III.
All cases in which the
A. Concept of remedial law
Remedial law is that branch of law
which prescribes the method of
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion.
B. Substantive law as
distinguished from remedial law
Substantive law- one which
creates, defines, and regulates
rights concerning life, liberty or
property, or the power of
agencies or instrumentalities for
the administration of public
affairs.
Procedural law- the method of
conducting a judicial proceeding.
It includes whatever is embraced
in the technical terms, pleadings,
practice, and evidence. It is the
means by which the power or
authority of a court to hear and
decide a class of cases is put to
action.
C. Rule-making power of the
Supreme Court
Sec. 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
a. Exercise original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus.
b. Review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
I. All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international
or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
II. All cases involving the
legality of any tax impost,
assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
jurisdiction of any lower
court I in issue.
IV. All criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or
higher.
V. All cases in which only an
error or question of law is
involved.
c. Assign temporarily judges of
lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
d. Order a change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
e. Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts, and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
f. Appoint all officials and
employees of the judiciary in
accordance with the civil Service
law.
1. Limitations on the
rule-making power of the
Supreme Court
Sec. 2, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution
The Congress shall have the power
to define prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts
but may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
 No law shall be passed reorganizing
the judiciary when it undermines the
security of tenure of its Members.
Sec. 30, Article VI, 1987
Constitution
No law shall be passed increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No.
129742, September 16, 1998,
295 SCRA 470
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily
pass upon constitutional questions
which are not raised in the
pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain
exceptions. It does not preclude a court
from inquiring into its own jurisdiction
or compel it to enter a judgment that it
lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on
which a court's jurisdiction in a
proceeding depends is unconstitutional,
the court has no jurisdiction in the
proceeding, and since it may determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction, it
necessarily follows that it may inquire
into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in
the regular and orderly procedure in the
trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of
the appellate court is involved in which
case it may be raised at any time or on
the court's own motion. The Court ex
mero motu may take cognizance of lack
of jurisdiction at any point in the case
where that fact is developed. The court
has a clearly recognized right to
determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.
Kuizon v. Desierto, G.R. No.
140619-24, March 9, 2001,
354 SCRA 158
Respondent alleges that the petition
was filed out of time considering that
more than sixty (60) days had elapsed
from the time respondent
Sandiganbayan's Order dated August
2
16, 1999 denying petitioners' Motion to
Defer Arraignment and petitioner
Daan's Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation and to Defer
Arraignment was rendered.The
erroneous filing by the petitioners of
their petition with the Court of Appeals
did not allegedly toll the running of the
period to file the same with this
Court. In reply thereto, petitioners
submit that the 60-day period should
not be strictly applied to them
considering that they originally filed
their petition with the Court of Appeals
within the prescribed period. They
maintain that the Court of Appeals has
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court
on special civil actions for certiorari
under Rule 65 applying the doctrine
in St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. National
Labor Relations Commission. Petitioners
now raise the issue as to which court
has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 questioning
resolutions or orders of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases.
In dismissing petitioners' petition for
lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto.
The appellate court correctly ruled that
its jurisdiction extends only to decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. In
the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
bears stressing that when we declared
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically
stated that said provision is involved
only whenever an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 is taken from a decision
in an administrative disciplinary
action. It cannot be taken into account
where an original action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is resorted to as a
remedy for judicial review, such as from
an incident in a criminal action. In fine,
we hold that the present petition should
have been filed with this Court.

Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. No.
1609098, October 12, 2006,
504 SCRA 280
In the first issue, respondent Gutierrez
contends that the proper remedy of
petitioner to assail the Resolutions of
the Ombudsman finding no probable
cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019,
Section 3(a), (e) and (j) was to file a
petition for certiorari with this Court,
not with the CA. In 1999, this Court
ruled in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario that the
remedy of the aggrieved party from a
resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman finding the presence or
absence of probable cause in criminal
cases was to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 in this
Court. The Court reiterated its ruling
in Kuizon v. Desierto and Tirol, Jr. v. Del
Rosario. And on February 22, 2006,
in Pontejos v. Office of the
Ombudsman, the Court ruled that the
remedy to challenge the Resolution of
the Ombudsman at the conclusion of a
preliminary investigation was to file a
petition for certiorari in this Court under
Rule 65.
In Estrada v. Desierto, this Court
rejected the contention of petitioner
therein that petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 assailing the Order/Resolution
of the OMB in criminal cases should be
filed in the CA, conformably with the
principle of hierarchy of courts. In that
case, the Court explained:
Petitioner contends that certiorari under
Rule 65 should first be filed with the
Court of Appeals as the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts precludes the
immediate invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner,
he is flogging a dead horse as this
3
argument has already been shot down
in Kuizon v. Ombudsman where we
decreed.
In dismissing petitioners petition for
lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals
cited the case of Fabian vs.
Desierto. The appellate court correctly
ruled that its jurisdiction extends only
to decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. In
the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals
from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It
bears stressing that when we declared
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as
unconstitutional, we categorically
stated that said provision is involved
only whenever an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken
from a decision in an administrative
disciplinary action. It cannot be taken
into account where an original action
for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted
to as a remedy for judicial review, such
as from an incident in a criminal
action. In fine, we hold that the present
petition should have been filed with this
Court.
Kuizon and the subsequent case
of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) drove home the
point that the remedy of aggrieved
parties from resolutions of the Office of
the Ombudsman finding probable cause
in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, when tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, is to file an original action
for certiorari with this Court and not
with the Court of Appeals. In cases
when the aggrieved party is questioning
the Office of the Ombudsmans finding
of lack of probable cause, as in this
case, there is likewise the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed
with this Court and not with the Court of
Appeals following our ruling in Perez v.
Office of the Ombudsman.
As this Court had already resolved said
issue of jurisdiction in the above-cited
cases, it is a salutary and necessary
judicial practice to apply the rulings
therein to the subject petition. Stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by
the decisions and disturb not what is
settled. Undaunted, petitioner now
harps on the validity of Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 6770 claiming it to be
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals,
it must be recalled, relied quite heavily
on Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 6770 in
relation to Fabian v. Desierto in ruling
that it had no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition filed thereat.
On the merits of the petition, the Court
finds that petitioner failed to establish
that the respondent officials committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsmans exercise of power must
have been done in an arbitrary or
despotic manner which must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law
Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 217126-27, November
10, 2015
The rule making power of this Court
was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also
r granted for the first time the power to
disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But
most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to
4
promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by
this Court with Congress, more so with
the Executive.
Under its rule-making authority, the
Court has periodically passed various
rules of procedure, among others, the
current 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Identifying the appropriate procedural
remedies needed for the reasonable
exercise of every court's judicial power,
the provisional remedies of temporary
restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction were thus
provided.
A temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction both
constitute temporary measures availed
of during the pendency of the action.
They are, by nature, ancillary because
they are mere incidents in and are
dependent upon the result of the main
action. It is well-settled that the sole
object of a temporary restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to
preserve the status quo until the merits
of the case can be heard. They are
usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial
controversy between the parties and
one of them is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission
of an act that will cause irreparable
injury or destroy the status quo of the
controversy before a full hearing can be
had on the merits of the case. In other
words, they are preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights
or interests, and, hence, not a cause of
action in itself, but merely adjunct to a
main suit.204 In a sense, they are
regulatory processes meant to prevent
a case from being mooted by the
interim acts of the parties.
2. Power of the Supreme Court
to amend and suspend
procedural rules
Echegaray v. The Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
 January 19, 1999 Resolution,
301 SCRA 96
The Rule making power of this Court
was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of
constitutional right. The Court was
also granted for the first time the
power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress,
more so with the Executive. If the
manifest intent of the 1987
Constitution is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary, it is
inutile to urge, as public respondents
do, that this Court has no jurisdiction
to control the process of execution of
its decisions, a power conceded to it
and which it has exercised since time
immemorial.
In re: Petition for Recognition
of the Exemption of the GSIS
from Payment of Legal Fees,
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February
11, 2010
The power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts is a traditional
power of this Court. It necessarily
includes the power to address all
questions arising from or connected to
the implementation of the said rules.
The Rules of Court was promulgated in
the exercise of the Courts rule-making
power. It is essentially procedural in
nature as it does not create, diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights.
Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically
procedural. It does not create or take
away a right but simply operates as a
means to implement an existing right.
In particular, it functions to regulate the
5
procedure of exercising a right of action
and enforcing a cause of action. In
particular, it pertains to the procedural
requirement of paying the prescribed
legal fees in the filing of a pleading or
any application that initiates an action
or proceeding.
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal
fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to
its rule-making power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In
particular, it is part of the rules
concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of
legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement. It is not simply the filing of
the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-
matter or nature of the action.
Appellate docket and other lawful fees
are required to be paid within the same
period for taking an appeal. Payment of
docket fees in full within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection
of an appeal. Without such payment,
the appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and
executory.
Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141524, September
14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633
To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Courts, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals
from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
Pinga v. Heirs of German
Santiago, G.R. No. 170354,
June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 393
To be certain, when the Court
Promulgated the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, including the amended Rule
17, those previous jural doctrines that
were inconsistent with the new rules
incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure were implicitly abandoned
insofar as incidents arising after the
effectivity of the new procedural rules
on 1 July 1997. BA Finance, or even the
doctrine that a counterclaim may be
necessarily dismissed along with the
complaint, clearly conflicts with the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
abandonment of BA Finance as doctrine
extends as far back as 1997, when the
Court adopted the new Rules of Civil
Procedure. If, since then, such
abandonment has not been affirmed in
jurisprudence, it is only because no
proper case has arisen that would
warrant express confirmation of the
new rule. That opportunity is here and
now, and we thus rule that the
dismissal of a complaint due to fault of
the plaintiff is without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute any
pending counterclaims of whatever
nature in the same or separate action.
We confirm that BA Finance and all
previous rulings of the Court that are
inconsistent with this present holding
are now abandoned.
Morales v. Court of Appeals
The records of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission would show
that the Framers debated on whether or
not the Court's rule-making powers
should be shared with Congress. There
was an initial suggestion to insert the
6
sentence "The National Assembly may
repeal, alter, or supplement the said
rules with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court", right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged^" in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme
Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S.
Aquino proposed to delete the former
sentence and, instead, after the word
"[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to
be followed by "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly."
Eventually, a compromise formulation
was reached wherein (a) the Committee
members agreed to Commissioner
Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase
"the National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with
the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court" and (b) in turn,
Commissioner Aquino agreed to
withdraw his proposal to add "the
phrase with the concurrence of the
National Assembly." The changes were
approved, thereby leading to the
present lack of textual reference to any
form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The
prevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent
powers."
3. Power to suspend procedural
rules
Commission of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao
Corp., G.R. No. 159593,
October 12, 2006, 504 SCRA
484
The courts have the power to relax or
suspend technical or procedural rules or
to except a case from their operation
when compelling reasons so warrant or
when the purpose of justice requires it.
What constitutes good and sufficient
cause that would merit suspension of
the rules is discretionary upon the
courts.
Sarmiento v. Zaratan, G.R. No.
167471, February 5, 2007,
514 SCRA 246
Considering the circumstances of the
present case, we believe that
procedural due process was
substantially complied with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would
warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a)
the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of
rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and
(e) exist in the present case.
The suspension of the Rules is
warranted in this case. The motion in
question does not affect the substantive
rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to
extend the period to file Memorandum.
The required extension was due to
respondents counsels illness, lack of
staff to do the work due to storm and
flood, compounded by the grounding of
the computers. There is no claim
likewise that said motion was
interposed to delay the appeal. As it
appears, respondent sought extension
prior to the expiration of the time to do
so and the memorandum was
subsequently filed within the requested
extended period. Under the
circumstances, substantial justice
requires that we go into the merits of
the case to resolve the issue of who is
entitled to the possession of the land in
question.
Further, it has been held that a motion
for extension of time x x x is not a
litigated motion where notice to the
adverse party is necessary to afford the
latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex parte motion
7
made to the court in behalf of one or
the other of the parties to the action, in
the absence and usually without the
knowledge of the other party or parties.
As a general rule, notice of motion is
required where a party has a right to
resist the relief sought by the motion
and principles of natural justice demand
that his rights be not affected without
an opportunity to be heard. It has been
said that ex parte motions are
frequently permissible in procedural
matters, and also in situations and
under circumstances of emergency; and
an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the
resulting delay might tend to defeat the
objective of the motion.
McBurnie v. Ganzon, G.R. No.
178034 & 178117, October 17,
2013
The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Even the Rules of Court
envision this liberality. This power to
suspend or even disregard the rules can
be so pervasive and encompassing so
as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final,
as we are now compelled to do in this
case.
The Rules of Court was conceived and
promulgated to set forth guidelines in
the dispensation of justice but not to
bind and chain the hand that dispenses
it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is
precisely why courts in rendering real
justice have always been, as they in
fact ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Truly then, technicalities, in
the appropriate language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the
realities of the situation
Consistent with the foregoing precepts,
the Court has then reconsidered even
decisions that have attained finality,
finding it more appropriate to lift entries
of judgments already made in these
cases. In Navarro v. Executive
Secretary,67 we reiterated the
pronouncement in De Guzman that the
power to suspend or even disregard
rules of procedure can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already
declared final.
4. Retroactivity of procedural rules
Go v. Sunbanun, G.R. No.
168240, Fevcbruary 9, 2011
Procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in
the rules of procedure. Neypes, which
we rendered in September 2005, has
been applied retroactively to a number
of cases wherein the original period to
appeal had already lapsed subsequent
to the denial of the motion for
reconsideration. Auroras situation is no
exception, and thus she is entitled to
benefit from the amendment of the
procedural rules.
5. Basic principles in jurisdiction
a. Principle of the exercise of
equity jurisdiction
A situation where the court is called
upon to deide a controversy and release
the parties from their correlative
obligations but if it would result in
adverse consequences to the parties
and the public, the court would go
beyond its power to avoid negative
consequences in the release of the
parties.
Poso v. Mijares, A.M. RTJ-02-
1693, August 21, 2002, 387
SCRA 485
The Supreme Court held that the
8
general rule that it does not review a
trial courts decision in an
administrative proceeding since its
main concern therein is to determine
the ethical responsibilities of judicial
conduct is not controlling. The facts of
case calls for the exercise of equity
jurisdiction to the end that we render
complete justice to all affected parties.
As we have said, Equity as the
complement of legal jurisdiction seeks
to reach and do complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of
their rules and want of power to adapt
their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are
incompetent to do so. Equity regards
the spirit of and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance
rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different
courts. Indeed, a court of equity which
has taken jurisdiction and cognizance of
a cause for any purpose will ordinarily
retain jurisdiction for all purpose and
award relief so as to accomplish full
justice between the party litigants,
prevent future litigation and make
performance of the courts decree
perfectly safe to those who may be
compelled to obey it.
Rubio v. Alabata, G.R. No.
203947, February 26, 2014
Due to the peculiarities of this case, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, relaxes the rules and
decides to allow the action for the
revival of judgment filed by petitioners.
The Court believes that it is its bounden
duty to exact justice in every way
possible and exercise its soundest
discretion to prevent a wrong. Although
strict compliance with the rules of
procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases
where a strict enforcement of the rules
will not serve the ends of justice; and
that it is a better rule that courts, under
the principle of equity, will not be
guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when to do so, manifest wrong or
injustice would result. Thus:
"x x x procedural rules may,
nonetheless, be relaxed for the most
persuasive of reasons in order to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed. Corollarily,
the rule, which states that the mistakes
of counsel bind the client, may not be
strictly followed where observance of it
would result in the outright deprivation
of the client's liberty or property, or
where the interest of justice so requires.
b. Elements of jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
It is conferred by law, and does
not depend on the objection or
the acts or omission s of the
parties or anyone of them.
It is not waivable, except in cases
of estoppel to question or raise
jurisdiction.
It is determined upon the
allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled or not, to
recover upon the claim asserted
therein, a matter resolved only
after and as a result of the trial.
2. Jurisdiction over the parties
Jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff is acquired by the filing of
the initiatory pleading, like a
complaint.
Jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired by the
proper service of summon, or by
his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to the
authority of the court.
3. Jurisdiction over the res
It is acquired by the seizure of the
thing under legal process
whereby it is brought into actual
custody of law, or it may result
from the institution of a legal
proceeding wherein the power of
the court over the thing is
recognized and made effective.
9
c. Classes of jurisdiction
General- power to adjudicate all
controversies except those
expressly withheld from the
plenary power s of the court.
Special or Limited- restricts the
courts jurisdiction only to
particular cases and subject to
such limitations as may be
provided by the governing law.
Original- power of the court to
take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for
the first time under conditions
provided by law.
Appellate- authority of a court
higher in rank to re-examine the
final order or judgment of a lower
court which tried the case now
elevated for judicial review.
Exclusive- Power to adjudicate a
case or proceeding to the
exclusion of all other courts at
that stage.
Concurrence/Confluent/Coordinat
e- Power conferred upon different
courts, whether of the same or
different tanks to take cognizance
at the same stage of the same
case in the same or different
judicial territories.
D. Nature of Philippine courts
1. Meaning of a court
Judicial tribunals in the administration
and dispensation of justice. A court is a
body in the government to which the
public administration of justice is
delegated.
2. Court as distinguished from a
judge
Courts may exist without a present
judge. There may be a judge without a
court. The judge may become
disqualified, but such fact does not
destroy the court. It simply means that
there is no judge to act in the court. The
courts of the Philippine islands were
created and the judges were appointed
thereto later. In a few instances, the
judges were appointed before the
courts were established. A person may
be appointed a judge and be assigned
to a particular district or court
subsequently.
3. Classification of Philippine
courts
4. Courts of original and appellate
jurisdiction
Courts of original jurisdiction-
those where a case is originally
commenced.
Appellate courts- those courts
where a case is reviewed.
5. Courts of general and special
jurisdiction
Courts of General jurisdiction-
Courts which take cognizance of
all cases, civil or criminal, except
those assigned to special courts
and courts of limited jurisdiction
Courts of special jurisdiction- The
SC explained that when the then
CFI takes cognizance of election
protests, it acts as courts of
special jurisdiction. In this sense,
they have a limited jurisdiction.
Thus, the CFI has no jurisdiction
over an election protest until the
special facts upon which it may
take jurisdiction are expressly
shown in the motion of protest.
There is no presumption in favor
of jurisdiction of a court of limited
or special jurisdiction.
6. Constitutional and statutory
courts
Constitutional courts- those
created by the constitution itself.
(SC)
Statutory courts- those created
by the legislature. (CA, RTS, MTC-
B.P 129)
7. Courts of law and equity
Courts are first and foremost courts of
law. Equity should be applied only in the
absence of any law governing the
relationship between the parties. While
equity might tilt on the side of one
party, the same cannot be enforced so
as to overrule positive provisions of law
in favor of the other. Equity cannot
10
supplant or contravene the law. The
rule must stand no matter how harsh it
may seem.
8. Principle of judicial hierarchy
Hierarchy of courts meant that while
the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
original writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas
corpus, such concurrence does not
accord litigants unrestrained freedom of
choice of court to which filing thereof
may be directed.
General rule: a higher court will not
entertain a direct resort to it unless the
redress cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower court.
Exception: in cases of national interest
and of serious implications, Supreme
Court does not hesitate to set aside the
rule and proceed with the determination
of the case.
Castro v. Carlos, G.R. No.
194944, April 16, 2013
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of
this Court is not exclusive but is
concurrent with that of the Court of
Appeals and regional trial court and
does not give petitioner unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. The
hierarchy of courts must be strictly
observed.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme
Court is a court of last resort and must
so remain if it is to satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by
the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition." A disregard of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
warrants, as a rule, the outright
dismissal of a petition.
A direct invocation of this Courts
jurisdiction is allowed only when there
are special and important reasons that
are clearly and specifically set forth in a
petition. The rationale behind this policy
arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time
and attention of the Court, which is
better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further
overcrowding of the Courts docket.
Dy v. Bibat-Palmos, G.R. No.
196200, September 11, 2013
Under the principle of hierarchy of
courts, direct recourse to this Court is
improper because the Supreme Court is
a court of last resort and must remain
to be so in order for it to satisfactorily
perform its constitutional functions,
thereby allowing it to devote its time
and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing
the overcrowding of its docket.
Nonetheless, the invocation of this
Courts original jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari has been allowed in
certain instances on the ground of
special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition, such as,
(1) when dictated by the public welfare
and the advancement of public policy;
(2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice;
(3) when the challenged orders were
patent nullities; or
(4) when analogous exceptional and
compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct
handling of the case.
This case falls under one of the
exceptions to the principle of hierarchy
of courts. Justice demands that this
Court take cognizance of this case to
put an end to the controversy and
resolve the matter which has been
dragging on for more than twenty (20)
years. Moreover, in light of the fact that
what is involved is a final judgment
promulgated by this Court, it is but
proper for petitioner to call upon its
original jurisdiction and seek final
clarification.
11
The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 205728,
January 21, 2015
The doctrine that requires respect for
the hierarchy of courts was created by
this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient
manner. Trial courts do not only
determine the facts from the evaluation
of the evidence presented before them.
They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may
include the validity of an ordinance,
statute, or even an executive issuance
in relation to the Constitution.67 To
effectively perform these functions,
they are territorially organized into
regions and then into branches. Their
writs generally reach within those
territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of
inferring the facts from the evidence as
these are physically presented before
them. In many instances, the facts
occur within their territorial jurisdiction,
which properly present the actual case
that makes ripe a determination of the
constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be
national in scope. There are, however,
some cases where resort to courts at
their level would not be practical
considering their decisions could still be
appealed before the higher courts, such
as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily
designed as an appellate court that
reviews the determination of facts and
law made by the trial courts. It is
collegiate in nature. This nature ensures
more standpoints in the review of the
actions of the trial court. But the Court
of Appeals also has original jurisdiction
over most special civil actions. Unlike
the trial courts, its writs can have a
nationwide scope. It is competent to
determine facts and, ideally, should act
on constitutional issues that may not
necessarily be novel unless there are
factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the
judiciary by breaking new ground or
further reiterating in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar existing
precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions
of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in
order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme
Courts role to interpret the Constitution
and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these
become exigent should not be
emasculated by the doctrine in respect
of the hierarchy of courts. That has
never been the purpose of such
doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court
has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction
[over] special civil actions for certiorari .
. .filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by
the nature of the issues clearly and
specifically raised in the petition." As
correctly pointed out by petitioners, we
have provided exceptions to this
doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is
allowed when there are genuine issues
of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time.
A direct resort to this court includes
availing of the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of actions of both
legislative and executive branches of
the government.
9. Doctrine of non-interference
or doctrine of judicial stability
Courts of equal and coordinate
jurisdiction cannot interfere or review
with the orders of each other. A court is
barred from reviewing judgments of a
co-equal court over which it has not
appellate jurisdiction nor power of
review.
Also applicable to administrative
bodies.
12
Yadno v. Anchales, G.R. No.
174582, October 11, 2012
We find that the Baguio RTC correctly
dismissed the case for injunction with
damages filed with it, since it had no
jurisdiction over the nature of the
action. Petitioners' predecessors could
not in an action for injunction with
damages filed with the Baguio RTC
sought the nullification of a final and
executory decision rendered by the
Urdaneta RTC and its subsequent orders
issued pursuant thereto for the
satisfaction of the said judgment. This
would go against the principle of judicial
stability where the judgment or order of
a court of competent jurisdiction, the
Urdaneta RTC, may not be interfered
with by any court of concurrent
jurisdiction (i.e., another RTC), for the
simple reason that the power to open,
modify or vacate the said judgment or
order is not only possessed by but is
restricted to the court in which the
judgment or order is rendered or issued.
The long standing doctrine is that no
court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or
decrees of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial
courts of a province or city, having the
same or equal authority, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or
judgments. A contrary rule would
obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of
justice.
Spouses Crisologo v. Judge
Omelio, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321,
October 2012
In the case at bar, petitioner filed an
independent action for the annulment
of the certificate of sale issued in favor
of private respondent, contending that
the property levied upon and sold to
private respondent by virtue of the writ
of execution issued in Criminal Case No.
90-2645 was her exclusive property, not
that of the judgment obligor. Pursuant
to our ruling in Sy v. Discaya, petitioner
is deemed a stranger to the action
wherein the writ of execution was
issued and is therefore justified in
bringing an independent action to
vindicate her right of ownership over
the subject property.
Contrary to the stand taken by the trial
court, the filing of such an independent
action cannot be considered an
encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a
co-equal and coordinate court. The
court issuing the writ of execution may
enforce its authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor; thus,
the sheriff acts properly only when he
subjects to execution property
undeniably belonging to the judgment
debtor. If the sheriff levies upon the
assets of a third person in which the
judgment debtor has no interest, then
he is acting beyond the limits of his
authority and is amenable to control
and correction by a court of competent
jurisdiction in a separate and
independent action. This is in
consonance with the well-established
principle that no man shall be affected
by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger. Execution of a judgment can
only be issued against a party to the
action, and not against one who has not
yet had his day in court.
Compare with Tan v. Cinco,
G.R. No. 213054, June 15,
2016
To summarize, the various branches of
the regional trial courts of a province or
city, having as they do the same or
equal authority and exercising as they
do concurrent and coordinate
jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are
not permitted to interfere with their
respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and
seriously hamper the administration of
justice.
13
In this case, the Court finds that the
Paraaque RTC violated the doctrine
of judicial stability when it took
cognizance of Teresita's nullification
case despite the fact that the
collection case from which it
emanated falls within the jurisdiction
of the Makati RTC. Verily, the
nullification case ought to have been
dismissed at the outset for lack of
jurisdiction, as the Paraaque RTC is
bereft of authority to nullify the levy
and sale of the subject property that
was legitimately ordered by the
Makati RTC, a coordinate and co-
equal court. In fact, the Paraaque
RTC was already on the right track
when it initially dismissed the
nullification case in its Decision51
dated July 8, 2010. However, it
changed its stance and reconsidered
its disposition upon Teresita's motion
for reconsideration, thereby
committing reversible error. To
reiterate, the determination of
whether or not the levy and sale of a
property in the execution of a
judgment was valid properly falls
within the jurisdiction of the court
that rendered the judgment and
issued the writ of execution.
A judgment rendered by a court
without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be attacked anytime. It
creates no rights and produces no
effect. It remains a basic fact in law
that the choice of the proper forum is
crucial, as the decision of a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction is a total
nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no
legal effect.
Del Rosario v. Ocampo-Ferrer,
G.R. No. 215348, June 20,
2016
At the outset, the Court emphasizes
that under the doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-
 equal court, the various trial courts
of a province or city, having the
same equal authority, should not,
cannot, and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases,
much less with their orders or
judgments. In Barroso v. Omelio, the
Court had the opportunity to
thoroughly explain the said doctrine
in this manner:
The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the
regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary
principle in the administration of
justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or
orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by the injunction.
The rationale for the rule is founded
on the concept of jurisdiction: a court
that acquires jurisdiction over the
case and renders judgment therein
has jurisdiction over its judgment, to
the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all
incidents, and to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment.
Thus, we have repeatedly held that a
case where an execution order has
been issued is considered as still
pending, so that all proceedings on the
execution are still proceedings in the
suit. A court which issued a writ of
execution has the inherent power, for
the advancement of justice, to correct
errors of its ministerial officers and to
control its own processes. To hold
otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in
the resolution of incidents arising in
execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
To be sure, the law and the rules are not
unaware that an issuing court may
violate the law in issuing a writ of
execution and have recognized that
14
there should be a remedy against this
violation. The remedy, however, is not
the resort to another co-equal body but
to a higher court with authority to
nullify the action of the issuing court.
This is precisely the judicial power that
the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and
which this Court has operationalized
through a petition for certiorari, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is not a viable legal position to claim
that a TRO against a writ of execution is
issued against an erring sheriff, not
against the issuing Judge. A TRO
enjoining the enforceability of a writ
addresses the writ itself, not merely the
executing sheriff. x x x As already
mentioned above, the appropriate
action is to assail the implementation of
the writ before the issuing court in
whose behalf the sheriff acts, and, upon
failure, to seek redress through a higher
judicial body.
10. Doctrine of non-interference in
Associations
Courts will not interfere with the
internal affairs of an unincorporated
association so as to settle disputes
between the members on question of
policy, discipline, or internal
government, so long as the government
of the society is fairly and honestly
administered in conformity with its laws
and the law of the land and no property
or civil rights are invaded.
II. Jurisdiction
Locsin v. Nissan Lease Phils.
Inc., G.R. No. 185567, October
20, 2010
Under these circumstances, we have to
give precedence to the merits of the
case, and primacy to the element of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to
hear and rule on a case and is the
threshold element that must exist
before any quasi-judicial officer can act.
In the context of the present case, the
Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction
over the termination dispute Locsin
brought, and should not be allowed to
continue to act on the case after the
absence of jurisdiction has become
obvious, based on the records and the
law. In more practical terms, a contrary
ruling will only cause substantial delay
and inconvenience as well as
unnecessary expenses, to the point of
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion,
of course, does not go into the merits of
termination of relationship and is
without prejudice to the filing of an
intra-corporate dispute on this point
before the appropriate RTC.
Civil Service Commission v.
Andal, G.R. No. 185749,
December 16, 2009
The CSC recognized the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
court personnel. This is consonant with
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Supreme
Court administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof,
thus:
Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have
administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the
Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels
administrative compliance with all laws,
rules and regulations. No other branch
of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
A. Jurisdiction over the parties
1. How jurisdiction over the
plaintiff is acquired
Jurisdiction is acquired over the person
of the plaintiff and the subject matter
by the filing of the complaint or petition.
An action or proceeding is commenced
by the filing of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading.
2. How jurisdiction over the
defendant is acquired
By the service of summons or other
coercive process upon him or by his
15
voluntary submission to the authority of
the court.
3. Compare with Criminal
Procedure
B. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter
1. Meaning of jurisdiction over the
subject matter
The power to hear and determine cases
of a general class to which the
proceedings in question belong.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and not by the consent
or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the
court that it exists. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the
cause or causes of action as alleged in
the complaint.
2. Jurisdiction versus the exercise
of jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive
law while the exercise of jurisdiction
unless otherwise provided by the law
itself is governed by the Rules of Court
or by the orders issued from time to
time by the Supreme Court.
Where there is jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, the
decision of all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of that
jurisdiction.
3. Error of jurisdiction as
distinguished from error of
judgment
4. How jurisdiction is conferred and
determined
Only the Constitution or law confers
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
On the other hand, what determines the
nature of the action as well as the
court, which has jurisdiction over the
case, is the allegation made by the
plaintiff in his complaint.
Gustilo v. Gustilo, G.R. No.
175497, October 19, 2011, 659
SCRA 619
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint.
But where the parties raise the issue
of ownership, as in this case, the
courts may pass upon such issue to
determine who between the parties
has the right to possess the property.
This adjudication, however, is not
final and binding as regards the issue
of ownership; it is merely for the
purpose of resolving the issue of
possession when it is inseparably
connected to the issue of ownership.
The adjudication on the issue of
ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same
parties involving title to the property.
Also, any intra-corporate issues that
may be involved in determining the
real owner of the property may be
threshed out in a separate
proceeding in the proper commercial
court.
Republic v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, G.R. No.
192975, November 12, 2012
In the present case, the material
averments, as well as the character
of the relief prayed for by petitioners
in the complaint before the RTC,
show that their action is one for
cancellation of titles and reversion,
not for annulment of judgment of the
RTC. The complaint alleged that Lot
Nos. 43 to 50, the parcels of land
subject matter of the action, were
not the subject of the CFIs judgment
in the relevant prior land registration
case. Hence, petitioners pray that
the certificates of title of RCAM be
cancelled which will not necessitate
the annulment of said judgment.
Clearly, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
on annulment of judgment finds no
application in the instant case.
The RTC may properly take
cognizance of reversion suits which
do not call for an annulment of
judgment of the RTC22 acting as a
Land Registration Court. Actions for
cancellation of title and reversion,
like the present case, belong to the
class of cases that "involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein" and where the
16
assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Consequently,
no grave abuse of discretion excess
of jurisdiction can be attributed to
the RTC in denying RCAMs motion to
dismiss.
Moreover, it should be stressed that
the only incident before the CA for
resolution was the propriety of
RCAMs motion to dismiss, thus, it
was premature for the CA at this
stage to apply the doctrine of
equitable estoppel as the parties
have not presented any evidence
that would support such finding.
Ching v. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
192828, November 28, 2011,
661 SCRA 449
It is an elementary rule of
procedural law that jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter
is determined by the allegations
of the complaint irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted
therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of
the court cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up
in the answer or upon the motion
to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the
defendant. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in
the complaint. The averments in
the complaint and the character
of the relief sought are the
matters to be consulted.
Gonzales v. GJH Land, Inc.,
G.R. No. 202664, November
10, 2015
At the outset, the Court finds Branch
276 to have correctly categorized Civil
Case No. 11-077 as a commercial case,
more particularly, an intra-corporate
dispute, considering that it relates to
petitioners' averred rights over the
shares of stock offered for sale to other
stockholders, having paid the same in
full. Applying the relationship test and
the nature of the controversy test, the
suit between the parties is clearly
rooted in the existence of an intra-
corporate relationship and pertains to
the enforcement of their correlative
rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the internal and
intra-corporate regulatory rules of the
corporation, hence, intra-corporate,
which should be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court
as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-
SC25 dated June 17, 2003
As a basic premise, let it be emphasized
that a court's acquisition of jurisdiction
over a particular case's subject matter
is different from incidents pertaining to
the exercise of its jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law, whereas a
court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless
provided by the law itself, is governed
by the Rules of Court or by the orders
issued from time to time by the Court.
In Lozada v. Bracewell, it was recently
held that the matter of whether the RTC
resolves an issue in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court is only a
matter of procedure and has nothing to
do with the question of jurisdiction.
the Court nonetheless deems that the
erroneous raffling to a regular branch
instead of to a Special Commercial
Court is only a matter of procedure -
that is, an incident related to the
exercise of jurisdiction - and, thus,
should not negate the jurisdiction which
the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already
acquired. In such a scenario, the proper
course of action was not for the
commercial case to be dismissed;
instead, Branch 276 should have first
referred the case to the Executive Judge
for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should
17
then assign said case to the only
designated Special Commercial Court in
the station.
5. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction
Non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies
It is incumbent upon the party who has
an administrative remedy to pursue the
same to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention.
The theory is that the administrative
authorities are in a better position to
resolve questions addressed to their
particular expertise that errors
committed by subordinates in their
resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so.
The failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, however, does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. Non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies only renders
the action premature, that the claimed
cause of action is not ripe for judicial
determination.
Doctrine of Primary jurisdiction
The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to resolving
the same, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience and services in determining
technical or intricate matters of fact.
Exceptions:
A. where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine;
B. where the challenged
administrative act is patently
illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction;
C. where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction what will
irretrievably prejudice the
complaint;
D. where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the
rule impractical and oppressive;
E. where the question involved is
purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts
of justice;
 F. where judicial intervention is
urgent;
G. when its application may cause
great and irreparable damage;
H. where the controverted acts
violate due process;
I. when the issue of non-exhaustion
of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot;
J. when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy;
K. when strong public interest is
involved;
L. in quo warranto proceedings.
Merida Waterworks District v.
Bacarro, G.R. No. 165993,
September 30, 2008
Non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies renders the action premature.
The Court has consistently reiterated
the rationale behind the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies:
One of the reasons for the doctrine of
exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference
with matters coming primarily (albeit
not exclusively) within the competence
of the other departments. The theory is
that the administrative authorities are
in a better position to resolve questions
addressed to their particular expertise
and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be
rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so It may be added that
strict enforcement of the rule could also
relieve the courts of a considerable
number of avoidable cases which
otherwise would burden their heavily
loaded dockets.
The Province of Aklan v. Jody
King Construction and
Development Corp., G.R. No.
197592 & 202623, November
27, 2013
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of
18
the proper administrative bodies, relief
must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a
remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction. It applies where a
claim is originally cognizable in the
courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed
within the special competence of an
administrative agency. In such a case,
the court in which the claim is sought to
be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its view
or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case
without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is to guide the court in
determining whether it should refrain
from exercising its jurisdiction until after
an administrative agency has
determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court.
Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency Inc. v.
Puerto Princesa City, G.R. No.
181792, April 21, 2014
The execution of the monetary
judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. This
was expressly provided in Section 26 of
Presidential Decree No. 1445, to wit:
Section 26. General jurisdiction. - The
authority and powers of the
Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to
auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general
accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining
thereto for a period of ten years, the
examination and inspection of the
books, records, and papers relating to
those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all
persons respecting funds or property
received or held by them in an
accountable capacity, as well as the
examination, audit, and settlement of
all debts and claims of any sort due
from or owing to the Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction
extends to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, including their
subsidiaries, and other self-governing
boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, and as herein prescribed,
including non governmental entities
subsidized by the government, those
funded by donations through the
government, those required to pay
levies or government share, and those
for which the government has put up a
counterpart fund or those partly funded
by the government.
6. Doctrine of adherence of
jurisdiction
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be
ousted by the happening of subsequent
events even of such character which
should have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance.
Exception:
When the change in jurisdiction is
curative in character.
Instances when a court may lose
jurisdiction even if it has been attached
to it:
a. When a subsequent law provides
a prohibition for the continued
exercise of jurisdiction.
b. Where the law penalizing an act
which is punishable is repealed by
a subsequent law.
c. When accused is deprived of his
constitutional right such as where
the court fails to provide counsel
for the accused who is unable to
obtain one and does not
intelligently waive his
constitutional right.
d. When the proceedings in the
court acquiring jurisdiction is
terminated abandoned or
declared void.
19
e. When the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the
effect that it intended to operate
as to actions pending before its
enactment.
f. Once appeal has been perfected.
g. When the law is curative.
Barrameda v. Rural Bank of
Canaman Inc., G.R. No.
176260, November 24, 2010
Indeed, the Court recognizes the
doctrine on adherence of
jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must be
reminded that such principle is not
without exceptions. It is well to quote
the ruling of the CA on this matter,
thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware
of the doctrine on the adherence of
jurisdiction. However, the rule on
adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute
and has exceptions. One of the
exceptions is that when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character
7. Objections to jurisdiction over
the subject matter
Machado v. Gatdula, G.R. No.
156287, February 16, 2010
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit is yet another matter.
Whenever it appears that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the action shall be dismissed. This
defense may be interposed at any time,
during appeal or even after final
judgment. Such is understandable, as
this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by
law and not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or
conveniently set aside. In People v.
Casiano, this Court, on the issue of
estoppel, held:
The operation of the principle of
estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon
the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same must
exist as a matter of law, and may
not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel However if the
lower court had jurisdiction, and the
case was heard and decided upon a
given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party
who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume
an inconsistent position that the lower
court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule
that jurisdiction in conferred by law, and
does not depend upon the will of the
parties, has no bearing thereon.
8. Effect of estoppel on objections
to jurisdiction
Kukan International Corp. v.
Hon. Reyes, G.R. No. 182729,
September 29, 2010
In the instant case, KIC was not made a
party-defendant in Civil Case No. 99-
93173. Even if it is conceded that it
raised affirmative defenses through its
aforementioned pleadings, KIC never
abandoned its challenge, however
implicit, to the RTCs jurisdiction over its
person. The challenge was subsumed in
KICs primary assertion that it was not
the same entity as Kukan, Inc.
Pertinently, in its Comment and
Opposition to Plaintiffs Omnibus Motion
dated May 20, 2003, KIC entered its
special but not voluntary appearance
alleging therein that it was a different
entity and has a separate legal
personality from Kukan, Inc. And KIC
would consistently reiterate this
assertion in all its pleadings, thus
effectively resisting all along the RTCs
jurisdiction of its person. It cannot be
overemphasized that KIC could not file
before the RTC a motion to dismiss and
its attachments in Civil Case No. 99-
93173, precisely because KIC was
neither impleaded nor served with
summons. Consequently, KIC could only
assert and claim through its affidavits,
comments, and motions filed by special
20
appearance before the RTC that it is
separate and distinct from Kukan, Inc.
C. Jurisdiction over the issues
An expression used to direct the
attention to whether the issue being
tried and decided is within the issues
raised by the pleadings. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred by
law while the jurisdiction over the
issues is conferred by the pleadings and
is conferred upon by the parties and
may therefore be waived such as when
an issue not raised in the pleadings is
tried by implied consent.
D. Jurisdiction over the res or
property in litigation
E. Jurisdiction of courts
1. Supreme Court
Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution
All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treat, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard
by the Supreme Court en banc, and all
other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc,
including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees
Sec. 5, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution
The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
g. Exercise original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto and habeas corpus.
h. Review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
I. All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international
or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
II. All cases involving the
 legality of any tax impost,
assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation
thereto.
III. All cases in which the
jurisdiction of any lower
court I in issue.
IV. All criminal cases in which
the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or
higher.
V. All cases in which only an
error or question of law is
involved.
i. Assign temporarily judges of
lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the
consent of the judge concerned.
j. Order a change of venue or place
of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
k. Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts, and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.
l. Appoint all officials and
employees of the judiciary in
accordance with the civil Service
law.
Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court
Rule 2, Sec. 3
21
Court en banc matters and cases. The
Court en banc shall act on the following
matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, executive
order, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed
decision imposes the death penalty or
reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls;
(e) cases involving decisions,
resolutions, and orders of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit;
(f) cases where the penalty
recommended or imposed is the
dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of
a lawyer, the suspension of any of them
for a period of more than one year, or a
fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding
paragraph and involving the
reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a
lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the
lifting of a judges suspension or a
lawyers suspension from the practice
of law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a
Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the
collegial appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle
laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division my be modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions
of two or more divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a
Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject
matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a
community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this
rule, other division cases that, in the
opinion of at least three Members of the
Division who are voting and present,
are appropriate for transfer to the Court
en banc;
(n) Cases that the Court en banc deems
of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions
in the administrative supervision of all
courts and their personnel.
Rule 2, Sec. 11
Actions on cases referred to the Court
en banc. The referral of a Division
case to the Court en banc shall be
subject to the following rules:
(a) the resolution of a Division
denying a motion for referral to
the Court en banc shall be final
and shall not be appealable to the
Court en banc;
(b) the Court en banc may, in the
absence of sufficiently important
reasons, decline to take
cognizance of a case referred to it
and return the case to the
Division; and
(c) No motion for reconsideration
of a resolution of the Court en
banc declining cognizance of a
referral by a Division shall be
entertained.
Rule 2, Sec. 14
Per curiam decisions. Unless
otherwise requested by the Member
22
assigned to write the opinion of the
Court, the decision or resolution shall be
rendered per curiam
(a) where the penalty imposed is
dismissal from service,
disbarment, or indefinite
suspension in administrative
cases; or
(b) in any other case by
agreement of the majority of the
Members or upon request of a
Member.
Rule 3, Sec. 1
The Supreme Court a court of law. The
Court is a court of law. Its primary task
is to resolve and decide cases and
issues presented by litigants according
to law. However, it may apply equity
where the court is unable to arrive at a
conclusion or judgment strictly on the
basis of law due to a gap, silence,
obscurity or vagueness of the law that
the Court can still legitimately remedy,
and the special circumstances of the
case.
Rule 3, Sec. 2
The Court not a trier of facts. The
Court is not a trier of facts its role is to
decide cases based on the findings of
fact before it. Where the Constitution,
the law or the Court itself, in the
exercise of its discretion, decides to
receive evidence, the reception of
evidence may be delegated to a
member of the Court, to either the Clerk
of Court or one of the Division Clerks of
Court, or to one of the appellate courts
or its justices who shall submit to the
Court a report and recommendation on
the basis of the evidence presented.
Rule 3, Sec. 3
Advisory opinions proscribed. The
Court cannot issue advisory opinions on
the state and meaning of laws, or take
cognizance of moot and academic
questions, subject only to notable
exceptions involving constitutional
issues.
Rule 3, Sec. 4
Cases when the Court may determine
factual issues. The Court shall respect
factual findings of lower courts, unless
any of the following situations is
present:
present. Court deliberations are
confidential and shall not be disclosed
to outside parties, except as may be
provided herein or as authorized by the
Court.

(a) the conclusion is a finding grounded Gonzales v. Solid Cement

entirely on speculation, surmise and Corp., G.R. No. 198423,
conjecture; October 23, 2012

(b) the inference made is manifestly Can the Supreme Court be a

mistaken; party to a case? Read:
Supreme Court v. Delgado,
(c) there is grave abuse of discretion; A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, October
4, 2011, 658 SCRA 401
(d) the judgment is based on a Can you appeal from a
misapprehension of facts; decision of a division of the SC
to the SC en banc? Read: Lu v.
(e) the findings of fact are conflicting; Lu Ym Sr., February 15, 2011
Resolution
(f) the collegial appellate courts went Yes, pero MR siya, hindi appeal.
beyond the issues of the case, and their The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
findings are contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (IRSC) states that the Court en
banc shall act on the following matters
(g) the findings of fact of the collegial and cases:
appellate courts are contrary to those of
the trial court; (a) cases in which the constitutionality
or validity of any treaty, international
(h) said findings of fact are conclusions or executive agreement, law, executive
without citation specific evidence on order, presidential decree,
which they are based; proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(i) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and (b) criminal cases in which the
reply briefs are not disputed by the appealed decision imposes the death
respondents; penalty or reclusion perpetua;

(j) the findings of fact of the collegial
appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are
contradicted by the evidence on record;
and
(c) cases raising novel questions of
law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls;

(k) all other similar and exceptional (e) cases involving decisions,
cases warranting a review of the lower resolutions, and orders of the Civil
courts findings of fact. Service Commission, the Commission
on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit;
Rule 10, Sec. 2
Confidentiality of court sessions. Court (f) cases where the penalty
sessions are executive in character, recommended or imposed is the
with only the Members of the Court dismissal of a judge, the disbarment of
23
a lawyer, the suspension of any of
them for a period of more than one
year, or a fine exceeding forty
thousand pesos;

(g) cases covered by the preceding

paragraph and involving the
reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of
a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the
lifting of a judges suspension or a
lawyers suspension from the practice
of law;

(h) cases involving the discipline of a

Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the
collegial appellate court;

(i) cases where a doctrine or principle

laid down by the Court en banc or by a
Division my be modified or reversed;

(j) cases involving conflicting decisions

of two or more divisions;

(k) cases where three votes in a

Division cannot be obtained;

(l) Division cases where the subject

matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a
community;

(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this

rule, other division cases that, in the
opinion of at least three Members of
the Division who are voting and
present, are appropriate for transfer to
the Court en banc;

(n) cases that the Court en banc deems

of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and

(o) all matters involving policy

decisions in the administrative
supervision of all courts and their
personnel.

24