The Four Types of

Non-Western Thought
Herman Johan Pietersen
 The Four Types of
Non-Western Thought

by

Herman Johan Pietersen

2015
 Copyright KR Publishing and Herman Johan Pietersen

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To all explorers of antinomies
 The Four Types in Non-Western Thought
Chapter 1. Fundamental approaches in human thought 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Ancient bifurcations 2
1.3 Modern thought 4
1.4 An integrated proposal 6
1.5 A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies 10
1.6 Concluding remarks 10
Chapter 2. Speculative Non-Western thought (I) 13
2.1 Indian (Vedanta) 13
2.2 Chinese (Yin-Yang) 16
2.3 Islamic 17
2.3.1 Al-Kindi 17
2.3.2 Al-Farabi 19
2.4 Jewish (Gabirol) 21
2.5 African (Metaphysics) 25
Chapter 3. Scientific Non-Western thought (II) 29
3.1 Indian 29
3.1.1 Nyaya 29
3.1.2 Vaisesika 29
3.2 Chinese 31
3.2.1 Mohism 31
3.2.2 The Logicians 33
3.2.3 The Legalists 33
3.3 Islamic 34
3.3.1 Ibn Sina 34
3.3.2 Ibn Rushd 36
3.4 Jewish (Maimonides) 38
3.5 African (Professional) 41
Chapter 4. Narrative Non-Western thought (III) 43
4.1 Indian (Mimamsa) 43

iii
 4.2 Chinese 44
4.2.1 Daoism 44
4.2.2 Zhuangzi 45
4.3 Islamic (Al-Ghazali) 46
4.4 Jewish (Halevi) 48
4.5 African (Ethno-philosophy) 53
Chapter 5. Pragmatic Non-Western thought (IV) 55
5.1 Indian (Patanjali Yoga) 55
5.2 Chinese 57
5.2.1 Confucius 57
5.2.2 Mencius 58
5.3 Islamic 59
5.3.1 Al-Farabi 59
5.3.2 Al-Ghazali 61
5.4 Jewish (Pakuda) 61
5.5 African (Nationalist) 66
Chapter 6. Review of Non-Western thought 69
6.1 Type I thought 69
6.2 Type II thought 70
6.3 Type III thought 71
6.4 Type IV thought 71
6.5 Concluding comment 72

References 73
Bibliography 87

iv
 PREFACE
The present work brings together the authors previous
writing on fundamental approaches in Non-Western
(Eastern, Jewish and African) thought.
For this purpose the existing material were subjected to
minor revision and re-arranged according to each of four
main types of human thought. A new chapter was written to
provide a concluding review of the contents of the book.
The overall project started out as an experiment, a
philosophical hypothesis, and repeatedly received clear
evidentiary support across a global range of knowledge
disciplines, traditions and thinkers in the history of thought.
I thank our Creator for the life given to me, to continue to
pursue my dream even though in the end we merely see
through a glass darkly.
The search for fundamentals has been a most meaningful
and worthwhile part of my life - something which words can
never fully express. I am deeply grateful and can only hope
that the work will be of value to readers interested in the
topic.

Herman Johan Pietersen

Haenertsburg
South Africa
Herman.pietersen@ul.ac.za

v
 CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTAL APPROACHES IN HUMAN
THOUGHT
1.1 Introduction
The history of thought shows a continuous and unfolding
succession of competing ideas and theories concerning,
especially, the nature of the true, the real and the good.
The struggle between different ideas and systems of
thought arose from the very beginning. This is evidenced in,
for instance, Heraclitus rejection of the Pythagorean
obsession with number and Platos opposition to the Ionian
pre-occupation with matter.
Today, human thought is characterised by many
conceptualisations that seems to defy any meaningful overall
view. Many different approaches to the nature of truth and
reality have emerged over time, for example: rationalism,
positivism, realism, nominalism, humanism, utilitarianism,
empiricism, pragmatism, behaviourism, naturalism,
existentialism, and postmodernism.
The question is how to make sense of it all? In striving to
find answers to this question, it became clear that the issues
the ancients grappled with still provide an important starting
point for understanding the nature of the problem.
A consideration of different intellectual emphases that
continually surface in the history of thought, starting with the
Greeks, led to the insight, namely, that a number of axiomatic
and interrelated orientations towards knowledge of the world
and of human beings underlie and shape the human intellect
in its endeavours.
Taken together, these dispositions emanate from the same
source, namely, the human being. As the body cannot rid

1
itself of its shadow, so human thought cannot be rid of - but
is embedded in - prototypical ways of looking at and
experiencing the world.
The current endeavour is a project in meta-theory
application, and will focus on a range of prominent
philosophical thinkers and approaches.

1.2 Ancient bifurcations

It was a major event in the history of humanity when the
ancients moved away from being in a state of dependency on
powerful forces around them, which they could not fathom
and were in awe of, to the awakening of reason. For Plato all
things were confounded together until reason gave order.
This provided the spark that triggered independent thinking,
away from blindly obeying social custom and the gods of
tradition.
The Greek quest for natural origins changed in about 600
BCE from seeking answers to the question who is the cause of
everything (for which the Olympic pantheon, under the
leadership of Zeus, typically was the source of explanation),
to the question what non-personal, primary force or principle
is behind or in nature and existence.
Cornford 1 describes two traditions, the scientific and
mystical modes of thought, which existed in Greek religion
and which influenced the development of Greek philosophy.
In Homers mythological thought (at about 800 BCE) it was
still the rule by impersonal force of destiny or fate (Moira), in
which everything was assigned to its allotted position or
province. Eventually, the family of Olympian gods became
the dominant source of answers, but, in turn, had to make
room for Reason - the rule by impersonal necessity of law

2
and principle. As the historical record shows, the occurrence
of swings between subjectifying (personal) and objectifying
(impersonal) orientations of mind is an early phenomenon in
human thought.
Basic intellectual differences appear in mythology in the
kind of powers and functions ascribed to, especially, the
Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus. 2, 3 Apollo and Dionysus
were depicted as very different type of Gods, with the
exception that the ancients attributed powers of music, poetry
and the arts to both of them. Figure 1.1 illustrates some of
the contrasts.
Figure 1.1: Apollo and Dionysus as paradigmatic opposites
Apollo Dionysus
God of temple at Delphi God of temple at Delphi
Ruled by reason Ruled by emotions and will
Intellectual, spiritual Freedom and equality
Purity, radiance, and light Excitement of life and
growth
Self-restraint and discipline Self-indulgence and passion
God of intellect God of senses

The conflicting elements in the characterization of these

two major deities of the ancient Greek world points to a root
distinction in human thought. Apollo is depicted as the aloof
deity, the impersonal god of reason, principle and a
hierarchical order that is superior to and above desires of the
flesh. Dionysus shows just the opposite qualities: of rule by
the passions and will; of an unbridled celebration of the
senses and of the drive toward equality and freedom of
expression.

3
 In the profiles of these mythical figures, the central
distinction between the impersonal and personal in human
thought emerges. Overall, Greek religion maintained the
dominance of Apollo (the God of law and order) over the
urges of the Dionysian in human nature, and of the rule of
the intellect over the senses. Yet, there was an intuitive
understanding that society had to accommodate both forces,
in order to avoid the tendency toward excess of each mode of
being, if left unopposed.
In the course of history, and despite continuing efforts by
the rational mind to subdue it, the Dionysian side of human
nature kept surfacing. From orgiastic festivals in ancient
Greece, to modern rock concerts, of which Woodstock (in
1969) is perhaps the iconic 20th century example; from the
temperamental and unruly steed (representing the passions) in
Platos parable of the charioteer, to Freuds modern
unveiling of the unconscious Id with its sexual libido - the
Dionysian drive refuses to be suppressed.

1.3 Modern thought

The scholarly literature of modern times shows that
bifurcated thought continues unabated. Kant, for instance,
aimed to provide a grand metaphysics of mind, yet he also
acknowledged the presence of different orientations in the
history of thought.
At the end of his main work 4 he provides his own
taxonomy that reflects basic divisions in human thought. He
distinguishes between intellectualists and nologists (Plato,
Leibnitz) on the one hand and sensualists and empiricists
(Epicurus, Aristotle, Locke) on the other. According to Kant,

4
the former strives to find truth and certainty in Reason, the
latter in Experience and sensuous objects.
Kant desired to enthrone Reason by giving the world a
comprehensive system of rational, pure, concepts of mind -
a master methodology of Reason that would: bring
Reason to perfect contentment 5
On the other side of the divide, and during the same
period, the poet-philosopher, Friedrich Schiller, eloquently
described the destructive effects of a one-sided, rational-
scientific approach to life. In Schiller the Dionysian
resentment against the soul-destroying characteristic of an
impersonal and mechanistic way of thought and life rises to
the surface: Like the analytical chemist, the philosopher can
only discover how things are combined by analyzing them,
only lay bare the workings of spontaneous Nature by
subjecting them to the torment of his own techniques? 6
His approach is a clear reflection of the romantic (Dionysian)
protest and reaction against an impersonal (Apollonian)
objectification of nature and human existence.
In the 20th century, the political philosopher Isaiah Berlin 7
distinguishes between formal and empirical categories of
thought in relation to human values and ethics. He echoes
Schillers distinction between sensuous and formal drives;
Kants sensualists and intellectualists and, prototypically,
Platos account (in the Sophist), of the everlasting battle
between the Giants (the friends of matter) and the Gods of
intellect (the friends of form).
For Bernstein 8 it is a struggle between "objectivism" and
"relativism"; between the basic conviction of the existence of
some permanent, a-historical truth or knowledge framework
and the equally basic view that all such thinking is relative to

5
the varied and changing nature of specific social and cultural
contexts.

1.4 An integrated proposal

The various intellectual tendencies, outlined in the previous
section, reflect different aspects or elements of what, at first
sight, seems to be two major streams in the history of
thought. This is conveniently summarized in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Some contrasts in human thought
Source #1 #2
Mythology Apollo: Dionysus:
(Greek) God of Intellect God of Senses
Impersonal (Logos) Personal (Mythos)
Order (hierarchy) Freedom (equality)
Plato Gods (form) Giants (matter)
Cornford Scientific tradition Mystical tradition
Kant Intellectualists Sensualists (Aristotle;
(Plato; Leibniz) Epicurus)
Schiller Faculty of Intellect Faculty of Feeling
Berlin Monists Pluralists
(hedgehogs) (foxes)
Utopianism Romanticism
Snow Scientific culture Literary culture

However, the list is potentially confusing if it is not borne

in mind that these classifications were generated by thinkers
and traditions of thought who themselves regarded the world
in different ways. They wore different spectacles, and
therefore adopted different approaches to truth and reality.
Kant, for instance, is the analytic philosopher who
favoured science and a universally applicable logic of mind.

6
Schiller, his contemporary, is the poet-philosopher who
anguished in moving and expressive language about the
destructive effect of an impersonal Kantian world of
scientific thought, with its cold logic, on the human spirit
and well-being.
The various elements may be reduced to a number of core
elements of thought, namely, the:
Impersonal (I It) vs Personal (I Thou)
Reason (ratio; logic) vs Meaning (will, feeling)
Form (abstract ideas) vs Matter (things/senses)
At the heart of these descriptions is the most fundamental
distinction of all, namely, what the ancients referred to as the
One and the Many - in its modern guise known as monism
and pluralism. This was regarded as an axiomatic and very
old truth already in the times of Socrates.
In Platos Philebus, Socrates enlightens his conversational
partner (Philebus) about the origin of this piece of wisdom,
which the ancient oral tradition passed on in the Greek
world, describing it as a divine gift from the gods. 9
From the above discussion, two intersecting kinds of
polarities may be derived, namely between Objectivist
(Apollonian) and Subjectivist (Dionysian) thought and between
Empyrean (Platos Gods; the super-sensible) and Empiricist
thought (Platos Giants; matter).
With reference to the Objectivist-Subjectivist distinction there
are, on the one hand, those thinkers and schools of thought
that prefer the truths arrived at by the workings of an
impersonal, calculating, mind or intellect (in answer to the
root question: what is this?). This is exemplified by Platos
episteme and known bias toward the immutable truths of logic
and mathematics. On the other, are the truths grounded in

7
values, will, and feeling, and in a personal and social context;
largely in response to the other enduring question, namely:
how should we live?
The Empyrean-Empiricist distinction, in turn, refers to two
basic approaches to the perennial ontological question,
namely, what is the nature of reality? Throughout the
history of thought, even before Platos formulation almost
two and a half millennia ago, answers to this question were
given by two different and enduring intellectual camps: the
friends of matter (Ionian materialism) and the friends of
form (Pythagorean idealism ).
The one group, the giants, exemplified by the Greek
Atomists, forever harks to the empirical truths of matter, the
sensible, so-called hard facts of nature. The other group, the
gods, is forever drawn to the transcendent and metaphysical
truths of forms, laws, and principles to an invisible and
super-sensible world beyond the human sensory apparatus.
Concerning the distinction between empyrean and
empiricist approaches, a modern historian of philosophy
aptly summarises it: whereas for Plato the best thought
was freed from sense experience altogether, for Aristotle it
remained rooted in sense experience. 11
The classic Western exemplars of objectivist thought are:
Plato, the empyrean theorist (conveniently designated as Type
I) and the quintessential empiricist thinker, Aristotle (Type
II). Types III and IV are best represented in Greek thought
by, respectively, Protagoras and the poetic-expressive,
subjectivist approach of Sophism, in general, and Plato, as
social theorist and reformer.
It is important to note that the proposed scheme of basic
orientations of mind does not imply that one particular

8
approach is necessarily better or worse than the other. They
should rather be seen as distinctive modalities or forces of
mind.
For each modality a cluster of typical descriptors has been
identified, as shown in Figure 1.3.
Although variations occur in the extent to which all
elements of each cluster apply to an individual or community
of thinkers and scholars, they are useful in characterizing the
different paradigms of thought. Collectively they do provide,
for each type, a more or less coherent meta-theoretical
profile. A more detailed discussion of the four paradigms of
human thought is provided elsewhere. 12, 13
Figure 1.3: The four modalities of mind
ARISTOTLE: Scientific PLATO: Metaphysical
Question: What is this? Question: What is behind?
Impersonal Impersonal
Description of life/world Essentials of life/world.
Reason (rationality) Reason (rationality)
Systematic-analytical Theoretical-integrative
Detailed explanation Broad understanding

PROTAGORAS: Narrative PLATO: Pragmatic

Question: What is the story? Question: What to do?
Personal Personal
To praise, tell inspiring To change, renew, life/world
stories OR to criticize, tell according to valued ideals
sad stories,
Emphasizes values Emphasizes values
(humanism) (humanism)
Personal-engaged / Communal-engaged/
experiential ideological
Poetic-particular and critical Advocacy-general and
reformist

9
1.5 A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies
The present work outlines various Non-Western philosophies
as examples of the four main types of modalities of mind.
The selection is shown in Figure 1.4 below.
Fig. 1.4: A spectrum of Non-Western philosophies
TYPE II MODALITY TYPE I MODALITY
Indian (Nyaya-Vaisesika) Indian (Vedanta)
Chinese (Mohism/Legalism) Chinese (Yin-Yang)
Islamic (IbnSina/Ibn Rushd) Islamic (Al-Kindi/Al-Farabi)
Jewish (Maimonides) Jewish (Gabirol)
African (Professional) African (Metaphysics)

TYPE III MODALITY TYPE IV MODALITY

Indian (Mimamsa)
Chinese (Daoism/Zhuangzi)
Islamic (Al-Ghazali)
Jewish (Halevi)
African (Ethno-philosophy)
Indian (Patanjali Yoga)
Chinese (Confucius/Mencius)
Islamic (AlFarabi/Al-Ghazali)
Jewish (Pakuda)
African (Nationalist)

Chapter two discusses various empyrean philosophies;

chapter three attend to scientific (realist) philosophies;
chapter four narrative-interpretive approaches, and chapter
five addresses pragmatic thought. Finally, chapter six briefly
reviews the four types of Non-Western philosophy.

1.6 Concluding remarks

There is much, though uncoordinated, evidence in the history
of thought of the existence of archetypal orientations of the
mind. The theory that is briefly presented in the present

10
chapter proposes an encompassing perspective on the nature
and dynamics of these enduring inclinations of the mind.

11
 CHAPTER 2
SPECULATIVE NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (I)
2.1 Indian (Vedanta)
The Vedanta school of orthodox Hinduism is concerned with
ultimate knowledge, and has as its main source the most
speculative part, namely the Upanishads, of the Hindu Holy
scripture, known as the Vedas (Veda means knowledge).
Whereas other schools of orthodox Hinduism, notably the
Mimamsa, interpret the Vedas as requiring rituals of faith, and
acts of personal devotion and sacrifice, which is more
characteristic of the type III modality of mind, Vedanta
thinkers are concerned with the deeper truths and knowledge
of the Vedas. This is to be obtained through lifelong study
and meditation. The chief principle of Vedanta is the
existence of one absolute reality named Brahman the
supreme, transcendent Spirit and Ultimate Reality, which is
the divine ground of all being.
Following Dasgupta, 1 and in relation to the objectivist-
empyrean modality of mind, core elements of the Vedanta
philosophy of Sankara may be noted. It is, firstly, the most
metaphysical school of orthodox Hinduism, favoured by
those believers with a more macroscopic, philosophical
inclination, who rely more heavily on the Upanishads. It
refers to a process of thought (pramana in Sanskrit) that aims
to achieve right knowledge (prama) of the world-soul
(Brahman) which is at the centre of the souls (Atman or self)
of individual believers.
There is, secondly, no separately existing knower or
perceiver but only knowledge-moments which are
simultaneously knowledge, the knower and the known. Any
distinction between knower and known is regarded as mere

13
illusion. It is, as Dasgupta describes it: a thoroughgoing
idealism [that] brushes off all references to an objective field
of experience. 2
Thirdly, Vedanta regards the Upanishads, the most
philosophical of Vedic texts, as meant only for the wise -
those that are able to control the senses and who are:
...disinclined to all earthly joys 3 - and not to the ordinary
mass of Hindu believers. It follows the Upanishads in
accepting that the world as it appears is mere magic or
illusion (maya) - the only real is the Atman-Brahman (literally:
Self-God). This is not the separate, unique soul of each
individual as in the Christian West, but a collective, pure,
world-soul that is to be found at the inner core (the Atman)
of each individual person, and which the enlightened believer
strives to attain to. It is the ultimate truth that is: pure self
as pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. 4
Vedanta seeks the ultimate truth beneath all appearance of
physical or mental events. It shows a remarkable similarity to
the Platonic notion of a super-sensible reality, except that
Platos ultimate reality is the pure, rational-mathematical
hierarchy of forms and of the Good, whilst with Vedanta the
ultimate truth is the pure, cosmic Self, beyond a worldly
subject and object - hence, the union of Atman and Brahman.
It is against all empiricist notions of truth and reality and
almost exclusively concerned with purity (a common element
in objectivist-empyrean thought), to the extent that, as
Dasgupta formulates it: Unless the mind is chastened and
purged of all passions and desires, the soul cannot
comprehend this truth. 5
Consistent with the teachings of the Upanishads, Vedanta
thinkers believe that there is no many anywhere but that

14
truth and reality is One, a state of highest salvation to be
attained and which occurs when the human becomes:
divested of all world-consciousness, or consciousness of
himselfand thus reduced to his original purity 6
Vedanta is antagonistic towards the Nyaya/Vaisesika (type
II) school of Hinduism, and its ideas about physical causation
and atomism, yet much more accepting of the Yoga school
(type IV) and its methods of self-purification and meditation.
This is consistent with the premises of the meta-theory
presented in chapter one, specifically proposition four.
The Vedanta system of ethics 7 requires the believer to
engage in a series of steps and perform a number of duties
before he/she can come into possession of the so-called four
virtues, which is necessary before one can be properly
instructed in the Vedas. Some of these duties, which, in the
nature of Vedanta thought, aim at progressive self-
purification, are: studying the Vedas through proper methods;
performing various religious (for example daily prayers) and
social duties (for example the birth ceremony of a son);
avoiding all action motivated by selfish desire; avoiding
prohibited action (for example murder).
The ethical virtues of the Vedanta school of Hinduism are
as follows: (a) Knowledge of what is eternal and what is
transient; (b) Disinclination to enjoyments of this life and of
the heavenly life after death; (c) Extreme distaste for all
enjoyments, and anxiety for attaining the means of right
knowledge; (d) Control over the senses (e.g., extreme
temperatures); (e) Strong desire to attain salvation. 8

15
2.2 Chinese (Yin-Yang)
At the centre of Chinese metaphysics are the concepts of
Change and Harmony. Whereas Hindu thought is more
purely metaphysical, and concerned with an impersonal and
transcendent cosmic power or world-soul, Chinese
cosmology is rooted in the concept of dynamic and
fundamental forces in nature that relate Heaven, Earth and
Humans with one another, in a harmonious way.
Again, Hindu metaphysics (Vedanta) is essentially
concerned with withdrawal from all earthly things by way of a
mystical knowledge through deep meditation, in order to
escape Karma (endless cycles of reincarnation) and become
one with the perfection of the Ultimate Reality (Brahman).
Chinese philosophy, on the other hand, is primarily aimed at
understanding how humans can live in harmony with the
dynamic, reciprocal, forces of nature, which it describes in the
poetical-narrative (type III) manner characteristic of Chinese
thought generally.
A brief sketch of Chinese metaphysics is provided,
following A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-Tsit
Chan. 9
The Yin Yang concept, the origin of which is unknown
and goes back to antiquity, holds that everything is the
product of two principles or forces: yang (the positive, active,
strong and constructive) and yin (the negative, passive, weak
and destructive).
Together with the Yin Yang theory, another theory, the
so-called Five Agents or Elements (namely metal, wood,
water, fire and earth) comprise Chinese cosmology. 10 The
emphasis in the combined Yin Yang and Five elements
theory is on dynamic (not static, mathematical) principles 11

16
and laws of the universe that: may be regarded as early
Chinese attempts in the direction of working out a
metaphysics and a cosmology. 12
The Yin Yang doctrine emphasizes the unity and
interrelatedness of nature and humans and is central to
Chinese thought and its outlook on life: it has reinforced
the doctrine of the Mean common to Confucianism, Taoism,
and Buddhism. 13
It serves as cosmological foundation for Chinese ethics
and social doctrines as well as the Book of Changes (I Ching
or Yijing), that Ng describes as: an ingenious and elaborate
bricolage of cosmic imaginings and ethico-moral musings,
[which] has through the ages in the Chinese world of thinking
been viewed as the Ur-classic, the fount of ancient wisdom
that promises to enlighten and illuminate our understanding
of the workings of the universe. 14

2.3 Islamic
2.3.1 Al-Kindi
Islamic philosophy consists of a combination of ideas, with
its origins mainly in Socratic and Hellenic philosophy; in
Neo-Platonism (with the doctrine of celestial hierarchies by
Plotinus, who in turn was influenced by the Gnostics) and in
the early Mutazilite movement with its preference for rational
interpretations of the Quran.
History shows that contrary to developments in the West
which led to the dominance of science, the Islamic world was,
early on, more inclined towards the truths of faith and
Quranic revelation.
In retrospect, it is surely one of those momentous
historical turns that the eventual triumph of Reason and

17
science in the West were strongly influenced by the
intellectual labours and re-introduction to Europe of the
Greek classics by thinkers such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd,
known, respectively, in Latinized Medieval Europe, as
Avicenna and Averroes. In the present section the
metaphysics of Al-Kindi and Al-Farabi will briefly be
discussed.
Al-Kindi (801 873 CE) is regarded as the founding
philosopher of Islam, and as reviews 15, 16 of his ideas indicate,
more oriented toward transcendent truths, utilizing the logic
of mathematical reasoning and a Neo-Platonic hierarchy of
other-worldly forces and entities. He essentially sought to
combine Plato and Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion. 17
For Al-Kindi Spirit or Mind is the highest reality,
substituting Aristotles Unmoved Mover with the Creator
Spirit, 18 and placing the Soul - which generates the various
spheres - in a middle position between the Spirit of God and
the material world. The human soul emanates from the Soul
of the world and, though united with the body, is spiritually
independent from it. 19
The highest level, the Spirit, is divided into:
God the real Cause and Essence of all;
Spirit as reasoning capacity or potentiality of the Soul;
Habit or actual possession of the soul; and, lastly,
Activity: ...by which a reality within the soul may be
carried over to the reality that is without - [which is]
the act of Man himself. 20
Al-Kindi has conflicting views concerning the relationship
between philosophy and religion, stating at one point that:
...theology is part of philosophy 21 and at another time that:
...theology occupies a higher rank than philosophy. 22

18
Nevertheless, in the early Islamic world Al-Kindi was the first
to conceive God in terms of reason and logic, as the
transcendent One, the true efficient cause of everything
without form, substance or quality, 23 the One who: acts
and is never acted upon. 24
Similar to Plato, Al-Kindi divides the soul into the
faculties of the rational, the irascible and the appetitive, and
indicates his empyrean preference: He who gets away from
the pleasures of the body and lives most of his life in
contemplation to attain to the reality of things, is the good
man who is very similar to the Creator. 25

2.3.2 Al-Farabi
Another major Islamic philosopher with a predominantly
metaphysical tendency is Al-Farabi, who is seen as the
culmination of the logical and metaphysical efforts of Al-
Kindi and others. 26
Al-Farabi (870 950 CE) was not interested in the
sciences, such as medicine and geography, but preferred to
focus on creating a top-down, logical system of thought. His
aim was a comprehensive metaphysics that attempted to
provide a best possible synthesis of the theories of Plato and
Aristotle, within the Islamic context.
Al-Farabi 27, 28, 29 favours the empyrean (type I) modality of
mind, accusing the religious dialecticians (type III mode) of
making logically untested statements, and rejects the so-called
natural philosophers (type II mode) because they are:
...occupying themselves merely with the effect of things, and
thus never getting beyond the contrasts of worldly
phenomena by attaining to a unified conception of the All. 30

19
 Typical of objectivist thinkers in the Platonic tradition, Al-
Farabi has a low opinion of poetry, relegating it, as Figure 2.2
shows, to the bottom of the ladder of truth. He goes so far as
to regard it as nothing more than: ...a lying and immoral
absurdity. 31
As objectivist thinker Al-Farabi does not accept the
primacy of will and feeling, arguing, contrary to Al-Ghazali,
who lived about a hundred years later, that: The cause of all
things is not the will of an almighty Creator, but the
knowledge of the Necessary. 32 His metaphysical hierarchy
focuses primarily on incorporeal entities and forces at various
levels, in descending order, though it includes a number of
material bodies such humans, plants and minerals. For Al-
Farabi, this logical order of the world is at the same time a
moral order. 33
Al-Farabis theory of various intelligences (see Figure 2.1)
reflects its Platonic (empyrean) inclination, with
demonstrative reasoning at the top and poetry relegated to
the bottom of the hierarchy. 34
His ethical thought is ruled by the dictates of pure reason,
and he is said to have frequently asserted that: Reason
decides whether a thing is good or evil. 35 Although
philosophical reasoning is important for understanding the
ultimate nature of human happiness, it is necessary to attend
to deliberative as well as moral virtues and the practical
arts. 36

20
 Figure 2.1: Al-Farabis levels of reasoning
TYPE OF: LEADS TO: USED BY:
HIGHEST
Demonstrative Certainty Philosophers
Scholars

Dialectical Semblance of Theologians

certitude through
good intention
Sophistical Semblance of
certitude through
bad/false intention
Rhetorical Probable opinion Politicians
Poetical Imagery giving Poets
pleasure/pain to the
soul
LOWEST

Al-Farabi insisted that moral virtue be regarded as

subordinate to the need for political rulers to first acquire a
philosophical understanding. However, his writing shows a
general neglect of the particulars of ethics, such as moral
habits and character traits, on which he hardly wrote
anything. 37

2.4 Jewish (Gabirol)

Ibn Gabirol (1021 1070 CE) is known, and his Fons Vitae
(Fountain of Life) 38 attests to it, as a clear example of Neo-
Platonism in Mediaeval Jewish thought.

21
 The book is concerned with wisdom as the source of life
and develops a long series of syllogisms and arguments to
prove the existence and unity of the First Essence. 39
It is a speculative work (which refers to only one other
author, Plato) that is presented by its author as being about
the root of wisdom, to be elaborated through a series of steps
from a knowledge of matter and form through knowledge of
the will, to the science of the First Essence. Wisdom is: ...to
know the First Essence...The cause of all things is the Prime
Essence and Will is the medium between it and all these
hylomorphically constituted things... 40
Figure 2.2 shows the structure and elements of Gabirols
Neo-Platonic system.
Figure 2.2: Gabirols universal substance

FIRST ESSENCE (GOD)

Universal Intelligence

Souls

Will of God

Nature

Elements
Earth Fire Water Air

Corporeal things of experience

22
 The Fons Vitae is presented in the form of a dialogue
between Master (Gabirol) and pupil and consists almost
entirely of a series of syllogistic demonstrations. The Master
declares at the outset that the purpose of the book is to
provide: ...proof of the existence of simple substances and
that the Pupil should closely follow the reasoning because it
uses the rules of logic. 41
Everything outside of the creator (the First Essence, that
is true unity) consists of varying combinations of matter and
form (the universal substance), with simple (pure) substance
being superior to compound substance, in a descending series
down to the (least pure) corporeal things of experience.
The principle involved is that the more a substance
descends the more multiple (hence, less pure) it becomes. On
the other hand: ...the more it ascends, the more unified it
becomes... 42
The following short extract from the Fons Vitae shows, by
way of example, how Gabirol went about proving the
existence and unity of the First Author or First Essence as
simple substance. As one may readily observe and Husik
unabashedly states: One has to wade through pages upon
pages of bare syllogisms, one more flimsy than another. 43
An example follows:
If the simple substance is below the compound
substance, then the simple substance is created by the
compound substance. But the compound substance is
created by the simple substance. Therefore the simple
substance is not below the compound substance. And
since it is not below it, it must necessarily be above it.
Hence the following syllogism: A simple substance is
above a compound substance. Now the substance

23
 that supports the categories is compound. Therefore a
simple substance is above a substance that supports
the categories. 44
Mediaeval Europe and the Christian Scholastics were not
aware that Gabirol (known as Avicebron by the Latins) was a
Jew, but made him their own. His basic thesis (of a
hylomorphic, universal substance underlying all experience):
...was made a bone of contention between the two dominant
schools; the Dominicans, led by Thomas Aquinas, opposing
this un-Aristotelian principle, the Franciscans with Duns
Scotus at their head, adopting it as their own. 45
Further characteristics of Gabirols philosophy may be
highlighted as follows:
1. He is a monist (Platonist) who identified matter
ultimately, with God; 46
2. Like Plotinus he: ...conceives of the universe as a
process of a gradually descending series of existences
or worlds...; 47
3. Man as a microcosm, a universe in little, partakes of
both the corporeal and intermediate worlds, and
hence may serve as a model of the constitution of the
macrocosm, or great universe.; 48
4. Not only material objects but: ...the intelligible or
spiritual substances also are composed of matter and
form.; 49
5. Creation is the process by which God establishes the
universal substance (matter and form), but it must be
conceived (in typical Neo-Platonist way) as: ...water
flowing from a fountain... 50 Hence, Fountain of Life
(Fons Vitae);

24
 6. Being of Jewish (non-pantheistic) faith, Gabirol also
felt it necessary to introduce a thoroughly un-Platonic
element in his system, namely, Gods Will.
Accordingly: ...God speaks and his Word or Will
impresses form upon matter.; 51
7. Husik refers to the mystical element in Gabirols
thought (what Paul Tillich would refer to as abstract
mysticism), according to which one: ...must raise
[ones] intellect to the last intelligible...must purify it
from all sordid sensibility, free it from the captivity of
nature... 52
Finally, Husik describes the Fons Vitae as essentially: ...a
peculiar combination of logical formalism with mystic
obscurity, or profundity, according to one's point of view...it
was employed in a lost cause. Neo-Platonism was giving way
to Aristotelianism, which was adopted by Maimonides and
made the authoritative and standard philosophy. 53

2.5 African (Metaphysics)

The literature on African philosophy, especially the writings
of black African thinkers, shows that for much of the second
part of the 20th century at least, it became imperative to find,
establish or carve out a uniquely African (thus non-
colonialist, non-Western) philosophical identity.
The problem of establishing a philosophical identity is
exacerbated by the fact that often there is no clear line of
demarcation between philosophical and anthropological
thought and writing in Africa. It is not unusual to open a text
purportedly dealing with African philosophy and find that it
is substantially about anthropological analyses or cultural

25
critiques of aspects such as the values, mores, customs and
habits of life of one or the other African tribe or community.
In view of the greater awareness of the undeniable variety
of ethnic and cultural traditions across the continent, the
choice is increasingly for what, in meta-theoretical terms, may
be described as the subjectivist-empiricist mode of
philosophizing. This is represented by the indigenous trends
of ethno-philosophy and sage philosophy.
Metaphysics does not enjoy high priority on the current
African philosophical agenda. Nevertheless, a general scheme
of African metaphysics is possible and will briefly be
described, following Teffo and Roux. 54 The main
components of a general African cosmology are as follows:
God, the intra-cosmic architect;
Ancestors;
Humans
Plants, animals, minerals
African metaphysics consist of a number of principles
which control vital forces and the relations between them.
These form a hierarchy or chain of being, with God, the
most vital force and cosmic architect, at the apex, followed
by ancestors, mortal humans and physical nature. 55
The system of vital forces forms a closed universe that
operates in the manner of a zero-sum game: when one force
gains in power or vitality another force has to lose it. 56
African metaphysics has a strong experiential content and
does not differentiate, in the Western Cartesian manner,
between body and mind or natural and supernatural. 57
In contrast with the Western conception of causality,
which is regarded as mechanical by Africans, the African view
is teleological and deterministic - it rejects chance events. In

26
this regard a distinction is made between primary causes,
namely forces such as spirits, witches or social forces in the
community and secondary causes which are influenced by the
primary causes, such as the petrol bomb that caused
destruction. 58
African thought has a strong social orientation (I am
because we are) in seeking answers to the problems and
issues of human existence, often resulting in a blurring of
distinctions between metaphysics, social theory and morality.
Its essence is: the search for meaning and ultimate
reality in the complex relationship between the human person
and his/her total environment. 59 Although God is the
cosmic architect, he is part of the created world. Africans in
general, therefore: do not accept ad hoc interventions by
God in the order of nature. 60
Compared to the West, ancestors play an important role in
African life, and hence in African metaphysics. They are
venerated (not worshiped) and viewed as an integral
component of life. Ancestors interact with mortals in a
closed, deterministic, universe in which no distinction
between the material and spiritual is made: ...the actions of
the ancestors are believed to be within the regular pattern of
events. The immortals merely happen to occupy a higher
status in the order of things than mortals. 61

27
 CHAPTER 3
SCIENTIFIC NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (II)
3.1 Indian
3.1.1 Nyaya
The Nyaya School of empirical atomism is based on an
Aristotelian system of enumeration and logic and specifies
four sources of truth or knowledge, namely: perception,
inference, comparison and testimony, for which a set of
criteria of validity is used.
Following an approach of atomistic pluralism Nyaya
postulates a physical universe consisting of several types of
atoms, with Brahman as the supreme force that provides the
multitude of atoms with consciousness. The Nyaya system
identifies a number of subjects (for example purpose,
illustrative instances, premises, argumentation and refutation)
as knowledge requirements in order to achieve the highest
good. Salvation is said to be attained by the: successive
disappearance of false knowledge, defects, endeavour, birth,
and ultimately of sorrow. 1
Reasoning consists of three kinds of causal inferences:
...from cause to effect, effect to cause, and inference from
common characteristics. 2 The objects of knowledge are:
...the self (atman), body, senses and sense-objects,
understanding, mind, endeavour, rebirths, enjoyment of
pleasure and suffering of pain, sorrow and salvation. 3

3.1.2 Vaisesika
Vaisesika thought is aimed at explaining virtue (dharma) -
virtue being required for prosperity and salvation, with these,
in turn, being necessary to ensure the validity and truth of the
Vedas. 4 Salvation occurs as a result of true knowledge of the

29
following categories: substance, quality, class concept,
particularity and inherence, and their various sub-
components. 5
Similar to the Western empiricist tradition, a basic premise
of Vaisesika is the reality or existence of things: If I or you
or any other perceiver did not exist, the things would
continue to exist all the same. 6 As a result of a reliance on
experience and good or valid reasons, Nyaya-Vaisesika
accepts the atomistic doctrine of the four eternal elements,
namely: ...earth, water, fire, and air. 7
Nyaya-Vaisesika is a body of thought that does not reduce
experience to abstract principle. Neither does it sacrifice the
testimony of sense-experience merely for the sake of logical
coherence. It is expressed as follows: The underlying
principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there
must be something to which the perception is due. 8 The
system emphasizes right thinking, which, when a person uses
reason to acquire knowledge of all the empirically embedded
entities, he/she ceases to be ruled by the passions, attains true
knowledge of the self, and becomes liberated. 9
Nyaya-Vaisesika objects to the idea that an invisible,
transcendent, power resides in each cause which produces an
effect, on the grounds that it is not an empirically observable
matter, and therefore not a legitimate hypothesis causes can
be satisfactorily explained in terms of molecular activity. 10 As
far as the origin of knowledge is concerned, Nyaya-Vaisesika
holds that it is based on perception, which is defined as:
...that right knowledge generated by the contact of the
senses with the object. 11

30
3.2 Chinese
Although there are differences between the Chinese Schools
of Mohism, the Logicians and Legalism, especially the latter,
many of their doctrines and ideas share the objectivist-
empiricist orientation in human thought.
Mohism (from Mo Tzu, the founder) may be regarded as
main representative of the more empiricist-analytical trend in
Chinese thought, whilst the Logicians, given the context of a
fractious socio-political environment in ancient China, never
had strong support or influence and eventually disappeared.
They were - unsurprisingly, given the narrative-poetical thrust
of Chinese thought - seen as rhetoricians who tried to
impress with words, instead of contributing to important
social values and goals.
The School of Legalism may be depicted as a
Machiavellian political movement in support of the
authoritarian regimes of ancient Chinese rulers, for example,
the Chin dynasty. However, its doctrines share certain
aspects of the Mohist philosophical outlook, hence their
inclusion in this section. Main characteristics of the three
schools of thought are briefly sketched, following Wing-Tsit
Chan. 12

3.2.1 Mohism
Consistent with what would be expected according to the
meta-theoretical premises presented in chapter one, Mohism
(type II mode) and Confucianism (type IV mode) were fierce
opponents. 13 The Mohist doctrine emphasized an impersonal
and universal love for others, which is the will of heaven,
while Confucianism, although it acknowledged heaven,
followed a humanistic philosophy of individual care and deep

31
respect (filial love), that started with ones parents and family
and extended from there to the rest of society, and its rulers.
In this regard, Mo Tzu is reputed to have said: If rulers
of the world really want the empire to be wealthy and hate to
have it poor, want it to be orderly and hate to have it chaotic,
they should practice universal love and mutual benefit. 14
Figure 3.1 provides a comparison of distinguishing
characteristics of Mohism and Confucianism.
The Mohists were the earliest Chinese writers on logic and
more scientific topics such as geometry, optics and
mechanics - even though in aphoristic and metaphoric style.
Mohist doctrine emphasizes functionality and is against costly
social ceremonies, such as elaborate funerals, and against
artistic expressions, such as music.
Figure 3.1: A comparison of Mohism and Confucianism 15
Mohism (type II) Confucianism (type IV)
Impersonal concern. Personal care.
Utilitarian. Humanistic.
Moral behaviour. Moral character.
Concept of Concept of
righteousness. humanity.
Moral life desirable The moral life is
because of its benefits. desirable for its own
sake.
Social benefits are the Social benefits are
motivation for deeds. the result of deeds.
Practical. Idealistic.

32
3.2.2 The Logicians
The Logicians followed an Aristotelian approach, and
although they gave attention to such concepts as cause,
actuality, space, time, relativity and quality, did not discover
or put forward any laws of thought or syllogisms and
analytical propositions, as in the Western tradition.
They preferred expressing themselves in the subjectivist
mode, by way of: dialogues, aphorisms, and paradoxes
instead of systematic and cogent argumentation. 16
The reason why this (type II) tendency did not further
develop in China is partly because the general emphasis
during those turbulent times was on values (type III and IV
modes) and on solving social problems for the sake of
harmony and peaceful co-existence - a recurrent theme in
Chinese society. But partly it was also because the Chinese
were not very interested in the science of logic. Evidence
can, for instance, be found in remarks of the type III thinker,
Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu), who said of the Logicians that:
They are able to subdue other people's mouths, but cannot
win their hearts. This is where their narrowness lies. 17
Consistent with the scientific mode of thought, they
subscribed to the objectivist view of impersonal care, of the
Mohists.

3.2.3 The Legalists

Although they were as much political movement as school of
thought, the Legalists did emphasize a number of principles
and concepts in the objectivist-empiricist modality of mind.
Similar to the Mohists, the Legalists were opposed to the
Confucian approach of civic virtues and morality, and in
favour of power (especially of rulers that they supported) and

33
political control of the state, through a utilitarian approach of
generous rewards and severe punishments. 18
They did not worship past sage-kings - such as Yao and
Shun by the Confucianists, or Yu of the Mohists - but, in an
objectivist-empiricist fashion, emphasized actual results and
concrete accomplishments in the present. 19 This orientation
is reflected in the words of one of its leading figures, Han Fei
Tzu: To be sure of anything without corroborating
evidences is stupidity, and to base one's argument on
anything about which one cannot be sure is perjury. 20
Like other Chinese schools the Legalists accepted the
correspondence theory of the relation between names and
things. However, whereas Confucians focused on its moral
meaning and the Logicians emphasized the logical aspect,
Legalists were more interested in the theorys application for
purposes of political control. 21

3.3 Islamic
3.3.1 Ibn Sina
Both Ibn Sina (980 1037) and Ibn Rushd (see next section)
were metaphysical thinkers in the early (Neo-Platonic)
tradition of Islamic thought. However, contrary to Al-Kindi
and Al-Farabi, their philosophies had a stronger empiricist
inclination and in varying degrees took the physical world of
bodies and of the senses, philosophically, more seriously than
was previously the case.
Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd, although they lived more than a
century apart, were trained medical practitioners and
scientists, and not inclined to ignore or derogate physical
reality. The following discussion is based on de Boer, 22
Shariff, 23 and Butterworth. 24

34
 Ibn Sina was essentially a top-down thinker who
emphasized demonstrative thinking in deducing everything
that exists, from the existence of a: First and Necessary
Being, whose essence and existence are one. 25
Whereas Al-Farabi, with his more pronounced empyrean
inclination, preferred pure reason for its own sake, Ibn Sina
looked to the soul and the body. For Ibn Sina: Matter is the
eternal and pure possibility of all that exists, and at the same
time the limitation of the operation of the Spirit. 26
At the apex of the Soul is Reason: which at first is a
mere capacity for Thought, becomes elaborated gradually, in
that Material which is conveyed to it by the external and
internal senses. 27
Ibn Sina was a scholastic and systematic thinker, with an
acknowledged influence on Aquinas and Medieval thought,
and created the first comprehensive and detailed system of
philosophy in the Islamic world. 28 Like Muslim philosophers
before him, Ibn Sina followed an emanation doctrine of
Existence or Being, with God, the Necessary Existent at the
top of the hierarchy, from which the First Intelligence
emanates alone. 29
In Ibn Sinas system, God creates the world, which is
contingent upon God, as a matter of rational necessity. 30
Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina emphasizes the close
connection between mind and body, but whereas Aristotle
incorporated Form (mind) and Matter (body) as integral
aspects of one Substance, Ibn Sina chooses a dualism of two
substances. 31 Despite the duality, Ibn Sinas Neo-Platonic
thought also emphasizes the spiritual aspect of nature. 32
Ibn Sina adheres to an empiricist epistemology which is
representational and based on perception. In this regard he

35
makes a distinction between internal mental faculties and
external perception of the five senses his principle being
that: to every clear idea there must correspond a
distinction in reality. 33
Contrary to Aristotle, who distinguishes between morality
and politics as different aspects of his practical sciences, Ibn
Sina blurs the distinction. He follows the Aristotelian ethics
of a balance or mean of moral habits aimed at breaking the
hold of the passions and purifying the soul, namely:
temperance, courage and wisdom, in addition to which the
laws of the prophet and the Quran is to be adhered to.
Similar to Aristotles intellectual virtues, Ibn Sina emphasizes
the primacy of Reason (theoretical wisdom) for attaining
justice and happiness. 34

3.3.2 Ibn Rushd

Compared with his predecessors Ibn Rushd (1126 1198) is
totally enamoured with Aristotle, who was, for him, the most
perfect man and thinker.
As may be expected, Ibn Rushds thought is thoroughly
empiricist, consisting of many detailed commentaries,
interpretations and philosophical exegeses of the Greek
philosophers thought. De Boer summarises it as follows:
He goes critically and systematically to work: He paraphrases
Aristotle and he interprets him, now with comparative
brevity, and anon in greater detail, both in moderate-sized
and in bulky commentaries. 35
About six hundred years before Kant, Ibn Rushd
separates the spheres of revelation and reason. He actually
rejected theology, essentially because it could not be justified
rationally. However, he also attempts to justify philosophical

36
reason by appealing to the same Quranic verses that Islamic
jurists use in support of their legal doctrines. 36
For Ibn Rushd the world is a dynamic unity, an eternal
process of becoming, hence: ...an eternally necessary unity,
without any possibility of non-existence or of different
existence. 37 This means that Form and Matter are universals
that can only be separated in thought, hence: The essence of
the First Mover, or of God, as well as of the Sphere-Spirits, is
found...in Thought. 38
In opposition to Ibn Sinas principle of dual emanation,
Ibn Rushd (like Aristotle) views the human soul in relation to
the body as Form is to Matter: The soul has an existence
only as a completion of the body with which it is associated.
39

Ibn Rushds philosophy is deterministic everything has a

cause, whether internally through acts of thought and the
imagination, or externally through the senses, or, as he
formulates it in his attempts to accommodate the Creator-
mind (Thought in itself): he who denies the existence in
this world of the dependence of effects on causes would deny
the wise Maker. 40
Against the subjectivist approach (also of Al-Ghazali, who
lived before him), Ibn Rushd responds that: To deny the
existence of efficient causes which are observed in sensible
things is sophistry, and he who denies them either denies with
his tongue what is present in his mind or is carried away by a
sophistical doubt... 41
Ibn Rushd distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge
- both being embedded in the reality of existence - individual
knowledge of the particulars through the senses and
imagination, and universal knowledge, which is the result of

37
the intellect: The act of the intellect is to perceive the
notion, the universal concept, and the essence. The intellect
has three basic operations: abstraction, combination, and
judgment. When we perceive a universal notion, we abstract it
from matter. 42
In ethics Ibn Rushd did not deviate from Aristotle and
emphasized the importance of theoretical wisdom and
practical morals as acquired habits of good conduct:
ethics are simply moral habits and character traits, that is,
the kind of actions we train ourselves in or are trained in
according to the doctrine of the mean. 43

3.4 Jewish ( Maimonides)

Showing his objectivist-empiricist mind-set, Maimonides
(1138 1204 CE) is of the opinion that one should only
believe what can be grasped with the intellect or perceived by
the senses. But, with his own Jewish faith in mind, he also
adds: ...or what he can accept on trustworthy authority. 44
After completing a work on revelation and the Jewish
Tradition he desired to validate its contents by the use of
philosophical analysis. This he accomplished with the Guide of
the Perplexed. 45
Maimonides was held in high regard by his
contemporaries and also later generations. This is expressed
in the popular saying: ...From Moses to Moses there was
none like Moses." 46
He firstly wished to establish that the: ...Divine Being of
whom the Bible speaks could...be regarded as identical with
the Primal Cause of the philosophers. 47
His stated intention was: ...to expound Biblical passages
which have been impugned, and to elucidate their hidden and

38
true sense, which is above the comprehension of the
multitude. 48
The book opens with an address to his pupil, R. Joseph
Ibn Aknin, appealing to him to study it systematically, so that:
...the truth should present itself in connected order... 49
Beginning each chapter with a Scriptural reference,
Maimonides explains that his purpose is to enlighten the
religious person who also wants to satisfy his reason.
The Guide of the Perplexed is aimed at those educated Jews
who are both sound religious believers and have a good
background in the sciences (physics, mathematics), but who
experience conflict between their faith and the principles of
reason. It is for him who: ...finds it difficult to accept as
correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the
Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived
from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid
expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety... 50
Maimonides repeatedly states that his work is not about
proving the propositions of the philosophers, but to apply
them to an explanation of Scripture. He accepts only Aristotle
and twenty five of his principles as his own guide, but
principle twenty six, namely, the eternity of the universe, is
accepted provisionally, so that: ...we shall be enabled clearly
to demonstrate our own theory 51
Maimonides type II (scientific) mode of thinking speaks
clearly in his advice to his student that he must free himself
from his passions and only use the dictates of reason. He
specifies the following conditions: ...First you must know
your mental capacities and your natural talents: you will find
this out when you study all mathematical sciences, and are
well acquainted with Logic. Secondly, you must have a

39
thorough knowledge of Natural Science, that you may be able
to understand the nature of the objections. 52
Maimonides is decidedly against mysticism (whether of the
type I or III kind). To explain the mystical passages in the
Bible is to go beyond the Law and reason: ...my knowledge
of them is based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration and
is therefore not infallible... 53/38
The rest of the book is spent on re-classifying the 613
Talmudic commandments into fourteen groups, with a
chapter on each. This is summarised in Figure 3.2 below.
Figure 3.2: Maimonides reduction of the 613 Talmudic
commandments 54
Class Theme
First Precepts which form fundamental principles
(e.g., on repentance; fasts)
Second Precepts concerning the prohibition of
idolatry
Third Precepts concerning the improvement of the
moral condition of humankind
Fourth Precepts relating to charity, loans, gifts, and
e.g., the rules respecting "valuations"
Fifth Precepts which relate to the prevention of
wrong and violence.
Sixth Precepts respecting fines, e.g., the laws on
theft and robbery, on false witnesses
Seventh Laws which regulate the business transactions
of men with each other
Eighth Precepts which relate to certain days, as
Sabbaths and holy days
Ninth General laws concerning religious rites and
ceremonies
Tenth Precepts which relate to the Sanctuary, its
vessels, and its ministers
Eleventh Precepts which relate to Sacrifices

40
Twelfth Laws concerning things unclean and clean
Thirteenth Precepts concerning forbidden food
Fourteenth Precepts concerning forbidden sexual
intercourse

Lastly, some additional aspects of Maimonides thought

are:
1. His objectivist treatment, insisting that four things
must be removed when considering the nature of
God: ...corporeality, affection, potentiality and
resemblance to his creatures. 55 This is a thoroughly
impersonal approach;
2. He provisionally accepts that the Neo-Platonic
conception of separate intelligences is the same as
Biblical angels, with the exception that they are not
eternal (Aristotle), but were created by God; 56
3. As Aristotelian thinker he attempts to harmonize
philosophy and the Hebrew Bible, but, as Husik
observes: ...he is apparently unaware of the yawning
gulf extending between them.; 57
4. Maimonides stressed the importance of intellect over
passion: The intellect determines the will, and not
even God's will may be arbitrary; 58
5. He was certainly not a poet, and even disliked it. 59
With regard to his antipathy toward poets (type III mode)
it is interesting to note that Halevi, who was a prominent
figure about two generations before him, is not even
mentioned by Maimonides.

3.5 African (Professional)

In post-colonial Africa a choice for an objectivist-empiricist
orientation (mainly modern analytical philosophy that
41
emulates Western science) has become more acceptable, and
is referred to as academic or professional philosophy. 60
However, Black professional philosophy that, in the
African context, deal with Western topics such as
epistemology and logic are often not well-received, and its
practitioners are, according to Mosley: often accused of
being sell-outs. 61
Wiredus solution is a translation of Western
philosophical concepts into the indigenous languages of
Africa. This is to be accomplished without sacrificing the
accumulated stock of folk wisdom of African cultures and
without surrendering to a linguistic imperialism of Western
philosophical concepts. 62
Professional philosophy in Africa is regarded as being:
engrained with argument and criticism and is the type
of philosophy supported by philosophers such as Wiredu,
Hountondji, Bodunrin, and Oruka. 63
Criticism of professional philosophy, mostly by
proponents of ethno-philosophy, are: (a) that it is too meta-
philosophical for the African social and communal context
and, therefore, not practical and useful; (b) that it lacks a
sufficient literature of its own and focuses too much on
critiques of indigenous thought, namely, of ethno-philosophy
and sage-philosophy. 64
Professional African philosophers, in turn, are of the view
that descriptive accounts of African world views, values,
much of it as anthropological discourse, are not philosophy,
because it lacks the rational analysis of professional
philosophy. The non-professional philosophical literature in
Africa is challenged by scholars such as Oruka, Wiredu,
Bodunrin, Hountondji, and Makinde. 65

42
 CHAPTER 4
NARRATIVE NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (III)
4.1 Indian (Mimamsa)
The Mimamsa School of thought arose from differences in
opinion among priests and believers about the meaning of
Vedic texts regarding religious duties, rituals and sacrificial
activities, especially the incantations or mantras.
Mimamsa (literally: attempts at rational enquiry) 1 is,
meta-theoretically, the opposite of Vedanta and despite the
meaning of its name, rejects the use of Reason to gain
philosophical knowledge and understanding of the Vedas.
Instead, for them, the Vedas exist for and require the daily
duties and acts of devotion by ordinary believers. Over time
Mimamsa became the primary, legally accepted, source of
conduct in these matters, for Hindu believers.
Although it attempted rational analysis, the Mimamsa
school avoided the formulation of abstract principles about
matters such as: cause, space, soul, inference and perception,
and were more concerned with exegeses of the Vedic texts.
In contrast to Vedanta, Mimamsa became known for its
anti-asceticism, and being primarily concerned with right
action, as opposed to the focus on right thinking by
Vedanta. It also requires an unquestionable faith in the Vedas
and regular rituals and sacrificial performances.
Mimamsa regards all knowledge (except memory) as valid
in itself, so that it does not require external conditions or
certification by any other authority, except the Vedas. It is
referred to as: the doctrine of the self-validity of
knowledge. 2 The corollary is that: knowledge is never
perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all

43
objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or
illumination. 3
This school of thought rejects the objectivist mode of
mind and does not differentiate between a knower and
known, thus: All knowledge whether perceptual, inferential
or of any other kind must necessarily reveal the self or the
knower directly. 4
Mimamsa agrees in the main with their type II meta-
theoretical neighbours, the Vaisesika, in its doctrine of the
five elements, yet it differs from the Nyaya in that it did not
require or accept external sources (for example the existence
of physical atoms) for validating knowledge claims. 5

4.2 Chinese
The approaches of Lao Tzu (better known as Daoism or
Taoism) and of the mystical poet, Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu),
typify the subjectivist-empiricist mode of thought. Both are
thoroughly individualist, and emphasize living in harmony
with nature, in opposition to the social reformist (type IV)
thought of Confucius and Mencius and the more analytical
and systematic orientation of Mohism / Legalism (type II).
Essential elements of the approaches 6 of Daoism and
Zhuangzi are indicated below:

4.2.1 Daoism
The central characteristic of Daoism is its philosophy of
living in harmony with nature, not in a quietist manner, but
by following the course of nature, in accordance with the
principle of non-action or wu-wei, meaning: simplicity,
spontaneity, tranquillity... 7

44
 In contrast to Confucianism, which focuses on the social
order and the promotion of old Chinese traditions for living
in peace and harmony with others, Daoism stresses the life of
the individual and on achieving a state of inner tranquillity
and of mystical unity with nature.
Daoism, which was meant for the sage-kings as a guide to
rule by non-interference in nature, is not a philosophy of
surrender to, withdrawal from or conquest of nature (as in
the West), but a philosophy of fulfilment of the way of
nature. This is reflected in the famous Yijing (also known as: I
Ching or Tao-Te-Ching), which is: a combination of poetry,
philosophical speculation, and mystical reflection. 8
Some of its better-known expressions, indicating its anti-
metaphysical stance, are: The Tao (Way) that can be told of
is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the
eternal name. 9
Chan provides a meta-theoretically informative
comparison of the use of water as metaphor: while early
Indians associated water with creation [type I] and the Greeks
looked upon it as a natural phenomenon [type II], ancient
Chinese philosophers, whether Lao Tzu or Confucius,
preferred to learn moral lessons from it [type III/IV]. 10

4.2.2 Zhuangzi
For Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu, 399 - 295 BCE), the foremost
exemplar of poetical nature-mysticism in Chinese thought,
the pure man: becomes a companion of Nature and does
not attempt to interfere with it 11
Whereas Confucianism believes in mans active
participation, and in education for developing his potential, in
order to fulfil the purpose of nature, Zhuangzi, more

45
pragmatically believes in: nourishing nature, returning to
destiny, and enjoying Nature 12 His pronounced mystical-
poetical orientation became an important source of
inspiration in Chinese landscape painting and poetry. 13, 14
Consistent with the characteristics of the subjectivist
paradigm, Zhuangzi is in favour of a plurality of perspectives
and sceptical about: assertions of universality and
objectivity that normally accompany knowledge-claims. 15

4.3 Islamic (Al-Ghazali)

In Al-Ghazali (Islams convincing proof,' 'the ornament of
faith and reckoned to be the equal of four Imams) 16
Islam had one of its most influential thinkers. Initially as
Islamic jurist and teacher in Baghdad, and later, after much
soul-searching and travelling, as Sufi-believer and reformer,
Al-Ghazali (1058 1110 CE) became a strong critic of the
metaphysics of especially Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi.
More than five hundred years before Descartes and
Hume, Al-Ghazali, as a result of a crisis of doubt and
skepticism that assailed him at the peak of a successful career,
decided on an approach of methodical doubt.
He had no difficulty in accepting the truths of the
sciences, and even published treatises on Aristotelian logic,
yet he came to the conclusion that neither the truth of the
senses (which Descartes regarded as sources of error) nor the
metaphysical speculations of the philosophers (which Hume
rejected as being out of touch with sense experience),
provided irrefutable certainty, and, therefore, any peace of
mind. Fakhry states it succinctly: If sense experience is not
to be trusted, then by analogy the knowledge of necessary
propositions or axioms is not to be trusted either. 17

46
 Although Al-Ghazali appreciated the sciences, he was
disaffected by their limited scope, in not being able to provide
the deepest, most encompassing, truth that only revealed
religion can offer.
He compares the physicist to an: ant who, crawling on
a sheet of paper and observing black letters spreading over it,
should refer the cause to the pen alone 18 However, the
truth is that the hand holding the pen is caused by a brain
that is in turn caused (activated) by the writers will (qualb or
heart), and ultimately by the hand (Will) of Allah. In true
subjectivist manner Al-Ghazali declares that: the heart is
not the piece of flesh situated in the left of our bodies, but
that which uses all the other faculties as its instruments. 19
He rejected the metaphysics of the philosophers, his main
target, because it was based on fanciful ideas - Neo-Platonic
celestial entities, such as spheres, intelligences and spirit-
hierarchies. According to Al-Ghazali, these were neither self-
evident nor logically derivable, and could neither prove nor
disprove the truths of revealed religion.
Al-Ghazali was seeking a higher authority and certainty,
which he eventually found in Sufi mysticism. His explanation
of how he regained his intellectual health through a: ...light
which God infused into his heart, which indeed is the key to
most species of knowledge, 20 is indicative of his preference
for the narrative-interpretive realm of mind.
Al-Ghazali also revolted against the philosophers selective
use of the Quran to justify or bolster their philosophies, and
their often outright rejection of the truths of the Quran.
In his Tahafut al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of the
Philosophers), he attacked the philosophers, specifically,
because of their rejection or denial of: (1) a world created by

47
the eternal God; (2) Gods knowledge of the particulars, and
(3) of bodily resurrection.
Sheikh refers to this clash of mindsets in much the same
tone as the struggle between worldviews: Intellectualistic-
deterministic of the philosophers, voluntaristic -
occasionalistic of Al-Ghazali. 21
Figure 4.1 provides a comparison of the contrasting
positions of Al Ghazali and the Islamic philosophers. It
shows that the struggle between Islamic Faith (Al-Ghazali)
and Reason (the Philosophers) represents a fundamental clash
of meta-theoretical opposites - an Islamic version of the
eternal dialectic and tension between subjectivist and
objectivist thought.
Figure 4.1: Al-Ghazali versus the Philosophers 22
Al-Ghazali (type III) Philosophers (type I)
The Divine Causality is free The world proceeds from
Creative Might; God as effect from cause;
There is only one causality, God is the highest Being,
that of the Willing Being; and his essence is Thought;
God has cognizance of the God wills the world,
world because he wills it; because he thinks it as best;
Emphasizes experience Emphasizes universal ideas

4.4 Jewish (Halevi)

In this section and the next, two outstanding subjectivist
Jewish thinkers, Judah Halevi (1075 1141 CE) and Ibn
Pakuda (type IV) will be presented, respectively. Though both
appreciated the role of reason and philosophy, it mainly
served as underpinning for their endeavours, namely:
defending the Jewish faith and culture, by Halevi; promoting

48
a religious ethic that went beyond lip service, by Pakuda. The
Kitab al Khazari 23 (also known as Khazari or Khuzari) was
written somewhere between 1120 and 1140, and is essentially
a defence as well as praise of the Jewish religion and way of
life, in the narrative-poetic (type III) modality of mind.
The Khazari is Halevis fictional account of the king of the
Khazars search for an appropriate religion for himself and
his people in dialogue with representatives from philosophy,
Christianity, Islam and a Jewish rabbi. Legend has it that the
king became a Jewish convert and that Judaism was the state
religion from about 830 CE, onwards.
The story came to Halevis attention and he saw it as an
ideal opportunity to defend Judaism. As he relates: I was
asked to state what arguments and replies I could bring to
bear against the attacks of philosophers and followers of
other religions, and also against Jewish sectarians who
attacked the rest of Israel. 24
Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 provide brief extracts from the
dialogue, showing the philosopher, Christian scholastic,
Islamic doctor and, finally, the Jewish rabbis response to the
kings question on how he should act to become saved.
The king was not satisfied with the philosophers answer,
and decided to: ...ask the Christians and Muslims, since one
of these persuasions is, no doubt, the God-pleasing one.... 25
He then invited a Christian scholastic to tell him about the
nature and practice of the Christian faith. This was followed
by conversations with the Islamist and Jewish rabbi.

49
 Figure 4.2: Philosopher vs Khazar King 26
Philosopher King
God...is above desire and Thy words are convincing,
intention. Everything is yet they do not correspond
reduced to a Prime Cause; not to what I wish. ...
to a Will proceeding from this, Yet we find that true visions
but an Emanation from which are granted to persons who
emanated a second, a third, do not devote themselves to
and fourth cause. study or to the purification
In fine, seek purity of heart in of their souls, whereas the
which way thou art able, opposite is the case with
provided thou hast acquired those who strive after these
the sum total of knowledge in things. This proves that the
its real essence; then thou wilt divine influence as well as
reach thy goal, viz. the union the souls have a secret
with this Spiritual, or rather which is not identical with
Active Intellect. what thou sayest, O
Philosopher.

Figure 4.3: Christian vs Khazar King 27

Scholastic
I believe that all things are
created, whilst the Creator is
eternal; that He created the
whole world in six days; that
all mankind sprang from
Adam, and after him from
Noah, to whom they trace
themselves back; that God
takes care of the created
beings, and keeps in touch
King
I see here no logical
conclusion; nay, logic
rejects most of what thou
sayest. If both appearance
and experience take hold of
the whole heart, compelling
belief in a thing of which
one is not convinced they
render the matter feasible
by a semblance of logic.

50
with man;
He shows wrath, pleasure, and
compassion; ...He speaks,
appears, and reveals Himself to
His prophets and favoured
ones; He dwells among those
who please him.
As for me, I cannot accept
these things, because they
come upon me suddenly,
not having grown up in
them. My duty is to
investigate.

Figure 4.4: Doctor of Islam vs Khazar King 28

Doctor of Islam King
The unity and eternity of God; Although your book may be
all men are from Adam-Noah. a miracle, it is written in
Reject embodiment. Arabic; I cannot see its
Return of the spirit to thes miraculous character
body in paradise; enjoy eating, I see I must ask the Jews,
drinking, and woman. because they are the relic of
the Children of Israel.

Figure 4.5: Jewish Rabbi vs Khazar King 29

Jewish Rabbi King
I believe in the God of The theory I had formed,
Abraham, Isaac and Israel, and the opinion of what I
who led the children of Israel saw in my dream thou now
out of Egyptwho sent confirmest, viz. that man
Moses...Law was given to us can only merit divine
because He led us out of influence by acting
Egypt, and...because we are the according to God's laws.
pick of mankind.

51
 Some additional comments and explanations regarding
Halevis approach follow:
1. For Halevi nothing in the Bible is contrary to the
dictates of reason, but he insists that only revelation
can make one wise; 30
2. In Judah Halevi the poet got the better of the
rationalist, emphasizing that God and the Jewish
religion: .... are not simply facts to be known and
understood like the laws of science. They are living
entities to be acquainted with, to be devoted to, to
love.; 31
3. Husik also notes that Halevis negative attitude
toward philosophy (because it reduces God to an
impersonal force) has much in common with the
Islamic thinker, Al-Ghazali, from whom he derived
much inspiration; 32
4. In contrast to Pakudas duties of the heart, Halevi
emphasizes adherence to the ceremonial laws and
sacrifices, 33 and is against: ...all manner of
asceticism; 34
5. Halevi places a strong emphasis, more than his
predecessors, on free will and is against any kind of
fatalistic determinism; 35
6. In contrast to the rigorous organization and
argumentation of Maimonides (type II), Halevis
Khuzari is: ...a meandering series of discussions and
arguments; 36
7. The greatest Hebrew poet of all time. 37

52
4.5 African (Ethno-philosophy)
The literature on African philosophy, by and large, shows a
predilection for what is referred to as ethno-philosophy, an
approach in the narrative-interpretive realm of thought.
A characteristic ingredient of the writing on African
thought is the ongoing concern with self-definition, 38 as well
as the question of African philosophys usefulness to society,
or as Oladipo formulates it: the question of how best to
respond to the colonial denigration or underestimation of
African cultures and traditions, and of how best to achieve
development in Africa without compromising our identity. 39
The historical roots of ethno-philosophy are traced back
to the writing of a Belgian priest, Placide Frans Tempels, in
the 1950s. Ethno-philosophy reportedly has a large following
of anthropologists, sociologists and philosophers. 40 It
consists of systematic descriptions of communal thought and
wisdom (myths, beliefs, folktales, proverbs), in contrast to
logical analysis and argumentation of professional
(objectivist) philosophy.
Most ethno-philosophical approaches start with the
assumption that there is an existing, coherent, body of
African thought that is separate from individual African
cultures and ethnicities and, secondly, that it is worthwhile
exploring and recovering this communal tradition. 41
Apart from ethno-philosophy, related approaches in the
subjectivist-empiricist mode of thought in Africa are culture
philosophy and sage philosophy.
Oruka, who identified main trends in African philosophy,
42
regards the sequence of historical development as follows:
firstly, culture philosophy (of ancient origin), then sage
philosophy (occupying the middle ground), and lastly, ethno-

53
philosophy. The thoughts of the sages: form significant
raw data for technical philosophical reflections by
professionals. 43 Figure 4.6 highlights the three trends.
Figure 4.6: Ethno-philosophy, Sage Philosophy and Culture
philosophy
Ethno Sage Culture
Holistic, communal Thought of Principles of a
thought; individual sages; culture;
Written Wise and Oral tradition
descriptions of inspirational (myths, beliefs,
culture taboos, values)

54
 CHAPTER 5
PRAGMATIC NON-WESTERN THOUGHT (IV)
5.1 Indian (Patanjali Yoga)
Compared to the Schools of Hinduism discussed so far
(Vedanta, Nyaya-Vaisesika, and Mimamsa) the Patanjali
School of Yoga is meta-theoretically most representative of
the subjectivist-empyrean realm of thought. It is not a
macroscopic ideological system, such as Platos Republic or
Marxs Communist Manifesto. Rather than being a program for
collective or social reform, Yoga is about an inner reform of
soul and spirit that, through release (moksha) from karma,
hopes to attain salvation.
Following Dasgupta, 1 key elements of the Yoga school of
meditative practice and self-purification are sketched below.
The Patanjali-Yoga program of purification 2 consists of
the following:
(a) Yamas:
Practise of absolute non-injury to all living beings,
Absolute and strict truthfulness,
Non-stealing,
Absolute sexual restraint,
Accepting nothing but the absolutely necessary
(b) Niyamas:
Practice of external cleanliness by ablutions and inner
cleanliness of the mind,
Contentment of mind,
Bearing all privations of heat and cold,
Keeping the body unmoved and remaining silent in
speech,
Study of philosophy,
Meditation

55
(c) Positive relations with others:
Thinking of all beings as friends,
Kindly feeling for sufferers,
Feeling of happiness for the good of all beings,
Feeling of equanimity and indifference for the vices
of others.
The word Yoga means harnessing or yoking (from its
use in the Rg Veda) which reflects its focus on
transformation. The emphasis is placed on control of the
senses through actions of abstinence such as: asceticism
and the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study [which] were
regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being
productive of the highest power. 3
Various moral activities are regarded as indispensable,
such as: ...association with good people, abandoning of
desires, [and] determined attempts at discovering the truth
with fixed attention. 4
In opposition to the objectivist metaphysics of Vedanta
and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, Yoga regards knowledge or
philosophy as insufficient. It takes the position that a
graduated course of meditative practice and inner reform is
necessary for liberation: ...before the mind can be fit for this
lofty meditation, it is necessary that it should be purged of
ordinary impurities. 5
When all the Yoga practices have been diligently
performed and all worldly pleasures left behind, one may
attain liberation of the mind by: ...constant practice with
faith, confidence, strength of purpose and execution, wisdom
attained at each advance. 6

56
5.2 Chinese
5.2.1 Confucius
Confucius ideas are characteristic of the subjectivist-
empyrean realm of thought. He had a lifelong ambition for
political mentorship and held high political office for a while.
Above all, he wanted to bring sanity to the warring and
factional Chinese society of his time, by educating people on
how to live right. For Confucius, as a confessed lover of
tradition, this meant making the best in ancient Chinese
customs and traditions available again; as a living tradition
contained in a body of maxims and rules that could serve as
guide for men and women in all the varied spheres of life in
society.
The work of Chan 7 serves as source for an outline of the
thought of Confucius (551-479 BC) as well as of Mencius
(371-289 BC), a prominent Confucian who lived about two
centuries after Confucius, and who became a leading figure in
the history of Confucianism.
At the age of fifty six, Confucius, upon: finding his
superiors uninterested in his policies...set out to travel (for
almost thirteen years) in a desperate attempt at political and
social reform. 8 He was concerned with humankind
improving its lot in cooperative and harmonious living with
others, or as Chan phrases it: believing that man can
make the Way (Tao) great, and not that the Way can make
man great, he concentrated on man. 9
Believing in the moral perfectibility of humankind,
Confucius stressed the concept of the superior man, but in a
social revolutionary way, by applying the concept of nobility
of character and virtue more broadly and not only to
hereditary rulers and those of high rank in Chinese society. 10

57
 Although he acknowledged and repeatedly refers to the
will of Heaven (Tien), for him: Heaven is no longer the
greatest of all spiritual beings who rules in a personal manner
but a Supreme Being who only reigns, leaving his Moral Law
to operate by itself. This is the Way according to which
civilization should develop and men should behave. 11

5.2.2 Mencius
Mencius, a man very much in the same mould, as well as of
similar background, life and career experiences, as Confucius,
was a prominent Chinese reformer, who: like
Confuciushad a sense of mission, if only to suppress
perversive doctrines. 12
More so than Confucius, Mencius proclaimed the original
goodness of humankind, as shown below: 13
Humans possess the innate knowledge of the good
and innate ability to do good;
If one develops ones mind to the utmost one can
serve Heaven and fulfil ones destiny;
Evil is not inborn but due to man's own failures and
his inability to avoid evil external influences;
Serious efforts must be made to recover our original
nature;
The end of learning is none other than to seek for
the lost mind.
The Confucian program of educational, moral and
political reform - the three items and the eight steps -
which is the application of its doctrine of humanity (jen, or
conscientiousness and altruism), is contained in the Chinese
classic, the Great Learning. The elements of this program are
outlined below.

58
 The Three Items
Manifesting the clear character of man,
Loving the people,
Abiding in the highest good
The Eight Steps
Investigation of things,
Extension of knowledge,
Sincerity of the will,
Rectification of the mind,
Cultivation of the personal life,
Regulation of the family,
National order,
World peace
The process of reasoning follows a double sequence of
thought, from the investigation of things to world peace
and back. 14
In summary: Confucius was a humanistic reformer for
whom the love of social harmony was the main driving force.
A giving of oneself to well-mannered servitude to superiors,
subordinates parents, peers and family; and educating people
in all these relations, were important to him. What had to be
relinquished by people was self-centered, immoral conduct
that went against the wishes of rulers and of social best
practice.

5.3 Islamic
5.3.1 Al-Farabi
Although not an active reformer (he was too much of a
recluse) Al-Farabis Platonic model or theory of the ideal city
is an example of the ideological mode of thought in Islamic
philosophy. Although primarily a type III critic and ancient

59
deconstructionist, Al-Ghazali also took on the role of
religious reformer in his peregrinations, as will briefly be
indicated below.
Al-Farabis theory of the democratic city is an elaboration
of Platos system of the ideal Republic or city-state. Platos
political theory makes provision for five types of city, in
descending order of excellence: the Virtuous (Platos ideal of
rule by the aristocracy), the Timocratic, Oligarchic,
Democratic and Tyrannical types of city.
Following Khalidi, 15 Al-Farabis system can be shown to
end up with nineteen types of city: the imperfect six types of
ignorant, immoral and erring cities, to which the virtuous city
is added. His city of indispensables is a city surviving on
bare necessity, with no luxuries, and is Al-Farabis version of:
the primitive city devoid of luxuries described by
Socrates. 16
Al-Farabi divided Platos oligarchic city into two cities:
the Vile city, that pursues wealth and prosperity, and the
Base city, which pursues sense pleasures. 17
Similar to Plato, Al-Farabi envisages his ideal city as an
organic unity in which each individual is assigned tasks and
responsibilities according to unique talents and abilities, with
the noblest of these activities: allotted to the chief, for he
stands in the same relation to the city as the heart to the body
and is the source of all activities and the origin of harmony
and order 18
The chief has all the good qualities associated with being a
leader, namely: intelligence, a lover of knowledge, defender of
justice. He must rise to the level of agent intelligence, where
he will receive revelation and inspiration. In addition to these
philosopher-king (Platonic) attributes, the chief must have:

60
communion with the celestial world as if the city is
inhabited by saints and governed by a prophet 19

5.3.2 Al-Ghazali
Al-Ghazali, as the discussion in chapter 4 showed, may
primarily be regarded as an acute thinker and critic of
metaphysics, in the type III mode of thought. Yet, there is
sufficient indication that he had a strong desire to persuade
and reform: to be the spiritual champion of the Muslim
faith, 20 in the advocacy or praxis mode of the type IV realm
of thought.
As with his father before him, Al-Ghazali strongly
identified with the Sufi movement, to the extent of
undergoing private and secret instruction in its deeper
intricacies and spiritual exercises. He felt the personal urge to
spread the word and join the Sufi movement as a religious
reformer and, toward this end, journeyed to various cities:
Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Mecca, Medina and back to
Baghdad. He eventually became a leading figure in the rise of
Sufism, and, as de Boer describes it: ever since his time
Mysticism both sustains and crowns the Temple of Learning
in Orthodox Islam. 21

5.4 Jewish (Pakuda)

Ibn Pakuda (circa 12th century), wrote the first treatise on
ethics in Judaism, entitled Duties of the Heart. 22 Together with
Guide of the Perplexed (Maimonides) and Khuzari (Halevi), it
became one of the most celebrated works in Judaism.
In an empyrean fashion, Pakuda recommends asceticism:
...as a means of removing hindrances to union with God. 23

61
 Pakuda is not against philosophy as such, stating about
believers that it is: ...the lamp of their reason, which enables
them to come to the will of God... 24 He appreciates the
wisdom of philosophy (whether it be philosophy of nature,
mathematical wisdom or philosophy itself), but they are all
merely: ...gates which the Creator, Blessed be He, has
opened to human beings. 25
He divides the book into ten sections, one for each of the
following principles: ...doctrine of the deity;...an examination
of creation;...the service of God, trust in God, action for the
sake of God alone, submission to God, repentance, self-
examination, separation from the pleasures of the world, love
of God. 26
The rest of the work presents a detailed exposition of a
range of different ethical imperatives, according to which the
Jewish faithful should think and act.
At the core of the book is the distinction between duties
of the limb and duties of the heart. His explicit aim is to
promote the latter as being the true wisdom and faith for
living the religious life.
The Torah is divided into duties of the body and duties
that concern thought and feeling. 27 The former he describes
as the ethics of the body and the latter as the ethics of the
soul. The duties of the mind and heart: ...have all of them
their roots in human reason, and, like some corporeal duties,
would be recognized as binding even without revelation. 28
Figure 5.1 presents an example of a range of duties of the
heart. The book consists of many invocations and practical
suggestions (gates) for action by the faithful.

62
 Figure 5.1: Pakudas duties of the heart 29
Duty Description
1 To accept His Unity and worship Him in our hearts.
2 To trust in Him, and humble ourselves before Him.
3 To tremble at the thought that He looks at usat all
that is revealed and all that is hidden about us.
4 To desire to do His will.
5 To concentrate all our efforts upon good deeds,
motivated only by the love of God.
6 That we should love Him and those that love Him.
7 We should not think sinful thoughts, or to have sinful
desires.

The following are examples of headings of sections 30 in

the Duties of the Heart, namely: The duties of the heart are for
every time and place; man's obligation of gratitude to God;
the gate of love.
Figure 5.2 provides a number of habits of those that love
God, as they: ...come opportunely to my mind. 31
Figure 5.2: Pakudas habits of those that love God 32
They know their God with a practical and fruitful knowledge.
They have recognised His rule and His restraining power in all
those affairs.
They have resolved not to be guided by their own preferences,
but to rest in perfect trust upon the Creator.
They are humble because of the fear of God.
When one speaks with them they are wise.
When any sin against them they are meek.
They are simple in worldly affairs, but at home in discourse
about God.
Their hearts are full of the love of God.

63
They have rejected all ways of corruption and chosen the best
paths.
They learn the ways of the Prophets and the customs of the pious
to seek examples of doing the will of God.
Birnbaum 33 provides an informative comparison of the
paradigmatic opposites of Maimonides (type II) and Pakuda
(type IV). Figure 5.3 below, summarizes the differences.
The descriptions are self-explanatory and clearly show
how, in substantive detail, the Aristotelian thinker differs
from the Neo-Platonic reformer intent on purifying the
Jewish religion with his emphasis on a higher-order spiritual
and religious code of ethics.
Figure 5.3: Pakuda compared to Maimonides 34
Pakuda (Type IV) Maimonides (Type II)
Influence of Plato. Influence of Aristotle.
The Duties of the Heart The Guide of the Perplexed is
speaks to the multitude, not meant for the
in an egalitarian way. multitude.
The goal of reason is to The goal is to effect a
bring the believer to the reconciliation between
creator through a reason (Aristotle) and
knowledge of Him. revelation.
The concern with evil is Concern with evil is
moralistic. philosophical.
Duties of the mind and Truth of mind prior and
body are equal. anterior to tradition.
Man is the center of Man is inferior to
Creation. heavenly intelligences.
Guards the Jewish Rational consistency at the
tradition at the price of price of Jewish tradition.
logical rigor.
The soul returns to God The Acquired Intellect
and to the World to returns to the Active
come. Intellect.

64
 Birnbaum 35 also compares Pakuda and Maimonidess
different conceptions of the role of reason, by presenting
their distinctive parables. This is shown in summary fashion
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.
Figure 5.4: Pakuda on the role of reason 36
The king wishes to assess the reasoning ability (wisdom) of
his servants by distributing skeins of raw silk among them
Wise servant Foolish servant
Divides the silk skeins (Bible) Indiscriminately weaves
into three categories: garments from the whole lot
superfine (duties of the heart), of skeins; ends up with
medium (Law) and inferior inferior products (duties of the
(Tradition) and wears the limb only) which he tries to
garments woven from each sell for whatever he can, and
type on appropriate squanders the money on
occasions at the palace. food and liquor.
The king is happy with what the wise servant did and gives
him a privileged position at court. The foolish servant is sent
into exile.

Figure 5.5: Maimonides on reason 37

The King is concerned about the ability of the masses for
cognitive truths
Levels Distance from the palace
1. (Lowest) Non-believers who have no religion and any
knowledge; they are outside the city
2. Those who have false doctrines; they are in
the city but with backs to the palace
3. The masses who observe the
commandments but who are ignorant; they
seek but cannot find the palace

65
4. Those who study and practice the law out of
fear, but do not inquire into the truth of
their faith; they arrive at the palace and go
around it in search of the gate.
5. Talmudists who investigate the principles of
religion and physical sciences; access to the
vestibule of the palace.
6. (Highest) Those who are also schooled in the divine
science; the metaphysicians (including
prophets) who have achieved true
knowledge of God and are able to enter the
inner court where the king lives.

There are, however, also similarities and agreement

between Pakuda and Maimonides on the following aspects, as
Birnbaum 38 indicates:
1. Mans perfection lies in the intellectual worship of
God;
2. The heart is the seat of the intellect;
3. Desire and evil arise from the material substance in
man which is in opposition to intellect;
4. The intellect is the distinct faculty which links man to
God;
5. By virtue of reason, the pious and righteous chosen
by God ascend to prophecy;
6. Reason is insufficient to grasp the essence of God.

5.5 African (Nationalist)

During the colonial era philosophical ideas in Africa were
used mostly by rulers such as Julius Nyerere (Tanzania),
Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia) and Leopold Senghor (Senegal)

66
for political purposes, 39 as political theories or ideologies in
order to gain independence. 40
Nationalist ideologies in the African context emphasise
values such as family, humanity and community. More recent
writing 41 is concerned with the usefulness of philosophy, in
the context of a global society.
In the so-called Newer debate as to what African
philosophy is for, Balogun places the emphasis, not only on
rational analysis, but more specifically on: reconstructive
evaluation of both traditional African cultural experience and
modern cultural heritage, in pursuit of the goal of useful
living for Africans. 42
A more active, socio-political (type IV) role is envisaged
for African philosophers, in order that they can: fulfil
their scholarly obligations to their societies. 43

67
 CHAPTER 6
REVIEW OF THE FOUR TYPES IN
NON-WESTERN THOUGHT
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the nature and characteristics of
four fundamental orientations or modalities of mind in
human thought. These, prototypical, ways of making sense of
life and world goes back as far as recorded history. It runs
through all human intellectual endeavours - ancient and
modern and has been found 1, 2 to underlie the content of a
wide range of scholarly disciplines and schools of thought
(Western as well as Eastern).
The purpose of the book is to provide evidence of the
existence of the four types of thought in a number of
divergent non-western philosophical ideas and systems. These
include some renowned figures and schools of thought, such
as: Vedanta (Hinduism); (Islamic) Al-Ghazali, Ibn Sina
(Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes); Confucius, Zhuangzi
(Chinese); Maimonides, Halevi, Pakuda (Jewish), and African
ethno-philosophy.
Being a selection, not every kind of non-Western
philosophy, of which there is a large variety, could be
included for analysis.

6.1 Type I thought

The thinkers and schools of thought that typify this modality
are, essentially, all metaphysicians (speculative philosophers),
or at least metaphysically-inclined. The arch-exemplar of
empyrean philosophy in the Western tradition is, of course,
Plato with his world of super-sensible entities (Forms) that
are supposedly more real than the particulars of sense-
experience.

69
 Plato (through Neo-Platonism) and the works of Aristotle,
jointly occupy a central role in Islamic thought. Both Al-
Kindi and Al-Farabi essentially sought to combine Plato and
Aristotle in Neo-Platonic fashion within an Islamic context.
Vedanta, with its disinclination to allow any earthly
influences and impurities of the flesh in its system, is clearly
an approach typical of the empyrean paradigm in orthodox
Hinduism. A similar role is performed by the Yin-Yang
concept, with its emphasis on the harmony of forces, in
Chinese thought.
Although not currently very topical, metaphysics in the
form of a cosmological hierarchy of: nature, humans,
ancestors, and God at the pinnacle, form the backbone of
African thought.

6.2 Type II thought

As in the West, Eastern and African thought also show
the presence of the scientific modality of mind.
The empiricist (type II) emphasis in Non-Western
philosophies is found in:
The atomistic pluralism and perception as source of
knowledge of the Nyaya-Vaisesika;
The attention to functionality, logic and scientific
topics, of the Chinese schools of Mohism, Legalism
and the Logicians;
The importance of sense-experience and the principle
of causality in the systems of Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd
(both of whom were also medical practitioners);
The central importance of Aristotelian concepts in
the system of Maimonides (Jewish), who thought that

70
 one should only believe what can be grasped with the
intellect or perceived by the senses;
The influence of Western analytic (scientific)
philosophy on African professional philosophy.

6.3 Type III thought

Here we, by and large, find the anti-metaphysical stance of
thinkers in the subjectivist-empiricist tradition of philosophy.
The narrative-interpretive orientation finds expression in:
The rejection of Reason (objectivism) by the Hindu
School of Mimamsa, for whom the Vedas only
require the daily duties and acts of devotion by
ordinary believers;
The philosophy of living in harmony with nature, of
Daoism, and the poetical nature-mysticism of
Zhuangzi (Chinese);
The religious mysticism (Sufism) of Al-Ghazali, who
rejected the metaphysical reasoning of the Islamic
philosophers and of knowledge based on sense-
perception (see type II);
The importance for Judah Halevi of defending the
Jewish faith and culture, in the narrative-poetical
mode;
The preference for ethno-philosophy and communal
wisdom in African thought.

6.4 Type IV thought

The subjectivist-empyrean modality of mind in Eastern and
African thought is evidenced in:
The program of asceticism and inner salvation of the
School of Patanjali Yoga (Hinduism);

71
 The philosophy and program of social reform and
education of Confucius and Mencius (Chinese);
The concern of Al-Farabi to create an Islamic political
dispensation that closely follows Platos rules for ideal
city; and the importance of Al-Ghazali in the rise of
Medieval Sufism, as well as his desire to be the
spiritual champion of the Muslim faith;
The nationalist-ideological philosophy of African
political leaders and thinkers.

6.5 Concluding comment

The present analysis leaves little doubt as to the existence and
operation of fundamentally different orientations of mind in
Non-Western philosophical thought.
No thinker (Western or Non-Western) can get away from
certain root intellectual stances or points of departure. It is at
the root of their concepts, theories and doctrines and reflects
often unspoken (if not unrecognized) assumptions about the
nature of the true, the real and the good.

72
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Chapter 1: Fundamental approaches in human thought
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Cornford, F. M. (1991/1912). From Religion to Philosophy, New
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2
Kirkwood, G. M. (1995). A Short Guide to Classical Mythology,
Illinois: Boldchazy-Carducci.
3
Rosenberg, D. and Baker, S. (1992). Mythology and You,
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4
Kant, I. (1934/1787). Critique of Pure Reason, translated J. M.
D. Meiklejohn. London: Dent.
5
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6
Schiller, F. (1967/1793). On the Aesthetic Education of Man,
translated E.M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby. London:
Oxford.
7
Berlin, I. (1978). Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p171.
8
Bernstein, R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science,
Hermeneutics and Praxis. Oxford: Blackwell.
9
Plato, (360 BCE). Philebus, Translated by Benjamin Jowett,
p8 [http://classics.mit.edu/Help/permissions.html].
10
Plato, (1987). The Republic. translated H.D.P. Lee. England:
Penguin Books.
11
Jones, W.T. (1970). The Classical Mind: A History of Western
Philosophy. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich. p243.
12
Pietersen, H. J. (2011). The Four Types of Knowing
Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
13
Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the
Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional.
New York: Edwin Mellen Press.

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Chapter 2. Speculative Non-Western thought (I)
1
Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy: Volume I.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
2
Ibid., p413.
3
Ibid., p432.
4
Ibid., p436.
5
Ibid., p440.
6
Ibid., p441.
7
Ibid.,
8
Ibid., p491 493.
9
Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
10
Ibid., p244.
11
Ibid.,
12
Ibid., p245.
13
Ibid., p246.
14
Ng, On-cho. (2008). Introduction: The Yijing and its
commentaries, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, p194.
15
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam,
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc.
16
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc.
17
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p81.
18
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc.

74
19
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p82.
20
Ibid ibid., p83.
21
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc., p425.
22
Ibid., p426.
23
Ibid., p428.
24
Ibid., p429.
25
Ibid., p432.
26
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p86.
27
Ibid.
28
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc.
29
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, pp.224 239.
30
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p88.
31
Ibid., p90.
32
Ibid., p92.
33
Ibid., p92.
34
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, at Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc., p457.

75
35
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p97.
36
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy , Journal of Religious Ethics, p228.
37
Ibid., p229.
38
Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of
Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from
the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by
Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of
Philosophical Library, New York.
39
Pessin, S (2010) Solomon Ibn Gabirol [Avicebron], Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. First published Thursday Sep 23,
2010.
40
James T E (1962) Introduction to: Gabirol, Ibn Solomon
(Avicebron) (1962). The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), specially
abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E.
Wedeck, with an introduction by Theodore E. James,
Wisdom Library, a division of Philosophical Library, New
York, pvii.
41
Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of
Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from
the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by
Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of
Philosophical Library, New York, p1.
42
Ibid., p5.
43
Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New
York: MacMillan Company, p63.
44
Gabirol, Ibn Solomon (Avicebron) (1962) The Fountain of
Life (Fons Vitae), specially abridged edition, translated from
the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an introduction by

76
Theodore E. James, Wisdom Library, a division of
Philosophical Library, New York, p5.
45
Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New
York: MacMillan Company, pp. 61 and 62.
46
Ibid., p65.
47
Ibid., p65.
48
Ibid., p65.
49
Ibid., p67.
50
Ibid. p68.
51
Ibid., p69.
52
Ibid., p70.
53
Ibid., p79.
54
Teffo, L.J and A.P.J Roux. (1998). Metaphysical thinking in
Africa, in Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J. Roux (Editors). Philosophy
from Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International
Thompson.
55
Ibid., p138.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid., p138.
58
Ibid., p139.
59
Ibid., p139.
60
Ibid., p140.
61
Ibid., p141.

Chapter 3: Scientific non-Western thought (II)

1
Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy: Volume I,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
2
Ibid., p295.
3
Ibid., p295.
4
Ibid., p296.
5
Ibid., p286.

77
6
Ibid., p311.
7
Ibid., p313.
8
Ibid.,
9
Ibid., p313.
10
Ibid., p321.
11
Ibid., p334.
12
Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
13
Ibid., p211.
14
Ibid., p217.
15
Ibid.,
16
Ibid., p232.
17
Ibid., p232.
18
Ibid., p251.
19
Ibid., p252.
20
Ibid., p253.
21
Ibid., p257.
22
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc.
23
Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc.
24
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p224 - 239
25
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p108.
26
Ibid., p109.
27
Ibid., p112.

78
28
Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc., p480.
29
Ibid., p481.
30
Ibid., p483.
31
Ibid., p487.
32
Ibid., p490.
33
Ibid., p493.
34
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p232.
35
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p146
36
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p234.
37
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc., p148.
38
Ibid., p149.
39
Ibid., p151.
40
Shariff, M.M. (2004). (Ed). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc., p550.
41
Ibid., p558.
42
Ibid., p553.
43
Butterworth, C.E. (2001). Ethics in Medieval Islamic
philosophy, Journal of Religious Ethics, p236.
44
Friedlander, M. Introduction, In: Maimonides, Moses
(1904) The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original
Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised

79
throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew
Literature Society, p32.
45
Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed.
Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander,
2nd Edition, revised throughout. NewYork: Publications of
the Hebrew Literature Society.
46
Friedlander, M. Introduction, In: Maimonides, Moses
(1904). The Guide of the Perplexed. Translated from the original
Arabic text by M. Friedlander, 2nd Edition, revised
throughout. New York: Publications of the Hebrew
Literature Society, p33.
47
Ibid., p60.
48
Maimonides, Moses (1904) The Guide of the Perplexed.
Translated from the original Arabic text by M. Friedlander,
2nd Edition, revised throughout. New York: Publications of
the Hebrew Literature Society, p379).
49
Ibid., p103.
50
Ibid., p104.
51
Ibid., p360.
52
Ibid., p452.
53
Ibid., p554.
54
Ibid., pp.691 694.
55
Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New
York: MacMillan Company, p322.
56
Ibid., p327.
57
Ibid., p360.
58
Ibid., p 360.
59
Birnbaum, R. (2007) Maimonides, then and now, Judaism,
p67.
60
Mosley, A. (1995). Translating philosophical meaning,
Africa Today, Vol. 42, (3), p68-73.

80
61
Ibid., p68.
62
Ibid., p69.
63
Kaphagawani, D.N. (1998). What is African philosophy? in
Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds), 1998. Philosophy from
Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International
Thompson, p98.
64
Ibid., p98.
65
Fasiku, G. (2008). African philosophy and the method of
ordinary language philosophy, The Journal of Pan African
Studies, Vol.2 (3), p102.

Chapter 4: Narrative Non-Western thought (III)

1
Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy, Volume I.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p371.
2
Ibid., p374.
3
Ibid., p375.
4
Ibid., p383.
5
Ibid., p404.
6
Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press
7
Ibid., p136.
8
Ibid., p137.
9
Ibid.,
10
Ibid., p143.
11
Ibid., p177.
12
Ibid., p178.
13
Ibid., p179.
14
Ibid.,
15
Lai, K.L. (2006). Philosophy and philosophical reasoning in
the Zhuangzi: dealing with plurality, Journal of Chinese
Philosophy, p365.

81
16
Sheikh, M. S. (1982). Islamic Philosophy. London: Octagon
Press, p85.
17
Fakhry, M. (1983). History of Islamic Philosophy. Second
Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, p35.
18
Albertini, T. (2005). Crisis and certainty of knowledge in
Al-Ghazali (1058-1110) and Descartes (1596-1650), Philosophy
East & West, Volume 55, (1), p3.
19
Ibid., p4.
20
Fakhry, M. (1983).History of Islamic Philosophy. Second
Edition, New York: Columbia University Press, p36.
21
Sheikh, M. S. (1982). Islamic Philosophy. London: Octagon
Press.
22
Ibid., p95.
23
Halevi, Judah (1905) Kitab al Khazari. Translated from the
Arabic by Hartwig Hirschfeld, New York: E. P. Dutton
[Scanned at sacred-texts.com, March 2006.]
24
Ibid., p35.
25
Ibid., p39.
26
Ibid., pp36 40.
27
Ibid., pp. 40 42.
28
Ibid., pp. 42 44.
29
Ibid., pp. 44 87.
30
Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New
York: MacMillan Company, p204.
31
Ibid., p206.
32
Ibid., p206.
33
Ibid., p222.
34
Ibid., p223.
35
Ibid., p225.
36
Berger, M. S. (1992) Toward a new understanding of Judah
Halevis Kuzari, The Journal ofReligion,p210.

82
37
Kaplan, L. J. (2011) The starlings caw: Judah Halevi as
philosopher, poet, and pilgrim, The Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol.
101, No. 1, pp. 97 and 98.
38
Oladipo, O. (1995). Reason, identity, and the African quest:
The problems of self-definition in African philosophy, Africa
Today, Vol. 42 (3), pp.26 39.
39
Ibid., p26.
40
Kaphagawani, D.N. (1998). What is African philosophy? in
Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from
Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International
Thompson, pp. 86 98.
41
Appiah, K. A. (1998). Ethno-philosophy and its critics, in
Coetzee, P.H. and A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from
Africa: A Text with Readings. Johannesburg: International
Thompson, pp. 109 117.
42
Oruka, H. (1998). Sage philosophy, in Coetzee, P.H. and
A.P.J Roux (eds) 1998. Philosophy from Africa: A Text with
Readings. Johannesburg: International Thompson, pp99 108.
43
Ibid., p100.

Chapter 5: Pragmatic non-Western thought (IV)

1
Dasgupta, S. (1922). A History of Indian Philosophy. Volume I,
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
2
Ibid., p277.
3
Ibid., p217.
4
Ibid., p271.
5
Ibid.,
6
Ibid., p272.
7
Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1963). A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8
Ibid., p17.

83
9
Ibid., p16.
10
Ibid., p17.
11
Ibid., p16.
12
Ibid., p49.
13
Ibid.,
14
Ibid., pp.86 and 87.
15
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. (2003). Alfarabi on the democratic
city, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 11(3), pp. 379
394.
16
Ibid., p383.
17
Ibid.,
18
Shariff, M.M. (Ed) (2004). A History of Muslim Philosophy.
Pakistan: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, by Islamic
Philosophy Online, Inc, p463.
19
Ibid., p463.
20
De Boer, T.J. (2003). The History of Philosophy in Islam.
Translated by E.R. Jones, New York: Islamic Philosophy
Online, Inc.,p123.
21
Ibid., p122.
22
Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The
Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin
Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London,
2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by
Hazell, Watson &Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W.
[Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com,
February 2010].
23
Collins, E, Introduction, In: Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar
Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The Duties of the Heart, translated,
with introduction by Edwin Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar,
University College, London, 2nd impression, John Murray,
Albemarle Street, Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd.,

84
London and Aylesbury W. [Scanned, proofed and formatted
at sacred-texts.com, February 2010], p12.
24
Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The
Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin
Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London,
2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by
Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W.
[Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-texts.com,
February 2010], p15.
25
Ibid., p15.
26
Husik, I (1916) A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy, New
York: MacMillan Company, p135.
27
Pakuda (Rabbi Bachye bar Joseph ibn Bakoda) (1909) The
Duties of the Heart, translated, with introduction by Edwin
Collins, Hellier Hebrew Scholar, University College, London,
2nd impression, John Murray, Albemarle Street, Printed by
Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury W.
[Scanned, proofed and formatted at sacred-exts.com,
February 2010], pp. 17 and 18.
28
Ibid., p18.
29
Ibid., pp. 18 19.
30
Ibid., pp. 22 57.
31
Ibid., p57.
32
Ibid., pp. 57 59.
33
Birnbaum, R (2001) The role of reason in Bahya and
Maimonides, SHOFAR, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 76 86.
34
Ibid.,pp. 76 86.
35
Birnbaum, R (2001) The role of reason in Bahya and
Maimonides, SHOFAR, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 76.
36
Ibid., p79.
37
Ibid., pp. 79 80.

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38
Ibid., pp. 84-85.
39
Mosley, A. (1995). Translating philosophical meaning,
Africa Today, Vol. 42, (3), p68-73.
40
Ikuenobe, P. (1997). The parochial universalist conception
of philosophy and African philosophy, Philosophy East & West,
Vol. 47 (2), pp.189-211.
41
Balogun, O.A. (2008). Philosophy: What social relevance?,
Philosophia Africana, Vol. II (2), pp.103-116.
42
Ibid., p106.
43
Ibid., p108.

Chapter 6: Review of Non-Western thought

1
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Epistemology of Mind, New York: Edwin Mellen Press.
2
Pietersen, H. J. (2014). The Four Archetypal Orientations of the
Mind: Foundational, Experiential, Organizational and Actional.
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Four fundamental and interrelated intellectual
orientations were found to characterize the thought
of a global range of thinkers, disciplines, and cultures
(Western, Eastern and African). This volume consists
of a review of the four types in Non-Western thought.

Professor Pietersen has made contributions to

philosophy, theology, sociology, psychology,
jurisprudence, and business and human resource
management.

He is the author of: The Four Types of Knowing

Metaphysical, Scientific, Narrative and Pragmatic: A Meta-
epistemology of Mind (2011) and The Four Archetypal
Orientations of the Mind: Foundational, Experiential,
Organizational and Actional (2014), both published by
Edwin Mellen, New York.

ISBN: 978-1-86922-612-1