PEOPLE POWER INSTITUTIONALIZED Shaddai, headed by former real estate agent Brother Mike Velarde (see box

10.1), and the Protestant group Jesus Is Lord, led by former Communist
The spirit of people power was institutionalized in the legislature with the
election of the first sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives
in May 1998. While slow to participate at firstonly thirteen of fifty-two
seats reserved for party-list organizations were filled in this election
reformists soon found reason to move into electoral politics. Although the
executive branch of the state was permeated by their discourse of
democratization, popular empowerment, and even revolution, their which has been the bane of the institutional Church throughout most of
reformist agenda had stalled from lack of money. Massive government
deficit, mandatory paydown of foreign and domestic debt, and corruption
hindered the social welfare agencies that were meant to symbolize state
strength. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and peoples
organizations (POs) themselves found resources growing scarcer as
international donors turned their attention to other countries. At the same
time, NGO and PO fiscal management came under question. Critics charged
that growth in the NGO sector70,200 organizations were registered in
1995 with the Securities and Exchange Commission was not matched by
growth in professionalism. NGOs were increasingly called upon to apply
accountability and transparencytheir buzzwordsto themselves.
The weakening of the NGO/PO movement was compounded by rivalries and
tension within and between NGOs, as well as between POs and their mass
bases, while conservative politicians further muddied the waters by forming
their own NGOs. Finally, protest fatigue and waning popular interest in
alternative politics made mass mobilization less effective. As a result, party-
list organizations such as Akbayan (Citizens Action Party) and Sanlakas (One
Strength) began to focus more on electing candidates and expanding
networks, and less on protests and picket lines.
Brother Eddie Villanueva. The political significance of these lay organizations
is their strong presence and encouragement of bloc voting among the
working poor and working class, groups the Catholic Church is increasingly
unable to mobilize. El Shaddai, for example, although officially part of the
Church, holds its prayer rallies outside Church buildings and spiritually
outside the hierarchys control, a representation of popular Christianity
Philippine history. The middle class is represented in this trend by the
Church-affiliated Couples for Christ, which professes allegiance to
traditional Catholic teachings. Along with El Shaddai, Jesus Is Lord, and
smaller evangelical groups, Couples has entered the democratic space once
dominated by secular reformist forces with a pro-family, nationalist and
civic minded discourse.
Into this era of weakening reformism, rejuvenated oligarchs and communists,
and assertive religious fundamentalists stepped Joseph Ejercito Estrada
aging former action-movie star, city mayor, senator, and vice presidentwho
would reshape the face of Filipino populism during his abbreviated term as
president (19982001).

The post-1986 restoration of electoral democracy had dampened the use of

violence to achieve political ends, helping reformist candidates backed by
church groups, NGOs, and POs oust entrenched political clans in some
provinces. Once in office, working through coalitions, reformists achieved
some notable successes. The 2003 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act and the
2004 Anti-Violence against Women and Children Law are two socially
progressive laws produced by an odd assortment of partners, including
political families and even warlords.

But the institutionalization of populist politics through suffrage contains an

inherent paradox. The logic of electoralism, Benedict Anderson argues, is
in the direction of domestication: distancing, punctuating, isolating.8 Voting
deflects people from direct action. When the educational process of
protests and demonstrations is replaced by the individualized decision
making of the election booth, ties between NGOs/POs and their mass bases
are undercut. When reformist social forces no longer implement effective
political education programs, depoliticized voters again become vulnerable
to traditional political ties and money politics (vote buying).

Two forces have defied this trend of demobilization. The first is the
Communist Party of the Philippines. The factional battles, executions, and
purges of the late 1980s gave way to a leaner movement in the 1990s under
the firm control of founder-in-exile Jose Maria Sison and his Philippines
based allies. The New Peoples Army, whose 1987 peak of 25,000 guerrillas
declined to 6,000 in 1994, grew back to 11,255 armed forces in 2000.
Deepening rural poverty and increased migration of poor lowlanders to
mountainous areas was as much a reason for the CPPs resurrection as its
claim to have cleansed itself of deviationists and renegades. The
government indirectly contributed to CPP growth by transferring
counterinsurgency operations to municipally controlled police and assigning
the main bulk of its forces to contain Islamic separatism in Mindanao. The
party remains weaker in urban areas, however; in a setting where coalition
politics and elections have become the norm, the CPP is hampered by its
antipathy toward rival leftist groups (many established by CPP expellees) and
lingering suspicion of contaminating the purity of armed struggle with
electoral politics.

The second exception to the waning of reform activism is the rise of religious
movements. These include old movements such as the independent
Philippine church Iglesia ni Kristo (Church of Christ). Under the leadership of
the Manalo family, the Iglesia has played a quiet but often decisive role in
elections through its membership of one million. The Iglesia was joined in
size and importance in the 1990s by the Catholic charismatic movement El
Box 10.1. New Paths to Salvation acceptable and normal. He is, to continue journalist Sheila Coronels
A Visit by an Angel splendid description, a charming rascal who expects to get away with his
Sometime in February 1978, at the age of 38, Bro. Mike [Brother Mariano rascality. Erap is any Filipinos (especially male Filipinos) pare.
Mike Z. Velarde, El Shaddai servant-leader] was confined at the Philippine
Heart Center for Asia Hospital due to heart enlargement and heart blocks. He Estradas popularity did not spring from political charisma, however; he
was scheduled to undergo a major heart operation, but none of his five developed his strong lower-class following from his original institutional base
doctors could guarantee that he would survive the operation. One night, an in the movie industry. As a young actor, Estrada almost always played the
angel in the guise of a nurse came to his room and told him, Mr. Velarde, popular role of defender of the oppressed. As he grew older and moved into
Ive been watching you for the past three weeks. You are very depressed and politics, his movie career declined, but his fame did not. The reason was
always in fear of a heart attack. Allow me to open that Bible beside you and television. In the 1990s, television networks, which had achieved national
show you a way out of your predicament. Then the angel opened the Bible coverage, aired his old movies and introduced him to a younger generation.
on 1 Corinthians 10:13 and gave it to him, saying, Read this and contemplate Inspired by the American entertainment industry, Filipino networks also
on it and I assure you, it will help. The verse read, No temptation has seized began to mix information and entertainment programming. Their first
you except what is common to man. And God is faithful; He will not let you experiments were very profitable, and by the late 1990s, the top television
be tempted beyond what you can bear. But when you are tempted, He will conglomerates, ABS-CBN and GMA, had happily embraced spicing up the
also provide a way out so that you can stand up under it. After reading the news and public affairs programs by injecting the elements of
verse a number of times and meditating on it, his fear disappeared entertainment comedy, drama, showbiz intrigue, crime and the
completely and he felt a peace of mind. That night he was able to sleep supernaturalto keep the viewers glued.
soundly. The next morning, he felt a new kind of strength and was filled with
joy. His doctors were surprised when they saw him walking along the The result was a leveling between news and everyday gossip that spread
corridors of the hospital. They examined his heart thoroughly and was [sic] throughout the mass media. Soon there was little difference between the
amazed to find out that his ailment had been healed! The operation was thus treatment of a free trade debate and a movie stars love affair. Politicians
no longer necessary. A week later, he was discharged from the hospital. who sensed the growing importance of the new formula turned to
Further examination of his heart by doctors in a hospital in Los Angeles, television to maintain a high profile or boost their flagging popularity. At the
California, USA gave him a clean bill of health. Once, while he was same time, the marriage of news and entertainment turned newscasters into
meditating on the miracle that had happened in his life, he asked God, Lord, celebrities and entertainment figures into political pundits, as movie and
what must I do to live according to Your will? The Spirit of God replied, My television stars recognized their power to influence public opinion. As one
son, bear witness to the salvation, love and miracle that youve experienced. business executive admitted: A lot of your life is sometimes governed by
If you continue to do this, your fellowmen will know that the God Whom you what actors and actresses do. Maybe theyre out there talking to people
serve is indeed alive and faithful! about moral standards which might be followed by your kid!14 The leap
Purchase of DWXI Radio Station and First Financial Miracle from moral to political was relatively easy. To the criticism that movie stars
In 1981, at the height of his real estate business expansion . . . Bro. Mike lacked the skill to be political leaders, many simply pointed to Corazon
bought the DWXI (1314 kHz) AM Radio Station from its owner-operators for Aquinothe mere housewife who brought down a dictatorship and
P2 million, because he needed the parcel of land on which it stood. Besides, restored democracy.
the owners would not sell the land unless the radio station was included in
the deal. Later, the radio station alone would cost him millions more to In 1987, Estrada was one of two anti-Aquino candidates who won a seat in
sustain its operations. That same year, Bro. Mike became a born-again the Senate, where critics poked fun at his lack of contribution to the
Catholic. In his eagerness to know more about the Lord Jesus Christ, he legislative process. But he turned many heads and gained the respect of
attended various prayer-meetings and studied the Word of God diligently. . . nationalists with his vote against renewing the U.S. military bases agreement
. He began to give financial support for the Mass and Healing Rallies of some and his feature film in support of that cause. Having fused his movie and
charismatic groups that had started to flourish in the Philippines. . . . One of political personas, Estrada became a presidential candidate at an opportune
these was the first Catholic Charismatic Mass and Healing Rally held at the time. He was not alone in appreciating the changing political climate: A bevy
Araneta Coliseum, which was organized by the Quezon City Catholic of movie and television celebrities, newscasters, singers, and basketball
Charismatic Secretariat. Brother Mike gave P50, 000 as a seed-of-faith players also campaigned for provincial, city, and congressional seats in the
offering for that activity. That amount was his last cold cash in the bank 1998 and 2000 elections (see box 10.2).
because his real estate business then had come to a standstill due to the
downward trend in the real estate industry in the midst of economic crisis. . . Box 10.2. Star-Studded Elections, 1998 and 2000
. Worse, his bank loans had snowballed to over P200 million because of Name Position Previous Occupation
runaway interests and penalties. After giving the P50, 000 seed-of-faith Joseph Estrada President Action star
offering, with in [sic] Gods Word, he prayed for a financial miracle. A week Ramon Revilla Senator Action star
before the rally was held, a group of businessmen approached him and Vicente Sotto Senator Comedian
bought part of his real estate holdings for P60 million! With joy in his heart, Robert Jaworski Senator Basketball player
he shared about the miracle during the Araneta prayer rally and started Noli De Castro Senator TV anchor
telling people about that testimony in other prayer-meetings where he was
Francis Pangilinan Senator TV/radio host
invited to attend. He recounted to them how God had returned his P50,000
Ted Failon Congressman TV anchor
seed-of-faith offering a thousandfold!
Teodoro Locsin Jr. Congressman TV host
From the El Shaddai website, http://www.geocities.com/elshaddai_
dwxi_ppfi/turning/turningpoint.htm (accessed October 15, 2004) Gilbert Remulla Congressman TV reporter
Ronald Estella Congressman TV reporter
Ramon Revilla Jr. Governor, Cavite Action star
Movie Star Millenarianism Manuel Lapid Governor, Pampanga Action star
Rio Diaz Governor, Negros TV host
Estradas nickname is Erap, a reverse spelling of pare (pronounced PA-ray; Occidental
buddy). The nickname aptly described the new presidenta pal to ordinary Jun del Rosario Provincial Board member TV reporter
folk, sharing the simplicity of their needs and aspirations and even their Rudy Fernandez Mayor, Quezon city Action star
lifestyle. Eraps popularity was that of a street-smart leader who acquired Helbert Bautista Mayor, Quezon city Comedian
power through guts, sheer determination, and hard work. President Ramon Rey Malonzo Mayor, Kalookan city Action star
Magsaysay supposedly had this quality, but Estrada set himself apart with a Joey Marquez Mayor, Paraaque city Comedian
mocking hostility toward the hypocrisy of political discourse. Magsaysay Jinggoy Estrada Mayor, San Juan city Action star
may have been called the man of the masses, but Erap actually talked like Vilma Santos Mayor, Lipa City Movie/TV star
the masses and translated the prerogatives of power into the language of Alfredo Lim Mayor, Manila TV host
the streets making them seem Edu Manzano Vice Mayor, Makati city Action star
Concepcion Angeles Vice Mayor, Quezon city TV host
Philip Cezar Vice Mayor, San Juan city Basketball player
Yoyoy Villame Councilor, Las Pias city Comedian/singer
Robert Ortega Councilor, Manila TV personality
Dingdong Awanzado Councilor, Marikina city Singer
Sonny Parsons Councilor, Marikina city Action star
Cita Astals Councilor, Manila Comedian
Anjyo Yllana Councilor, Paraaque Comedian
The movie star as politician was the face of Filipino populism in the 1990s.
The new populists differed from older politicians in several ways. In contrast
to Aquinos popularitytempered by her elite lineage and anchored in moral
rectitudethe new populists entertained crowds and lent pageantry to
political life. Media populism or movie star millenarianism had an
entirely different electoral base as well. Aquinos and Magsaysays support
had transcended class lines, while the voters favoring Estrada and other
media populists were overwhelmingly poor voters. Accordingly, Aquino and
Magsaysay used broad, all-inclusive political themes, while Estrada was anti
elite in rhetoric. Finally, although neither type of populist displayed
command of complex policy matters, the new populists personalized the
state without seriously advancing any economic vision. Estrada simply
assured the poor that, if elected, he would use the state to serve their needs
instead of those of the rich or middle classes.
Once he proclaimed his candidacy, however, Estrada attracted a coalition as
ideologically broad as those that had backed Aquino and Ramos. On the
conservative side, many joined on the basis of friendship, dislike of Ramos, or
older allegiances. Estrada especially relied on financial assistance from
former Marcos cronies Eduardo Cojuangco and Lucio Tan, as well as from the
anti-Ramos Chinese-Filipino community. These wealthy donors compensated
for Estradas weak election machinery, enabling him to outspend his rivals.
On the reformist side, two groups were unabashed in supporting Estradas
candidacy: academics and former Communists who admired his anti-bases
vote. The former were eager to use Estrada to advance their own governance
ideas, reasoning that he had no mindset to change because he had no
mindset. The ex-Communists were drawn to Estradas anti elitism, believing
that he was really for the people. A former CPP cadre explained his
decision to join Estrada: This is the alternative to . . . waiting for the new
dawning of the new revolutionary elite.
Estradas campaign slogan was simple: Erap para sa Mahihirap (Erap for
the poor). On election day, he won an unprecedented 46.4 percent of votes
cast; his closest rival, House Speaker Jose de Venecia, received 17.1 percent.
After being sworn in as the countrys thirteenth president, Estrada promised
a government that would exercise transparency and professionalism, assured
critics that he would disallow family involvement in his administration, and
vowed to continue the economic reforms of the Ramos years.
The Erap Presidency
Despite his election day promises, in less than half a term in office, Estrada
transformed the presidency from a respected symbol of the nation into a
rogues court of family members, mistresses, bastard children, denizens of
show-business, gambling partners, business partners both established and
obscure, and late-night drinking buddies who made major decisions
regarding affairs of state. Access to the president was everything following
an executive order requiring presidential approval for all contracts in excess
of 50 million pesos. Economist Emmanuel De Dios describes how
enfranchised deal cutters competed over who would be first to interpose
themselves between approving authorities and private contractors. The
effect was something akin to a feeding frenzy, as members of this privileged
swarm sought to secure niches for themselves.
Corruption under Estrada was distinct in the leveraging of government
assets and authority to undertake deals that were ultimately mediated by
the market. Examples of such innovative, market-oriented corruption
include the use of funds from government-controlled financial institutions to
support corporate takeovers, to rescue ailing banks and corporations, and to
buy into companies coveted by the president and his family. Estrada also
used his influence to help a crony manipulate the stock exchange. To this
should be added old cases such as Estradas unabashed defense of the
corporate interests of Cojuangco and Tan in the name of removing
government interference from the private sector.
Estradas popularity dropped as stories of governance by midnight cabinet
circulated. The stories were fueled by his bad relationship with the media,
the failure of an anticorruption drive, and his administrations slow
implementation of antipoverty programs. Critics began to refer to Estrada as
the second coming of Ferdinand Marcos, especially after he forced a critical
newspaper to shut down. Yet this was not entirely accurate. Most Estrada
cronies were engaged only in small or non-mainstream business, and the
interests of his families (official and unofficial) were not in primary sectors.
Estradas corruption therefore lacked the devastating effect on the economy
that Marcoss had had. And although Estrada valued his friendships, he
eventually heeded the critics, distanced himself from his cronies, and tried to
act more presidential. And he did honor his promise to continue the market
liberalization programs of his predecessor.
In 1999, Estrada sought to project decisiveness by ordering the destruction of
Moro Islamic Liberation Front camps and the takeover of Jolo Island to
destroy the Abu Sayyaf Group. He and the Congress approved the return of
American military forces to the Philippines to train and advise the AFP in
these campaigns. To show his new commitment to governance, Estrada gave
his cabinet secretaries autonomy to run their offices without interference,
prompting the Far Eastern Economic Review to comment that he had
metamorphosed into a savvy politician [who] had found a way to get things
done. The performance of certain government agencies, some under the
management of ex-leftists, popular activists, and academics, did offset the
erratic leadership at the top. Despite limited funds and the surrounding
corruption, the Department of Agrarian Reform, Bureau of Immigration, Civil
Service Commission, and Bureau of Treasury performed credibly.
These improvements received unlikely reinforcement from an economy that
sloughed off the sick man of Asia label that had dogged [it] through-out
the 1980s. Signs of recovery included 2.2 percent growth in GNP in the first
quarter of 1999, agricultures turnaround real growth rate of 2.5 percent
against a drop of 3.8 percent in the same quarter of the previous year, and a
$4 billion trade surplus following a 20 percent rise in exports led by
computers and electronics. The countrys international reserves rose to
nearly $15 billion, strengthened by a two-year IMF standby facility and bond
financing in the international capital market. But sustained growth was still
threatened by a ballooning budget deficit of 132.5 billion pesos in 2000.
These modest economic and governance improvements were outweighed by
negatives. Estrada began to lose allies in the House, and Congress refused to
pass the next series of reforms needed to sustain economic recovery. The
political points won in early 2000 by taking a strong stand against Islamic
rebels were wiped out by the militarys lack of a decisive victory.
Government coffers were also hurt by the war in Mindanao: Unofficial
estimates ranged from $500,000 to $2.3 million daily, forcing budget officials
to divert monies from other programs.
Finally, accusations of government complicity in drug smuggling and illegal
gambling led to Estradas downfall. Jueteng (pronounced WHET-ting), an
illegal lottery, is the centerpiece of the nations thriving informal economy.
Because millions of ordinary Filipinos regularly place a one-peso bet on a
combination of numbers hoping for a four-hundred-peso winning, jueteng
can net a local operator as much as 1.2 million pesos and provincial bosses
about 4.8 million pesos monthly. Its profitability spawned a complex,
nationwide network of alliances between operators, politicians, and law
enforcement agencies. Political campaigns and poorly paid military officers
alike have come to depend on jueteng revenues.
Because of its national span, any crack in juetengs highly centralized and
well-protected structure could have serious implications. In early October
2000, Ilocos Sur governor Jose Singsona longtime Estrada crony, gambling
partner, and drinking companionrevealed that he had personally delivered
$8 million in illegal gambling money to the president over a twenty-
onemonth period, plus an additional $2.5 million as the presidents cut of
the tobacco excise taxes allotted to his province. Singson went public after
Estrada allegedly tried to have him assassinated, although he had already
decided to reveal all when he learned that the president planned to set up a
bingo network to rival his jueteng organization.
With Singsons revelations, anti-Estrada forces coalesced to drive him from
office. The alliance of conservative church and business sectors, traditional
politicians from opposition parties, NGOs, middle-class associations, and
different factions of the Left brought back memories of the Aquino years.
The CPP, learning its lesson from 1986, made sure its legal organizations
acted with the anti-Estrada front. Of course, the president was not without
his own supporters. The core of Estradas allianceformer Marcos cronies,
the movie industry, provincial and town officials grateful for hastily released
internal revenue allocations, Christian fundamentalist groups whose leaders
sought to evade Church control, and former Communists in government
remained steadfast behind him.
Initial skirmishes began when the House of Representatives passed the first
articles of impeachment against Estrada, charging him with plunder, graft,
and corruption. In early December 2000, the Senate, where Estrada
controlled a majority, formed itself into a tribunal to deliberate the charges.
Meanwhile, the jueteng expos and impeachment plunged the economy into
crisis. The peso had depreciated 22 percent from the start of the year,
investments were down 20 percent, and the scandal-plagued stock market
continued to sink. When pro-Estrada senators blocked prosecutors from
revealing a critical piece of incriminating evidence, the battle moved to the
streets. On January 16, 2001, anti-Estrada forcesone million strong
gathered at the Edsa Shrine. In a festive atmosphere, they vowed not to
leave until Estrada resigned the presidency.
The composition of Edsa 2 ranged from core veterans of the 1986
Revolution to members of Couples for Christ and Iglesia ni Kristo, who did
not hesitate to demand a role on the coordinating committee. As
expected, Estrada rebuffed the protestors, and his supporters staged their
own show of force in a similarly large rally. The impasse was broken on
January 20, when the AFP leadership withdrew its support and Estrada had
to abandon the presidential palace. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
was immediately sworn in as president and Edsa 2 was widely praised as a
massive exercise in direct democracy after the institutions of impeachment
had failed.
Edsa 2 versus Edsa 3 (Poor Peoples Power)
On April 25, 2001, the government arrested Joseph Estrada on charges of
plunder, violation of the antigraft law, perjury, and illegal use of an alias. The
perceived discourtesy of the arresting authorities angered the ex-presidents
supporters, who mobilized up to three million people at the Edsa Shrine, a
gathering notable for including no Church symbols [and] no Church
personnel. After four days of speeches and rallies, about three hundred
thousand people broke away from the main group and marched on the
presidential palace, where they fought a bloody street battle with police and
military forces. Declaring a state of rebellion, President Arroyo ordered a
full military-police counterattack. By May 1, the rebels were in full retreat,
with five killed and more than a hundred arrested. Edsa 2 groups declared
victory over the mob with a triumphant Mass at the Edsa Shrine,
symbolizing their recovery of the sacred site.
While easily routed, Edsa 3 had reverberations that shook the new
government. State officials and anti-Estrada intellectuals insisted that the
pro-Estrada mobilization was not an example of people power because its
violence contradicted the peaceful nature of people power. But Arroyo
supporters could not dismiss the importance of the class divide: Edsa 3 was
predominantly a poor peoples movement, while Edsa 2, despite the
presence of pro-poor groups, was mainly urban middle class and elite in
composition. Portraying Edsa 3 participants as a drug-crazed mob that was
brought and made to do what they did by . . . leaders who were not there
did little to dispel this uncomfortable reality. While it was true that the
violence was incited and funded by anti-Arroyo politicians, poor peoples
power was clearly a manifestation of lower-class grievances against the
nations comfortable classes. Despite a decline in poverty in the late 1990s,
the gap in quality of life and power between the classes was growing.
Emmanuel De Dios and Paul Hutchcroft explain Estradas ouster in this
context: What for [Edsa 2 activists] was a step toward rational and impartial
government, represents for [Edsa 3 supporters] a return to a heartless
dispensation and an affront to the already powerless.
As a result of Edsa 3, the optimism that followed Edsa 2 was short-lived,
replaced by apprehension and questioning of the value of people power as a
political act. Even Estradas critics had second thoughts about the wisdom of
resorting to popular uprising. People Power as a method of political change
and of ousting leaders, wrote journalist Amando Doronila, has made
Filipino democracy volatile, unstable, and unpredictable. More dangerously,
it has brought Philippine democracy to the edge of mob rule, even if
exercised in the name of social change.
Edsa 2 and Edsa 3 also saw a shift in the constellation of political forces that
influenced the countrys political direction. On the one hand, reformist NGOs
and POs that supported Estradas ouster were not united in their support of
Arroyo. As the alliance that brought them together unraveled, they won
fewer cabinet positions in the new administration, and in public discourse
they were challenged for the right to represent the people by the more
disciplined CPP (which had kept its legal fronts autonomous from the
alliance). On the other hand, the new president was clearly beholden to
military officers (active and retired) and traditional politicians. The former
were directly or indirectly responsible for two of the countrys four political
transitions since 1986. AFP watcher Glenda Gloria notes that the dependence
of weak civilian governments on the military puts regimes in a most
vulnerable situation and the militarys access to arms affects
appointments. An attempted coup in July 2003 (the Oakwood Mutiny) only
increased this dependence.
The resurrection of the traditional politician was exemplified by Governor
Singson. While trapos had been active players in 1986 and did in fact
dominate the Aquino and Ramos governments, their prominence was
treated with some disdain and suspicion. Singson, in contrast, was
proclaimed a hero. This admitted high-level operator in the illegal economy,
this warlord who ruled his province with an iron fist, this quintessential
backroom dealer, became the man of the hourpraised by fellow trapos, the
new regime, the Catholic Church, and even some NGOs and POs. Those who
raised the issue of his background were roundly shouted off the stage.
Singsons apotheosis suggested that despite the rise of media populism,
trapos and strongmen controlling patronage networks and votes would not
be so easily disposed of.
DREAMING A STRONG REPUBLIC
Gloria Macapagal Arroyotrained economist, daughter of President
Diosdado Macapagal, and veteran politicianbecame head of state not
because she was the unanimous choice at EDSA 2 but simply because, as vice
president, the constitution said she was next in line, a succession that was
eventually approved by the Supreme Court. Her careful handling of Estradas
detention and a publicity offensive portraying her as pro-poor partly
defused lower-class anger, but it was only with the general elections of May
2001 that she achieved a majority in the legislature and the support of local
officials. These did not come without a price, of course. Creating a
congressional majority required compromise and the dispensing of pork
barrel funds. These compromises alienated NGOs and POs, who accused her
of pursuing her own political survival at the expense of civil society and
progressive forces. The poor apparently had not forgiven her, either,
electing Estradas wife and his former police chief (Panfilo Lacson) to the
Senate and several of his cronies to the House of Representatives. This
meant that Arroyos legislative agenda would encounter some resistance.
Economic recovery was more important than ever, and some positive signs
followed the resolution of the political crisis. Pressure on the peso eased, and
the decline in the GDP share of agriculture and industry was mitigated by real
growth in the service sector, especially after Congress passed the Retail
Trade Liberalization Act opening that subsector to foreign investment. GDP
growth bounced back to 4.4 percent in 2002 (after dropping to 3.0 percent in
2001). Remittances from overseas Filipino workers also picked up after a
late-1990s plateau. While the government still engaged in deficit spending,
reduction targets were set and the ratio of spending to revenue collection
fell. Spending cuts, unfortunately, left social welfare hanging in the balance.
Poverty reached 40 percent (up from 31.8 percent in 1997), and social
indicators such as education, health, and domestic unemployment and
underemployment remained troubling. Governments ability to deal with
these social problems continued to be hampered by debt servicing, which
consumed more than one-fourth of the national budget in 2002.
In any case, modest economic accomplishments were again overshadowed
by continuing political turmoil. Despite lifting the death penalty moratorium
for kidnappers, abductions continued unabated. In June 2001, after the Abu
Sayyaf Group kidnapped sixteen people from a central Philippine resort,
senior military officers were accused of helping the group escape a besieged
position in Basilan in exchange for a cash payment. This controversy led to
exposs of corruption in the AFPs procurement system and its inability to
deal with the Abu Sayyaf Group. Other corruption investigations by
independent journalists implicated senior government officials in the
government insurance system, Department of Justice, and power and waste
management sectors.
To dispel the growing impression of weakness, Arroyo announced, in her July
2002 address to the nation, her goal of building a strong republic. She
followed up with a number of attempts to assert the states regulatory
power and put its own house in order. Government lawyers charged the
Lopez family conglomerate with overpricing its electric power services and
revoked (on the grounds of rigged bidding) a contract signed by the previous
administration with a foreign firm to build and operate a new international
airport terminal. Arroyo also instituted lifestyle checks on government
personnel, targeting bureaucrats in the notoriously corrupt Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs, and ways were explored to
minimize graft in these offices (see box 10.3).
Box 10.3. Improving Revenue Performance
Since 1986, the government has embarked on tax policy reforms designed
to simplify the countrys tax structure. These tax reforms are focused on
lowering rates and broadening the tax base. However, numerous tax
exemptions and fiscal incentives provided under various laws have
undermined the tax policy reforms. Clearly, there is a need to rationalize
these tax exemptions and fiscal incentives in order to plug the tax leakage
and make tax obligations transparent. Presumptive taxation for hard-to-tax
groups such as professionals and small businesses can also reduce the
discretionary power of both taxpayer and tax assessor and make tax
calculations simpler and clearer. Tax simplification and elimination of special
exemptions can help curb opportunities for corruption, reduce the
compliance cost of honest tax payers, and increase the overall efficiency of
the economy. An area where reforms could yield the highest return is in
revenue administration, particularly institutional and administrative
arrangements. A major proposal in this area is to grant the BIR some degree
of autonomy and shield it from political interference. With greater
autonomy, the BIR can have more flexibility in its human resources and
budgetary decisions, allowing it to attract good people and manage human
resources on the basis of skills and performance. Together with greater BIR
autonomy, a system of internal and external checks should be strengthened.
Strong and credible internal audit systems, covering financial, procedural and
management functions, complemented by effective external audit provisions
should be in place. As in other countries, perhaps it would help to create
anti-corruption units within the bureau. The Commission on Audit should be
given access to BIR to undertake its revenue audit function. Congress should
also actively pursue its oversight of the BIR as mandated under the Tax Code
of 1997. Civil society involvement in revenue oversight should also be
promoted. A private sector led Taxpayers Foundation can be organized to: (a)
serve as a venue for taxpayers complaints against unscrupulous BIR
personnel, (b) file appropriate charges in court, (c) conduct continuing
taxpayer education, and (d) assist small- and medium scale taxpayers in their
dealings with the BIR. Excessive contact between taxpayers and tax
personnel opens opportunities for corruption, hence this should be
minimized or avoided. Among the instruments that
can be helpful in this regard are: (a) the use of third party information for tax
assessment, (b) automation or computerization, and (c) privatization of
selected functions of tax administration.
Congressional Planning and Budget Office, Special Study:
Getting Out of the Fiscal Bind, June 2002: 10.
Arroyos anticorruption drives signaled her intent to make the state
autonomous of dominant classes and sectors, so that it represents the
peoples interests. But these well-publicized actions backfired in some
instances, only serving to highlight the real limitations of state capacity. BIR
bureaucrats made clear their intention to stonewall reform by slowing
collection efforts and appealing to patrons in Congress, while Arroyos newly
appointed BIR commissioner was sued by his own officers when he tried to
move them and uproot their patronage networks. After a bomb threat at his
office, he resigned, and Arroyo backed away from overhauling the entire
revenue collection system. Court cases against the airport contractor and the
Lopez family became bogged down in the judicial system, and the president
did little to speed them along. Her vacillation renewed criticisms that she
would rather have safe, if sticky, compromisesclassic trapo behavior.
Critics on the left labeled her strong republic a ruse to bring back
dictatorship. Continuing Estradas policy against armed southern Islamists,
Arroyo approved a visiting forces agreement with the United States in 2003
that allowed longer-term visits by American troops; this act arguably skirted
a constitutional provision banning the presence of foreign troops on
Philippine territory. Soon after, U.S. troops began to assist the AFP in
pursuing the Abu Sayyaf Group. While the collaboration was well received by
most Filipinos, including those in Muslim Mindanao, in Manila it provoked
intense criticism. And when she pledged support for the American war on
terror in advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, critics ranging from
the CPP to nationalist academics branded her a puppet, exacerbating her
strained relationship with reformists.
The year 2002 ended with the news that government had overshot its
budget deficit target by 71 percent because of poor tax collection. A
despondent Arroyo announced on December 30the anniversary of Jose
Rizals executionthat she would not campaign for her own presidential
term in the May 2004 election and would instead devote the remainder of
her time in office to policy implementation free from the influence and
interference of narrow sectional interests. Her decision not to run was
received with warm public support, and her approval ratings began to rise.
The 2004 Election: Machine Politics versus Media Populism
Arroyos critics and political opponents did not relent in their attacks,
however, continuing to allege widespread corruption by the president, her
family, and her allies. By November 2003, acquiescing to pressure from allies
and angered by attacks on her family, the president announced her decision
to defer retirement and offer [her]self to the electorate in 2004. This
reversal confirmed her critics suspicions, but a clear alternative candidate
and philosophy of governance was lacking. Four major candidates ran against
Arroyo in 2004Paul Roco, her popular former secretary of education;
Panfilo Lacson, the law and order candidate with murder charges hanging
over his head; Brother Eddie Villanueva of the Jesus Is Lord movement, who
became the middle-class protest candidate when Roco dropped out for
health reasons; and aging action-movie star and political novice Fernando
Poe Jr., who emerged as the most serious challenger.
It looked to be a contest between an incumbents political machine and a
media populist with no known political positions except friendship with the
disgraced former president Joseph Estrada. As Poe took an early lead in the
polls, business leaders, academics, and political commentators feared the
worst, and reformist NGOs and POs became increasingly irrelevant to the
contest. Many of the latter opted to support Arroyo without lobbying for the
inclusion of their agenda into her platform. Those in Poes camp did not even
bother to fashion a sophisticated argument for him (as they had for Estrada),
because their presence was hardly recognized by the candidate himself. The
growing attractiveness of the party-list system and the CPP threat also
dictated that reformists pay greater attention to contesting sectoral seats in
Congress. (CPP positions carry weight in national debates via a sympathetic
national media, and its party-list organizations would succeed in electing all
six of its candidates to the House of Representatives in 2004.)
Arroyo depended heavily on the electoral machinery of her coalition of
political allies nationwide; Poe, who had no such machinery, used his movie
star personathe quiet heroto attract voters. Both candidates chose news
anchorsturnedsenators (proven vote-getters) as their vice presidential
running mates and took full advantage of relaxed election rules that allowed
maximum use of all forms of media. Oddly enough, Poe turned out to be the
less effective campaigner. His personality (taciturn and humorless), political
inexperience (leading to frequent upheavals in his campaign team),
discomfort with the media (which he alternately shunned and snapped at),
and near total lack of policy articulation cost his initial lead in the polls.
Arroyo campaigned vigorously throughout the country, speaking the local
language in her native Visayas and several other regions, reminding voters of
the avalanche of financial support and development projects her
government was providing, exercising political muscle on wavering local
officials, and dispensing campaign funds to local candidates.68 Her well-
managed attack on Poes inexperience and an agreement with the CPP to
allow her party to campaign in NPA territory in exchange for supporting
Communist party-list candidates also helped tilt the race in Arroyos favor.
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was elected by a margin of 1,123,576
votes out of roughly twenty-five million cast. A postelection analysis in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer pointed to the Arroyo teams astute combination of
old and new strategies, an indication that media populism would henceforth
be a crucial part, but not the sole determinant, of electoral politics.
According to writer Tony Bergonia, The campaign strategy involved
unbridled access to government resources, the hiring of an expert pollster,
brilliant use of opinion surveys, a deal with a popular TV personality and
innovations to tried and tested campaign devices. Bergonia points to how
the normal delivery of government services [was used] as a campaign tool
without making it look like what it really wasan attempt to capture votes.
For example, road maintenance in Metro Manila created 250,000 jobs by
using labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive methods, and student
loans were disbursed by the Student Assistance Fund for a Strong Republic.
Bergonias sources told him that Ms. Arroyos strategists found nothing
irregular in the so-called governance projects since the state funds used had
already been allotted and were not realigned from other existing projects.
The campaign team engaged an in-house pollster to survey voter approval on
key issues and gauge to what extent voters would follow the endorsements
of such figures and groups as Jaime Cardinal Sin, ex-President Corazon
Aquino, the Iglesia ni Cristo and the Catholic group El Shaddai. (Pacts with
the religious groups delivered many votes and continued to pay off when
vote counting in the House of Representatives was subject to repeated
delaying tactics and Arroyos victory looked vulnerable to opposition protest.
In early June the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines endorsed the
election and its results: Arroyo called it an answer to her prayers.) Bergonia
emphasized the media popularity brought to the campaign by vice
presidential candidate Noli de Castro (a new strategy) and, finally, alleged the
preparation of a very massive operation to commit fraud if the local
political machines failed to get the votes and perform magic (a very old
strategy). This allegation was vigorously denied by the presidents office,
though few Filipinos doubt the capacity of any successful politician to
commit election fraud.
Arroyos Challenge: Economic Governance
With her political coalition winning majorities in the Senate, House of
Representatives, and provincial and municipal governments, Gloria Arroyo
secured the opportunity to govern for six years unhampered by the taint of
illegitimacy she faced while completing Estradas term. Yet Arroyos promise
to create a strong republic will no doubt encounter bureaucratic
opposition and resistance from Congress, which, although containing more
reformist members, continues to be dominated by patronage politicians. Due
to the manner of her election, Arroyo will herself remain beholden to these
politicians, while reformists struggle to revive a mobilizing capacity to
strengthen their bargaining power inside state institutions.
Her short- and medium-term priority will be the economy. In the July 2004
State of the Nation address, Arroyo labeled the budget deficit and tax
collection the most pressing problems facing the nation. She called for
business to adopt an attitude of tax acceptance and Congress to pass a
package of tax laws to increase revenue by eighty billion pesos per year. To
reduce spending, she promised to abolish thirty agencies under the Office of
the President (in addition to the eighty already eliminated), attack
corruption, eliminate redundant offices, and encourage early retirement.
Public reaction was swift, demanding first that government improve tax
collection and rein in corrupt BIR officials before asking citizens to pay more
taxes and, second, that Congress accept the reduction or elimination of the
discretionary funds that fuel patronagepork barrelthe most visible
symbols of corruption in government. As the countrys leading newspaper
editorialized: So long as the pork barrel exists, any cost-saving campaign and
any anti-corruption drive will be meaningless, and any new tax measure will
be an undue imposition on the people. (See box 10.4.)
Box 10.4. The Unmistakable Stench of Institutionalized Corruption
The dust is beginning to settle on one of the most divisive, acrimonious and
bitter electoral exercises this country has ever seen. . . . Those who voted for
President Macapagal-Arroyo despite the three difficult years just past, did so
in the hope that if she had a true mandate she would finally be able to steer
the country toward a brighter future. Only a competent and well-meaning
president with a clear mandate can possibly lead us through this difficult
time when collective national sacrifice will have to be the rule of the day . . .
before . . . economic recovery can even begin to emerge. Cognizant of this,
many thinking Filipinos like me are ready to make sacrifices. But we must
also see that our leaders, especially our legislators, are likewise willing to
share in our collective sacrifice. So far however, other than jockeying for juicy
committee chairmanships and fighting over offices, all we have heard from
the majority of our honorable legislators is empty talk about burden
sharing. None of them has yet categorically announced that they are willing
to make one of the biggest sacrifices of all: giving up part of their pork barrel.
Depending on the source of information, each representative receives an
estimated P70 to P100 million a year in pork barrel funds while a senator
receives about P200 million a year. Multiply this by 236 representatives
(party list excluded) and 23 senators and you arrive at the mind-boggling
figure of P28 billion a year! This in itself is bad enough, particularly in the
light of our alarming budget deficit and the dismal legislative output. . . . But
things really get unbearable when one reads reliable investigative reports
saying that as much as 45 percent of this amount ends up in the pockets of
legislators. True or not, exaggerated or not, it cannot be denied that the
term pork barrel or the more palatable Countrywide Development Fund
carries with it the unmistakable stench of institutionalized corruption. . . .
Cynicism, distrust of government and a general lack of hope are the
predominant sentiments that weigh heavily on our people, enveloping our
country in a thick, dark cloud. Unless the President and her men can break
through this cloud, effective governance will be virtually impossible. The
Pork Barrel Sacrifice, painful though it may be, might just be the sword that
can cut through this cloud. . . . Anything short of this sacrifice would send the
disturbing message that it is business as usual for our elected leaders. At
this particular time in our nations history, when we are being primed for
higher taxes, higher utility rates, higher prices and tough times ahead, all for
the sake of our country, business as usual . . . should have absolutely no
place in governance and will only spell disaster.
Minguita Padilla, Business as Usual? commentary,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 29, 2004
The month following Arroyos address, a group of prominent University of
the Philippines economists expressed doubt whether the Presidents
message has been truly understood and internalized by the political elite and
public. The UP School of Economics report argued the imminence of a fiscal
crisis and the superficiality and/or wrongheadedness of some solutions being
discussed. This influential report was widely disseminated and set the agenda
for public policy debate at the start of Arroyos term. It also made admirably
explicit the often implicit contract between state and society in its discussion
of causes and proposed solutions. As so often in the past, a crisis helped
illuminate the states relationship with the various forces both within it and
in society at large.
The UP report first establishes the problem: At the end of 2003, the
Philippine national government debt was 3.36 trillion pesos, or 78 percent of
GDP. More important to the analysis, total public sector debt (explained
below) exceeded 130 percent of GDP. Service on the debt, an automatic
appropriation, consumed 27 percent of the years national budget. All these
numbers are trending upward, but the authors argue that yearly increases in
the level of debt have not been caused by rising interest rates or higher
government spending. In fact, even as government moved from mid-1990s
balanced budgets to budget deficits, spending by its agencies declined
significantly . . . And are now at its lowest level in a decade. Such fiscal
discipline was not a sign of strengthrather one of despair. For, aside from
debt servicing, large chunks of the national budget are already pre-empted
by salaries, maintenance and operating expenses, and the internal revenue
allotment to local governments, leaving little room for infrastructure
spending and other development needs.
The authors acknowledge that 43 percent of the debt increase from 1997 to
2003 was caused by budget deficits and attribute these largely to failure of
the tax structure and bureaucracy. The success or failure of revenue
collection is measured as a percentage of GDP; the Philippines tax effort fell
from a high of 17 percent of GDP in 1997 to only 12.5 percent by 2003.
Including both tax and nontax revenue, the Philippines tax effort was 19
percent of GDP; this was about the same as Thailand and better than
Indonesia, but much weaker than Malaysia (23 percent) and Singapore (37
percent). The tax effort of developing countries as a whole averages 18
percent of GDP, while that of industrialized countries averages 31.2 percent.
Naturally, corruption in the BIR and judicial failure to pursue large tax
evaders contribute to falling revenue, but the report also points to serious
structural flaws that can be laid more broadly at the feet of the executive,
Congress, and taxpayers themselves: An inflexible and unresponsive tax
structure, mortally weakened by the legislative failure to adjust specific taxes
(e.g., taxes on petroleum, beverage, and tobacco); the excessive grant of
incentives and exemptions (e.g., from the BOI [Board of Investments] and for
special economic zones); the failure to provide for administrative rules to
plug revenue leakages (e.g., failure to ensure that final taxes on loans and
deposits withheld by banks are actually remitted to the government); and an
unabashed surrender to lobbying, as illustrated by the VAT [value-added tax]
exemptions given by Congress to doctors, lawyers (and law firms!), and even
show-business.
The report attributes a further 37 percent of the debt increase to
nonbudgetary accounts and assumed liabilities and lending to
corporations. Such off-budget expenditures represent the difference
between national government debt (generated by activities involving
regular branches and agencies) and total public debt. This difference stems
from the operation and liabilities of government-owned or -controlled
corporations such as the National Power Corporation (NPC), the Public
Estates Authority (manager of public lands), and the bodies responsible for
social security and public-sector employee insurance. The government is also
involved in commercial banking and in manufacturing, real estate, and media
companies. The accounts of these corporations are meant to be separate
from the governments, but we have seen how, in the post-Marcos era of
cleanup and restructuring (of the Central Bank, for example), government
assumed the liabilities of many failed corporations.
This practice continues, especially where the delivery of vital public services
such as power is concerned. When the NPC, for example, was unable to sell
bonds abroad to cover operating losses, the national government . . .
bought the NPC debt paper, then proceeded to borrow abroad on its own
account to further finance this unprofitable institution. The report points
out that unprofitability is not due solely to mismanagement but is often
imposed by the government itself when for political reasons, [it] decided to
reduce power-rate charges. Whatever the cause, when government
assumes corporate debt, what ought to have been liabilities only of these
corporations and the clients they serve become transformed into debts of
the national government and of all Filipinos.
Observers agree that the growing debt has had a tremendous negative
impact on Philippine growth by restricting the ability of government to make
strategic investments in its people (education) and economy (infrastructure).
And the problem is self-perpetuating, with successive credit downgrades
raising the cost of borrowing. But the UP report argues that the trend is
unsustainable for much longer and, further, that any of a number of external
factorshigher global interest rates or falling overseas workers
remittancescould quickly result in debt default and a full-blown fiscal crisis
marked by sharp peso depreciation, most likely aggravated by capital flight,
severely contract[ed] trade . . . a deep recession and unemployment. Nor, it
argues, can the problem be solved by budget cuts without provoking large
dislocations and inviting social unrest or be outgrown: When has the
economy ever demonstrated the ability to achieve, much less sustain, GDP
growth of 78 percent annually? Corruption is not solely to blame and so its
elimination would not comprise the whole solution; in any case, the authors
question whether the time exists for such reforms in administration to play
out before the fiscal time bomb explodes.
Instead, the UP report calls for a package of measures that spreads the
burden among the branches of the state, the private sector, and the general
public. These include (1) cutting nonbudgetary expenditures by half, forcing
government- owned and -controlled corporations to adopt sound business
practices, and retreating from politicized price-setting; (2) moving national
government expenditures from deficit to surplus by first optimizing existing
lawsautomatic updating of excise taxes and audits on self-reported
income and later phasing in tax increases (VAT, petroleum) and new taxes
(car registration, new vehicles); (3) cutting local government unit (LGU)
allotments by a quarter, from 40 percent to 30 percent, which the president
is authorized to do for a three-year period by declaring an unmanageable
public-sector deficit; and (4) cutting pork by half and increasing government
credibility by using some of the savings on publicly visible infrastructure
projects, the rest on deficit reduction. Once the deficit has been stabilized,
the report recommends rationally downsizing government bureaucracy;
completely replacing the revenue agencies; pursuing a new round of
privatization; rationalizing and reducing future tax incentives; establishing
credible regulatory bodies to set power rates, transit fare, and tolls; and
making LGU revenue allotments conditional on the quality of spending or as
matching grants to supplement new local revenues.
The UP School of Economics recommendations are not beyond debate.
Another line of thought is represented by Walden Bello (of the NGO Focus on
the Global South) and Lidy Nacpil and Ana Marie Nemenzo (of the NGO
Freedom from Debt Coalition) in their rejoinder, Overdue, Selective, Not
Daring Enough. They take issue with the UP reports neglect of tariff
reduction as a cause of declining revenue, noting that the UP authors are all
supporters of trade liberalization. Bello and colleagues, who cite the
departing remarks of former finance secretary Jose Isidro Camacho in
support of their position, back recent executive orders freezing or raising
tariffs on selected agricultural, fishery, and manufactured products and call
for the accelerated reversal of liberalization throughout the economy.
Most fundamentally, these critics question why the UP economists do not
face the issue of foreign debt head on. Since 1986, opinion has been growing
that Corazon Aquino erred in not attempting to restructure the debt at the
very time the Philippines, emerging from a larcenous dictatorship, was most
likely to win concessions from its creditors. In fact, some of the UP authors
were among the early critics of the model debtor policy, by which
repaying the debt on the terms demanded by the creditors became the
national economic priority, with development taking a backseat. Although in
agreement with many of the UP-proposed measures, Bello and his coauthors
believe that never ending and rising payments to foreign creditors are the
major reason the Philippines is facing fiscal crisis. But where the UP report
sees default on international debt as unthinkable, Bello, Nacpil, and
Nemenzo point to Argentina, which, they argue, collapsed in 2002 due to its
good debtor policy, after which it redirected its resources . . . into
investment rather than debt service. They want the Philippines to follow the
example of the Argentine president, who offered his countrys creditors 20 to
25 cents on the dollar and still received a new IMF loan: To our creditors,
many of whom have been paid many times over for the original sum lent us,
we can say, loosen your terms to, say, 50 cents to the dollar now or you will
get a bankruptcy that will drag you along with it.
But beyond its specific recommendations, which can and should be debated,
the value of the UP report lies in its recognition that modern government
in principle anywayis based on a contract in which people agree to be
taxed in exchange for protection, justice, infrastructure and services
provided by the state. Violation of this contract has caused a tacit but
undeniable tax revolt by citizens appalled that taxes are used to support
feckless, unresponsive government. The authors therefore put the onus on
government to begin to fix the problem, but acknowledge that all state
branches and social forces will have to show unprecedented unity:
Congress, the President, local governments, business, professionals, and
people at large, all effectively possess some veto power over the outcome,
since by refusing to cooperate, they could scuttle the package.
The fiscal crisis faced by the Philippines in the early twenty-first century
highlights a recurrent pattern that can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth
centurythe need to improve state capacity in order to cope with economic
change. Then, too, the state faced dilemmas raised by globalization and the
movement of international capital and then, too, sought to strengthen
revenue collection and other primary functions. In the 1930s, when
worsening agrarian relations led to peasant rebellion, the Commonwealth
reinforced state capacity in the name of social justice. The pattern recurred
in the import substitution phase of the postwar Republic, as well as on the
eve of martial law. As the years passed, however, expectations of responsive
government grew, reformist and radical social forces protested the skewed
distribution of rewards, and the solution grew more complex. Some of the
other themes we have traced through the history of state formation in the
Philippinesthe shape of executive and legislative institutions, insiders and
outsiders, the role of religionalso have contemporary manifestations. We
close the book by sketching four such issues of current import as
introductions to further reading or research.
CURRENT ISSUES
Presidential versus Parliamentary Government
At times of transition or crisisduring the Philippine Revolution, in the
Commonwealth period, in the aftermath of dictatorshipFilipinos have
debated the merits of different institutions of representative government.
These debates have revolved around questions of executive versus legislative
power, bicameral versus unicameral legislature, and presidential versus
parliamentary government. The latest push for institutional reform, springing
from the clear limitations of people power as demonstrated by Edsa 2 and
Edsa 3, finds many in public life advocating the replacement of U.S.-style
presidential government (which balances power between the executive,
legislature, and judiciary) with a unicameral parliamentary government (in
which a prime minister emerges from the leading party or parties in the
legislature).
Most of the arguments in favor of constitutional change fall into two
categories: improvement of state capacity or increased government
responsiveness. Together, advocates believe, they add up to a case for a type
of government that would be more effective and more representative of all
Filipinos. We will outline three of these arguments and counterarguments
before turning to a fourth, related issue.
The first argument for changebased on state capacity or efficacyis that
the current bicameral system has failed, producing endless gridlocks and
impasses. Even when a president enjoys majority support in the House of
Representatives, bills must be debated twice [and] approved twice. One
congressman complained in late 2003 that a thousand local governance bills
legislated by the House still languished in the Senate. Hilario Davide, as a
member of the Aquino-appointed constitutional commission in 1986
(currently chief justice of the Supreme Court) endorsed this view:
[Unicameral parliamentary government] is not only efficient and less costly
to maintain, but it is also simpler, less time-consuming, and invites minimum
conflicts and controversies, thus facilitating speedy legislation. More
recently, departing finance secretary Camacho warned: We have a very high
debt that is not sustainable unless we do something, and right now there is
something wrong with our political system. It is too slow and is not equipped
to deal with this kind of problem. He advocated either a unicameral
parliamentary system or a highly centralized state with a powerful chief
executive.
The second argument takes aim directly at the upper house as a
manifestation of unbounded elite dominance of the political process.
Columnist Manuel Quezon III points out the risk in having senators elected
at large: senatorial campaigns . . . available only to the very rich, or the very
popular. Because the Senate is the training ground for the presidency, this
argument has gained urgency with the rise of media populism, which carries
the additional threat that the quality of the senators might rapidly
deteriorate. The third argument speaks to the problem of unseating a
leader such as Joseph Estrada, who was demonstrably inept and corrupt and
whose Senate allies undermined the course of his impeachment trial. Under
the presidential system, the electorate must wait for the term of the
president to end, whereas under a parliamentary system, proponents argue,
the ruling party would be forced to clean its own house and/or call an
election. With no upper house of (in this case, obstructionist) senators facing
election only once in six years, the entire system would be more responsive
to the people. In short, the parliamentary system would provide a system of
removing bad leaders short of uprising.
Although these points have merit, various counterarguments can be made.
Gregorio Tingson, another constitutional commissioner, argued that the
Senate fosters national unity and consciousness in a way that the House of
Representatives, merely based on the respective districts of the members,
cannot. And the slower legislative process is in fact purposeful, helping
Congress steer clear of hasty legislation. Past experience confirms this, as
Quezon writes: The justification for the restoration of the Senate in 1941 was
based on the experience of the country under a unicameral legislature from
19351941, which revealed the tendency for the herd mentality to erupt
among assemblymen, resulting in stampedes by the members of the National
Assembly. . . . A Senate would act as a brake on the enthusiasm of
congressmen, while at the same time provide an opportunity for the training
of national leaders required by a young country like ours.
Political commentator Neal Cruz fears that the loss of checks and balances
between the three branches of government will actually cause corruption to
worsen. He questions how the same politicians and public officials will
solve the countrys many problems simply by shifting to a parliamentary
system, arguing that the key is not the system; it is the people. Andrew
MacIntyres comparison of four Southeast Asian countries addresses this
issue of institutions versus personnel from the perspective of the reform
process itself, noting that it is the same actors who would design, carry out,
and be governed by proposed changes to the system (see box 10.5). And
former finance secretary Roberto de Ocampo articulated the concern that
institutional reform would distract the leadership and the public from
undertaking more crucial economic reforms.
Box 10.5. Institutional Reform
Institutional reform is difficult. New political frameworks do not fall from
the heavens and slide directly into place. They are the product of debate and
struggleoften violent struggle. They are ideas about how politics should be
organized that are articulated, promoted, entrenched, and then defended by
a coalition of actors seeking to advance certain interests. . . . Redesigning the
basic rules of national politics can be an especially difficult category of
institutional reform. This is not simply because the stakes are so high, but
more subtly because politicians are frequently both the subjects and the
objects of change. Unlike the process of reforming many economic
institutions, such as trade unions or major trade laws, changing formal
political institutions often means that politicians are the primary actors in the
redesign of rules that are to govern their own behavior.
Andrew J. MacIntyre, The Power of Institutions: Political Architecture and
Governance (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003), 1056, 107
Some defenders of the existing system fear legislative control over the
executive branch, specifically valuing the role of the presidency. Although not
denying that presidents have depended on and mastered patronage politics,
they note that at various times in Philippine history, presidents have been
crucial in strengthening the state in the name of reform. This position has
been weakened in the last decade by the experience of the Estrada
presidency, when people were both reminded of the sordid years of the
Marcos dictatorship and taught what could happen to the presidency in the
hands of an incompetent politician.
Finally, the most substantive argument made in favor of constitutional
change sees it as a way of reforming political parties that are now
instruments of elites with limited mobilizational capacity. In this view, the
Philippines central institutional problem is the lack of program-based
political parties those emphasizing policy over personality and governing
principles over patronage. Political activist Joel Rocamora identifies the
advantage of the parliamentary custom of proportional representation:
If voters choose between parties instead of individual candidates, it will
lessen the intensity of personal and clan contests which are the main sources
of violence and money politics. Parties will then be required to strengthen the
organizational and programmatic requirements for electoral victory.
Minimally, parties will be forced to distinguish themselves from each other
enough for voters to make choices. The shift in the center of gravity of
organizational work away from individual candidates will force parties to
strengthen themselves organizationally.
Rocamora notes that because parties today have no programs, policymaking
in the legislature and the executive is mainly a matter of deal making, an
endless cycle of patronage. Program-based and disciplined political parties, it
is hoped, would have less need for backroom deals to win elections or pass
laws. Rocamora and political scientist Paul Hutchcroft further argue that this
change would help to structure political competition toward the realization
of aggregate rather than particularistic interests.
Muslim Separatism
The long-standing conflict between the national government and Christian
Filipino majority, on the one hand, and the Muslim armed separatist
movements, on the other, has ceased to be a flashpoint in todays politics.
The 1996 peace agreement with the Ramos government led to the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF) taking the leadership of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was created by President
Aquino in response to calls for Muslim autonomy. But instead of
transforming ARMM into an authority reflecting the ideals of the MNLF, Nur
Misuari and his comrades did little to change its oversized and mostly inept
bureaucracy of 19,000 employees. In fact, MNLF leaders were soon accused
of contributing to its characteristic waste and corruption. State capacity has
been particularly weak where personnel are former guerrillas; institution-
building programs are currently run by the Australian, Japanese, and U.S.
governments, among others. Misuari himself showed less concern for
governing than for traveling in the Philippines and abroad. He tried to lobby
for an extension of his term after the November 2001 ARMM elections, and
when Manila denied his request, he ordered his troops to revolt. But the
rebellion in Jolo was easily crushed, and Misuari fled to the neighboring
Malaysian state of Sabah. The Malaysian government, which now favors a
peaceful resolution to the Philippines Muslim problem, later extradited
him back to his homeland, where he languishes in a jail cell outside Manila.
The MNLF has become a spent force.
Into the void has stepped the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), whose
forces grew from six thousand to fifteen thousand in the 1990s and which is
today considered the most powerful armed Islamic group in Muslim
Mindanao. In some ways, though, the MILF is difficult to categorize. While
openly Islamist in its politics (in contrast to the more secular MNLF), it has
expressed no intention of establishing an Islamic state and has not declared
its rebellion to be a jihad. (Jihad, an Arabic word, can be translated as
struggle or striving; in the political sense, it indicates a defensive struggle
or fighting to right a wrong.) According to investigative journalists Marites
Daguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria, The MILF leadership has not yet fully
thought [through the] idea of what constitutes an Islamic state, and MILF
leaders and followers differ in their interpretation of jihad. In fact, Vitug and
Gloria observe an ideological gap between the leaders and the rank and file
[that is] wide and palpable. MILF leaders may be devout students of Islam,
but ordinary Maguindanaos, Maranaos, Tausugs, and other Filipino Muslims
tend to practice some form of folk Islam that mixes animism with teachings
from the Koran. Many of its fighters have joined the MILF for reasons having
little to do with religionoften to avenge the death of family and friends at
the hands of the military or because it represents opportunity in one of the
poorest regions in the country.
This inconsistency of intentions, interpretations, and motives extends to the
MILFs politics. It claims to be fighting for a Bangsa Moro Republik, but has
agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government on the issue of
autonomy. It declares itself an Islamic movement and admits hosting
members of al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, a Southeast Asian jihadist
network) in the past, but has sought the assistance of the United States in
expediting peace negotiations and expresses no opposition to the presence
of American soldiers training Filipino troops in its areas. On the other hand,
while it claims to have removed foreign fighters from its ranks, all evidence
points to ongoing operational and training links, perhaps without central
MILF control or approval. If the Malaysian and American governments do
broker talks, there is a distinct possibility of establishing lasting peace in
Muslim Mindanao; this is one reason the separatist issue has moved quietly
to the margins of public debate. But the Philippine governments support for
the American war on terror and JIMILF links give it the potential to move
quickly back to center stage.
As the countrys original outsiderswithin the Philippines, but outside the
church-state template from which the nation-state developedit is not
surprising that Muslim intellectuals have a unique perspective on current
constitutional debates. Abraham Sakili of the University of the Philippines
says:
If the Christian Filipinos have the so-called Muslim problem in the southern
Philippines, the Muslims of the south have also their Christian problem.
Assimilation . . . could mean death to a culture and religion. . . . It is
therefore urgent for the Philippine government to alter the unity structure of
its assimilationist system of governance vis--vis the Muslims, instead of
pursuing its centrally directed so-called Strong Republic.
Population Policy
A report released by the U.S. Council for Foreign Relations after the May
2004 elections cautions that Philippine economic recovery depends in part
on how the country deals with its high rate of population growth.101
Growing at its current rate of 2.36 percent annually, the population
estimated at 84.2 million in 2004will double by the early 2030s. According
to the Asian Development Bank, because labor supply is outstripping labor
demand, the countrys quickly rising population does not permit a rise in
per capita incomes sufficient to provide the savings necessary among the
poorest for the required amount of capital formation for growth. Yet
according to economists Alejandro Herrin and Ernesto Pernia, the country
has lacked a consistent population policy during the decades other
developing countries have been forging consensus and implementing policy
on this important issue (see box 10.6).
Box 10.6. Why Population Matters
To this day, the issue of why and how population matters remains crucial for
this country. Given its soft state and hard church, the Philippines has
neglected the population problematique, practically just sweeping it under
the rug. Consequently, it now finds itself virtually alone among middle-
income developing countries as not having made any significant
demographic transition. And it finds itself having to debate an issue that is
pass for most Asian developing countries, including such less developed
countries as Bangladesh and India. . . . In the other East and Southeast Asian
economies, sharp reduction in poverty has occurred as a consequence of
rapid and sustained growth, attributable to sound economic policies coupled
with strong population policy. These countries have been benefitting from a
demographic bonus resulting from an increasing share of workers
(population aged 1564) relative to young dependents (ages 014), while the
Philippines continues to be burdened by a demographic onus (large share of
young dependents relative to workers). . . . The lack of a clear and
consistent population policy . . . partly explains [the Philippines] anemic
economic growth and persistent mass poverty. Some observers would, of
course, point to problems of poor governance, corruption and political
economy, or to exogenous shocks brought about by trade liberalization and
WTO rules as the culprit. The counterargument, however, is that these
problems or circumstances have also beset or affected the other Asian
economies. And so the question remains: Why have they consistently
performed better than the Philippines?
Ernesto M. Pernia, Population: Does It Matter?
Revisiting an Old Issue, Philippine Star, August 16, 2003
Ferdinand Marcos, who strengthened the state in many other ways, was also
the first modern president to attempt to shape the familya basic
component of society that had hitherto been subject to Church leadership.
According to Herrin, the countrys first family planning program addressed
the negative consequences of rapid population growth on the attainment of
social and economic objectives. Recognition that the decisions of individual
couples affected the nation justified state intervention in providing
information and services as well as advocacy for a small family size.
The Marcos-era programwhich condoned and provided modern (artificial)
methods of birth control in opposition to Catholic Church teaching
benefited from the Church being deeply divided on how to protect its own
interests and continue to have the influence it thought it ought to over the
country. The situation turned around completely from the mid-1980s under
the presidency of Corazon Aquino. Aquino came to power with the strong
backing of the Catholic hierarchy and, more than simply owing it loyalty,
appeared comfortable with closeness to the Church. The resurgence of
Church influence over this issue was reflected in her administrations focus
on the rights of couples to determine the number of their children and was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution. Article XV, Section 3.1, states: The
State shall defend the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood.
In the following decade (19922001), the emphasis of population policy
shifted back to the effect of rapid population growth in constraining
socioeconomic progress, but because the program itself had been absorbed
by the Department of Health, the promotion of fertility/population growth
reduction was diluted by that departments emphasis on the promotion of
reproductive health. While not mutually exclusive, of course, the reality of
limited funding blunted the states advocacy of smaller families. Under both
Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada, however, the state endeavored to make
various means of birth control available to married couples who wanted to
achieve their desired family size. It is often pointed out that Ramos is a
Protestant and therefore personally less subject to Catholic Church influence.
Readers will also notice certain continuities between the state under Marcos
and under Ramos: Marcos militarized the country and maintained power
through martial law; Ramos, who was a senior military officer under Marcos,
also articulated a commitment to building a strong state. In contrast, the
presidents who followed Marcos (Aquino) and Ramos (Arroyo, after the
Estrada interlude) have been both personally pious and politically
dependent on Church support.
Arroyos administration continued to treat family planning as a health
intervention, specifically as an element of reproductive health. The
president initially took a tolerant position toward government promotion of
modern birth control methodsshe acknowledges using the pill herself
during her child-bearing yearsbut bitterly disappointed womens groups in
2002 by cutting the Department of Healths budget for purchasing artificial
contraceptives and further in 2003 by announcing that her government
would promote only the Catholic Churchs natural family planning method.
Arroyo defended her policy with the assertion that most Filipino mothers are
conservative Catholics who do not use artificial contraceptives.106 Yet the
governments own 2002 Family Planning Survey by the National Statistics
Office showed that half the Catholic women practicing birth control use
artificial contraceptive methods such as pills, IUD, injectibles and condoms
while 11.1 percent of them have resorted to permanent family planning
methods such as female and male sterilization. That Catholic women
generally are trying to limit family size is shown by the countrys falling total
fertility rate (births per women)from 4.4 in 1990 to 3.4 in 2000.108
Independent polling confirms public approval of the policy of reducing
population growth and the promotion of a wider range of contraceptive
methods, including modern artificial contraception, developments to which
the Church offers persistent and consistent opposition.
Given Arroyos personal beliefs and political indebtedness to the Catholic
bishops for their support after the May 2004 elections, her policy stance is
unlikely to change. When a congressman introduced a two-child
population policy bill in July 2004, the president reiterated her support for
responsible parenthood, enlightened birth spacing and free choice. She
rejected the majority view of other economists that curbing high population
growth was essential to economic growth: My priority now is not to deal
with over-population to overcome the challenges we face in social justice
and economic development but to go directly to the social and macro-
economic issues that strike at the root of these challenges. Arroyos views
were echoed by Mike Velarde, leader of the conservative Catholic lay group
El Shaddai:
The root of our problems is not population but corruption and
mismanagement of our resources. . . . When a father fails to use his God-
given talent, energy [and] resources wisely to feed his family, the tendency is
to blame the number of mouths to feed. When our leaders seem to run out of
solutions or simply lack the knowledge and ability to provide for the needs of
the people, they begin to conclude that the population, nay, the people is the
problem.
In support of the population bill, columnist Raul Pangalangan cites its aim to
provide timely, complete and accurate information and education on
reproductive health as well as ready access to safe, adequate and affordable
reproductive health care services. Pangalangan castigates those who
conclude that the government should leave parents alone without help,
without medical advice, without access to contraceptivesand conveniently
forget that the right to choose requires knowledge and informed choice.
Herrins recommendations offer some hope of breaking through this
impasse. He calls for the government to develop a stable policy consensus
on the issue, which would include opportunities for the Church and state to
work together: An example of actual cooperation between the Catholic
Church and local government units is the joint implementation of a Natural
Family Planning (NFP) Program in the province of Pangasinan. But in
addition to acknowledging the interests of the technocrats and the moralists,
Herrins approach has an important democratic component: There is a need
to listen to the larger, albeit unorganized and silent, constituencythe
married couples with unmet needs for contraceptionwhose consistent
views are well documented in nationally representative demographic surveys
and opinion polls.
The Filipino Diaspora
At the end of 2002, some 7.5 million Filipinos were living outside the
Philippines. Over three million were classified as Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), meaning that their stay abroad was tied to a work contract and they
were expected to return; another 1.6 million of irregular status were
largely overseas workers as well. The remaining 2.8 million were classified as
emigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries, although it is
impossible to draw a distinct line between temporary and permanent
residence abroad. Official OFWs fall into eight skill categories; the top three
in the 1990s were service workers, production workers, and technical and
professional workers. The growth of the service category in overseas labor
coincided with its increasing feminization, as the proportion of newly hired
OFWs who were women grew from 58 percent in 1995 to 72 percent in 2001.
This development mirrored the growth of the service sector in the domestic
economy and the fact that, at 64.4 percent of the working poor, women
constitute a significant source of surplus labor.
The state deploys the official OFW workforce by screening candidates,
processing exit visas, waiving income tax, and (as a kind of alternative tax)
collecting a fee for an Overseas Employment Certificate each time an OFW
leaves the country. Likewise, the state depends heavily upon these workers
for remittances that averaged 22 percent of the countrys foreign exchange
earnings from 1995 to 2000. Except for 3 years within the 19842000
period, Germelino Bautista reports, the level of remittances has steadily
grown, thereby accounting for the increasing difference between GNP and
GDP per capita, that is, between the countrys total income (which includes
remittances, loans, and other revenue from abroad) and the countrys
domestic production. Remittances as a portion of GNP increased from
0.07% of GNP in 1980 to 7.7% in 2000, or about $6 billion.114 By 2003,
remittances had reached the $8 billion mark.
Yet another way of measuring the OFWs contribution to the nation-state is
to calculate their proportion in the countrys total employment, which was
3.1 percent in 2000. That is to say, more than 3 percent of the nations
workforce, who would otherwise swell the ranks of the unemployed, found
work at their own expense outside the national economy, yet consumed a
substantial portion of their earnings (via their families) within the national
economy. Little wonder that the state calls OFWs the nations heroes and
accords them small courtesies such as dedicated immigration counters at the
countrys international airports (an Erap innovation).
But the state cannot discharge its debt with such easy measures. This is
because of the sacrifice OFWs make, especially women, a majority of whom
perform domestic work and cultural entertainment, health care and
nursing, where the pay is low and the nature of the work involves a higher
exposure to physical, sexual and other abuse. Accounts of such abuse strike
a sensitive note among the Philippine public, which feels acutely the double
weakness of the OFWs situationfirst forced by the weakness of the
Philippine economy to seek work in inhospitable circumstances and then left
without practical recourse because of the weakness of the Philippines
international standing. When the misfortune of a Filipino abroad includes
deaththe murder of an entertainer in Japan in the 1980s, the death by
execution of a domestic worker by Singapore in the 1990sit can become a
major public issue.
This happened again shortly after Arroyos election in 2004, when a Filipino
truck driver in Iraq was kidnapped by militants demanding the withdrawal of
Filipino troops from that country, where they formed part of the U.S.-led
coalition. Failing compliance, the militants promised to behead their hostage.
After a few days of unsuccessful negotiations, the Philippine government
acceded to the kidnappers demands, bringing home its small contingent of
troops a few weeks ahead of schedule. This concession to terror tactics
occasioned howls of protest and derision from U.S. allies such as Australia
and Great Britain, as well as quieter disapproval and a symbolic reduction in
aid from the United States itself. But it was seen as the proper course of
action by the vast majority of the Philippine public, which was no stranger to
politically motivated kidnappings and also the least opposed to U.S. foreign
policy among nations surveyed in September 2004. Why? It was not for the
sake of one Filipino hostage, Filipinos argued, but to prevent the 1.3 million
workers remaining in the Middle East from becoming targets of retaliation.
As Senate majority leader Francis Pangilinan acknowledged, the state owed
whatever help it could extend to its overseas workers, even at the temporary
expense of its alliances (see box 10.7).
Box 10.7. Why Philippine Troops Left Iraq Early
It was an American politician who once said that all politics is local. True to
that maxim, our decision to advance our troop pull-out by a few weeks also
was based on certain realities in the Philippines that may not have been fully
grasped by those who have been critical of the move. Angelo de la Cruz, the
man taken hostage, is one of 7 million Filipino workers scattered around the
world. These workers have families back home to whom they send their
earnings. . . . The sacrifice they make because the country has failed to
provide them with adequate means to take care of their families imposes a
special responsibility on the government. The government may not always be
able to be there for them. But when it is within its means to act for their
welfare, there is a heightened sense that the government owes them
everything it can do.
Francis Pangilinan (Senate majority leader), Why Manila Left Iraq Early,
Far Eastern Economic Review, July 29, 2004: 24
horrendous of conditions, sometimes shelling out his own minute resources to
buy his patients medicine.
Several issues are discernible in these exchanges. First, the newspapers
unthinking shift from hero to sellout occurred along class lines. While
schoolteachers forced to work as domestics earn the papers sympathy, a
move up the economic ladder through education and emigration elicited a
charge of betrayal. But the response was not so unconscious of class
categories: Many readers charged that the nations elite (for whom the
editorialist was a handy stand-in) had not delivered and therefore had no
right to be self-righteous about loving ones country.
Second, the growth of Filipino migrant communities throughout the world, in
conjunction with the internet revolution of the 1990s, has profoundly
affected the territoriality of Philippine nationalism. Whereas we have written
in earlier chapters about outsiders who resided inside the Philippine state,
we are now confronted with insiders who reside outside the state. Because
their billion-dollar remittances are crucial in propping up the Philippine
economy, Filipinos who work or have migrated abroad are less diffident
about making their views known about the problems and future of their
country.

Yet there is a great deal of ambivalence about the migration of Filipinos
abroad in search of economic security. In early 2004, a leading national
newspaper highlighted the case of a medical student from one of the
countrys poorest provinces. Elmer Jacinto, who topped the years national
examination for medical doctors, announced his intention to acquire a
nursing degree and pursue employment in an American hospital, where a
shortage of nurses was pushing up salaries and attracting droves of foreign
medical professionals. Jacintos action was met with disdain from
nationalists, and the Philippine Daily Inquirer editorialist called his decision a
sellout:
This is what we have come to in this country of our afflictions, where young
(28), bright (magna cum laude in Medicine) offspring of middle-class
professionals (teachers in mathematics, science and English), yet
unencumbered by the challenges of life (single, no children), throw in the
towel before even putting up a fight. What a sellout.
The tone of the Jacinto debate suggests a greater confidence in the voices
from the diaspora. And starting in 2004, those voices can be institutionalized
through the implementation of the Overseas Absentee Voting Law.
Registration was low for the 2004 electiononly 357,782. This included
157,000 in Saudi Arabia, 66,000 in Hong Kong, and 24,000 in Singapore, all
sites of concentrated overseas Filipino workers. Those who registered and
voted sometimes had to overcome significant obstacles. Domestic workers in
Singapore, for example, often have little access to information, a day off
only every other week, once a month, or once in two months, and no
transportation to the embassy, where registration and voting occur.
Professional workers are much more informed and able to vote. Will they
translate their exposure to competence and efficiency overseas into
influence over elections back home, demanding higher standards of
performance from the Philippine state? Or will they simply give up on the
Philippines?

Responses to the editorialmany coming from overseas on the newspapers

websitewere just as passionate and combative. Most overseas Filipinos
vehemently defended their right to seek better employment in countries
where their talents were appreciated. One wrote that immigration has
always served as the safety valve for countries that could not provide for
their own. Immigrants left their country behind because their country . . .
failed to establish the environment that created jobs and a dynamic
productive economy for the long run. One doctor noted that the Philippines
annual health budget was only 3.5 percent of GNPthe World Health
Organization recommends 5 percentthus holding the government partly
to blame for the exodus. Another writer faulted the countrys political
leadership:

I love the Philippines, sir. Our country simply made it impossible for me to
have the future my children deserved. I may be in a different country. At least
Im earning a living, I follow the rules, and I pay taxes and know where my
taxes go. I could be in the Philippines, pursuing a career in politics, stealing
the peoples money for my sons new [Honda] Accord. Sir, with all due
respect, between me and the corrupt politician, whos really selling the
Philippines out?

Others upbraided the newspaper for misplaced self-righteousness,

contrasting Manilas elite journalists with the medical student from southern
Mindanao:

Dr. Jacinto has every right and every reason to leave. He is not a wealthy
scion. He is not the son of newspaper owners and editors. While you were
sleeping soundly in your high-walled subdivisions, Dr. Jacintos village was
being brutalized by a gang of thugs (including even the Abu Sayyaf). While
you were traipsing around in ridiculous outfits at Manilas hippest parties, Dr.
Jacinto spent a [residency] year in the Philippine General Hospital caring for
the poorest of the poor. Long after you handed your token donations, Dr.
Jacinto was just starting another sleepless day of working in the most