Alarcon
Concepcion. They prayed for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and for
mandatory injunction. Despite demand, defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez
refused to leave the subject property. Initial referral to the barangay was made but
barangay conciliation is unnecessary because the parties reside in different cities and
their barangays are not adjoining each other. Defendant Laura Perez filed an
ejectment case against defendant Laura Perez which was dismissed by the Metropolitan
Trial Court Branch 48 of Pasay City. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the
Regional Trial Court Branch 231 of Pasay City. The ownership of the subject house by
Lydia Alarcon Concepcion is proven: (1) by an October 25, 1972 communication by the
legal office of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) for NAWASA application; (2)
pictures taken in 1977 with the subject house of Lydia Alarcon Concepcion as
background thereto; and (3) the receipts in 1993, 1994 and 1995 wherein the herein
defendants were paying rentals for the house of Lydia Alarcon Concepcion. The subject
house which is declared in the name of plaintiffs son Rodolfo Alarcon had been
assessed under a zero valuation and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

2
 ANSWER

Defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez answered that plaintiffs have no
cause of action against them because plaintiff Antonia Villanueva has transferred and
conveyed to them, for valuable consideration, all her rights, interest and participation in
the premises in question in a document dated December 17, 1977. Neither do the
plaintiff Lydia Alarcon Concepcion has any cause of action against them as they are not
and have never been sub-leases of the premises in question. They alleged that subject
lot was leased by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) to one Jorge Villanueva,
married to plaintiff Antonia Villanueva, under the terms and conditions embodied in a
lease contract dated July 21, 1965. With the consent of the spouses Jorge Villanueva
and plaintiff Antonia Villanueva, they occupied the said property in September 1984, on
the conditions that hey will pay the annual rentals as required in the Contracts of Lease
and to comply with the obligations of the lessee to put up substantial improvements
required under the Villanuevas lease contract with the CAA. Their possession of the
premises in question was derived from the legitimate lessors, Jorge and Antonia
Villanueva, not from Lydia Concepcion Alarcon whose pretended claim of ownership
which has no basis, either in fact or in law. They had religiously paid in behalf of lessors
spouses Villanueva, all expenses entailed by the possession and beneficial use of the
property including realty taxes and annual rental to persons and/or officials entitled
thereto. Since 1984 to date, they continuously resided in the premises which they kept
in good and habitable conditions and introduced therein valuable improvements and
repairs for and in behalf of their benefactor, the spouses Villanueva without anybody
protesting against their presence and/or occupancy. For purposes of tax collection the
City government of Pasay City, the Manila International Airport Authority conducted a
Census of the residents in the area in question, resulting into the issuance by the Pasay
City Assessor of Tax Dec. No. 189-00197 for the lot in the name of the MIA Authority
with Jorge Villanueva c/o Antonia Villanueva as administrator and Tax Dec. No. 18900-
198 for the house in the name of Roberto Perez and Laura Perez both effective as of the
year 1988. Delinquent Tax Payment for both the lot and the house to date were paid
by them. In a survey conducted in the area to determine the proper beneficiaries of
socialized housing in Barangay 189, by the MIA Authority, they were listed as occupants
of the house and lot in 8 Beech craft St. from 1985 to present. Sometime in January
1997, a certain Lydia Concepcion Alarcon filed an ejectment case against them before
the Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 48, Pasay City. Defendant Laura Perez met
plaintiff Lydia Concepcion Alarcon for the first time only in March 1997 during the
Barangay Conciliation conference.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF

Testimonial

The plaintiffs presented as their witnesses the following:

ANTONIA VILLANUEVA testified, among others, that she and her husband
Jorge Villanueva, subleased a lot in 1968 to Lydia Alarcon Concepcion located at Block
6, lot 4 Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) Housing Project NO. 1, situated at Don
Carlos Village, Pasay City.1 Her husband Jorge Villanueva died on February 22, 1993.

1 TSN dated October 19, 2001, p. 7.

3
They subject lot was granted to her and to her husband Jorge Villanueva by Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA). They were employees of CAA. On July 21, 1965, a
contract of lease was executed by and between CAA and Jorge Villanueva involving the
subject property at Block 6, Lot 4, with an area of more or less two hundred forty (240)
square meters. In 1968, the subject lot was sub-leased to Lydia Alarcon and Norberto
Alarcon.2 The contract was executed before a notary public on June 24, 1968. After the
said property was sub-leased by the plaintiff to Lydia Alarcon Concepcion and Norberto
Concepcion, they built a house on the said lot. The house was rented by defendant
Laura Perez who was not able to pay rents. In August 1996, Mrs. Felicidad Carino,
her, brought defendant Laura Perez to her house . It was the first time she met the
defendant Laura Perez who asked for help because she is being evicted by plaintiff
Lydia Alarcon Concepcion. Defendant Laura Perez then told her that Plaintiff Lydia
Alarcon Concepcion was claiming ownership over the lot.

On cross examination, she averred that she never transferred her right to
defendant Laura Perez because they were not being fed by said defendant. The three of
them were working at CAA before. Defendant Laura Perez is not her friend. In the
affidavit of transfer of rights dated December 17, 19997, she could not determine if the
signature appearing thereon is her signature. She never executed any transfer of rights
to Laura Perez. She confirmed that plaintiff Laura Perez came to her house only once to
sign a document which is farce. She has no relationship with the herein defendants.
She did not receive any amount of money in consideration of affixing her signature on
such document.

LYDIA ALARCON CONCEPCION testified, among others, that she knew

plaintiff Antonia Villanueva, who sold to her the right over a lot located at Beechdraft,
Don Carlos Village, Pasay City.3 The document was denominated as contract of sub-
lease. She was allowed to build her house over that lot. She identified the Meralco
certification indicating her name with reads this is to certify, as per records the electric
service account no. 12968-0260-18 at no. 8 Beechcraft, Don Carlos Village, Pasay City,
registered under the name of Lydia A. Alarcon since 1968.4 At present, the house was
occupied by defendant Laura Perez who was permitted by Arthur Sumalde to occupy
the house, with her permission. Defendant Laura Perez rented the house with an initial
amount of Eight Hundred Pesos (P800.00). The rentals were received by her
granddaughter Elisa Villar. Defendant Laura Perez refused to vacate the property when
asked by her.

On cross examination, she testified that she executed a Special Power of Attorney
in favor of Elisa Villar. She went to the United States in 1980 but she cannot recall when
she returned back to the Philippines. She stayed in the United States for more or less
five (5) years. She admitted having filed an ejectment case before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 48, through a General Power of Attorney in favor of
her nephew Roberto Alarcon but she has no copy of such complaint. After affirming the
contents of the ejectment complaint, she admitted that she cannot read the sub-lease
contract because it was written in English and her highest educational attainment was
only grade 2 elementary. She admitted that she is not the owner of the house and the lot
and she is just sub-leasing it form Jorge Villanueva. The real owner actually is the MIA
housing CAA project. After the lot was given to her sometime on June 24, 1968, she

2
TSN dated October 19, 2001, p. 11.
3 TSN dated March 21, 2002, p. 5.
4 TSN dated March 21, 2002, p. 8.

4
constructed a house. She identified the receipt for the payment of the Home Owners
Association for the period 1998 to 2002 with the total amount of One Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty Pesos (P1,280.00) on March 16, 2002. At present, the Brgy. Chairman
is Mr. Emmanuel Sarigumba. Eliseo Reyes was the Barangay Chairman in 1968. In
1985, she leased the property through Arthur Sumalde but without written contract.
The payments of the rentals were also given to Arthur Sumalde. It was Arthur Sumalde
whom she entrusted the property and the latter sub-leased the property to Defendant
Laura Perez. She caused the preparation for the contract of sub-lease with her signature
on it and brought it to defendant Laura Perez sometime in 2006 . She requested her to
sign the contract of sub-lease but she refused to sign it. There is no more contract
entered into after the contract signed by her husband and plaintiff Antonia Villanueva
in July, 1965 with the term on twenty (25) years. She paid her Amilyar or real
state taxes registered under the name of her son Rodolfo Alarcon for the amount of nine
hundred pesos ( P900.00) with O.R. 6135862 dated February 21, 2002. She
remembered appearing before the Barangay Chairman of Beechcraft prior to the filing
of ejectment case against defendant Laura Perez and she can remember defendant
Laura Perez who was present in the meeting. It was not only the first time that she met
defendant Laura Perez because she knew her personally who was the tenant of her
nephew for along time. She also confirmed that the house was actually registered to her
son Rodolfo Alarcon.

On re-direct examination and re-cross examination, she confirmed that she has
no copy of that contract because defendant Laura Perez did not give her a copy. The
contract was not signed by defendant Laura Perez.

ARTHUR CLEMENTE SUMALDE testified, among others, that he knew the

house located at No. 8 Beechcraft , Don Carlos Village, Pasay City because it is near to
his house and the owner of the said house is plaintiff Lydia Alarcon Concepcion.5 He
rented such house since it was vacant. Plaintiff Lydia Alarcon allowed him to stay in the
said house in 1983 in consideration of seven hundred pesos (P700.00) without receipt
and he stayed there for not more than a year. When they left the house, his friend Jun
Salvador, stayed in that house with permission from plaintiff Lydia Alarcon. Later on,
Jun Salvador went back to Davao and the next person who occupied the house was
defendant Laura Perez, who stayed in that house as a tenant. She rented the said house
in the amount of seven hundred pesos (P 700.00) monthly. He asked defendant Laura
Perez to give one month advance and one month deposit. Plaintiff Lydia Alarcon has
knowledge of such agreement. It was plaintiff Lydia Alarcon who asked him to manage
the house and if there is any problem, it will be referred to her nephew or niece or to her
granddaughter Jenny Alarcon also known as Elisa Villar. Because of such instruction,
he referred the problems to Elisa Villar.

After she stayed in the said house, defendant Laura Perez learned that plaintiff
Lydia Alarcon is the owner of the house and she knew Jenny already whom she directly
dealt with and to whom she paid rentals in 1986.

On cross examination, he confirmed that he was the one who permitted the
defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez to stay in the property after consulting
plaintiff Lydia Alarcon. He and plaintiff Antonia Villanueva were officemates while

5 TSN dated May 31, 2002, p. 23.

5
defendant Laura Perez was connected with the Philippine Airlines. During the time
that the herein defendants were staying in the said premises, he did not see plaintiff
Antonia Villanueva visited the said property. He denied that he had participation
whatsoever in the ejectment case filed by plaintiff Lydia Alarcon against the defendants.
A certain Luz Sarigumba, the President of the Home Owners Association, had been a
katiwala of the said premises and that she was in charge of the premises since 1980.
He has seen improvements done in the said property.

On re-direct and re-cross examinations, he testified that the case between the
defendants and his parents-in-law, involving the case of his brother in law who eloped
the 16 years old daughter of Laura Perez, has already been settled and that their good
understanding is stable up to this time. He is not in speaking terms with the defendants
even before this case was filed.

ELISA SALVADOR VILLAR also known as Jenny testified on direct

examination that she is the same Elisa referred in the amended complaint filed by the
plaintiff and that a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) was issued to her, acknowledged
before a counsel for the Republic of the Philippines in United States of America, which
contained the signature of Mrs. Lydia Alarcon Concepcion. She confirmed that Lydia
Alarcon Concepcion was her grandmother and that she personally knew the herein
defendants because they are presently renting the house of her grandmother located at
No. 8 Beechcraft Don Carlos Village, Pasay City. The land where such house is situated
is owned by plaintiff Antonia Villanueva. The assessed value of the property is now at
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) and the assessed value of the house is naught.

The tax declaration for the land issued on December 1998 is in the name of MIA
authority and under administration of Rodolfo Alarcon. The defendants were paying
their rentals to her in behalf of her grandmother Lydia Alarcon Concepcion.6 She
issued receipts and gave them the original copies. Only the photocopies were left to
her. Sometimes, they pay to her at their office. The receipts presented by her in this
Court apply only for the year 1993 up to 1996 because the receipts from 1986 to 1992
were destroyed by floods. She can no longer identify them.

In 1997, she intended to build a house because she was asked to transfer from
that house since her grandmother is coming home . This is the reason why the
defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez did not pay anymore to her. Defendant
Laura Perez is interested in that property. Whenever payments were made, they were
the ones bringing such payments.

On cross examination, she stated that the subject house is owned by her
grandmother Lydia Concepcion and that she has personal knowledge that a house was
constructed on the lot. She was the one paying the real estate tax since she became the
administrator thereof. Rodolfo Alarcon is her uncle. The administration of such house

6 TSN dated July 26, 2002, pp. 6 to 7.

6
was transferred to her in 1986 thru phone conversation but there was no written
authority. The duplicate original of the receipts were with Atty. Hilvano who was
then their former lawyer and were submitted to the ejectment case field at the
Metropolitan Trial Court.

On re-direct and re-cross examinations, the witness clarified that based on the
certified copy of the Declaration, the owner of the house is Rodolfo Alarcon. The tax
declaration indicated the name of Rodolfo Alarcon Concepcion, the son of Lydia Alarcon
Concepcion.

VIOLETA SARIGUMBA testified that plaintiff Lydia Alarcon Concepcion is

the owner of the house located at No. 1 Beechcraft, Don Carlos Village, Pasay City. She
is familiar with the place because she stayed there since 1972. She also knew defendants
Spouses Perez because defendant Roberto Perez is a friend of her husband who is
working in PAL and a tenant of his fathers house since 1980. Presently, the spouses
Perez are occupying the house owned by plaintiff Lydia Concepcion.7 The spouses
Perez filed a complaint before the barangay regarding her fence and they submitted a
document The Registration Potential Socialized Housing Beneficiaries: that states
they are renter of the house and lot. Defendant Roberto Perez submitted those
documents to prove that they are the owners of the house and not to allow them to put
the fence. The dispute was dismissed due to lack of merit and evidence.

On cross examination, she claimed that she knows that the house belongs to Mrs.
Concepcion and her proof is the realty tax, which the plaintiff is paying at the same time
her father-in-law is their lawyer regarding the said house. The Registration for Potential
Socialize Housing was submitted to the barangay by the defendants and she does not
the reason why there is such kind of registration. She was asked if she knows that the
property in Don Carlos Village, Pasay City was declared by the President ready for
disposition to the actual occupants of the property and she answered it in a case to case
basis.

Documentary

The plaintiffs documentary evidence consisted of: (1) Contract of Lease

between Civil Aeronautics Administration and Jorge Villanueva marked as Exhibits
A to A-7; (2) Contract of Sublease between Jorge Villanueva and Lydia Alarcon
Concepcion marked as Exhibits B to B-4; (3) Tax Declaration Lot No. 4 Blk. 6, No.
8 Beechcraft Don Carlos Village, Pasay City marked as Exhibits C to C-1;
(4)Ejectment Complaint MTC Pasay marked as Exhibits D to D-2; (5) Pictures of
the family members marked as Exhibits E to E-3-1; (6) Pictures of the Street
marked as Exhibits F to F-2; (7) Receipts of Rentals marked as Exhibits G to
G-9; (8)Tax Declaration of Lot-Rodolfo Alarcon marked as Exhibit H; (9)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Antonia Villanueva marked as Exhibit I; (10) MERALCO
Certification marked as Exhibit J; (11) Certification of the former President of
Homeowners Association marked as Exhibits K to K-1 ; (12) Certification of
Eliseo C. Reyes Former President and Barangay Captain (1972 to 1982) marked as
Exhibits L to L-1; (13)Official Receipts of the Homeowners Association as Exhibit
7
TSN dated August 1, 2003, p. 6.

7
M; (14) SPA given by Lydia Alarcon to Elisa Villar marked as Exhibits N to N-3;
(15) Tax Declaration-MIA marked as Exhibits O to O-3 ; (16) Tax Declaration-
Rodolfo Alarcon marked as Exhibits P to P-2; (17)Tax Declaration-Rodolfo Alarcon
marked as Exhibits Q to Q-2 ; (18) Receipts of Payment of Rentals-Laura Perez
marked as Exhibits R to CC-1; (19) Real Property Receipts-Rodolfo Alarcon
marked as Exhibits DD to RR; (20) Sketch made by Elisa Villar marked as Exhibit
SS; (21) Certification of Payments of Taxes marked as Exhibit TT;
(22)Certificate of Notice of Hearing marked as Exhibits UU to UU-2; (23) Minutes
of Barangay Proceedings marked as Exhibits VV to VV-2 ; and (24) Documents
Submitted by Roberto Perez marked as Exhibits VV-4 to VV-4-C.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANT

Testimonial

The defendants presented the following witnesses:

MARIA ALMA VALENCIANO testified that as a Director Manager of

National Housing Authority (NHA), she covered the cities of Pasay, Paraaque and La
Pias and oversees the implementation of the projects of NHA, South Sector I. They are
in-charge in the development of housing projects, constructing housing projects and
improving projects identified by the government. Likewise, she is in-charge in the
creation and collection of accounts from the disposition of the land and the units that
the NHA undertakes. She has been holding her position since 1995 up to present. She
received a copy of subpoena issued by this Court. She obtained a copy of Proclamation
No. 391. The NHA is the preliminary agency responsible for the disposition of the land
covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 144 as amended by Proclamation No.391. The
area of Don Carlo is among those identified areas under the administration of MIAA
segregated from TCT No. 6735. She does not know the plaintiffs Antonia Villanueva and
Lydia Alarcon personally but their names appeared in the MIAA Census and Tagging
Operation census master list.8 During the census which was conducted by the Census
Survey Team, with the composition of the NHA, the Settlement and Department
accompanied by the officers of the Home Owners Association in the area headed by a
certain Sarigumba, on February to August of 2002 by virtue of the Memorandum of
Agreement between MIA and NHA, the identified owner of the subject house is Out
During Census. They undertook verification of the actual occupants of the properties
that they census. The name of Household head per census is Villar Wilfredo Raymundo
and his spouse is Elisa Salvador Alarcon and not in the name of Lydia Alarcon because
the latter is an Absentee Household Owner (AHO), which means that the house owners
are not actually residing in the place. The Absentee Home Owners are automatically
disqualified from the benefit of a lot awarding because Proclamation 391, states that the
MIA owned property is declared to actual occupants of the place. The actual occupants
of the property are those who are in the possession of the TAG Number and they are
Elisa Alarcon and Salvador Villar. The actual possessor of the TAG is to prove that he is
the actual occupant of the place during the Tagging.

On cross examination, she testified that the one being interviewed inside the
structure is the one found in the place and the tag is to be given to that person
interviewed, which is called Prioritizing. She explained that the NHA first basis is the
possessor of the tag. She has no knowledge in her capacity as District Manager that the

8
TSN dated May 6, 2004, p. 19.

8
defendants were merely renting. The survey was conducted for two times and during
those times she was not present. Only the land and not the house will be awarded and
if the house will be awarded and if the house is not owned by the awardees, the owner
will see it to the renter and the potential awarded of the land may not be owner of the
house.

ATTY. MIGUEL RAESES testified that the function of Business Real Estate
Investment Division of MIAA is to maintain the integrity of the benefit of the authority
to ensure the boundaries based on the map as conserved by the agency of the
government concerned is property emulated. In his capacity as the Division Manager of
the Business Real Estate Investment Division of MIAA, he was aware that the properties
that are holding by MIAA is within the jurisdiction of Pasay City and included Don
Carlos. Based on the history of MIAA, CAA then allowed its employees to occupy some
portion of the premises of the authority for purposes of proximity of their job.9 He
received a subpoena requiring him to bring to Court a lease contract between CAA and a
certain Jorge Villanueva but he brought instead a contract between CAA and a certain
Alicia Villanueva. It was basically the NHA who will conduct the survey and will identify
the actual occupants in the area and who will determine how much the government will
get in return. He explained that the NHA first conducted the survey, that is tagging and
census and in the tagging and census, the NHA now will try to find out whether or not
the owner of the house is there or outside or absent and who are the actual occupants.
Based on this tagging and the census of NHA, they have no the remarking absentee
logger.

On cross-examination, he testified that he does not know Jorge Villanueva and

that he has no knowledge about the employees of Jorge Villanueva. He did not have
actual participation in the survey of actual occupants because it was the NHA who did it.
The NHA has the authority to determine who the actual occupants are or who will be
the beneficiary of the proclamation. He also denied having any personal knowledge of
official information whether the defendants have been declared as awardees.

ROBERTO PEREZ testified that he paid rentals on the subject property to

plaintiff Antonia Villanueva. 10 Later on, he was paying goods and money to said
plaintiff. When they moved into the subject lot, a shanty was already in place and it was
their undertakings that they do the improvements on the lot by constructing fences
and steel gates. They put up filings on the land. They declared such improvements with
the Assessors Office for taxation purposes. They pay for it. They were summoned to the
Barangay for a barangay conciliation. In that meeting the defendants Spouses Perez,
plaintiff Antonia Villanueva and plaintiff Lydia Alarcon were present. He corroborated
the testimony of other witnesses for the herein defendants as to the fact that they were
sued in an ejectment case, which was dismissed. The land was owned by the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) now presently administered by the National
Housing Authority (NHA).

On cross-examination, he stated that Antonia Villanueva was with the Records

division of the CAA and not with the Flight Safety division.

9 TSN dated February 18, 2005, p. 8.

10 TSN dated February 3, 2006, p. 7.

9
 FELICIDAD CARINO testified that the statement of Roberto Perez is true
that there was indeed a Deed of Transfer of Rights. She is one of the signatories therein.

Documentary

Defendants documentary evidence are the following: (1) Copy of Memorandum-

12-15-1998 marked as Exhibits 12 to 12-A-E; (2) Voters Affidavit of Roberto Perez
marked as Exhibits 13 to 13-A ; (3) Affidavit of Transfer of Rights marked as
Exhibits 17 to 17-O; (4) Real Property Tax-1988 marked as Exhibits 20-a to 20-
b; (5) Certified Xerox Copy of Real Property Tax marked as Exhibits 21; (6) Notice
of Tax Assessment marked as Exhibit 22; (7) Copy of Decision MTC Branch 48-
Ejectment Case marked as Exhibits 23 to 23-F-1; and (8) Copy of Decision RTC
Branch 231 marked as Exhibits 24 to 24-C-1

REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Testimonial

ELISA VILLAR testified, among others, that the testimonies of defendant

Roberto Perez and their as to the defendants claim of ownership over the subject
property as well as the alleged transfer of rights are baseless and fictitious. The true
and genuine owners of the property are plaintiffs Antonia Villanueva and Lydia Alarcon
Concepcion. Defendants Spouses Perez were not the owners as they are not the
beneficiaries of the transfer of rights.

During the re-direct examination and re-cross examination, she presented the
original picture of the subject property which was in her possession. She was merely
ten (10) years old when the picture was taken. She was not the one who took the picture
since it was only given to her by her grandmother in 2001 when the case was filed.
Depicted in the picture was a certain house that belonged to her grandmother Lydia
Alarcon Concepcion. During that time, she did not have any knowledge of the ownership
of the said house, she being at her tender age when the picture was taken.

WILHELMINA CAPARAS SUMALDE testified that her husband was

assigned as a caretaker of the subject property by the late Lydia Alarcon Concepcion.
They allowed defendant Laura Perez to rent the house . The Concepcions are the lessors
while the spouses Perez are the tenants.

ROMEO ARGUELLES testified that the property located at No. 8 Beechcraft is

the same as the residence of Rodolfo Alarcon of Bonanza Street, Don Carlos Village,
Pasay City and that Rodolfo Alarcon is the owner of one-storey house under ARP No.
B7-189-00170 and said house was classified as residential.

On cross examination and re-direct examination, he clarified that the property in

this case which was declared for tax purposes is in the name of Rodolfo Alarcon. When
he went to the house of plaintiff Antonia Villanueva to confirm whether or not her
husband was a concessionaire of the land, he was accompanied by the defendant Laura

10
Perez in this case, who is also applying for a tax declaration on the improvements of the
property. The defendants have also a tax declaration on the improvements located in
that property.

GREGORIO FARAON testified, among others, that he is in-charge of the

processing of notarial commissions of the lawyers and receiving of notarial reports. An
affidavit of transfer of rights that was allegedly executed by the plaintiff Antonia
Villanueva in favor of the defendants and subscribed by Atty. Henry D. Adasa, a Notary
Public in the City of Manila, is not among those documents executed before him based
on his notarial reports which was submitted before the office of the clerk of court and ex
officio sheriff 2 of Book NO. IV.

Documentary

Plaintiff offered the following rebuttal exhibits: (1) Computer Printouts marked
as Exhibits WW to XX; (2) Postal ID of Lydia Alarcon marked as Exhibits YY
to YY-1; (3) Form 137 Norberto Concepcion marked as Exhibits ZZ to ZZ-2; (4)
Certification from City Assessor of Pasay marked as Exhibits AAA to AAA-1; (5)
Declaration of Real Property marked as Exhibits P to P-5; (6) Declaration of Real
Property marked as Exhibits Q to Q-5; (7) Drawing prepared by Romeo Arguelles
marked as Exhibits BBB to BBB-1; (8) Certification- Office of the Clerk of Court
Manila marked as Exhibit CCC.

PRINCIPAL ISSUE

Whether or not this motion for reconsideration should be granted.

SUB-ISSUES

(1) Was there res judicata?

(2) Was there laches?

(3) Was the affidavit of transfer of rights valid and effectual?

(4) Who has the better right of possession over the subject property?

RULING

This motion for reconsideration should be granted because it is impressed with

merit.

There is no res judicata in this case.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second
actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of
action. These elements are not fully satisfied in this case.

11
 In Custodio vs. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, our Supreme Court
held, On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable
in this case since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and
120 would clearly reveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued
that what should control in determining the cause of action are the averments in both
complaints seeking recovery of possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of
dispossessing and ejecting petitioner from the property and restoring it to respondent
and not the different captions of the two complaints. He argued further that the
application of the principle of res judicata only requires substantial and not absolute
identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered that while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not identical in Civil Case
Nos. 116 and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material possession while
the latter is one for recovery of possession and ownership of the subject land. We find
petitioners contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable
because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of
action is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.

In this instant case, the decision of Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 48, Pasay
City docketed as Civil Case No. 667-97 was not based on the merits. To quote a portion
of the decision: Plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant. Hence, the case
must be dismissed. It may not be amiss to state at this point that Lydia Alarcon y
Concepcion is not a real party in interest in this case. She is not the owner, lessor, lessee
or lawful occupant of the premises. There is no evidence that plaintiffs are lessees of the
lot. Plaintiffs did not even allege how and why they became the lawful occupants of the
lot which gave them the right to lease the premises to the defendant. A decision on
the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is
determination which party is right, as distinguished from a decision rendered upon
some preliminary or formal or merely technical point, or by default and without trial.
Thus, a decision on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of
the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action and the
subject matter of the case. In this case, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 667-97 was
anchored on its lack of cause of action without determining and resolving who has the
right of possession between the plaintiffs and defendants. Moreover, the appeal
decision rendered by Regional Trial Court Branch 231 , Pasay City stating: The alleged
sub-lease relationship between Jorge Villanueva and Lydia Alarcon Concepcion was not
raised and introduced in the Court a quo hence, it should be precluded since it cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. Clearly, the dismissal of the same Civil case was not
resolved on the merits but was dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an
action for want of jurisdiction cannot operate as res judicata on the merits.11 Ergo, the
old case of Del Rosario vs. Celosia 26 Phil 404 that if forcible entry or unlawful detainer
has already been decided upon, the subject may not be threshed out in an accion
publiciana because it would present a real case of res judicata is not applicable in this
instant case. The decision contemplated in the said case is a decision on the merits.

There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 667-97 and this
present case. The cause of action in the former is for recovery of possession and not
ejectment. These are two separate causes of action and therefore the principle of res
judicata does not apply to the present case.

11
Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, G.R. No. 134895, June 19, 2001, citing Diwa v. Donato, G.R.
No. 97547, July 29, 1994.

12
 Indeed, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to
the circumstance obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In
one case, our Supreme Court declared that an ejectment case involves a different cause
of action from an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria and the judgment of the
former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element of
ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue
than possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means
constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action
for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our
jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a
possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action (accion
reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. An
unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms
of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from
the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the
right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership
which includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession.

There is no laches in this case.

The "Doctrine of Laches" is based upon maxim that equity aids the vigilant and
not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim
which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity.12. The neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law,
should have been done.13 Neglect or omission to assert right as, taken in conjunction
with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to adverse party.14

Our Supreme Court held, Well-settled is the rule that the elements of laches
must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to
dismiss. At this stage therefore, the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is
premature. Those issues must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein
both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and
defenses. In this case, our Supreme Court ruled that a trial court wrongly order the
dismissal of the complaint based on laches without conducting trial on the merits in
consonance to the Court of Appeals holding that under Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court, laches is not enumerated under said provision, hence, it must be proved during
trial.

The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a
remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as having been afforded an opportunity
to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the

12 Wooded Shores Property Owners Ass'n Inc. vs. Mathews, 37 Ill. App.3d 334, 345 N.E.2d. 186, 189.
13 Lake Development Enterprises, Inc. vs. Kojetinsky, Mo.App. 410 S.W.2d 361, 367.
14 People ex rel. Mulvey vs. City of Chicago, 292 Ill.App. 589, 12 N.E.2d 13, 16.

13
complainant would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit
is not held barred.

Whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question involving a factual
determination by the trial court. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches
or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.10 Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time, rather, the party
must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may
sufficiently constitute laches.11 Without prejudging the instant case, an apparent delay in
the enforcement of ones claim does not automatically constitute laches. The party
charged with negligence or omission in invoking his right must be afforded the
opportunity to raise his defenses, which can be accommodated only in a contentious
proceeding.

In the Heirs of Nieto vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan, G.R. No. 150654,
December 13, 2007, our Supreme Court, speaking through its ponente Justice Antonio
Eduardo Nachura, declared: Yet, even if we apply the doctrine of laches to registered
lands, it would still not bar petitioners claim. It should be stressed that laches is not
concerned only with the mere lapse of time. This Court has consistently held that those
who occupy the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without any
contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants
will vacate the property upon demand. The status of the possessor is analogous to that of
a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continues by
tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. Upon the refusal to
vacate the property, the owners cause of action accrues. In this case, the first element of
laches occurred the moment respondent refused to vacate the property, upon petitioners
demand, on February 23, 1994. The filing of the complaint on December 28, 1994, after
the lapse of a period of only ten months, cannot be considered as unreasonable delay
amounting to laches. Moreover, case law teaches that if the claimants possession of the
land is merely tolerated by its lawful owner, the latters right to recover possession is
never barred by laches. Even if it be supposed that petitioners were aware of
respondents occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession,
the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long
as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.

The ejectment case between Rodolfo Alarcon, Lydia Alarcon Concepcion

represented by Roberto Alarcon versus Laura Perez with Civil Case No. 667-97 before
Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 48, Pasay was dated March 18, 1998. The appeal
decision was dated September 14, 1998. The amended complaint of plaintiff Antonia
Villanueva was dated June 12, 2001 and filed on the same day in this Court. The period
of filing this complaint from the time of the decision by Regional Trial Court Branch 231
of Pasay City in Civil Case No. 98-0794 does not amount to laches. There was no
unreasonable delay to speak of.

Furthermore, the doctrine of laches cannot be invoked to defeat justice or to

perpetrate fraud and injustice. The doctrine of laches is not concerned with the mere
lapse of time, rather, the party must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his

14
claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.15 It is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes
laches; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an
equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be
worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.14 In the instant case,
plaintiffs Antonia Villanueva and Lydia Alarcon Concepcion filed their action within
the prescribed period for filing of recovery of possession after the unlawful detainer case
filed by plaintiff Lydia Alarcon was dismissed by Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 48,
Pasay City.

In addition, Article 555 of the New Civil Code provides for the lawful ways of losing
ones possession which are : (1) by the abandonment of the thing; (2) by assignment; (3)
by destruction or total loss of thing; (4) by possession of another, subject to Article 537
of the New Civil Code. The testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the
plaintiffs showed that they did not lose possession of the subject property. Therefore,
the doctrine of laches finds no application in this case because it is the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of laches when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice
would result.

The affidavit of transfer of rights was invalid and ineffectual.

Article 1306 of the New Civil Code states: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.

The stipulation in the contract of lease between the CAA and plaintiffs husband
Jorge Villanueva providing: XXX 13. The LESSEE agrees not to transfer his rights to
any other party without the written consent of the airport , Transfer by right of
inheritance is exempted from this provision XXX is binding to other persons,
including to defendants spouses Laura Perez and Roberto Perez. The alleged affidavit of
transfer of rights between plaintiff Antonia Villanueva and defendants Laura Perez and
Roberto Perez which was claimed to be obtained with vices of consent is not a voidable
contract subject to ratification as provided in Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. It is a
void contract. The applicable provision is as follows:

Article 1409 of the New Civil Code states: The following contracts are inexistent and
void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy;

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

15 Juco v. Heirs of Tomas Siy Chung Fu, G.R. No. 150233, February 16, 2005.

15
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;

(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;

(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;

(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal object of the
contract cannot be ascertained;

(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.

These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of
illegality be waived.

The alleged execution of the affidavit of transfer of rights which is a contract

between plaintiff Antonia Villanueva and defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez is
contrary to the condition of the contract of lease between CAA and plaintiffs husband
Jorge Villanueva. Thus, the object of the contract embodied in the affidavit of transfer
of rights is an example of Article 1409 (1) of the New Civil Code. Because the defendants
Laura Perez and Roberto Perez are aware of the contents of the said contract of lease,
the presumption of good faith on their part was lost. They knew of the flaw of their
possession from the onset they are mere tenants and they cannot acquire the subject
property from defendant Antonia Villanueva by virtue of the affidavit of transfer of
rights that was void ab initio.

Indeed, obligations arising from void contracts have no force of law between the
parties and should not be complied with in good faith. While there is nothing that can
stop the parties from establishing stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy, this is not so in the instant case. The assignment,
contested and disputed by plaintiff Antonia Villanueva, did not transfer any rights of
ownership over the subject property to herein defendants. Consequently, the possession
de facto and possession de jure of plaintiffs were not lost. Therefore, an action for
recovery of possession is proper.16

The herein plaintiffs have the better right of possession over the
subject property.

Article 525 of the New Civil Code provides: The possession of things or rights
may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept of owner; or in that of the
holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to another
person. In the case at bar, the possession of plaintiff Antonia Villanueva is in the
concept of a holder by virtue of the Contract of Lease executed between her husband
Jorge Villanueva, as lessee, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration, as lessor on July
1, 1965. Since plaintiff Lydia Alarcon Concepcion was a sub-lessee of plaintiff Antonia
Villanueva, her possession is in the concept of holder also. While there are conflicting

16 See Manresa Vol. 4, p. 321.

16
 versions as to how defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez came into possession of
the subject property, the fact remains that they possessed it as tenants in the concept of
a holder, too. Who has a better right to possess the subject property? In this present
case, plaintiff Lydia Alarcon Concepcion has a better right of possession over the
defendants as supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. It is noteworthy
that Maria Alma Valenciano, Director Manager of National Housing Authority (NHA),
testified that she does not know the plaintiffs Antonia Villanueva and Lydia
Alarcon personally but their names appeared in the MIAA Census and
Tagging Operation census master list. On the other hand, as between plaintiff
Antonia Villanueva and defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez, the former has
better right of possession. This was long answered by the defendants in their Answer ,
page 5 thereof, when they pleaded as follows:
It was leased by the CAA to one Jorge Villanueva, married to Antonia
Villanueva, under the terms and conditions embodied in a lease contract under the date
of July 21, 1965. XXX In said land which was adjacent to a creek, was a dilapidated
structure, not so much fit for habitation. It was actually a pig step. With the consent of
the spouses Jorge Villanueva and Antonia Villanueva, the spouses Roberto Perez and
Laura K. Perez, occupied the said property in September, 1984, on condition that the
latter would pay the annual rentals therefor as required in the Contract of Lease and to
comply with the obligations of the lessee to put up substantial improvements required
under the Villanuevas lease contract with the CAA. Defendants such possession of the
premises in question is derived from the legitimate lessees , Jorge and Antonia
Villanueva, not from Lydia Concepcion Alarcon whose pretended claim of ownership
has no basis , either in fact or in law.

Moreover, there is no judgment either cancelling the lease contract between

CAA and Jorge Villanueva or ordering Jorge Villanueva to vacate from the leased
premises. Neither did the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC) or the National Housing Authority (NHA) in coordination with the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) ejected Jorge Villanueva, his assigns or heirs
from the leased premises. Likewise, as the undisputed facts reveal, defendants Laura
and Roberto Perez are sub-lessees, having leased the subject property from plaintiff
Antonia Villanueva and her husband Jorge Villanueva as sub-lessors of the property
thus the former can invoke no right superior to that of the latter. As sub-lessees,
herein defendants can only assert such right of possession as could have been granted
to them by their sub-lessors, their right of possession depending entirely upon that of
the latter.17 The defendants as mere sub-lessees are not in a position to assert any right
over the subject property, not even the right to remain on it. By virtue of Article 1652 of
the New Civil Code, the sub-lessee, therefore, cannot invoke a right superior to that of
his sub-lessor and the moment the latter is duly ousted from the premises the former
has no leg to stand on. The sub-lessees right if any, is to demand reparation for
damages from his sub-lessor, should the latter be at fault.18 And, in another case, our
Supreme Court interpreted the same article to mean that the sub-lessees can only
assert such right of possession as could have been granted them by their sub-lessors,
their right of possession depending entirely upon that of the latter.19

17 Guevara Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 478, 482 (1988).
18 Sipin, et al. vs. Court of First Instance of Manila, et al., 74 Phil. 649; Heirs of Eugenio Sevilla, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 206 SCRA 559, 566 (1992).
19 Madrigal vs. Ang Sam To, et al., 46 O.G. 2173.

17
 DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision dated October 24,

2009 penned by Acting Presiding Judge Josephine Vito Cruz is hereby
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.

A judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the

defendants by declaring the plaintiffs Antonia Villanueva and Lydia Alarcon
Concepcion as the rightful and legal possessors of the subject property referred to as
Block 6, Lot 4, CAA Housing Project 1, Pasay City situated at the corner of Bonanza and
Beechcraft Streets, Don Carlos Village, MIA District , Pasay City and ordering the
defendants Laura Perez and Roberto Perez to vacate the premises and to surrender the
possession thereof to the plaintiffs. Likewise, the defendants are ordered to pay the
attorneys fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and the cost of
suit.

SO ORDERED.

Pasay City, June 28, 2010.

ELIZA B. YU
Judge

Copy furnished:
Atty. June Ibones Maratas
Atty. Montano Nazario Jr.
Counsels for the Plaintiffs
Grapilon Chan & Pasana Law Offices
Bldg. 26, Apt. 23, BLPC Condominium,
Pag-asa, Quezon City

Atty. Santiago Quial

Counsel for the Defendants
5th Floor, M.G. Bldg., 150
Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati City

18