Professional Documents
Culture Documents
January 7, 1986
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 72915, 72922, 72923, 72924, 72927, 72928, 72935, 72954, 72957,
72968 & 72986
RESOLUTION
Gentlemen :
"G.R. No. 72915 (Philippine Bar Association, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72922 (Martiniano P. Vivo, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72923 (MP Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. The
Treasurer of the Philippines, et al.); G.R. No. 72924 (The Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI], et al. vs.
The Commission on Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72927 (The Liberal Party, et al.
vs. The National Treasurer of the Philippines); G.R. No. 72928 (Concerned
Women of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Maximiano Savellano, et al.); G.R.
No. 72935 (Alberto G. Romulo, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.); G.R.
No. 72954 (Victor C. Avecilla, et al. vs. Commission on Elections); G.R. No.
72957 (National Bar Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72968 (Laban ng Bayan [LABAN], et al. vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al.) and G.R. No. 72986 (Juan T. David vs. The
Commission on Elections, et al.). After considering all the pleadings and
deliberating on the issues raised in the petitions as well as on the oral
arguments of the parties and the amici curiae in the hearings held in these
cases, Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and six (6) Justices, namely, Justices
Claudio Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Vicente Abad Santos, Efren I.
Plana, Venicio T. Escolin and Lorenzo Relova, voted to DISMISS the petitions in
these cases and to DENY the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986. In the
opinion of Chief Justice Aquino, B.P. 883 is constitutional.
"Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., B.S. de la Fuente, Seran R. Cuevas, Nestor
B. Alampay and Lino M. Patajo voted to DECLARE B.P. 883 unconstitutional
and to grant the injunction prayed for.
"Justice Teehankee is of the opinion that inasmuch as there are less than
ten votes in favor of declaring B.P. Blg. 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in
these cases are hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied.
"This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21
SCRA 802 and Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 141.
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SCRA 802 and Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 141.
"Justices Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., de la Fuente,
Alampay and Patajo led separate opinions.
"This resolution is without prejudice to the ling of separate opinions by
the other Members of this Court.
"At the session of January 7, 1986, the Court noted that its act of
dismissing the petitions had not been formally stated in its basic Resolution of
December 19, 1985. The Court therefore authorizes the insertion of the
following dispositive portion:
'Accordingly, inasmuch as there are less than the required ten (10) votes
to declare Batas Pambansa Bilang 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in
these cases are hereby DISMISSED and the writs therein prayed for are
DENIED.'"
"Chief Justice Aquino is of the opinion that the revision of the December
19, 1985 resolution is totally unnecessary. It is clear. It is understood that the
petitions are dismissed. The public and the Comelec understood that the
petitions were dismissed." ETaSDc
G.R. No. 72915 (PBA ET AL. VS. COMELEC ET AL.) and other
consolidated petitions.
In the interval of over two weeks between December 3rd and now,
supervening facts and events have overtaken the Court and the petitions at
bar so much so that many of the petitions were withdrawn expressly or
abandoned impliedly. The political parties have since chosen and proclaimed
their candidates for president and vice-president and the frenzied campaign is
in full swing. President Ferdinand E. Marcos is quoted as saying: "we have
already spent a lot of energy and money on this thing." 2/ The foremost
exponent of the Act's unconstitutionality, M.P. Arturo Tolentino who strongly
held that "Mr. Marcos is not intended by the Constitution to succeed himself
before 1987 for an additional six years" and that "the President must rst
resign from oce in order for the constitutional mandate to go into eect and
for the Batasan speaker to assume the post of Acting President" 3/ had laid
aside his "personal objections" against the bill's validity and has accepted the
ruling KBL's nomination as vice-presidential candidate with President
Ferdinand E. Marcos as candidate for reelection in the scheduled February 7,
1986 national elections. The heretofore divided opposition has unied and
likewise presented their standard bearers Corazon "Cory" Aquino and former
Senator Salvador "Doy" Laurel, for president and vice-president, respectively.
President Marcos himself in his letter to the Batasang Pambansa 4/
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"irrevocably vacati(ng) the position of President eective only when the
election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualied as President
by taking his oath oce ten (10) days after his proclamation" urgently
stresses that "there is no moment to lose", that "I am, therefore, left no choice
but to seek a new mandate in an election that will assess, as demanded by
the opposition, the policies and programs I am undertaking. Such an election
necessarily shortens my tenure. But the necessity arises from no less than the
time-honored principle of public accountability, inherent in a democracy and
explicit in our Constitution" and that the "nal settlement of these issues can
be achieved only through a presidential election."
The unied opposition has likewise realized the imperative urgency of
seeking the mandate and verdict of the people. Rather than insist on strict
compliance with the cited constitutional provision that the incumbent
President actually resign, vacate his oce and turn it over to the Speaker of
the Batasang Pambansa as Acting President, their standard bearers as the
parties most prejudiced have not led any suit or petition in intervention for
the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. Instead, the unied
opposition, including almost all other political parties of standing, (with the
exception of a few who have lost faith in the electoral process due to past
sorry experiences) have rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Cory
Aquino. In short, they have taken the President at his own terms and
conditions and will confront him at the scheduled February 7, 1986 elections
and have not insisted that he vacate the oce of president and its vast
powers. As Senator Pelaez reported to the Court: "(T)he Opposition's answer is
rm" they are willing to give the President this illegal handicap, so long as the
election is clean, fair and honest."
The real issue at bar has thus veered from the purely justiciable issue of
the questioned constitutionality of the Act due to the lack of an actual
vacancy in the oce of President and transformed itself into a political
question that can only be truly decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity in a fair, clean and honest election. (Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50
SCRA 30). Stated dierently, may this Court at this advanced stage stop the
holding of the elections?
Labor Minister Blas Ople, an articulate KBL spokesman, stressed that the
people's minds have been prepared and conditioned to expect the holding of
the February 7th, 1986 presidential elections and that the Court "from its
ivory tower" should not stand in the way. (This nation-wide perception that
the great majority of the people want to express their will in the special
election as the best chance for democracy's survival is reected in all sectors
of the press, be they establishment, neutral or opposition.) As reported by the
press: "Ople said the high court, which did not issue a restraining order to stop
preparations for the special elections, "will have to take judicial notice of a fait
accompli the elections are on. He said the KBL, and the opposition have
formed a consensus by deed by nominating their ocial tickets, campaigning
and spending, while the people 'from whom all sovereignty emanates' have
been conditioned to expect an election. . . . The people and the world, Ople
said, will not believe that the administration did not help inuence a court
annulment of the elections, no matter how unfair this charge of interference
in judicial independence might be. Thus, he said, the cancellation of the
elections 'can only aggravate the prevailing crisis and the President may nd
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it dicult to govern eectively. 'Here and abroad, Ople said, there will be calls
for the President to step down and allow an election under Article 7, Section 9
of the Constitution, to clear the last remaining obstacle to an election which,
both sides now agree, should be held to 'break a dangerous stalemate in both
the political and economic climates' in the face of 'issues threatening
national survival.' Ople said a political system that calls an election and then
calls it o after the momentum has built up will not be received kindly by the
people. An election, he said 'should be treated with respect and the majesty it
deserved.' It gives meaning to the central directing principle of the
Constitution that all sovereignty emanates from the people, he said." 5/ cAHIST
Separate Opinions
PLANA, J.:
Long ago, U.S. Chief Justice Marshall laid down an epochal standard in
evaluating the constitutional validity of a law: "Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." (M'Culloch v.
Maryland, et al., 4 Wheat. 316.) That standard remains valid till now.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
A special election may not be called for just any purpose or on any
occasion. A special election becomes necessary only when a vacancy is created
by death, permanent disability, removal from oce, or resignation. I cannot
accept the proposition that a simulated or ctitious vacancy is a "vacancy" as
understood in the law of public ocers. The vacancy must be real and in esse,
not a parody or shadow of the real thing. In the same way that death,
disability, or removal from oce must be actual and permanent before the
pertinent provisions of Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution may come into
play, so must a resignation be real and irrevocably permanent. Inspite of all
the learned arguments of distinguished counsel, I still fail to see how special
or emergency elections may be held for a position which is not vacant. Or how
the call for special elections can become the means of creating in the future
the now non-existent vacancy. Or how a vacancy can come about only after
special and emergency elections to ll that very same vacancy have already
been held. Credulity can be stretched only too far.
If the exigencies of national interest are pressing, now or in the near
future, and if the need for establishing political and economic stability is
imperative, that elections for a President and a Vice President can no longer
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wait for 1987, the Constitution provides the remedy. The President can resign
and pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the Speaker of the
Batasan shall act as President until the President and the Vice President or
either of them shall have been elected in the special elections called to ll the
vacancy thus created and shall have qualied. The muddling of the President's
term of oce shall also be obviated. By the same provision of the
Constitution, a new term of oce, which ignores the present xed term of the
incumbent, shall commence at noon of the tenth day following the
proclamation and shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of the sixth year
thereafter.
I nd Section 9 of Article VII clear and intelligibly simple. Any layman
reading it can easily grasp its meaning and understand the contingencies for
which it was intended. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
speaking for the Court in J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration (31
SCRA 413, 422) are appropriate:
"We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed
in which case the signicance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the
rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where
the need for construction is reduced to a minimum."
Since the Constitution itself provides an easily followed remedy, one
which any fairly literate citizen can readily comprehend, I do not see why the
Legislature and the executive should adopt a new fangled, perplexing, and
constitutionally inrm method of achieving a most desirable end. I believe
that all of us in Government must sincerely demonstrate our readiness to
abide by the terms and procedures of the Constitution even as we try to solve
serious national problems.
Neither can the special elections be premised on the accountability
provisions in Article XIII of the Constitution. Snap elections to make the
executive accountable to the people are for parliamentary systems. We have a
presidential form of government. When the 1973 Constitution came into force
and eect on January 17, 1973, it provided for a parliamentary system.
Section 13 of Article VIII provided that "the National Assembly may withdraw
its condence from the Prime Minister only by electing a successor by a
majority vote of all its members." Executive power was then exercised by the
Prime Minister assisted by his cabinet. The President was only a symbolic head
of state. The National Assembly could remove the Executive by majority vote
but the Executive could also have the Assembly dissolved and have the
questions on fundamental issues resolved by the people in so-called snap
elections. ITAaCc
Fully aware as I am that all laws are presumed constitutional and that
all reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of their constitutionality and
only when the conict between any law and the Constitution is clearly
beyond reasonable doubt, should said law be declared unconstitutional, I
approach the issue of the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 in the
context of what appears to be a popular clamor for the holding of a special
presidential and vice-presidential election on February 7, 1986.
The common grounds alleged in the petitions assailing the
constitutionality of said law are that the only instance that the Batasan can
call for the holding of an election before the expiration of the term of the
President in 1987 is upon the occurrence of the contingencies provided for in
Section 9 of Article VII of the Constitution, namely the permanent disability,
death, removal from oce or resignation of the President before the
presidential election of 1987 for in that case a vacancy in the Oce of the
President has been created triggering the mechanism for the calling of a
special election to ll up said vacancy together with the election of the vice-
president in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 9, Article VII of
the Constitution and that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 has in eect shortened
the term of the President elected in 1981 without going through the process
of amending the Constitution as the Batasan in enacting said law acted in the
exercise of its legislative powers and not as a constituent body. Petitioners
contend that the letter of the President recommending to the Batasan the
calling of a special election because of the need for the President to seek a
new mandate in an election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition,
the policies and programs being undertaken by him upon his undertaking that
he will irrevocably vacate the position of the President eective when such
election is held and the winner is proclaimed and qualied as president by
taking his oath of oce ten days after his proclamation is not a resignation
which would create a vacancy within the meaning of Section 9 of Article VII.
That there is no vacancy is evident from the fact that the President still
continues in oce until the assumption in oce by the winning candidate in
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continues in oce until the assumption in oce by the winning candidate in
the special election instead of the Speaker who, under the provision of the
Constitution, becomes acting president in case of a permanent disability,
death, removal from oce or resignation of the President before the
presidential election of 1987. What Section 9, Article VII contemplates is an
actual vacancy and not a vacancy in futuro.
The Solicitor General defending the constitutionality of said law
contends that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the Batasan
Pambansa in the exercise of its legislative plenary powers to call for the
holding of the special election for the Oce of the President on February 7,
1986 upon the undertaking of the incumbent President that he will
irrevocably vacate the position of president if an election is held for said oce
and the winner proclaimed and qualied by taking his oath of oce ten days
after his proclamation. The occasion for the holding of said special election is
the need of the incumbent President to seek a new mandate in an election
that will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs
being undertaken by him.
It is my considered view that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is
unconstitutional.
While the 1973 Constitution, as amended, has adopted several features
of the parliamentary system, our government is still essentially a presidential
form of government and the term of oce of the President is for a xed term
of six years. Since the incumbent President was elected in 1981 for a term of
six years beginning at noon on the 30th day of June of 1981 and ending noon
of the same date six years thereafter when the term of his successor shall
begin, Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 had shortened the term of the President
without going into the process of amending the Constitution. The shortening
of the term of the oce of the incumbent President cannot be justied by the
action of the President agreeing to vacate his oce on condition that a special
election be held and the winning candidate for said oce is proclaimed and
qualied as president by taking his oath of oce ten days after his
proclamation. The President can only shorten his term of oce by
unconditionally resigning therefrom before its expiration in order that a
vacancy is created and the Speaker of the Batasan shall act as President and
the Batas Pambansa shall call for the holding of a special election to elect a
president and a vice-president in accordance with the provisions of Section 9
of Article VII of the Constitution.
aSTAIH
"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and
desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same inexible law
until changed by their own deliberative action; and it cannot be
permissible to the courts that, in order to aid evasions and
circumventions, they shall subject these instruments * * * to a
construction, as if they were great public enemies standing in the way of
progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their
provisions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust
whenever convenient. They must construe them as the people did in their
adoption. If the means of arriving at that construction are within their
power." Bay City v. State Treasurer , 23 Mich. 499, 506. (emphasis ours).
In the same vein is what the Court said in ex rel Kinworthy v. Martin, 60 Ark.
343, 30 S.W. 421, that in construing Constitutions, Courts have nothing to do
with the argument ab inconveniente and should not bend the Constitution to
suit the law of the hour, quoting Greencasce vs. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 565. 11
Am. Jur. 659.
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is a justiciable one and
not a political question which the Court must decide without equivocation.
I vote, therefore, to grant the petition and declare Batas Pambansa Blg.
883 unconstitutional.
Finally, if the objective of the so-called "snap" election law was to enable
the President to ask the Filipino people for a vote of condence, the most
appropriate and adequate vehicle for that is a referendum as suggested by MP
Arturo Tolentino and former Vice-President Pelaez. A negative vote would
surely bring about a vacancy in the oce of the President, which can then be
lled up in accordance with the succession procedure provided by section 9,
Article VII. The other option, also suggested by both, is a constitutional
amendment incorporating the features of B.P. Blg. 883, to be submitted to the
people for ratication.
Footnotes
1/.Emphasis copied.
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2/.Phil. Daily Express issue of Dec. 18, 1985.
"The consequence of all this was: as ratied by the people, the present presidential
succession procedure, which was adopted together with other constitutional
amendments on Jan. 17, 1984, is denite, precise, and clear, leaving no room
for the Batasan to change or add to it one whit. No discretion whatsoever is
given to the Batasan to exercise its legislative power either to amend or to
ignore any portion thereof.
"The rst sentence presupposes that a Vice-President shall have been elected and
shall have qualied. It provides that in case the Presidency becomes vacant by
reason of permanent disability, death, removal from oce or resignation, the
Vice-President shall automatically become President. This is the 'spare tire'
concept of the Vice-Presidency which our people are familiar with and easily
understand from experience . . . The provision does not apply to the present
where we have no Vice-President.
"The next sentence provides that in the absence of a President and Vice-President,
the Batasan shall by law provided for a further line of succession. This is one of
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only two instances where the Constitution authorizes the Batasan to take a
hand in the presidential succession procedure. The other one is found in the
fth and last paragraph of Section 9 above-cited, in case of death, permanent
disability or resignation of the Speaker.
"In other words, where the Constitution wants the Batasan to legislate on presidential
succession, it expressly says so. The clear implication is that, where the
Constitution itself mandates the precise procedure to the last detail, as we shall
presently see, the Batasan must keep out.
"The logic of this position is unassailable. If the Constitution were to permit the
Batasan the discretion to revise the presidential succession formula laid down
by it with meticulous exactitude or, as proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7 [now, B.P.
Blg. 883], adopt an entirely new succession procedure, we would have a
situation where every Batasan could be tinkering with the matter. The inevitable
consequence would be the nullication of the procedure laid down by the
Constitution. The plain language of the Constitution's directive to the Batasan is:
you may supplement the line of succession, as in the two instances above-cited
where you are expressly authorized to do so, but you may not touch what is
already prescribed by the Constitution or, much less, replace it with another.
"Let us, by re-reading the third and succeeding sentences, pinpoint the specics of
the succession procedure mandated by the Constitution.
"Upon the occurrence of a permanent vacancy in the Presidency during the present
term of President Marcos, the following events would take place:
1. The Speaker of the Batasan automatically becomes the Acting President. He shall
serve as such until President and Vice-President, or either of them shall have
been elected and shall have qualied. The language of the Constitution is clear
enough, requiring no explanation or elaboration.
2. On the third day after the occurrence of the vacancy, (a) at ten o'clock in the
morning, (b) the Batasan shall convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call the constitutional provision itself makes the call in advance; and
(c) within seven (7) days enact a law, (d) calling a special election to elect a
President and Vice- President; (c) not earlier than forty-ve (45) nor later than
sixty (60) days from the time of such call.
"Please note how the Constitution goes into painstaking details. The convening of the
Batasan must be on the third day from the occurrence of the vacancy not
on the rst or second or fourth and so forth but on the third. Even the hour of
convening is set at ten (10) o'clock. The Batasan is given a deadline of seven (7)
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days within which to enact a law calling for a specied election. The candidates
to be selected are specied the President and the Vice-President. The
Batasan is given very little leeway in xing the date of the election: it must not
be earlier than forty-ve (45) nor later than sixty (60) days after the call. This
minuteness of detail had a denite purpose, as we shall presently see.
"The provisions of the above-mentioned Section 9, Article VII, are contrary to all
traditional notions of constitution-making. The standard knowledge is that a
constitution must be couched in general terms, allowing the legislature to esh
out the constitution's broad outlines with details. As above-shown, however, the
above-cited Section 9 does not follow the traditions. The Constitution itself
supplies the details. It allows the legislature no leeway to do so.
"The 'law' calling a special election under the presidential succession provision, Section
9 of Article 7, is in eect, a measure sui generis wherein the Constitution has
acted both as the fundamental law of the land and as the legislature pre-
empting any claim of the Batasang Pambansa to any legislative authority to
change or replace the constitutionally prescribed procedure of presidential
succession.
"The claim that the Batasang Pambansa may now, in the exercise of its power of
general legislation, enact a law on presidential succession to call a special
election, under circumstances other than those enumerated in the Constitution,
thereby amending and short-circuiting the very precisely laid down procedure
in Section 9, Article VII on the subject, is utterly baseless. Neither Article VII (on
powers of the President and Vice-President) no Article VIII (on the powers of
the Batasan) of the Constitution grants it the authority claimed.
(a) While Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution would authorize a special election
during the term of President Marcos only in case his oce is permanently and
actually vacant, the cabinet bill would authorize a "snap" election without the
occurrence of such a vacancy. (President Marcos' letter of "resignation"
categorically states that he will relinquish the Presidency only if some one else is
elected to and qualies for the position. Since the "resignation" would be
simultaneous with the assumption of oce or any person elected other than
President Marcos, there would actually be no vacancy.)
(b) While the Constitution would install the Speaker as Acting president from the
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moment the vacancy occurs until a President or, in his absence, a Vice-
President, shall have qualied, so that, in eect, it is the Speaker, as Acting
President, who would oversee the election, the cabinet bill would brush the
Speaker aside, (and with him the Constitution), and allow President Marcos to
usurp the Speaker's role and oversee the election in which his own tness to
continue as President would be the crucial issue.
(c) While the Constitution specically directs the Batasan to meet on the third day
after the vacancy occurs to enact a law calling for the special election, within
seven (7) days, the cabinet bill would blithely ignore these specics.
"I f the proposal becomes a law and is upheld, then the constitutional provisions on
the same subject would be set aside. It would be a dangerous precedent . . .
xxx xxx xxx
"If we would but . . . hold uppermost in our minds the future of constitutional
government in our country, I believe there can be an accommodation which
would bolster rather than subvert the rule of law. In this connection, may I oer
the following suggestions, . . . :
"1. In his speech in Cebu on Nov. 15, 1985, the President stated, more or less, that a
'snap' election was crucial because his leadership had been assailed abroad and
it was necessary to show the world that the people were still with him . . .
"If this is the objective, rather than holding a 'snap' election in violation of the
Constitution, I would endorse the recommendation of Senator Arturo M.
Tolentino that the exercise appropriate for the purpose should be a referendum
on whether or not the President should continue in oce.
"If the vote is in the armative, the President would then have the necessary weapon
to counteract what he believes to be a campaign of destabilization against him .
..
"If the vote is in the negative, then the President should resign without delay. A
vacancy in the Presidency would then occur, in which case the constitutional
succession procedure would be operative . . .
"2. Another alternative would be to amend the Constitution. The Batasan should meet
as a constituent assembly and approve a resolution proposing an amendment
to the Constitution authorizing the calling of a special presidential election more
or less in the manner proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7 or as may be agreed
between the majority and the minority in the Batasan. The resolution should
then be submitted to the people in a plebiscite . . .
"In either case, the Constitution shall have been shielded from further assaults on its
supremacy . . ."