G.R. No.

L-32052 July 25, 1975

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular
hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction.

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is
therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also
DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote their general
welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is
already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society
have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent
and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete.

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED.

Government v. Monte De Piedad Digest

G.R. No. L-11524 October 12, 1916
MORELAND, J.:
Facts:

1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake.
2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine Government
directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a result, various petitions were
filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for the State to bring suit against Monte de
Piedad, and for it to pay with interest.
3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans.

Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action

YES.

The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since there has been no change
of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people. These principles are based upon public
policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it was exercising its sovereign functions or
powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the
United States. Finally, if said loan was for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil
capacities.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945

FERIA, J.:

FACTS:

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the case and to continue the proceedings in petitioners case on the
ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all
judicial proceedings and judgments of court during the Japanese occupation. Respondent contends that the lower courts
have no jurisdiction to continue pending judicial proceedings and that the government established during the Japanese
occupation was no de facto government.

ISSUE:

1. Do the judicial acts and proceedings of the court during the Japanese occupation remain good and valid?

2. Did the proclamation of MacArthur invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of said court?

3. May the present courts continue those proceedings pending in said courts?

HELD:

It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by military forces and thus a de
facto government of the second kind. Legislative, as well as judicial, acts of de facto governments, which are not of
political complexion, remain valid after reoccupation. It is presumed that the proclamation of General MacArthur did not
specifically refer to judicial processes thus it has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts during
the Japanese regime. The existence of the courts depend upon the laws which create and confer upon them their
jurisdiction. Such laws, not political in nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty and continue in force until
repealed by legislative acts. It is thus obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue proceedings in cases
not of political complexion.

People of the Philippines vs Loreta Gozo

G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973

FERNANDO, J.:

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayors Office and some neighbors, she demolished the
house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then later on erected another house. She was then
charged by the City Engineers Office for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition
and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered
that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign
country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of
their own decline to make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the
City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

Laurel v. Misa

G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947

FACTS:

Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate
government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change of sovereignty over
the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.

ISSUE:

1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?

2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.

The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not affect the prosecution
of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.

Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533 August 20, 1946

TUASON, J.:

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military
bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains
and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of
their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of
command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the
time of war and the Japanese occupancy.
HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still
covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of
an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction
and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction.

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality
of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of
the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing
the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to
Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of
International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of
the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if
petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be
categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the
lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in
the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was
acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose,
but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to
transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner
did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it
almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.
Sanders v. Veridano

GR No. L-46930; June 10, 1988

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents
Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as
gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised
that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a letter addressed to
petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which
caused them to be ridiculed and thus filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:

1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the acts for which the private
respondents sued them for damages?

2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official character of the letters, the petioners were, legally
speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the
government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue
their claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are all citizens and under
whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the case.

Caylao et.al. vs. Republic et.al.

G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform program. There
was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12 rallyists and scores were
wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for
the purpose of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission
was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government. Based
on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against the
Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunityas claimed by the petitioners.
The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims
does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the
creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as
the basis for a cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus, the
recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officerswho allegedly were responsible for
the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a
settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong. The military andpolice officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personally liable for damages as they exceeded their
authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.

G.R. No. L-5156 March 11, 1954

DIOKNO, J.:

FESTEJO v. FERNANDO

GR No. L-5156; March 11, 1954

FACTS:

The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, took possession of the three parcels of land on February 1951
without obtaining first a right of way, without consent and knowledge of plaintiff, and against her express objection. The
petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its former condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19,
343.20 for the unlawful taking possession of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Is the defendant liable for the unlawful possession of the lands?

HELD:

The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the trespass on plaintiffs land, defendant committed
acts outside the scope of his authority. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiffs land southeasterly of the
right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general
rule that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his
jurisdiction and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. He
cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his office and not personally.

\G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990

CRUZ, J.:

USA v. GUINTO

182 SCRA 644

FACTS:

The cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, private
respondents re suing several officers of the US Air Force in connection with the bidding for barbering services in Clark Air
Base. In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista was arrested following a buy-bust operation for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bautista then filed a complaint for damages claiming that because of the acts of the respondents, he lost his job. In GR No.
79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force. In GR
No. 80258, complaint for damage was filed by the respondents against petitioners for injuries allegedly sustained by
plaintiffs. All cases invoke the doctrine of state immunity as ground to dismiss the same.

ISSUE:

Are the petitioners immune from suit?

HELD:

It is clear that the petitioners in GR No. 80018 were acting in the exercise of their official functions. They cannot be directly
impleaded for the US government has not given its consent to be sued. In GR No. 79470, petitioners are not immune for
restaurants are commercial enterprises, however, claim of damages by Genove cannot be allowed on the strength of the
evidence presented. Barber shops are also commercial enterprises operated by private persons, thus, petitioners in GR
No. 76607 cannot plead any immunity from the complaint filed. In GR No. 80258, the respondent court will have to receive
the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions before it can be known in what capacity
the petitioners were acting at the time of the incident.

VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91359. September 25, 1992.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under Section
4 and 17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution
against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and
institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc.
(PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the
Modifying Regulations on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and
Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that all private security agencies/company security
forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their
main offices are located.... As such membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature,
it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the
minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00
within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat
competition by undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on
Discipline recommended the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license
to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the
cancellation of VMPSIs license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of
membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and
consider VMPSIs application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership
from PADPAO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State
without its consent.

HELD:

Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them
in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired
jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed
from is affirmed in toto.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916

TRENT, J.:

The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while
he was riding his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the
ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely
injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even
earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the
government by virtue of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower
court then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to
plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely
gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the
damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through
a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation
of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent
hence, there can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the
fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

MAKALINTAL, J.:p

Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was noannotation in favor of the government of any right or interest
in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the
lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the
President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the
Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against
the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways
for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was
premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the
right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not
given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government.

Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit
against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its
consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the
certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to
the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover
possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However,
since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only
relief left is for the government to make due compensationprice or value of the lot at the time of the
taking.
[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

CARPIO, J.:

Republic v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 166859, G.R. No. 169203, G.R. No. 180702, April 12, 2011

FACTS:

The Republic commenced Civil Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan by complaint,impleading as defendants respondent
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco) and 59individual defendants.

Cojuangco allegedly purchased a block of 33,000,000 shares of SMC stock through the 14holding companies owned by the
CIIF Oil Mills. For this reason, the block of 33,133,266shares of SMC stock shall be referred to as the CIIF block of shares.

Contention of the Republic of the Philippines:

That Cojuangco is the undisputed "coconut king" with unlimited powers to deal with thecoconut levy funds, who took
undue advantage of his association, influence andconnection, acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos, misusedcoconut levy funds to buy out majority of the outstanding shares of stock of San MiguelCorporation.

Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., and ACCRA law offices plotted, devised, schemed,conspired and confederated with
each other in setting up, through the use of coconutlevy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that
led to theestablishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK. CIC, and more thantwenty other coconut levy-funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San MiguelCorporation shares and its institutionalization through presidential
directives of thecoconut monopoly.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan:

Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033-F was dismissed for failure of plaintiff toprove by preponderance of evidence
its causes of action against defendants with respectto the twenty percent (20%) outstanding shares of stock of San Miguel
Corporation registered in defendants names.

Republic of the Philippines appealed the case to the Supreme Court invoking that coconutlevy funds are public funds. The
SMC shares, which were acquired by respondentsCojuangco, Jr. and the Cojuangco companies with the use of coconut
levy funds -in violation of respondent Cojuangco, Jr.s fiduciary obligation are, necessarily, public incharacter and should
be reconveyed to the government.

ISSUE:

Whether Respondent Cojuangco Jr. used the coconut levy funds to acquire SMC shares inviolation of the his fiduciary
obligation as a public officer.

G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987

YAP, J.:

Republic vs. Feliciano (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner-appellee, vs. Pablo Feliciano and Intermediate Appellate Court, respondents-
appellants.
March 12, 1987

Yap, J:

Facts:

Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property
reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the trial court by
86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of ownership.

The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence.
Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the trial
court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to present their
evidence.

Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.

Issue:

Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Held:

No

Ratio:

A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, either expressly
or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.

The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the government is not
being divested of any of its properties.

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

United States of America vs. Ruiz

136 SCRA 487

Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the
construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke
state immunity.

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of
international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary
acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

FERNANDO, J.:

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co.,
Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award
in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June
24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor
directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal
served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and civilian personneland for maintenance
and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for
acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a
Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa fundamental
postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is
immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not because of any formalconception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand
soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent
to be sued had been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its
consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimants actiononly up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the
correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects,asappropriated by law

G.R. No. L-33112 June 15, 1978

FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:

PNB v. Pabalan

GR No. L-33112; June 15, 1978

FACTS:

Judgment was rendered against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA). Judge Javier Pabalan
issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of PVTA. The full amount mentioned
in such writ is P12, 724.66. Philippine National Bank allege that such funds are public in character, thus, the doctrine of
non-suability of a state is applicable.

ISSUE:

Is the respondent exempt from garnishment by virtue of the doctrine of non-suability of a state?

HELD:

It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
be treated like any other corporation. Petitioner cannot set bar to the garnishment for funds of public corporations which
can sue and be sued, as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.