You are on page 1of 28

Bantay vs.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which
have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for
Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this
urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs
Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales,
et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually
declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure
request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is
deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila
Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections
without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite
qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups
from participating in the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the
respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the
names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May
14, 2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make
a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the
case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to
address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an
organization. )

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:


Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:


Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups,
Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party,
such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in
the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The peoples
right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001


ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of
154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections.
Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the
non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition,
petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where
the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha
facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the
Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. It is however,
incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so
as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of
the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to
determine compliance by the party lists.
Lozada v COMELEC

Jose Mari Eulalio Lozada together with Romeo Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold an election to fill the vacancies in the Interim Batasang
Pambansa (IBP). They anchor their contention on Section 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election,
the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
COMELEC opposed the petition alleging that 1) petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for
they are not the proper parties to institute the action; 2) the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition; and 3) Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution does not apply to the Interim
Batasan Pambansa.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can compel COMELEC to hold a special election to fill vacancies in the
legislature.
HELD: No. The SCs jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latters
decision, orders or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XII-C, Section 11 of the New
Constitution which reads:
Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be reviewed by this
Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision, which is the only
known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over the COMELEC.
It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would
entail huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasang Pambansa (BP) can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts
much less may COMELEC compel the BP to exercise its power of appropriation. From the role BP has to
play in the holding of special elections, which is to appropriate the funds for the expenses thereof, it
would seem that the initiative on the matter must come from the BP, not the COMELEC, even when the
vacancies would occur in the regular not IBP. The power to appropriate is the sole and exclusive
prerogative of the legislative body, the exercise of which may not be compelled through a petition for
mandamus. What is more, the provision of Section 5(2), Article VIII of the Constitution was intended to
apply to vacancies in the regular National Assembly, now BP, not to the IBP.

SECTION 26 PASSING OF A BILL


PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ 15 SCRA 489, 1965
FACTS:

The Supreme Court was called upon in to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the
constitutionality of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives and to the elective officials of both houses (of
Congress).

The constitutionality of the law is assailed on the ground that the provision for the retirement of the
members and certain officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of the
Constitution.

ISSUE: W/N RA 3836 violates the Constitutional provision that every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

HELD:

YES. Under RA 3836, amending CA 186, as amended by RA Nos. 660 and 3096, the retirement benefits
are granted to members of the GSIS who have rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age.
This provision is related and germane to the subject of CA 186. On the other hand, the succeeding
paragraph of RA 3836 refers to members of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not
members of the GSIS. To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials would relate to subject
matter, not germane to CA 186.

Ligot v Mathay

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December
30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and
took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressmen) were
increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that
said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act
No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of
any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last
three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the
highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. The House
of Representatives granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so
issue certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during
his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such
increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased
salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00
per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would
be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what
he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of
Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the
simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided
by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of Ligots
colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, Such a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it
would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what
cannot be done directly.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS

Feb. 3, 2000

Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that
of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

People v Jalosjos

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of
the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been
re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a
covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be
defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected
a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several
motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be
heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a
co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of


Representatives

Held:

NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege
has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater
is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.
11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not
removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency
or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually
make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they
do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more
in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a
Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the
same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift
him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.

TRILLANES v PIMENTEL

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS


PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
556 SCRA 471 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and
publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series of
negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening.

In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained
in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.

Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside
orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.

The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to
bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited
provisions apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is
beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the
proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."

Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally to
detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The Court in People v.
Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not
practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate

The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a
plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's
electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so
with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the
people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the
people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed
to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006,
file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as
senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these
prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT


OSMENA V. PENDATUN
G.R. NO. L-17144 OCTOBER 28, 1960

FACTS:

Congressman Sergio Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59.

Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59 found said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behavior; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its
session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended and suspending him from office
for fifteen months.

ISSUES:
Whether or not delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct
for which Osmena may be disciplined?
Whether or not the resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for
speeches delivered in the House?

HELD:

a. Yes. There is no question that Congressman Osmena made a serious imputation of bribery against the
President. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. The house has exclusive power; the courts have no
jurisdiction to interfere. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands
in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
b. No. The resolution does not violate the constitutional parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
the House. Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming of a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the parliament or of
Congress have bee, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of
their colleagues.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION 16 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION


OSMEA VS. PENDATUN
(G.R. NO. L-17144, OCTOBER 28, 1960)

BENGZON, J.: FACTS:

Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his
parliamentary immunity. He also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be
enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him
to substantiate his charges of bribery against then President Garcia with the admonition that if he failed to
do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and
third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule
XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had
uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.

The Special Committee during the pendency of his petition, found said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behavior. The House approved House Resolution No. 175 declaring him suspended from office
for 15 months.

ISSUE: Can the House of Representatives discipline its members as in the case at bar?

HELD:
Yes. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of
which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea
conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction
and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power
committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that,
even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is
vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause
which it may deem sufficient.

The Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more
weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative
bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.

ARTICLE VI - LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT


JIMENEZ V. CABANGBANG
G.R. NO. L-15905, AUGUST 3, 1966

FACTS:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jiminez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of the defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the letter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This
motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.

ISSUES:

a. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication?


b. Whether or not it is libelous?

HELD:

a. No. The aforementioned publication does not fall within the purview of the phrase speech and debate
therein that is to say in Congress used in Art.VI, sec.15 of the Constitution. Said expression refers
to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of
their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein,
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress
presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, the said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

b. No. The letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs action for damages. It is true that the
complaint alleges that an open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that is false and
with the intent to impeach plaintiffs reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and
ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the
complaint. The very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they might
be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the
planners. This statement is not derogatory to the plaintiffs to the point of entitling them to recover
damages.

Adaza v Pacana

Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Fernando Pacana, Jr. was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the
law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his
certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost.
Adaza took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude
Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to
be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that
within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local
elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected
member of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices
abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more
than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a
private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against
BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code.

Liban vs. Gordon (2009)


Ponente: Carpio, J.

Facts:

Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while Respondent is the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by
accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of
the Senate - Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987
Consti: No Senator or Member of the HoR may hold any other office/employment in the Govt, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including govt-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected).
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled
corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their
appointment to another government office.

Respondent:
Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/c appears to be an action for quo warranto they do not
claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil

Procedure: action should be commenced w/in 1 year after the cause of public officers forfeiture of office
respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs
Petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers no claim that they suffered some actual
damage/threatened injury or illegal disbursement of public funds
If petition is for declaratory relief, SC has no jurisdiction original jurisdiction in RTC
PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation
Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to PNRC is not an
office/employment Petitioners: present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning unlawful disbursement of
funds considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other compensation as a Senator even
if he is no longer entitled to his office. Court has jurisdiction because it involves a legal/constitutional
issue of transcendental importance.

Issues, Holding & Ratio: WON petitioners have standing.

SC: NO. The petition is an action for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules of Court an action for the
usurpation of a public office against a public officer who does or suffers an act which constitutes a ground
for forfeiture of his office). See facts for petitioners allegations. Petitioners do not claim to be entitled to
the Senate office of respondent.

WON PNRC is a Private or Government Owned or Controlled Corporation. SC: PNRC is a Private
Corporation. May 22, 1947 Pres. Manuel Roxas signed RA 95 (PNRC Charter) adhering to the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1929.
PNRC is:
- A non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable w/o consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
- A member of National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

7 Fundamental Principles:
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, Universality. - Must be
autonomous, neutral and independent; not appear to be instrument/agency that implements govt policy to
merit the trust of all and effectively carry out its mission therefore, it cannot be owned/controlled by the
govt The Philippine govt does not own the PNRC does not have govt assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals/entities
obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors (Sec. 11, PNRC Charter).
The govt does not control the PNRC. Only 6 of the 30 members of the PNRC Board of Governors are
appointed by the President of the Philippines (Sec. 6, PNRC Charter). A majority of 4/5 of the PNRC
Board are elected/chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not
appointed by the President or any subordinate govt official, therefore, he is not an official/employee of
the Philippine Government.

Sec. 16, Art. VII of Consti President appoints all officials & employees in the Executive branch whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Consti or by law. President also appoints those whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law. The law may also authorize the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint officers lower in rank. The vast majority of the thousands of
PNRC members are private individuals, including students and foreigners; those contribute to the annual
fund campaign of the PNRC (Sec. 5, PNRC Charter amended by PD 1264).

Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: A govt-owned or
controlled corporation must be owned by the govt, and in case of a stock corporation, at least a majority
of its capital stock must be owned by the govt. In case of a non-stock corporation, at least a majority of
the members must be govt officials holding such membership by appointment/designation by the govt.

WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a govt office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti.

SC: The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office. The President cannot review, reverse or modify
the decisions/actions of the PNRC Board and the PNRC Chairman. Only the PNRC Board can review,
reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Chairman.

*The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation of Private
Corporations by Special Law 1935 (Sec. 7 was in force when PNRC was created by special character on
March 22, 1947), 1973 & 1987 (Sec. 16) Constitutions provide that:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Govt-owned or controlled corporations may be created/established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

Feliciano v. CoA Sec. 16 of 1987 Consti bans private corporations to be created by special charters,
which historically gave individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. PNRC
was created through a special charter, however, the elements of govt ownership and control (e.g. capital
assets and operating funds from govt) are clearly lacking in the PNRC. It therefore cannot be considered
a govt-owned or controlled corporation. In creating PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact
creating a private corporation, which is not exempt from constitutional prohibition (Sec. 16 above) even
as a non-profit/charitable corporation. PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and grants it corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional Sec. 1-13 are void. Other
provisions remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that PNRC is the local
National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and thus entitled to the
benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. They also implement the Phil. Govts
treaty obligations based on the Geneva Conventions. Judgment: Office of the PNRC Chairman declared
not a government office.

Dissent: Nachura, J. The petition is one for prohibition and petitioners have legal standing as citizens and
taxpayers. The remedy sought is preventive and restrictive, an injunction against an alleged continuing
violation of the fundamental law. They raise a constitutional issue, w/o claiming any entitlement to either
the Senate seat or chairmanship of PNRC. The Court has full authority and bounden duty to assume
jurisdiction to determine WON other branches of govt have kept themselves w/in the limits of the Consti
& laws and have not abused discretion given them. PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation
(GOCC). Its charter does not violate the constitutional proscription against creation of private
corporations by special law. PNRC was incorporated under RA 95, a special law. It cannot be anything
but a GOCC. PNRC was not impliedly converted into a private corporation simply because its charter was
amended to vest in it authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, tax fees, etc. The
use of Sec. 2(13) of Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 by the ponencia to define a
GOCC does not pronounce a definition of a GOCC that strays from Sec. 16, Art. XII of Consti. It merely
declares that a GOCC may either be a stock or non-stock corporation.

Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter PNRC is officially designated to assist the RP in discharging the obligations set
forth in the Geneva Conventions therefore, it is engaged in the performance of the govts public
functions. PNRC is endowed w/ corporate powers. It administers special funds contributions of
members, aid given by govt, supported by PCSO and LGUs. It submits annual reports receipts and
disbursement to the President. ANRC (precursor of PNRC) is considered a federal instrumentality
immunity from state taxation, subjected to governmental supervision & regular financial audit, principal
officer appointed by the President but remains an independent, volunteer-led org. No basis to assume
that it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out mission as a National Red Cross
Society. Separatists & insurgents do not consider them as the enemy but as the entity to turn to in the
event of injury. Considering that PNRC is a GOCC, its charter does not violate the constitutional
provision (Sec. 16, Art. XII). To declare Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter (creation and incorporation of the org)
invalid and the rest valid is to reach an absurd situation in w/c obligations are imposed on and a
framework for its operation is laid down for a legally nonexisting entity. Sec. 2-17 of RA 95 are not
separable from Sec. 1 cannot stand independently no separability clause. Presumption of
constitutionality of law is presumed. There is no clear showing that the PNRC Charter runs counter to the
consti. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. Deleterious
effects will result if PNRC is declared a private corporation employees will no longer be covered by the
GSIS; it can no longer be extended tax exemptions and official immunity; and cannot anymore be given
support, financial or otherwise, by the National Govt, LGUs, and PCSO. The Court must not arbitrarily
declare a law unconstitutional just to save a single individual from unavoidable consequences of his
transgression of the Consti even if done in good faith. Sen. Gordons continuous occupancy of 2
incompatible positions is a clear violation of the Consti (Sec. 13, Art. VI). The language in the provision
is unambiguous; requires no indepth construction. A position held in an ex officio capacity (a second post
held by virtue of the functions of the first office) does not violate such constitutional proscription. The
chairmanship of the PNRC Board is not held in an ex officio capacity by a member of Congress. Vote to
grant Petition.

DANTE V. LIBAN, et al. v. RICHARD J. GORDON (2011)

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a Supreme Court decision which ruled
that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a
Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and
the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to
incorporate itself with the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of
the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation.
Respondent avers that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It
is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.

ISSUE:

Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?
HELD: In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As
such, the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive
issue, the PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent
Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to
assist victims of war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others.
It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to
eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in
order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The
creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a National
Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and GOCC. The
PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the other
mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC
statute as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the
Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui
generis in being a private corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the
PNRC is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to create.

It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when
it comes to issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case.

You might also like