Constitution Guide

Constitution Guide:
1. Borromeo Case
Administrative Law; Contempt; There can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of contempt,
for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and
judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of
justice.Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's
guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross
disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and
degrading the administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be
without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in
many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and
unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on
nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law;
he has insulted the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his
adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges
and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints,
pleadings and motions.
Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the power or duty of the court to institute a charge for
contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential
to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public.
It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against
itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or pros-
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* EN BANC.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo
ecuting officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from
litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and
judges obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in
order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent
to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges
by the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge
in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person.
Same; Same; The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious
litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees and other
persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them
into disrepute and disrespect.Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention
that in making the allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of
freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as
guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountability of
public officials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious
litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees and other
persons, for abusing the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them
into disrepute and disrespect.
Same; Same; Public policy demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest
and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute finality.To be sure, there may be, on
the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions
therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but
the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some definite
time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute
finality.
Same; Same; Judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other
agency, branch, department or official of Government.The sound, salutary and self-evident
principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest
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tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch, department, or official of
Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision
should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or
modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or conclusions of law,
flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and traditional
principle.
Same; Same; Should judgments of lower courts become final and executory before or without
exhaustion of all recourse of appeal they too become inviolable, impervious to modifications.
ln respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a
party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or
reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts.
Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special
civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, should
judgments of lower courtswhich may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals
become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they, too,
become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any
way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less
by any other official, branch or department of Government.
Same; Judges; Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders.Judges must be
free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors. They should not be
subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do
and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally
liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith. This Court has
repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no
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408
one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or
incurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called
for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Contempt.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241 SCRA 405,
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
2. Conducto v Monzon
Courts; Judges; Ignorance of the Law; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Election Law; Re-
election of a public official extinguishes only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability
incurred by him during his previous term of office.The findings and conclusions of the Office of
the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too
light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been continuously keeping abreast of
legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed the Bar Examinations in
1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as 18 December 1967 in
Ingco v. Sanchez, this Court explicitly ruled that the reelection of a public official extinguishes
only the administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of
office, thus: The ruling, therefore, thatwhen the people have elected a man to his office it
must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he had been guilty of anyrefers only to an
action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case, because a crime is a public
wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed by a public
officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but
to the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which
enumerates the grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office
as one of them, at least insofar as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is
only the President who may grant the pardon of a criminal offense.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions
of the Supreme Court is a commendable virtue of judgesand, of course, members of the Bar
comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where ones competence
may then be put to the test and proven.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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620
Conducto vs. Monzon
Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-
mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and
jurisprudential development [sic] in the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or
misread these cases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even cited the
cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of his 30 June 1995 order. What is
then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read these cases or that he simply
miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence, since
both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of
misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by
this Court. While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a
commendable virtue of judgesand, of course, members of the Barcomprehending the
decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area where ones competence may then be put to
the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. He should strive
for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification
of justice and the Rule of Law.
Same; Same; A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of
the nation.On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid
down in Ingco v. Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial
Governor, Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he simply wished
to enjoy the privilege of overruling this Courts doctrinal pronouncements. On this point, and as
a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People
v. Vera: As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege
of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to litigation, and judicial
chaos would result. A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the
position that
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Conducto vs. Monzon
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
Same; Same; By tradition and in our system of judicial administration, the Supreme Court has
the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution
and laws form part of the countrys legal system.In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, this
Court affirmed that by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, this Court has the
last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution and
laws form part of this countrys legal system. All other courts should then be guided by the
decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v. Cloribel warned: Now, if a
Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the
case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law
as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from the principle laid
down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays
and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge, still believes that he
cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position
that he could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art.
9, C.C.), and he has only one legal way to do that.
Same; Same; A judge should administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law.The last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a
judge to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of
law.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Ignorance of the Law. Conducto vs. Monzon,
291 SCRA 619, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1147 July 2, 1998
3. Macariola v Asuncion
Judges; Sales; The prohibition to judges from acquiring properties in litigation applies only where
the sale takes place during the pendency of the litigation.The prohibition in the aforesaid
Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to
the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that x x x for the prohibition to operate,
the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property
Same; Same; Respondent judge did not acquire property at bar during the prohibited period.In
the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-
E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final
because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the
lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March
6, 1965, respondents order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November
11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Same; Same; Incapacity of judges to acquire property involved in cases before their sala does not
apply where property was not acquired from any of the parties to the case.Furthermore,
respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot
1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more
specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes. Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
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* EN BANC.
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Macariola vs. Asuncion
Same; Same; Same.The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two ques tioned orders dated October
23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
Same; Respondent acted in good faith in approving project of partition without the signature of
the parties where the lawyers manifested that they were authorized to sign the same by the
clients.I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for
approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in
good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel
of record of Mrs. Macariola, that he was authorized by his client to submit said project of
partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true that such, written
authority if there was any, was not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo
appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was
presented as respondents Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to
believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
conformity thereto.
Same; While a judge may not have acquired property in litigation before him in the technical
sense, it was, however, improper for him to have done so under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his
court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: A judges official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach. And as aptly observed by the imvestigating Justice: x x it was unwise and indiscreet
on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that
was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of
which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an
exalted
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position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the
citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his
actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and
distrust.
Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Constitutional Law; The provision of the Code of
Commerce incapacitating judges and justices and other public officers from engaging in business
is part of Political Law.It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines,
it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the
government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Law defined.Political Law has been defined as that
branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the governmental
organs of the State and defined the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory
(People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces
constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce prohibiting certain public
officers from engaging in business activities is political in nature and has already been abrogated
with the transfer of sovereignty from Spain, to the United States and later to the Republic of the
Philippines.Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from
the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must
be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.There appears no enabling or affirmative act that
continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change
of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines.
Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals.
Same; Anti-Graft Law; A judge cannot be held guilty of violating the Anti-Graft Law where there
is no showing that he intervened in the business or transactions of a commercial firm.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the.
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where
respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was
held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a
similar prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene. (I)t is not enough to be a public
official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene
in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or
transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.
Same; Same; Same.It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation
gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondents financial
involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or
against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant
except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales,
et. al., wherein the complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9
or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when
respondent Judge was no longer
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connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Same; Constitutional Law; Judges are not prohibited from engaging or having any interest in any
lawful business.Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because
there is no provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an
existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in
any lawful business.
Same; Same; Same.It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact,
under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not
involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district judge
concerned.
Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Anti-Graft Law; Civil Service; Although Civil Service
regulations prohibit public officers from engaging in business without prior authority of his
department head, violation of such administrative rule does not constitute violation of the Anti-
Graft Law.In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant
to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging
in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department,
the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by
the Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by
a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a written permission
from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Section 12 of the Civil Service Act and RA. 2260, of the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations do not apply to members of the Judiciary.On the contention of
complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We
hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
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2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII,
do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: No officer or employee
shall engaged directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
Head of Department x x. It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member
of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judges are not officers or employees subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Civil Service Commission.However, judges cannot be considered us
subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial
Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil
Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260 [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or
second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a violation of
Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against judges
because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two
grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Only permanent officers in the classified service are subject to the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commissioner. Judges do not fall under this category.There is
no question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the
government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision.
We have already ruled that x x in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we
emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Same; Being an officer of a business corporation is violative of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
However, in the case at bar respon-
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dent judge and his wife sold their shares already without a short time after acquisitiona
commendable act.WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his
wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their
respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in
anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the
Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on
January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on January 31, 1967 from said
corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation
only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that
early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent
Judge and his wife therefore deserve commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the
firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation.
Same; It is but natural for a judge to believe that a person who publicly holds himself out as an
Attorney-at-Law is a bona fide member of the Bar.The respondent denies knowing that
Dominador Arigpa Tan was an impostor and claims that all the time he believed that the latter
was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent.
It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an
attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words Attorney-
at-Law (Exh. I and I-1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent and any
person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value.
Fernando, C.J.:
Took no part.
Barredo, J.:
I vote with Justice Aquino.

Aquino, J.:
I vote for respondents unqualified exoneration.

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Abad Santos, J.:
Took no part.
Escolin, J.:
Took no part.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Acts unbecoming a judge. Macariola vs. Asuncion,
114 SCRA 77, Adm. Case No. 133-J May 31, 1982
4. Republic v Sandiganbayan
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG); Armed Forces of the Philippines; The PCGG can only investigate the
unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who have either (a) accumulated ill-
gotten wealth during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their
public office or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationships, or (b)
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the
PCGG.The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in
Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth
during the administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family,
relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using
their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
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* EN BANC.
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Republic vs. Sandiganbayan
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Ejusdem Generis; Words and Phrases;
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos; The term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 and 2 refers to one
who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the
immediate family member, relative and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business association, dummy, agent or nominee in EO No. 2there must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.Mere position held by a military officer does
not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A
absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino
discussed this issue in this wise: A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will
readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO
No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation. Applying the rule in statutory
construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration
of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of
the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Register of
Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203]. [T]he term
subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO
No. 2. x x x It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official
or employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army
with the rank of Major General does not suffice to make the occupant a subordinate of former
President Marcos for purpose of EO No. 1 and its amendments.Ramas position alone as
Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major General does not suffice to
make him a subordinate of former President
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Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie
showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to
him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President
Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President
Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose,
and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379
without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its
amendments proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and
limited purpose, and necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and
limited purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth
was accumulated by a subordinate of former Pres. Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.
Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten wealth was
accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO
No. 1 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the
intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of
unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, while the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the
Solicitor General. The Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the
Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; The PCGG should have recommended the
instant case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of
ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases.After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz,
the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a
subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the
Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents
since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to respondents.
The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of RA
Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary
unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino: [But] in view of the patent lack of
authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for
violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding
with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the
powers granted to it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Jurisdictions, Waivers; Where there is no jurisdiction
to waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it,
then the respondent could not be deemed to have waived any defect in the filing of the
forfeiture petition by filing an answer with counterclaim; Parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at
any stage of the proceeding.Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any
defect in the filing of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with
counterclaim deserves no merit as well. Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents.
Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or
prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth
of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim
jurisdiction over a case. Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the
PCGG to investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they
learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August
1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October
1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of
the proceeding. Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is
vested by law and not by the parties to an action.
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Constitutional Law; Revolutionary Governments; Bill of Rights; International Law; The resulting
government following the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 was indisputably a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated
in President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done
in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution. The resulting government was
indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except
treaty obligations that the revolutionary government, as thede jure government in the
Philippines, assumed under international law.
Same; Same; Same; During the interregnumi.e., after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption
of the Provisional Constitution)a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of
Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights then.We hold that the Bill
of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum. However, we
rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of
the revolutionary government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent
and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum.
Same; Same; Same; Sequestration Orders; To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would render void all sequestration
orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution.To hold that the
Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum would
render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which
direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance
without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill
of Rights. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as
violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during
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the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; International Law; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant); Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration); Even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.Thus, to rule that
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum, absent a
constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary
government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rightsrecognized in the present Covenant.
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories
to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the
Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also
obligated under international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Declaration is part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant.The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its
obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.
Suffice it to say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law,
and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid
down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant
or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure
government, the revolu-
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tionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution
on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became
subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law
that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution
adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The Provisional Constitution served
as a self-limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers
entrusted to it by the people.
Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; A raiding team exceeds its authority when it seizes
items not included in the search warrant unless contraband per se.It is obvious from the
testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies, communications
equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not
particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority.
The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could
be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority
when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these
items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom
the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of
these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and
withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned
immediately to Dimaano.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Legal Philosophy; Revolutionary Governments; The question of
whether the Filipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum
between February 26 and March 24, 1986 is not as perplexing as the question of whether the
world was without a God in the three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He
rose to life.While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on
whether or not private respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against unreasonable search
and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence resulting therefrom compels this humble opinion.
The ponencia states that (t)he correct issue is whether the Bill of Rights was operative during
the interregnum from February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President)
to March 24, 1986
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(immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution).The majority holds that the Bill
of Rights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against
unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was searched and her
properties were seized during the interregnum or on March 3, 1986. My disagreement is not
with the ruling that the Bill of Rights was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that
the private respondent has lost and cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and
seizure and the exclusionary right. Using a different lens in viewing the problem at hand, I
respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is whether she can invoke these rights in
the absence of a constitution under the extraordinary circumstances after the 1986 EDSA
Revolution. The question boggles the intellect, and is interesting, to say the least, perhaps even
to those not half-interested in the law. But the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of
fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perplexing as the question of
whether the world was without a God in the three days that God the Son descended into the
dead before He rose to life. Nature abhors a vacuum and so does the law.
Same; Same; Same; Natural Law; With the establishment of civil government and a constitution,
there arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights, difficult though to
define their scope and delineation.With the establishment of civil government and a
constitution, there arises a conceptual distinction between natural rights and civil rights,difficult
though to define their scope and delineation. It has been proposed that natural rights are those
rights that appertain to man in right of his existence. These were fundamental rights endowed
by God upon human beings, all those rights of acting as an individual for his own comfort and
happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others. On the other hand, civil rights
are those that appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. These rights,
however, are derived from the natural rights of individuals since: Man did not enter into society
to become worse off than he was before, nor to have fewer rights than he had before, but to
have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his rights. Civil
rights, in this sense, were those natural rightsparticularly rights to security and protection
which by themselves, individuals could not safeguard, rather requiring the collective support of
civil society and government, Thus, it is said: Every civil right has for its foundation, some
natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to the enjoyment of which his individual power is
not, in all cases, sufficiently competent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The distinction between natural and civil rights is
between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those
which he throws into the common stock as a member of society.The distinction between
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natural and civil rights is between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering
into society, and those which he throws into the common stock as a member of society. The
natural rights retained by the individuals after entering civil society were all the intellectual
rights, or rights of the mind, i.e., the rights to freedom of thought, to freedom of religious belief
and to freedom of expression in its various forms. The individual could exercise these rights
without government assistance, but government has the role of protecting these natural rights
from interference by others and of desisting from itself infringing such rights. Government
should also enable individuals to exercise more effectively the natural rights they had exchanged
for civil rightslike the rights to security and protectionwhen they entered into civil society.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Natural Rights and Civil Rights, Distinguished.American
natural law scholars in the 1780s and early 1790s occasionally specified which rights were
natural and which were not. On the Lockean assumption that the state of nature was a condition
in which all humans were equally free from subjugation to one another and had no common
superior, American scholars tended to agree that natural liberty was the freedom of individuals
in the state of nature. Natural rights were understood to be simply a portion of this
undifferentiated natural liberty and were often broadly categorized as the rights to life, liberty,
and property; or life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. More specifically, they identified as
natural rights the free exercise of religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and press,
right to self-defense, right to bear arms, right to assemble and right to ones reputation. In
contrast, certain other rights, such as habeas corpus and jury rights, do not exist in the state of
nature,but exist only under the laws of civil government or the constitution because they are
essential for restraining government. They are called civil rights not only in the sense that they
are protected by constitutions or other laws, but also in the sense that they are acquired rights
which can only exist under civil government. In his Constitutional Law,Black states that natural
rights may be used to describe those rights which belong to man by virtue of his nature and
depend upon his personality. His existence as an individual human being, clothed with certain
attributes, invested with certain capacities, adapted to certain kind of life, and possessing a
certain moral and physical nature, entitles him, without the aid of law, to such rights as are
necessary to enable him to continue his existence, develop his faculties, pursue and achieve his
destiny. An example of a natural right is the right to life. In an organized society, natural rights
must be protected by law, and although they owe to the law neither their existence nor their
sacredness, yet they are effective only when recognized and sanctioned by law.Civil rights
include natural rights as they are taken into the sphere of law. However, there are civil rights
which are not natural rights such as the right of trial by jury. This right is not founded in the
nature of man, nor
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does it depend on personality, but it falls under the definition of civil rights which are the rights
secured by the constitution to all its citizens or inhabitants not connected with the organization
or administration of government which belong to the domain of political rights. Natural rights
are the same all the world over, though they may not be given the fullest recognition under all
governments. Civil rights which are not natural rights will vary in different states or countries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the
refurbished idea of natural right in the 1940s, eludes definitionthe usual definition that is the
right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs the question.
Similar to natural rights and civil rights, human rights as the refurbished idea of natural right in
the 1940s, eludes definition. The usual definition that it is the right which inheres in persons
from the fact of their humanity seemingly begs the question. Without doubt, there are certain
rights and freedoms so fundamental as to be inherent and natural such as the integrity of the
person and equality of persons before the law which should be guaranteed by all constitutions of
all civilized countries and effectively protected by their laws. It is nearly universally agreed that
some of those rights are religious toleration, a general right to dissent, and freedom from
arbitrary punishment. It is not necessarily the case, however, that what the law guarantees as a
human right in one country should also be guaranteed by law in all other countries. Some
human rights might be considered fundamental in some countries, but not in others. For
example, trial by jury which we have earlier cited as an example of a civil right which is not a
natural right, is a basic human right in the United States protected by its constitution, but not so
in Philippine jurisdiction. Similar to natural rights, the definition of human rights is derived from
human nature, thus understandably not exact. The definition that it is a right which inheres in
persons from the fact of their humanity, however, can serve as a guideline to identify human
rights. It seems though that the concept of human rights is broadest as it encompasses a human
persons natural rights (e.g., religious freedom) and civil rights created by law (e.g. right to trial
by jury).
Same; Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican
constitution and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution
would have nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their
experience of a republican governmenta Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also
included because the people had been accustomed to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past
organic acts.Aside from the heavy American influence, the Constitution also bore traces of the
Malolos Constitution, the German Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Spain, the
Mexican Constitution, and the Constitutions of several South American countries, and
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the English unwritten constitution. Though the Tydings-McDuffie law mandated a republican
constitution and the inclusion of a Bill of Rights, with or without such mandate, the Constitution
would have nevertheless been republican because the Filipinos were satisfied with their
experience of a republican government; a Bill of Rights would have nonetheless been also
included because the people had been accustomed to the role of a Bill of Rights in the past
organic acts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Because of the wide-scaled violation of human rights during the
dictatorship, the 1987 Constitution contains of Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the
peoples fundamental liberties in the essence of a constitutional democracy.Pursuant to the
Freedom Constitution, the 1986 Constitutional Commission drafted the 1987 Constitution which
was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, it
retained a republican system of government, but emphasized and created more channels for the
exercise of the sovereignty of the people through recall, initiative, referendum and plebiscite.
Because of the wide-scale violation of human rights during the dictatorship, the 1987
Constitution contains a Bill of Rights which more jealously safeguards the peoples fundamental
liberties in the essence of a constitutional democracy, in the words of ConCom delegate Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. It declares in its state policies that (t)he state values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights. In addition, it has a separate Article
on Social Justice and Human Rights, under which, the Commission on Human Rights was created.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Considering the American model and
origin of the Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurist and legal scholars
define and explain the nature of the Philippine constitution in similar terms that American
constitutional law scholars explain their constitution.Considering the American model and
origin of the Philippine constitution, it is not surprising that Filipino jurists and legal scholars
define and explain the nature of the Philippine constitution in similar terms that American
constitutional law scholars explain their constitution. Chief Justice Fernando, citing Laski, wrote
about the basic purpose of a civil society and government, viz.: The basic purpose of a State,
namely to assure the happiness and welfare of its citizens is kept foremost in mind. To
paraphrase Laski, it is not an end in itself but only a means to an end, the individuals composing
it in their separate and identifiable capacities having rights which must be respected. It is their
happiness then, and not its interest, that is the criterion by which its behavior is to be judged;
and it is their welfare, and not the force at its command, that sets the limits to the authority it is
entitled to exercise. (emphasis supplied)
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; The power to search in England was first used
as an instrument to oppress objectionable publications.The power to search in England was
first used as an instrument to oppress objectionable publications. Not too long after the printing
press was developed, seditious and libelous publications became a concern of the Crown, and a
broad search and seizure power developed to suppress these publications. General warrants
were regularly issued that gave all kinds of people the power to enter and seize at their
discretion under the authority of the Crown to enforce publication licensing statutes. In 1634,
the ultimate ignominy in the use of general warrants came when the early great illuminary of
the common law, and most influential of the Crowns opponents, Sir Edward Coke, while on his
death bed, was subjected to a ransacking search and the manuscripts of his Institutes were
seized and carried away as seditious and libelous publications.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Privacy; From Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616, 625
(1885), it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect rights to
security of person and property as well as privacy in ones home and possessions.When the
Convention patterned the 1935 Constitutions guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures after the Fourth Amendment, the Convention made specific reference to the Boyd case
and traced the history of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure back to the
issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance in England and the American colonies. From
the Boyd case, it may be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures, which is an almost exact copy of the Fourth Amendment, seeks to protect
rights to security of person and property as well as privacy in ones home and possessions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While there has been a shift in focus of the Fourth
Amendment in American jurisdiction, from protection of the individual from arbitrary and
oppressive conduct to protection of privacy rather that property, the essence of his right in
Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been understood as respect for ones personality,
property, home privacy.In the United States, jurisprudence on the Fourth Amendment
continued to grow from the Boyd case. The United States Supreme Court has held that the focal
concern of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the individual from arbitrary and oppressive
official conduct. It also protects the privacies of life and the sanctity of the person from such
interference. In later cases, there has been a shift in focus: it has been held that the principal
purpose of the guarantee is the protection of privacy rather than property, [f)or the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. The tests that have more recently been formulated in
interpreting the provision focus on privacy rather than intru-
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sion of property such as the constitutionally protected area test in the 1961 case of Silverman
v. United States and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard in Katz v. United States
which held that the privacy of communication in a public telephone booth comes under the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Despite the shift in focus of the Fourth Amendment in
American jurisdiction, the essence of this right in Philippine jurisdiction has consistently been
understood as respect for ones personality, property, home, and privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exclusionary Rule; It is said that the exclusionary rule
has three purposesthe major and the most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable
searches and seizures, the second is the imperative of judicial integrity, and the third is the
more recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United States Supreme Court which
is that of assuring the peopleall potential victims of unlawful government conductthat the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously
undermining popular trust in government.It is said that the exclusionary rule has three
purposes. The major and most often invoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and
seizures as stated in Elkins v. United States and quoted in Mapp: (t)he rule is calculated to
prevent, not repair. Its purpose is to deterto compel respect for constitutional guaranty in the
only effective available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it. Second is the
imperative of judicial integrity, i.e., that the courts do not become accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold . . . by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions. . . A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal
trial . . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while
an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur. Third is the
more recent purpose pronounced by some members of the United States Supreme Court which
is that of assuring the peopleall potential victims of unlawful government conductthat the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously
undermining popular trust in government. The focus of concern here is not the police but the
public. This third purpose is implicit in the Mappdeclaration that no man is to be conceived on
unconstitutional evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Invoking natural law because the history,
tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show adherence to it is an altogether different
story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition, the people are the source of all
government authority and the courts are their creationwhile it may be argued that the choice
of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact against which one cannot
argue.In deciding a case, invoking natural law as solely a matter of the judges personal
preference, invites criticism that the
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decision is a performative contradiction and thus self-defeating. Critics would point out that
while the decision invokes natural law that abhors arbitrariness, that same decision is tainted
with what it abhors as it stands on the judges subjective and arbitrary choice of a school of legal
thought. Just as one judge will fight tooth and nail to defend the natural law philosophy, another
judge will match his fervor in defending a contrary philosophy he espouses. However, invoking
natural law because the history, tradition and moral fiber of a people indubitably show
adherence to it is an altogether different story, for ultimately, in our political and legal tradition,
the people are the source of all government authority, and the courts are their creation. While it
may be argued that the choice of a school of legal thought is a matter of opinion, history is a fact
against which one cannot argueand it would not be turning somersault with history to say that
the American Declaration of Independence and the consequent adoption of a constitution stood
on a modern natural law theory foundation as this is universally taken for granted by writers on
government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It could confidently be asserted that the spirit
and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of government and the Bill of
Rights were concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA Revolution.It is also well-settled
in Philippine history that the American system of government and constitution were adopted by
our 1935 Constitutional Convention as a model of our own republican system of government and
constitution. In the words of Claro M. Recto, President of the Convention, the 1935 Constitution
is frankly an imitation of the American Constitution. Undeniably therefore, modern natural law
theory, specifically Lockes natural rights theory, was used by the Founding Fathers of the
American constitutional democracy and later also used by the Filipinos. Although the 1935
Constitution was revised in 1973, minimal modifications were introduced in the 1973
Constitution which was in force prior to the EDSA Revolution. Therefore, it could confidently be
asserted that the spirit and letter of the 1935 Constitution, at least insofar as the system of
government and the Bill of Rights were concerned, still prevailed at the time of the EDSA
Revolution. Even the 1987 Constitution ratified less than a year from the EDSA Revolution
retained the basic provisions of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions on the system of government
and the Bill of Rights, with the significant difference that it emphasized respect for and
protection of human rights and stressed that sovereignty resided in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although Filipinos have given democracy its own
Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political and legal institutions are American in origin; When
government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was established
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to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could be replaced
with one to which the people consent, and this highest of rights the Filipino people exercised in
the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.Two facts are easily discernible from our constitutional
history. First, the Filipinos are a freedom-loving race with high regard for their fundamental and
natural rights. No amount of subjugation or suppression, by rulers with the same color as the
Filipinos skin or otherwise, could obliterate their longing and aspiration to enjoy these rights.
Without the peoples consent to submit their natural rights to the ruler, these rights cannot
forever be quelled, for like water, seeking its own course and level, they will find their place in
the life of the individual and of the nation; natural right, as part of nature, will take its own
course. Thus, the Filipinos fought for and demanded these rights from the Spanish and American
colonizers, and in fairly recent history, from an authoritarian ruler. They wrote these rights in
stone in every constitution they crafted starting from the 1899 Malolos Constitution. Second,
although Filipinos have given democracy its own Filipino face, it is undeniable that our political
and legal institutions are American in origin. The Filipinos adopted the republican form of
government that the Americans introduced and the Bill of Rights they extended to our islands,
and were the keystones that kept the body politic intact. These institutions sat well with the
Filipinos who had long yearned for participation in government and were jealous of their
fundamental and natural rights. Undergirding these institutions was the modern natural law
theory which stressed natural rights in free, independent and equal individuals who banded
together to form government for the protection of their natural rights to life, liberty and
property. The sole purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve these rights. And
when government not only defaults in its duty but itself violates the very rights it was
established to protect, it forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could
be replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people exercised this highest of
rights in the EDSA Revolution of February 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; It is implicit from
the pledge in Proclamation No. 1 dated February 25, 1986 that the president and the vice
president pledged to do justice to the numerous victims of human rights violations that the
new government recognized and respected human rights.I shall first deal with the right against
unreasonable search and seizure. On February 25, 1986, the new president, Corazon Aquino,
issued Proclamation No. 1 where she declared that she and the vice president were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people and pledged to do justice to the
numerous victims of human rights violations. It is implicit from this pledge that the new
government recognized and respected human rights. Thus, at the time of the search on March 3,
1986, it may be asserted that the government had the duty, by its own pledge, to uphold human
rights.
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This presidential issuance was what came closest to a positive law guaranteeing human rights
without enumerating them. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a positive law granting private
respondent Dimaano the right against unreasonable search and seizure at the time her house
was raided, I respectfully submit that she can invoke her natural right against unreasonable
search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rights against unreasonable search and
seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and property.The right against
unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right to life, liberty and
property. Our well-settled jurisprudence that the right against unreasonable search and seizure
protects the peoples rights to security of person and property, to the sanctity of the home, and
to privacy is a recognition of this proposition. The life to which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established and consented to,
will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property
dates back even earlier than the modern philosophers and the American and French revolutions,
but pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence, thus it has
been described, viz.: The right to personal security emanates in a persons legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes
the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A natural right to liberty indubitably includes the
freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the private part of his beings and
the extent of his sharing; Truly, the drapes of a mans castle are but an extension of the drapes
on his body that cover the essentialsin unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes
and the invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to
keep himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy.A natural right to liberty
indubitably includes the freedom to determine when and how an individual will share the
private part of his being and the extent of his sharing. And when he chooses to express himself,
the natural right to liberty demands that he should be given the liberty to be truly himself with
his family in his home, his haven of refuge where he can retreat from the cares and pressures,
even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world, to borrow the memorable words of
Chief Justice Fernando. For truly, the drapes of a mans castle are but an extension of the drapes
on his body that cover the essentials. In unreasonable searches and seizures, the prying eyes and
the
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invasive hands of the government prevent the individual from enjoying his freedom to keep to
himself and to act undisturbed within his zone of privacy. Finally, indispensable to the natural
right to property is the right to ones possessions. Property is a product of ones toil and might be
considered an expression and extension of oneself. It is what an individual deems necessary to
the enjoyment of his life. With unreasonable searches and seizures, ones property stands in
danger of being rummaged through and taken away. In sum, as pointed out in De Los Reyes,
persons are subjected to indignity by an unreasonable search and seizure because at bottom, it
is a violation of a persons natural right to life, liberty and property. It is this natural right which
sets man apart from other beings, which gives him the dignity of a human being.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reflective grasp of what it means to be human
and how one should go about performing the functions proper to his human nature can only be
done by the rational person himself in the confines of his private spaceonly he himself in his
own quiet time can examine his life knowing that an unexamined life is not worth living.It is
understandable why Filipinos demanded that every organic law in their history guarantee the
protection of their natural right against unreasonable search and seizure and why the UDHR
treated this right as a human right. It is a right inherent in the right to life, liberty and property; it
is a right appertain(ing) to man in right of his existence, a right that belongs to man by virtue
of his nature and depends upon his personality, and not merely a civil right created and
protected by positive law. The right to protect oneself against unreasonable search and seizure,
being a right indispensable to the right to life, liberty and property, may be derived as a
conclusion from what Aquinas identifies as mans natural inclination to self-preservation and
self-actualization. Man preserves himself by leading a secure life enjoying his liberty and
actualizes himself as a rational and social being in choosing to freely express himself and
associate with others as well as by keeping to and knowing himself. For after all, a reflective
grasp of what it means to be human and how one should go about performing the functions
proper to his human nature can only be done by the rational person himself in the confines of
his private space. Only he himself in his own quiet time can examine his life knowing that an
unexamined life is not worth living.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; A revolution is
staged only for the most fundamental of reasonssuch as the violation of fundamental and
natural rightsfor prudence dictated that governments long established should not be changed
for light and transient reasons.Every organic law the Filipinos established (the Malolos, 1935,
1973, and 1987 Constitutions) and embraced (the Instruction, Philippine Bill of 1902, and Jones
Law) in the last century included a provision guaranteeing the peoples right against unrea-
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sonable search and seizure because the people ranked this right as fundamental and natural.
Indeed, so fundamental and natural is this right that the demand for it spurred the American
revolution against the English Crown. It resulted in the Declaration of Independence and the
subsequent establishment of the American Constitution about 200 years ago in 1789. A
revolution is staged only for the most fundamental of reasonssuch as the violation of
fundamental arid natural rightsfor prudence dictates that governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient reasons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is a natural right, the government cannot claim that a person
was not entitled to the right for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the
right at the time the search was conductedthis right precedes the constitution and does not
depend on positive law since it is part of natural rights; Even in the absence of the constitution,
individuals had a fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under
natural law.Considering that the right against unreasonable search and seizure is a natural
right, the government cannot claim that private respondent Dimaano is not entitled to the right
for the reason alone that there was no constitution granting the right at the time the search was
conducted. This right of the private respondent precedes the constitution, and does not depend
on positive law. It is part of natural rights. A violation of this right along with other rights stirred
Filipinos to revolutions. It is the restoration of the Filipinos natural rights that justified the
establishment of the Aquino government and the writing of the 1987 Constitution. I submit that
even in the absence of a constitution, private respondent Dimaano had a fundamental and
natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exclusionary rule is likewise a natural
right that can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution guaranteeing such right; To be
sure, though, the status of the exclusionary right is a natural right is admittedly not as
indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is firmly supported
by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history.We now come to the right to the exclusion of
evidence illegally seized. From Stonehill quoting Mapp, we can distill that the exclusionary rule in
both the Philippine and American jurisdictions is a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty for it is a necessary part of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which in turn is an essential part of the right to privacy that the Constitution protects. If the
exclusionary rule were not adopted, it would be to grant the right (against unreasonable search
and seizure) but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Thus, the inevitable
conclusion is that the exclusionary rule is likewise a
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natural right that private respondent Dimaano can invoke even in the absence of a constitution
guaranteeing such right. To be sure, the status of the exclusionary right as a natural right is
admittedly not as indisputable as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures which is
firmly supported by philosophy and deeply entrenched in history. On a lower tier, arguments
have been raised on the constitutional status of the exclusionary right. Some assert, on the basis
of United States v. Calandra,that it is only a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal
constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Along the same line, others contend that the right
against unreasonable search and seizure merely requires some effective remedy, and thus
Congress may abolish or limit the exclusionary right if it could replace it with other remedies of a
comparable or greater deterrent effect. But these contentions have merit only if it is conceded
that the exclusionary rule is merely an optional remedy for the purpose of deterrence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Without the strength of history and with
philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the exclusionary rights status as a fundamental and
natural right stands on unstable groundthe conclusion that it can be invoked even in the
absence of a constitution also rests on shifting sands.Unlike in the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, however, history cannot come to the aid of the exclusionary right. Compared
to the right against unreasonable search and seizure, the exclusionary right is still in its infancy
stage in Philippine jurisdiction, having been etched only in the 1973 Constitution after the 1967
Stonehill ruling which finally laid to rest the debate on whether illegally seized evidence should
be excluded. In the United States, the exclusionary rights genesis dates back only to the 1885
Boyd case on the federal level, and to the 1961 Mapp case in the state level. The long period of
non-recognition of the exclusionary right has not caused an upheaval, much less a revolution, in
both the Philippine and American jurisdictions. Likewise, the UDHR, a response to violation of
human rights in a particular period in world history, did not include the exclusionary right. It
cannot confidently be asserted therefore that history can attest to its natural right status.
Without the strength of history and with philosophy alone left as a leg to stand on, the
exclusionary rights status as a fundamental and natural right stands on unstable ground. Thus,
the conclusion that it can be invoked even in the absence of a constitution also rests on shifting
sands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exclusionary right is available to
someone who invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Constitution and the
1987 Constitution.Be that as it may, the exclusionary right is available to private respondent
Dimaano as she invoked it when it was already guaranteed by the Freedom Consti-
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29
tution and the 1987 Constitution. The AFP Board issued its resolution on
Ramas unexplained wealth only on July 27, 1987. The PCGGs petition for forfeiture against
Ramas was filed on August 1, 1987 and was later amended to name the Republic of the
Philippines as plaintiff and to add private respondent Dimaano as co-defendant. Following the
petitioners stance upheld by the majority that the exclusionary right is a creation of the
Constitution, then it could be invoked as a constitutional right on or after the Freedom
Constitution took effect on March 25, 1986 and later, when the 1987 Constitution took effect on
February 2, 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Revolutionary Governments; I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos
during the one month from February 25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their
rights, including their natural rights as human beingswith the extraordinary circumstances
before, during and after the EDSA Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a
constitution, but certainly not without fundamental rights.The Filipino people have fought
revolutions, by the power of the pen, the strength of the sword and the might of prayer to claim
and reclaim their fundamental rights. They set these rights in stone in every constitution they
established. I cannot believe and so hold that the Filipinos during that one month from February
25 to March 24, 1986 were stripped naked of all their rights, including their natural rights as
human beings. With the extraordinary circumstances before, during and after the EDSA
Revolution, the Filipinos simply found themselves without a constitution, but certainly not
without fundamental rights. In that brief one month, they retrieved their liberties and enjoyed
them in their rawest essence, having just been freed from the claws of an authoritarian regime.
They walked through history with bare feet, unshod by a constitution, but with an armor of
rights guaranteed by the philosophy and history of their constitutional tradition. Those natural
rights inhere in man and need not be granted by a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that borders the
miraculousit was the first revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and perhaps even in the
history of this planetand fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of its kind in this Court,
where history and philosophy are invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a positive law, but
to recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man.I wish to stress that I
am not making the duty of the Court unbearably difficult by taking it to task every time a right is
claimed before it to determine whether it is a natural right which the government cannot
diminish or defeat by any kind of positive law or action. The Court need not always twice
measure a law or action, first utilizing the constitution and second using natural law as a
yardstick. However, the 1986 EDSA Revolution was extraordinary, one that borders the
miraculous. It was the first revolution of its kind in Philippine history, and
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30
perhaps even in the history of this planet. Fittingly, this separate opinion is the first of its kind in
this Court, where history and philosophy are invoked not as aids in the interpretation of a
positive law, but to recognize a right not written in a papyrus but inheres in man as man. The
unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA revolution cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of man,
rights that antedate constitutions, rights that have been the beacon lights of the law since the
Greek civilization. Without respect for natural rights, man cannot rise to the full height of his
humanity. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 407 SCRA 10, G.R. No. 104768 July 21, 2003
5. Manila Prince v GSIS

Constitutional Law; Statutes; Contracts; Words and Phrases; A constitution is a system of
fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nationit is supreme, imperious,
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since the Constitution
is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious,
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Manila Prince Hotel us. Government Service lnsurance System
absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. lt prescribes the permanent framework of a
system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties,
and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental
conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any
norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the
executive branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and
without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and.construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.Admittedly, some
constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish an
outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery
and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision which lays down
a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-
executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision
is selfexecuting if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed
by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.
Same; Same; Same; Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
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Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System
executing.As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws
intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory
enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that
of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic.
Same; Same; Same; Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII
is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions.
Same; Same; Same; The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executingthe rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily
exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available.In self-
executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the
protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not neces-
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411
Manila Prince Hotel us. Government Service Insurance System
sarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by
itself, fully enforceable.
Same; Same; Same; A constitutional provision may be selfexecuting in one part and non-self-
executing in another.Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not selfexecuting. The argument is flawed. If the first and third
paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the
State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second
paragraph can only be selfexecuting as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.
Same; National Economy and Patrimony; When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified Filipinos shall be preferred.On
the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution
mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just thatqualified
Filipinos shall be preferred.
Same; Same; When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence
of any legislation on the subjectsuch right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance.And when our Constitution declares that a right
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412
exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Same; Same; Manila Hotel; Manila Hotel has become a landmarka living testimonial of
Philippine heritage.Manila Hotel has become a landmarka living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then
become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. It was
called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration
of the Philippine Commonwealth, Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine
Government it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.
Same; Same; Same; Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony.For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with
public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence
and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony.
For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter
for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the
51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
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413
Same; Same; Same; Filipino First Policy; Words and Phrases; The term qualified Filipinos as
used in the Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not
the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. The argument is pure sophistry.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
Same; Statutory Construction; Even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of judicial
remedy. The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that
the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite
disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provisionby the government itselfis
only too distressing. To adopt such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure
faithfulness to the Constitution, For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which
evidently need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of
a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out of the
failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of a person distinct
from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved
with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action.Respondents further argue that the
constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself
possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is
undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of
the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC
a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the
government are considered state action
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covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government
responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.
It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and
therefore subject to the constitutional command.
Same; Same; Same; When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State.When the Constitution addresses the
State it refers not only to the people but also to the government as elements of the State. After
all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of powerlegislative, executive and judicial.
Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional
injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a
government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
Same; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding; Since the Filipino
First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos, the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared the
winning bidder.It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only
be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts,
and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution
bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance
that the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not
bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the
1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
415

415
Same; Same; Same; Same; Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Filipino
First Policy constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules
issued by GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the Constitution.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it
should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules
be nullified for being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that
all laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate
the Constitution lose their reason for being.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a
higher, or even the highest, bidParagraph V.J.1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any
reason the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the constitutional mandate
itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive
of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
Same; Same; Same; Where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity.ln the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if
the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For,
while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a
perilous skirting of the basic law.
416
416
Same; Any person desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to
be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when
venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in
the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights
and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
Same; Statutory Construction; The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable, thus the
Supreme Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the
constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the
Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the
indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
Same; Same; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Nationalism; The Filipino
First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism, embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely
to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforcedso must it be
enforced.The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. lt is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be
enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will
never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of
this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far
from it,
417

417
the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the
preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper
governance of a free society, after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to
draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.Privatization of a business
asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further losses, regardless of
the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial,
nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court
will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is
nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the
Constitution is involved.
Same; Same; Same; Nationalism; Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines
being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and
from whom all government authority emanates.Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of
the Philippines being a democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino
people and from whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and
welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher purpose. Any
interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept. Protection of
foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Manila Hotel; Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a
significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture,
and in this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soula place with a history of
grandeur, a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.The
Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of
property in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of
the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We
418
418
are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role
as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it
has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soula place with a history of grandeur; a most
historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The conveyance of Manila Hotel, an epic exponent of the
Filipino psyche, to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver.This Court
cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmarkthis Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asiato a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for
some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn
from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hoteland all that it stands for
is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural
heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved
and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and
wellmeaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of
the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and
protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
PADILLA, J ., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; There is no doubt that the
Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves constitutional
protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation.There is no doubt in my mind
that the Manila Hotel is very much a part of our national patrimony and, as such, deserves
constitutional protection as to who shall own it and benefit from its operation. This institution
has played an important role in our nations history, having been the venue of many a historical
event, and serving as it did, and
419
419
as it does, as the Philippine Guest House for visiting foreign heads of state, dignitaries,
celebrities, and others.
Same; Same; Same; Bids and Bidding; The Constitutional preference should give the qualified
Filipino an opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the
preference of the qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.Now, a word on preference.
In my view preference to qualified Filipinos, to be meaningful, must refer not only to things
that are peripheral, collateral, or tangential. It must touch and affect the very heart of the
existing order. In the field of public bidding in the acquisition of things that pertain to the
national patrimony, preference to qualified Filipinos must allow a qualified Filipino to match or
equal the higher bid of a non-Filipino; the preference shall not operate only when the bids of the
qualified Filipino and the non-Filipino are equal in which case, the award should undisputedly be
made to the qualified Filipino. The Constitutional preference should give the qualified Filipino an
opportunity to match or equal the higher bid of the non-Filipino bidder if the preference of the
qualified Filipino bidder is to be significant at all.
Same; Same; Same; It is true that in this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign
investments in our country, stress is on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and
investment in the country, yet we should not preclude ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos
certain areas where our national identity, culture and heritage are involved.It is true that in
this present age of globalization of attitude towards foreign investments in our country, stress is
on the elimination of barriers to foreign trade and investment in the country. While government
agencies, including the courts should recondition their thinking to such a trend, and make it easy
and even attractive for foreign investors to come to our shores, yet we should not preclude
ourselves from reserving to us Filipinos certain areas where our national identity, culture and
heritage are involved. In the hotel industry, for instance, foreign investors have established
themselves creditably, such as in the Shangri-La, the Nikko, the Peninsula, and Mandarin Hotels.
This should not stop us from retaining 51% of the capital stock of the Manila Hotel Corporation
in the hands of Filipinos. This would be in keeping with the intent of the Filipino people to
preserve our national patrimony, including our historical and cultural heritage in the hands of
Filipinos.
420
420
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; In this
particular case before us, the only meaningful preference, it seems, would realty be to allow the
qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid.On the pivotal issue of the degree of preference to
qualified Filipinos, I find it somewhat difficult to take the same path traversed by the forceful
reasoning of Justice Puno. In the particular case before us, the only meaningful preference it
seems, would really be to allow the qualified Filipino to match the foreign bid for, as a practical
matter, I cannot see any bid that literally calls for millions of dollars to be at par (to the last cent)
with another. The magnitude of the bids is such that it becomes hardly possible for the
competing bids to stand exactly equal which alone, under the dissenting view, could trigger the
right of preference.
Same; Separation of Powers; Supreme Court; Judicial Review; It is regrettable that the Supreme
Court at times is seen to be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the
perception that it even takes on non-justiciable controversies.It is most unfortunate that
Renong Berhad has not been spared this great disappointment, a letdown that it did not
deserve, by a simple and timely advise of the proper rules of bidding along with the peculiar
constitutional implications of the proposed transaction. It is also regrettable that. the Court at
times is seen to, instead, be the refuge for bureaucratic inadequacies which create the
perception that it even takes on nonjusticiable controversies.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring in the Judgment:
Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; In the
context of the present controversy the only way to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos is to allow petitioner ioner Philippine corporation to equal
the bid of the Malaysian firm for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation.I take the view that in the context of the present contro-versy the only way
to enforce the constitutional mandate that "[i]n the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national patrimony the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos is to allow
petitioner Philippine corporation to equal the bid of the Ma-
421

421
laysian firm Renong Berhad for the purchase of the controlling shares of stocks in the Manila
Hotel Corporation. Indeed, it is the only way a qualified Filipino or Philippine corporation can be
given preference in the enjoyment of a right, privilege or concession given by the State, by
favoring it over a foreign national or corporation.
TORRES, JR., J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Manila Hotel; Bids and Bidding; The
history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the auction block of a purely business
transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical values of our people.I subscribe to
the view that history, culture, heritage, and tradition are not legislated and is the product of
events, customs, usages and practices. It is actually a product of growth and acceptance by the
collective mores of a race. It is the spirit and soul of a people. The Manila Hotel is part of our
history, culture and heritage. Every inch of the Manila Hotel is witness to historic events (too
numerous to mention) which shaped our history for almost 84 years. As I intimated earlier, it is
not my position in this opinion, to examine the single instances of the legal largesse which have
given rise to this controversy, as I believe that has been exhaustively discussed in the ponencia.
Suffice it to say at this point, that the history of the Manila Hotel should not be placed in the
auction block of a purely business transaction, where profit subverts the cherished historical
values of our people.
PUNO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; To determine whether a particular provision of a

Constitution is self-executing, a searching inquiry should be made to find out if the provision is
intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definite law, or if it needs future
legislation for completion and enforcement.To determine whether a particular provision of a
Constitution is selfexecuting is a hard row to hoe. The key lies on the intent of the framers of the
fundamental law oftentimes submerged in its language. A searching inquiry should be made to
find out if the provision is intended as a present enactment, complete in itself as a definitive law,
or if it needs future legislation for completion and en-forcement. The inquiry demands a micro-
analysis of the text and the context of the provision in question.
422
422
Manila Prince Hotel us. Government Service Insurance System
Same; Same; Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may
give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as selfexecuting, rather than as
requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not difficult to discern. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the
sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the
ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to constitutional rights but
congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Same; Same; A constitutional provision is not self-executing where it merely announces a policy
and its language empowers the Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be
carried into effect.Contrariwise, case law lays down the rule that a constitutional provision is
not self-executing where it merely announces a policy and its language empowers the
Legislature to prescribe the means by which the policy shall be carried into effect.
Same; Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations; Government Service Insurance System;
As a state-owned and controlled corporation, the GSIS is skin-bound to adhere to the policies
spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general welfare of the
people.The submission is unimpressive. The GSIS is not a pure private corporation. It is
essentially a public corporation created by Congress and granted an original charter to serve a
public purpose. It is subject to the jurisdictions of the Civil Service Commission and the
Commission on Audit. As a state-owned and controlled corporation, it is skin-bound to adhere to
the policies spelled out in the Constitution especially those designed to promote the general
welfare of the people. One of these policies is the Filipino First Policy which the people elevated
as a constitutional command.
Same; Only a constitution strung with elasticity can grow as a living constitution.The fourth
issue demands that we look at the content of the phrase qualified Filipinos and their
preferential right. The Constitution desisted from defining their contents. This is as it ought to
be for a Constitution only lays down flexible policies and principles which can be bent to meet
todays manifest needs and tomorrows unmanifested demands. Only a constitution strung with
elasticity can grow as a living constitution.
423

423
Same; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; The second paragraph of Section
10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alienit is pro-Filipino for it gives
preference to Filipinos but it is not anti-alien per se for it does not absolutely bar aliens in the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony.Thus,
we come to the critical issue of the degree of preference which GSIS should have accorded
petitioner, a qualified Filipino, over Renong Berhad, a foreigner, in the purchase of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel. Petitioner claims that after losing the bid, this right of
preference gives it a second chance to match the highest bid of Renong Berhad. With due
respect, I cannot sustain petitioners submission. I prescind from the premise that the second
paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alien. It is pro-
Filipino for it gives preference to Filipinos. It is not, however, anti-alien per se for it does not
absolutely bar aliens in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony. Indeed, in the absence of qualified Filipinos, the State is not prohibited
from granting these rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners if the act will promote the
weal of the nation.
Same; Same; Same; In implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the
Constitution, the stellar task of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between
two desideratafirst, the need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of
foreigners if necessary, and, second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos.In
implementing the policy articulated in Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, the stellar task
of our State policy-makers is to maintain a creative tension between two desideratafirst, the
need to develop our economy and patrimony with the help of foreigners if necessary, and,
second, the need to keep our economy controlled by Filipinos. Rightfully, the framers of the
Constitution did not define the degree of the right of preference to be given to qualified
Filipinos. They knew that for the right to serve the general welfare, it must have a malleable
content that can be adjusted by our policy-makers to meet the changing needs of our people. In
fine, the right of preference of qualified Filipinos is to be determined by degree as time dictates
and circumstances warrant. The lesser the need for alien assistance, the greater the degree of
the right of preference can be given to Filipinos and vice versa.
424
424
Same; Same; Same; Bids and Bidding; 1 submit that the right of preference of a Filipino bidder
arises only if it tied the bid of the foreign bidder.To date, Congress has not enacted a law
defining the degree of the preferential right. Consequently, we must turn to the rules and
regulations of respondents Committee on Privatization and GSIS to determine the degree of
preference that petitioner is entitled to as a qualified Filipino in the subject sale. A tearless look
at the rules and regulations will show that they are silent on the degree of preferential right to
be accorded a qualified Filipino bidder. Despite their silence, however, they cannot be read to
mean that they do not grant any degree of preference to petitioner for paragraph 2, Section 10,
Article XII of the Constitution is deemed part of said rules and regulations. Pursuant to legal
hermeneutics which demand that we interpret rules to save them from unconstitutionality, I
submit that the right of preference of petitioner arises only if it tied the bid of Renong Berhad. In
that instance, all things stand equal, and petitioner, as a qualified Filipino bidder, should be
preferred.
Same; Same; Same; While the Filipino First Policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does
not demand that we wrong an alien.We support the Filipino First Policy without any
reservation. The visionary nationalist Don Claro M. Recto has warned us that the greatest
tragedy that can befall a Filipino is to be an alien in his own land. The Constitution has embodied
Rectos counsel as a state policy and our decision should be in sync with this policy. But while the
Filipino First Policy requires that we incline to a Filipino, it does not demand that we wrong an
alien. Our policy makers can write laws and rules giving favored treatment to the Filipino but we
are not free to be unfair to a foreigner after writing the laws and the rules. After the laws are
written, they must be obeyed as written, by Filipinos and foreigners alike. The equal protection
clause of the Constitution protects all against unfairness. We can be pro-Filipino without
unfairness to foreigners.
PANGANIBAN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; National Economy and Patrimony; Filipino First Policy; Bids and Bidding; The
majoritys strained interpretation constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which makes
bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win.The
majority contends the Constitution should be interpreted to mean that, after a bidding process is
concluded, the
425

425
losing Filipino bidder should be given the right to equal the highest foreign bid, and thus to win.
However, the Constitution [Sec. 10(2), Art. XII] simply states that in the grant of rights x x x
covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos. The majority concedes that there is no law defining the extent or degree of such
preference. Specifically, no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and
equal that of the winning foreigner. In the absence of such empowering law, the majoritys
strained interpretation, I respectfully submit, constitutes unadulterated judicial legislation, which
makes bidding a ridiculous sham where no Filipino can lose and where no foreigner can win.
Only in the Philippines!
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner.
Napoleon G. Rama, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Perla Y. Duque & Francis Y. Gaw for Manila Prince Hotel
Corp.
The Government Corporate Counsel for G.S.I.S.
Yulo, Torres, Tarriela & Bello Law Office for Manila Hotel Corporation.
Jooaquin Bernas and Enrique M. Fernando amici curiae. Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government
Service Insurance System, 267 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

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VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 21, 1995

VOL. 291, JULY 2, 1998

VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982

VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982

VOL. 114, MAY 31, 1982

I vote with Justice Aquino.

I vote for respondents unqualified exoneration.

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5. Manila Prince v GSIS

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

VOL 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

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Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; To determine whether a particular provision of a

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 3, 1997

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