CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

PATNA

LAW OF TORTS

TOPIC : ACT OF GOD AND INEVITABLE ACCIDENT

Submitted To:- Mrs. Sushmita singhSubmitted By:- Aditya Parihar

Faculty of Law oftorts Roll no. 1706
B.A.LLB (Hons.) 1st Semester
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my faculty Mrs. Sushmita singh whose guidance helped me a lot with
structuring my project.

I owe the present accomplishment of my project to my friends, who helped me immensely with
materials throughout the project and without whom I couldnt have completed it in the present
way.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my parents and all those unseen hands that helped me
out at every stage of my project.

THANK YOU
NAME: Aditya Parihar
ROLL NO: 1706
 INDEX
1 . Introduction 04
a. Aims and Objectives
b. Hypothesis
c. Research Methodology
d. Sources of data
e. Research question

2. Inevitable Accident.06

3. Act of god12

4. Case laws.15

5. Major difference......17

6. Conclusion...20

7. Bibliography20
 INTRODUCTION

When the plaintiff brings an action against the defendant for a particular tort, providing the
existence of all the essentials of that tort, the defendant would be liable for the same. The
defendant may, however, even in such a case, avoid his liability by taking the plea of some
defence. Among them we would concentrate on the defence of Inevitable accident and Act of
god.

An inevitable accident or unavoidableaccident is that which could not be possibly

prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill. It does not apply to anything which
either party might have avoided, . Inevitable accident was defined by Sir Frederick Pollock as an
accident

"not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there, could
be expected to take."1

In the pre nineteenth century cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be essentially
relevant in actions for trespass when the old rule was that even a faultless trespassery contact was
actionable, unless the defendant could show that the accident was inevitable. It was for long
thought that the burden of proof in trespass upon the person rested with the defendant and that
trespass, therefore, offered scope to the defence of inevitable accident, but it has now been held
that here too the burden is with the claimant.

An Act of god is a kind of an inevitable accident with the difference that in the case of Act of
god, the resulting loss arises out of the working of natural forces like exceptionally heavy
rainfall2

An act of God as known to the law,

1
Anurag Pandey , Understanding the difference between act of god and inevitable accident, AMOOLYA
(Oct. 1, 2017, 10:30 P.M) , https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/understanding-differences-act-god-force-
majeure/.

2
Nichols v. Marsland , (1876) 2 Ex. D. 1.
is such an unusual and extraordinary manifestation of forces of nature that it could not under
normal conditions have been reasonably anticipated or expected.

In case of P.K. Kalasami Nadar v. K. Ponnuswami Mudaliar and Ors., the court defined Act of
God as

an act of god will be an extra-ordinary occurrence due to natural causes, which is not the
result of any human intervention3

An act of God cannot be avoided by human care, skill, foresight or any reasonable measures; it is
different from an inevitable accident, even though it may have happened at least once before.

An act of God must be such a direct and violent and sudden and irresistible act of nature as the
defendant could not by any amount of ability foresee would happen or, if he could foresee it
would happen, could not by any amount of care and skill resist, so as to prevent its effect.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

To understand the defences of inevitable accident and Act of god.

To find out the difference between them.

HYPOTHESIS

The researcher assumes that the difference between inevitable accident and act of god is that
there is no need of human insurgency in act of god while it is a must condition in inevitable
accident.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher relies on doctrinal method of research to complete the project.

SOURCES OF DATA

The researcher relies on primary and secondary sources of data.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

3
P.K. Kalasami Nadar v. K. Ponnuswami Mudaliar and Ors., AIR 1962 Mad 44
1. What is inevitable accident?

2. What is defence of Act of god?

3. How Act of god is different from Inevitable accident?

INEVITABLE ACCIDENT

An inevitable accident or unavoidableaccident is that which could not be possibly

prevented by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill. It does not apply to anything which
either party might have avoided. Inevitable accident was defined by Sir Frederick Pollock as an
accident

"not avoidable by any such precautions as a reasonable man, doing such an act then there, could
be expected to take."

It does not mean a catastrophe which could not have been avoided by any precaution whatever,
but such as could not have been avoided by a reasonable man at the moment at which it
occurred, and it is common knowledge that a reasonable man is not credited by the law with
perfection of judgment. As observed by Greene M.R., an accident is "one out of the ordinary
course of things, something so unusual as not to be looked for by a person of ordinary
prudence." All causes of inevitable accident may be divided into 2 classes:4

Those which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature unconnected with the
agency of man or other cause
Those which have their origin either in the whole or in part in the agency of man, whether
in acts of commission or omission, nonfeasance, or in any other causes independent of the
agency of natural forces. The term "Act of God" is applicable to the former class.

4
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Torts, (Wadhwa, Nagpur, 24th Ed., 2002) : Margaret Brazier and John
Murphy, Streeton Torts, (Butterworths, London Edinburgh Dublin, 10th Ed., 1999).
The defence of inevitable accident in personal injury litigation is one that posits a non- tortious
explanation for an accident. It asserts that where an accident is purely inevitable, and is not
caused by the fault of either party, the loss lies where it falls.

According to the authorities, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of
negligence, the onus will shift to the defendant to prove inevitable accident. In so doing,
the defendant is required to show how the accident took place and that the loss of control
of the vehicle could not have been avoided by the exercise of the greatest care and skill.
A defendant may thus escape liability by showing one of two things:
(i) the cause of the accident, and the result of that cause was inevitable; or

(ii) all the possible causes, one or other of which produced the effect, and with regard to
every one of these possible causes that the result could not have been avoided.

This standard, though certainly a high one, is not a test of perfection.

In light of the foregoing general principles, a plaintiff seeking to undermine or defeat a
defendants reliance on the defence of inevitable accident must challenge with
evidence and argument the defendants explanation of how the accident, collision or
mishap occurred without his negligence. As is clear from a perusal of the recent
jurisprudence, there are definite limitations on the availability of the defence and it is
unlikely to prevail if the person seeking to invoke it caused or contributed in any way to
the emergency situation.
2
Some of the factors that will be relevant in considering whether the conduct of a driver
can be characterized as negligent, such that the doctrine of inevitable accident ought not
to be engaged, include: road conditions, weather, speed, the condition of the vehicle, the
intensity of the vehicles headlights, the drivers experience and his/her familiarity with
the roadway, the drivers reaction to the risk presented, any evasive action taken, other
traffic on the roadway, and the physical and mental condition of the driver (ie. fatigued,
distracted, dizzy, experiencing a medical crisis or condition, etc.)
An accident is said to be inevitable' not merely when caused by Vis major or the act of God but
also when all precautions reasonably to be required have been taken, and the accident has
occurred notwithstanding. That there is no liability in such a case seems only one aspect of the
proposition that liability must be based on fault. Act of God or VisMajor or Force Majeure may
be defined as circumstances which no human foresight can provide against any of which human
prudence is not bound to recognize the possibility, and which when they do occur, therefore are
calamities that do not involve the obligation of paying for the consequences that result from
them. Vis Major includes those consequences which are occasioned by elementary force of
nature unconnected with the agency of man. Common examples are falling of a tree, a flash of
lightening, a tornado or a flood. The essential conditions of this defence are:

The event causing damage was the result of natural forces without any intervention from
human agency.
The event was such that the possibility of such an event could not be recognized by using
reasonable care and foresight.
In the pre nineteenth century cases, the defence of inevitable accident used to be
essentially relevant in actions for trespass when the old rule was that even a faultless trespassery
contact was actionable, unless the defendant could show that the accident was inevitable. It was
for long thought that the burden of proof in trespass upon the person rested with the defendant
and that trespass, therefore, offered scope to the defence of inevitable accident, but it has now
been held that here too the burden is with the claimant5. In trespass as well as in negligence,
therefore, inevitable accident has no place. In these cases inevitable accident is irrelevant
because the burden is on the claimant to establish the defendant's negligence, but it does not
follow that that it is any more relevant if the claimant has no such burden. The emerging
conception of inevitability can be seen most clearly in Whitelock v. Wherwell6, the bolting horse
case from 1398. The complaint in Whitelock was unusual because the plaintiff, rather than just
reciting that the defendant had hit him with force and arms, also alleged that the defendant had
"controlled the horse so negligently and improvidently" that it knocked him down. The defendant
conceded that the horse had knocked down the plaintiff, but pleaded that the plaintiff's fall was
"against the will" of the defendant. The defendant went on to explain that he had hired the horse

5
Fowler v. Lanning (1959) 1 All ER 290.
6
43 Emory L.J. 575, Pg (610).
without notice of its bad habits, that it ran away with him as soon as he mounted it, and that he
"could in no way stop the horse" although he "used all his strength and power to control" it. It
was a plea of inevitable accident in a case of latent defect (the horse is a "bolter"). The collision
may have been inevitable, but it had become inevitable by virtue of the defendant's negligence,
and was thus not held to be an accident.
The first explicit statement that a defendant can escape liability in trespass if the accident
was inevitable occurs in Weaver v. Ward7 , decided in 1616. The category "inevitable accident"
was understood, in its inception as distinguished from the defence of "accident," or "mischance,"
which was available in felony but not in trespass, and which was a true no-negligence defence.
The defendant in Weaver inadvertently shot the plaintiff when his musket discharged while their
company of soldiers was skirmishing with another band. The defendant pleaded that he
"accidentally and by misfortune and against his will, in discharging his musket, injured and
wounded the plaintiff; which wounding is the same trespass of which the plaintiff complains."
Substantively, this was a plea of accident. The plaintiff demurred, and the court held the
defendant's plea bad. In trespass, the plaintiff needed only to allege that the defendant had done
harm with force and arms, rather than done harm negligently. In actions on the case, however,
allegations of negligence seem always to have been necessary.
In property damage cases involving heavy weather, where there was typically a
presumption of fault against the moving vessel, and the vessel owner's efforts to rebut liability
take the inevitable accident form. The inevitable accident defence was typically invoked when a
vessel, caught in the full force of a storm, has been driven against another vessel or vessels, or
against a fixed structure. Property damage cases also involved destruction by fire.
In Tucker v. Smith8, the defendant said simply that his house "caught fire by mischance and was
burned down so that the fire there from being blown by the wind to [plaintiff's] house" burned it
"by mischance." It can be quite as impractical to stop an ordinary wind from spreading fire as a
tempest. The plaintiff therefore elected to join issue on how the fire started rather than how it
spread. His special traverse claimed that the defendants burned the house "of their own wrong
and by their fault" and denied that it "was burned down by mischance."

7
Hob. 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616). C.F. 43 Emory L.J. 575, Pg (591).
8
43 Emory L.J. 575, Pg (611).
 In Ellis v. Angwyn[, the defendant pleaded that unknown to him and "against his will, a
fire suddenly arose by mischance" in his house, and was spread by "a great gust of wind" to the
plaintiff's houses. The plea says nothing about what the defendant did to prevent the fire from
arising or spreading. The act of God was thus incorporated (though not by that name) in a plea of
accident to show that the harm was inevitable.The last pre-nineteenth century case that directly
deals with how inevitable accident should be pleaded is Gibbons v. Peper9. The defendant
pleaded that his horse became frightened and "ran away with him so that he could not stop the
horse," that the plaintiff ignored his warning "to take care," and that the horse thus ran over the
plaintiff "against the will of the defendant." In substance, this was a plea of inevitable
accident. Gibbons thus holds that inevitable accident should be raised by pleading the general
issue when the substantive nature of the plea amounts to a complete denial of causal
responsibility. The Gibbons court put the "runaway horse" on a par with the hypothetical case of
A using B's hand to strike C, and treated both as denials.
In Mitchell v. Allestry, the plaintiff was run over by two untamed horses the defendants
were breaking in a public square. The plaintiff initially brought an action claiming that the
defendants "did negligently permit" the horses to run over her. But at the first trial "the evidence
as to the negligence" went against the plaintiff, and she was non-suited. She then brought a
second suit, in which, as counsel for the defendant said, her "own declaration excused" the
defendants of that "negligence," because it said "that on account of their ferocity they could not
govern them, but that they did run upon her." The first suit failed because the evidence-given that
the plaintiff did not challenge the defendants' antecedent decision to break horses in a public
square-showed that the harm was both accidental and inevitable. The court (Hale, C.B.) pointed
out, however, that the plaintiff could sue again on a different theory. This accordingly illustrates
the way in which some decisions about precautions were governed only by accident, while others
were also governed by inevitability. In the Nitro Glycerine10 case, the defendants, a firm of
carriers, received a wooden case to be carried to its destination and its contents were not
communicated. It was found that the contents were leaking. The case was taken to the
defendants' office, which they had rented from the plaintiff and the defendants proceeded to open
the case for examination but the nitro glycerine which was present had already exploded. All

9
43 Emory L.J. 575, Pg (635)
10
1872) 15 Wallace 524.
present were killed and the building was badly damaged. The defendants were held not liable "in
the absence of reasonable ground of suspicion, the contents of the package offered them for
carriage" and that, they were "without such knowledge in fact and without negligence."
In the case of Holmes v. Mather11, the defendant's horses while being driven by his
servant on a public highway ran away from a barking dog and became unmanageable that the
servant could not stop them, but could, to some extent guide them. While trying to turn a corner
safely, they knocked down and injured the plaintiff on the highway. It was held that the action
was not maintainable since the servant had done his best under the circumstances. In the case
of Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington the defendant parked his saloon motor car in a street and left
his dog inside. The dog has always been quiet and docile. As the plaintiff was walking past the
car, the dog started jumping about in the car, smashed a glass panel, and a splinter entered into
the plaintiff's left eye which had to be removed. Sir Frederick Pollock said: "People must guard
against reasonable probabilities but they are not bound to guard against fantastic
possibilities" In the absence of negligence, the plaintiff could not recover damages. In the case
of Brown v. Kendal, the plaintiff's and defendants dogs were fighting. The defendant was hitting
the dogs to stop them from fighting while the plaintiff was standing at a distance watching them.
Accidentally, the stick hit and hurt the plaintiff's eye. In an action for damages it was held that
the defendant would not be liable since the damage was the result of a pure accident and not the
negligence of the defendant.
The use of inevitable accident in early actions interpreted inevitability as impracticality.
In the present scenario, to speak of inevitable accident as a defence, therefore, is to say that there
are cases in which the defendant will escape liability if he succeeds in proving that the accident
occurred despite the use of reasonable care on his part, but is also to say that there are cases in
which the burden of proving this is placed upon him. In an ordinary action for negligence, for
example, it is for the claimant to prove the defendant's lack of care, not for the defendant to
disprove it, and the defence of inevitable accident is accordingly irrelevant and it is equally
irrelevant in any other class of case in which the burden of proving the defendant's negligence is
imposed upon the claimant. Nor is the position different in a case of res ipsa loquitor, for that
merely raises a prima facie case.

11
1872) 15 Wallace 524
ACT OF GOD
Act of God, which is defined to be such a direct, violent, sudden and irresistible act of nature as
could not by any amount of ability , have been foreseen or if foreseen, could not by any amount
of care and skill have been resisted[26]. Since time immemorial, we have been witnessing a
parade of natural calamities of seemingly biblical proportions: earthquakes, floods, hurricanes,
tornadoes, wildfires, drought and a deadly tsunami. Lives are lost, properties destroyed or
damaged, and emotions shattered when these forces of nature tragically strike. The severity of
nature's blow may come as a total shock and surprise both to the direct victims of the disaster
and, subsequently, to the accused tort feasors. What follows this is a myriad rush of litigations,
especially in heavily litigated countries like the United States of America. Defendants are quick
to claim act of God as a defence to these lawsuits.For three centuries, the act of God defence has
been accepted in negligence and strict liability cases. As a legal concept, act of God shows up
not only as a defence, but also in discussions of duty and causation. At first glance, the act of
God defence seems a simple, straight-forward concept with few nuances or intricacies.
Consequently, all too often, many attorneys have misused the phrase "act of God" to mean any
unfortunate act of nature. Vis Major to afford a defence, must be the proximate cause,
the causa causans, and not merely the causa sine quo non of the damage complained of. The
mere fact that Vis major co existed with or followed on the negligence to accelerate the damage
caused is no adequate defence. Before an act of God may be admitted as an excuse, the
defendant must himself have done all he is bound to do. In a sixteenth century opinion, in
the Shelly's Case best known for the famous property law doctrine of the rule in Shelley's Case12,
the court wrote in terms of performance becoming impossible by an act of God, which was the
death of one of the parties. The court stated:
"It would be unreasonable that those things which are inevitable by the Act of God, which no
industry can avoid, nor policy prevent should be construed to the prejudice of any person in
whom there was no laches".
No further explanation of the phrase, Act of God', was provided by the court. The phrase
reappeared in the 1702 case of Coggs v. Bernard, which invoked liability for a bailment by a
common carrier. Justice Powell opined that a bailee shall answer accidents, as if the goods were

12
Lawman, Act of god and Inevitable accident in tort, Abhinav.K.Mishra (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:44 A.M),
http://www.lawman.net.in/2012/09/act-of-god-and-inevitable-accident-in.html
stolen; but not such accidents and casualties as happen by the act of God, as fire, tempest for the
bailee is not bound, upon any undertaking against the act of God.The act of God defence
expanded from common carriers into other areas of strict liability. The Courts then extended the
act of God defence to cases of negligence. The act of God defence received prominence in
decisions construing the common-law liability of common carriers who were treated as insurers
of the goods they carried. Since strict liability applied to insurers, the act of God defence existed
to ameliorate an otherwise potentially draconian liability. In the case of Morse v. Slue, Judge
Hale stated that the master is not chargeable in the case of pirates, storms, and the like, "but
where there is any negligence in him he is." Morse involved a ship lying in the Thames which
was boarded by robbers who took the plaintiff's goods from the vessel.
In 1785, Lord Mansfield delivered a unanimous opinion in Forwardv. Pittard, which involved an
accidental fire for which the carrier was in no way at fault. The court clearly established a rule of
strict liability for common carriers: It appears from all the cases for 100 years back, that there are
events for which the carrier is liable independent of his contract. Again, in Forward, the English
courts limited the act of God defence by excluding acts of man. In addition, the burden of proof
was shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant to establish the existence of the act of God
defence. Although the courts subsequently split on the liability issue for common carriers whose
delay subjected its freight to damage from an act of God, there was a consensus that liability
would result if the common carriers knew that the force of nature was coming.In the 1875 case
of Nichols v. Marsland13, the defendant had a series of artificial lakes on his land in the
construction and maintenance of which there had been no negligence. Owing to unusual rainfall,
so great that it could not have been reasonably anticipated, the reservoirs burst carrying away
four country bridges. The court of appeals held that an act of God is a defence in cases of
reservoir failures.In the subsequent case of Smith v. Fletcher, Baron Bramwell followed the strict
liability holding of Rylands, but dismissed the act of God defence even though the flood was
extraordinary, and they could not foresee it on the grounds that it did not affect their legal
responsibility.Greenock Corp. v. CaledonianRailway Co., contrasts with Nichols. The House of
Lords cirticised the application of the defence in Nichols v. Marshland, and four of their
lordships cast doubt on the finding of facts by the jury in that case In this case, the Corporation
obstructed and altered the course of a stream by constructing a padding pool for children. Due to

13
(1875) LR 10 Ex 255.
rainfall of extraordinary violence which would normally have been carried away by the stream
overflowed and caused damage to the plaintiff's property. It was held that rainfall was not an Act
of God. The House of Lords followed Rylands in holding that a person making an operation for
collecting and damming up the water of a stream must so work as to make proprietors or
occupants on a lower level as secure against injury as they would have been had nature not been
interfered with. Nichols was further distinguished on two bases: the escape in Nichols was from a
reservoir rather than a natural stream, and a jury in Nichols found the flood was due to an act of
God. There had been no negligence in the construction or maintenance of the reservoirs," and
"the flood was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated'.
Smilar to Greenock Corp. is Nitro-Phosphate & Odam's Chemical Monroe Co. v. London & St.
Katherine Docks Co., where an extraordinarily high tide may well have constituted an act of
God, but the defendant was still negligent because it built a dock insufficiently high. As stated by
Lord Justice James in Nugent v. Smith, the accident must be due to natural causes, directly and
exclusively, and that it could not have been prevented by any amount of foresight and pains and
care reasonably to be expected from him'.14
In the case of Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co the defendants had constructed water pipes
which were reasonably strong enough to withstand severe frost. There was an extraordinarily
severe frost that year causing the pipes to burst resulting in severe damage to the plaintiff's
property. It was held that though frost is a natural phenomenon, the occurrence of an unforeseen
severe frost can be attributed to an act of God, hence relieving the defendants of any liability. In
the Indian case of Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar15 the plaintiff had booked goods with
the defendant for transportation. The goods were looted by a mob, the prevention of which was
beyond control of defendant. It was held that every event beyond control of the defendant cannot
be said act of God. It was held that the destructive acts of an unruly mob cannot be considered an
Act of God.
In the case of J & J Makin Ltd .v London and North Eastern Railway Co., liability for damage
was imposed on the defendants even if such damage was caused by an act of God. The
defendants were owners of a canal which crossed a valley at the top of a high embankment. As
the result of a violent storm the embankment collapsed and a great quantity of water escaped

14
Lawman, Act of god and Inevitable accident in tort, Abhinav.K.Mishra (Oct. 2, 2017, 12:44 A.M),
http://www.lawman.net.in/2012/09/act-of-god-and-inevitable-accident-in.html
15
Ramalinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar A.I.R 1971 Kerala 197, 202.
from the canal into the stream below and was carried down to the plaintiff's mill where it was
deposited together with a large number of stones. The plaintiffs in claiming damages said that the
act imposed absolute liability irrespective of negligence.
ACT OF GOD AND NEGLIGENCE
Act of God, in law, is an accident caused by the operation of extraordinary natural force. The
effect of ordinary natural causes (e.g., that rain will leak through a defective roof) may be
foreseen and avoided by the exercise of human care; failure to take the necessary precautions
constitutes negligence. Negligence, in law, especially tort law, is the breach of an obligation
(duty) to act with care, or the failure to act as a reasonable and prudent person would under
similar circumstances. Both these defences are based on reasonable foreseeability. In terms of
foreseeability, the question is not whether a similar event has occurred before, but whether the
risk that this particular mishap may occur is foreseeable. Thus, a flood, earthquake, hurricane, or
other natural force need not have previously struck a particular location for negligence to exist.
Liability may still exist if reasonable design, construction, operation, inspection, or maintenance.
For a plaintiff to recover damages, this action or failure must be the "proximate cause" of an
injury, and actual loss must occur. In cases of joint causation, where both human negligence and
act of God have a role to play, the traditional sine qua non ("but for"), substantial factor, or legal
causation tests apply. If the act of God is so overwhelming that its own force produces the injury
independent of the defendant's negligence, then the defendant will not be liable. If the damages
suffered are incurred solely due to natural causes without any known fault, there is no liability
because of the act of God. There are two ways of viewing this situation. The act of God either
supersedes the defendant's negligence, or the defendant's negligent act is not a cause in fact of
the injury. In either case, the defendant's act did not cause the damage since the injury would
have occurred anyway. The party injured in the accident may be entitled to damages. An act of
God, however, is so extraordinary and devoid of human agency that reasonable care would not
avoid the consequences; hence, the injured party has no right to damages. Accidents caused by
tornadoes, perils of the sea, extraordinary floods, and severe ice storms are usually considered
acts of God, but fires are not so considered unless they are caused by lightning.

CASE LAWS
INEVITABLE ACCIDENT
Stanley v powell (1891)
The defendant and the plaintiff were members of a shooting party. The bullet shot by the
defendant properly glanced off a tree almost at right angles and injured the plaintiff. It was held
that the accident is an inevitable accident. It is a case of act of man.
National Coal Board v Evans (1951)
A case of trespass to chattel, inevitable accident is a good defense. The plaintiffs predecessors
had laid electric cable under the land of a county council without their knowledge. County
council employed some contactors to make an excavation in the process damaged the cables. It
was held that it was the fault of the plaintiff that they wrongfully did this without the permission
of the county council so will not be eligible for compensation. This is a case of act of man.16
Nitroglycerine case (1872)
The defendant, a firm of carriers, was given a wooden case to carry from one place to another.
Some persons detected some leakage and box was opened when it exploded and the office
building belonging to the plaintiff was damaged. It was held that since the defendant could not
foresee the contents of the box and its explosive nature they were not liable for damages caused
by the accident. This is a case of act of man.
Holmes v Mather (1875)
A person was walking by the side of the road when he was knocked by a pair of horses which
suddenly went out of control though the defendant tried his best to control it. It was held that it is
an inevitable accident and the defendant is not liable as he took necessary care of controlling that
horse. It is a case of act of man.
Ryan v Young (1933)
While driving a motor vehicle the driver suffered from a heart failure and died which caused an
accident. It was held that this accident is a mere inevitable accident and plaintiff is not eligible
for compensation.
Nichols v Marsland (1875) .
The defendant constructed a series of pools and artificial reservoir on his own land which was
adequate and can be considered as normal use. But due to an unnatural violent cyclone the

16
Sayan Biswas, Justification of torts, Lawyersclubindia (OCT. 3, 2017, 11:23 P.M)
file:///C:/Users/Excalibur/Downloads/JUSTIFICATION%20OF%20TORTS..html
reservoir bursted its banks and destroys the plaintiffs bridges. It was held that it is an act of god
as such an exceptional storm was not expected.
State of Mysore v Ramchandra,
The state constructed a reservoir for supply of drinking water for some villagers. The overflow
channels were partially constructed thus during heavy rains the channel overflowed causing
damage to the plaintiffs crops. It was held that it was an act of god as well as the act of state. In
my opinion it is a negligent act on the part of the state. If the construction would have been made
properly then the plaintiff would have suffered lesser losses. The plaintiff should get
compensation from the state. This case should not be categorized under inevitable accident. The
Bombay High Court rejected the plea of act of state saying that act of construction of a reservoir
can be considered as an welfare actins not an act of state done in exercise of sovereign power.
An act of state relating to law and order situated is different from an alleged act of state
pertaining to a welfare project.17

ACT OF GOD
Ramalinga Nadar vs. Narayan Reddiar
In this case the plaintiffs goods that were being transported in the defendants truck was stolen
by an unruly mob. The defendant tried to plead the defence of n act of god; however, the court
ruled that an act of god had to be an act that could trace its roots back to a natural cause.
Nichols vs. Marsland
In this case the defendant created a series of artificial lakes and built embankments to contain
them. One day due to extremely heavy rainfall, the heaviest in human memory, the embankments
broke and the water washed away four bridges owned by the plaintiff. The court held that the
defendant was not liable as there was an act of god that contributed to the damage.

MAJOR DIFFERENCE
The relationship between these two defences is a slightly ambiguous one. Going by logic and
definition, these two defences are very similar in nature. In fact, by definition,

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Sayan Biswas, Justification of torts, Lawyersclubindia (OCT. 3, 2017, 11:23 P.M)
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VisMajor/ForceMajeure is considered a type of inevitable accident. However, a careful study of
their evolutionary process throws results subscribing to the contrary. These two defences are two
distinct forms of escaping liability in tort. They are, in practice referred to as two separate
defences instead of one being a subset of the other. The very term "Inevitable accident" is used
for incidents where accidents occur by chance, in the absence of any form of negligence or
human error. Meanwhile, Vis Major specifically restricts itself to severe and unforeseen acts of
nature leading to a particular damage. One similarity in both these defences is that these grounds
stand nullified if negligence of the defendant is proved. An inevitable accident is an event which
happens not only without the concurrence of the will of the man, but in spite of all efforts on his
part to prevent it. It means, an accident physically unavoidable something which cannot be
prevented by human skill or foresight. However, in the absence of negligence, Vis Major appears
to be a more valid claim. Having resulted from a severe and drastic natural catastrophe, Vis
Major easily has a wider domain. From a philosophical point of view, this is a principle which
makes God the defendant hence making the accident truly beyond human control. On contrarie,
Liability might be imposed on a party not negligent on the grounds of the risk involved in the
activity they were doing. A glaring example of this is the non applicability of "inevitable
accident" as a defence in cases of Strict Liability as opposed to the claim of "Act of God".
This can be observed in the Indian case of A KrishnaPatra v. Orissa
StateElectricityBoardwhere it was held that Inevitable Accident is not a valid defence in a case
of accidental death due to electrocution. Since transmission of electricity was a dangerous
activity, the principle of strict liability was applied in this case. The Court further observed:
......We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons working
in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to
the community to" ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous or inherently
dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken......" And "...... We would therefore hold
that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and harm
results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the enterprise is strictly and
absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not
subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principles of strict liability
under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.
Thus, the plea of inevitable accident has, in cases of this type, practically lost all its utility. The
ambit of Inevitable Accident as a defence has shrunk majorly. The plea of inevitable accident has
now substantially lost its utility. Since the principle of strict liability applies even in the absence
of negligence on the part of the defendant, inevitable accident in the absence of a natural
catastrophe does not hold any scope as a defence. With growth of scientific knowledge, the
number of accidents that can be termed "inevitable" is fast dimishing. However, things are a little
different for those Inevitable Accidents that involve nature's intervention.
VisMajor as a defence depends on two things; lackofpredictabilityandlackofcontrol. If either
criteria is missing, the defence fails. Both were solidly based for centuries on the lack of
scientific knowledge. Man not only lacked the ability to predict the forces of nature, but also the
ability to guard against, control, or otherwise minimize their impacts. In the words of the ancient
mime writer Publilius, it is vain to look for a defence against lightning'. Today, foreseeability is
based not only upon the past, but also upon that which modern technology and science allow us
to project into the future. Science has advanced to the point where we can understand many
forces of nature, such as precipitation and flooding. Historically, we know which areas have been
subjected to specific forces of nature. Scientifically, we can predict the areas which may be
subjected to such forces. At first glance, the act of God defence should continue to play a role in
strict liability cases. Part of the underlying purpose of the act of God doctrine was to ameliorate
strict liability. In strict liability a number of exceptions have evolved. Whether a particular
occurrence amounts to an Act of God is a question of fact, but the ambit of this defence is
somewhat restricted. Increased knowledge seems to limit the unpredictable. Natural hazards are
no longer a mystery to us. Hence, the applicability of the act of God defence has shrunk in
inverse proportion to rapidly expanding concepts of foreseeability. Conversely, environmental
changes at the global level have left some scope for Vis Major as a defence. Unforeseen disasters
like the July 26, 2005 floods in Mumbai or the devastating Tsunami on 26 December 2004,
which was the result of severe earthquake with its epicentre at Indonesia can still be attributed to
acts of God. These disasters were completely unforeseen and any prior intimation about the same
would not have helped bring the situation under control. Such natural catastrophe has left some
scope for the use of Act of God as a defence.
CONCLUSION
After going through all the sources, I conclude saying that the my hypothesis is correct that the
difference between inevitable accident and act of god is that there is no need of human
insurgency in act of god while it is a must condition in inevitable accident. They are not absolute
and have changed considerably in changing times. There are various features added to the
clauses in times which have changed the characteristics of these two words and their legal
meaning too. The Act of God is still much or less the same with some minor changes mostly in
the language and its interpretation the Clause of Force Majeure has got its ambit wider

BIBLIOGRAPHY
The researcher consulted following things while making the project
1.BOOKS: The researcher consulted following books:
a. Law of torts DR. R.K Bangiya
b. Law of tort P.S.A Pillai
c. The law of torts Ramaswamy iyer

2. WEBSITES: The researcher consulted following websites

a. www.lawctopus.com
b. www.lawman.net.in
c. www.lawyersclubindia.com