Mercado vs Manzano GR 135083 (May 26, 1999)
135083 May 26, 1999
Posted on October 1, 2012
GR No. 135083
307 SCRA 630
May 26, 1999
FACTS
Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent received the highest votes from the election but his
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that respondent
was not a Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and acquired US
citizenship by operation of the US Constitution & laws under the
principle of jus soli. However, he was also a natural born Filipino
citizen as both his parents were Filipinos at the time of his birth.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent is
both a Filipino and a US citien a dual citizen.
Under Sec.40(d) of the LGC, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
ISSUE
Whether under our laws, respondent is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his CoC and is thus disqualified from holding the
office for which he has been elected.
HELD
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws
of 2 or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art.IV) of our Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens to possess dual
citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born
in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of the latters
country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters
country, the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition.
The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec.40(d) and in RA 7854,
Sec.20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Consequently, mere dual citizenship does not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their CoC, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
G.R. No.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B.
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The
results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,2751
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,2 the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on
the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division
said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the
office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American
citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in
American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration
as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds
dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified
from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent
Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor
of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration.3 The motion remained pending even until after the
election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May
10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the
votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private
respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling
of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to
run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation
of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle ofjus
soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he
did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections
of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US
citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among
the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred
three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his
closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred
thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of
two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III
obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy
five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to
err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal
issues involving private international law which may well be settled
before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections,
257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the
resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering
the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and
proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the
winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when
he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of
majority when he was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered
himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming
that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private
respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado his personality
to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's
motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the
Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this
suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any
person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or
during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the
Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or
proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when
he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a
motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights
may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in
the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner
sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there
had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the
vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule
in Labo v. COMELEC,6 reiterated in several cases,7 only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified
candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the
time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May
20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under
40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted
the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City,
was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter
was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because
he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of
votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a
right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No.
6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the
COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion
for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting
private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private
respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether
he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought
under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local
position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is
incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through
40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed]
in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance
to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The
former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states.9 For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state
which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of
our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries
which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers
if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of
that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines
may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution
provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included
in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople
who explained its necessity as follows: 10
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a
dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere
double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages
or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship
at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists
of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-
Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the
Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall,
in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of
Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were
represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also
represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled
kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but
who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance,
either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern
expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of
guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner
Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on
our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan,
Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of
the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned,
owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It
can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital
famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly
consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS
INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO
LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of
these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern
about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance
under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a
freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which
implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is
defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship
including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State
when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those
debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number
of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October
10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of
allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit
of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern
about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance
which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I
appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the
determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from,
let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing
double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed
amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate
double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must
be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination
of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional
Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed
on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely
beyond our control." 12
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time
forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be
that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line
41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run
for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but
his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one
belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person
to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that
at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has
to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but
the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such
countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public
office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does
not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any
overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is:
Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only
one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine
law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the
Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises
acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then
he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization
must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject
or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and
compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid
or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies
within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The
latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department
of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to
require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to
exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and
at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will
and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
"effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so
that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and
that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private
respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent
renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind
349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States,
which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e)
Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power
given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by
filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post,
private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect
renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate
of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR
"NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY
SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF a dual citizen.
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was of his election of Philippine citizenship.
held: 17 His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and
the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
"had long renounced and had long abandoned his American who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December merit.1wphi1.nt
19, 1995: SO ORDERED.
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality
long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted
by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness
or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath
of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of
candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted
that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport
which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997.
There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy
on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him
can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality
before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court
said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private
respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino
and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is
an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still
a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either "express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is
a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
G.R. No. 142840 of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
May 7, 2001 the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a citizenship.
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
citizen. having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is
Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or citizenship.
Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine vs.
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO
in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. C. CRUZ, respondents.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through CONCURRING OPINION
repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of DISSENTING OPINION
Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by KAPUNAN, J.:
Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case,
of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for citizen."1
reelection. Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents.
with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2
a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
election. Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. of law reads:
HELD: petition dismissed SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose
YES his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however xxx
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed
enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the
reacquired by a former citizen: acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
1. by naturalization, country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with
2. by repatriation, and the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a
3. by direct act of Congress. Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
** circumstances is present:
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive
their citizenship due to: pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
1. desertion of the armed forces; (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; territory with the consent of the Republic of the
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and
5. political economic necessity taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to,
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not
his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or
natural-born Filipino. commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
R.A. No. 2630 provides: from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June
5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the
Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998
elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the
HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact
that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not
validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine
citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could
not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born
Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered
a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he
swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire
the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who
are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status
as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase
"from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and
none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino
citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has
(1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation
of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
qualifications17and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section
4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed
forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political
economic necessity.23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965
and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics
in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However,
he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by
rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces
of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in
the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said
oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in
citizenship. this case.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father.27 It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-
born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1)
a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to
perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of
Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those
who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they
also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as
natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen
who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to
be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction
over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
on the part of the latter.30 In the absence thereof, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision
of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the
latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for
certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 10:58 PM
G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon
and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only
to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law
era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of
valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local
elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the
laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the
alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to
drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA
No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the
province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador
Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo;
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20,
1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special
and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship
only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization,
he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival
against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines
after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He
also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being
in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within
ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper
party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said
section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses
but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its
Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits.
His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated
February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside
on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary
order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC
and at the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion
that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January
18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on
Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo
from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null
and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were
to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed
within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in
September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And
assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye
himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal
capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported
the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and
had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American
citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in
the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus
Election Code was not applicable because what the League and
Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the
termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he was not a Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines
because his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed
with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955
I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's
naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had
been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not
have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the
Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI
No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act
of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship
under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the
move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein
raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing
the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this
Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay.
Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital
principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction
over this question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress
and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on
Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC
through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims
that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him
after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval.
It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we
may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of
Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as
having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the
Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the
COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo
was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January
18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues
raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of
the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State
and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a
candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the
Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is
running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo
described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines,
omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence
shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by
Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October
20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and
issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly
admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it
was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution
of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one
of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree
that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization
was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he,
who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been
coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not
take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner
who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely
renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore
been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the
Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of
those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their
Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the
Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to
the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague
Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality
shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any
such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34
years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in
Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In
1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he
was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of
Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which
he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt
with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided
by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact,
even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national.
The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a
citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other
nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of
our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention
providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are
its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization
in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his
naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue
of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United
States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did
lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and
could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in
the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might
have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was
that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself
under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein
had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that
body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not
specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It
would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim
back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their
adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what
that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was
done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The
herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a
female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by
her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-
born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all
the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price.
But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it
is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and
unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G.
FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said
province once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a
Public Officer Dual Citizenship Labo Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival,
Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto against Labo as
Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified;
that he was naturalized as an Australian after he married an
Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not
make him an Australian; that at best he has dual citizenship,
Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian
when he married an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when
his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an
Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere technicality which
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for
him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote
in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event Labo is
disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence
presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian in 1976. It
was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It
was his act of subsequently swearing by taking an oath of allegiance
to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an
Australian passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he
was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino citizenship when he
swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost
his Australian citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his
Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be
declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this
happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his
lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the electorate is
not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio
have voted for Labo had they known he is Australian). The electorate
had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege
over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo
warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the mayor by reason
of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second
highest number of vote. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS
LARDIZABAL, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections
from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for
his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner,
he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public
respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter,
considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not
filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness
not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which
the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee
is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the
popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it
is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary
period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and the
challenge abated.
The petitioners position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of
Baguio City on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was
filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee
was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988,
or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself
alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed
only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary
period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the
election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial,
or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto
with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required
under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC
providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course
without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the
payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filing of
the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect,
specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid
out of time. In fact, he says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that
when he filed his Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for
Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or
Injunction on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-
proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No
docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on
February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as
solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19,
serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the
filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when
the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto
proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the
Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became
effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of
the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44
thereof. 3 These rules could not retroact to January 26, 1988, when
he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election
Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary
under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the
respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and
February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent
counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections
held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local
elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-
mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days alter its publication
as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform
Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section
30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the
Commission. The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that
the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as
extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the
assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that
Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took
effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the
February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Taada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the
resolutions became effective immediately upon approval simply
because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that
publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite
such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondents fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case,
we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for
the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however, this Court, taking into account the special
circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee.
However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a
reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case
shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above
prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding.
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the
petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the
filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his
alleged lack of citizenship as a futile technicality. It is regrettable, to
say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for
public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded
as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period
the petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally
raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto
proceedings against him.
However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more
important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest,
we shall directly address it now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case,
it would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be to
resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred
in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question should
indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended pleadings
of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial
justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon
such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the
allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and
unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the
interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the
record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to
end the basic controversy between the parties here and now,
dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway
affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6
xxx xxx xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court
and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct
procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the
proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been
pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112
SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
. . . it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive
to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root
or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will
be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from
there to this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals,
et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29,1988), we stated that:
. . . But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those
facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioners favor. There
is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of
Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change,
nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already
elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733;
Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber
Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco
v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste
of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government,
not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (of: Fernandez v.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-
up is that where the dictates of justice so demand . . . the Supreme
Court should act, and act with finality. (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA
1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34
Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court
act, and act with finality. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them
to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when
public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the
trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is
holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondents comment, respondent COMELEC
implicitly adopted as its own private respondents repeated
assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has
not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by reason of
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by
private respondent still pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly
on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative
decisions on the question of the petitioners citizenship. The first was
rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found
the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was
rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of
the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chairman Vicente
Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate, Savellano and Opinion
concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the
dismissal of the petition without prejudice to the issue of the
respondents citizenship being raised a new in a proper case.
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner
Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been
made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the
petitioners alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam
Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was
eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had
married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and
registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this country in
1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the
official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12,
1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still
an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in
1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by
virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the
Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983,
and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the
Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983,
do hereby provide the following statement in response to the
Subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition
for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No.84-
73). and do hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was
married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an
Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements
for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian citizenship by
Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian
citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: I. . . .,
renouncing all other allegiance . . . ., etc. This need not necessarily
have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the
citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in
Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in
respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates
to the giving of false or misleading information of a material nature in
respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such a
prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian
citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of
Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian
citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a
formal end voluntary act other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose his Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the
Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL
OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12TH DAY OF APRIL
1984.
DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed)
GRAHAM C. WEST
Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed
to the private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs
reading as follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform
you that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the
Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28
July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship
had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance which carries a renunciation of all other allegiance.
Very truly yours,
For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs:
(SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR
Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every
naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I
will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the
Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to
law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Australia and fulfill
my duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely
promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and
successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the Laws
of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above
evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport
No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980,
when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an
alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No.
B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from
immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted
Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also
categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number
of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and even sought to
avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was
a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts
as mistakes that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship,
although, as earlier noted, not all the member joined in this finding.
We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an
unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his
acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he
performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that
time and stresses Labos political affiliation with the party in power
then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed
because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be
dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as
the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear
that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed
his reply 20 to the private respondents comment. Besides, one of the
requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in
this case.
The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national
in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is
irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased
to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and
positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an
Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he
swore to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia. . . . , and to fulfill his duties
as an Australian citizen.
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made
him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against
the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable
to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that
under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization
in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter
between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the
fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and
willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country.
The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by
Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically
reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner
claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as
to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725,
providing that:
. . . (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship
may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying
with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of
Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after
which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration.
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected
his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present
claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections
on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not
even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his
alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of
Baguio City under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing
in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. (1) An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day,
a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city
or province where he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for
at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy,
and able to read and write English, Pilipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a futile
technicality that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of
Baguio City who elected him by a resonant and thunderous
majority. To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead
over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the
people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the
requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution.
The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual
owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may
have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency,
title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but
were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election.
The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although
elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Elections, 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival,
who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by
default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
then, 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their
vote. 25One was on official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, 27 which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in
Topacio vs. Paredes, 28 was supported by ten members of the
Court, 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, 30 another took no part, 31 and two others were on
leave. 32 There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can
be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes
is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the
winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified,
or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office
or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter,
if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was
alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride
in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more
than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him.
Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious
advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him material
and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be
sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and
transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But
having done so, he cannot expect to be welcomed back with open
arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself
disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the
country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total
and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not
be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered
to VACATEhis office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of
Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
David v. Agbay
G.R. No. 199113March 18, 2015Facts:In 1974, petitioner migrated to
Canada where he became a Canadian citizen bynaturalization. Upon
retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and
purchaseda lot where they constructed a residential house. Petitioner
filed a Miscellaneous LeaseApplication. In said application, petitioner
indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Agbay opposedthe application
on the ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to
own land.Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225. TheCENRO issued an order
rejecting petitioners MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-
acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA
which was void ab initio.Petitioner argues that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the samestatus under R.A.
No. 9225, he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost it at the
time of hisnaturalization in Canada and through the time when he
was said to have falsely claimedPhilippine citizenship.
Issue:Whether or not the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 to the date of filing
of application can beapplied to the case at bar
Held:No. Petitioner lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country. R.A. 9225itself treats those of his category as having
already lost Philippine citizenship, incontradistinction to those
natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A.
9225came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy
that considers Filipinos whobecame foreign citizens as not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read togetherwith Section
3 which clarifies that such policy governs all casesafterthe new laws
effectivity.Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA that
he is a Filipino citizen at the time of thefiling of said application, when
in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,naturalization
in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born
citizen loseshis Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225 sixmonths later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactiveeffect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015
RENATO M. DAVID, Petitioner, v. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the
Order1 dated October 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, which denied the petition for
certiorari filed by Renato M. David (petitioner). Petitioner assailed the
Order2 dated March 22, 2011 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro denying his motion for redetermination of
probable cause.
The factual antecedents:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian
citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, petitioner and his
wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they purchased a
600-square meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental
Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, in the
year 2004, they came to know that the portion where they built their
house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application3 (MLA) over the subject land with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) at the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) in Socorro. In the
said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.
Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the
ground that petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land.
She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public
documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (I.S. No.
08-6463) against the petitioner.
Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,4(R.A. 9225) as evidenced by
Identification Certificate No. 266-10-075 issued by the Consulate
General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his
application, he had intended to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and
that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property
from the Agbays who misrepresented to him that the subject
property was titled land and they have the right and authority to
convey the same. The dispute had in fact led to the institution of civil
and criminal suits between him and private respondents family.
On January 8, 2008,6 the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor issued its
Resolution7 finding probable cause to indict petitioner for violation of
Article 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information in court. Petitioner challenged the said
resolution in a petition for review he filed before the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
On June 3, 2008, the CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioners
MLA. It ruled that petitioners subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab
initio.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the meantime, on July 26, 2010, the petition for review filed by
petitioner was denied by the DOJ which held that the presence of the
elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant indictment of the petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
any proof that he gained or intended to injure a third person in
committing the act of falsification.9 Consequently, an information for
Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC (Criminal
Case No. 2012) and a warrant of arrest was issued against the
petitioner.
On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the Information and before
his arrest, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of
Probable Cause10 in the MTC. Interpreting the provisions of the law
relied upon by petitioner, the said court denied the motion, holding
that R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those who became
foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those who lost their
Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the governing law
was Commonwealth Act No. 6311 (CA 63). Since the crime for which
petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed on April 12, 2007 before he had re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen. Thus, the MTC ordered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
and for lack of merit, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12
In his motion for reconsideration,13 petitioner questioned the
foregoing order denying him relief on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction and insisted that the issue raised is purely legal. He argued
that since his application had yet to receive final evaluation and action
by the DENR Region IV-B office in Manila, it is academic to ask the
citizenship of the applicant (petitioner) who had re-acquired
Philippine citizenship six months after he applied for lease of public
land. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition15 for
certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the MTC. He asserted that first, jurisdiction over the person of an
accused cannot be a pre-condition for the re-determination of
probable cause by the court that issues a warrant of arrest;
and second, the March 22, 2011 Order disregarded the legal fiction
that once a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in
another country re-acquires his citizenship under R.A. 9225, his
Filipino citizenship is thus deemed not to have been lost on account
of said naturalization.
In his Comment and Opposition,16 the prosecutor emphasized that
the act of falsification was already consummated as petitioner has not
yet re-acquired his Philippine citizenship, and his subsequent oath to
re-acquire Philippine citizenship will only affect his citizenship status
and not his criminal act which was long consummated prior to said
oath of allegiance.
On October 8, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed Order denying the
petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the lower court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. At any rate petitioner
is not left without any remedy or recourse because he can proceed to
trial where he can make use of his claim to be a Filipino citizen as his
defense to be adjudicated in a full blown trial, and in case of
conviction, to appeal such conviction.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner is now before us arguing that
A. By supporting the prosecution of the petitioner for
falsification, the lower court has disregarded the
undisputed fact that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino
citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A.
No. 9225 he was by legal fiction deemed not to have lost
it at the time of his naturalization in Canada and through
the time when he was said to have falsely claimed
Philippine citizenship.
B. By compelling petitioner to first return from his legal
residence in Canada and to surrender or allow himself to be
arrested under a warrant for his alleged false claim to
Philippine citizenship, the lower court has pre-empted the
right of petitioner through his wife and counsel to question
the validity of the said warrant of arrest against him before
the same is implemented, which is tantamount to a denial
of due process.18
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that petitioners
argument regarding the retroactivity of R.A. 9225 is without merit. It
is contended that this Courts rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections19 and Altarejos v. Commission on Elections20 on the
retroactivity of ones re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship to the
date of filing his application therefor cannot be applied to the case of
herein petitioner. Even assuming for the sake of argument that such
doctrine applies in the present situation, it will still not work for
petitioners cause for the simple reason that he had not alleged, much
less proved, that he had already applied for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship before he made the declaration in the Public Land
Application that he is a Filipino. Moreover, it is stressed that in
falsification of public document, it is not necessary that the idea of
gain or intent to injure a third person be present. As to petitioners
defense of good faith, such remains to be a defense which may be
properly raised and proved in a full-blown trial.
On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of accused (petitioner),
the Solicitor General opines that in seeking an affirmative relief from
the MTC when he filed his Urgent Motion for Re-determination of
Probable Cause, petitioner is deemed to have submitted his person
to the said courts jurisdiction by his voluntary appearance.
Nonetheless, the RTC correctly ruled that the lower court committed
no grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion after
a judicious, thorough and personal evaluation of the parties
arguments contained in their respective pleadings, and the evidence
submitted before the court.
In sum, the Court is asked to resolve whether (1) petitioner may be
indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his
Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. 9225; and (2) the
MTC properly denied petitioners motion for re-determination of
probable cause on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused (petitioner).
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Sections 2 and 3 of said law
read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the
State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to
have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following
oath of allegiance to the Republic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I ______________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I
recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of
this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Emphasis
supplied)
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the
conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such conditions for two
categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second
paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country
who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after
R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required
for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became
citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different,
re-acquired for the first group, and retain for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos
who became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A.
9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is Retention of Philippine
Citizenship, the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms
re-acquire and retain to describe the legal effect of taking the THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). The title of the Senate version is
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also
evident from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and
retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall
be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was
lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country
is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its
title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the
provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other
countries and allowing dual citizenship,21 and also provides for the
procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the
case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect,
they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new
law.
Petitioner insists we should not distinguish between re-acquisition
and retention in R.A. 9225. He asserts that in criminal cases, that
interpretation of the law which favors the accused is preferred
because it is consistent with the constitutional presumption of
innocence, and in this case it becomes more relevant when a
seemingly difficult question of law is expected to have been
understood by the accused, who is a non-lawyer, at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense. He further cites the letter-reply
dated January 31, 201122 of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) to his
query, stating that his status as a natural-born Filipino will be
governed by Section 2 of R.A. 9225.
These contentions have no merit.
That the law distinguishes between re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship was made clear in the discussion of the
Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of
House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on August 18, 2003,
where Senator Franklin Drilon was responding to the query of
Representative Exequiel Javier:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
REP. JAVIER. I have some questions in Section 3. Here, under Section
3 of the Senate version, Any provision of law on the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after
the effectivity of this Act, shall and so forth, ano, shall retain their
Philippine citizenship.
Now in the second paragraph, natural-born citizens who have lost
their citizenship by reason of their naturalization after the effectivity
of this Act are deemed to have reacquired
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Prior to the effectivity.
REP. JAVIER. Well, you have two kinds of natural-born citizens here.
Natural-born citizens who acquired foreign citizenship after the
effectivity of this act are considered to have retained their citizenship.
But natural-born citizens who lost their Filipino citizenship before the
effectivity of this act are considered to have reacquired. May I know
the distinction? Do you mean to say that natural-born citizens who
became, lets say, American citizens after the effectivity of this act are
considered natural-born?
Now in the second paragraph are the natural-born citizens who lost
their citizenship before the effectivity of this act are no longer natural
born citizens because they have just reacquired their citizenship. I just
want to know this distinction, Mr. Chairman.
precisely retention and reacquisition. The reacquisition will apply to
those who lost their Philippine citizenship by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63. Upon the effectivity -- assuming that we can
agree on this, upon the effectivity of this new measure amending
Commonwealth Act 63, the Filipinos who lost their citizenship is
deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of the act.
The second aspect is the retention of Philippine citizenship applying
to future instances. So thats the distinction.
REP. JAVIER. Well, Im just asking this question because we are here
making distinctions between natural-born citizens. Because this is
very important for certain government positions, no, because
natural-born citizens are only qualified for a specific
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). That is correct.
REP. JAVIER. ...positions under the Constitution and under the law.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. DRILON). Yes. We can get to that later on. Its
one of the provisions, yes. But just for purposes of the explanation,
Congressman Javier, that is our conceptualization. Reacquired for
those who previously lost [Filipino citizenship] by virtue of
Commonwealth Act 63, and retention for those in the future.
(Emphasis supplied)
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior
to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of
natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his
Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the
time of filing his MLA, it is not necessary to discuss the rulings
in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such reacquisition
because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already
lost Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos
who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second
paragraph of which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after
the new laws effectivity.
As to the letter-reply of BI, it simply quoted Section 2 of R.A. 9225
without any reference to Section 3 on the particular application of
reacquisition and retention to Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
Petitioners plea to adopt the interpretation most favorable to the
accused is likewise misplaced. Courts adopt an interpretation more
favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that
penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in
favor of the accused.23 R.A. 9225, however, is not a penal law.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 17224 in relation
to Article 17125 of the RPC refers to falsification by a private
individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.
172 of the RPC are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or x x x x
employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an
Article 171 of the RPC; and affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an
(3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings,
commercial document.26 constitutes voluntary appearance.
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public
document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said x x x x
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under
CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases,
citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow
no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding probable cause processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over
for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1. the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit
The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner himself to the custody of the law.29 (Emphasis supplied)
accused as ground for denying petitioners motion for re- Considering that petitioner sought affirmative relief in filing his
determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed prior to his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC clearly erred
arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the in stating that it lacked jurisdiction over his person. Notwithstanding
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. 27 In Miranda such erroneous ground stated in the MTCs order, the RTC correctly
v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, this ruled that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MTC in
Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and denying the said motion for lack of merit.
jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading seeking WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8,
an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his Civil Case No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is
person. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was
already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, With costs against the petitioner.
petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SO ORDERED.
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to
the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing
for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail,
since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the
accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his
arrest or voluntary surrender.cralawred
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction
between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody
of the law is required before the court can act upon the application
for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought
by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or
voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused
is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be
under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.
On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when
an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in
the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby
deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient
to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the
ELLIS V. REPUBLIC
7 SCRA 962
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California and is
married to Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are
citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26,
1959. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the
Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mothers and their
babies stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without
bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption
of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition
on January 14, 1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been
in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as
staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.
Issue:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines,
petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
Held:
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines
and, hence, non-resident aliens the Court cannot assume and
exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality
theory or the domiciliary theory.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation.
Since adoption is a proceedings in rem, no court may entertain
unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case
and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal
status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein.
Art. 15 adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a
natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to
this theory, the Court has jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the
petitioners, who are foreigners.
Under the Philippines political law, which is patterned after the
Anglo-American legal system, the Court have, likewise, adopted the
latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, is
determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary
law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of
Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714).
This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit
adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused
to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce regardless
of the grounds upon which the same are based involving citizens
of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even
when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines
(Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22;
Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales,
58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)".
G.R. No. L-16922 April 30, 1963
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE,
MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees,
vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Leonardo F. Lansangan for petitioners-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and
Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28
years of age. On September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in
Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States.
Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan
Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her
with the Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mothers and
their babies stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose
without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.).
Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a
petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption
of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition
on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been
in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as
staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles,
Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in the
Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953.
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent
residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby
Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Non-resident aliens;".
xxx xxx xxx
This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. No matter
how much we sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the
good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but
to apply its explicit terms, which unqualified deny to petitioners the
power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem,
which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the
res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over
the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our
political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal
system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that
personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the
jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp.
713-714). This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not
permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently
refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce
regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based involving
citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the
forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the
Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30
Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)".
Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines
and, hence, non-resident aliens - we cannot assume and exercise
jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality theory or the
domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above quoted
provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over
the res or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to
grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so
held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v.
Republic L-15472 (June 30, 1962).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and
another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case.

VIVO vs CLORIBEL
FACTS:
This is a case of Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines for a
visit but who refused to leave. And one where the improvident
issuance of an ex-parte preliminary injunction, followed by judicial
inaction, actually extended the stay of aliens beyond the period
authorized by law, and even beyond what the visitors had asked for.
Private respondents are a Chinese mother, and her 2 minor
children,
They arrived from Hongkong and were admitted in the
Philippines as temporary visitors on October 1960, with an initial
authorized stay of three (3) months.
The husband and father of these aliens applied for
naturalization, and CFI granted his petition in 1961
The said temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite extension
of their stay.
By virtue of a Cabinet Resolution granting aliens concurrent
jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay of temporary
visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized (in 1961) the
change in category from temporary visitors to that of special
non-immigrants under the Immigration Law for a period of stay
extending up to 11 April 1963
The Secretary of Justice approved the extension thus authorized,
subject to the condition that the said aliens shall:
o secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two
months over and beyond their extended stay, and
o maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of
Immigration and to pay the corresponding fees.
But the petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to
recognize the said extension further than 16 June 1962, and
denied acceptance of payment of the extension fees.
The respondents requested the President to extend their stay up
to April 1963 in order to coincide with their hope for and
forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance of the husband/father.
The request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner.
The commissioner informed the respondents that the new
Secretary of Justice ruled in that the Cabinet Resolution had no
force and effect, and denied the request for extension of stay of
the respondents and advised them to leave the country
voluntarily not later than June 1962; otherwise, they would be
proceeded against, in accordance with law.
The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified,
but instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction, to
restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a warrant
for their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their
temporary stay and to order the Commissioner to implement the
extension.
The court then denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for
lack of a prima facie showing and set the case for hearing on 13
July 1962
On July 1962, respondents re-filed the same petition with the
same court. The petition alleged three grounds therefor, namely:
(1) the extension of their stay was authorized and approved by
the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were
due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the
granting of the husband/fathers petition for naturalization,
which had not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath
of allegiance on 11 April 1963; and (3) their departure from the
Philippines would work great injury and injustice to themselves.
The judge issued ex-parte and without hearing an order granting
preliminary injunction, and, on a bond of P3,000.00
The Immigration Commissioner filed his answer stating that:
o the visitors authorized stay expired on June 1962;
their change in category from temporary visitors to
special non-immigrants and the extension of their
authorized by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of
Justice was invalid as it is the Commissioner of
Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant
extensions of stay;
o the petition filed was not the proper remedy;
o the Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of
the father/husband and even if he will become a
Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically
become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that
she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
On 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case for
the unreasonable length of time that the petitioners had failed
to prosecute their case
But the court denied the motion to dismiss for being not well
taken.
On December 1965, the Commissioner filed with the SC an action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against
the respondent court
ISSUE:
WON Chua (the mother/wife) automatically became a naturalized
Filipino
RULING:
The court ruled that the wife, Chua Pic Luan, does not, under Section
15 of the Revised Naturalization Law, automatically become a
Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino
citizen, since she must first prove that she possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization.
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and
administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a
temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay
permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court processes
the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan
demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by
the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted
herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the
constituted government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival
on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed
to meet the required qualification of continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being
illegal. As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong,
our pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966,
18 SCRA 713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship if
dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalzation of the
parent.
Dwelling means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father
of respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of
citizenship their lawful period of stay had already expired and they
had already been required to leave, they were no longer lawfully
residing here (Kua Suy et al. v. The Commissioner of Immigration, L-
13790, Oct. 31, 1963).
Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous
with the result of the naturalization proceeding of their husband and
father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized stay was for a definite
period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the
termination of the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and
can not be set at a definite date.
G.R. No. L-25441 October 26, 1968
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as (Acting) Commissioner of
Immigration, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch VI, CHUA PIC LUAN, UY KOC SIONG and UY TIAN
SIONG, respondents.
Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor General P.
Pardo for petitioner.
Jose S. Zafra and Tomas B. Torrefranca for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is another case involving Chinese nationals who came to the
Philippines allegedly for a visit but thereafter refuse to leave. And one
where the improvident issuance of an ex-parte preliminary
injunction, followed by judicial inaction, actually extended the stay of
aliens beyond the period authorized by law, and even beyond what
the visitors had asked for.
The private respondents herein, Chua Pic Luan, a Chinese mother, and
her minor children, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, arrived from
Hongkong and were admitted in the Philippines as temporary visitors
on 16 October 1960, with an initial authorized stay of three (3)
months. The husband and father of these aliens, Uy Pick Tuy had
applied for naturalization, and the Court of First Instance of Manila (in
its Civil Case No. 43163) granted his petition therefor only on 11 April
1961. Meanwhile, said temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite
extension of their stay. Acting thereon, and purportedly in
accordance with a Cabinet Resolution on 29 February 1956 granting
them concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay
of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto
Serrano, on 16 May 1961, authorized the change in category from
temporary visitors to that of special non-immigrants under Section
47(a) (2) of the Immigration Law for a period of stay extending up to
11 April 1963; and the Secretary of Justice, Alejo Mabanag, on 8 June
1961, approved the extension thus authorized, subject to the
condition that Chua Pic Luan, Uy Koc Siong, and Uy Tian Siong shall
secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two months over
and beyond their extended stay, and that they shall maintain their
cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration and to pay the
corresponding fees. But the herein petitioner, Commissioner of
Immigration, refused to recognize the said extension further than 16
June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment of the extension fees.
Thereupon, the respondents, on 4 June 1962, requested the Office of
the President of the Philippines to extend their stay up to 11 April
1963 in order to coincide with their hope for and forthcoming oath-
taking of allegiance of Uy Pick Tuy. The request was referred to the
Immigration Commissioner. The latter, on 11 June 1962, informed the
respondents, through counsel, that the new Secretary of Justice, Jose
Diokno, had ruled in January, 1962 that the Cabinet Resolution of 29
February 1956 had no force and effect, and forthwith denied the
request for extension of stay of the respondents and advised them to
leave the country voluntarily not later than 16 June 1962; otherwise,
they would be proceeded against, in accordance with law.
The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified, but
instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction, docketed as
Civil Case No. 50671, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, to
restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a warrant for
their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their temporary stay
and to order the Commissioner to implement the extension
previously authorized and approved by Secretaries Serrano and
Mabanag.
His Honor, Judge Federico Alikpala, to whose sala the case was
assigned, denied the prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of
a prima facie showing and set the case for hearing on 13 July 1962.
On the said date, which was pre-selected with the conformity of
petitioner's counsel, said counsel did not appear but another lawyer
appeared to ask for postponement. Judge Alikpala denied the
postponement and dismissed the case without prejudice.
On 19 July 1962, the herein respondents re-filed the same petition
with the same court, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 50993. The
petition alleged three grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of
the stay of the petitioners (herein respondents) up to 11 April 1963
was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and
of Justice; (2) they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino
citizens by virtue of the granting of Uy Pick Tuy's petition for
naturalization, which had not been appealed, and he was due to take
his oath of allegiance on 11 April 1963; and (3) their departure from
the Philippines would work great injury and injustice to themselves.
As before, the petition prayed for a preliminary injunction. This time,
the case was assigned to the sala of herein co-respondent Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel.
On 21 July 1962, respondent judge, ex-parte and without hearing,
issued an order granting preliminary injunction, and, on a bond of
P3,000.00, issued the writ on 24 July 1962.
On 3 August 1962, the Immigration Commissioner filed his answer (as
respondent therein) stating, in defense, inter alia, that the visitors'
authorized stay expired on 16 June 1962; that their change in
category from temporary visitors to special non-immigrants and the
extension of their stay up to 11 April 1963 by the Secretaries of
Foreign Affairs and of Justice was invalid, as subsequently ruled by
their successors in office, and that it is the Commissioner of
Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant extensions of
stay; that the petition filed was not the proper remedy; that the
Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of Uy Pick Tuy and that,
even if Tuy will become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not
automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that
she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
Three (3) years passed without the case having been heard.
Then, on 14 September 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to
dismiss the case for the unreasonable length of time that the
petitioners had failed to prosecute their case, and that even the final
relief that they sought, which was to implement the extension up to
11 April 1963, had already expired. But, on opposition of herein
respondents, the court, on 26 October 1965, denied the motion to
dismiss for being "not well taken."
On 9 December 1965, the Immigration Commissioner filed with the
Supreme Court the present original action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, contesting the respondent
court's order of 21 July 1962 granting preliminary injunction ex-parte,
the writ of preliminary injunction of 24 July 1962, and the order of 26
October 1965 denying the motion to dismiss.
This Court required the respondents to answer, and on 16 December
1966, on motion of the petitioning Commissioner, it restrained the
private respondents from representing themselves to be Filipinos and
from exercising any of the rights and privileges of Filipino citizens,
until further orders from the Court.
The conclusions derivable from the foregoing chain of uncontested
facts are: that herein private respondents secured admission to the
Philippines as temporary visitors by falsely pretending to come for a
visit but, actually, with the intent to stay permanently; that, knowing
that their authorized stay would expire on 16 June 1962, private
respondents filed their petition in court for injunction, then delayed
its adjudication, the better to prolong their stay, and that private
respondents have thus succeeded in prolonging their stay in the
country even beyond the date that they had originally sought and
asked for, which was 11 April 1963, upon the respondent court's
compounded abuse of discretion, inaction and excess of jurisdiction.
Which was, in law, the expiry date of the respondents' stay: the 16th
of June 1962, as fixed by the Immigration Commissioner, or 11 April
1963, as authorized and approved by the Serrano-Mabanag
indorsements? This question, as well as the question of whether
temporary visitors may change their status to special non-immigrants
without first departing from the country, were specifically answered
by this Court in Lim Chiok, et al., vs. Vivo, L-20513, 26 December 1963,
in the following manner:
... The so-called Cabinet Resolution of February 29, 1956 did not
specifically authorize the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice
to extend the stay of temporary visitors. It could not legally do so
because under the express provisions of the Immigration Law, it is the
Commissioner of Immigration who is vested with the power and
authority to grant such extensions. And, the Cabinet has no power to
amend or modify the law. We so declared in Ang Liong vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (51 O.G. 2893)1 when we said: "The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is not authorized to admit into the
Philippines aliens for temporary stay, or extend the period authorized
by the Commissioner of Immigration for their stay in the Philippines."
Neither can the two Secretaries authorize the change of status from
temporary visitors to special non-immigrants. The law and our
decisions on the matter are clear on this point: temporary visitors
could not have their status changed to special non-immigrants
without first departing from the country. (citing authorities)
As early as 1956, in fact, this Court had already ruled that the period
of stay of alien temporary visitors could not be extended without first
departing from the Islands; and in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner
of Immigration (28 September 1956), 99 Phil. 1021, 1023, we ruled:
No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of Section 9
of the Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction"',
for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any
other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage
aliens to enter the Islands on false pretenses; every alien, so
permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should be, and
thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to
examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a
right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the
alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the
port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
That the Cabinet Secretaries acted as alter egos of the President, as
now claimed by the respondents, is not true; because the President,
when a request for extension was made directly to him, did not affirm
the acts of the Secretaries but referred the matter to the
Commissioner. The respondents knew that said Secretaries did not
act as alter egos of the President; otherwise, they would not have
written the President after they received the Secretaries'
indorsements. And when the Immigration Commissioner insisted
upon private respondents departing from the Islands, they did not
dare ask the President for relief.
The other reason given by the respondents to support their petition
filed with the court below is their expectation to follow the citizenship
of Uy Pick Tuy when he should take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen.2 Such expectation is legally baseless.
As to the wife, Chua Pic Luan, she does not, under Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen
on account of her marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since she
must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications for naturalization.3
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and
administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a
temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently;
and for having intentionally delayed court processes the better to
prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her
incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph
of Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of
good moral character and must have conducted herself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence
in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival
on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed
to meet the required qualification of continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16 June 1962 being
illegal. As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong,
our pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966,
18 SCRA 713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship "if
dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalzation of the
parent." "Dwelling" means lawful residence. Since prior to the time
the father of respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his
oath of citizenship ... their lawful period of stay had already expired
and they had already been required to leave, they were no longer
lawfully residing here (Kua Suy et al. v. The Commissioner of
Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963).
Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous
with the result of the naturalization proceeding of their husband and
father, Uy Pick Tuy, because their authorized stay was for a definite
period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the
termination of the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and
can not be set at a definite date.4
It is contended for the respondents that two-year old respondent Uy
Tian Siong cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be separated
from his mother; that husband Uy Pick Tuy has the right to fix the
residence of the family (Article 110), to the company of his wife
(Article 109) and those of his minor children (Article 316), and said
wife and chidren are obliged to obey and live with him (Articles 109,
311, 357); and that to make said wife and children depart from the
Philippines is destructive of family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These
arguments are beside the point. Said laws govern the relations
between husband and wife inter se or between private persons,5 not
the relations between visiting alien and the sovereign host country.
Respondents seem to have forgotten that they came here for a visit,
and, as visitors, they have no right to impose upon their host a period
of stay of their own choosing. Furthermore, being still aliens,6 they
are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the
nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country
(cf. Civil Code, Article 15).
The date insisted upon by the Commissioner as the terminal date of
stay of the respondents (16 June 1962) had already passed when
respondent judge issued his writ of preliminary injunction (24 July
1962). This fact should have cautioned him to issue notice to the
Immigration Commissioner and hold a hearing before issuing the writ.
But respondent judge never did hold a hearing, either on the
preliminary injunction or on the merits, so that it is mild to say that
his ex-parte preliminary injunction was improvidently issued. The
date insisted on by the repondents as their terminal date of stay (11
April 1963) had, likewise, long expired when the Commissioner filed
his motion to dismiss (14 September 1965) in the court below. Plainly,
the case had by then become moot and academic,7 and the court was
left with no further controversy to adjudicate. Hence, the respondent,
Judge Cloribel, whimsically and arbitrarily denied the motion, in open
disregard of the public interest and of the national policy expressed
in the Immigration Act.
Thus, the respondent judge, by refusing to dismiss the case, allowed
these alien visitors to remain in the country for as long as the case
remained pending in his docket; in effect, he abusively arrogated unto
himself the power to grant extensions of stay to temporary visitors, a
faculty that, under the law, belongs to the Commissioner. Thus,
respondent judge, instead of applying and interpreting the law, has
effectively disregarded the same and violated its policy.
WHEREFORE, the order granting preliminary injunction on 21 July
1962, the writ of preliminary injunction on 24 July 1962, and the order
of 26 October 1965, all issued in Civil Case No. 50993 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, are all hereby set aside, and the respondent
judge is hereby permanently restrained from taking cognizance and
assuming jurisdiction over said Civil Case No. 50993, except to dismiss
it as moot and academic. The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. Costs against private
respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
 MARCOS vs COMELEC did not overtedly abandon her domicile since even if living in
(residence and domicile, for purposes of election laws are Malakanyang, she constantly goes home to her domicile.
synonymous)
The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the Prior to this:
1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger
or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
The civil code provides that the wife follows the domicile of her
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office
husband.
to serve that community."
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the
same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition,
private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives.
Held:
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these
and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an
honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for
the residency qualification requirement. It would be plainly ridiculous
for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand, domicile
can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place,
there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is
also established in some other place.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves
reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of
the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the
absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law
cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, this Court
concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law,
regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
A Person cannot have 2 domiciles. As long as the Domicile was not
lost, it continues to be the same until replaced by a new one. Marcos
Valles vs comelec
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May
1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her
disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the
basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution
took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United
States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known
as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines
Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law,
Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000]
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions
dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition
for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles,
against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998
elections for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has
continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter
but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran
for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo
warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient
proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the
Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition,
ratiocinating thus:
A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned
resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary
proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and
consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the
Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the
contrary notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important
documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to
confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian
citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a
mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an
equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and
consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate,
nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of
her Filipino citizenship.[1]
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran
for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent,
Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA
No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her
Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by
the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an
issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in
the May 11, 1998 elections.Her candidacy was questioned by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a
Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to
dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above
table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-
066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and
incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having
put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature,
persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal
of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a
matter of course.
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters
and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive
explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by
this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission
RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in
its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present
petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a
public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was
married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso
jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the
COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066,
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective
position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent
is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate
of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and
circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or
subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had
renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had
her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified
to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private
respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the
private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must
comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under
Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public
office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since
the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her
alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent
has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified
to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred
in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under
consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner
of Immigration,[3] that:
xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court
or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship
of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship
on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses,
Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time,
what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal
organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These
were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens
of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined
Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside
therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled
to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the
United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish
subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided
for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who
cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the
insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons
residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States,
or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of
the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private
respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in
force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the
Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has
established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition
of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by
virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
1973[4] and 1987[5] Constitutions.Thus, the herein private
respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the
private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless
renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention,
petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of
an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one
years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a
foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of
the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by
virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his
nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such
renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the
application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This
issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC[6] and in the
more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.[7]
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that
respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the
fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen
in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a
certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just
assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express.[8] As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of
registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of
an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were
mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she
effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of
Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included
as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the
private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to
run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which states:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
xxx....................................xxx....................................xxx
Again, petitioners contention is untenable.
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified
dual citizenship as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution on dual allegiance.[9] Recognizing situations in which a
Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that
dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did
not automatically disqualify her from running for a public
office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual
citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon
the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship.[10] The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.[11] This is so because
in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent
was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro
of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the
alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent
must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an
issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy
Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.[12] He insists that the
same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the
principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on
the issue of citizenship.However, in the case of Burca vs.
Republic,[13] an exception to this general rule was recognized. The
Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res
judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must
be present:
1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim
Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on
citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on
these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler.[14] Indeed, there appears sufficient
basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in
SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of
citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented
in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence
or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC
Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively,
in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged
qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 3, 1963
FACTS:
Edward Christensen, who at his death was a US citizen but domiciled
in the Philippines, left a will, devising unto Maria Helen a certain
amount of money and giving the rest of his estate to Maria Lucy.
Helen opposed the partition on the ground that she is deprived of her
legitime. Her contention is that the law of California directs that the
law of the domicile (Philippines) should govern the will.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law or the domiciliary law should
apply
HELD:
The intrinsic validity of wills is governed by the national law of the
decedent. In the present case, the national law of Edward is the laws
of California. However, there were two conflicting California laws
regarding succession. One is enunciated in In Re Kaufman (which
does not provide for legitimes) and another is Art. 946 of the
California Civil Code (which provides that the law of the domicile
applies). SC held that the national law is Art. 946, which is the
conflict of laws rule of California. The reason is that In Re Kaufman
applies only to residents while Art. 946 is specific to non-residents.
Thus, since Art. 946 contains a refer-back to Philippine laws (the law
of the domicile), then Maria Helen is entitled to her legitime.
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No.
622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things
the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her
to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed
during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and
contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in
trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of
the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the
principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued
thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard
Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor
in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of
only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
(a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be
the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section
946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions
in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the
way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192,
cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death.
But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted
by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during which
time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year
1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the
United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some
nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country, and
came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon
liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to
the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs.
"MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now
in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila
on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of
California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never
to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between
which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in
it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient
connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however,
that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular
business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply
requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with
many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et
the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property
is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and
is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to
the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors,
thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws
rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is
the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system;
i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to
accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois
which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having
determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it
is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless
chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back.
Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of
Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-
round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid
this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and
at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal
law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only
way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject,
or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with
the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same
result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will
be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile
of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The
question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's
next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for
the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the
distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the
Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the
Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts statute
of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court
would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law
of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted
to as governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are
the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also
to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has been
considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject
of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to
be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the
forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account
the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict
of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules
of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the
American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in
an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531.
The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following
theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court
shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that
said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be
certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium
in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law
of nationality that is the English law he must accept this
reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and
leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the
law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will
be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The
rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of
Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as
in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the
doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The general
principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was
one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business
intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little
notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule
is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp.
442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946
of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference
or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court
of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government,
59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the
United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,

a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions
of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the

case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition
be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
 LLORENTE V. COURT OF APPEALS may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are valid in their
GR No. 124371, November 23, 2000 National Law. Thus the divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because
the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National Law
FACTS: since the divorce was contracted after he became an American
citizen. Furthermore, his National Law allowed divorce.

Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937

in the Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of
Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo Llorentes will and determination of
became a US Citizen. Upon his visit to his wife, he discovered that she the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.
was living with his brother and a child was born. The child was
registered as illegitimate but the name of the father was left blank. [G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
Llorente filed a divorce in California in which Paula was represented
by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings,
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA
which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together
F. LLORENTE, respondents.
for 25 years bringing 3 children. He made his last will and testament
stating that all his properties will be given to his second marriage. He
filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special DECISION
administrator of his estate. Before the proceeding could be
terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over PARDO, J.:
Llorentes estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion
for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the Court of Appeals, The Case
which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she
be declared co-owner of whatever properties, she and the deceased,
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
may have acquired in their 25 years of cohabitation.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of

ISSUE:
Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property
Whether or not national law shall apply? she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that
RULING: they lived together as husband and wife.

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, The Facts
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the
United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated. On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of
which the decedent was a resident. Second, there is no showing that
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued
New York State law.
in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York.[6]
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
(emphasis ours)

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the

Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the
Likewise, Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
divorced Paula. Such was also the situation when he married Alicia
the fathers name was left blank.[9]
and executed his will. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on
February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect
that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy
as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily
admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula
and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement
was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego.Paula was represented by counsel,
John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for
the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and
issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage
even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband
and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my
residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other
movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to
my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente,
in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever
located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-
Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines
Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R.
Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties,
whether real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded,
sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold,
ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of
this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of
the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or
testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in
any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any
manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with
respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed
respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his
last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the
trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage,
(3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp.
Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings,
the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-
888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the
newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision,
thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce
decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable
in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia
Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being
so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any
share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which
is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the
will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente
is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should
go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the
remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her
to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay
and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court
and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of
evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for
reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul
and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo
since they were not legally adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision
of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the
estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever
properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the
twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for
lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various
arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit
from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity
of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and
our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of
Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the
trial court called to the fore the renvoidoctrine, where the case was
referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case,
Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York
was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident.[39] Second, there is
no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard
of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with
the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the
factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second
wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other
issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is
SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in
favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will
and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed
with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased
within the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent)
are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in
which they are executed.
DJUMANTAN VS. DOMINGO
G.R. No. 99358 30 January 1995
Petitioner: Dyumantan
Respondents: Hon. Andrea D. Domingo, Commissioner of the Board
of Immigration, Hon. Regino R. Santiago and Hon, Jorge V.
Sarmiento, Commissioners Bureau of Immigration and deportation
FACTS: Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to
Indonesia as a contract worker. On April 3, 1974, he embraced and
was converted to Islam. On May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in
accordance with Islamic rites. He returned to the Philippines in
January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children
with Banez, arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter
made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during
his stay in Indonesia. When petitioner and her two children arrived
at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport on January 13, 1979,
Banez, together with Marina Cabael, met them. As "guests,"
petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940.In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. On March 25, 1982, the immigration status
of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April
14, 1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a
letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred
the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. The CID issued an order revoking
the status of permanent resident given to petitioner, the Board
found the 2nd marriage irregular and not in accordance with the
laws of the Phils. There was thus no basis for giving her the status of
permanent residence, since she was an Indonesian citizen and her
marriage with a Filipino Citizen was not valid. Thus this petition for
certiorari
Facts
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.Hethen embraced and was converted to Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez
then returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children
with Banez arrived in Manila as the guests of Banez. The latter
made it appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner
and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during
his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an Affidavit of Guaranty and
Support, for his guests. As guests, petitioner and her two
children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her children
were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina
Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and
petitioner. She filed a complaint for concubinage, however,
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit. Immigration status of
petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent
resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Banez eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently
referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the
ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen. CID
disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent
Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her.
Issue
Whether or not the Djumantans admission and change of
immigration status from temporary to permanent resident legal.
Ruling
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioners entry into the country and the change of her
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
All such privileges were obtained
through misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to
Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications
for temporary visitors visa and for permanent residency.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country. This right is based on the fact that since the aliens are not
part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a matter of
pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation
on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the
right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in
the Philippines.The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not
withdraw her from the operation of the immigration laws governing
the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman
to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country
upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitors
visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an
indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a
change of status and may be admitted as a permanent resident.
Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency
if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into
the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of
right, even if they are legally married to Filipino citizens.
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of
petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
I for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10). However, she a
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as
a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May
17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He
returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in Manila
as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a
friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the
hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with
Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his
"guests," stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the Philippines of Mrs.
Djumantan, 42 years old, and her two minor children, MARINA, 2
years old, and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian citizens, who are
coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of gratitude to their family for
the hospitality they have accorded me during the few years that I
have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens and I guaranty their
behavior while they are in the Philippines; I also guaranty their
support and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon the termination of the
authorized stay granted them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of
Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with
the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two.
This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was changed
from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident under Section
13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner was issued an
alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred the
letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the
deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a cash
bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the CID that
she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines and asked
change of heart and moved for the dismissal of the deportation case
on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino citizen (Rollo,
pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through public
respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws
of the Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously
granted to her (Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in
their Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public
respondents to cease and desist from executing or implementing the
Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated January
29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father
died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother were
withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent resident
visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under Article
27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice
of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise, she argues that
under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 68 of
the Family Code and Article 34 of the Muslim Code, the husband and
wife are obliged to live together and under Article 110 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, the husband is given the right to fix the
conjugal residence. She claims that public respondents have no right
to order the couple to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General took
the position that the CID could not order petitioner's deportation
because its power to do so had prescribed under Section 37 (b) of the
Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if
under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable
alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Therefore, to be
first resolved is the question on petitioner's immigration status,
particularly the legality of her admission into the country and the
change of her status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
Upon a finding that she was not lawfully admitted into the country
and she did not lawfully acquire permanent residency, the next
question is whether the power to deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner's entry into the country and the change of her immigration
status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such
privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's visa
and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion on
the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities
would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to
have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3 SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the
country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is based on the fact that
since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the
territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them
to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to
continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as Congress
may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shauhnessy
180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the
right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in
the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission
and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shauhnessy,
338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations,
71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does
not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her
from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her
extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362
[1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory
for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once
admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily may
apply for a change of status and "may be admitted" as a permanent
resident. Among those considered qualified to apply for permanent
residency if the wife or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration
Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their
admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are
legally married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the
right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed, citing
Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be
effected under any clause unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five years after the cause for deportation
arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the
court, or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend
to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported
(As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof
provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by
him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act by means of false and misleading statements or without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a
designating port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this
Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this Act, is convicted in
the Philippines and sentenced for a term of one year or more for a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after his
entry, is so convicted and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for a violation of the law
governing prohibited drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an inmate of a house of
prostitution or is connected with the management of a house of
prostitution, or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge within five years after entry
from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent to
entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted a non-
immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the
overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the
Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in
or is opposed to organized government, or who advises, advocates,
or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials because of
their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful
destruction of property, or who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or
who on any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or
otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts described in Sections forty- Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:
five and forty-six of this Act, independent of criminal action which
may be brought against him: Provided, That in the case of an alien Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7,
who, for any reason, is convicted and sentenced to suffer both 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2,
imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall first serve the entire 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does not apply.
period of his imprisonment before he is actually deported: Provided,
however, That the imprisonment may be waived by the Commissioner
In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted that
of Immigration with the consent of the Department Head, and upon
she had gained entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by making
payment by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner
use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other than that of
may fix and approved by the Department Head, and upon payment
her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that she could no
by the alien concerned of such amount as the Commissioner may fix
longer be deported "for the simple reason that more than 5 years had
and approved by the Department Head (as amended by R.A. No. 144);
elapsed from the date of her admission."

10) Any alien who, at any time within five years after entry, shall have
been convicted of violating the provisions of the Philippine
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and fifty-three, otherwise
known as the Philippine Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic
Act No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall have been
convicted more than once of violating the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-
marketing, independent of any criminal action which may be brought
against him;
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on
January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements in
her application and in the other supporting documents submitted to
the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with
the CID on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was
admitted into the country and asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp.
77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-up letter to the
CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and seventy-three,
Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of petitioner
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
into the country, more than five years had elapsed before the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;
issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.

13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by absconding or alienating

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred
properties, to prevent them from being attached or executed.
under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed that
what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but merely
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the Philippines the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously
after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading granted her (Rollo, p. 102).
statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at
The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for
a designated port of entry" is subject to deportation.
the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the
arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has a in the country. When public respondents revoked the permanent
prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the arrest in residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest
the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause and deportation as an overstaying alien.
for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of alien order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.
from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53
S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR 1282).
The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27,
1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.
we held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940, the
deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of five years
SO ORDERED.
after the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano, in his
dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law as
follows:

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five
(5) year limitation is applicable only where deportation is sought to
be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8,
11 and 12; that where deportation or exclusion is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no period of limitation is
applicable; and that to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be
effected "at any time after entry."
G.R. No. L-24530 October 31, 1968
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioners, vs. BEATO
GO CALLANO, MANUEL GO CALLANO, GONZALO GO
CALLANO, JULIO GO CALLANO and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On July 13, 1962, the Department of Foreign Affairs informed
the Commissioner of Immigration that, on the basis of the
findings made by the National Bureau of Investigation, the
signatures of former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto M.
Serrano, on certain documents, amongst them cable
authorization No. 2230-V (File No. 23617) authorizing the
documentation of Beato Go Callano and others, were not
authentic. Thereupon, the Department declared several
documents among them the cable authorization just mentioned
to be null, void and of no effect, and the documentation made
by the Philippine Consulate General at Hongkong pursuant to
said cable authorization consisting of the certificates of
registration and identity issued to Beato Go Callano and his
brothers Manuel, Gonzalo and Julio for travel to the Philippines
were cancelled. All this was done without previous notice
served nor hearing granted to said parties.
On August 21 of the same year, the Board of Immigration
Commissioners, exercising its power of review under Section
27 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, issued,
also without any previous notice and hearing, an order
reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated
January 4, 1962, admitting Beato and his three brothers for
entry as citizens; ordering their exclusion as aliens not properly
documented for admission pursuant to Section 27 (a) (17) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, and
ordering that they be returned to the port whence they came or
to the country of which they were nationals, upon the ground
that they had been able "to enter this country and gain
admission as Filipino citizens by the fraudulently secured
authorization." On the same date (August 21, 1962) the
Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion
commanding the deportation officer "to carry out the exclusion
of the above-named applicants (the Go Callano brothers) on
the first available transportation and on the same class of
accommodation in which they arrived to the port whence they
came or to the country of which they are nationals."
The warrant of exclusion, for one reason or another, was not
served immediately upon the parties ordered deported, who,
on November 16, 1962, filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for injunction to restrain the Board of
Immigration Commissioners and the Commissioner of
Immigration from executing the order of exclusion or
deportation already mentioned. They based their action on the
following grounds: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to
exclude them from the Philippines because they were not
aliens but Filipino citizens, and (2) that the order of exclusion
was issued by the Board without due process and in violation
of the Constitution. Months later, the Court of First Instance
issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
respondents in the case from deporting the petitioners. After
trial, the Court rendered judgment finding that, according to
petitioners' undisputed evidence, "the petitioners herein are the
illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, with
her common-law husband a Chinese citizen," and
concluding that "until the petitioners left for China in 1947, they
must be considered as citizens of the Philippines as they were
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father who, however,
was not married to their mother."
Notwithstanding the above finding and conclusion, however,
the Court dismissed the case holding that "the petitioners are
citizens of the Republic of China and not being properly
documented for entry into the Philippines as found by the
Immigration Commissioner, the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued by this Court shall be deemed dissolved
upon finality of this decision." The grounds upon which the
Court based its decision were: (1) because petitioners stayed
in China for a period of fifteen years before returning to the
Philippines, they must be considered as citizens of the Chinese
Republic; (2) as petitioners were recognized by their alien
father as his children, they became Chinese citizens under the
Chinese law of nationality. While the Court also found that the
cable authorization mentioned heretofore was a forgery, it held
that, for the purpose of the petition before it, "it was immaterial
to determine the genuineness or falsity of the cable
authorization. For if the petitioners are Filipino citizens, they
are entitled to remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Republic in whatever way they might have entered."
After the denial of herein respondents' motion for re-
consideration, they appealed to the Court of Appeals where
they raised the following issues: (a) that being Filipino citizens
by birth, they did not lose their citizenship nor acquire Chinese
citizenship, neither by their prolonged stay in China nor by their
alleged recognition by their Chinese father, and (b) that the
cablegram authorization was not a forgery.
In due time the Court of Appeals rendered the decision now
under review by certiorari, reversing that of the lower court.
Like the court of origin, the Court of Appeals found that herein
respondents were the illegitimate children of Go Chiao Lin, a
Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen, who
started living maritally in Malitbog, Leyte, in 1934; that out of
their illegitimate union were born the following: Beato, in
Sugod, Leyte, on September 28, 1936; Manuel, in Libagon,
Leyte, on June 17, 1941; Gonzalo, in Malitbog, Leyte, on April
17, 1943, and Julio in Malitbog, Leyte, on January 31, 1945.
The Court of Appeals also found that in 1946, Go Chiao Lin,
Emilia and their four sons went to Amoy, China, on vacation,
but Go died there the same year. In 1948, Emilia had to return
to the Philippines as the maid of Consul Eutiquio Sta. Romana
because she was penniless, leaving her children behind.
Subsequently the latter were able to go to Hongkong, where
they sought and obtained employment. In 1961, they applied
with the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong for entry into
the Philippines as Filipino citizens. On December 12 of that
year, the Consulate received a cablegram from the Department
of Foreign Affairs authorizing it to investigate whether the
petitioners for entry were the illegitimate children of Emilia
Callano a Filipino citizen, and, if satisfied, after a thorough
screening, to issue the corresponding document certifying that
they were Filipino citizens. The Consulate made thereafter the
appropriate investigation, and on the basis of evidence
presented consisting of the sworn statements of the applicants,
their birth certificates and blood test reports, said office issued
late that month a certificate of registration and identity to the
effect that the applicant had submitted sufficient evidence of
their citizenship and identity and had been allowed to register
in the Consulate as Filipino citizens and to travel directly to the
Philippines.
On December 26 of the same year 1961, they arrived in Manila
by plane from Hongkong. As the Immigration Inspector at the
airport was of the opinion that their travel documents did not
constitute conclusive proof of citizenship, he referred their case
to the Board of Special Inquiry No. 2. Thereupon the latter
conducted an investigation at which the respondents presented
oral and documentary evidence to sustain their right to
admission as Filipinos (Exhs. B, D, E and H; pp. 93-98; 99-
100; 101-102; 104 of the Record). Upon these evidence, the
Board on January 4, 1962, promulgated a decision finding the
Go Callano brothers to be the illegitimate children of Emilia
Callano, a Filipino citizen, and entitled to admission, as they
were in fact admitted, as Filipino citizens.
That Go Chiao Lin, a Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano a
Filipino, lived maritally in several municipalities of Leyte since
1934 and that out of their union the four private respondents
were born, are facts found, after appropriate proceedings, first,
by the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong; second, by
the Board of Special Inquiry who investigated their case in
Manila upon their arrival thereat in 1961; third, by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and lastly, by the Court of Appeals.
These facts, according to well settled jurisprudence, are not
reviewable by Us in this appeal by certiorari.
In this appeal, the Board of Immigration Commissioners and
the Commissioner of Immigration maintain the following
propositions: (1) that, in view of the fact that the cable
authorization referred to heretofore is a forgery, all the
proceedings had in connection therewith are void and, as a
result, the private respondents must be deported as aliens not
properly documented; (2) that, granting that they were Filipino
citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that
citizenship, firstly, by staying in China for a period of fifteen
years, and secondly, because they were recognized by their
common-law father, they became citizens of the Republic of
China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law.
The Court of First Instance of Manila declared the cablegram
authorization a forgery on the strength of the testimony of Mr.
Logan a handwriting expert. This finding, however, was
reversed by the Court of Appeals, the pertinent portion of its
decision being the following:
The next question raised by the petitioners-appellants is
whether the Government has satisfactorily proved that the
signature of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs on the cable
authorization, Exhibit 1, is a forgery. Felipe P. Logan, chief of
the questioned documents division of the National Bureau of
Investigation, testified that he made a comparative examination
of the signature of the Department Secretary on Exhibit 1 and
the signatures of the same official on the detail orders, Exhibits
3-G to 3-L, and from the significant differences in the writing
characteristics which he observed and concluded that the
signature on Exhibit 1 was not written by the Department
Secretary.
Before it can be said that the questioned signature is a forgery
there must be competent proof that the specimens are the
genuine signature of the Secretary. According to witness,
Logan, he knows that the signatures on the detail orders are
genuine "because they were submitted to me by an agent who
took them from the files of the Department of Foreign Affairs"
(p. 52, transcript). The foregoing testimony of the witness does
not prove the genuineness of the specimen signatures, more
so because the agent who allegedly took the detail others from
the files of the Foreign Affairs Department was not presented
as a witness. The NBI expert concluded, from his observation
that there are significant differences between the questioned
signature and the specimen signatures on the detail orders,
that the former is a forgery. But the conclusion is stultified by
the admission of the same witness that even between the
specimen signatures there are variations in the handwriting
characteristics of the signatory (p. 24, transcript). Our
appreciation of the evidence showed that there are variations
indeed between the specimen signatures (Exhibits S-1 to S-5);
there are distinct similarities even between the questioned
signature and the specimen signatures (cf. Q-5, S-4 and S-5).
Upon the evidence presented by the Government, it cannot be
said that the forgery of the questioned signature has been
satisfactorily proven.
Even if the competent proofs were presented showing that the
questioned signature is a forgery, the forgery of the signature
on the cable authorization would not have nullified the
documentation of the petitioners by the consulate in Hongkong.
We were not cited to any specific rule or regulation of the
Department of Foreign Affairs stating that the prior
authorization of this Department is necessary before the
consular official abroad can act in documentation cases. On
the other hand, as per resolution of the Cabinet of August 24,
1948, the President suggested and the Cabinet "resolved to
restore the prewar practice of entrusting to our respective
consular officials abroad the duty of receiving all visa
applications and investigating the qualifications of the
applicants." (cited in Espina, Immigration Laws, 1956 Ed., p.
142.) It is evident from the aforequoted resolution that the
Executive branch of the Government intended that the right to
screen applicants for entry into this country should be lodged in
the consular officials abroad. Giving effect to this intention, the
Supreme Court stated in Ng Gioc Lin vs. The Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. L-2175, March 31,
1950, "that although the foreign service has been placed under
the over-all direction and supervision of the Department of
Foreign Affairs by Executive Order No. 18 (42 Off. Gaz., 2064),
this does not necessarily mean that the Department Secretary
takes the place of the consular officers abroad in the matter of
the issuance of passport visas, for the Secretary cannot relieve
those officers of their responsibility under the law. ... The
reason of the law in conferring upon the consuls themselves
the duty and power to grant passports and visas is obvious.
The applicant for visa is in a foreign country and the Philippine
consular officer there is naturally in a better position than the
home office to determine through investigation conducted on
the spot whether or not the said applicant is qualified to enter
the Philippines." It can be deduced from the foregoing that the
documentation of the petitioners in Hongkong was not vitiated
by a substantial defect even assuming that it was done without
prior authorization from the Foreign Affairs Department.
It must be stated in this connection that the petitioners became
Philippine citizens because of their relation with their mother
who is a Filipino. Their status was conferred on them neither
by the documentation by the consulate in Hongkong nor by the
finding of the Board of Special Inquiry in Manila. Consequently,
whatever defects there are in the proceedings before the
consulate and the board of inquiry cannot affect their status.
Therefore, even assuming that the petitioners were not
properly documented, there is no basis for the finding of the
respondent Board that they are aliens who can be excluded.
Due, therefore, to the pronouncement made by the Court of
Appeals regarding the insufficiency of the evidence presented
by herein petitioners to prove the alleged forgery again, a
matter not now within our power to review the questioned
cablegram must be deemed to be authentic. But be that as it
may, we agree with both the Court of First Instance of origin
and the Court of Appeals that, even assuming that said
document was forged, this would not automatically render void
all the proceedings had before the Philippine Consulate in
Hongkong and the Board of Special Inquiry, both of which
ended with a definite finding that the Callanos were Filipino
citizens. That these proceedings and finding can not be
nullified by the Department of Foreign Affairs summarily and
without giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard majority, he did not express his desire to choose the nationality
is too evident to require any demonstration. of his father." The import of the foregoing pronouncement is
To the other questions relied upon by herein petitioners, the that of itself a protracted stay in a foreign country does not
following portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals would amount to renunciation. Moreover, herein petitioners were all
seem to be sufficient answer: minors when they where brought to China in 1446. They were
without legal capacity to renounce their status. Upon their
The question, whether petitioners who are admittedly Filipino return to the Philippines only Beato Go Callano had attained
citizens at birth subsequently acquired Chinese citizenship the age of majority, but even as to him there could not have
under the Chinese Law of Nationality by reason of recognition been renunciation because he did not manifest by direct and
or a prolonged stay in China, is a fit subject for the Chinese law appropriate language that he was disclaiming Philippine
and the Chinese court to determine, which cannot be resolved citizenship. On the contrary, after he has attained the age of
by a Philippine court without encroaching on the legal system majority, he applied for registration as a Philippine citizen and
of China. For, the settled rule of international law, affirmed by sought entry into this country, which are clear indicia of his
the Hague Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws of April intent to continue his former status. The foregoing shows that
12, 1930 and by the International Court of Justice, is that "Any the petitioners have not lost their Philippine citizenship.
question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a
particular state should be determined in accordance with laws Lasty, petitioners claim that the private respondents are barred
of that state ." (quoted in Salonga, Private International Law, from questioning the decision of the Board of Immigration
1957 Ed., p. 112.) There was no necessity of deciding that Commissioners dated August 21, 1962 and the warrant of
question because so far as concerns the petitioners' status, the exclusion issued by the Commissioner of Immigration on the
only question in this proceeding is: Did the petitioners lose their same date, because they did not appeal from either to the
Philippine citizenship upon the performance of certain acts or Secretary of Justice.
the happening of certain events in China? In deciding this We find this to be without merit for the reason that, as stated
question no foreign law can be applied. The petitioners are before, both orders were issued without previous notice and
admittedly Filipino citizens at birth, and their status must be hearing and were, therefore, in violation of due process. As a
governed by Philippine law wherever they may be, in matter of fact, even in the case of an alien,decisions of the
conformity with Article 15 (formerly Article 9) of the Civil Code Board of Immigration Commissioners, like that of any other
which provides as follows: "Laws relating to family rights and administrative body, do not constitute res judicata so as to bar
duties, or to the status, conditions and legal capacity of a re-examination of the alien's right to enter or stay (Ong Se
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even Lun, et al. vs. Board of Immigration, G.R. No. L-6017,
though living abroad." Under Article IV, Section 2, of the September 16, 1954), and the courts can grant relief if said
Philippine Constitution, "Philippine citizenship may be lost or Board abused its powers, or committed serious legal errors, or
reacquired in the manner provided by law," which implies that denied the alien a fair hearing (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81
the question of whether a Filipino has lost his Philippine Phil. 682).
citizenship shall be determined by no other than the Philippine WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed,
law. with costs. It is so ordered.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended by
Republic Act No. 106, provides that a Filipino citizen may lose
his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country; express
renunciation of citizenship; subscribing to an oath of allegiance
to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country;
rendering service to, or accepting a commission in, the armed
forces of a foreign country; cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; declaration by competent authority that he is a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war; in the
case of a woman by marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of laws
in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
Recognition of the petitioners by their alien father is not among
the ground for losing Philippine citizenship under Philippine
law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former
status by reason of such recognition. About the only mode of
losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on the
petitioners is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be
cited in support of the conclusion that petition lost their
Philippine citizenship because the law requires an express
renunciation which means a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication; a
renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. (Opinion
No. 69 of the Secretary of Justice, Series of 1940.) Indeed, as
the Supreme Court held in U.S. v. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332, a
case for deportation, where Ong, a natural child of a Filipino
mother and a Chinese father, born in the Philippines, was
brought by his parents to China when he was 4 years old,
where he remained for 18 or 19 years, returning to the
Philippines at 25 years of age, "The fact that a minor child in
those conditions was taken to China and remained there for
several years is not sufficient ground upon which to hold that
he has changed his nationality, when, after reaching his
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
Facts:
Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a
certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
In 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise
known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003.
o It was approved and the petitioner took her oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
In 2006, petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs,
Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010
elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She
obtained the highest numbers of votes and was
proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the
petitioners eligibility were filed before the RTC. The
petitions similarly sought the petitioners disqualification
from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a
dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath"
as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
Petitioner argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere
formal and not a mandatory requirement.
Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post
Held: Yes
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost
their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political
rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the
petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held
dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine.
o Before she initially sought elective public office,
she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship
in Canberra, Australia, which was not under
oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section
5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
When the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no
occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only
room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one
such instance.
o In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical
and single meaning: a Filipino American or any
dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy. We also expounded on the form of
the renunciation and held that to be valid, the
renunciation must be contained in an affidavit
duly executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing
all foreign citizenship.
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with
the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus
hold any elective public office.
G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P.
PAGADUAN,Respondents.
SERENO,*
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ *
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance
with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run
for and thus hold any elective public office.
The Case
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari1 under Rule
64 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify
Resolution2 dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in
EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution (a)
reversed the Order3 dated November 30, 2010 of
COMELEC Second Division dismissing petitioners
appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated
Decision4 dated October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, declaring
petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner)
disqualified and ineligible to her position as Vice-
Mayor of Caba, La Union.
The Undisputed Facts
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having
been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On
December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized
Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain
Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3
of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The
application was approved and the petitioner took her
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an
unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and
Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn
issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying
that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.6
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of
Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her
bid. She again sought elective office during the May
10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V.
Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M.
Bautista,8 (private respondents) all registered voters of
Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo
warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility before
the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners
disqualification from holding her elective post on the
ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to
execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred
that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2),
R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public
office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
Ruling of the RTC
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010,
the trial court held that the petitioners failure to
comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered
her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted
by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal
declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was
not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the
document containing the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before any public officer
authorized to administer oath. Consequently, the
RTCs decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
renders judgment in FAVOR of [private respondents]
and AGAINST (petitioner):
1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-
CONDON, disqualified and ineligible to hold the office
of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;
2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning
candidate for Vice-Mayor of said municipality; and
3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said
municipality vacant.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the COMELEC
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the
appeal was dismissed by the Second Division in its
Order10 dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the
docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion
for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the
COMELEC en banc in its Resolution11 dated
September 6, 2011. In the same issuance, the
substantive merits of the appeal were given due
course. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the
findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also granted
the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the
private respondents.
The decretal portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
Commission RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES as
follows:
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit;
2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010
of the court a quo; and
3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on
November 12, 2010.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the COMELEC en banc.
The Petitioners Arguments
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be
an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking
elective office does not apply to her.
She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a
mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. In
support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of
the House of Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003
containing the sponsorship speech for House Bill
(H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped
from questioning her eligibility since they failed to do
so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the
2007 and 2010 elections.
Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en
banc to: (a) take cognizance of the substantive merits
of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the
COMELEC Second Division for the continuation of the
appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the execution
pending appeal of the RTCs judgment.
The Issues
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I)
Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the
merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II)
Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the
execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an
election case; III) Whether the private respondents
are barred from questioning the qualifications of the
petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the
petitioners eligibility to run for public office, whether
the "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" in
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma
requirement.
The Courts Ruling
I. An appeal may be simultaneously
reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
reconsideration.
The power to decide motions for reconsideration in
election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en
banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c),
Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit:
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order
or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the
Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory
orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order.
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set
any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in
resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is
nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating
the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the
division that initially dismissed it.
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc
when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of
the petitioners appeal after ruling for its
reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in her motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the
petitioner not only proffered arguments on the issue
on docket fees but also on the issue of her eligibility.
She even filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration attaching therewith supporting
documents13 to her contention that she is no longer an
Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an
unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow
the en bancs exercise of discretion on the substantial
merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the
same in the first place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded
similar appeals to the Division that initially dismissed
them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition
of the petitioners appeal. A decision or resolution of
any adjudicating body can be disposed in several
ways. To sustain petitioners argument would be
virtually putting a straightjacket on the COMELEC en
bancs adjudicatory powers.
More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the
COMELEC Second Division would be unnecessarily
circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential
disposition of quo warranto cases espoused in Rule
36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.14
II. The COMELEC en banc has the
power to order discretionary
execution of judgment.
We cannot subscribe to petitioners submission that
the COMELEC en banc has no power to order the
issuance of a writ of execution and that such function
belongs only to the court of origin.
There is no reason to dispute the COMELECs
authority to order discretionary execution of judgment
in view of the fact that the suppletory application of
the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section
1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.15
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
execution pending appeal may be issued by an
appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction.
In Batul v. Bayron,16 we stressed the import of the
provision vis--vis election cases when we held that
judgments in election cases which may be executed
pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts
and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the
exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
III. Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning
petitioners eligibility to hold public
office.
The fact that the petitioners qualifications were not
questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for
2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an
estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the
RTC.
Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), there are two instances where a
petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate
of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof
which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking
to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election; and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter
contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Emphasis ours)
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to
disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition
within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for
whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him
completely helpless as he has another chance to
raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
proclamation of the results of the election, as provided
under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.17
The above remedies were both available to the
private respondents and their failure to utilize Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar
them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo
warranto petition under Section 253.
IV. Petitioner is disqualified from
running for elective office for
failure to renounce her Australian
citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition
of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic, thus:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
 "I, _____________________, solemnly swear
(or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith,
subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage
must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article
V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall
subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance
to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by,
or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public
office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.
(Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the
petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian
and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially
sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the
renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile
renunciation, the petitioner pleads the Court to
interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship" in Section 5(2) to be a mere pro forma
requirement in conformity with the intent of the
Legislature. She anchors her submission on the
statement made by Representative Javier during the
floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of
R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty
to interpret the law according to its true intent is
exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of
doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of
the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is
clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for
construction or interpretation; there is only room for
application.19 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one
such instance.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more
meanings, of being understood in more than one way,
or of referring to two or more things at the same time.
For a statute to be considered ambiguous, it must
admit of two or more possible meanings.20
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any
ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC,21 we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American
or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally
swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at
the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also
expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in
an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law
who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing
all foreign citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v.
Dal,22 when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or
retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship
if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines,
thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their
Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who
reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1)
to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in
Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the
making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos
availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act
to accomplish an undertaking other than that which
they have presumably complied with under Section 3
thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing
Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No.
2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic
Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin
Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor
explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that
the oath of allegiance is different from the
renunciation of foreign citizenship;
xxxx
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos
reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also
to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they
wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To
qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
citizenship.23 (Citation omitted and italics and
underlining ours)
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC,24 we declared
petitioner therein to be disqualified from running for
the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of his American
citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory
nature infused by the above rulings to the phrase
"sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is
plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single,
definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be read
literally.25 The foreign citizenship must be formally
rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an
officer authorized to administer oath.
It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Legislature has intended to convey.26 Even a resort to
the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked
by the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill,
dual citizenship is only limited to natural-born Filipinos
and not to naturalized Filipinos.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the
Bill which provides that natural-born Filipinos who
have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil
and political rights. This being the case, he sought
clarification as to whether they can indeed run for
public office provided that they renounce their foreign
citizenship.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that
these citizens will only have to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any
authorized public officer.
Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter,
citing that while the Bill provides them with full civil
and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure
also discriminates against them since they are
required to make a sworn renunciation of their other
foreign citizenship if and when they run for public
office. He thereafter proposed to delete this particular
provision.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this
serves to erase all doubts regarding any issues
that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship
of any candidate. He subsequently cited the case
of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States
considered a naturalized American still as an
American citizen even when he cast his vote in
Israel during one of its elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of
voting is different because in voting, one is not
required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He
pointed out that under the Bill, Filipinos who run for
public office must renounce their foreign citizenship.
He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the
Bill.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino
citizens who had acquired foreign citizenship and are
now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will
be considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he
likewise inquired whether they will also be considered
qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the
country.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the
only requirement is that they make a sworn
renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they
comply with the residency and registration
requirements as provided for in the Constitution.
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the
Constitution, natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens at the time of birth without having to perform
an act to complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the
reason why the Bill seeks the repeal of CA No. 63.
The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who
acquired foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship.
With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill, he explained
that the Committee had decided to include this
provision because Section 18, Article XI of the
Constitution provides for the accountability of public
officers.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this
case, the sworn renunciation of a foreign citizenship
will only become a pro forma requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan
affirmed that natural-born Filipino citizens who
became foreign citizens and who have reacquired
their Filipino citizenship under the Bill will be
considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore
qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency
or for a seat in Congress. He also agreed with the
observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen
is one who is a citizen of the country at the time of
birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in effect,
return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign
citizenship, the status of being a natural-born citizen
effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would
be discriminating against naturalized Filipino citizens
and Filipino citizens by election who are all
disqualified to run for certain public offices. He then
suggested that the Bill be amended by not
considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos
who had renounced their Filipino citizenship and
acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should
be considered as repatriated citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the
Committee will take note of the latters comments on
the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy
deliberation on the subject, the Committees on
Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert
back to the status of being natural-born citizens those
natural-born Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign
citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino
citizenship.
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses
her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to a
foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino
citizenship, upon the death of her husband, by simply
taking her oath before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but
only wants to be fair to other Filipino citizens who are
not considered natural-born. He reiterated that
natural-born Filipino citizens who had renounced their
citizenship by pledging allegiance to another
sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to
their status of being natural-born citizens once they
decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He
underscored that this will in a way allow such Filipinos
to enjoy dual citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment
incorporating the position of Rep. Javier, Rep.
Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the
Bill.
Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-
born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign
citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino
citizenship, will be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET
wherein the Supreme Court had ruled that only
naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as
natural-born citizens.
In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by
election or those whose mothers are Filipino citizens
under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of maturity, are not
deemed as natural-born citizens.
In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the
Bengzon case, repatriation results in the recovery of
ones original nationality and only naturalized citizens
are not considered as natural-born citizens.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving
back the status of being natural-born citizens to
natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign
citizenship, Rep. Libanan remarked that the Body in
plenary session will decide on the matter.27
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading
of Representative Javiers statement; she
conveniently disregards the preceding and
succeeding discussions in the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record
show that Representative Javiers statement ought to
be understood within the context of the issue then
being discussed, that is whether former natural-born
citizens who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship under
the proposed law will revert to their original status as
natural-born citizens and thus be qualified to run for
government positions reserved only to natural-born
Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members
of the Congress.
It was Representative Javiers position that they
should be considered as repatriated Filipinos and not
as natural-born citizens since they will have to
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who need
not perform an act to perfect their citizenship.
Representative Libanan, however, maintained that
they will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens. To reconcile the renunciation imposed by
Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born
citizens are those who need not perform any act to
perfect their citizenship, Representative Javier
suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship be considered as a mere pro forma
requirement.
Petitioners argument, therefore, loses its point. The
"sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be
deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the
re-acquisition of ones status as a natural-born Filipino
so as to override the effect of the principle that
natural-born citizens need not perform any act to
perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned or
even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court
to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the
option of executing an unsworn affidavit of
renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5
was intended to complement Section 18, Article XI of
the Constitution on public officers primary
accountability of allegiance and loyalty, which
provides:
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the
State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and
any public officer or employee who seeks to change
his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with
by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a
swearing to God or a revered person or thing, that
ones statement is true or that one will be bound to a
promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites
punishment if the statement is untrue or the promise
is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the
person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is
false.28
Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of
punishment attached to an oath ensures truthfulness
to the prospective public officers abandonment of his
adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement
is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it
would also accommodate a mere qualified or
temporary allegiance from government officers when
the Constitution and the legislature clearly demand
otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act
of 1948, under which she is already deemed to have
lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We
disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like
any other fact, they must be alleged and proven.29 To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present
a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his office. (Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of
the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the
above rules and held that the existence of a foreign
law may also be established through: (1) a testimony
under oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-
at-law in the country where the foreign law operates
wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and
states that the same was in force at the time material
to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that
evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity
regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not
meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in
the light of all the circumstances, the Court is
"satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof
offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere
authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by
the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held to
be a competent proof of that law.30
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian
Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the above
methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and
COMELEC, the petitioner failed to show proof of the
existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued
by the Australian government showing that petitioner
already renounced her Australian citizenship was
unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted
judiciously in disregarding the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if
we were to admit as competent evidence the said
letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of
Authentication issued by Consular Section of the
Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached to
the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of
Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied
Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong31 that the
framers of R.A. No. 9225 did not intend the law to
concern itself with the actual status of the other
citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply
the enactments of the legislature must do so
conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the
interference of any foreign law. If we were to read the
Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the application and
operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not
what our legislative department has deemed wise to
require. To do so would be a brazen encroachment
upon the sovereign will and power of the people of
this Republic.32
The petitioners act of running for public office does
not suffice to serve as an effective renunciation of her
Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously
declared that the filing by a person with dual
citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already
considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship,33 such
ruling was already adjudged superseded by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003
which provides for the additional condition of a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship.34
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure
the defect of her candidacy. Garnering the most
number of votes does not validate the election of a
disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.35
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-
born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and
seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before
an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
candidates in Philippine elections.36 The rule applies to
all those who have re-acquired their Filipino
citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to
whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-
requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run
for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for
elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-
acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No.
9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to
run for public office. The petitioner's failure to comply
therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the
law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed
on September 18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain
her political right to seek elective office. Unless she
executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any
elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the

petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections
en bane in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.