In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;

ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath
of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after
July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

FACTS:

Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court).

Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted
to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947,
70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and
feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed
 it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.

Purpose For the Bill:

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students
during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the
liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed
that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave
defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary,
and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence
are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have
temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls
article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire
law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers
of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects
violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from
these fatal defects.

Decision:

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and
therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-
1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this
Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal
of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It
obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other
may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to
regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and
this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to
facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students
inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
 5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to
1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of
the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have
voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to
1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief
Justice may set. So ordered.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

( creation of the integrated bar of the Philippines )

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects
of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages
44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be
no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom
to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.
 A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs
the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even
the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been
dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers
and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay
annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they
have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar
integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of
the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar;
(4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public.
No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine
Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying
will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission
on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the
integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent)
voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association
and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has
expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662
(or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on
January 16, 1973.

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence
and mercy" of the Court.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law
is a profession and not a trade.
 "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion
and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofilea for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that
of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui, now
deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925)
and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of
donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or
death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed
of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime
sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio
Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera
de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de
Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la
cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon
the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on
1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,
beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to
which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doa Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied
with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their
deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio
de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone,
means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a
law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espaola, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed.,
p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o
puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion
of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that
class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may
be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the
"titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided
in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist,
in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A
lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for
the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of
administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue
of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground,
among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is
made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for
his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.
1w ph1.t

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court.
The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the
capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character a fit and proper person to practice law. The
court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301,
p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney
has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be
the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof
than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral
character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper
person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications
are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be
regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p.
816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney
cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is
disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches.
Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must
be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that
year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of
the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded
for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in
the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator,
Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the
Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter
dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he
took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated
2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in
his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the
Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion
previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of
the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ.
No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator.
On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to
dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he
was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a
second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was
pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may
disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case
filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants
thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28
May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached
this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of
the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by
whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the
following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between
them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934
(60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of
assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was
dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such
an action all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action
in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that
the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not
interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action
is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not
from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one
of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line
of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The
deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself)
pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and
therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the
founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the
deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and
the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence
the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent **
;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that
I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action
before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent,
hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner
above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection
Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit,
dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales
agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996,
in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head
of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions
from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly
duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed
by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require
an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also
averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of
court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his
acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was no basis for the
complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of
the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the
mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other
person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the
letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail
of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-
law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction,
but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property --
subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got
his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several
months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary
deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996
and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty.
Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More
than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency
involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious,
in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or
undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a
member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for
most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and
the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint,
courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the
study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid
or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.