Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 196161 September 26, 2012

CYRIL CALPITO QUI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, J.:

In her petition for review under Rule 45, Cyril Calpito Qui assails the merits of the December 17,
2010 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33494, which denied her Urgent
Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal, and the March 17, 2011 CA Resolution2 which rejected
her Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent factual antecedents are undisputed.

Petitioner was charged with two counts of violation of Section 10(a),3 Article VI of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act.

In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96544, the Information alleges:

That on or about the month of December 1999 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of cruelty and child
abuse upon the person of one Christian John Ignacio, a minor 8 years of age by then and there
angrily shouting invectives while pointing her fingers at said minor and threatening to knock down his
head which acts are prejudicial to the childs psychological and emotional development, debase,
demean and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity of said Christian John Ignacio as a human
being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. Q-00-96545, the Information reads:

That on or about the 15th day of March 2000 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of cruelty and child abuse upon
the person of one Christian John Ignacio, a minor 8 years of age by then and there angrily shouting
invectives and threatening to shoot said minor and which acts are prejudicial to the childs
psychological and emotional development, debase, demean and degrade the intrinsic worth and
dignity of said Christian John Ignacio as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On June 18, 2010, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City convicted petitioner as
charged, and sentenced4 her to two equal periods of imprisonment for an indeterminate penalty of
five (5) years, four (4) months and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional in its maximum
period, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as maximum.

On July 1, 2010, petitioner filed her Notice of Appeal. With the perfection of her appeal and the
consequent elevation of the case records to the CA, petitioner posthaste filed before the appellate
court an Urgent Petition/Application for Bail Pending Appeal which respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed. The OSG urged for the
denial of the bail application on the ground of petitioners propensity to evade the law and that she is
a flight-risk, as she in fact failed to attend several hearings before the RTC resulting in the issuance
of three warrants for her arrest.

Page 1 of 21
On December 17, 2010, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying petitioners application
for bail pending appeal on the basis of Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise rejected through the March 17, 2011 CA
Resolution.

Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following assignment of errors, to wit: (1) there is a
manifest absence of all the conditions justifying a denial of bail under Sec. 5 of Rule 114; (2) the
conviction of petitioner is for a bailable offense and the evidence of guilt against her is not strong;
and (3) since petitioners conviction by the RTC is under appeal, hence not yet final, she should be
accorded the constitutional guaranty of innocence until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
which guaranty entitles her to bail. In gist, the core issue boils down to whether petitioner is entitled
to bail pending appeal.

The petition is bereft of merit.

Bail pending appeal is governed by Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall
be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as here. The Court held:

Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances
are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.5

In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that
the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.6

The CA denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal on the ground that she is a flight risk,
a bail-negating factor under Sec. 5(d) of Rule 114 quoted above. The appellate court anchored its
denial on several circumstances, pointed out by the OSG, which showed petitioners propensity to

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evade the law, as when she failed to attend the hearings before the RTC, which compelled said
court to issue three warrants for petitioners arrest. There is no dispute, and petitioner does not deny
the fact, that on various dates, specifically on August 24, 2005, February 20, 2006 and March 8,
2010, the RTC issued warrants for her arrest. The March 8, 2010 RTC Order also directed the
forfeiture of her bail bond.

Petitioners plea for bail pending appeal is bereft of merit.

The CA properly exercised its discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal.
The CAs determination as to petitioner being a high risk for flight is not without factual mooring.
Indeed, the undisputed fact that petitioner did not attend the hearings before the RTC, which
compelled the trial court to issue warrants for her arrest, is undeniably indicative of petitioners
propensity to trifle with court processes. This fact alone should weigh heavily against a grant of bail
pending appeal.

Petitioners penchant to disobey court processes may also be deduced from the fact that she lied in
order to wiggle out of, and justify her non-appearance on the March 8, 2010 hearing before the RTC.
Petitioner gave the convenient but false excuse that her father, Cirilo Calpito, was hospitalized on
said hearing day (i.e., March 8, 2010) and that Cirilo died on March 24, 2010. The lies foisted on the
court were exposed by: (1) the Death Certificate of Cirilo Calpito clearly showing that he died on
March 24, 2009 or a year before the aforesaid March 2010 RTC hearing; and (2) the Certification
issued by Dr. Aniana Javier stating that Cirilo went to her clinic on March 9, 2009.

Lest it be overlooked, the RTC notice sent to petitioners bonding company was returned with the
notation "moved out," while the notice sent to petitioners given address was returned unclaimed with
the notation "RTS no such person according to Hesita Family" who were the actual occupants in
petitioners given address. The fact of transferring residences without informing her bondsman and
the trial court can only be viewed as petitioners inclination to evade court appearance, as indicative
of flight, and an attempt to place herself beyond the pale of the law.

Petitioners argument that she has the constitutional right to bail and that the evidence of guilt
against her is not strong is spurious. Certainly, after one is convicted by the trial court, the
presumption of innocence, and with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.7 As to the strength of
evidence of guilt against her, suffice it to say that what is before the Court is not the appeal of her
conviction, let alone the matter of evaluating the weight of the evidence adduced against her.

Consequently, the Court agrees with the appellate courts finding of the presence of the fourth
circumstance enumerated in the above-quoted Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and holds that the appellate court neither erred nor gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal. The appellate court appeared to have been
guided by the circumstances provided under the Rules. As the Court categorically held in People v.
Fitzgerald, "As for an accused already convicted and sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding
six years, bail may be denied or revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any
of the. circumstances under Sec. 5, paragraphs (a) to (e) x x x."8 Evidently, the circumstances
succinctly provided in Sec. 5 of Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have been placed as
a guide for the exercise of the appellate court's discretion in granting or denying the application for
bail, pending the appeal of an accused who has been convicted of a crime where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years.

In all, the Court finds the CA to have exercised its discretion soundly when it denied petitioner's
application for bail pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed December
17, 2010 and March 17, 2011 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33494 are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

Page 3 of 21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1529 December 16, 2004

PROS. EDILBERTO L. JAMORA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE A. BERSALES, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, General Santos
City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

The instant administrative case stemmed from a verified complaint dated April 24, 2003 filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by Prosecutor Edilberto L. Jamora, against Presiding Judge
Jose A. Bersales of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos City, Branch 2,
charging the latter with gross ignorance of the law in connection with his grant of bail to all the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 44231-2 and 44232-2. entitled People vs. Alimora M. Akmad, et al.

Complainant Jamora, assigned as the trial prosecutor of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General
Santos City, Branch 37 alleged that on August 8, 2002, Criminal Cases Nos. 44231-2 (for violation of
Sec. 11,1 Art. II of RA 9165) and 44232-2 (for violation of Sec. 52 in relation to Sec. 263 of Art. II of
RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) were filed against
spouses Alimora M. Akmad and Reynalda L. Akmad. Alimoras brother, Abra M. Akmad was co-
accused in the second case. Respondent Judge Bersales of the MTCC of General Santos City
conducted the preliminary investigation based on the criminal complaints.4

After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent judge issued an order dated August 13,
2002, finding the existence of a probable cause against all the detained accused. He also
recommended bail of P120,000 for each accused in the same order.5 On that very same day,
accused filed a motion for reduction of bail which respondent judge, without notice and hearing,
granted on August 15, 2002.6

On August 22, 2002, respondent judge issued an order in connection with Criminal Case No. 44232-
2, finding that a violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 may have been committed and not Sec. 5,
Art. II of RA 9165. The dispositive portion reads:

Evaluating the evidence of the complaint, the investigating judge finds that the offense of
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165 otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

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 Act of 2002 may have been committed and the accused may be held for trial in the Regional
Trial Court.

The transmittal of the records of the said cases to the Office of the City Prosecution of General
Santos City for review and further evaluation was likewise ordered.7

Upon review of the respondent judges report, Reviewing Prosecutor Ramon C. Alano issued an
order (and approved by 1st Assistant City Prosecutor Andres N. Lorenzo, Jr.) affirming respondent
judges findings on the existence of probable cause but took exception to the bail granted.
Prosecutor Alano pronounced that in Criminal Case No. 44232-2, bail should not have been granted
to the accused considering that the crime charged is a non-bailable offense, the imposable penalty
being, life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000 to P10,000,000. Likewise, in Criminal Case
No. 44231-2, the bail set should have been P200,000, as the imposable penalty is twelve years and
one day to twenty years and a fine ranging from P300,000 to P400,000.8

On September 3, 2002, an information for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Article II

of RA No. 9165 (for Criminal Case No. 44232-2) was filed before the RTC of General Santos City
and docketed as RTC Criminal Case No. 16334 which was raffled to Branch 35 presided by Judge
Eddie R. Rojas.

On September 24, 2002, bondsman Hadji Sarip Akmad filed a motion to substitute cash bond to
property bond.9Finding the motion to be without merit and considering that the crime charged (under
Crim. Case No. 44232-2) is a non-bailable offense, Judge Rojas ordered the cancellation and
forfeiture of the cash bond in favor of the government. A warrant of arrest was issued against all the
accused.10

Complainant then filed this complaint charging respondent judge with ignorance of the law in
reducing/changing the crime charged from violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 to violation of Sec. 11 of
RA 9165 to justify the grant of bail. Likewise, no hearing was conducted before the grant of bail, thus
denying the prosecution an opportunity to be heard on the question of bail.

In his comment dated July 15, 2003,11 respondent vehemently denied the accusation that he is
ignorant of the law and that the present administrative complaint was merely an offshoot of a
contempt order he issued against complainant.

He stated that upon receipt of the two criminal cases, he lost no time in conducting the preliminary
investigation of the complaints to find the existence of a probable cause. In Criminal Case No.
44231-1, accused were charged of having in their possession and control one heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance believed to be "shabu" weighing more or
less .03 grams, one plastic tooter with suspected "shabu" residue, one strip aluminum foil with
suspected "shabu" residues and one disposable lighter confiscated at the leather pouch located at
the back of the drivers seat. In Criminal Case No. 44232-2, accused were charged of delivery of one
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance believe to be "shabu," weighing
more of less 2 grams to be sold for P5,000 to a Narcotic Agents who acted as poseur-buyer.12

He maintained that after scrutiny of the complaint, he found the evidence against all the accused
weak and not strong because it was based merely on the police officers belief that the items are
"shabu". While he was informed that one of the cases is a non-bailable offense, however, mindful of
the constitutional guarantee on the right of the accused when the evidence of guilt is not strong and
the elementary principle that it is better to free a guilty man than to imprison an innocent one, he
granted bail to the three accused after availing of his judicial discretion.

As to the charge that the Office of the City Prosecutor was not given the opportunity to be heard on
the motion to reduce bail, respondent declared that due notice was given to the said office as
evidenced by the marginal notation on the motion by Assistant City Prosecutor Jose Jerry Fulgar,
thus:

For violation of Sec. 11, RA 9165 the prosecution submits to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court.

For violation of Sec. 5 RA 9165, No bail is recommended. Hence, no motion for reduction can
be entertained.

Page 5 of 21
Respondent likewise declared that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for
every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge. If the complainant is not
conformable with his order, he should have brought the issue to the appellate court. Thus, he prays
for the dismissal of the complaint.

Based on its evaluation, the OCA recommended that the instant case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that respondent judge be suspended from office for a period of three
months without pay, with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future will be dealt with a
more severe penalty.

In a Resolution dated February 16, 2004, the Court required the parties to manifest whether or not
they are submitting the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. In separate Manifestations, both
dated March 17, 2004, complainant and respondent judge manifested their conformity to the said
Resolution.

We agree with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended penalty.

It is imperative that as an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is
expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. He should be
acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. He must
have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional competence
at all times.13 Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, respondent judge owes the public and
the court he sits in proficiency in the law. Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Not
only did he change or reduce the crime charged so as to justify his grant, but more so, he granted
bail to all the accused without conducting any hearing, thus, denying the prosecution the opportunity
to present its side.

Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary investigation as an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
For practical considerations and also as dictated by necessity considering the lack of prosecutors in
the provinces, judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have been
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations.14 When a preliminary investigation is conducted by
a municipal trial court judge, he is obligated, upon conclusion of the preliminary investigation, to
transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate action, the resolution of the case which must
contain a brief statement of findings of fact and of the law supporting his action, together with the
entire records of the case.15

In the present case, immediately after his determination of a probable cause, but before the
termination of the preliminary investigation, respondent judge granted the accused bail in the amount
of P120,000 each, later reducing this to P60,000 over the objection of the prosecution. This
pronouncement was stated not in a resolution, but in a separate order declaring the finding on the
existence of a probable cause and without any summary of his findings of fact and law supporting
his action. The courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated the judges own conclusion on whether such
evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The summary thereof is considered
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or the denial of the application for bail.16 Nowhere is such summary to be found
in the order of respondent judge.

While respondent judge alleged that a hearing was conducted, he failed to submit any evidence in
support thereof. He alleged that the prosecution was duly notified as evidenced by Prosecutor Jose
Jerry Fulgars marginal notation on the copy of the motion for reduction of bail. However, said
marginal notation stated that for violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165, the prosecution submits to the
sound discretion of the court and in the other case, he recommended no bail and that the motion for
reduction of bail should not be entertained.

The crime for violation of Sec. 5 of RA 9165 carries a penalty of life imprisonment to death. Rule
114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states:

No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution".

Page 6 of 21
This provision is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.

The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offense hinge on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The determination of whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. Stressing in Basco v.
Rapatalo17 that the judge had the duty to determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong, the
Court held:

When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross
examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.

xxx xxx xxx

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution
chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the sound discretion of the
court.

Also, in Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held:

xxx, while the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, this discretion, by the nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after
the evidence is submitted to the court at such hearing. Whether the motion for bail of an
accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in
the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must always be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court may
resolve the motion for bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there
would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail
should be considered void on that ground.

Hence, in the present case, respondent Judge clearly acted irregularly when he motu proprio fixed
and granted bail and subsequently reduced the amount thereof without hearing the side of the
prosecution. Irrespective of his opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong,
the law and settled jurisprudence require that an actual hearing be conducted before bail may be
granted, if bail is at all justified.19

Moreover, having conducted the preliminary investigation, respondent judge has no legal authority to
determine the character of the crime and, regardless of his belief as to the nature of the offense
committed, his only duty after conducting the preliminary investigation is to transmit to the provincial
prosecutor his resolution of the case together with the entire records of the same.20 The rationale for
this is after the preliminary investigation by the municipal judge, it could very well happen that the
prosecution may have gathered such other evidence, in addition to or in connection with that which
he already has, which when taken together, are sufficiently strong to prove the guilt of the accused
of a capital offense.21

Lastly, respondent claimed that an administrative complaint is not a proper remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision of a judge. We would like to reiterate that an administrative
matter is distinct from the courts power of appellate review. It involves the exercise of the courts
power to discipline judges. It is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare, that is, to
maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government.

Page 7 of 21
All told, where the law involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith.
Judicial competence requires no less. The mistake committed by respondent judge is not a mere
error of judgment that can be brushed aside for being minor. Respondent should be imposed a stiffer
penalty so that he would better grasp the importance of being proficient in both substantive and
procedural law, particularly on the subject of bail.

As to the amount of penalty, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and is now
punishable with severe sanctions under the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court by A.M.
No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001, to wit:

Sec. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

We take note that only last June 9, 2004, in our resolution in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1522, entitled City
Prosecution Office of General Santos City vs. Jose Bersales, respondent was previously held guilty
of gross misconduct for which he was fined the amount of P20,000 with a warning that a similar
offense in the future would be dealt with severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Jose A. Bersales is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and is ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P30,000.00 with a warning of a most severe
penalty for another infraction of him.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 149723 October 27, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
August 31, 2001 Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20431 which granted
the Motion for Bail2 of accused-appellant, herein respondent Victor Keith Fitzgerald, (Fitzgerald).

The facts are of record.

An Information filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Olongapo City and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 422-94, charged Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section
5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610,3 allegedly committed as follows:

Page 8 of 21
 That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH
FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant "AAA,"4 a minor, 13 years of age, to engage
in prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and
thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage
and prejudice.5

After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a Decision dated May 7, 1996, the decretal portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Victor Keith Fitzgerald GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph 5 of Republic Act
No. 7610, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with all the accessory penalties attached
therewith; and to indemnify the private complainant "AAA" the amounts of P30,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Lingap Center of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in
Olongapo City shall hold in trust the said awards and dispose the same solely for the
rehabilitation and education of "AAA", to the exclusion of her mother and her other relatives.

The accused under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code shall be credited in full of his
preventive imprisonment if he has agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise to only 4/5 thereof.

Upon completion of the service of his sentence, the accused shall be deported immediately
and forever barred from entry to the Philippines.

In Criminal Case No. 419-94 for Rape, the accused is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.6

Fitzgerald applied for bail which the RTC denied in an Order dated August 1, 1996, which reads:

xxxx

In fine, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Prosecution during the hearing on the
bail petition, the Court is of the considered view that the circumstances of the accused
indicate probability of flight and that there is undue risk that the accused may commit a
similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Petition for Bail pending
appeal is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.7

Fitzgerald appealed to the CA which, in a Decision8 dated September 27, 1999, affirmed the RTC
Decision, thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that the penalty imposed on the accused-
appellant is imprisonment of Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of
Reclusion Temporal to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua, the
decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.9

Fitzgerald filed a Motion for New Trial10 and a Supplemental to Accused's Motion for New Trial11 on
the ground that new and material evidence not previously available had surfaced. The CA granted
the Motion for New Trial in a Resolution dated August 25, 2000, to wit:

Page 9 of 21
 WHEREFORE, the appellant's Motion for New Trial dated October 14, 1999 is
GRANTED. The original records of this case is hereby REMANDED to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City Branch 75 who is DIRECTED to
receive the new evidence material to appellant's defense within sixty days from
receipt and thereafter to submit to this Court the said evidence together with the
transcript of stenographic notes together with the records of the case within ten (10)
days after the reception of evidence. The Motion to Transfer appellant to the National
Penitentiary is DENIED.12 (Emphasis ours)

The People (petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 from the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution
while Fitzgerald filed a Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation.14 Both Motions were denied by the CA
in its November 13, 2000 Resolution.15 In denying Fitzgerald's bail application, the CA held:

[T]his Court hereby RESOLVES to:

xxxx

2. DENY accused-appellant's Motion to Fix Bail with Manifestation, pursuant to the

provisions of Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"Sec. 7. Capital Offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is
strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal procecution."

In the case at bar, the maximum imposable penalty in accordance with Republic Act 7610
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act is reclusion perpetua. As it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, hence,
We hold that his motion for bail cannot be granted at this point.

With regard to his alleged physical condition, let it be stressed that accused-appellant
is not precluded from seeking medical attention if the need arises provided the
necessary representations with the proper authorities are made.

SO ORDERED.16 (Emphasis ours)

The People filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari17 docketed as G.R. No. 146008
questioning the August 25, 2000 and November 13, 2000 CA Resolutions. The petition was
dismissed in a Resolution18 dated January 15, 2001, which became final and executory on May 2,
2001.19

Meanwhile, on December 3, 2000, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the
Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.20 The People
filed its Comment21 to both Motions.

On August 31, 2001, the CA issued the herein assailed Resolution22 granting Fitzgerald's bail
application, thus:

xxxx

Be that as it may, while We maintain that, as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong, We
have taken a second look at appellant's plea for temporary liberty considering primarily the
fact that appellant is already of old age23 and is not in the best of health. Thus, it is this
Court's view that appellant be GRANTED temporary liberty premised not on the
grounds stated in his Motion for Bail but in the higher interest of substantial justice and
considering the new trial granted in this case. Accordingly, appellant is hereby DIRECTED to
post a bail bond in the amount of P100,000.00 for his temporary liberty provided he will
appear in any court and submit himself to the orders and processes thereof if and when
required to do so. The appellant is likewise refrained from leaving the country now or in the
future until this case is terminated. Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
ORDERED to include appellant in its hold departure list xxx.

xxxx

Page 10 of 21
 SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis ours)

Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on

September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.25

Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set
aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite
the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence
of his guilt is strong.26 It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering
that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial.27

In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the
previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;28 and justifies his provisional
release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and
deteriorating health.29

The petition is meritorious.

We resolve first the preliminary question of whether the CA, after issuing its August 25, 2000
Resolution granting a new trial, still had jurisdiction to act on respondent's Motion to Post Bail. Our
ruling on this matter, however, shall be limitted to the effect of the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution on
the latter's jurisdiction; it shall have no bearing on the merits of said Resolution as this has been
decided with finality in G.R. No. 146008.

According to petitioner, considering that the August 25, 2000 CA Resolution, referring the case to
the RTC for new trial, had become final and executory on May 2, 2001 when this Court denied its
petition for review in G.R. No. 146008, then, when the CA issued the August 31, 2001 Resolution
granting respondent bail, it had been stripped of jurisdiction over the case.30

Petitioner is mistaken.

When this Court grants a new trial, it vacates both the judgment of the trial court convicting the
accused31 and the judgment of the CA affirming it,32 and remands the case to the trial court for
reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment,33 at times with
instruction to the trial court to promptly report the outcome.34The Court itself does not conduct the
new trial for it is no trier of facts.35

However, when the CA grants a new trial, its disposition of the case may differ, notwithstanding Sec.
1,36 Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides for uniformity in appellate
criminal procedure between this Court and the CA. Unlike this Court, the CA may decide questions
of fact and mixed questions of fact and law.37Thus, when it grants a new trial under Sec. 14, Rule
124, it may either (a) directly receive the purported newly-discovered evidence under Sec. 12,38 or
(b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec. 15.39 In either case,
it does not relinquish to the trial court jurisdiction over the case; it retains sufficient authority to
resolve incidents in the case and decide its merits.

Now then, the CA, in its August 25, 2000 Resolution, ordered: first, the remand of the original
records of the case to the RTC; second, that the RTC receive the new evidence material to
appellant's defense within 60 days from receipt of the original records; and third, that the RTC submit
to it the said evidence together with the transcript of the case within 10 days after reception of
evidence.40 From the foregoing dispostion, it is evident that the CA retained appellate jurisdiction
over the case, even as it delegated to the RTC the function of receiving the respondent's newly-
discovered evidence. The CA therefore retained its authority to act on respondent's bail application.
Moreso that the the original records of the case had yet to be transmitted to the RTC when
respondent filed his bail application and the CA acted on it.

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA
erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in
the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys,41 be allowed

Page 11 of 21
provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required
under specified conditions.42

Implementing Sec. 13,43 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 444 and 5, Rule 114 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure set forth substantive and procedural rules on the disposition of bail
applications. Sec. 4 provides that bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,45 but a matter of discretion
on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when the evidence of his guilt is strong.46 As for an accused
already convicted and sentenced to imprisonment term exceeding six years, bail may be denied or
revoked based on prosecution evidence as to the existence of any of the circumstances under Sec.
5, paragraphs (a) to (e), to wit:

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a)
That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; (d)
That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e)
That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (Emphasis supplied)

It will be recalled that herein respondent was charged with violation of Section 5, par. (a), sub-
paragraph (5), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a crime which carries the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He was later convicted by the RTC for a lesser crime which carried a sentence of
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.

These circumstances are not altered when the CA granted a new trial.47 As already discussed, the
CA retained appellate jurisdiction over the case even as it ordered the remand of the original
records thereof to the RTC for reception of evidence. In retaining appellate jurisdiction, it set aside
only its own September 27, 1999 Decision but left unaltered the May 7, 1996 RTC Decision. In fact,
in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, the CA emphasized:

As we have pointed out earlier, the propriety of appellant's conviction of the offense charged
as well as the penalty imposed thereto should be resolved during the appreciation of the new
trial after considering the new evidence which appellant insist would prove his innocence.48

The May 7, 1996 RTC Decision, therefore, remained operative. And under said Decision,
respondent stood sentenced to an imprisonment term exceeding six years.

Moreover, both the RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong
evidence of the guilt of respondent.49 These findings were not overturned when the CA granted a
new trial. Under Section 6 (b), Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly-
discovered evidence but maintains evidence already presented or on record. And if there has been a
finding that evidence is strong and sufficient to bar bail, that too subsists unless, upon another

Page 12 of 21
motion and hearing, the prosecution fails to prove that the evidence against the accused has
remained strong.50 In the present case, no new evidence had since been introduced, nor hearing
conducted as would diminish the earlier findings of the RTC and CA on the existence of strong
evidenc against respondent.

In sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right
but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the
stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon
evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein 51 such as those indicating
probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.

As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx
not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is
already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it
is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx."52 The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural
requirements on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by
respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick
pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A
mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.53 It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail
for prisoners who are seriously sick.54 There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective
decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
increases.55 But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from
an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his
health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the
only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating
that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile
area xxx."56 That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November
13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from
seeking medical attention while confined in prison.57

Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar
offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate
an undue risk that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal. 58 The RTC
explained its findings thus:

Dr. Aida Muncada, a highly competent Psychiatrist, testified that phedophilia is a state of
sexual disorder and sexual dysfunction. It is intense and recurrent. The possibility of the
commission of a similar offense for which the accused was convicted is great if the accused
will be exposed to "stress" and if an opportunity to commit it lurks.59

The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such
finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail
application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The bail bond posted by respondent is CANCELLED. Let an ORDER OF ARREST
ISSUE against the person of the accused, Victor Keith Fitzgerald.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 13 of 21
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident
of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accuseds propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul
the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several
others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enriles motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital
following his medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix
Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support
of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he
was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enriles Motion to
Fix Bail, disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

Page 14 of 21
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed
an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly
premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with
plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the
allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it
may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should
the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk
and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.

Admittedly, the accuseds age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors
that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of
guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enriles Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7,
2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enriles
motion for reconsideration filed vis--vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile

may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enriles
guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at
it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed
to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Page 15 of 21
Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

Page 16 of 21
 (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of
the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33

Page 17 of 21
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35

Enriles averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion
to Fix Bail has only argued that

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is
only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that
the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of
the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in
the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.39

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In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We
also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical
examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery

disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1,
2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p

Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent

ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to
brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to
fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for

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heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be
triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which
could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enriles advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that
medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies
ran as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
PNP Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or
have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the
patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

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Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in
Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner
"is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic,
granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into
advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into
consideration that the petitioners previous petition for bail was denied by the Peoples Court on the
ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the Peoples Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the
petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for
bail; and considering further that the said Peoples Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases
against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in
New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the Peoples Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re
lease the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the
issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of
judicial notice that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of
the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure
the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of
the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ;
ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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