PS1101

Introduction to History

2008/2009 Semester 1

Azmi Suhaimi

Discuss the following quotation: “It was culturally and psychologically impossible for
Qing China to follow the Japanese example and modernize along Western lines”.

© 2010 by Azmi Suhaimi Page 1

 The advent of Western increasing outlook for much needed involvement in East

Asia in the 18th and 19th century resulted in them trying to “knock” on the proverbial door

of China and Japan, for increased trade concessions and influence. However, the differing

response between Qing China and Tokugawa (and more importantly later, Meiji) Japan

were vital signs on the views of either regarding acceptability to the perceived western

influence. What were the reasons on Qing China not modernizing, vis-à-vis Japan’s

supposed embrace? Were cultural and psychological obstacles in preventing such, the

only reasons? I seek to agree with the quotation, with culture and psychology being the

main factors, but I would propose to qualify the statement somewhat, by weighing in the

contribution other smaller factors in the situation of Qing China at that moment. Thus is

my hypothesis, keeping in mind the absolute nature of “impossible” in my comparison.

The position of China as the “Middle Kingdom” in history was crucial in

developing the psyche of superiority over outsiders, thus having a large impact on their

actions as well as the reactions of others. The establishment of tributary states, as early as

the Ming Era, where those “Yearning for civilization” had to practice the “kowtow”

(showing of servile deference) in front of the emperor (with gifts nonetheless), shaped the

mindset of Chinese thought.1 This followed through to the Qing, where Sinicized states

of Korea, Laos and others continued to be on the preposition of Chinese tributary power.

Foreigners were frowned upon as being “barbaric”.2 Thus, when the British Mccartney

mission of 1793 arrived to request for improved communications access, they were

treated in much of the same way. The Qianlong emperor remarked: “Formerly Portugal

1
Rhoads Murphey, A History of Asia: Fifth Edition (New York: Pearson, 2006), p.210.
2
Ibid.

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paid tribute, now Britain is paying homage”.3 If previously it went down well with

earlier tributaries, it was due to them having, and understanding elements of Chinese

culture. However, Maccartney would have none of that, as events of drastic nature later

proved. The Japanese though, placed Chinese culture, and especially Confucianism, on a

high plane, and adopted several ideas into their own. This started as early as the Soga Uji

period, where the Japanese leader Shotoku (600-622) started an “officialdom on the

Chinese pattern” to emulate the successes of the Tang dynasty, influencing the Japanese

writing style and even the kimono.4 Japan realized early on that they needed to adopt

such virtues, into the creation of their own culture as they were a small and isolated

nation, and realized the practicality of learning from other civilizations. This psychology

of functionalism inculcated over centuries provided a stark contrast to the impossibility of

the Chinese dynastic mindset in suddenly opening up to new Westernizing ideas in the

future.

The strict adherence of governance, by cultural control of Confucian ideals, also

hindered Qing China’s acceptance of Western modernizing thought. By 1794, China’s

population had increased rapidly, more than that of production levels, and thus caused a

gradual shortage of food.5 However, the lack of development in transport systems stunted

commerce, making the situation worse. One solution could be to induce a “jolt” from the

outside, in the form of Western industrialization.6 However, the Qing rulers refused such

a compromise, partly due to their disapproving view of the “barbarians”, but more

pertinently also due to the clash of fundamentals between that of Confucianism and

3
J.A.G Roberts, Modern China: An Illustrated History (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998), pp.21-22
4
Murphey, History of Asia, p. 167-9
5
Mark Elvin, A Pattern of Chinese Past (London, Eyre Metheuen, 1973) p. 304-6
6
Ibid.

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modernization. The culture of a country focused on moral order instead of economic

developments, ensured that China’s economy remained agricultural. For example, in

1866 , Prince Gong’s suggestion for new subjects of education in mathematics and

astronomy was met with derision, as importance was placed more on “propriety and

righteousness”, not “power and plotting”.7 Japan, in contrast, was more flexible in

shifting away from agrarian interests. The previously feudal Togukawa shoganate had

been replaced by the Meiji Restoration 1868, largely through non-violent transfer of

power, with a new vital ethos being “fukoku-kyohei”- change of traditional concept to

compromise on the development of commerce and adoption of Western methods in

improvement of military and technology.8 This mindset of adaptation, as mentioned

earlier, had always been in practice by Japan in terms of self-improvement. In contrast,

the Chinese rulers were stricter in their ideology of Confucian culture in governance.

Why so?

In attempting to rationalize the reasons why, it is important to note that the

Manchu dynasty was beginning to be in decline from 1793 onwards. Evidence of such

could point to the series of rebellions of “White Lotus” (1796) and “Taiping” (1850),

peasant unhappiness which were a signal to the dire need for drastic attempts at changes

within the ideology and governance of the Qing. However, the emphasis on “Great

Harmony”, in the Chinese psyche, where all elements of the universe had to work in

tandem, hindered incentives to alter the present system. 9 This psychological mindset was

in contrast to European thought, where inclination was more towards man dominating the

7
Roberts, Modern China, pp.74-75
8
W.G. Beasley, The Modern History of Japan (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973) p.97
9
Lloyd E. Eastman, Family, Fields and Ancestors : Constancy and Change in China’s Social and Economic
History, 1550-1949 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 149-50

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environment, not vice-versa. 10 Furthermore, the decline of the regime, according to the

“Great Harmony” principle, was seen as a fault of the ruler, and not the system, and thus

focus was more on the ability of rule instead of modifying the political framework. In

contrast to the Manchu rulers, the Meiji Constitution created a national image of

“kokutai”, a symbol of unity for Japan, as a sign of moving away from the previously

feudal (and perhaps fragmenting) framework of the Bakafu (tent rule) to that of the

Emperor’s role as now consolidating the nation and mobilizing them to allow the

introduction of reforms from the West.11 Such a change allowed for the easier change in

policy for Japan, the needed psychological “jolt” to change aspects of the old regime in

the light of increasing Western threat to the region, allowing a singular focus led from the

top, which thus makes it extremely difficult for China to emulate if devoid of such a

psychological change.

Shifting from the ideals of China’s Cultural heritage was the last thing the

declining Manchu rule wanted to do to preserve their hold over the dynasty. It would be

impossible for them to adopt of modernizing change if they feared that it would cause

unhappiness at them trying to move away from tradition. It would compromise their

already loosening political position, and lead to gradual overthrowing of the dynasty. 12

This is understood to have stemmed from the origins of Manchu rule, where the

adaptation of a strict interpretation of Confucianism when they first came to power was

10
E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence As A Modern State (Vancouver, University of British Columbia,
1940) p. 92
11
Ewa Palasz Rutkowska, The Unique Character of the Emperor: The Main Leadership of Modern Japan?
(Surrey, Japan Library, 1996), pp. 116-127 document in Ian Neary, Leaders and Leadership in Japan
12
Richard J. Smith, China’s Cultural Heritage : The Qing Dynasty 1644-1912 (Boulder, Westview Press,
1994) pp.250-1

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intended to create legitimacy in the Manchu, seemingly not Chinese in a pure sense, to

control the state. Richard J. Smith quotes Ping-ti Ho: “In no earlier period of Chinese

history do we find a deeper permeation of the norms...regard as Confucianism”.13 The

Meiji, however, advocated a “plural bi-cultural” lifestyle as the ideal of national identity,

where the continuity of the Japanese culture and way of life in private realm is separated

from the psychological stress of Western modernization at work.14 This was based on

practicality of modernizing, but without the conflict of destabilizing social effects if

Western modernization were to be forced upon all Japanese as the sole ideology.

However, it is important to note that not only culture and psychology affected the

feeling of impossibility in Chinese response to Western modernization. The unique

political factors in the light of the events which unfolded also hindered the Chinese

progress. The Qing responded to the Opium Wars (1839-42) and subsequent rebellions

with the Tongzhi Restoration (“Self-Strengthening”) of economic rehabilitation and

military, but which were seen as a failure due to insufficient political reform and also the

obstructive role of the Empress Dowager. An evidence of obstruction could be the shift

from initial inroads of private enterprise to that of full bureaucracy, which could hardly

be seen as a reform.15 In contrast, the Japanese learnt the China’s lessons better (as had

been a practice since the past) by shifting to more autonomy for private enterprise in

commerce and industry which were previously state-run. The government kept hold of

key industries but sold off some to private enterprise, which was seen as important in

13
Smith, China’s Heritage, p.139
14
Selcuk Esembel, The Meiji Elite and Western Culture (Surrey, Japan Library, 1996), pp. 116-127
document in Ian Neary, Leaders and Leadership in Japan
15
Roberts, Modern China, pp.76-81

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their quest for modernization.16 Geography of the differing lands also resulted in a

difference of adapting change in modernizing aspects. China’s highly fertile soil meant

that they were able to be self-sustainable, and further evidence of their strength in

agricultural yields was them not needing Western advance techniques to produce more

yield, since their yields without such machinery were almost as high if such techniques

were used.17 Japan, on the other hand, had poor soils of low fertility, and their mountains

were too steep to emulate Chinese style agriculture on the edges.18 It was also noted that

the geography of Japan as an island meant that there was exposed threat from the sea at

all corners causing a psychological susceptibility of such, in contrast to that of China,

who could withdraw to their huge landlocked territory to escape such.19 Therefore,

geographical features of China could also point to being an additional reason on why the

Qing Dynasty found it “impossible” to embark on Western modernization the same way

Japan did. The push factors experienced by Japan as early as the Soga Uji period (as

mentioned in paragraph 2) clearly influenced their reactions , in contrast to Chinese

dynastic rule, where Western modernization was regarded as more of a pulling factor

which did not motivate the Manchu rule strongly enough in wanting to adopt them.

16
Norman, Japan’s Emergence, pp.127-32
17
Roberts, Modern China, pp.10-11
18
Murphey, History of Asia, p. 163.
19
Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1976) p24

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 I thus restate my theme in which I seek to agree with the quotation with my

abovementioned arguments, but I would propose to qualify the statement in such a way:

“It was impossible for Qing China to follow the Japanese example and modernize along

Western lines, not only due to the main factors of culture and psychology, but also in

regard to other factors of political leadership, circumstance and geo-economics.”

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