The Reisulkuttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz

6 4 -7 3 5
A B O U -E L H A J, R ifa 'a t A li, 1 9 3 3 -

TH E R EISU UK U TTAB AN D O TTO M A N
D IP I jOMAC Y A T KA R LOW ITZ
P r in c e to n U n iv e r s ity , P h .D ., 1963
H is to r y , m o d e m
U niversity Microfilms, Inc., A n n Arbor, M ichigan
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
THE HEISOLKDTTAB ABD OTTOIA31 DIPLOMACY AT O R M U Z
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Departments of Oriental
Studies and History
Princeton University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
By
Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj
June, 1963
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
ABSTRACT
This study deals with two major, interrelated problems8
1. Because knowledge of the military situation leading to
peace negotiations had, prior to I698 , been considered as
sufficient qualification for leading an Ottoman peace mission,
the delegates were invariably drawn from the ranks of the
military commanders. With the overwhelming defeat of the
Ottoman forces at Senta in 1697? however, oiroumstanoes had
changed to suoh an extent as to necessitate the requirement
of other, additional qualifications in leaders of the dele
gation. This study proposes that by selecting Rami Mehmed
Efendi to lead the mission of 1698 , the Ottoman State had
chosen one of its few administrators who met the qualifications
required by this new situation. Due to its militant ideology
(the ever-expanding, frontier of Islam), and as a direot result
of drawing the leaders of peaoe missions from the ranks of the
military personnel, the Ottoman State possessed no corps of
trained diplomats to conduct negotiate ons after the drastic
change in circumstances in I698 . This study, by tracing the
rise of the office of the Reisftlkiittab in general and of the
incumbent Reisftlkttttab Rami Mehmed Efendi in particular, within
the Ottoman administrative system, suggests that by the time
he held that office Rami Mehmed Efendi had acquired sufficient
knowledge of and experience in the fields of foreign and
domestic affairs to be able to deal competently with the
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
problem of more or less suooessful negotiations* Thuss
' in 1
choosing him as leader of the delegation* the Ottoman Court
had not only broken with tradition and established a new

precedent, but had also selected the man most qualified for the
task, of negotiating with the diplomats of the Holy League.
2. Neither of the two previous studies of the negotiations

at Karlowitz (M.E. Popovig, Per Priede von Karlowitz (Leipzig,
1895) and W.B Munson, "The Peace of Karlowitz" Dnipublished
Ph.De dissertation, The University of Illinois, Urbana, 19403),
has attempted to investigate the position and performance of

the Ottoman mission at the oongress. This study, using
Ottoman sources, considers in detail the meetings at Karlowitz
between the Ottoman and the Holy League delegations, analyzes

the major problems arising on each side, and lists solutions
proposed and accepted by the principles in order to indicate
how well the Ottoman peace mission acquitted itself during the
negotiations. Pue to a laok of primary souroes, no one has
yet fairly treated the problem of the role of the Ottoman dele-
gation at Karlowitz. After studying Ottoman manuscripts and
documents, it is suggested by the author that the delegation
of the Ottoman State to the peaoe conference of 1698-99, despite

the handicap of the recent and crushing defeat at Senta, did do
quite well in defending and upholding the interests, honour and
dignity of the Ottoman State.
TABLE CF CONTENTS
Page
....................................... iii
T O E OS? TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . iv

P ROLOGUE....................... v
Chapter
I. THE DIPLdLLIC SGEHE I688 -I698 .. . . . 1
H. THE OTTOMAN PEACE MISSION.......... . 20
Iskerletzade Alexander
Rami Mehmed Efendi
Life and Career I654 -I698

The Rise and Ascendency of the
ReistHk3.ttab
Responsibilities of the Reisftlkuttab
at the Chanoery
a. Campaign and Military Affairs

b. Administration and Security
Affairs
c. Foreign Affairs
III. THE NEGOTIATIONS.................... 60
Preliminaries* July-Novemberj 1698

Negotiations with the Austrian Mission
Negotiations with the Polish Mission
Negotiations with the Russian Mission
Negotiations with the Venetian Mission
IV. RESUME ANDCONCLUSIONS .......... 133
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................... 144
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY................ 149
APPENDIX . . . ........................... 174
ii
AOTCWLEDGESaEBTS
For the guidance and assistance which X received from
the faculty members of the Departments of Oriental Studies
and History at Princeton University during the course of
preparation of this thesis, I wish to acknowledge my debt.
During my stay in Istanbul, Princeton and Canton the staffs
of the Baffbakanllk Arfivi, the Firestone Library and the
Owen D. Young Library gave generously of their time in the
location of both substantive and supporting sources? A
Foreign Area Study Fellowship, then of the Ford Foundation,
made possible my research in Istanbul during the year
I96O-I96I and in Princeton through January, 1962. The
Foundation's financial support, does not in any way,
imply its concurrence with or adherence to the ideas and
opinions expressed in this work. To Michel Hazzaoui,
my especial thanks for making available his rendition into
English of a pertinent Venetian "Relation." Without
the intellectual and moral support of my wife, this work
could never have been completed.
iii
NOTE ON TBaNSLTPERATIGN M B MBBEVX&FIONS
Th* transliteration system adopted Tor the rendition of
Ottoman Turkish words into the Latin soript follows the one
used by Islam An.siklo~psdisi Wherever possible the modem
Turkish script has been followed.
The following are abbreviatione of titles used in the
footnotess
B.M.J British Museum
E.I.s Encyclopedia of Islam (First Edition)

2
E.I. s Encyclopedia of Islam (Second Edition)
I.A.t Islam Anseklopedisl
P.B.O., S.P.t Public Beoord Office, State Papers.
iv
PROLOGUE
At nine o'clock, Saturday morning, November 13; 16$&S
an Ottoman diplomatic mission met tJie delegations representing
the Holy League powers at the site of the ruined Serbian town
of Karlowitz (modern Karlovci Sremski in modern Yugoslavia).
The occasion for this diplomatic confrontation was the settle
ment of territorial claims and differentiation of frontiers
between the Kaiser and his Allies on the one hand and the
Sultan on the other. In this sense, the meeting which took
place at Karlowitz signalled the beginning of formal assess
ment of the decisions which had been forced at the battlefields
of astern Europe.
When viewed in the perspective of earlier diplomatic
encounters between the representatives of the Allies and the
Sultan, the one of November, 169 8 , differs in many essentials.
By the end of the seventeenth century the military balance
had finally been reversed. In the past, the Otteaman State
had managed to maintain this balance in its favour. Although
as early as the latter part of the sixteenth century this
balance had begun to shift to favour the Habsburgs, the
definite reversal did not take place until the last two
decades of the seventeenth century. Indeed, on at least
two occasions in that century, the Sultan's "ever-victorious"
armies were defeated by Austrian troops. Even then, no
major territorial concessions were accorded the Kaiser with
the formal termination of hostilities in 1606 and I664
In 1682, an Austrian hid for the renewal of tbs twenty-
year truoe of Vasvar (1 6 6 4 ) failed. The refusal of the
Ottoman executive to renew this truoe was net only to signal
the end of a precarious peace, hut also to marshal the final
reversal of the military balance in favour of the Habsburgs.
In the following decade and a half, Ottoman armed forces
were to lose several decisive battles at the hands of Austrian
and allied troops. On at least two cooasions during this
period, attempts were made, through the endeavours of Dutch
and English mediators, to effect a truoe. In neither
instance was either side willing ox .ready to agree on any
basis for the termination of hostilities.
Yet these initial offers of peace-making, in I688 -8 9 ,
and l692-$3, were not made in vain. Later in the century,
the Ottomans put to good use the allied propositions whioh
were advanced in the earlier diplomatic overtures. How
ever, the Sultan would not turn to compromise until every
chance of regaining the lost Ottoman territories, by mili
tary arms, had been exhausted. Finally, with the defeat
at Ssnta in 169 ?, it became quite clear to the Court at
Istanbul that the only alternative to compromise awn a
negotiated peace would most definitely have been an even
vi
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
more punitive dictation of terms=a prospect which could
have encompassed Ottoman evacuation of the Balkans<>
Thus* when the Sultan consented to participate in the
peace negotiations; the proposed articles which he had
sent to the allies as the bases for peace, not only
reflected a realistic appraisal of the Ottoman military
and internal situation; hut also took into account some
of the earlier allied demands.
In this study, it is proposed that for Ottoman
history, the Sultans consent to negotiate peace has far-
reaching implications. Uow, for the first time in its
annals, the Ottoman State, as a price for defeat on the
battlefields of Europe, was to give formal recognition
to major territorial excisions. Realization of the
necessity for these concessions must have been quite
painful to a state whose initial, avowed and express
raison d*8tre had been baaed on the precept of the ever-
expanding frontier of Islam. Given this patently mili
tant ideology, it is perhaps only a truism to assert that
to this State war rather than compromise had been the
chosen and preferred instrument of international inter
course with Europe. However, this attitude oould be
sustained only as long as Ottoman military superiority
was upheld. European challenge to Ottoman military pre
ponderance in eastern and southeastern Europe posed a new
vii
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
problem and disclosed a deficiency in Ottoman diplomatic
methods.
In the process of dictating its peace terms, during moments
of victory, the Ottoman State had developed neither the formal
apparatus for diplomatic communication nor the corps of trained
personnel necessary for the negotiation of peace. In the
past, when knowledge of the immediate military situation was
considered sufficient qualification for leading an Ottoman
diplomatic delegation, the personnel of Ottoman missions was
drawn almost exclusively from the military establishment.
In some instances, the Grand Vezir himself, as commander-in-
chief, would lead a delegation composed primarily of his
military entourage.
Concomitant with the sustained success of the European
challenge to Ottoman hegemony in the southeastern regions of
the continent, a subtle, albeit deliberate, alteration in
the composition of Ottoman diplomatic missions is discern
ible. Although it had been the rule to draw on the mili
tary establishment for leadership and composition of these
missions, the designation of one or two relatively high officers
of the central administration as delegates becomes the usual
practice. One of the tentative theses suggested by this
study is that in its searoh for experienced and qualified
men to defend its interests at the negotiation table, the
viii
Ottoman State had turned away from the military establish
ment to the central administration. Thus, on two occa
sions prior to 1683-a year before the treaty of Vasvar, and
the second in 1672, at the negotiations of the treaty of
Buczaea holders of the office of the Rois&lMittab were
present at international deliberations.
With the appointment of the ReisQlkfittab Rami Mehmed
Efendi as chief of the Ottoman delegation to the Congress
of Karlowitz, the transfer of responsibility for leadership
of Ottoman diplomatic missions from the military establish
ment is completed. In this study two major and inter
related propositions will be considered* (l) Given the
fact that the Ottoman State had developed neither the trained
personnel nor the diplomatic apparatus for negotiation, in
choosing the Reisulkhttab Rami Mehmed Efendi as chief dele
gate, it had seleoted one of the few administrators who were
qualified to adequately defend Ottoman interests at Karlowitz;
(2) Here, it will be proposed that given several handicaps,
the Ottoman delegation at Karlowitz had discharged its respon
sibility at Karlowitz quite admirably, without compromising
the interest or dignity of the Sublime Ottoman State. Thus
far, two studies (one by M.R. Popoviq, Bar Frlede von Karlowitz.
Leipzig, 1893; the other by W,B- Munson, The Peace of Karlo
witz," [unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. The University of
Illinois, Urbana, 1940]]) have been made of the negotiations
ix
which took place at Karlowitz between the representatives
of the Holy League powers on the one hand and the Ottoman
State on the other* Dus to several factors, not the
least important of which was the unavailability of Ottoman
Turkish sources to both authors, neither one attempted to
study the position and performance of the Sultans mission
at the peace conference. Through the use of Ottoman
sources, the meetings which had taken place at Karlowitz
will be considered in some detail.$ the major problems
raised by each side will be analysed, and the solutions
proposed and accepted by the interested parties will be
evaluated.
I. THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE 1683-1698
On only two occasions throughout these thirteen years
(l683-l696) of hostilities were peace proposals seriously
entertained by the Ottoman side. The first, when an Otto
man mission was despatched to Vienna in 1688, was made in
response to Dutch efforts.^ Ostensibly, the mission was
entrusted with the delivery of an Imperial letter to the Kaiser,
announcing the accession of Sultan Suleyman II (16871691)*
However, the mission had been given instructions to hear propo
sals and treat only after the other side had shown an inclina-
2
tion to make peace. Once this attitude became manifest,
plenipotentiaries of both parties exchanged credentials and met
for negotiations.
_Although the Ottoman envoys lacked the power to conclude

3
peace, negotiations were carried out, and proposals were
submitted by both sides. Despite several months of discus
sions and deliberations, the plenipotentiaries never came to
any agreement, and finally, in exasperation, the Allied representa
tives declared the negotiations terminated, blaming the deadlock
on the Ottoman envoys
More than anything else, this mutual display of bad faith
and reluctance to submit realistic proposals for peace caused
the discontinuance of negotiations at Vienna in 1689 On the
2
one hand, the Ottoman mission had no power to conclude peace*
which circumstance forced it to depend on communication with
the Ottoman Court whenever a serious proposal was submitted,
thereby casting a auspicious and unfavourable light on its
motives. On the other hand, Poland and Venice were especially
reluctant to negotiate. When pressure was exerted on their

t
plenipotentiaries to submit proposals, both forwarded unrealistic

and unacceptable deuands: for example, Poland requested the
Tatar evacuation of the Crimea.'*
Since it was in the French interest to have Austria contin
uously preoccupied on its eastern frontier, other factors not
withstanding, Louis XIV1s timely invasion of the Palatinate was
partly aimed at relieving the Sublime State. ^ Once Austria
had become preoccupied militarily on its western frontier, pressure
on the Ottoman forces was reduced, and they began to retrieve
some lost territory, thereby restoring the Court's confidence
in future successes. For these reasons, the mission of 1688-89
failed.
On the second occasion, in 1692-94, Dutch and English

mediation was pressed at Edirne (the second capital). By
1692, two English envoys to the Sultan had already failed to

7
establish solid diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans. The
death of the second of these left the post vacant, and
William III, in his anxiety to see at least a truce arranged
3
between the warring parties. appointed Heemskerk, the Butch
envoy extraordinary at Vienna, mio interim ambassador for

g
the English at the Ottoman Court. This was an unfortunate
appointment. Heemskerk lacked both patience and finesse*
two indispensable attributes for any ambassador at the Ottoman

Court.
At Belgrade, in October of 1692, the English pro
interim ambassador submitted the Allied proposition for peace
to the Grand Vesir. 9 Since no answer could be given to the
proposed articles until they had been thoroughly studied by

the Sultan and his counsellors, the envoy was dismissed from
the Grand Vezir* s presence with the promise that as soon as
was possible an answer would be given. In his anxiety to
see the negotiations started, Heemskerk misjudged the situation.
He held the illusion that the Sultan was only waiting for
the arrival of the Allied preposition before initiating
negotiations irrespective of the demands contained therein.
Had he been well-informed, the envoy of William III would
have realized that at that juncture the Court was in no mood
for making peace, and especially not on the basis of the
proposals which he had conveyed. In those articles, Austria

10
demanded on its own behalf, and on that of its Allies:
1. The maintenance and recognition of conquered lands

(uti possidetis). Transylvania was to be no
exception.
4
2. The inclusion of the Czar in the peace negotiations

on the same basis*
3* The renewal of the capitulations with Austria for
thirty years.
4* The renunciation by the Ottomans of their possessions
in the Ukraine and PodoUa.- Easenets-Podolsk (Ksjaaniqe)
was to be returned to Poland.
5. A promise by the Sultan to halt Tatar incursions and
raids into Polish territory.
6. Venice was to receive all the territory it held on the
Dalmatian coast and Albania; the tribute of the island
of Zante was to be abolished; the Allies were to receive
the right to construct and repair the forts in their
possessions; the Morea was to remain in Venetian hands.
Although this proposition was, in comparison to the
demands of 1689, more realistic, by 1692 the Sultan's military
position had been vastly improved. In 1691, Belgrade had been
recaptured, much of Serbia had been recovered, and Ottoman
troops had penetrated as far as Zalankemen(Islankamen) As
long as hope was in sight for the further recovery of Ottoman

territory, the chances of making peace, and especially on
the basis of the above-listed proposition, were doomed.
Heemskerk's several and insistent efforts to elicit a response
from the Grand Vezir were rebuffed. Finally, the Chief
Dragoman told him definitely that the Sultan and the Grand
Vezir did not approve the proposals, and their conveyance was
regarded as an unfriendly act on his part.^" It was at this
point that Lord William Paget, the newly appointed English

12
ambassador, arrived at Edime. On his way there, in ac
cordance with his instructions, Paget had stopped at Vienna,
where he consulted with the Allied ministers on the problems
5
of peace. At that time, it was decided that the principle

13
of uti possidetis would be proposed as the basis for peace.
Before his audience with the Grand Vezir and Sultan, Paget
had learned from Heemskerk of the proposition which the Dutch
man had presented at Belgrade, In response to the new Allied
proposition which Paget conveyed to the Ottoman Court, the
Grand Vezir called a public audience on March 14, 1693, To
an assembly of over eighty Ottoman commanders and men of state,
and in the presence of Paget and Heemskerk, the credentials
for mediation were read. Whereas Heemskerk*s detailed

14
proposition was produced and distinctly'* read, Paget*s
formula for peace was simply ignored* Immediately thereafter,
with the excuse that those present required time to consider
the proposals, the Grand Vezir dismissed the assembly. Neither
Paget's insistence that he had nothing to do with Heemskerk*s
proposition, nor his declaration that his presence invalidated

15
Heemskerk*s credentials was heeded. Later, Paget dis
covered that the idea of holding the public audience and
reading Heemskerk1s proposition was the ReisGlkGttab*s. In
his despatches to the Secretary of State in London, Paget
accuses the "Reis Effendi" (an alternate and shortened name
for the ReisOlkCtttab) of having conspired
tc disappoint the people *s hope of peace, to take

off the good thoughts they might have had of our
negociations, to irritate and incense the soldiery,
and that it might have its full effect, copies of it
wore immediately with care and industry sent to be dis-
6
persed over all the Empire*
The incid at the public audience was clearly meant to
arouse the assembled men of state and commanders against the
making of peace, on any basis not completely favourable to
the Ottomans It was feared that the presence of two
mediating ambassadors at the Court would give rise to false
hopes, and possibly demoralize any attempt to resist peace

17
on an unacceptable basis* Despite the fact that this
incident clearly indicated Ottoman reluctance to make peace
at that time and along the lines of Allied suggestions, Paget
was not deterred from continuing to press for mediation of
peace* Since he had no new proposals to convey, he was at
first simply appeased and ignored, but further insistence
on his part was met with arrogant demands by Ottoman officials;
on one occasion he was told that the Sublime State would not
make peace until it had recovered its territory in Hungary*
However, Paget would not be discouraged. Finally, when the
Grand Vezir departed on his campaign of July, 1693> Paget left
for Istanbul, where for twenty months (July 19,1693 - March,

1 A
1695) he was denied permission to return to Edirne*
It is quite obvious that tbe Ottoman Court was not
ready to negotiate peace either at Vienna in 1689 or at Edime
in 1692-93* It is, perhaps, just as obvious that a peace
faction had existed at the Court, otherwise no peace proposals
7
would have been considered. It has already been suggested
that military maneuvers in the west had contributed to the
deadlock and final collapse of the 1689 negotiations at
Vienna. Once military pressure on the eastern frontier was
eased by Austria's preoccupation in the west, the recovery
of some, if not all, Ottoman territory previously lost to the
Allies became a definite possibility in the minds of the Otto
mans, and peace negotiations were doomed. In 1691, Ottoman
forces had been successful in recapturing Belgrade, and some
territory in Serbia, due to Austria's involvement with French
military pressures in the west. Although the Ottoman forces
were defeated at Zalankemen in 1692 where the Grand Vesir was
also killed, any weakening of Ottoman resolution would have
been considered tantamount to treason.
Again, the reluctance displayed by the Ottomans toward
accepting Allied proposals in 1692-93 can be attributed partly

19
to the prevalence of French influence. In his despatches,
Paget describes some of the Ottoman men of state as being

20
thoroughly "Frenchified". In bewailing the predominance
of the French point of view, Paget indicates how well the
ambassador of Louis XIV had performed his duties. At one
point it seemed to Paget that the whole Court had displayed
too much trust in the French claims to military victories
in the west. His several attempts to disabuse these officials
of French pretensions were, if not totally ignored, at best
8
coldly received. Thus, as long as Allied military forces
did not threaten the seat of Ottoman power in Europe
(symbolized by Belgrade), and as long as French troops
continued to occupy Austrian attentions in the west, the
Sublime State would neither accept Allied proposals for
peace, nor abandon its hopes of recovering the territory
lost to its enemy. Conversely, as soon as France was
reconciled with Austria, as in September of 169?, and Otto
man forces had met with defeat at Senta in the same year,
which posed a direct threat to the heart of Ottoman possessions
in tne Balkans the Sultans Court began to entertain Allied
proposals for a peaceful settlement.
Ottoman reticencs was converted in 1697-98 into an anxiety
to negotiate peace. At Senta in September, 1697, about thirty

21
thousand Ottoman troops were trapped by Austrian forces. In
the ensuing melee, most of these troops were either killed or
drowned. In Europe about the same time, peace negotiations
between France and Austria were in progress, and a treaty was
signed on October 30, 1697. The decisive Ottoman defeat at
Senta and the awareness of the progress of these negotiations
signalled the doom of Ottoman designs of recovering, by mili
tary force, any territory that had been lost to the Allies.
In December. Lord William Paget received an invitation

22
from the Grand Vezir to go to Edime. A few days before
9
his appointed audience, Paget set with Iskerletzade Alexander,

23
the Ottoman Chief Dragoman. Paget reports that
in the visit he (Alexander) told me, the vesier asked

whether I was the person that had favourably brought
some overtures for peace between the two empires?....
He then told me (but as from himself) that it might
not be improper (if in mgr audience from the vesier I
had a convenient opportunity for it) to take notice
of what had passed (i.e. the unheeded proposals of 1693).
In his audience with the Grand Vezir, and throughout
the conferences which Paget held with the Chief Dragoman, the
question of the acceptability of uti pcssidetis to both parties
was discussed. Austria, on behalf of the Holy League powers,
had, in 1693* proposed the unconditional and unrestricted
application of uti possidetis as the basis for the settlement
of peace. By 1698, military circumstances had changed, and
although Paget could not guarantee Allied adherence to the
same conditions, he urged the Grand Vezir to accept this

25
principle as a preliminary to any action. However, ac
ceptance of the application of an unconditional and un
restricted uti possidetis would have implied abandonment by
the Ottomans of nearly all their territorial claims in Hungary
and absorption of Transylvania by Austria.
In an attempt to exclude this Rumanian principality from the
strict application of the principle of uti possidetis, an Otto
man interpretation was suggested to the letter of this basis
for negotiations.
26 It was argued that Transylvania, which
10
was internationally recognized as an autonomous region, a
status guaranteed by both the Sultan and Kaiser, should be

27
returned to its former condition* This meant that
Austrian troops would have to withdraw, and henceforth the
principality*s affairs would be left in the hands of its
own assemblies* Inasmuch as Transylvania was party to the
military conflict against Austria, this interpretation of
the principle was untenable; here, the Ottomans were
requesting an application of the status quo ante* Paget,
through the Chief Dragoman, reminded the Grand Vezir that
Ottoman insistence on this point would be an insurmountable
obstruction to the progress of the preliminary negotiations*
To Ottoman insistence on the exception of the Rumanian
principality and Austrian demolition of the strategic fortresses
of Petrovaradin, Osijek and Ilok, Paget retorted with a semi-

28
threat*' First, he argued that even as early as 1693, the
Kaiser would not have made an exception of Transylvania in the
general settlement of peace, and then stated that as provisions
for territorial exchange would be forthcoming only with the
demarcation of the frontier, insistence by the Ottomans on
the abovementioned two items might lead to a renewed and united
effort by the Allies to expel the Ottomans from the northern
regions of the Danube and Belgrade altogether*
On January 10, 1698, a secret consultation council,
11
presided over the Grand Vezir, and composed of the Han

of Crimea, the eyhulislam, the Kazaskers of Anatolia and
29
Rfflaeli, the Janissary Aga and the Reisttlktittab, was held.
After long deliberations over Paget !s proposition, a consen
sus in favour of peace was reached. In spite of the fact
that it was quite clear to the council that Ottoman forces
could not withstand the united Allied forces at that time,

the Sultan warned the Grand Vezir and the other members of
this divan to be cautious in their decisions, and ordered
the chief executive to be prepared to undertake any military

30
action which might seem necessary.
In the latter part of January, 1698, the Grand Vesir called
Lord Paget to a special audience, where he handed him a letter
for King William III, together with a list of Ottoman counter-

31
proposals for peace, which were to be conveyed to the Allies.
In his letter, the Grand Vezir acknowledged and welcomed the
mediation of the King of England and the Estates General of the
Netherlands; however, he added that it would be against the
naxmxs (dignity) of the Ottoman Sublime State to accept uncondi
tionally the principle of uti possidetis. To Paget however,
the Grand Vezir intimated that although the articles enclosed
in the list would not necessarily be insisted upon, negotiations

32
should proceed within that general framework.
In the list, the Sublime State indicated its desire
12
to end combat and make peace on the principle that the
territory presently held should remain in the possession of
the present holder, in other words, on the principle of ala

33
haleh (uti possidetis) However, the following
restrictions were to be upheld:
1, Austrian troops should evacuate all forts in

Transylvania, These forts were to be returned to
the "leaders of that principality. The territory
itself should be returned to its previous status of
an autonomous state under the protection of both
Sultan and Kaiser,
2, The Tisza and Mure rivers should be the boundaries
of Timioara province,
3, Fort Titel should remain evacuated, and no forts
should be built on that site.
4, Territory on the farther side of the Save river
which had formerly been part of Belgrade, should be
returned.
5, The fort of Petrovaradin should be razed, and the
forts of Ilok, Esseg and Brod should be evacuated, with
the line of demarcation, if possible, being made there,
6, The nalangas (redoubts) within the Bosnian frontier
on the farther side of the Una river, with their dependent
lands should b held by the Ottomans, and the rest of the
nalangas on the same river should, in order to avoid
conflict, be evacuated.
Once agreement had been reached with Austria, peace with
Poland and Venice was to be made on the following conditions:
1, The fort at Kamenets-Podolsk should be demolished,

2. The Poles should completely evacuate the principality
of Moldavia,
3* The old frontier with Poland should be maintained,
4* The principle of uti possidetis would be the basis
upon which peace would be made with Veniee.
5* The plenipotentiaries of the various powers would,
through consultation with the mediating powers, rectify
the frontier, and when seen necessary, the evacuation
and/or demolition of certain forts would be decided
upon.
In contrast to the vague and unrealistic demands of 1689
13
and 169293* the Ottoman objectives as displayed in this

proposition were concrete, realistic and militarily sound.
The insistence on Transylvania*s return to its former status
was motivated by two main factors. First, the principality,
wedged as it was between Hungary and the eastern tributaries
of the Sublime State, was strategically valuable for the
protection and defence of these tributaries, and for the

defence of the remaining Ottoman territory in the Subdanubia.
Also, as long as Transylvania remained an autonomous region,
a status guaranteed by the Kaiser and the Sultan in 1664 by"
the Treaty of Vasvar, Protestant dissidents would continue
to find it a haven from the Austrian (Jesuit-inspired) persecu
tions, under which circumstance it would exist as a check on
Austrian expansion in the Balkans. It was also primarily
for these reasons that Austria could not tolerate making an
exception of the Rumanian territory from a strict interpretation
of the principle of uti possidetis.
In the meantime, neither effort nor time was spared by
the Ottomans in making preparations for any eventuality.
Despite the realization that Austria was just as anxious as
the Sultan's Court to make peace, Ottoman troops and levies
were called for a defensive campaign, should the preliminary
negotiations fail.
In their response to the Ottoman list of counter*-
14
proposals for a basis for peace, Austria and Venice
reasserted their determination on a strict adherence to

35
uti possidetis. The mediating ambassadors were informed
that the Kaiser, by virtue of his recent victory, had every
right to change his former stand, that of 1693, and make
stiffer demands, but that in the interests of a rapid
settlement of peace, he would do neither Although Austria
and Venice were, in general, agreed on making provisions for
territorial adjustment contingent on the rectification of the
frontier, the Kaiser still insisted that Transylvania should
not be excepted from a strict application of the principle of
uti nossldetia. Any other stand would render the negotiations
useless and the continuation of war inevitable. Furthermore,
since in its list of counter-proposals, the Ottoman Court had
excluded the Czar as a party to the negotiations, and since
the Czars adherence to the Holy League rendered it impossible
for the Allies to conclude a peace separately, both Austria
and Venice required a more comprehensive list than had already
been presented to them.
During the early months of the preliminary negotiations,
the Czar's name as a participant in these negotiations was

36
conspicuously absent. This oversight, in addition to the
anxious moments when the negotiations at E d i m e were strained
to the breaking point, delayed by several weeks the meetings
of the envoys of both parties. For this delay, Austria and
15
her two other Allies were to blame; they did not inform
the mediators of their necessity to include the Czar until
May, l698o Since in the Aillied proposition Austria had not
named Moscow as a participant in the negotiations, the
mediators had no reason to believe that the Czar should have
been mentioned.
The election not long before, in 1696, of a new King
in Poland to replace John Sobieski, further added to the delays
in bringing the parties to an agreement on peace proposals.
Austria informed the mediators that messengers had already been
cent to the Polish Court and to the Czar to obtain their
acceptance of the proposition. Mo further action could be
taken by either Austria or Venice without the endorsement of
their Allies.
While the Ottomans awaited the Allied response, the
French ambassador, who had heard of the progress of the prelim-
inary negotiations, approached the Grand Vezir at Edirne,

ostensibly to convey to the Ottoman Court the news that France
had formally terminated its military operations in the west
at ffyswick on September 30, 1697, and with Vienna on October,
30 of the same year. 37 At the audience, the ambassador
proposed his King13 mediation for the termination of the
hostilities between the Holy League and the Sublime S+ate.
The Grand Vezir, who had from the first guessed at the
16
intentions of the ambassador, spoke proudly of the glory
of the Ottoman Sublime State and its survival, under the
guidance of Allah, for over four hundred and fifty years,
without outside aid.
After hearing this rebuff, the French ambassador
reversed his position, and then attempted to convince the
Sultan's Chief Deputy that peace at this juncture would not
serve Ottoman interests. He argued that in the opinion of
the French, the peace concluded in October with Austria was
nothing more than a truce, and that further hostilities with
the Kaiser were certain to break out over the rival claims
of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons to the Spanish succession.
These hostilities would cause Austria to shift some of its
military forces to the west, thereby relieving pressure on
the Ottoman frontier and facilitating the recovery of
territory by the Sultan's armies.
The Grand Vezir, "Aristotle in wisdom", demanded
documentary proof of the authenticity of the French ambassa-

38
dor's offer. When this proof could not be produced,
the French scheme was simply ignored, and the Grand Vezir
turned to preparing the Ottoman forces for the campaign,,
Wnen the Sultan appointed the Grand Vezir the serasker
(commandej>-in-chief) in June of 1698, the Ottoman forces
marched to Sofia, and from there on to Belgrade. On their
17
way to Belgrade, these forces crossed the path of the
English ambassador's secretary, who was returning from
Vienna with the concerted Allied agreement to negotiate peace# 39
When these letters from Vienna were given to the mediators at
Sofia, Paget and the Dutch ambassador J. Collier (who had
entered the latter stages of the preliminary negotiations as
the second mediator on behalf of the Estates General of the
Netherlands) met with the Chief Dragoman and communicated the
contents to him, . With these letters, the ambassadors had

40
received documents empowering them to conduct the mediation.
Once this information was communicated to the Grand Vezir, it
was then passed on to several prominent men of state -
presumably the same officials who had attended the secret
consultation council of January, 1698, After some delibera
tion a consensus was reached. In view of both domestic
and foreign problems then in existence, it was felt that the
conclusion of peace would be in the best interests of the
Ottoman Sublime State. Although the Kaiser had not changed
his stand on Transylvania, some satisfaction was derived from
the provisions which the Allies allowed for the exchange of
territory and frontier adjustments concomitant with the
rectification of boundaries between the several states.^
18
1. Rapid, Tarih-i Baald (Istanbul, 1282), II, 4244

(hereafter cited as Rapid, Tarlh).
2* Silihdar, Silihdar tarihl (Istanbul, 1928), H , 365

(hereafter cited as Silihdar, Tarih).
3* Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Gesohichte des Osmanischen

Reiches (Pest, 18271835)? VI, 534 (hereafter cited as von
Hfflsser, G.O.R. ),
4- For summary of what transpired at negotiations seeg

ibid.. -528f.
5. Ibid., 542.
6. Silihdar, Tarih II, 396-97* On the suggestion that

Louis H V ' s gesture was aimed at aiding the Ottomans see* The
Hew Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1 9 6 1 ), V, 1 5 .
7 London, B.M., Paget Papers, Add. Mss. 28939 290a.
8 . Ibid.
9. Ibid., 17s.
10. von Hammer, a 0.R.. VI, 57172, and Silihdar, Tarlh. H ,

693 (both texts sunmarized).
11. London, B.M., Paget Papers, Egerton Mss. 913, 17.
12. For biography of Lord William Paget see Dictionary of

Rational Biography (London, 1885-1900).
13* London, B.M., Paget Papers, Add. Mss. 28939, 2 9 O*.
14- London, B.M., Paget Papers, Egerton Mss. 918, 17a-l8a.
15. Ibid.. l8 a.
16. Ibid.
3.7. Ibid.
18. London, P.R.O., SP 97/21, 4& (hereafter cited as P.R.O.

SP 97 / 2 1 ).
k
19* London, B.M., Paget Papers, Egerton Mss. 918, 18
20. Ibid., 35*.
19
21. P.R.O. SP 97/21, 32.
22. Ibid., and^Rami Mehmed Paâ, Karlof5 a Muhakalemeei,

Istanbul, Istanbul Universitesi KutQphane3 i, T&rk Yazznalari
3514, 13-14a (hereafter cited as Rami Mehmed, Karlofga).
23* For a biographical sketch of Iskerletzade Alexander

see below? 2524.
24. P.R.O. SP 97/21, 4b.
25. Ibid.. 5a, and Rami Mehmed, Karlof9a, 14a
26. P.R.O. SP 97/21, 5a.
27. During the preliminary talks at Karlowitz, the Ottoman

delegation would continue to use this argument, see below. Tiff.
28. Rami Mehmed, Earlofca, 14b-15a
29 . Ibid.. 15b , and P.R.O. SP 97/21, 8 a.
30. Rami Mehmed, Karlof9 a, 16 .
31. Ibid.. and P.R.O. SP 97/21, 8 a.
32. P.R.O. SP 97/21, 8 b.
33 For a copy of the Ottoman text, see Rami Mehmed, Karlofga,

17 18 For the Latin text with the signature of the Chief
Dragoman on behalf of the Sublime State, see P.R.O. SP 97/21, 12s.
The date given for the Latin translation is 15 Recep, 1109, or
January 2 6 , 1698 .
34. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 29a and P.R.O. SP 97/21, 8b.
35 Rami Mehmed, Karlof9a, 23a-24a, also 25&.

36. P.R.O. SP 97/21, l6 a.
37 Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 27a-28a.

38. Ibid.. 28a.
39 Ibid.. 29a.
. 4P For a copy of the Turkish text in translation see* ibid.,

29 -30.
41 Ibid., 32b-33a
n. THE 0TTCMA1T PEACE MISSIOF
The Ottoman agreement, in I6 9 8 , to negotiate peaoe, marks
an important milestone in Ottoman diplomatio history. Whereas
in the past, the cessation of hostilities with European powers
was almost invariably followed by a peaoe more favourable to the
Ottomans, by the end of the seventeenth century, the situation was
reversed when the Sublime Ottoman State- recognizing its weakness
in the face of a stubborn and stronger opponent, was forced to
negotiate peace on other than its own terms. In the process of
imposing its demands on other powers, the Sublime State had developed
neither the apparatus for diplomatic intercourse nor the corps.of
trained personnel neoessary for the negotiation of peaoe. Since
knowledge of the military situation prior to the despatch of a
peace mission had been deemed a sufficient qualification, dele
gations from the Sublime Stats had formerly been nearly always
drawn from and led by men of the Ottoman military establishment.
Beoause the Ottoman defeat at Santa in 1697 had finally
reversed the military balanoe in favour of the Allies, and the
Ottomans were forced to negotiate peaoe under conditions set by
their European opponents, a search was set in motion for men who
possessed both the qualifications and the ezperienoe necessary
to defend Ottoman interests and successfully negotiate peace in
this new situation. When the Grand Vezir finally conveyed to
the Sultan the recommendation in favour of peaoe, an Imperial
20
21
rescript (Hatt-i Hgmayua) was issued, dated July 22, announcing
the willingness of the Sublime State to negotiate peaoe on the
basis of uti possidetis. and designating the Grand Vezir as the
Padi?ah's deputy with full powers in the conduct of the negotia
tions.* The latter, in his turn, designated the ReisSlkSttab
Rami Mehmed Efendi as Chief, and Iakerleisade Alexander as mem
ber, of the Ottoman peaoe mission. Thus, in its search for
two qualified men to conduct negotiations with the Allies on a
reciprocal basis, the Ottoman Court had tamed away from the
military establishment to the central administration. Since
very few Ottomans were versed in European languages, it was not
unusual to appoint a dragoman, Iskerletzade Alexander, to the
mission. However, since the leadership of Ottoman peace
missions had, thus far, been drawn from the military establish
ment. the appointment of the ReisGlkSttab to lead the delegation
of I6 9 8 signalled a break in a long-established practice, and
initiated a new precedent. Prom then on, until the conversion
of the office of the ReisGlkuttab into the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, as a part of the complete renovation of the central
administration in the 1 8 3 0 *3 , holders of this office almost
invariably led Ottoman diplomatic missions bound for the negotia
tion of peace.
Thus far no attempt has been made to investigate the qualifi
cations which enabled the ReisHlkHttab to lead an Ottoman peace
mission. The second part of this study will be devoted to an
22
investigation of tke special qualifications of 'both, the
BeisBlkfittab Bami Mehmed Efendi and the Chief Dragoman
Iskerietzad Alexander For reasons already indicated,
only a small section will he allotted to a consideration of
the qualifications of the latter. Bami Mehmed Efendics
competence will "be studied in the light of his training and
experience. The positions which he held in the Ottoman
central administration prior to his appointment in 1698 will
be recognized first. The extent to which these posts had
become sensitive and important by the last decade of the
seventeenth century will be indicated In order to appre
ciate the importance which the office of the Reis&lkSittab had
gained by the end of the century, an investigation will be under
taken to show how it achieved ascendency and control of the Chan
cery of the Divan (secretariat of the central executive branoh of
the government). Some of the official responsibilities of the
ReisQlkBttab will be studied and the channels and types of infor
mation whioh were available to Bami Mehmed Efendi during his
reaset will be explored. Here it shall be maintained that the
types of first hand information (especially in military and foreign
affairs) and experiences (in Ottoman law and practice) whioh he had
acquired during his reaset were his main qualifications for leading
the Ottoman peaoe mission in 1698 .
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
23
Iskerletzade Alexander
Alexander was b o m to a Greek father and an Italian mother
at Chi ob , in November, 1641* At an early age he was brought
to Istanbul, where he studied at the Patriarchate School*
Although his father had died when Alexander was in his middle
teens, his mother, an ambitious woman, had him sent to Italy in
1657* to study at the Greek College in Rome Upon completion
of his studies there, he went first to the University of Padua,
and then to Bologna- There, Alexander, who had read for
medicine, was awarded his degree, and in 1664 he left for Istanbul.
Besides his training in medicine, Iskerletzade had by the time of
his graduation from Bologna attained profioiency in all the major
European languages of his times Latin, Italian, French, Spanish
and German. He had already gained profioiency, through his
training in Istanbul, in Greek, Turkish, Arabic and Persian.
Upon his return to the Ottoman capital he acquired, on the basis
of these qualifications, a teaching position at his former school,
and practiced medicine during his free time.^
It was during these years of teaching at the Patriarchate
School that he married the daughter of a very wealthy and influen
tial man in the Greek community of the Phanar. Through his
father-in-law. Alexander met the Chief Dragoman of the Imperial
Divaa. In 1671, the latter hired Alexander as his private
secretary.^ Two years later, upon the death of his patron,
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
24
Iskerletzade was elevated to the office of Chief Dragoman.
Prom this date, until his appointment in 1698 , Alexander was
plunged into the dangerous, but lucrative, official life of

the Ottoman Court.
After the failure of the Ottoman assault on Vienna, the
Chief Dragoman, blamed for poor oounsel to the Grand Vezir
Kara Mustafa was stripped of his office and imprisoned.
Only by shedding the greater part of his wealth was he released,

7
pardoned, and reinstated. As Chief Dragoman of the Divan,
Alexander was a party to all phases of the preliminary negoii-

3
ations which took place in 1689 at Vienna, in 1692-93 at
9 10
Edirna, and previous to his appointment in 1698 . At Vienna,
he served as the Ottoman interpreter, and when after four months
the negotiations failed, both he and the Sultan's plenipotentiary
extraordinary were imprisoned, to be released three years later.
He was back in Edirne just in time to serve as interpreter to the
new Allied overtures presented to the Ottoman Court by Heemskerk
and Paget in 1692 and 16 9 3 . ^
Although the negotiations which took place in Vienna in
I689 and at Edirne in 169293 failed, Iskerletzade, who by virtue
of his official post, had been a party to all these negotiations
and had served as liaison ana interpreter at Edirne in 169798,
was qualified by his experience as well as by his thorough knowledge
of European languages to participate in the conduct of negotiations
on behalf of the Ottoman Court.
Hand Mehmed Efendi
Life and Career 1654-98
Rami Mehmed was horn to a certain Hasan Aga sometime in
the year 1654> in the Moaned Quarter at Eyup, a suburb of
Istanbul.^ His early life, it is said, consisted of his
roaming the bazaars of the Ottoman capital, indulging himself
in varied but useless activities.^ A certain Cafer Efendi
came to his rescue, and Rami Mehmed was attached to the Chan
cery of the Imperial Divan as an apprentice. How long he
remained at the Chancery preparing himself for the post of a
scribe, is not clear. In the meantime, he had joined the
informal poetic circle of Mabi Efendi, the famous Ottoman

1*5
poet of the time. J Through Habis good offices Rami Mehmed
detached himself from the Divan Chancery and was attached to
the personal service of Musahib Mustafa Paa,^ companion of

17
the Sultan and Habi Efendi*s patron.
As companion of the Sultan, Mustafa Pa?a had great influ
ence in the inner circle at the Palace. Prom the date of
his attachment until the death of the Paâ in 1686, Rand Mehmed
fortune was bound up with that of his employer. When in 1675
Musahib Mustafa Pa?a was given Hatice Sultan, the sister of the
18
Sultan, in marriage, he had reached the zenith of his power
and influence at the Palaoe. Earlier, he had served in the
temporary post of Kajnmnakam-1 Rikab-i HOmavun (Grand Vezir*s
deputy at Istanbul), but a decade after his betrothal to the
26
19
Sultan*s sister, Mustafa Pa?a was dismissed from tne Court* ^
Due to the resentment and jealousies of Palace courtiers of
his growing influence and power, he was not allowed to stay
at the Capital. In December, 1683, the Papa was appointed
Kapudan of the Navy, only to he transferred, in the following
year, to the command of Ottoman forces against the Venetians
in the Morea. After a short and undistinguished performance
at the battlefields of the Greek peninsula, he was demoted to
the post of commander of Bcgaz Hisar (castles protecting the

20
Dardanelles), where he died in September, 1686.
Rami Mehmed Efendi stayed with his patron to the very end.
When the latter was appointed to the consnand of the Navy, Rami
Mehmed sailed with him in the Mediterranean. He aocompanied
the Papa to the Morea and finally to the command of defences

21
of the Dardanelles. During his service with Mustafa Papa,
Rami Mehmed Efendi, who was known for his competence in account
ing, was appointed first as masraf katibl (secretary for expen
diture at the Papa*s household). When Nabi Efendi became the
personal seoretary to the Papa, Rami Mehmed Efendi became the
ohief scribe at the Papa's household. With the retirement of
Nabi Efendi from the service of Mustafa Papa, Rami Mehmed Efendi
took over as personal seoretary, until the Papa's death in Sep
tember, 1686.^
By 1686, Rami Mehmed Efendi, at the age of thirtytwo, had
27
not only gained in experience* but had already received recog
nition as a poet and stylist. Tims, when he returned from
performing the pilgrimage with Nabi Efendi, he found it easy

23
to re-enter the Divan Chancery at the capital. The exper
ience which he gained, and the reputation which he mads in the
service of the discredited Paa, served him well, for he was
appointed to the important post of secretary to the Bureau of

24
the Reisulkuttab. In this capacity, Rami Mehmed Efendi
was in charge of liaison between the ReisfalkUttabs Bureau and
the other Bureaus of the Chancery. All state papers whioh
required the inspection and approval of the Reisftlk&ttab were
first handed to the seoretary, who then made them available to
his chief. In this latter capacity, Rami Mehmed Efendi served
as keeper of state papers. In return for his services as
secretary, he enjoyed the benefits of a Haas-i HBmayun (Royal
Land Holding), in the form of a special zeamet (income of at
least twenty thousand akge from a fief), in one of the districts
of Bulgaria. The annual income from this zeamet amounted to

2'5
twentytwo thousand and fifty akqe.
When his turn came, in I69 O, Rami Mehmed Efendi was promoted
within the Chancery to the office of Beylikol.26 the second
highest post in the Chancery. Towards the end of the seven
teenth century the Beylikoi served as the executive assistant to
the ReisHlldlttab. He had access to all the Chanoery oorres-

27
pondence, both regular and confidential, and was equal to the
28
ReisQlktittab in all except rank and the privilege of signing
for the Grand Vezir in his official capacity.
Pour years later, on November 17, 1694, Rami Mehmed Efendi
was appointed the Reisftlkuttab by the incumbent Grand Vezir

2$
Ali Paa. As Reisulkuttab, Rami Mehmed Efendi was chief
29
of the Divan Chancery; ' since, during the campaign months, a
mobile division of the Chancery accompanied the Grand Vezirs,
holders of the office of Reisulkuttab were considered chiefs
of both the mobile and permanent divisions of the Divan
Chancery. Here, almost all state papers and correspondence
were drafted and issued. As chief, Rami Mehmed Efendi's
task consisted of checking all correspondence to be issued
and counter-signing all drafts emanating from the Chancery,
destined for the Grand Vezir and Sultan.
Throughout the years of his servioe as Beylikoi and
Reisulkhttab, I69 O1702, (with an interruption of eight months
in I6 9 7 ), Rami Mehmed Efendi enjoyed the benefits of a zeamet
in Aleppo. While serving in the mobile division of the
Chancery, shortly before his promotion to the office of
Beylikoi. Rami Mehmed Efendi was critically injured.^ As
a reward for his long services at the Divan, he was granted
the ohoioe of retirement and sold, in the form of pension^'
the usufruct of the said zeamet.^ The usufruct was aug
mented with purchases of more taxfarming privileges, and by
29
I6 9 2 , the total annual income from the zeamet amounted to two
hundred thousand and eighty akee. The terms of the grant
stipulated that Rami Mehmed Efendi collect one hundred thousand
akce for his own subsistence, and that the remaining one hundred
thousand and eighty akce were to "be paid to the Imperial Treasury
in installments.
Less than a year after his promotion to the office of
Reis&lkuttab, the bases for holding Royal Lands in Syria, Aleppo,
Diyar Bekir, Hardin, Adana, Malatya, Ayntap and Tokat were
changed. In the past, the right to collect land tax on Royal
Lands had been sold at auction to the highest bidder. Those
who bought the right to collect the tax were sold this right for
a period of one or two years at a time. Due to the fact that
the sale of taxfarming for a short period of time exposed the
peasants and the Royal Lands to all the obvious abuses, and due
to the fact that the Imperial Treasury was in need of immediate
cash payments because of continuous wars with Austria and her
Allies in the Holy League, it was felt that the sale of tax-
farming privileges for life would reduce these abuses, and add
ready cash to the Treasury.
The decree of January 11, 1695* stipulated that henceforth,
a life-long (malikane) right to colleot land taxes from Royal

*52
Land Holdings would be sold at auction to the highest bidder.
The bidding was to start from the average sum of two or three
years' income whioh accrued to a tax farmer out of the gross
30
sum of land tax collected from the particular holding "being
auctioned. The proceeds from the auction were to "be paid
to the Treasury in Istanbul. The payments "by the highest
"bidders did not exempt them from their obligations to pay a
part of the proceeds of their collections to the Imperial
Treasury.
In 16959 Rami Mehmed Efendi "bought a life-long right to
collect land tax on his holdings in Aleppo. Although his
annual obligation to the Treasury in the form of one hundred
and twenty three thousand and eighty akce was not revoked,
Sami Mehmed Efendi was guaranteed an income of one hundred
thousand akge per year for life.
Neither the accession of a new Sultan, on February 6,
1695 nor the dismissal of Ali Pa?a, the Grand Vezir, on
May 2 of the same year, and emergence of Elmas Mehmed Pa?a
as the new Grand Vezir affeoted Rami Mehmed Efendi's position.^
He continued to serve as the ReisELUrfittab until February 1,
16979 when, through a misunderstanding with the Grand Vezir,
he was dismissed from his offioe and ordered to keep to his
quarters in Istanbul. 35
' Rami Mehmed Efendi*s retirement
from service in the Hivan Chaaoezy lasted only eight months
(until October 29, 1697)* the meantime, ElmaB Mehmed
Pa$a, who had died at the battle of Senta, was succeeded as
Grand Vezir by Amoazade Huseyin Paâ. At the urging of
31
Feyzullah Efendi, the êyhGlislam and the Mufti of Istanbul,
the Grand Vezir recalled Rami Mehmed Efendi to his post at
the Divan Chancery.
Thus immediately "before his appointment to lead the
Ottoman peaoe mission, Rami Mehmed Efendi had spent over
twelve years of nearly continuous service at the Divan Chancery*
seoretary to the ReisGlkuttab*s Bureau for five years, Beylikoi
for four and ReisftlkSttab for three years. It has been indi
cated that these three administrative posts were, by the second
half of the oentury, both important and lucrative. However,
before the second half of the seventeenth century there is no
evidence that either of the first two posts had been in exist
ence. As a matter of fact, the offioe of the ReisGlkGttab
itself did not come to prominence until the seoond half of the
seventeenth oentury.
The Rise and Ascendency of the Reisulkuttab
The office of the Reisulkuttab did not come to prominence
in the Bivan Chancery until after 1656 , when the conduct of
all state affairs was transferred from the Sultans Palace to
the Grand Vezirs Household (Paga Kauisi). However, there
is evidence that previous to this transfer, the offioe of the
ReisHlkGttab had risen in importance and influence. For,
while the Reisulkuttab was barely mentioned in the Statutes
of Sultans Mehmed II (14511481) and SGleyman I (1520 -1 5 6 6 ) ^
32
with the retirement of the sultans, late in the sixteenth
oentury, from active and direct eonduot of state affairs,
the one official who had "been the actual chief of the Divan
Chancery, the Hisanci, "began to lose influence and import
ance in the supervision and direction of state business at

39
the Chancery. '
The Kisanel was the Ottoman official who had been in
charge of inscribing the Sultans Tugra on state papers.^
One of his most important functions was to check decrees
and orders which required the Tugra, and to examine whether
the content conformed to Ottoman law and usage (hence the
designation Mufti-i kanun). Since knowledge of Ottoman law
and usage was required for holding the office, the Higancis
were drawn from teachers who had competence in Ottoman law,
or the Defterdars (chief officers at the Financial Division
of the Ottoman central administration), or the RelsSlkuttabs -
the last two having acquired this special competence through
their official experience. In the first half of the seven
teenth century most holders of the office of Reisulkuttab
ultimately became Hisancis. Starting from the second
half of the same century, however, this practice beoomes
less frequent. It had, previously, been considered a
promotion for the ReisUlkSttab to become the Rigano-i . but
prior to 1694, there are instances where the holders of the

latter, who had formerly served as ReisQlkilttab, were re
33
assigned to their former post.^1 The ease with which this
transfer took place signifies the achievement of a status
and competence in Ottoman law equal to that of the Ifiganei,
by the EeisulkGttab in the Divan Chanoery.^
Whereas, until about the year 1592 , the Klganci was the
official in full charge of important state affairs at the
Chancery, and the ReisB.lkS.ttab was confined to the rectifi
cation and execution of orders and decrees in the prooess of
issuanoe from the Chancery, after the 1590*s 'the ReisGlkuttab
began to gain equal prominence at the Chancery in all respects
except rank and pay. By I6 5 6 , when all state affairs had
been transferred to the Pasa Kanisl, the Elsanci was primarily
an honorary and prestigious rank, and the services of the
Divan Chanoery were then confined to the surveillance and
conduct of the ReisBlkQttab.
Although it cannot be definitely stated at what point
the ReisGlkBttab began to participate in the management of
Ottoman state affairs, there is evidenoe indicating that in
the latter half of the seventeenth century some holders of
this office became involved in policy making. Prior to
Rami Mehmed Efendis first appointment to the offioe of
ReisGlkBttab in 1 6 9 4 , two holders of this offioe were executed.
In 1663, amizade Efendi, the ReisGlkuttab Tinder Grand Vezir
KoprGlBzade Ahmed Pa?a, had, in a report to the Court, accused
34
his chief of mismanagement of state affairs during the cam
paign. Counting on the protection and favour of the
Valide Sultan (the Sultan's Mother), he portrayed his
son-in-law, the Commander of Bloopolis, Veair Ibrahim Papa,

A1
as a more competent oandidate for the office of Grand Vezir.
However, the advice oontained inthe reportwent unheeded.
The despatch of the report to theCourt wasbrought to the
attention of the Grand Vezir, whoordered ipassizade Efendi
strangled on September 13 , 1663.
The execution of ReisHlkOttab Mustafa Efendi on
Wednesday February 2, 1684, took plaoe about six weeks
after his dismissal from office. He had been ReisCUrflttab
under Grand Vezir Kara Mustafa Papa, and had accompanied the
latter on the campaign which led to the siege of Vienna in
1683* As a confident and respected consultant to Kara
Mustafa Papa, he was implicated in the mismanagement of the
campaign. The Grand Vezir had, on December 25, 1683,
paid with his own life for his failure to take Vienna.
Ahmed Hesmi, in his biographical dictionary of the holders
of the office of the ReisQlkttttab, maintains that on the
following count, at least, the ReisQlkfittab was innocent.
The year 1683 marked the end of the twenty years* peaoe
signed at Vasvar between the Sublime State and Austria.
The Austrians, who were preparing for a oampaign on their
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.
35
western frontier, had sent, in 1683, an envoy to the Ottoman
Court requesting an extension of the treaty. Mustafa Efendi
received the envoy sent "by the Kaiser. At the conference
whioh followed, the Reis&lkHttab was accused of having dis
played indifference to the Austrian overtures for the renewal

45
of peace. ^
Holders of the office of ReisUlkHttab were never full
members of the Divan-i Humayun - the highest Ottoman State
Council, where policies were, if not formulated, at least
discussed under the supervision of the Grand Vosir. Hence,
neither one of the examples cited can he taken to denote
definitely the full participation of the holders of the office
of ReisulkGttab in the daily management of Ottoman state
affairs. However, i oan he said that previous to Rami
Mehmed Efendis promotion to office in 1694, holders of the
office of the Reisdlkuttab had aohieved such a position of
importance in the Ottoman central administration that when
given the necessary protection and confidence, they had
opportunities to affeot policies. With the decline of the
influenoe and importance of the offioe of ffiganoi at the
Divan Chancery, and the ascendency of the offioe of
Reisulkuttab, the management and direction of state affairs
at- the secretariat fell to the latter. Thus, prior to
Rami Mehmed Efendi*s appointment in 1694, the offioe of the
36
ReisulkGttab had already gained both importance and influence
in the Ottoman central administration.,
Responsibilities of the Reisulkuttab at the Chancery
It has already been indicated that by the end of the seven
teenth oentury, the main responsibilities of the ReisG.lkn.ttab
at the Chancery consisted of supervising all Divan correspon
dence turned over to the Chancery for processing and despatch
All clerical duties, whether in the form of first draft copies
of decrees, letters and orders or fair copies, were within his
supervision. In addition, the rectification, examination and
issuance of all state orders, decrees and despatches from the
Chancery were his specific duties. Thus all state correspon
dence, with the exception of certain categories of financial
affairs were drafted under the surveillance, and with the
knowledge and approval, of the ReisGlkGttab.^
In the late seventeenth century, the Divan was usually
held wherever and whenever the Sultan and the Grand Vezir
were present. Thus in the fall and winter months of campaign
years, the Divan was usually held either at Istanbul or Edirne.
Therefore, whenever the commanderinchief, be he the Sultan or
the Grand Vezir, departed on a campaign, the mobile division of '
the Chancery was always attached to his suite for the duration
of the campaign. This mobile division continued the despatch
37
of all Divan "business. However* its chief service consisted
of despatching orders from the Sultan and the Grand Vezir
whether given in or out of Divan, and having them oommunicated
to their proper destinations. Among the services performed
"by this division was the despatch of orders for reinforcements
and supplies from one sector of the front to another and for
reinforcements and supplies to "be readied and despatched to
threatened forts and frontiers.
It is difficult to ascertain how many of the staff of
the permanent division attended the mobile division on any one
campaign. On at least four occasions Bami Mehmed Efendi was
witness to oampaigns as part of the mobile divisions in I69 O,
at Belgrade, in his capacity as secretary to the ReisBlkttttabs
Bureau;^ in 1692 , as B e y l i k o i and in 1695 and 1696 , as the
ReisB.lk3.ttab.49
' During the campaign months, July-Hovember
of every year, deputies (kaymmakams) were usually appointed
at Istanbul and Edirne to conduct state business in the absence
of the Grand Vezir. A deputy ReisUUdlttab was also appointed
to administer the permanent division of the Chancery in the
absence of the Reisulkuttab on campaign* 50 Hence, during
the absence of the Grand Vezir and the BeisBlk3ttab on
campaigns, the services of the oentral administration were

continued.
38
Copies of despatoh.es, decrees, orders end correspondence
of the Divan were inscribed and kept in special register
books at the Chancery. Whereas all copies of despatches
pertaining to military and internal affairs were kept in the
so-called "MQhimme defters" (registers of important public
affairs),^ copies of correspondence with foreign heads of
state, ambassadors, and foreign subjects and merchants were
kept in the "Defatir-i umur-i eoaebiye" (registers of foreign
affairs).^
Although the entries in the "Muhimme defters", for the
late seventeenth century, cover a large variety of topics,
these can be divided, for purposes of study and analysis,
into two major topics* campaign and military affairs and
administrative affairs*
a. Campaign and Military Affairs. During the period
covered by "Muhimme defters" IO5-IO9 , the Sublime State was
engaged in preparations for three major campaigns on its
western frontier. Its contenders were the Austrians in
Hungary and Transylvania? the Poles in Podolia and Moldavia;
the Russians in the Crimea; and the Venetians in the
Mediterranean Sea, at the Morea and Dalmatia. Theentries
consulted for the months covering the preparations for the
campaigns of 1695 and 1696 , ^ indicate that whereas Ottoman
military preparations and movements at the Russian and
39
Polish frontiers were defensive in nature, those directed
against Austria and Venice were offensive. This reflects
Ottoman reaction to defeat and territorial losses to each
one of theee states. By I6 9 8 , the Ottoman State had lost
more territory to Austria and Venice than to Russia and
Poland. The proximity of Austrian and Venetian military
operations to the centre of Ottoman power and government
added to the intensity of Ottoman concentration of military
effort on the north north-western frontiers.
Between five to eight months of eaoh campaign year
were usually spent in military preparations. In the last
decade of the seventeenth century, first calls to the colour
were usually issued in October and November of each year for
oampaigns which started in the summer of the following year,

54
and lasted until the early fall. The first calls were
usually addressed to the provincial governors, in their capa
city as commanders of the provincial troops; to the commanders
of the janissaries stationed permanently in the provinces; to
the sancak commanders; and to the kadis of localities where
troops were stationed. These first calls brought to the
attention of the commander or official in question, the intent
tions of the Sultan and the Grand Vezir to conduct a major
campaign in the following year. He was expected to notify
the commanders and officers of troops within his jurisdiction
40
of the necessity of preparation and readiness for participation
in the campaign* The orders always ended with an imperial
warning to the commanders exhorting them to do their utmost in
making full preparations for the campaign*
Second notices were issued from one to three months after
the first, containing substantially the same kind of information,
but adding the date on which these troops were expected to meet
the commander-in-chief* They further add that mubasirler
(agents) were being assigned, their names usually given, to
supervise and carry out the provisions of the orders* These
agents were usually assigned from the Kapici Basilar (from the
Palace units normally) of the Sultan* They were issued
registers containing the orders to be implemented, and their

55
credentials."^ Upon reaching their destination* their main
responsibility consisted of registering those troops assigned

56
to the campaign. In most cases, they accompanied the
troops from their point of origin to their rendezvous with
the commander-inchief* These registers were used to check
first on the movements of troops, then on their arrival at
campaign headquarters, and on their movements during the
campaign. Sinoe the wages of paid troops, like the
janissaries, and the benefits from "fiefs" to zuema and
timar holders were contingent upon whether or not these
troops registered their attendance at the campaign, these
registers inscribed by the special agents sent out frcan
41
Istanbul were the only means by which desertion and recalci
trance of troops were checked*
As the campaign date drew near, third notices were
usually sent out, primarily to hasten troops and their com
manders en route to their rendezvous with the commanderin
chief and the rest of the armed forces. These third notices
were sometimes sent to commanders and governors reminding
them of the fact that the assembly of the troops of the State
was drawing close and that every means should be exhausted to
have their troops arrive on time. In oases where troops
were unable to meet the rest of the forces at the campaign
headquarters, orders were left for them, usually with the
Kaymmakam of Istanbul if they were coming from Anatolia or
Syria, to join the commanderin-chief at the next major stop
after departure from headquarters.
For clear and succinct illustrations, the call of the
troops of Egypt and Diyar Bekir will be cited. For the
campaign of 1695> "the Governor of Egypt was issued an order
from the Bivan Chancery, dated December 18-28, I6 9 4 , stating
the intention of the Sultan to lead a campaign against Austria,

157
in the following summer. The Governor was instructed to
have ready two thousand troops from the janissaries of Egypt
for participation in the campaign, and one thousand others to
be despatched to the Island of Rhodes for its defence against
42
58
possible attacks by the Venetians. Two other orders fol
lowed tbs one of Decembers one addressed to the Governor
himself, repeating what was stated in the first, and informing
him that on the oocasion of the campaign, a robe of honour was

59
being forwarded to him with the agent Ibrahim.'' In the
next order (dated January 27 - February 6 , 1695) the said
agent was ordered to proceed to Egypt to deliver the robe to
the Governor and to supervise the proper registration and
despatch of the troops of Egypt destined for Rhodes and the
campaign in Hungary. Due to the faot that by May 15-25,
1695 there was no more threat from the Venetians to the Island
of Rhodes, the one thousand troops of Egypt were diverted to
the Euboea Island.^ At the same time the Kapudan of the
Imperial Navy was notified of the necessity of providing trans
portation to this same contingent of troops.
Meanwhile, the first note of the imminent arrival of
the two thousand troops of Egypt at Selanik was made July
13-23 1695- On that same date, an order was issued to the
commanders of these same troops to proceed, upon arrival at
Selanik, to Edime.
62 Among the entries in the "MUhimme
defters" for the duration of the campaign of 1 6 9 5 there is no trace
of the two thousand troops of Egypt. However, after the cam
paign, the commanders of the two thousand troops were directed

63
to make E d i m e their winter oamp. Shortly thereafter,
December 28, 1695 January 9> 1 6 9 6 , the Governor of Egypt was
43
notified of the death of one hundred and fifty of the two
thousand troops of Egypt despatched to the campaign in
Hungary.^
For the same campaign year, orders were issued from
the Divan Chancery to the provincial troops, zuema and timar
holders of the Province of Diyar Bekir to participate in the
campaign* The orders specified that- the Governor with his
household troops, four hundred kullar (janissaries), and the
zuema and timar holders were expected to he ready for the
campaign in the summer.

65 Two hundred of the four hundred
janissaries were later, for various reasons, excused from the
campaign* On April 6-16, 1695 a set of three orders was
issued first to the Governor of Diyar Bekir, ordering him to
collect the provincial troops the second, to the commanders
of troops, to join the zuema end timar holders in their pre
parations for the campaign; and the third to the commander of
troops in Anatolia, who had heen authorized to march the troops
of Anatolia on their way to the campaign, instructing him to
anticipate the Diyar Bekir troops* For three months, no
word arrived of these troops, and the main part of the armed
67
forces was about to depart for the front. ' It is not known
why these troops were delayed; however, by July 22-August 1,
1695 they were assigned to the garrison of fort Timisoara
(in what is now Rumania).

68
44
Many similar citations, of the campaigns of 16 96 and
1697> "both from the Asiatic and Horth African provinces and
the European, can be oitsd to illustrate the procedure
adopted in calling troops to the colour. For this study,
the examples already given should suffice to illustrate the
pattern followed by the Divan Chancery and central admini
stration in issuing orders for the campaign, and checking
on those who had responded to the orders for participation
in campaigns.
Before turning to an illustration of orders issued from
the mobile chancery during campaigns, it might be useful to
note that all the orders issued for calling troops were always
addressed to the commanders of these troops, and in some oases
to the kadis of the areas where they were stationed. Whereas
orders issued to the zuema and timar holders required no
special and specific authorization, orders issued for calling
the paid troops from the provinoes were invariably authorized,
and written in conformity with written memos of the Janissary
Aga. In this oapaoity, the Divan Chancery served as a
secretariat of war.
F'or a clear illustration of orders issued during the
campaign, those orders issued to the Governor of Aleppo during
the campaign of l695 sited. Sometime between August
22 and September 1, the Governor was assigned to the oonmand
45
69
of the garrison of the fort at Belgrade* ^ Five weeks later,
he was relieved of his command at the said fort, and was
assigned to the command of relief columns and supply and

70
munitions convoys ordered to fort Timisoara. Less than
a fortnight later, he was transferred with the Governors of
Syria, Sivas, Karaman and Adana to put down a mutiny of Ottoman

7X
troops in the vicinity of fort Ochakov (on the Dnieper).
Many more examples can be given for the oampaigns of
1695 > I696 and 1697 to illustrate the orders for assigning
commanders and troops to one locality and shifting them
during the actual campaign to another, as military circum-

72
stanoes required. By tracing the movements of comman
ders and troops during any one campaign, it is possible to
draw a general picture of that campaign and who of the
commanders and troops ordered to participate were present
and what assignments were made for them. However, this
part of the study was undertaken to illustrate the type of
information contained in the military orders entered in the
"Milhimme defters'* for the years 1695-97 Since these
orders were drafted at the Chancery, both in the permanent
and mobile divisions, under the surveillance of the Reistil
kQttab Rami Mehmed Efendi, it is accurate to conclude that
Rami Mehmed Efendi was fully aware of Ottoman military
activities during the campaigns of 1695 > I696 and part of
1697, and of Ottoman moves to forestall enemy break-through
46
and incursions into the Sultan*s territory.
"b. Administrative and Security Affairs. The "Muhimme
defters for the years 1 6 9 5 -9 6 and a part of 1697 contain a

73
large number of entries pertaining to administrative problems.
The great majority of the entries of this category consists of
orders for appointments and reshuffling of officials. Besides
the regular yearly turnover of officials, dismissals on a wide
scale from major, and to a lesser extent minor, posts took place
only after the accession of Sultan Mustafa II. Some of the
major posts affected were those of the Grand Vezir, the ieyhfilislam,
the Kaymmakanu the Janissary Aga and the Kizlar Agasi (Chief
Eunuch of the Imperial Harem).^
The incumbent Grand Vezir Ali Papa, was not dismissed
until May 3 1695 four months after the accession of the new
Sultan, when it was discovered that he was intriguing with
janissary contingents to discourage the Sultan from taking
part in the impending campaign. He was first exiled to
Qegme, opposite the Island of Chios, only to be recalled a
few weeks later. The night of the very same day he arrived
75
at Edime, he was executed. Of the other major officials
who lost their posts about this time, only the Grand Vezir*s
Kaymmakam at the Court met with a violent end. The others
were relieved of their posts due to preference of the Sultan
to have others appointed in their stead. Those who were not
47
*76
assigned to other posts were either exiled or simply retired.
Entries pertaining to security affairs are mostly aimed
at crushing revolts and mutinies in the provinces. Two
major revolts were in progress when Sultan Mustafa II acceded
to the throne: one led by iperif Sa*d in the Hijaz, the other-
77
b y M a anoglu in Syria. erif Sa'd, when dismissed from
the Ernerat of Meooa for robbing and menacing the pilgrims,

78
came out in open revolt in 1694* Allying himself with
the reoalcitrant son of the Imam of Yemen, he tried several
times to capture Mecca. However, he did not succeed until
after the pilgrimage in 1695 j when the commander who was sent
79
to guard the pilgrims had departed. The central govern
ment, busy with continuous campaigns against four enemies,

30
had virtually no choice but to reinstate him in his post.
M a ,anoglu*s revolt started in May, 1694? primarily after
several acts of brigandage committed by his companions and

On
allies in the mountains of Tripoli in Syria. On previous
occasions, the former Grand Vezir Ali Pa?a, when serving as
commander in the area, had suppressed their activities.

82
However, Ma'anoglu and his allies had recovered and were
able to defy the local authorities, rob villages and halt
the collection of land taxes. All-out efforts to suppress
them failed. In August, 1695? a compromise was reached,
whereby the Sultan pardoned them in return for payment of part
of the damage incurred during their disorderly activities.^
48
Perhaps the least important of the "MUhimme defters"
entries of this category are the ones concerned with moral
problems. Some of these problems will be cited to illus
trate the variety of internal problems dealt with in these
registers. The great majority of these entries are in the
form of diatribes against the sale of wine and aloohol.^
However, there are several entries in the registers for the
years 1695 9 7 , directing the officers in eharge to exile
from Istanbul prostitutes who had committed other misdemean-

85
ours. J In February 15-25, I6 9 6 , the eyh of Mecca and
his colleague of Medina were warned that it had come to the
attention of the Sultan that brothels were being operated
in both cities. The eyhs were urged to have the establish
ments closed and destroyed, and the practice in the holy cities
discontinued.**
Other examples from the "Mfihimme defters" can be cited
to illustrate the variety of information that was available
to the ReistUk&ttab. and the internal problems which the Sublime
State faced during the years of Rami Mehmed Efendis tenure in
office. At this juncture it is sufficient to note that the
Divan Chancery, headed by the Reis&lkSttab, did not only dis
charge correspondence pertaining to campaign problems, but also
correspondence pertaining to a large variety of internal problems.
Sami Mehmed Efendi, as Chief of the Chanoery, was in the unique
position of observing and noting, simultaneously, most of the
49
internal problems which beset the Ottomans at this crucial
period of their history.
c. Foreign Affairs.- By the end of the seventeenth
century, most problems of foreign affairs for the Ottomans were
centred around trade and commerce. Thus, the majority of
the entries the "Defatiri umur-i ecnebiye were confined to
capitulations, commercial dealings, foreign trade and regulation
of duties. Incoming and outgoing correspondence pertaining
to foreign trade and subject was inscribed in these registers

87
at the Divan Chancery. Copies of capitulations, peace
treaties and ratified treaties were drafted in separate regis
ters for each foreign state. Despite the fact that some of
the entries in these special registers date as far back as the
mid-sixteenth century,
88 it is perhaps significant that only
in the latter half of the seventeenth century are entries pre
faced by the names and dates of the incumbent Grand Vezir and
Reis&lk&ttab.^ It would be difficult at this stage of
research to ascertain whether or not this assignment to the
ReisSlkUttab implies a definite trend of administrative change.
Both theoretical and practical implications and adjustments
due to the transfer of the central administrative organs of
government from the Sultan's Palace to the Grand Vezir's House
hold will have to be studied before any definite answers can
be given. However, as had already been indicated, some
holders of the office of ReisOlkftttab had in the second half
50
of tho seventeenth, century, on certain occasions been assigned

90
responsibilities pertaining to foreign problems.
As Chief of the Divan Chancery, Rami Mehmed Efendi had
full access to entries in the registers of foreign affairs, and
had made use of precedents and Ottoman commitments in previous

91
treaties during the negotiations at Karlowitz. One of the
main tasks of this Chancery was the receipt of correspondence
from heads of state. These were conveyed through their resident
ambassadors to the Sultan and Grand Vesir. Whenever necessary,
an answer was despatched through the Chancery. The translations
of letters arriving from European heads of state were done by
the Chief Dragoman of the Court. Drafts of these translations
were made at the Chancery, and forwarded to the Sultan and Grand
Vezir for their inspection. As with all confidential corres
pondence, foreign despatches were confined to a small group of
officers at the Chancery. The Beylikoi himself wrote most of
the letters of confidential nature, in some instances even in
the privacy of his own home. All confidential correspondence
and drafts were passed on to the Reis&lkBttab for his inspection

92
and approval.
Although some European states were represented at the
Ottoman capital by resident ambassadors, the Ottoman Court had
no reciprocal diplomatic representatives abroad.^ Whenever
circumstances required the presence of envoys to represent
51
Ottoman interests, especially for ratification of peace
treaties, missions were sent on an ad hoc "basis. Intelli
gence and information of the outside world were obtained
primarily secondhand, through diplomatic representatives
resident at the Ottoman capital. European declarations
of war, reports of progress of military campaigns, move
ments and changes of heads of state, were all made available
to the Ottomans. Although this kind of intelligence can
be, at best, slanted to favour the governments submitting
it, the basic issues were usually incorporated in these
reports.
Thus, between 1688 and I6 9 6 , the Ottoman Court was
informed of the Glorious Revolution (1 6 8 8 - 8 9 )*'^ and French
attempts at halting the debarkation of William of Orange in
England 5 the departure of Czar Peter I on his famous tour of

95
Europe,^ and the accession of Frederick August of Saxony
96
to the Polish throne. The Divan Chancery received these
reports, and some copies of the translated texts were available
to the ReistLlkGttab even in the "MShimme defters".
The recognition of the important role of the ReisHlkOttab
in Ottoman foreign affairs, can, perhaps, be best illustrated
by the presence of R a *4 Mehmed Efendi in 1697, at the Divan
discussions on the peaoe proposals submitted by the mediating

97
ambassadors on behalf of the Holy League. In his desorip-
52
tion of the proceedings, Rami Mehmed Efendi displays "both
intimate and detailed knowledge. He is, for example, well
informed of the English-Dutch and French rivalry over the
impending peace, and of the encounters between the Grand
Vezir and the French ambassador, preceding the despatch of the
diplomatic missions to the peace conference*
The present part of this study was undertaken to explain
the appointment of the Raisftlkutta'b, as chief, and the Chief
Dragoman, as member, of the Ottoman peace mission of 1698,
and to indioate what the qualifications of each were for the
diplomatic mission* In the first section, the qualifications
of the Chief Dragoman Iskerletzade Alexander for the appoint
ment were briefly cited. It was indicated that although the
normal Ottoman practice was to appoint a dragoman on suoh a
mission, Alexander had an added advantage* He was the only
surviving Ottoman subjeot who had an experience in negotiations
with the Allies: at Vienna in 1689. Furthermore, as Chief
Dragoman at the Ottoman Court, he had acted as liaison and
interpreter between the Grand Vezir and Divan* and the mediating
ambassadors during the preliminary negotiations at Edime both
in 1692-93 and 1697-98. Thus, it can be conoluded that
Iskerletzade Alexander's qualifications, for an appointment
to the peace mission, were not based solely on his competence
in European languages, but equally on his experience in negoti
ations*
53
Remi Mehmed Efendi*s training and experiences were "briefly
recorded in the second seotion. His bureaucratic and admini
strative training had been noted. Evidence had been presented
to indicate that the office which Razai Mehmed held before his
appointment in 1 6 9 8 , had achieved equal status with the Higanci
(by the 1650's), the de .jure chief of the Chancery, and that
with the decline of the latter's influence, in the second half
of the seventeenth century, the Reistilkftttab, a subordinate,
had displaced him as chief.
By virtue of this ascendency at the Chancery, in both its
permanent and mobile divisions, the Reisulkftttab had access to
everyday state transactions. By the end of the seventeenth
century, the holder of this office was in a unique position
for observing and receiving simultaneously first-hand inform
ation of the internal, military and foreign problems of the
Sublime State. It was by virtue of his long experience with
these problems that Rami Mehmed Efendi was appointed to lead
the Ottoman peace mission in I6 9 8 . As the Reisftlktittab, he
was one of the few Ottomans who combined three fundamental
qualifications: knowledge of law with a first-hand experience
of the most recent Ottoman military and diplomatic commitments.
Yet, contrary to recent contentions, the ReisRlkRttab in the
second half of the seventeenth century was not the Ottoman

98 _
foreign secretary, but rather a secretary of state for internal,
military and foreign affairs.
54
1. Hami Mehmed 5 Karlof$a, 33 for the text of the resoript.
2 Alexandre A.C. Sturdza, L*Europe Orientale et le Sole

Fistorlgue de Maurooordato, 1660-1830 (Paris. 1913). 33.
3. Ibid.. 34.
4 rbld., 35
.
5 rbld.. 40 .
6. Xbld.. 34.
7 lbid ., 50 .
8. See above: 1S.
9 See above: 2-6.
10. See above: 810.
11. Silihdar, Tarlh, II, 652ff.
12. See above: 2-6.
13. Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, Hadlkat ai-vSzera (Istanbul, 127l),

128 (hereafter olted as Osmanzade. Hadlkat).
14. Ibid.
19 . For a short note on Musahib Mustafa Pafas early life sees
Silihdar, Tarlh. I, 429-30.
16. For a modem study of Habi Efendi sees I.A.
17. Silihdar, Tarlh. I, 646-48.
18. Ba?id, Tarlh, I, 441*
19. Silihdar, Tarlh, II, 122, 136-37* 218. For an aooount

of his whole oareer sees ibid.. 299 *
20. Seyhl, Vskay Ql-fUzala (Istanbul Universittesl KSthphanesl,

Thrk Tzamalarl, Mo. 3216), II, 101a (hereafter cited as eyhi, Vskay').
21. Osmanzade, Hadlkat. 128.
22. feyhi, Vskay*, 101a.
23. rbld.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
55
24* Ismail HakkI Uzunsargili, Merkez va Bgh-rjye Teskilati

(Ankara; 1948), 245 (hereafter cited as Pgtmcargill* Merkez-).
25 Istanbul* Baghakanlik Arîvi, Maliye defterleri, 10141,

48s and 29^7 10** (hereafter oited as Maliye defteri).
26. Osmanzade, Hadlkat. 128.
2 7 . Uzun$ar?ili, Merkez. 51-52 and 256.
28. Defterdar Mehmed Pa*?a, Zdk-dat Sl-vakay* (istanhul:

Sfileymaniye KHtUphanesi T.Y. 2382), 273a (hereafter oited as
Defterdar, Zhbdat), Haaid- Tarlh. H , 276 gives November 11,
I694.
29. For the various functions of the Reisulkiittab sees

Uzunar9ili, Merkes. 242-43*
30. Maliye defteri, 9S7O, 17a and 19^. Also Maliye

defteri, 9876, 209*.
31. Maliye defteri, 3423, 17a*
32. For a full text of tbs deoree sees Maliye defteri,

3423, 6a-71** I* Fekete, Die Siyaqat-sohrlft (Budapest, 1955),
II, 88, has fragments of the decree, hut no details of the
auction of tax-faiming. Rasid, Tarih, H , 288-91, deletes
one of the reasons for the promulgation of the new orders the
need for ready cash for the Treasury.
33* Bami Mehmed Efendi paid regularly to the Treasury the

annual amounts due to it. For payments, including the period
of eight months he spent at Istanhul unemployed, sees Maliye
defteri, 1044, 56a.
34* For a modem study of Elmas Mehmed Pa?a sees I.A.
35* Defterdar, Zffbdat, 341la-342a.
36. Ihid., 34215.
37. Uzungargiili, Merkez. 249*
38. gaymrmamg1 I Osman (Tarih-i Osmani EncQmeninin

Mecmuaslnln ilavesi, Istanhul, 1329)> 18. See alsos
Kanunname-i al-1 Osman (T.O.E.M. ilavesi, Istanhul, 1330), 15.
39* Ahmed Resmi, Safinat Hl-rELeaa (Viennas Osterreiohische

Nationalhihliothek, H.O. 118), 3 4a (hereafter oited as Resmi,
Safinat).
56
40* For a short article on the Miasmc? sees Encyclopedia

of Islam (Leiden, 1913-34)- For a more detailed study of the
Hisanel and the Tugra sees I.H. ITzungarîli, Tugra ye Pengeler,1*
Bslleten (Ankara, 1941), V, 101-157*
41* For examples sees Resmi, Safinat, 2ia-22a and 26a-28a.

Vi
42. Ibid., from the introductions 3 -5
43. For partial content of reports Silihdar, Tarih. I, 276.
44. Ibid.. 277-
45 Resmi, Safinat, 4 0 Also Silihdar, Tarih. H , 125*
46. Usungarilis Merkez. 243ff*
47* Maliye defteri, 1041, 48a.
48. It was the general practice, immediately prior to campaigns

to issue basic provisions for the entourage of the oommander-in-chief.
For the campaign of 1692, Rami Mehmed Efendi was given provisions
for four and a half monihss July I to November 12, 1692. For
the provisions and services provided him see: Maliye defteri, 1971,
17a , 23a , 34* and 35a.
49* 3*07 Rami Mehmed Efendi*s provisions for 1695 campaign

sees Maliye defteri, 4960, 23a and 25^. For 1696 campaign
see* ibid.. 43a and 20 and also Maliye defteri, 7144, 5
^ 50. Istanbul* Beupbakanlik Arîvi. Muhimme defteri, 107,

1 , for Rami Mehmed8s deputy at the Permanent Division.
51. For a list of the Mfthimme defterleri sees Midhat

Sertoglu, MRhteva Baklmlndan Basvekalet Arsivi (Ankara, 1955),
16-23 (hereafter cited as Sertoglu. Mfihteva).
52. For a list of these registers sees ibid.. 13-14*
53* MUhimme defterleri, 105-107.
54. The troops were expected at Edime on RUz-i 51 zr (St.

George's Day), April 23, O.S. Normally, the armed forces
departed from the battlefields on R&g-i Kastm (St. Demeter's
Day), Ootober 26, O.S.
55* ôr a d e a r example of the use of agents sees Maliye

defteri, 6006 , 28a40s. In this instance, the agent was used
to register with the cooperation of the local Kadi, the names
57
of the Hungarian and Transylvanian auxiliary troops who had

fought well with the Ottomans until 1697* and had lost their
property "by treaty with Austria in 1697* The registration
was carried out in order to settle those allies of the Otto
man State on new land* The entry is actually a whole defter*
an original oopy whioh contains the kadis seal and signature.
It starts with the conditions for resettlement of these troops.
Then follows a oopy of the credentials of the agent, stating
his missions The lists of names of all the Hungarian and
Transylvanian warriors, each group under its own chief, cover
the greater part of the register. All provisions for round
ing them up and marching them to their new habitat in Bulgaria
are noted and the prices of the provisions and services written
down.
56. There are instanoes where the agents were given the
right to execute any soldier who displayed reluctance to be
recruited. For example see* MQhimme defteri, 105, 20^.
57o Ibid.. 30*.
58. Ibid., 41a notified the Eadi of Rhodes of the impending

arrival of the one thousand troops of Egypt, assigned to garrison
the Island. (Order issued January 17-27> 1695)
59 .Ibid., 35a . (Dated Deoember 28
60. Ibid.. 59a.
61. MQhimme defteri, 106, 50*-5la.
62. Ibid., 64a.
63. Ibid. , 85a.
64. Ibid.. 146a.
65. Muhimme defteri, 108, 9a.

66. Muhimme defteri, 105, 17a.
67. MQhimme defteri, 106, 14*.
68. Ibid., 29s , 88*, 100b and MQhimme
69. MQhimme defteri, 106, 79a.

70. Ibid.. 166*-l67a.1
71. Ibid.. 364a.
58
72c Over seventeen similar oases oan be oited for the

campaign of 1695 and over thirty eaoh for the campaigns of
I696 and 1697.
73 Muhimme defterleri, 105-108.
74c MQhimme defteri, 106, 47Sffc
75. Ibid.
76. jbido
77o IoH. UzungsEfili, Osmanli tarihi (Ankara, 1954)? H I , 2

Kisim, 45*
"b fl
78. Muhimme defteri, 105, 1 -2 .
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid., 175a.
81. Ibid., 3a-4a.
82. Ibid.
83. Muhimme defteri, 106, 119^.
84. For example, MQhimme defteri, 108, 113^.
85. Ibid. . 53a.
86. Ibid., 46b .
87. For a list of these registers see Ahidname, Ahkam, and

Konsolosluk defterleri, in Sortoglu, MQhteva, 13-14.
88. Ibid. 14, for register under Wemge (Austria) covering

the years 1567-1913*
89. For example see* Istanbul, Ba^bakanllk Arîvi, Fransalunun

HI?an defteri, for 1673-74 to 1838-39* 17^* Also Fransa Bevetinin
Atik defteri, for 1687-88 to 1701-1702, 66*.
90. See above: 54-55.
91. Bami Mehmed. Karlofca, 39 The occasion was the

oontroversy with the English Ambassador over the location of the
negotiations. Bami Mehmed Efendi in his response to Lord
William Paget's suggestion of accepting Vienna or any city within
59
Austrian territory explained that the Ottoman State on similar

occasions in the past had met with the Austrians even in the
middle of a river (the Danube) in order to preserve the honour
and dignity of both parties He was referring to the negoti
ations which culminated in the Treaty of Zsitvaiorolc, in
1606
92 Uzungarsili, Merkez 51-52
93 For a general treatment of this topio sees Hurewitz,

"Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy, Belleten. XXV, 455"466.
94 Silihdar, Tarih, H , 480 and 534
95 Hami Mehmed, Karlofga, l8a
- 96, Muhimme defteri, 110,
97 Lord William Paget relates in his despatch to the

secretary of state that the ReislVlidittab was in attendance
at the big divan meetings with the Grand Vezir, the Han of
Crimea and others. P.R.O. SP/97 / 2 1 , 4a-8^
2
98 EI . J.R. Walsh, in his short biography of
Celebizade Efendi, the He isUlkdttab for eight months in
1108-1109, translates the Reis&lk&ttab as Foreign Secretary8*.
See also Hew Cambridge Modern History (Cambridge, 1961), V,
513.
in* the hegotiations
Preliminaries? July November* 1698.- Pour months passed
between the designation of the Ottoman plenipotentiaries, late
in July, 1 6 9 8 , and the oommencemenc of the formal negotiations
at the congress, in midHbvember. During those four months,
two major problems occupied the attention of the belligerents?
persuasion of Poland and Muscovy, by Austria, to accede to sen
ding delegations to the peace conference, and the agreement of
the principals in the conflict over the location of a site for
the negotiations*
Since Austria was committed by the treaties of I6 8 4 , with
Venice and Poland, and of 1697, with Moscow, not to make a
separate peace with the Ottomans, the designation of both the
Austrian and Venetian plenipotentiaries was delayed until
Poland and Muscovy were finally convinced of the possibility
of peaoe. The difficulties in persuading Poland and Muscovy
to the Allied point of view were these*^ first, on the basis
of the Ottoman proposed articles, Poland stood to lose on two
counts* by agreeing to the demolition and perpetual evacuation
of fort KsmenetsPodolsk, the Poles would be abandoning their
most important claim in Podolia. For, although this fort
would have to be evacuated by the Ottomans, according to the
principle of uti possidetis, its perpetual evacuation would
leave the whole province of Podolia open to Tatar raids and
60
61
razzias. Furthermore, the Ottoman stipulation that Poland
should abandon the territory which it held in Moldavia and
reestablish the old frontier with the Ottoman State would
mean a loss of part of the lands which Poland had gained
from the Ottomans by force of arma.
The Czars objections to making peace in 1698 rested on

2
the problem of the straits of Kerch. Although Moscow had,
in I6 9 6 , finally succeeded in wresting Azov and its fort,
thereby gaining access to the sea of that name, the Muscovites
had very little time left for mounting an expedition against
Kerch. Since the possession of Azov without access to the
Black Sea rendered the fort both insecure and useless, the
Czar was extremely reluctant to accept uti noBsidetia as
basis for negotiation of peace with the Sublime State. For,
by accepting this principle, Czar Peter would have had to
abandon claims to fort Kerch and its straits. In vain, the
Muscovite Czar tried to persuade the Kaiser, during the
formers sojourn in Vienna in 1 6 9 8 , to continue the war with
the Ottomans until, at least, the Muscovites had succeeded
in wresting the Kerch straits from the Ottomans.
Only after the Kaiser had promised to protect Polish in
terests at the conference,^ and then with the concurrence of
Poland faced the Czar with a fait aooompli of three original
members of the Holy League standing ready to make peace, did
62
the Czar capitulate, enabling the allies finally to designate
their plenipotentiaries and notify the mediators that they
would proceed to a negotiations center.
Although the Kaiser had designated Count Kinsky, the
Austrian Chancellor, as his representative for the peace
negotiations, the latter, not willing to leave Vienna, and
being more desirous of handling the whole proceedings from
the capital, suggested others to take his place as Austrian
plenipotentiaries to the peace congress.^ The Kaiser,
finally, named as his representatives Count Otingen and
Count Schliok. As an advisor, they had Count Marsigli,
an Italian "by "birth, whose duties were confined to the
meetings specifically held to discuss Austrian claims.
The representative of the Kingdom-Republic of Poland
was Stanislas Count Malachowski, whereas the Czar's was
Vozhnitsin. Venice, like Poland and Moscow, sent one
envoy, Carlo Ruzzini, the envoy of the republic to the

5
Court at Vienna.
Prom the date of the designation of the Ottoman perce
mission, until the beginning of October, 1698 , the contro
versy over where to hold the congress continued. In the
instruments of power which were granted the Reisulkuttab
Rami Mehmed Efendi and the Chief Dragoman of the Ottoman
Court, Iskerletzade Alexander, a general proviso was incor-
63
porated concerning the site for the discussions. Here,
the Ottoman delegates were only instructed to meet their

g
opposite numbers at "an appropriate place."
Lord William Paget, who had acted all along as liaison
between the two sides over this problem, was anxious to per
suade the Ottoman party that a town 02* a city within Austria*s
frontier would be the most convenient choice for such a site

7
especially in terms of housing and provisions. The Ottoman
plenipotentiaries, who had flatly turned down the Kaiser*s
offers of meeting at Vienna, sensed the desire of the English
envoy to please the Austrian side. Perhaps to avoid undue
and unwonted political pressure, and the possibility of
facing indignation at the hands of their victorious opponents,
should they prove difficult at the negotiations table as in
1 6 8 9 , when the Ottoman peace mission, composed of Zfilfikar
Bfendi and Iskerletzade Alexander, was imprisoned for three
years after an unsuccessful negotiation the Reisfi.llrii.ttab,
and his colleague the Chief Dragoman, advanced the suggestion
of holding the congress in the open, somewhere close to the
Ottoman frontier.
8
The English mediator objected vehemently to the Ottoman
proposal. Since the frontier was in ruins, he argued,
locating the conferences in the open would require camping
in tents, which would prove inadequate for living during the
64
9
winter months.^ He pleaded with the Ottoman plenipoten
tiaries not to hold the meetings under suoh circumstances,
especially since he himself was an old man and already
quite ill* Furthermore, he indicated the difficulties
which would have to be faced in the procurement and trans
portation of supplies*
The Ottoman delegation, having been provided with
adequate supplies to last for at least eight months,^
had no fear of shortages. As to the problem of camping
in the winter in tents, Paget was told that the Ottoman
State stood ready to build huts and furnish all the fire
wood needed for the comfort of the mediators.^ In
reporting this encounter to the Grand Vezir, Rami Mehmed
Efendi indicated that Paget was not satisfied with the
Ottoman response, but that he had no other resort but to
comply with the Ottoman insistence on this score.
The Court, at Vienna, indioated surprise at the Otto
man obduranoe and insistence on not meeting within Austria's

12
ter *itory. In a cummunioation to Paget, which is quoted
by the Ottoman chief delegate, Kinsky, the Austrian Chan
cellor, and the Kaiser's spokesman in the negotiations,
pointed out that in the past, the Ottomans had sent missions
as far as Vienna itself for the negotiation of peace* He
expressed surprise and astonishment at the Ottoman stand,
65
but finally consented to holding the congress in the open,
somewhere close to the Ottoman front.
Although the general area within which the congress
was to be held was designated by the beginning of October,
no agreement was reached as to the specific location of
the congress. By a decree (hukm) the Sultan designated,^
and the Kaiser affirmed, a neutral zone. In the preamble,
it was stated thats
To whatever place they [the plenipotentiaries of the

Allies and the Ottomans and mediators! agree upon as
a place for negotiations, they are to have with their
retinues, full safeconduct and security while they
are performing their duties in this beneficial affair.^4
Hostilities were forbidden on the waters of the Danube and
Sava rivers. A truce was declared in the territory between
these two rivers from Zemlin up to Ilock and from Belgrade to
the confluence of the Bosut river with the Sava an area of
about seventy-eight miles in length in the eastern parts of
Slavonia.
While the exact spot for holding the congress had not
been decided, the Allied plenipotentiaries settled close to

15
Petrovaradin about the first of October. J The mediators
orossed to the Zemlin side on the 14th of October, and the
Ottoman mission followed three days later, crossing the Sava
river in the direction of Zalankemen. Rami Mehmed Efendi
and Iskerletzade Alexander met both the English and Dutch
66
ambassadors and held a conference concerning the exact loca

16
tion of the congress. In his report to the Grand Vezir,
the Reisulkuttab states that Ottoman observers had been sent

earlier from Belgrade to study the terrain and report on a
possible site. However, their reports were so contra
dictory that the Ottoman delegates were not convinced of
the efficacy of the suggestions of the observers. Upon
deliberation with the mediators, Eami Mehmed Efendi con
tinued, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries decided that the dis
tance between their camp and that of the Allies which was
close to a four-hour ride-the allies near Earlowitz, and
the Ottomans near Zalankemen was too inconvenient for con
ducting the negotiations. In the first place, it would

put too muoh strain on the mediators, especially Paget who
was ill. Each trip was estimated to take three days.
Furthermore, after the advent of winter, it would be nearly

impossible to communioate with the allied camp with snow
and heavy rain blocking the roads.
Taking into consideration the convenience of meeting
from close quarters with the Allies, and the facility of
transport of provisions on the Danube, it was decided to
move on to Earlowitz, where the allied plenipotentiaries
planned to oamp, and where harbour facilities were adequate.
Thus, on the 28th of Ootober, the mediators moved on to
Earlowitz and the next day the Ottoman plenipotentiaries
67
with, their retinue alighted at the "bank of the Danube close

17
to Earlowitz. 1 The Ottoman tent-attendants went ahead
of the B.eisQ.lkuttab and the Chief Dragoman, to have the site
of the Ottoman camp cleared and readied for receiving them.
When the Ottoman plenipotentiaries started toward their
camp, they were attended by an escort of over twelve hundred

18
officers and troops. Each had more than three hundred
curbacilar (officers of the corps of the janissaries), dressed
in their red flowing robes, trousers, plumed headgear and
yellow light boots. Several hundred cavalry infantry offi
cers and troops from various divisions of the Ottoman aimed
forces, with scores of musketeers carrying their silver em
bossed muskets, marched in front of the Ottoman delegation.
This array of troops, dressed in their colourful ceremonial
uniforms, each group distinguished by the colour of its uni
forms and headgear, marching row upon row, must have been an
impressive spectacle to behold.
The fortnight between the arrival of the Ottoman peace
mission at the designated spot, near Earlowitz at a distance
of about an hour from the mediators, 19' in the direction of
Zalankemen, and the commencement of formal negotiations on
the 13th of November, was spent in csremonial visits, and
the exchange through the mediators of authenticated copies
of the instruments of power and credentials. Until the
68
negotiations house, which was still under construction, had
"been completed, the delegations used a large size tent whioh

20
the Sultan had provided for the oooasion. In order to
avert any oonfliot over precedent during the negotiations,
four entries were provided, facilitating the simultaneous

21
entry of the missions of the belligerents
Precautions were taken by both Paget and Collier to
avert every possible type of conflict over precedent during
the conduct of the negotiations. A list of ground rules

22
was drawn up by them, and shown to all the missions before
the articles were finally accepted and authenticated with
the signatures of the ambassadors of the mediating powers.
The ground rules were aimed at facilitating informality in
the negotiations and setting aside of punctilious obser
vation of etiquette and precedent. At least two incidents
of the latter sort had already delayed the commencement of
the negotiations by several days. The Austrian and Vene
tian missions had gone ahead of the Polish and Muscovite
ones and had settled at their designated spots near Karlo-
witz, at a distance of an hour from the mediators In the
direotion of Petrovaradin. When the Polish and Muscovite
envoys, who had come by way of the Danube, reached the bank
leading to Earlowitz, a conflict ensued over which one of them

21
should descend first. Finally, the deadlock was broken
and both Count Malachowski and Vozhnitsin arrived at the
69
allied camp site. There the Pole, who had "been assigned
the left side of the Austrian tents, as a camp site, raised

24
another point of precedent He was indignant at heing
placed in that position when he, representing a king, should
have been placed at the right of the Kaisers representatives
The Venetian envoy, who had arrived with the Austrian dele
gation, had been placed at the contested place of honour.
Since Ruzzini represented only a republic, Count Malachowski
ordered his tents struck down, and brought over to be pitched
between the Austrian and Venetian tents. A long argument
ensued. Finally, a solution was deviBed whereby the tents
of the four allied representatives were pitched in a rectan
gular order, thence eliminating the question of precedent
and place of honour.
It may be recalled that by an Imperial rescript, dated
July 22, 1 6 9 8 , the Sultan had named the Grand Vezir, his
deputy (vekil) in the settlement of peace, with delegated
authority to appoint an Ottoman peace mission fully accre
dited and empowered to treat, negotiate and sign the peace.
However, it was stipulated that in their conduct of the
negotiations both the Grand Vezir and the Ottoman pleni
potentiaries were not to act, under any circumstances, con
trary to the honour (irz) and the dignity (namus) of the
Sultan.
70
The problem facing the Ottoman delegation; as with any
delegation representing a defeated power at the conference
table, is one of minimizing losses to the enemy and avoiding
a humiliating peace. From the start, however, this
mission's task at the conference table was facilitated by
three factors* (i) In the proposed articles of January,
1698 , the Sublime State had limited its aims to territorial
adjustments along the existing front. Some articles had
been incorporated pertaining to specific land adjustments
for two of the four members of the League. These articles,
however, were added only as a precautionary measure against

TOidue demands by the specified powers. (2) The Kaiser,
in 1698 , was anxious for a rapid conclusion of peace due to
the imminence of a possible conflict with France over the
Spanish Succession. (3 ) The dissension among the Allies
over the agreement in principle, and over the timing of the
congress. These three factors eased the task of Rami
Mehmed Efendt and Iskerletzade Alexander and afforded them
several opportunities to sway certain terms of the prelimi
nary agreements in their own favour.
In the remaining part of this study, it will be shown,
in four separate seotions, corresponding to the number of
the holy League powers, how the Ottoman mission understood
and interpreted the preliminary agreements? the "compromises"
reached during the negotiations with each power will be
71
indicated and th6 Ottoman tactieB in the negotiations will "be
commented on*
Negotiations with the Austrian Mission. Since the proposals
for peace which were exohanged hy Austria and the Ottoman State
25
were both vague and general, and the preliminary agreements
were only in principle, the Austrian delegation requested,
through the mediators, the submission by the Ottoman mission
of its demands in writing. Had the Austrians hoped by such
a request to force their opposite numbers to reveal their in
structions and the real basis upon whioh the Sultan was ready
to make peace, their hopes were to be disappointed. Rami
Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander had complied with
the Austrian request, and had drawn, from the list of Ottoman
proposed articles of January, 169 8 , the following demands:
adherance to uti possidetis in principle, but excepting and
making a special case of Transylvania from the strict appli
cation of the said principle; and allowance for evacuation
and demolition of suae forta and palwngas concomitant with

oc
the rectification of the frontier.
As on an earlier occasion, the Austrian response to the
special interpretation of the principle of uti possidetis
for Transylvania was in the negative. The Ottoman dele
gation was reminded of the Kaiser's previous stand on this
point, and told that the principality had been conquered by
72
Austrian, troops at a high price and with great sacrifices
Should the Ottomans persist in this vein, it was said, the

27
preliminary negotiations would he stopped. When Paget
conveyed to the Ottoman plenipotentiaries the Austrian
stand and threat, the Sultan's envoys ohanged their tactioe,
and pretended to make a concession. They suggested that
in return for Ottoman concession on this point, the Govern
ment of Transylvania should pay an annual gift to the Sultan
as a consolation-price for the loss of the revenue which had

accrued to the Ottoman treasury from the principality. 26
When the Austrian delegation threatened again to break the
congress and leave Earlowitz, the Chief of the Ottoman
peace mission, before agreeing to drop Ottoman demands on
Transylvania, felt compelled to oommunioaie this to the
Grand Vezir. In his report, Rami Mehmed Efendi described

the efforts of his colleague and of himself to convince the
Austrians of the equity of the Ottoman demands concerning

29
the principality. ^ At the same time he conveyed to the
Grand Vezir the impression that should the Ottomans persist
in their stand on Transylvania, Austria would break up the
congress, and would then use the opportunity for capturing
more territory which, upon the resumption of negotiations,
it would then claim, under the principle of uti -possidetis.
With this possibility in mind, the Ottoman delegation, with
the help of the mediators, finally conceded the claims of
73
the Sultan to the principality, thereby allowing the formal
negotiations to begin.
Even as early as this stage in the conversations, the
Ottoman tactics of negotiation were discernible. In the
first place, the Ottomans did not reveal what their instruc
tions were, if any written instructions had been given them
at all, thereby allowing themselves a wide range for negoti
ating, and for voioing their demands on each problem separately.
'Their adoption of the proposed articles of January I6 9 8 , although
construed by the Austrian plenipotentiaries as deceit, was
done as a test to discover the extent to which the Kaiser's
representatives would go to obtain peace. Furthermore, the

Ottoman empty concession on Transylvania will be used by the
Sultan's envoys as quid pro quo for their claims on other
areas of the frontier during the formal negotiations.
On November 13, 16 9 8 , and at the propitious hour, the
Austrian and Ottoman plenipotentiaries, simultaneously and
in the presence of the mediators, entered the negotiations
tent. The usual greetings were exchanged, and declarations
were made from both sides for a successful conclusion of peace
between their respective sovereigns. Since the first general
problem dealt with the designation of the frontier on its whole
length between the two states, the Austrians requested again
from their Ottoman counter-parts, through the mediators, a
74
*1
written statement or their demands.' Eami Mehmed Efendi,
w a r y of written statements which might be misconstrued and
used as commitments on behalf of the Sultan, avoided a direct

32
response. Instead, he had Iskerletzade Alexander indi
cate the irritation of the Ottoman mission with Austrian
demands for a written statement, complaining that if it had
been possible for both parties to settle their differences

by correspondence, such a procedure would have been followed.
Had this been adopted, there would have been no necessity
for either delegation to take the trouble to come to Karlo-
witz.^ The Austrian delegation was reminded that in the

past, it was a standard practice to start from one end of
the frontier and negotiate until the whole length was covered,
disposing of one item at a time. In that fashion no con

flict would arise over little known and ill-defined areas,
and each item would be isolated and taken oare of separately.
By adopting this well-tested precedent, argued the Ottoman
spokesman, the general designation of the frontier would be

achieved, and the meeting and personal confrontation would
be justified.
The main point of contention between the Ottoman and
Austrian point of view was whether or not negotiations should
proceed from the general to the particular, the Austrian
proposal, or from the particular to the general, the Ottoman
suggestion. Eaoh side had its reasons for advanoing its
75
position against the other* The Austrians, partly perhaps
to find out what the Ottoman delegation's instructions were
and partly to protect itself from exorbitant Ottoman demands,
wished to know in advance, though generally, what the limits
of Ottoman aspirations in the negotiations were* The Otto
mans, on the other hand, always mistrustful of committing
themselves on paper, were probably hopeful that taking one
part of the frontier at a time, they could wring several minor
concessions from their Austrian counterparts.
After several hours of discussion, the Austrians conceded
this point and agreed to prooeed from the specific to the
general in the negotiations over the frontier.^ Where the
frontier was not known or was ill-defined, especially in areas
where there was no natural boundary, it was agreed to have it
designated generally, and leave the rectification to a joint
Ottoman-Austrian commission, which would carry out in detail
the designation of the frontier on the spot. In order to
avoid possibilities of forgery, it was decided to hand over
to the mediators,for safekeeping, the articles which were
agreed upon as soon as these were drawn up.
Not without apprehension did the Austrian mission adopt
the Ottoman position on procedure* As it turned out, its
initial fears concerning Ottoman demands and the possibility
that the Sultan's mission would use this'adopted procedure
76
to try to force concessions from Austria were fully justified.
Thus the negotiations whioh took place the following day,
November 14, 'between the Ottoman and Austrian delegations,
vindicated the latters fears and apprehension. The dis
cussion was oentred upon the agreement in principle, i.e.
uti possidetis, and the adopted provisions allowing for demo
lition and evacuation of territory concomitant with the recti
fication of the frontier. It may "be recalled that the Otto
man Court had regarded uti posBidetis. without exception and
restrictions, as contrary to and incompatible with the dignity
and honour of the Sultan, and that the very same provisions
for demolition and evacuation of specific forts and districts
had been incorporated in the Ottoman proposed articles in
order to reotify this possible indignity. The Austrian
side had allowed, though generally, and with little specifi
cation, for these provisions, however, with the additional
statement that such provisions were to be applied in an
equitable manner.
In practice, though, the Ottoman mission interpreted the
concession on the part of the Kaiser as quid pro quo for the
Sultan*s acceptance of unrestricted application of uti possidetis.^
and argued that in the application of this agreement, equal
weight should be given to both principles. Whereas the prin
ciple of uti possidetis would apply to Ottoman territory in
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission of th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
77
Austrian hands, in return, the provisions for evacuation
and demolition should apply to the Austrians exclusively.
In vain, the Austrian side tried to assert that unrestricted
uti possidetis was the "basis for the agreement in principle,
and that the provisions allowed for demolition and evacuation
were meant to apply to "both parties equally* for every
fort the Austrian side evacuated or demolished, the Ottomans
would do the same to an equivalent fort or territory. 37
The support which the mediators accorded the Austrian
stand went unheeded "by the Ottoman mission. Paget and
Collier finally suggested that negotiations should proceed,
and when the territory of each side was determined, then
the designation and rectification of the frontier would "be
possible. It was argued that only then the necessity of
evacuation and demolition of forts and territory would "be
seen after whioh the process should not "be too difficult
to resolve. It was also suggested that otherwise both
sides would be creating unnecessary problems thereby hinder
ing and delaying the smooth oonduot of the peaoe negotiations.
In its attempt at rationalizing such a stand, which was
dearly oontrary to tat preliminary agreements, the Ottoman
mission blamed the vague and unclear Austrian response to

38
the Grand Vezir*s proposed articles of January, I6 9 8 .
When this was received, the Grand Vezir is said to have
78
detected the ambiguity of its statement on evacuation and
demolition, and realized that he had two alternatives*
refuse to accept the Austrian document, thereby halting
the peace negotiations or send a messenger to Vienna to
obtain clarification on these points a process which was
estimated to take several days, or perhaps weeks, to com
plete. In the interest of peace, and with the hope
that such vagueness would be dispelled at the conference
table, the Grand Vezir had not taken any action. Thus
reasoned the Ottoman mission. Yet despite the support
which the mediators accorded the Austrian stand, both
Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander had pre
pared a rebuttal*
Interpreting the vagueness to the advantage of the
Sublime State, they explained that the drawing of fine dis
tinctions between uti possidetis and the designation and
rectification of the frontier was equivalent to splitting
hairs* In order to illustrate this point, they introduced

39
a concrete example. ^ According to the strict application
of uti -possidetis, the principality of Transylvania fell to
the Austrians, but this principality had a common frontier
with Timisoara provinoe. This frontier which existed between
than would have to be designated simultaneously with the dis
posal of the article on Transylvania. Henoe, in Timisoara, the
Austrians would have to evacuate the palangas which they held
79
there, thereby putting into effect both the principle of
uti possidetis and the provisions for evacuation and demo
lition* It was quite clear that the Ottomans had not
advanced any further proposals to their initial one of

equating uti possidetis to evacuation and demolition,
assigning exclusively the application of the former to
themselves, and the latter to the Austrians* However,
by introducing this concrete example, the Ottoman mission
helped in removing the discussion from the theoretical
level to the concrete, at the same time as it succeeded
in evoking a violent response from the Austrians. The
Kaiser's envoys, after reiterating their position on the
mutual benefit to be derived from the application of the

provisions, again turned to dispute the new Ottoman claim.^
It was pointed out that except for the fort of Timisoara
itself, the greater part of the province was actually in
Austrian hands, including ten forts which were at that time
occupied by Austrian troops. Thus, it was argued, the
Ottoman demand for keeping Timisoara province, and its
evacuation by Austria was asking for the impossible, being
in the order of the least having the most claim.^
In response to these Austrian "pretensions** the Ottoman
mission first enumerated the holdings of the Sublime State
in the provinoe and then indioated that Timisoara, which had
always had a capacity for accommodating a garrison of over a
80
thousand soldiers, was the seat and capital of the provin
cial government.^ Since the capital was in Ottoman hands,
its districts and dependencies would have to remain with the

Sublime State. Furthermore, it was indicated that the
forts which the Austrians claimed to hold, were nothing but
palangas, with a maximum capacity of several score troops.
3 v'6B if, theoretically, these nalangas were considered forts,
still they were dependencies of the capital and seat of the
government of the province, and hence are part and paroel of

the territory. The Ottoman argument, as stated by Iskerlet
zade Alexander, went furthers it was true that when the

dependencies were added, they added up to more than the
capital which was the centre of power. However, number
and size did not exempt dependency. As long as Timisoara
was the capital of the province and its principal fort, it

would continue to be more important and rank higher than
the sum total of its dependencies. In the past, the Chief

Dragoman reasoned, Austria had agreed to such a principle,
and adhered to it. Furthermore, it was pointed out that
Kinsky, the Austrian Chancellor, had. agreed before the arrival
of the various peace missions to Earlowitz, to the evaouation
of some territory in Hungary on the part of Austria. Accord
ingly, the Ottoman spokesman insisted that inasmuch as Timisoara
was geographically located in Hungary, the territory and forts
whioh Austria held within the boundary of the province would
81
have to "be evacuated.
At that juncture, it seemed to the mediators, that
neither delegation was willing to concede or compromise
on its rigid interpretation of the position which each
took regarding Timisoara. Furthermore, there ensued
an exchange of acrimony and accusations of had faith.
Finally, the mediators proposed the postponement of dis
cussion d negotiations over the evacuation and demolition
articles, in order to move on to take up the next part of
the frontier. The Sultan's envoys postponed their res
ponse until the following day.
That same evening, November 14, both Rami Mehmed Efendi

and Iskerletzade Alexander spent several hours preparing a
response to the suggestions of both the Austrian envoy and
the mediators.^ The third conference with the Kaiser's
plenipotentiaries was opened by the Ottoman mission with a
summary of its position on the province of Timisoara.^
It was argued that since the central parts of the province
with its capital were in Ottoman hands, and owing to the
fact that it would be impossible to designate any frontier
for the province at that juncture, it might have been more
beneficial to postpone the discussion of the artiole per
taining to Timisoara, and take the next article on the
agenda. The A ustrian mission would not oonsent to the
82
Ottoman motion, until the problem on hand had been settled.4 5'
The Sultans ambassadors were told that the province belonged
to the Kaiser by right of conquest. Arguing in the Ottoman
style, the Austrian spokesman claimed that one of the largest
forts in Timisoara, fort ebe, which was in Austrias
possession at the time, was much larger than fort Timisoara,
and due to its larger capacity for accommodating troops
commanded greater military rank and importance. Whereas
Timisoara could acoommodate one thousand troops, fort ebe?,
aocording to the Austrian envoy, had facilities for over four
thousand.
When the Ottomans stood adamant on their position, the
Austrians, anxious to proceed with the negotiations, finally
consented to hand over fort Lugoj, but in return demanded
that the Ottoman province be delimited by the Nvarad river,
a tributary of the Tisza, thus leaving the waters of the
Mure? and northern portions of the Tisza river in Austrian

46
hands. It was hoped that by holding this portion of
the province, Austria would guarantee free and unencumbered
access, by river, to Transylvania. To this proposal, the
Ottomans raised a technical question.47 Since the ffvarad
river had water flowing in it for only nine months of the
year, they wondered what kind of frontier it could serve.
Besides, they argued, why should Austria have exclusive use
of the Mure? and a good part of the Tisza rivers? To these
83
objections the Austrians agreed to evacuate the region north
of the Evarad, on condition that the area remain neutral
uninhabited and uncultivated}, serving as a buffer zone between

the possessions of the Sultan and the Kaiser. Iskerletzade
Alexander again objected to this arrangement as contrary to
the spirit of peace peace was after all, for the repose and
tranquility as well as prosperity of the people of both states,
48
and for the recultivation and resusoitation of their lands.
The Austrian delegation was ready with one furthex modifies,
tion of its most reoent proposal. After deliberation, it
consented to abandon its claims to the northern regions of

the province, on the condition that the land three to four
miles from the Mure? and Tisza rivers remain evacuated and
neutral. The conference of November 14 ended on this note,
with the Ottomans,though ready to give their response to this

modification, postponing it until the next conference.
When the two parties met on the following day, the Aus
trian mission, reiterating its most recent modification, ^
threatened to discontinue the negotiations unless the Otto
mans agreed to adopt it. However, unlike the case of
Transylvania, the Ottoman mission was undeterred from its

stand. It had become quite obvious to both Rami Mehmed
Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander that the Austrians wanted
exolusive and full control of the waters of the Mure? and
the northern parts of the Tisza, depriving the inhabitants

of the Ottoman region of fishing rights and cultivation of
84
50
the land. The Sultan's spokesman insisted again, on
behalf of the Ottoman State, that the Mure? and Tisza
should serve as the boundaries of the province on its
northern and western fronts. The Austrians were assured
that the Sublime State had no intention of rebuilding any
of the forts of the province or any other fortifications

which the Austrians would evacuate. However, the Stiltan
had agreed to making peace in order to resuscitate the land
and repopulate the provinces, which had been ravished by
the war. 51 Since this was the principal aim of peace,
it would be unfair argued the Chief Dragoman, to deprive
the populace of the province under discussion of the use
of the waters of either one of the two rivers. Furthermore,
it was asserted that sinoe the Sultan had shown willingness

to leave Transylvania in Austrian hands, what reason was
there for Austria to balk at having Timi?oara provinoe remain
in Ottoman hands.
When it became clear, to the Austrians, that the Otto
man delegation would not waver from its determination on
complete evacuation of the provinoe, and when they reoeived
assurance that the Sultan had no intention of rebuilding the
forts and fortifications on the northern borders of the pro
vinoe, they agreed to have the Mure? and Tisza rivers serve
as the northern and western boundaries of the Ottoman pro
vince, with the stipulation that the waters of both these
85
rivers could be freely used by the Austrians for uumniuni-

52
cation with Transylvania.
53
Separate articles were then drawn up, one for Transylvania,
giving the whole principality with its old frontier to the
Kaiser, and the other for Timisoara, which was delimited by
the Transylvania border in the east and the Mure$ and Tiszs
in the north and west respectively. Although by article I
all Ottoman claims to the principality were dropped, it is

*
perhaps significant to note at this juncture that this Otto
man concession had a beneficial effect on the Ottoman cause.
As early as January, 1698 , it was obvious to the Ottoman
Court that Austria would not entertain any motion other than
the complete renunciation of Ottoman claims in Transylvania,
whether actual or theoretical. At the congress it became
quite obvious again that the Kaiser stood ready to have his
delegation withdrawn from the peaoe conference, should the
Ottomans persist in their claims. It has already been
suggested that two explanations are possible for the Otto
man insistence on pressing proposals as late as November on
the Transylvania settlement. The Sublime States envoys who
could not lay claim to any part of the principality by right
of conquest, were in effect trying to test their opponent's
resilience, and the extent to which the latter would go to
obtain peaoe. It is perhaps possible, also, that the Otto-
86
mans, having no illusions on this score, hoped to use it as
a means of persuading the Austrians to agree to the Sultan's
claims to all of Timisoara. Hence, the Austrian response
to the Ottoman demands on Transylvania was not surprising
to Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander, as long
as Austria was made to "believe that the Sultan was conceding
on this point.
Although it cannot "be said that Rami Mehmed Efendi and
Iskerletzade Alexander had suooeeded in obtaining exclusive
Ottoman hold over the province of Timipoara, only through
their diplomatic maneuvers the Kaisers anxiety to obtain
a speedy conclusion of the peace may have played an equal
role in the Ottoman retention of the province the Austrian
tacit recognition of the Ottoman interpretation of the pro
visions gave the Sultan8s envoys a powerful precedent.
In their negotiations with the Kaiser's unequal partners
in the League the representatives of the Sublime State used
this precedent to its fullest extent. Since this aspect
of the Austrian concession will be discussed in its proper
context, subsequent remarks will be confined to the main
features of Ottoman taotios as revealed in the first en
counter with the Kaiser's delegation.
Despite the fact that the Sultan's plenipotentiaries
were not to succeed as well in obtaining Austrian concessions
87
on the asms b&~is in every article on the agenda, from the
first meetings which took place "between the Kaiser's envoys
and those of the Sultan, some features of the Ottoman pro
cedures of negotiation "become manifest. Despite known
and anticipated Austrian opposition to any Ottoman claims
to the principality, Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade
Alexander were, "by pressing the Transylvania article, in
effect following the injunctions of the Ottoman Court to
press every item, of the articles. 54 Here, it must he
noted that unlike most of the articles for the other allies,
those for Austria were specific. Hence, the Ottoman
mission continued to press the proposed articles for Austria
throughout the remaining part of the negotiations.
Except for creation of a breach of faith, the Sublime
State's representatives had everything to gain by pressing
their demands on Transylvania and similar territory whioh
was not held by the Sultan's troops. It has already been
pointed out that the Ottoman concession on the Transylvania
article was used immediately in the following conference,
as a quid -pro quo for the Sultan's demands for exclusive
retention of the provinoe of Timisoara. One feature
differentiates the Ottoman view and treatment of both
territorial units. In the oase of Transylvania the Otto
mans had lost to Austria through military conquest, all the
territory which they had once viewed as the Sultan's. In
88
Timisoara the Sublime State's envoys could claim, with full
justification, Ottoman retention of at least the middle part
of the province, including the provincial capital, the most
important fort in the territory. Thus, as long as the terri
tory in dispute between the Kaiser and the Sultan was outside
the oontrol of the Sultan's troops, as in the case of Tran
sylvania, it was possible for the Ottoman mission to drop
the claims of the Sublime State. However, although Austria
was the victor in the recent campaigns, the Sultan's mission,
in its negotiations with the Kaiser's plenipotentiaries, did
not concede any territorial claims which the Sublime State
had made initially in the January, 1 6 9 8 articles concerning
Timisoara.
Hence, in the following negotiations with the Kaiser's
plenipotentiaries, the Ottoman peace mission at Karlowitz,
continued to hold steadfast to one prinoiple: no Ottoman-
held territory, in the frontier areas, would under any cir
cumstances be abandoned to Austria as a result of the nego
tiations. Thus, in the next confrontation with the
Kaiser's plenipotentiaries, Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerlet-
zade Alexander did not raise any objections to Austria's
retention of the Bagka district, a territory located between
the Tisza and Danube rivers, held exclusively by the Kaiser's
troops. However, when the settlement of the Serm territory
was raised, they contested Austrian holdings there.^ Here
89
the problem was further complicated by the lack of a natural
frontier between the holdings of both sides, a condition
which did not facilitate the quick designation of the fron
tier, without great land concessions by either state<>
In the January articles, the Ottomans had demanded the
evacuation of several forts in the Serm district specifically

56
Petrovaradin, H o o k and Brod. All of these forts were,
at the time, in Austrian hands. Furthermore, the Ottoman
side suggested the delineation of a frontier with Austria
whioh would start from near those forts. When in accordance
with their adopted prooedure, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries
tried to press settlement in the Serm along the proposed
articles of 1 6 9 8 , they faced a determined opposition from
the Austrians.
The Kaiser*s envoys at this point protested that the
whole province of Timi9 oara had, despite Austrian holdings,
just been conceded in its entirety to the Sultan. It was
difficult for them to understand the equity of the Sublime
States demands on Austrian-held forts in the Slavonian
district. The Ottomans therefor dropped their request
for evacuation of forts Petrovaradin and Ilock, making
possible the designation of the frontier between the Otto-

57
man and Austrian held territory. This settlement,
article II, reflected two aspects of the Ottoman missions
90
aspirations: the Ottomans wore assured of a foothold in
the Serm, in full conformity with their directives that the
dependencies of Belgrade across the Sava should remain within
Ottoman control. Furthermore, the Ottomans, by virtue of
this article, received a reassertion of their right to con
trol the territory held by the Sultans troops. Hence,
as long as the Sublime States holdings in eastern Slavonia
were preserved by this article, the Ottoman mission did not
find it difficult to drop its initial demands for the evacu
ation of Austrian occupied forts.
Agreement over the next article for the designation of
the territory and frontier in Bosnia-Croatia was even more
difficult to reach. During the war, Austrian troops had
succeeded in entering the northern regions of Bosnia, but
had failed to capture the whole of Croatia on the western
banks of the Una rivor. Demands to have this river serve
as the boundary between the two provinces were refused by
the Ottomans. In the proposed articles of January, the
Sultan had requested the evacuation of all Austrian-held
fortifications and fortified positions across the Una and
the return of all the districts which were dependent on
Croatian forts oooupied by Ottomans.
When von Schlick protested that by requesting the evacu
ation of so much Austrian-held territory the Ottomans were
91
59
virtually dictating their t e r m s , h e was reminded by
Iskerletzade Alexander that the territory which Austria
had captured frcsa the Ottomans and which it would retain

60
was extensive. Should the Sultans consent for the
ratification of the peace be desired, the Ottoman spokes

man argued, some satisfaction would have to be offered.
He then asserted that the Sublime State held large por
tions of the districts of Croatia bordering on the Una.
In order to justify the Ottoman demands for evacuation,
of the dependencies of these Croatian forts and districts,
he returned to the argument that the Ottoman Court had
oonceded to treat on the basis of uti -possidetis in
return for the provisions of evacuation and demolition.
After four or five hours of heated discussion, it
was decided to designate the frontier generally, but
within the framework of the Ottoman mission's demands.
The rectification of the frontier was left to a joint
Austro-Ottoman commission, whose duties would start after
the signing of the treaties.^ Once the frontier and
territorial articles were settled, the major problems
between the Ottoman and Austrian delegations were solved.
One more conference was held between the missions of the

*
Sultan and Kaiser, in which the discrepancies between
the Latin and Ottoman Turkish texts were oorreoted.
However, at that conference the Austrian mission raised
92
the question of the independence of Ragusa, and requested
a clarification of the statue of the free state. Accord
ing to the mission's spokesman, the Ragusans had, during
the war, asked for the protection of the Kaiser, and the
latter had accorded it to them, in return for a declaration
of Haguean allegiance to the Kaiser. Onoe this statement
was made, it was obvious to the Ottoman delegation that the
Austrians were aiming at a joint protectorate over the free
state. Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander were,
however, well prepared with an answer. Regusa, it was
indicated, had been paying tribute to the House of Osman,
as far back as the time of Orhan, when his capital was
still at Bursa. Furthermore, during the recent war, an
exemption had been awarded to the Ragusans, by an Imperial
rescript authorizing the use of the tribute due to the
Sultan for the defenoe of the free state against the inour-
sions of the Venetians. ^ The Austrian mission, apparently
uninterested in any concessions over Ragusa, was satisfied
with the assurance of a return to the status quo ante the
free state would remain independent, but would oontinue to

65
pay tribute to the Sultan. y
In their disoussions with Austria, Rami Mehmed Efendi
and Iskerletzade Alexander had managed, through negotiation,
to gain the main objectives of the Ottoman State as outlined
in the proposed articles of January, I698 . As has already
93
been observed, these objectives were both limited and realis
tic* Although the greater part of Hungary and all of Tran
sylvania were lost, with the larger part of Croatia, to
Austria and were never to be recovered, and despite the fact
that Austria was victorious after sixteen years of continuous
war with the Sublime State, the territorial-frontier settle
ment, especially in Timisoara and Bosnia-Croatia, was
finally conoluded in favour of the aforementioned Ottoman

66
aims. When compared to Ottoman losses, these gains
are perhaps miniscule* However, the Sultan's envoys had
succeeded in obtaining what to the Ottoman Court was an
equitable settlement, without compromising its honour and
dignity*
It has also been observed that the Ottoman mission
had followed, in its negotiations with Austria, the precept
that no territory occupied or held by Ottoman troops would
be handed over to the Kaiser. At this point, however,
another aspect of the territorial settlement requires
elaboration. The Ottoman insistence on having exclusive
hold over Timisoara, which lies between Transylvania and
Hungary, and whose northammcst frontier is less than 150
miles from Buda, had a strategic significance. By having
exclusive control of this province, the Ottomans were
within striking distance of the very heart of what had
been until very recently Ottoman Hungary* When the time
94
was ripe, they could have mounted expeditions against "both
Austrian holdings in that Kingdom and into the principality. .
Similarly, the Sultans Croatian and Seraian holdings would
serve as convenient stepping-stones for the recovery of
lost territory in Croatia on the one hand and Slavonia and
southern Hungary on the other.
The Ottoman mission had arrived at Karlowitz, invested
with full powers to negotiate a peace settlement with Austria
on the hasis of the proposed articles of January, I698 . It
may he recalled that these articles "bore tentative restrict
ions. Had the articles been any more specific, it is very
likely that no preliminary agreement would have been reached
for holding the congress. This feature of the articles
served another purposes once the delegations met face to
face, they could then discuss and settle the particular
interpretations to suit their own ends.
Almost from the very beginning of the formal negotiations,
the Ottoman mission had, through a ruse, succeeded in conveying
the Ottoman interpretation of the agreement in principle* the
Sultan having accepted uti possidetis as quid ore quo for
Austrian evacuation and demolition of forts and territory
adjacent to lands and fortifications held by his troops.
Other than serving as an excuse whereby the Ottoman mission
could claim something in return for the Sultan's losses to
95
Austria, there is another facet to this concession. The
tacit recognition accorded by the Kaiser's plenipotentiaries
at Karlowitz, to this interpretation of the agreement in
prinoiple, had perhaps more repercussions in the Ottoman
negotiations with Austria's allies, than even with Austria
itself.
Although this special Ottoman interpretation was
contrary to the agreement in prinoiple, which stipulated
that in the application of the provisions for evacuation
and demolition equity should be observed, the Ottoman
mission had forced its recognition by Austria, which
posed as the leading power of the Holy League, and the
most active member of this alliance against the Sublime
State. Thus, once peace with the Kaiser was almost
assured the negotiations over the territorial settle
ment having taken place in the first four days of the
conference and armed with the precedent set by Austrian
recognition of the Ottoman interpretation of the provisions
for demolition and evaouation, it shall be observed in the
following three sections how the Ottoman mission attempted,
though with uneven success, to put this concession to good
use. Furthermore, it shall be observed how Rami Mehmed
Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander, when negotiating with
the Kaiser's unequal allies minor states which were
militarily inferior to the Sultan's power tried to press
96
the proposed articles of January, 1698, to their fullest
extent to favour the Sultan*
Negotiations with the Polish Mission*- Negotiations with
Count Malaohowski, the plenipotentiary of the Polish Kingdom-
Eepublic, centered around three major problems? fort Kamanige
(Kamenets-Podolsk), Bogdan (Moldavia) and the Tatars of Crimea*
Although the first two discussions consisted of the usual
ceremonial declarations of good will and pleasant hopes of
quick and easy resumption of the "old friendship" which used

67
to exist between the two states, the first sitting bogged
down again over the interpretation of the agreement in

68
principle* Count Malaohowski, the Ottoman mission
claimed, had from the very outset of the negotiations
portrayed ignorance of the content of the preliminary
agreements. The Count had argued from the very beginning
that, whereas King August II had not even signed the document
which bore Austrian adhsrance to the preliminary agreements,
he had been sent to represent Poland*s interests at the con-
However, he asserted that irrespective of what the
outcome of the negotiations might be, the Kingdom-Republio
would not give up its demand for Ottoman evacuation of fort
Kamenets-Podolsk, for this item had the nighest priority in
the opinion of the Polish King.^^
Before presenting the Ottoman counter-claims, the
97
Sultan's mission insisted that inasmuch as the Kaiser, who
was August II* s chief ally, had, early in the exchange of
views over the preliminaries requested the inclusion of
Poland as party to the negotiations, it was hound to par
ticipate on the same basis as the Kaiser Then turning
to Polish claims to the strategic fort which was then in
Ottoman hands, the Sultan's spokesman countered, though
contrary to the proposed articles of January, by claiming
the Podoilan fort with its districts and dependencies in
accordance with the prinoiple of uti possidetis* 70 In
order not to jeopardize its claims in Bogdan, the Ottoman
mission felt hound to make a counter-move which would
serve as a bargaining point for concessions* This claim
to Kamenets-Podolsk was immediately followed by a request
for the complete evacuation of Polish-held territory in
the principality.
Withholding comment, until a later occasion, on Polish
adherance to the agreement in principle, Malachowski resumed
his argument on Kamenets-Podolsk, and proceeded to advance
several reasons for Polish claims to the fort. The argu
ment centered around the claim that most of the distriots
surrounding the fort, including several large and heavily
fortified locations, were in Polish hands. Similarly, in
Moldavia, he felt that Polish possession of suoh forts as
Reymaz and Sugeava, Roman and Campulungu forts which had
98
survived several Ottoman assaults entitled the Kingdom-
Republic to full possession of the principality in con-

71
formlty with the prinoiple of uti -possidetis. With
such olaims, Poland felt entitled not only to full pos
session of Podolia and parts of the Urkaine, but also to
full control of the Rumanian principality. It was on
this basis that Malaohowski would negotiate. Should
this prove impossible to accept as a basis for negotiations,
he warned, there would be no possibility of achieving a
peace settlement with his sovereign. Furthermore, he
tried to remind the Ottoman mission of the fact that in
the field of battle Poland had rendered valuable services
to her allies, especially Austria. Therefore, he argued,
the Kaiser would not reach a final settlement with the Sul
tan until and unless an accord had been reached with King
August II.
Once the initial olaims were laid down, first the Otto
man spokesman, than Malachcwski, in an attempt at bolstering
the righto of the state each, was representing, gave in greater
detail his reasons for the olaims made. Poland's position
on Moldavia whioh rested on the right of conquest, was dis
puted by the Ottoman spokesman on the ground that the prin
cipality was if anything an Ottoman province, whose govern
ment sat at the pleasure and bidding of the S u l t a n . T h e
voyvoda, it was explained, was appointed by and responsible
99
directly to the Ottoman. Covert for the conduct of affairs of
the territory-thus tribute was collected and ordered when
requested by Istanbul* Besides this legal claim, it was
pointed out to Malaohowski that the Polish holdings in Mol
davia were very unimportant fortified positions, which, had
the Sultan wished, would have been easily wrested from
Polish hands* In faot, most of the forts which Poland
held in the principality were in the north, giving the
Kingdom-Republio a strong hold over the northern regions
only* Thus the Ottoman spokesman argued that inasmuch
as the capital and the greater part of the principality
were in Ottoman hands, the Rumanian principality should
remain under the suzerainty of the Sultan* As for Kamenets-
Podolsk, Malaohowski was reminded that King Sobieski himself
with thousands of Polish and allied troops had several times

73
failed to capture it. Hence, again, by the principle
of uti possidetis, the fort and its environs should be
retained by the Sublime State.
By making this last claifi, the Ottomans were persisting
in their violation of the proposed articles of January.
However, since the Polish envoy had from the start indicated
unwillingness to treat on the basis of the agreement in prin
oiple and the proposed artioles, the Ottoman mission could
not have felt bound to respect its own preliminary commit
ments. In order to break the deadlook, it was indicated
100
to the Polish Count that persistence in the type of negoti
ations he had "been conducting would not lead to a successful
settlement. He was then reminded of the fact that from
the very "beginning of the negotiations he had consistently
ignored and acted contrary to both the preliminaries and
the agreement in principle, especially by trying to settle
the Kamenets-Podolsk problem without showing any willingness
to have Moldavia evacuated.
In response to the Ottoman arguments, Malaohowski finally
offered the evacuation of some areas of Polish-held territory
in Moldavia, in return for the Ottoman evacuation and abandon-

74
raent of fort Kamenets-Podolsk. ^ However, he attached a
condition to this offer of compromises he requested the dis
posal of the article concerning the Podolian fort, before
proceeding to the settlement of the disputed territory in
the principality. In his anxiety to obtain satisfaction
over the Podolian fort article, Malaohowski had not indicated
any willingness to negotiate the full abandonment by Poland
of its territory in Moldavia. Thus the Ottoman delegation
had no ohoioe but to regard the Polish envoy*s most recent

75
proposal as an empty concession. J Its stand was reiterated
by the Ottoman spokesman, who went as far as to olalm that
the disposal of Kamenets-Podolsk lay not in the hands of the
mission, but with the Sultan alone. By denying the Ottoman
mission*s ability to dispose of the Kamenets-Podolsk article,
101
the Sultans envoys hoped to stray the Polish plenipotentiary
to concede on the Moldavia article.
Faced with this new twist in the Ottoman argument,
Malaohowski tried a different tactic. In order to holster
Polish rights to Moldavia, ho belittled the importance of
the Podolian fort, reasoning that whereas the latter was nothing
hut a heap of rock, Polish holdings in the Rumanian principality

76
"brought an annual tribute to the Polish treasury. Since
Poland had just renewed and strengthened the fortifications
of its holdings there, at the same time maintaining large
garrisons of some thousand troops in each, the Polish envoy
found it difficult to consider the exchange of the fort for
the northern regions of Moldavia as a fair bargain. Mala-
ohcwski then turned to the agreement in prinoiple and tried
to show that he was negotiating in accordance with it, insist
ing at the same time that even the Austrisns had negotiated
with the Ottomans on the very same basis.
According to the Ottomans, Malaohowski continued to
demonstrate a complete misunderstanding of the agreement in
prinoiple and the proposed articles. In the only exchange
which the Ottoman Court had allowed, the proposed article
pertaining to Poland stipulated its oomplete evacuation of
Moldavia, in return for the Sultan's abandonment of fort
Kamenets-Podolsk. When the Kaiser signified his approval
102
of the proposed articles "before the dispatch of the peace
missions to Earlegits, he had not challenged the Ottoman

77
requests for the evacuation of the principality, '
Since Count Malaohowski was violating the "basis of agree
ment for the negotiations* the Ottoman mission felt com
pelled to produce "both the articles of January, 1698, and
the Kaiser's consent. In its report to the Grand Vezir
concerning the Moldavia problem, the Ottoman mission described
the scene at which the documents were reintroduced and re
read, When it became quite clear that the Polish envoy
had, until that moment, been treating contrary to the pre
liminary agreements, the Ottoman mission, in order not to
further embarrass Count Malaohowski, moved to adjourn the
meeting, hinting that perhaps it was not fated for the two
missions to reach an aocord on that day.
At the next to the last conference, the Polish pleni
potentiary chose to set aside the territorial settlement,
and turned to discuss the problem of the Crimean Tatars and

78
Polish tribute,' In the past, the Poles had paid the
Tatars for mercenary services against their enemies. At
such oooasions, the sum which was paid was determined at
each occasion separately. However, the practice had
changed in character, when the Ottoman State, either not
oaring to control or incapable of controlling the Tatars,
had led to instituting this practice in the form of an
103
annual tribute as a form of bribe to oontrol their raids
into Polish territory. At this conference, however, the
Kingdom-Republio's plenipotentiary indicated that inasmuch
as the Polish State was both sovereign and independent, a
resumption of payment of the Tatar tribute would detract
from the sovereignty of the state he represented. He
tried to persuade the Ottoman mission to agree to discontinue

the practice.*^
The Ottoman mission, perhaps slightly annoyed at
Malaohowski *s attempt at diverting the negotiations from
the territorial settlement, expressed the Sultan*s polioy
with regard to the Tatar tribute. In the past, its
spokesman stated, Poland had paid the Han of Crimea a
certain amount of money as a gesture of good will. Since
the practioe had been entirely successful in its aim, the
Ottoman mission found it difficult to understand why the
Poles desired to discontinue it. Malaohowski was assured,
however, that the Ottoman Court would do its utmost to con
trol the Tatars and contain them within their boundaries,
but since the tribute was a problem which concerned the
Poles and the Qan direotly, it was suggested that any nego
tiations on this particular item be left to the representa-

8Q
tives of the parties concerned* By such a proposal,
the Ottoman mission had hoped to render unnecessary any
further delay of the negotiations over the territorial
104
settlement. Hence, as a positive gesture, the Ottoman
spokesman suggested the conclusion of an article on the
Tatars, expressing the willingness of the Sublime State
to control and contain them.
Count Malaohowski, not quite satisfied with this
Ottoman move, intimated that whereas peace with the Sublime
State would be quite feasible, and probably assured, an
accommodation with the Tatars could not be reached. He
then pointed out that should the Sultan find it difficult
to maintain the Tatars within his oontrol, he should with
draw his protection and eventually evict them from the

An
Sublime State9s Crimean territories In concluding
his remarks, the Polish envoy warned that unless the Tatar
plague was remedied, and the demand for tribute dropped,
it was not very likely that a peace settlement between the
Ottomans and Poland would be reached.
Discussion of the Tatar problem lasted several hours.
Finally, the mediating ambassadors, tired of the endless
and fruitless arguments, suggested postponing the settle
ment of the Tatar problem until other articles were settled
and drawn up. Although Malaohowski hesitated to aooept
this proposal, he agreed to have the conference adjourned
for that evening.
105
At the last conference the Polish envoy, putting aside
the Tatar question, finally consented to the Polish abandon
ment of Moldavia, in return for re-possession of the Podolian

82
fort. Although the Tatar tribute was not dealt with in
a separate article, despite Malaohowski*s assurances that any
future demands for it would be simply ignored, an article was
incorporated professing the Sublime Statefs readiness to halt

8.1
all Tatar violations of the Polish frontier.)
At the beginning of the negotiations, the Polish ambassa
dor had tried, by avoiding any commitment with regard to the
Polish evacuation of northern Moldavia, to obtain Ottoman
consent for the evacuation and abandonment of fort Eamenets-
Podolsk. By such tactics, he hoped to obtain Ottoman

84
recognition of Polish holdings in the principality. In
order not to be out-witted, the Ottoman mission, after
reminding Malaohowski of the proposed articles of January,
I698, which required the evacuation of Moldavia in return
for the Podolian fort, changed its tactics, and insisted
on Polish evacuation of both the principality and the
Podolian regions surrounding Kamenets-Podolsk, Although
this shift in Ottoman tactios was contrary to the explicit
statements of the proposed articles, it had a propitious
effect for the Ottoman side. Once the Ottoman olaim for
the Podolian regions was asserted, it was not too diffioult
to effect a bargain with Count Malaohowski. As a Counter
106
proposal; he had indicated the readiness of the Kingdom-
Republia to evacuate some parts of Polish-held territory
in the Rumanian principality, in return for Ottoman con
cession on the fort. However, by attaching the condition
that the article for Kamenets-Podolsk would have to he
drawn up first, Malaohowski, was in effeot, negating his
oonoession
The Ottoman delegation, undeterred by the Counts
threat of jeopardizing the whole conduct of the peace
settlement Austria would not, he indicated, make a uni
lateral peaoe- refused to consider the suggestions of the
Polish envoy, and would not budge from a complete evacuation
of Moldavia by the Kingdom-Hepublic. At the same time,
it was hinted that the disposal of the Kamenets-Podolsk
article lay in the hands of the Sultan. Although the
Tatar tribute was interposed by the Pole in the midst of
the discussions over the territorial settlement, the Otto
man mission did finally suoceed in obtaining a complete
evacuation of the principality, in return for Polish
acquisition of the main fort in Podolia.
Negotiations with the Hussian Mission.- As in the pre
ceding negotiations with the envoys of Austria and Poland,
in the first meeting, the Musoovite ambassador Vozhnitsin
and the Ottoman spokesman exchanged greetings and declarations
107
of good intentions for a rapid and successful settlement of

85
the outstanding problems between the Czar and the Sultan.
However, when he was asked to present his olaims, Vozhnitsin
indicated his preference to present them orally, and only

86
after the Ottoman envoys had submitted their own demands.
The Sultan*s plenipotentiaries, apparently peroeiving
their problems much more olearly than on similar occasions
in the past, prefaced their remarks with the accusation that
the Muscovite State had twice broken the peace, which was
considered especially painful sinoe the Sultan was involved

87
in a clash with the Kaiser. They saw, however, two
alternatives open for proceeding in their negotiations with
the Czars ambassador, one of which would lead to a perma
nent settlement, the other to a temporary one. Should
the Czar desire a lasting and permanent peace, and should
he desire a renewal of the friendship which had prevailed
before these wars between the Czar's predecessors and the
Sublime State, and if he had inherited the good sense of

88
these predecessors, then he would evacuate the fort of Azov
and relinquish all the territory which had fallen.to his
troops, unjustly, during the reoent campaigns. However,
should he indicate a desire for a temporary truce and the
oessatitm of hostilities? then the boundary between the two
states should start from fort Azov, which would remain in
Muscovite hands, and the forts of Togan, Gazlkerman,
108
NRsretkerman and EXlbXrun would be evacuated. Under these
oiroumatances the old frontier in the Oohakov would then pre
vail.
After assuring Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade
Alexander of the fact that the Czar had no quarrel with the
Sultan, Vozhnitsin launched an attack on the Tatars, who

89
were, to Moscow, the chief point of contention. ' Despite
several assurances by the Sublime State in peace treaties,
end Russian complaints to the Ottoman Court against them,
he stated that the razzias and raids of the Tatars into
Muscovite territory had not been halted. Inasmuch as
Istanbul had not taken adequate measures to arrest the
forays of enslavement and destruction against Muscovite
subjects and lands, the Czar had found it necessary to take
action himself, and devise effective means by which to halt
these pernicious raids into his domains. Thus Azov and
Togan were oaptured, and an expedition allegedly consisting
of several hundred thousand troops and over a hundred naval
units was mounted for a direct attack on the Crimer,, the
very source of this Tatar plague. For although the Czar
was not at war with the Sultan, he was, at that very moment,
at war with the Tatars. However, should the Sultan
surrender the fort of Kerch, there would be no necessity
for this expedition, since Muscovite troops stationed at
this fort would ourb the movements of the hitherto uncontrolled
109
Tatars* Once Kerch was handed over to the Czar, a peaceful
settlement with hoth Sultan and Han would be possible* How
ever, should the Ottoman mission he incapable of negotiating
on the basis of the surrender of Kerch, then a truce of two to
three years' duration would have to be signed, pending future
discussions* .This would provide a respite within which the
several points of contention between the two states could be
settled* Voahnitsins request for the truce was based upon
the fact that due to lack of time the large number of problems
under consideration could not be completely covered at Karlo-
witz*^ Here, the Czar's envoy indicated that for other
than the proposals which he submitted, he had no further
authorization*^ Should it be impossible to negotiate
on either basis, war would have to be resumed*
The Ottoman mission had prepared to deliver several
comments on the proposals of the Muscovite envoy* Its
spokesman felt compelled to give Vozhnitsin a lesson in
Ottoman realities concerning the relations of the Tatars
to the Sultan* It was explained that the Tatars were
subjects of the.Sultan, and therefore had no sovereignty
over any parts of the territories of the Sublime State*
Thus the forts and lands which constituted the Crimea and
its dependencies were under the direct control and dis
cretion of the Sublime State* Hence, it was reasoned,
all complaints against the Tatars should be addressed to
110
the Sultan. The situation "being thus, the Ottoman mission
could not understand the connection "between the Muscovite
demand for Kerch and the Tatars, especially since the fort
was maintained and garrisoned "by the Sultan's troops.
The same situation applied to several districts beyond
Kerch, like the Hogay, Qerkes. Abaza and Georgian-inhabited
regions. Hone of those peoples was independent, nor had
any one of them any sovereignty over the lands which it
inhabited, for the lands were all directly under the suze
rainty of the Sultan. Since there was no connection
between the Tatars and the ultimate possession of Kerch,
the contentions of the Muscovite envoy were felt tp be
unfounded. The Ottoman mission indioated that the con
gress was not held to discuss such basics as the relation
ship of the Tatar-inhabited lands to the Sultan.
The Ottoman understanding of how the peace settlement
was to be achieved was then communicated to the Czar's
representative. It was said that an agreement in prin
ciple had been reached by the powers of the Holy League,
which included the Muscovite State. It was agreed that
uti -possidetis would be the basis for the negotiations and
land settlement; however, special provisions were appended
to this basis, allowing, as an accommodation to the Sultan,
the evacuation and demolition of territory and forts.
Since the Czar was a party to the war with the Holy League
Ill
powers 9 it was understood that the peace settlenient with
him would he conducted on the same "basis as with the others.
The congress had "been called and was "being held to negotiate
on the "basis of the forementioned agreement in principle.
When the first alternative was applied to the land settle
ment with the Czar* the Ottomans would leave Azov in
Muscovite hands, hut Togan and the other forts on the
Dnieper, which were recently "built, would have to he

9?
evacuated hy the Muscovites. These forts, while in
Muscovite hands, dominated the route between the Sublime
State and the Crimea, and hence blocked free access
between the Sultan and one of his dependencies. With
the evaouation of these forts by the Czar and a return to
the old boundary between the two states it would then be
possible to reach an accommodation. The alternatives
being as simple as that, the Ottomans could not understand
why the negotiations should necessitate several years of
discussion, especially since the outstanding problems
between the Sultan and the Czar were not as numerous as
the letters envoy contended. Once the land settlement
was reaohed, it would then be quite possible for the Han
and the Czar to discuss the remaining outstanding points
of contention.
Although the Ottoman mission had allowed the second
of its two initial alternatives to be the basis for peace
112
rather t*1m only for a truce, the Czar's envoy returned to
his tirade against the Tatars.^ This time, however, he
intimated that the Czar, having neither seen the proposed
articles of January, nor signed the allied adheranoe to
them, did not feel hound to treat on the "basis of the agree-
04
ment in principle as embodied in these documents. Should
the Ottomans indicate their incapacity to hand over Kerch
at that moment, the war with the Tatars would have to he
continued. Furthermore, since he had no instructions or
authority to comply with the Ottoman demands for evacuation
of the forts on the lower Dnieper, he could not satisfy the
Ottoman requests.
Both the Ottoman envoys and the mediating ambassadors
were puzzled by Vozhnitsin's persistence in upholding his
initial stand. Although they had noticed that he would
treat on the basis of uti -possidetis he would not allow
for the provisions of evacuation and demolition. When
the Ottoman mission began to realize that the Muscovite
envoy was adopting delay taotics similar to those used by
the Polish, and later on by the Venetian envoy, they sus
pected that a stalemate had occurred, and took a different
approach. It was indioated to Vozhnitsin that the Kaiser,
the head and leading power of the Holy League, had agreed to
treat, ^ and indeed had upheld the agreement in prinoiple
during the negotiations. Thus several forts which were
113
held by Austrian forces were to be evacuated, and others
were to be demolished. He was then advised that should
the Czar follow suit, and agree to Ottoman demands for the
evacuation of Togan and the other forts, and on a return to
the old frontier in the vicinity of Oohakov, peace would
then be quite practicable. However, should he feel that
it would be impossible to comply with the Ottoman demands,
a truce should then be signed until it was deemed possible
tc reach an agreement at some future date?
The Csar's envoy took several days to prepare an answer

96
to the Ottoman proposals.7 When his response finally
came it was in favour of a two-year truoe which would commence
on December 15, 1698 . ^
Negotiations with the Venetian Mission. Venice suffered
the most from the special Ottoman interpretation of the agree
ment in prinoiple. The entire first set of sessions between
the Ottoman and Venetian representatives was spent in an
attempt to reach an accord over the meaning of the basic

98
agreement.7 Again, Rami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade
Alexander took the acquiescence of Austria to their inter
pretation of the agreement as a precedent in their negotiations
with Ruzzini, the Venetian envoy. Ruzzini had from the very
beginning indicated his lack of authority to treat on any basis
other than a striot adheranoe to the prinoiple of utl possidetis.
114
which in terms of territory, would have included several,
islands, complete possession of the Morea, and the terri
tory which the republic held in the eastern Balkans.
In Dalmatia and the area north-west of the Morea, the
Venetians claimed possession of the free state of Bagusa
and the lands surrounding the Gulf of Corinth.
The Venetian envoy was reminded of the fact that when
England and Holland sought to effect mediation on the basis
of uti -possidetis, the Sultan had not even bothered to
answer, consenting to accept their overtures for peace only
after the allies had allowed for the provisions of evacuation

QQ
and demolition." He was then told bluntly that Venice
should have voiced its dissent from the majority opinion,
when the basis for agreement was being reconsidered, but
definitely not at the negotiation table. Then the Otto
man envoys became specific* if Venice were to retain the
Morea, the northern shores of the Gulf of Corinth would
have to be evacuated, the forts of Lepanto and Prevesa
demolished, and their sites a b a n d o n e d . O n l y on this
basis would the Ottomans agree to a settlement of the
southern regional the Morea according to a striot inter
pretation of uti possidetis would go to Venice, and the
area to be evaouated and handed over to the Ottomans would
be allowed for by the provisions.
115
Ruzzini tried to reason with the Ottoman mission,
indicating that Loth Lepanto and the northern shores of
the Gulf of Corinth were not only important strategically
for the defence of the peninsula, hut also financially for

101
the treasury of the republic. He claimed that Venice
had heen collecting tribute from fourteen districts in
that area, implying that their loss would pose a financial
hardship to the Venetian republic. Furthermore, Ruzzini
indicated that he had to follow the directives issued by
the Senate, which stipulated that the negotiations were to
prooeed on the basis of uti possidetis without changes or
modifications. Even had the Senate authorized him to
aot otherwise, and consented to the evacuation clause, it
would be expected that mutual benefit should be derived
from the final settlement.
In response to these claims, the Ottoman mission
insisted on the evacuation of Lepanto (modem Navapaktos)
and Prevesa. The requirements of frontier security and
free access routes would necessitate Ottoman retention of

102
both forts. Once this was achieved, then it would
be possible for merchants and subjects of both states to
cross back and forth in complete safety. If no agree
ment could be reached on the evacuation of these forts,
especially Lepanto, then as far as the Ottoman were con
cerned, further negotiations would be futile. At this
116
juncture, Ruzzini was reminded that most of the territory
which Venice had acquired, had been taken without fighting,
during Ottoman preoccupation with campaigns on the Austrian
front He was then told that the negotiations with
Austria had progressed to the point where only the signature
of "both parties on the completed list of articles was lacking.10^
By adopting this type of argument, the Ottoman mission
was in effeet threatening Ruzzinis first he was reminded
of the fact that had the Sultan not teen preoccupied else
where, Venice would not have Been able to acquire the terri
tory it did in Greece and Dalmatia* By introducing the subject
of the Ottoman settlement with Austria (the principal of the
Holy League, which did most of the actual fighting, and had
allowed for the Ottoman interpretation of the agreement in prin
oiple), the Sultan's envoys hoped to indicate to Ruzzini that
Venice would be virtually isolated, should it be incapable of
reaching a settlement with the Sublime State.
-fhe Venetian envoy, however, protested that Austria would
not make peace without its allies, and especially without the
105
republic. ^ At this point, the Ottoman mission reminded
the Venetian envoy of the faot that the Ottoman State had
large reserves of both men and money with which to resume
extended campaigns against the four members of the League.10^
He was then told that the Sultan had consented to explore the
117
possibilities of peace, only after he had "been begged by
the mediators on behalf of the Holy League and humanity.
Euzzini was reinformed of the smooth conduct of the negoti
ations with the Kaiser's plenipotentiaries, and of Austria's
consent to give the Sultan some satisfaction by allowing
for the clearance of some of its domains, thereby obtaining
the Ottoman State's favour for the beneficial affair of
p6&0@
Thus, when Euzzini was threatened again, he turned to
delay tactics, in order to have time to obtain fresh
instructions from the Senate. He pointed out to the Otto
man mission the fact that north of the Isthmus of Corinth

107
there were mountains whioh he olaimed were in Venetian hands. 1
These mountains, Euzzini suggested, should serve as the line
differentiating the Ottoman from the Venetian territoryo
Once the frontier of the Morea was established, he would
then oonsent to turn to the study of the Boonia-Dalmatia
boundary, leaving the points of contention in the northern
regions of the Gulf of Corinth until later when he would
have already consulted the Senate on the Ottoman demands
there.
Although the mediators supported the Venetian envoy's
requests, the Ottoman response was negative. On this note
the second set of sessions with the Venetian envoy came to
118
an and* When the two minions mat for the next set of
sessions , and the Venetian ambassador neither advanced any
new proposals nor indicated any change in his attitude, the
Austrian delegation, became impatient with both sides over
the delay in concluding peace. The Ottoman envoys were
reminded that the Kaiser, as a member of the Holy league,
could not make a unilateral peace, should a settlement with

108
Venice be impossible to reach*" Here, the Ottoman envoys
protested that they had come to the negotiations with good
intentions to reach a peace settlement; however, they com
plained of the Venetian envoy's delay tactics, without once: giving
any indication as to whether or not he would ever, agree to
treat on the same basis as Austria had done. After all,
the Austrian delegation was reminded, negotiations with the
Kaiser^ Poland and even Moscow had successfully been accom
plished. In order to show their good faith, Rami Mehmed
Sfendi and Iskerletzade Alexander invited the Kaiser's
representatives to attend the sessions with the Venetian

109
envoy to observe for themselves Ruzzini's conduct*
Despite the presence of the Austrian plenipotentiaries,
the Republic's ambassador remained obdurate, pressing the
very same demands he had presented at the beginning of the
first negotiation with the Ottomans* When enough time
had been wasted, and Ottoman patience had been exhausted,
the Sultan's representatives gave the Venetian negotiator
119
110
an ultimatum* He was told that final proposals should
he advanced by Venice without delay. When Ruzzini answered
by returning to the question of the mountains, the Sublime
State9s envoys reminded him, curtly, that in the first place
these mountains were not in Venetian hands no Venetian
troops were anywhere in possession of the mountains and
hence according to uti possidetis Venice could not make
any olaims to them. 111 Furthermore, it was indicated to
him that those very same mountains north of the Isthmus
were districts and dependencies of Athens, and not the
Morea, hence they should stay within Ottoman jurisdiction.
Ruzzini pointed out that the Ottomans were, after all,
requesting the evacuation of the northern shores of the Gulf
of Corinth, and not to agree to his proposal on the mountains,
which were indispensable for the defence of the peninsula,
was unreasonable and inequitable. Since the Ottomans had
not allowed in their proposed artioles of January, 1698 , for
the exchange of territory with Venice, as they did with

_ 112
reland, the Sublime State's negotiators would not change
their stand: evacuation of the northern districts of the
Gulf of Corinth, and delimitation of the Morea's frontier
to the Isthmus, a proposal which eventually won the favour
of the Austrian envoys.
In its report to the Grand Vezir on the progress of the
120
negotiations with the Venetian envoy, the Ottoman mission
complained of the obduracy of Ruzzini. On the one hand
he would suggest an exchange of the mountains, without
indicating any willingness to have fort Lepanto demolished
and evacuated, and on the other he would raise several
objections to Venetian abandonment of that fort on both
military and historical grounds..
When the talks were resumed, after the adjournment of
the last conference, Ruzzini, without advance notice, shifted
to a discussion of the islands. Prefacing his question
with a long harangue on Venetian rights to these islands,
Ruzzini wanted to know what the Ottoman demands were,
especially since the tribute which the republio oolleoted
there was insignificant having been estimated at one hundred
thousand guru?. Thus, before the Ottomans had a chance
to reply, Ruzzini suggested that uti possidetis should apply
there, leaving the islands held by Venetian troops, in the
republic's hands.
It was at this moment that the Sultan's envoys, losing
patience with Ruzzini, turned to the Austrian observers and
indicated that the representatives of the Sublime State had
no longer any faith in the good intentions of the Venetian
e n v o y . T h e Kaiser's envoys were told that perhaps what
Venice was aiming at, by such tactios, was the halting of
121
-the negotiations, and the reinvolvemant of the Kaiser and
the Sultan in another war. In order to report the situ
ation to the Sultan, the Sublime State's plenipotentiaries
required an answer through the Austrian observers concerning
the next steps to he taken.
After talking to the mediators and the Venetian
ambassador, the Austrian observers approached the Sultan's
representatives and assured them of the fact that the peace

' 114
settlement with the Kaiser was definite. However, the
Venetian envoy was excused because, not having authorization

+ IN AM A Mt r ANA A+ UAM + U nW A 11+ J A+
(A MWI
iv vv w w vw w wmw* wucu* umv xu
ciple, Euzzini could not at that time give any definite and
satisfying answers to the Ottoman proposals. The Sultan's
envoys were assured that sons kind of accommodation would
be reached with the Venetian republic at Karlowitz. In
order to give Ruzzini enough time to receive further instruc
tions from the Senate, the Austrians requested a five-day
period for the final answer from the Venetian envoy.
Although the five days were allowed, no new instructions
arrived from Venice. Meanwhile, the English and Dutch
mediators had joined the Ottoman camp and had tried to per
suade Bami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander not to
insist tm their demands for the demolition and evacuation
of Lepanto. For the first time the Sultan's envoys revealed
122
quite bluntly, their demands in a comprehensive lists the
northern shores of the Gulf of Corinth, demolition of the
forts of Lepanto and Prevesa, and all the islands which
Venice had captured sinoe 1684 *
On January 4, 1699; a conference was held in the presence

of the Austrian observers, at which the Venetian envoy agreed
to desist from demanding the mountains as the boundary of the
Morea* Cnoe this was achieved, .and with continued Austrian
pressure, Ruzzini conceded Venetian evacuation of Lepanto,
hut with the stipulation that its fortifications, once demolished,
should never he rebuilt. Although the Ottomans were not to
achieve complete satisfaction in their demand for Venetian
abandonment of the islands held since the commencement of the
war, their access to Ragusa was assured, 115 through the
cession by Venice of territory surrounding the free state.
Most of the articles pertaining to land settlement with
Venice, were prepared almost exclusively without the partici
pation of Ruzzini, who had not received any new authority.
Beth the Austrian and Polish delegations took the full
responsibility and the initiative for drawing them. Sinoe
the subscription of the Senate was needed for this tentative
agreement to become valid, the envoys of the Kaiser suggested
that a fortnight be allowed for its a r r i v a l . I t was then
decided that should the authority for the subscription not crane
123
in time, the envoys of the Kaiser and the Polish Kingdoa-
Espublic would sign their agreements end the tentative agree
ment between Venice and the Sublime State would be subscribed
to at a later date.
Sinoe the authority from Venice did not arrive within
the period allowed by the Kaiser5a envoys, the Austrian and
Polish treaties were signed on January 26, 1699- Since
the Muscovite envoy had signed the truce with the Ottoman
mission four days earlier, the envoys of the five delegations

departed from Karlowitz, 117 without Senate approval of the
OttomanVenetian treaty. 1X8
With Venice, unlike the others, and with the exception
of Mosoow, the Ottoman negotiators had been able to apply
fully the special interpretation of the agreement in prin
oiple to the advantage of the Sultan. Venice had to abandon
Lepanto and the northern shores of the Gulf of Corinth.
Furthermore, Ruzzini*s claims for the mountains north of the
Isthmus of Corinth were dropped, and the land route between
the Sublime State and Ragusa was reopened.
Several factors were involved in making Venioe acquiesce
to the virtual dictation of terms by the Ottomans. First
and foremost, was the anxiety of the Kaiser, Venice's chief
ally in the struggle with the Sultan, to bring to a suooessful
end the negotiations with the Sublime State. The Kaiser,
124
committed not to sign a treaty with, the Ottoman Court, unless
all his allies had reached some form of accommodation, was
forced to press Venioe to reach an aoocrd with the Sultan1s
envoys. Thus, at one point, the Kaisers envoys were
ready to rescind the Austrian cesssitment on unilateral peace,
should the Venetians fail to reach a settlement with the
Ottomans. The very fact that the Venetian envoy had,

though with diffidence, left to others the responsibility
of drawing the Venetian articles, points out the weakness
of the republic in face of Sultan and Kaiser, the one dic
tating, the other supporting and helping in the formation
of articles which complied with the dictation.
The Ottoman mission had played on the anxiety of the
Kaiser to conclude a settlement, as well as on Venice's
growing weakness in the face of the Sultans power. The
Venetian envoy had made the fatal mistake of believing that
should he hold out long enough, the Ottomans would concede
to his proposals. Euzzini, in great bitterness, even
accused Austria and Poland of having been too hasty and
anxious to conclude a settlement with the Sultan.
125
1. Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 50^-51a and 53^-54a.
2. B.H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire

(Oxford, 1949), 19-20.
3. Michajal Fopovig, Per Friede von Karlowitz (Leipzig,
1893), 41ff.
4* Bami Mehmed, Karl of9a, 52a. The Ottomans were under
the impression that Kinaky was ill.
5. Michajal B. Popovig, Per Friede von Karlowita (Leipzig,
1893), 43-46.
6 . Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 3?a
7- Ibid., 38*.
8 . Ibid.. 38b-39a.
9. Ibid.
10. Maliye defteri, 7744, 6 a-D, and 11^, where it is stated
that Bami Mehmed Efendi had eight cavuslsr in his retinue end
Iskerletzade Alexander only two. Paget and Collier rated three
9 avu9 lar and eight torchbearers. Forty Usthagik vessels and
fifteen fayka were used for the transport of provisions. (Ustuagiks
were special vessels for transport on the Danube, carrying one
helmsman and eight oarsmen, whereas the ?ayka was a kind of sea
going boat which was in general use on the Black Sea). The
following table of amounts of provisions assigned to the Ottoman
plenipotentiaries and the mediators is selected from Maliye
defteri, 7744, 6 a** and from a loose document in the Ibnulemin
tasnifl, Harioiye Bo. 379 at the Ba^bakanlik Arîvi in Istanbul*
Provisions for the period June 22, 1698 to February 2 5 , 16 9 9 *
Flour K. Loaves-Bread Sugar 0. Eggs Bice K
Bami Mehmed 106.5 14,450 639 5,490 639
Iskerletzade 314.5 1 3 ,1 2 0 43.5 9,300 648
Paget 124 2,844 456 9,400 648
Collier 124 2 ,8 4 6 356 9,400 648
Coffee 0. Hens
Band Mehmed 1,065 3 ,6 6 0
Iskerletzade 298 1 ,8 6 0
Paget 456 1 ,8 8 0
Collier 456 1 ,8 8 0
Prices- which prevailed in 1698 *
126
Floor per keyl (about 35 lbs) 10 akge

Bread per loaf 2 **
Sugar per okka (about 2.82 lbs) 320 M
Eggs per egg 2 "
Bice per keyl 320 "
Coffee per okka from 184 to 240 n
Hens per ben from 24 to 36 M
11. Bami Mehmed, Earlofga, 38 .
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.. 59b.
14 For a text of the order (hukm) sees ibid. 6Qa, dated

October 17-27, I698 .
15 . Ibid.. 59 b.
16 Ibid.. 62a-63ao
17c Ibid.s 62 s.
T - ..I J
XU X U X U e 9 OJ 9
19. Ibid.. 62a.
20. Ibid.. 66*.
21. Ibid.. 68 ^-6 9a.

u v
22. Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 64 65 , for a detailed list of

the ground rules.
23. Ibid., 66 a.
24. Ibid.. 66 a_1).
25* For a summary of the Ottoman proposed articles, see abovei 12.
26. Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 69 **

h o __
27 Ibid.. 70 -71 , and von Hammer, G.O.B.. VI, 662.
28. Ibid.. which corroborates Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 71b.
2 9 . For text, sees ibid., 72b-73a.
30. Ibid., 73b , and von Hammer, G.O.B.. VI, 663 .
127
31. Bami Mehmed; Karlofga, 73^.
32. Ibid., 75 s.
fl Ti
33. Ibid., 75 C* Ruzzini, the Venetian envoy at
Earlowitz, remarked the Ottoman suspioiona of oonmittlng their
demands on paper in "Relatione del Congresso di Carloviz e
dell* Ambasciata di Vienna di Sr. Carlo Ruzini Cavr. Fontes
Rerum Austrlaoartmu XXVII, 353. W.B. Munson states that
"They (the Turks) refused to discuss the question (of regulation
of the frontier) save in conference, quoted from authors
"Peace of Karlowitz" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Illinois, Urbasa, 1940), 172 (hereafter cited as Munson,
"Peace."
34. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 76a-77b.
35 Pbid., 78s.
36. Ibid., 78 b.
37> Although the Ottoman mission was well aware of the Austrian
stand on an equitable settlement of the evacuation and demolition
provisions5 It Is perhaps significant that this sams mission in
its special interpretation of these provisions, simply ignored the
Austrian stand.
38. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 79&
39- Ibid., 79**.

4 0 . Ibid., SGb.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 8lb-82a= Munson, "Peace," 173, asserts that

"Because of their possession of Temesvar the Turks asserted that
the whole Banate belonged to them.
43. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 83ab.
44. Ibid., 82b-83a.
45. Ibid., 83a1>.
46. Ibid.. von Haunter, G.O.R.. VI, 665 .
47* Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 84a.
4 8 . Ibid., 8 4 k> and von Hammer, G.O.R.. VI, 665 .
128
49* Band Mehmed * Karlofga, Qâ*
50. Ibid., 8513.
51. Ibid.
52. See article II of Austro-Ottoman treaty below* 174.
53. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 86a. For article I see below; 174.
54* Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 37
55. Ibid., 86s.

56. For Ottoman proposed articles see above. IS.
57* For article designating the frontier, see article belows 175.
For the Ottoman commissioner's report on the rectification of the
frontier sees Muahadat Mecrmaai (.Istanbul, 1294), 7, 217-272.
58 . See above for proposed articles on Croatia-Bosnia frontier* IS.
59* Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 87*.

60. Ibid., 87.
61. Although one item concerning the distriots of Fort

Bihac on the western banks of the Una river in the frontier
settlement in Bosnia-Croatia was not settled until 1703$ the
final rectification of the frontier in that area favoured the
Ottoman proposals. The Austrians were required to evacuate
several forts in accordance with article V , see belowj 175-176.
Thus the Ottoman frontier extended as far as the Glina and
Korana rivers. For a copy of the report of the Ottoman
frontier commissioner see MuahftAat Mecmuaal (Istanbul, 1294)?
V, 225ff.
62. Rami Mehmed Efendi, Karlofga, 1 0 Luigi Villari,

The Renublio of Ramisa. London, 1904, 321-22, states that Ragusa
was forced, in March I6 S4 , to join the Holy League. However,
by August 20 of the same year, a treaty was signed by Bagusan
and Austrian diplomats declaring the free state a protectorate
of the Kaiser. For Venetian threat to Ragusa during the
Austro-Ottoman wars (1683-1697)* see ibid.
63. The Ragusans started to pay a regular tribute of 1 ,5 0 0

ducats in 1459* and within a short time the tribute increased
to 15,000. The first documented contacts between the Ragusans
and Ottomans took place during the reign of Tildirim Beyazit,
129
and net during the rsigu of his father, as the Ottoman mission
claims. P. Babinger, E.I.. "Haguea, and Ciro Truhelka,
Dobrcvenik Amjivinde furk-Islav vosikalari," Istanbul Enstitusu
Berglsi9 I (1955), 39-65-
64 . Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 103^, see also Baîd, Tarih. II,

265-66. For the text of the rescript, see Band Mehmed,
Karlofga, 103b-104Tj-
65 . The settlement of the Ragusan issue had beneficial

ramifications for the Ottomans in their peace settlement with
Venioe. The latter had, during the war, occupied the terri
tory surrounding the free state. Austria's acceptance of
the status quo ante, with respect to Ragusa, strengthened the
Ottoman demands for direct access to the Sultan's tributary.
66. The Ottomans lost all of Transylvania and Hungary with

the exception of Timisoara and most of Croatia-Slavonia.
1.
67 . Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 94 .

dTQ tvi -a
VWf# A U A U
69 . Ibid., 95b.
70 . Ibid.. 96 a.
V a
71* Por Polish argument, see ibid., 94 -96
72. Ibid.
73* Ibid.
74. Ibid.. 97a von Hammer, in G.O.B..VI. 667, states that

out of five Polishheld oloisters in Moldavia, Malachowski
proposed to evacuate two, leaving the remaining ones in Polish
hands.
75 Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 97^-98*.

76. Ibid., 98l5.
77. Ibid.. 99s.

GO
Ibid., 1 0 5 ^

79. Ibid., 105*.

80 . Ibid.. 106ab
130
81. Ibid., 107s.
82. See articles II and III belowj also see Bami Mehmed,
Karlofga, 108.
S3. See article IV below* 178.
8 4 . Von Hammer, G.O.R.. VI, 6 6 7 . Oscar Halecki in Border

lands of Western Civilization (Hew York, 1952), 223, attributes
the failure of the Poles to obtain more territory in the princi
pality to the hostility of the native Rumanian population.
85 ? Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 99** There is no trace of

evidence in Ottoman sources of the intrigue by which Vozhnitsin
tried, through bribery, to arrange a settlement with the Ottomans,
through his co-religionist Iskerletzade Alexander. Both H. Ubers-
berger, Busslands Orientalpolltilr (Stuttgart, 19 1 3 ), I, 61, (here
after cited as ubersberger. Russlands) smfl E. Schuyler, Peter the
Great (Hew York, 1884 ), I, 355, mention this attempt.
86. Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 100a.
87 . Ibid.
88. Ibid.. 100a"k$ von Hammer, G.O.R.. VI, 666 and Ubersberger,
Russlands. I, 63 .
89 . Bami Mehmed, Karlofga, 100*-101a.
90. Ibid., 101*.
91. Vozhnitsin was initially not even provided with instructions.

B.H. Sumner, Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire (London, 1949),
20 n.l.
92. Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 102a, and Ubersberger, Russlands

I, 64.
93* Rami Mehmed, Karlofga, 102a.
94. Ibid., 102*.
95. Ibid., 109*.

96. Ibid., 110a.
97* Ubersberger, Russlands. I, 64 . A copy of the text of

the truce oan be found in Silihdar Mehmed Aga, Husretname
(Bayazit UmSmi KELtUphanesi, Ho. 3216), 2S5b-266a. The date
given for the document is 22 Rejep, 1110.
131
98. Bami Mehmed, 1 3*
99. Bami Mehmed, '

100 * Ibid.. 91a.
101 . Ibid., 91*.
102 . Ibid.
103. Ibid. 9 92a.
104 Ibid.
105. Ibid., 93s.

106. Ibid.
107. Ibid., 93*.

108 . Ibid., 111 11.
10 . Ibid.
110 . Ibid.. 113.
111 . Ibid., 114s"15
112 . Ibid.. 115s.
113. Ibid.. 115*.
114. , 116a.
115 Ibid.. 116*.

116 . Ibid.. 117*. Paget, in his report to the Secretary
of State, reports that
". . . the. the Venetian Ambassador has not subscribed

and signed his, nor seems to like them, yet they have
been so well and oarefully drawn, with the intervention,
assistance and industry of the Imperial ambassadors
that 'tie not doubted but the State of Venioe will
readily approve them, but because that Ambassador has
not orders to conclude, time is allowed for his sub
scription to this treaty so that it is act doubted
but the Peace will be general so soon as that Plenipct.
can hear from Venice.
From Wm. Paget to Bt. Honourable, dated January 16/26, 1699
Text in P.B.C., SP 97/21, 37*-38a.
118. XbicL j 49a for statement that th Venetian ratification
was received by Paget on February 13/23* 1699*
IV. BESQME M L CO0CUJSIOES
The fourteen years, from 16831697, of Ottoman military
defeats, only interspersed with minor victories, oan be said
to have revealed the insufficiency of the well-tested Ottoman
military arm as an instrument of foreign policy. This
instrument had been until 1683, almost consistently, the.
Ottoman method of settling disputes with enemies. Though
interesting in itself, and of great signifiosnoe to Ottoman
history, the failure of the Ottoman military a m in face of
the superior arms of European states has not been the central
theme of this study. Instead, the focus has been on one of
the consequences of this failure.
Prom its inception, perpetual war in the "darQlharb
(abode of war), had been the raison d8Stre of the Ottoman
Gazi State. Other than submission to tribute, its enemies
had no other alternative but war, for reaching any type of
acoord over territorial disputes. When the latter alterna
tive had been chosen and defeat had been the lot of these
enemy states, as a price of victory, the Sultan or his
deputy in the person of the Grand Vezir, usually dictated
the artioles of peace. This situation was almost reversed
in 1697 when at the battle of Senta, the Ottoman armies
were overwhelmed and utterly defeated. This battle came
as the culmination of several military disasters for the
133
134
Sublime State. Sinoe a resumption of campaigns pointed
to probable disaster and a dictated peace, the Ottoman
Court was faced with the problem of negotiating peace from
a position of weakness. Although there were some mili
tary commanders with large following, such as Daltaban
Mustafa Paa, who would have opted for a continuation of
the war, the Sultan upon the urgent bidding and insistence
of both the Grand Vezir and the Divan chose the way of
peace.
In the process of imposing its will on its enemies
during moments of victory, the Sublime Ottoman State had
developed neither the formal apparatus for diplomatic iater-
oourse nor the oorps of trained personnel necessary for the
negotiation of peace. Hence, for the Ottoman Court, the
problem was reduced to the appointment of men who possessed
both the experience and qualifications for defending its
interests at the negotiation table. It has been stated
that both the incumbent ReisHlkfittab and Chief Dragoman of
the Divan were chosen to fill the posts of Chief Delegate
and Delegate. In the seoond part of this study, it was
pointed out that Iskerletzade Alexander, through his thorough
training in European languages and experience in negotiations
with European powers, was highly qualified for his appointment

on the Ottoman diplomatic mission.
135
Rami Mehmed Efendi's training and experiences were also
studied in order to determine his qualifications for leading
the Ottoman peace mission. It was asserted then that
through his long sojourn at the Divan, first as secretary
to the bureau of the ReistHMittab, then as Baylikoi, and
finally as the Reisfilkuttab, he brought to the conference
table a thorough training in Ottoman law, as well as first
hand knowledge of military campaigns internal and external
affairs.
In I6 9 8 , the Sublime Ottoman State was ready and willing
to negotiate peace with the Holy League powers. Its readi
ness is perhaps best reflected in the Ottoman aims advanced
in the proposed articles of January, I6 9 8 . Unlike the Otto
man position in I6 88 -8 9 and 169293? its aims were limited
and realistic, though not devoid of either dignity or strategy
the Ottoman Court aocepted uti possidetis only after it was
assured of provisions for evacuation and demolition of forts
and territories concomitant with the rectification of the

frontier.
Thus in Uovssnber, I6 9 8 , the Ottoman peaoe missicn,
olothed with full-powers to treat and negotiate peaoe, was
limited to negotiate within the framework of the said
proposed artioles. Despite several delays, the negoti
ations were from the start facilitated by the regulation
136
that eacti delegation should advance its own proposals and
negotiate with the Ott omans separately. Hence$ due to
considerations of rank; precedent and power, the Ottoman
mission first negotiated with the Kaiser*s plenipotentiaries.
By rapidly disposing of their "business with Austrias repre
sentatives, in the first four days of the formal negotiations,
Bami Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade Alexander cleared the
greatest hurdle which could have blocked the path to peace.
This first phase of the negotiations acquired deeper
significance with the commencement of Ottoman negotiations
with the other allies. For, in their negotiations with
the Kai sBi'1u esvs^s, the SuXvSus x-epreentativea had
succeeded, within their limited aims, in establishing
precedents and interpretations advantageous to their claims.
The Austrian delegation, at the opening of the formal negoti
ations suggested that both sides present in written form,
their general demands. Lest such a statement be used
as a definite commitment on behalf of the Sultan, the Otto
man mission refused to adopt the Austrian proposal. Since
the Ottoman plenipotentiaries were negotiating from a point
of weakness, compliance with the Austrian proposal would
have deprived them of any opportunity of obtaining minor
concessions. Instead, Rami, Mehmed Efendi and Iskerletzade
Alexander advanced the proposal that in the negotiations,
the plenipotentiaries were to proceed from the specific to
137
the general disposing of one problem at a time, until the
whole range of problems was oovered.
The basic and most central theme of the discussions
between November 13 and January 24 concerned the interpre
tation and application of the agreement in principle.
5Tegotlations on the 'basis of uti possidetis and allowance
for provisions for evacuation and demolition of forts,
concomitant with the rectification of the frontier were
the two component parts of this agreement. These two
parts had been approved by both the Sultan and the Kaisor,
(the latter acting in behalf, though not with the full
approval, ox his allies), before their missions had arrived
at Karlowitz. However, at the conference table, three
basic interpretations emerged. The one given by the
Austrian delegation had not only differed from the interpre
tation given by the Ottoman mission, but also from those of
the Kaisers allies. Concessions on the provisions for
the evacuation and demolition had been made cn the under
standing that these would be applied equitably and for the
mutual benefit of both sides. The Ot t o man mission, on
the other hand, interpreted the concession on the part of
the Kaiser as quid -pro quo for the Sultan's acceptance of
unrestricted application of uti possidetis. Hence, in
the application of the agreement, equal weight was given
to both parts. Accordingly, Rami Mehmed Efendi and
138
Iskerlotzade Alexander understood this to mean that the
principle of uti -possidetis would apply to Ottoman terri
tory in Austrian and allied hands, in return for an ex
clusive application of the provisions for evacuation and
demolition to the territory held hy the Kaiser and his
three allies* The three had agreed that utl possidetis
should he the only basis for the negotiations of peace.
But since their governments had not subscribed to Austrian
concessions to the provisions of evacuation and demolition,
they did not feel hound hy than. Thus, although the
Austrian delegation finally accepted the Ottoman interpre
tation of the agreement, the Venetian envoy refused to
negotiate on any hasis other than a strict application
of uti -possidetisc The Muscovite, on the other hand,
went as far as demanding Ottoman cession of the key fort
commanding access to the Black Sea* Heither envoy
succeeded in obtaining Ottoman recognition of his interpre
tation; the Czars envoy, through a two years truce,
obtained the termination of hostilities, and the post
ponement of a final accord, which was eventually negoti
ated on the basis of Ottoman terms set up at Karlowitz*
After exhausting all the delay taotios he could
muster, the Venetian envoy finally accepted the tentative
articles which were drawn up hy the Austrian and Polish
envoys* These articles were, despite Kuzzini's
139
skepticism, approved and subscribed to by the Senate in
February, 1699* Por Poland, the Ottoman Court, included,
in its proposed articles, a provision for the exchange of
territory* Ottoman evacuation and demolition of fort
KamenetsPodolsk for complete Polish evacuation of Moldavia.
In an attempt at gaining a foothold for Poland in this
principality, Malaehowski chose to ignore the exchange
and refused to recognize the provisions for evacuation
and demolition.
Once the Austrian peaoe mission aoceded to the Otto
man position on both procedure and agreement in principle,
the task of the BeisCUMltiab and the Chief Dragoman for
the rest of the negotiations was simplified. The fact
that the allies never felt bound to adhere to Austrian
acquiescence to the Ottoman position necessitated the
repetition, at every new negotiation, of the same arguments
for the Ottoman stand. Unlike the negotiations with the
Kaisers envoys when stubborn adherence to one position
produced most of the desired results for the Ottomans in
the negotiations with the allies, it was necessary some
times to resort to threats. Thus, the Venetian envoy
was told that unless he conceded to Ottoman demands, the
Venetian Republic might find itself faoed with a new war
and possible alienation and isolation from her allies.
140
However, there were occasions when Sami Mehsed Efendi
sad Iskerletzade Alexander demonstrated leniency, without
compromising Ottoman interests* The attempt hy Malaehowski
to ignore completely the agreement in principle and the
exchange clause was tolerated for a few sessions. Even
when it became necessary to produce the documents contain
ing the. article for exchange, he was only ridiculed, but
not extensively. Thus the Polish envoy was eventually
cajoled into conceding on the Moldavia article.
It is perhaps necessary, at this juncture, to note
the attitude of the Sublime Ottoman State, as refleoted
in its mission's strategy and tactios at the negotiations,
toward each one of the allied delegations. To the Otto
man Court, negotiations with Austria, which was the leader

and most powerful force in the allianoe, were conducted
as with an equal. For this reason it should be noted,
that at no time during the negct iatlmiE did the Ottoman
envoys threaten te resume war, when it was impossible to
obtain concessions on a particular point. Furthermore,
it was felt that once the Ottomans gained their limited
aims from the Austrians, it would not be too difficult to
obtain equal, if not better, terms from the allies. The
Ottoman calculations were best served in the negotiations
with Venice. For, whereas the Ottoman mission had not
threatened to revert to war with Austria at every turn of
141
the negotiations* with Venice, the weakest of the allied

powers, the Ottoman mission had hy persistent threat of
war and isolation, not only succeeded in acquiring a
secure frontier, but also drew the Austrian delegation
to its support.
With the Kingdom-Republio8s envoy, the Ottoman mission
anted most leniently. Poland's claims to the territory

held exclusively by its troops were not disputed. Even
the opaque tactios and naivete of Malaehowski were toler
ated. For, to the Sultan, Poland was nothing but a

second rate power, and the territory which, it wrested
from Ottoman hands, had been precariously held by the
troops of the Sublime State. Except for parts of Moldavia,
all the territory which Poland olaimed and received had

little if any strategic value to the Ottomans.
Despite the success of the Czar's troops in obtaining
Azov and the forts on the lower Dnieper, at the negotiations

table the Muscovite envoy was treated summarily. For,
although the participation of Vozhnitsin in the negotiations
at Karlowitz marked the formal entry of Russia into Rear
Eastern politics, the Muscovite State was still regarded
as a second rate power not quit Poland's equal. Thus,

the Sublime State's plenipotentiaries were willing to let
the Russians keep Azov, but were adamant on the evacuation
142
of the strategic forts on the lower Dnieper.
Throughout the negotiations, Rami Mebmed Efendi and
Iekerletzade Alexander adhered to one basic principles
unless specified; as in the case of Kamenets-Podolsk, no
part of Ottoman-held territory was negotiable. This,
it must be immediately noted, the Sultan*s envoys success-
fully upheld. The exclusive application of the provisions
for evacuation and demolition of territory to allied lands
was, however, a corollary of the principle of inalienability.
From the very beginning, the Ottoman mission's activi
ties were guided by both this principle and its corollary.
In effect, this meant that the Sublime Ottoman State would
not accept a dictated peace a position which is delicately
concealed by the Ottoman insistence on maintaining the dig
nity and honour of the Sultan. Although the strategic
aspects VA tfJuO final frontier settlement were not ignored,
the insistence of the Ottoman Court on this stand was
necessitated by two considerations. First, it was a
face-saving device. In the wake of military disasters,
the Ottoman plenipotentiaries were expected to minimize
the territorial price of defeat. Thus the Ottoman mission
required territorial concessions from each one of the allied
delegations, with varying degrees of suooess the territorial
concessions obtained being almost directly proportional to
143
the military power of each state. By the end of the
negotiations, not one of the allied delegations could claim
to have dictated its terms.
Second, it was a foregone conclusion that subsequent
to the negotiations the Sultan would acoord formal recognition
to vast territorial acquisitions by the allies. Both the
Ottoman Court and its mission at Earlowitz had to take into
full consideration the internal reperoussiens of these losses.
Hence, at the negotiation table measures had to be taken to
make the final settlement palatable to the Sultan*s subjects
generally and to the military establishment specifically.
For, the dislocation and hardships suffered and endured by
the former, during fourteen years of continuous warfare,
and the humiliation of the latter on the battlefields of
Hungary, rendered a dictated settlement unacceptable.
BJBLIOGRAPE?
Archival Material
Great Britain
Londons British Museum

Add. Mss. 28939
Eg arton Mss. 9^8
Londons Public Reoord Office

State FepsrSj 97/21
Istanbuls Ba^vekElet Arîvi

Maliye dafteri 9 1041
1044
1971
2976
3423
4960
6006
7144
9870
9876
10341
Muhimme dafteri a 105 (Mid Recap, 1105 Mid Reeep,

1106)
106 (Latter SJewal, *06 Latter
Cemaziyelewel, *07)
107 (Beginning Zilkade, '06 -
Mid Rebiyfilewel, *07)
108 (Mid Cemaziyelewel, *07 -
Beginning RebiyQlahir, '08)
109 (Latter Zilkade, *08 - Beginning
RebiyGlahir, ' 6 9 )
110 (Beginning Zilkade, *08
Middle Zilkade, *10)
111 (Mid Zilkade, *10 - Mid Rebi-
y&lahir, *13)
112 (Latter RebiyRlahir, *13 -
Beginning Ramazan, *14 )
113 (Mid Zilkade, *13 - Latter
Rebiyfilewel, *15 )
114 (Beginning Sjfewal, *14 - Latter
Rebiy&lewel, *15)
115 (Mid Muharrem. *18 Latter
ewal, *20)
145
DefStir-i UmGr-1 Ecnebiye

Fransalunun HlSan defter! (1084-1254)
Fransa Devletinin AtIt Ahkaml (1099-1113)
Manuscripts
Istanbul
Beyazit UmUmi KHtUphanesi, 2369s Silihdar Mebmed Age,,

SUsratname
M
Istanbul Universitosi Kutiiphaneai, TUrk YazmalarS!

2711, Bam! Hehmed, Karlofca Mukalemesi
3216, Bey h i , Vakay* Si-f&zela
3514, Bami Mebmed, Karlof5a Mukalemesi
SHleymaniye EStSpkaaesi, Essd Efendi ktb. 2382

Defierdar Mehmed Pasa, Zubdat ul-vakay
Millet Kuttiphanesi, BeSld Efendi ktb., 992 a

Mecmua, which, has Sirri Efendi OskELdaris
Tarih-i zsman-i Sultan Mustafa Han
BeSid Efendi ktb, 685, Bami Mebmed,
KarlofSa Mukalemesi veya Muahadesi
Vienna
5sterreiohisohe Hationalbibliothek
H.O. 90, Z&lfikar Efendi, Zlilfikar Mukalemesi
H.O. 118, Ahmed Besmi, Safinat 81-ruesa
Printed Material
Ahmed Bifat Efendi, Luffat-I tarihiye ve oografiye. 7 vols.,

Istanbul, 1299*
Franz Babinger, Die Qeschiohtssohreiber der Osmanen und Ihre

Werke. Leipzig, 1927*
Der Grosae Brnakh^ng. 13 vols., Leipzig, 1 9 2 8 -3 2 .
The Cambridge History of Poltîd. 2 vole. Cambridge, 1950-51*
The Mew Cambridge Modern History. Vol. V. Cambridge, 1 9 6 1 .
Dimitri Cantemir, The History of the Growth and Decay of the

Othman Empire. London. 175d.
146
Edmond Ch.ishu.ll* Travels in Turkey end Back to England.

Londan* 1747*
I.H. Danipsend, IzahlT QctwiwIT tarihi kronolo.lisl. 4 vols.
Istanbul, 194755*
Dictionary of Hationa.1 Biography. London, 1885-1900*
Salahaddin Ekler, Divan Raksmlarl. Ankara* 1953
Encyclopedia of Islam* Ed. A.J. Wenslnck et al. 4 vols. and

Supplement. Leiden, 1913-38. Few Edition ed. B. Lewis et al.
1954-
L. Fekete, Die Siyaaat-sobrlft in der TUrklaohen Finanzverwalturg.
2 vols. Budapest, 1955*
H.A.E. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamio Society and the West. Vol. I,
pts. I and II. London, 1950-57*
Ibrahim Alaettin Gftvsa, TUrk Meshurlarl Anaiklopedisi.

Istanbul, 1946.
O b oar Halecki, Borderlands of Western Civilization. Hew York, 1952.
Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall, Dee Osmanisohen Reiohes Staats-

TOrfnBHiing and Staatsverwaltung. 2 vols. Vienna. 1815.
, Gesohiohte dee Osmanisohen Reiohes.

10 vols. Pest, 1^27-1635.
Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine. 1552-1615. Oxford, i960 .
D.B. Horn, British Diplomatic Representatives 1689-1789.

Camden Society, 3rd ser. Ho. XLVI. London, 1932.
William Horsley, The Political History of Europe 800-1716.

London, 1746.
J.C. Hurewitz, "The Europeanization of Ottoman Diplomacy,

Belleten. Vol. XXV, 455-466.
Islam gnsiklo-Dadial. Istanbul, 1940-
Noxman Itzkowitz, "Mehmed Raghib Pashas The Making of an

Ottoman Grand Vezir, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation.
Princeton University, 1959*
Re sat E k m m Ko$u, Osmanli Muahedeleri ve Kapltttlaslyonlar.

1300-1920. Istanbul, 1934*
147
Ecprul&zadd Mohmod Fuat. "Bizans aaagaesalaraiRlR QfinawH

muesaeselerine te'serl hakkinda bazi mulahazalar,
TSrk Hukuk ve Xktlsat Mectauasi. Vol. I, 165-313*
David M. Lang, The Last of the Georgian Monarchy. 1658-1832.

Hew York, 1957 .
Bernard Lewis, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives, I," Bulletin

of the School of Oriental and African Studies. London
University. XVI. pt. 2. 469-501.
Vahid A. Moran, TUrkce-Iwgl11ticq SBzlUk. Istanbul, 1945
Mnahfldftt Mecumaai. 5 vols. Istanbul, 129498.
W.B. Munson, The Peace of Karl&witz," Unpublished Ph.D.

Dissertation. University of Illinois (Urbana), 1940.
Naima, Tarih-i Baima. 6 vols. Istanbul, 1283
Gabriel Noradounghian, Becueil dlaotes intemationaux de

1*Empire Ottnm.Tp. 2 vols. Paris, 1897.
M.Z. Pakalln, Osmanlf Tarih Deylaleriave Terimleri SBzlUgu.

3 vole. Istanbul, 1946.
Miohajal B. Popovi^, Der Priede von Karlowitz. Leipzig, I893 .
Raîd, Rasid tarihi. 6 vols. Istanbul, 1282.
G.E. Bothenberg, The Austrian Military Border in Croatia.

1522-1747. Urbana, I960.
C. Buzzini, "Relations del Congresso di Carloviz e dell*

Ambasoiata di Vienna di Sr. Carlo Buzzini Cavr.,"
Font63 Rerum Austriaoaruau Vol. XXVTI, 345- 444 .
J.W. Bedhouse, Tfirkceden Itîllzoeye LEUEat. Istanbul, I89 O

and New Impression, 1921.
John Richardson. A Dictionary of Persian. Arabic and English.

London, 1829": :
------- ---- --- -
S. Sami, Kamus-i TBrki. Istanbul, 1318.
Midhat Sertoglu, Muhteva BakTmfndan Basvekalet Argivi.

Ankara, 1955
Stanford J. Shaw, Archival Sources for Turkish History,
Journal of the Amerioan Oriental Sooiety. Vol. 80, 2ff.
148
Stanford J. Shaw* The Fiagssial aad Admj wi fttrativQ Organi v.ntAon

and Development of Qttnman Egypt < 1517-1798. Prinoeton.
x9o2.
Silihdar Mehmed Aga, Siliftdwj tarihi. 2 vols. Istanbul; 1928*
Danis Sinor, History of Hungary. Hew York; i960 .
B.H. Sumner3 Peter the Great and the Ottoman gm-pira- Oxford,
1949-
Mehmed Sttreya, Sicil-i Osmani. 4 vols. Istanbul, 1308.
Osmanzade Ahmed Taib, Hftdlkat ai-v&zera. Istanbul, 1271.
Taraiaa Sozlfigu. 5 vols. Istanbul. 1943-57*
"Kanunnamei ali Osman, Tarlh-i Osmani EncGmeninin il&velerinden.

Istanbul, 1329-30.
Giro Truhelka, Dobrovenik Arîvinde Tttrk-Islav vesikalarl,

Istanbul EnstitHstt Dergisi. I (1955), 39-65.
Hans Ubersberger, Russlands Orientalnolitik. I. Stuttgart, 1913.
Ismail Hakki Uzunârîli, Markez ve Bahriye Teskilati. Ankara,

1948.
. Osmani! tarihi. Ill cilt. 1 and 2

kisim. Ankara, 195^ 1954.
. Tugra ve Penêler, Belleten. Vol.V,

Ankara, 1941. pp. 101157*
Co^kun Uook, TSrk Huikuk Tarihi Deraleri. 3rd ed., n.d.
Dorothy Vaughn, Europe and the Turk. 1350-1700. Liverpool, 1954.
Luigi Villari, The Republic of Ragusa. London, 1904.
A.C. Wood, A History of the Levant Company. London, 1935*
Mahmud Yazir, Siywka.t Yazisl. Istanbul, 1941.
J. Zihkeisan, Gesohiohte des Osmanisohen Reiohes in Europa.

7 vols. Gotha, 1840-1863*
BIBLIOGEiPHTOJii ESSAT
'Turkish. Archival Material
M&himme Defterleri
In this short note on the MGhimme defterleri, I will con
fine my remarks to those registers which I used extensively*
For a full list of these registers, with notations of the
years covered hy each, see, in Turkish: Midhat Sertoglu.
Mllhteva, 16-23. The list givea there is noted in English
by Stanford Shaw in Journal of the American Oriental Sooiet.y.
Vol. 80, p. 2, under the title "Archival Sources for Ottoman
History." For examples of the descriptions of the struc
tures of the decrees in some of these registers, see Uriel
Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine. 1552-1615. (Oxford,
I960).
Since it would be impossible to give an analysis of the

contents of each one of the defters used, I confined my
review to the notation of the folios used in each register,
external dimensions, the average number of lines per page,
and the division of the entries in each register into months.
The folios between which decrees for particular months are
entered, were also noted.
At the Ba^vekalei Ar?ivi in Istanbul, the classification
of the contents of some of the earlier registers had been
149
150
started , "but none exists for the ones which were studied by
this student-- It is hoped that the following review of
MQhirame defterleri (Bos. 105-111) wovild facilitate their
future use hy others interested in doing research in this
period.
Muhimme clefteri Bo. 105
ff. 72 9 which contain entries on ff. la - 72a* Length
of the defter: 12*5 ins. and breadth 8.3 ins. There are
between 25-30 lines per page. (Description will henceforth
be given in this forms 72 (la - 7 2 a )j (12.5/8.3) 25 - 3 0 .
The first six folios contain oopies of eighteen communi
cations issued through the Chancery in the months of Ramazan
and Spewalj 1105= Prom 7& 72a , there are three hundred
and thirty-three copies of letters which were issued under
the Grand Vezirate of SQrmeli Ali Pa?a. The appointment
of this Grand Vezir is noted on 7& indicating that the
following entries were issued during his tenure of office.
Together with the notation of the aooession of the Grand
Vezir, there is a statement that the entries were made under
the reas et of (Rami) Mehmed Efendi. The following is the
text of the heading:
ly uV\ < 3 . ,.J\=-V; ti*
151
The entries made under the said Grand Vezir and Reis
Efendi %
For the Month
Rebiy&lewel, 1106 ..... sixty-nine entries (7a - 14& )

a V
Rebiyulahir, 1 1 0 6 seventy-one entries (14 - 27 )
Cemaziyelewel, 1106 ... one hundred and twenty-two

entries (27 ^ - 5 0 a )
Cemaziyelahir, 1106 .... seventy-six entries (50a - 70 )
Reoep, 1106 ............ fourteen entries (63a 72a )
ipaban, 1106 ........... one entry (71^)

"b
Ramazan, 1 1 0 6 ........ . four entries (6b - 69 ).
Mtthinnne defteri Mo. 106
191 (la - 191a ); (12.5/8.3); 28.
Out of nine hundred and eighty entries, the first three,

St
1 - , are actually copies of defters, rather than letters
issued from the Chancery. The first entry is dated Rebiyxilewel,
1106, the second has no date, but the third is dated in paban,
1106 .
For the Month
Pabsn, 1106 ............ sixty entries (2a - 24^)
Ramazan, 1106 forty entries (same folios)
(2 5 a oommenoes with*
Ramazan, 1 1 0 6 ......... one hundred and seven entries

(25a - 4#>)
152
SjSewsl* 1 1 0 6........ one hundred and fifiy~3ix entries

(4 6 b - 7 4 b)
Zilkade,.1106 ......... ninety-five entries (71^ - 96a)
Zilhicoe, 1106 ........ eightyfive entries (90 ^ - 121a )
Muharrem, 1107 ........ fiftyeight entries(115 ** -128^)

Safer, 1107 ......... seventy-two entries (128^ - 140a )
Rehiyillewel, 1107 .... eighty-fourentries (128^ - 154a )
Rehiyttlahir, 1 1 0 7 one hundred and ten entries

.
(I53a - 179s)
Geiaasiyelewel, 1107 .. ninety=nine entries (I74a - 191 a).
MShimme defteri No. 107
15 (l5 - 15a)j (11 .8/7 .5)5 23.
The first entry (l^) is undated.
On 2a, the following caption is given*
For the Month
Zilkade, 1 1 0 6 ...... . thirty entries (2s - 7& )
Zilhicoe, 1 1 0 6 ..... . twenty-two entries (7& 9^)
Muharrem, 1 1 0 7 ...... twentytwo entries (I0a - 13a)
Safer, 1 1 0 7...... . fifteen entries (12*5 - 14a)
RehiyQlewel, 1107 thirteen entries (14S 16a)
MQhimme defteri No. 108
216 (la - 214s ); (12 .5/ 8 .3)5 25-30. Folios 2a - 3a
153
o ])
are empty From folio 1 through folio 19 , the upper
portions of the pages were exposed to water, without impairing
the writing or legibility of the texts.
fiai'h
On folio 1 there are two unrelated entries, the first
of which enumerates the troops (over thirteen thousand) which
were ordered to several localities, e.g. Vidin and Temesvar
(Timisoara). The second enumerates the number of troops
required from Rttmeli beylerbeyisi (400 suvari nefers and 200
piyade nefers), Avlunia and Duluniya sancaklari mutasarefi
Kaplan Pa?a (200 suvari nefers and 700 piyade nefers), Kostandil
SanoagI mutasarefi Zunbul Pa?a (50 suvari nefers and 200 piyade
nefers) and Uhri sancagl mutasarefi Recep Pa?a (70 suvari nefers
and 200 piyade nefers).
The entries in the Mtthimme defter proper starts on f. 2
with*
' >)) o
a " f t / ^ j --
^ ^ <3 *
For the Month
Cemaziyelewel, 1107 seventysix entries (2a 19 & )
Cemaziyelahir, 1107 one hundred and twenty-six entries

(118* - 46a)
154
Reoep, 1107 ........... one hundred and fiftythree

entries (46a - 103 *)
Spaban, 1107 -............. one hundred and ninety-eight

entries (55b 137b )
Ramazan, 1107 ........ one hundred entries (80b 124b )
ewal. 1 1 0 7 ............. two hundred and twenty-five

entries (111 - 143b )
Zilkade, 1 1 0 7 ......two hundred and eighty entries

U32* - 173s)
Zilhicce, 1107 .......... one hundred and seventy entries

(I73a - 189*)
Missing folio 190ab
Muharrem, 1108 twenty-six entries (l91a 195^)
Safer, 1 1 0 8 .............. sixty-two entries (195& 20?a )

RehiySlewel, 1 1 0 8 ....... sixty-four entries (I96a - 215 s)
RebiyRlahir, 1108 .......... two entries (215 b )
Summary of defter, which contains the amounts of wheat due
to the Holy Cities from Egypt for the years 1101-1107,

(215 b - 2l6b )e
MUhimme defteri Ho* 109
16 (la - 16b )j (11.8/7.5)? 23.

The first entry, la, is an order to the deputy (vekil)
Reis&lkfrttab, warning ahout the fact that offioial "stationary
was "being misused for obtaining official services without
authorization.
On folio lb the following caption is founds
155
d\yC 3 -*J>*? *-*0
ÎpL-tf^tû-CU'c, \_i-t ir--*
c-<J|j,S\*j u \r %L_J o^XjJ^ <3

F or tins mimth
Zilkades 1 108...... five entries (l^ - 2a)
Zilhicoe, 1108 ......... forty-one entries (2a - 7& )

T\ T\
Muharrem, 1 109....... . twenty-six entries (07 - 10 )
Safer, 1 1 0 9 ...... ........ twenty-three entries (10^ 14S)
Rebiyfilewel, 1 1 0 9 ...... . twenty-two entries (l4a l6a)
RebiyQlahir, 1 1 0 9 ...... . seven entries (l6a 16^)
UQJilrame defteri No. 110 (Muhiramei Ordu)
341 (la - 341*); (12.5/8.3); 25-30.,
This defter covers entries for Zilkide, 1108 - Mid-Zilkide,
1110. Although it is listed as a MGhimme defteri, in reality

it is a Ufihimme-tOrdu.
The Grand Vesirate of Amoasade Hussyin Pa?a, and the re
appointment of Remi Mehmed Efendi to the reaset, arenoted on
f. 57*. The oaption states, in the usualformula,thatthe
entries whioh followed were done under the said Grand Vezir and
Eeis^lldittab, in the first deoade of RebiytHewel, 110.
Mtthimme defteri No. Ill
272 (la - 272 a); (12 .5/8 .3 ); 25-30.
This defter covers the period Mid-Zilkide, 1110 to latter
156
decade of Rebiytllahir, 1113.
Th.e usual caption, stating ttie fact that the letters which
followed were entered under the incumbent Grand Vezir and
Reisfilkttttsb, in this defter is stated on f
Maliye deftarleri
The classification of the Maliye defterleri is described
generally by both Midhat Sertoglu, Mtthteva Bakimindan Bagve'fcalet

Arsivi. and Stanford Shaw, JAQS. Vol. 80
In neither instance would the student-researoher find
any detailed description of the materials available in these
registers. Despite the fact that there are thousands of
these registers which have already been classified, there is
no adequate up-to-date study or work which gives descriptions
of the contents and kinds of materials available in these
millions of folios on Ottoman finanoial administration. The
fact that the classification had not been completed, may
explain this lack.
These registers are classified in two forms* chronologically
and by subject matter. In the former, Tarih gore tasnifi,
the description of eaoh register is placed in a chronological

order, and contains a register which dates back to 836 A.H.
(He* 280). This defter oontains primarily entries on tlma-ra.
but has some entries on vakfs, and oovers entries up to 971 A.H.
157
Isa the classification according to subject mattr5 w2?s<?ter
oins ve nevine gBre," the registers are classified in this
ordert
4 U^ ! v N W t - )(Sju> ' A
(V\s\- \\hS)O A * A
V - \^f) I C C\i; \ u U j yji X
N'v* *1.^)CjjLp\fe -SK'Z) J cJ>A-\ cS/lyJ$ .1.
< I\msJ .O
Cv'vVi - U ) A
( ^ V - Ne^^) .A
^\\?\\ _ A
(^K\/ _ V\ij A.
( W \ A - \^V*) cj'j*A^ o ' y J AV
- \. V > 3 j _>j .vs.
_ Ac'% ) UjjV XV
Cî'c' - 3 4 ^ Al
(vc.v _ a... jy>\ \o
(v^V A - V .\V ) ^ 14 \ - > A \
\ N ^ ) .W
(v<LoO *Co A-W a N.
156
The classification which I found most- useful for my own. work
was the chronological one. Here, as in the case of the
sub.jeot matter classification, one finds the descriptions of
the registers on separate sheets of paper about 3 by 5
in length and breadth, written by hand usually in pencil.
Pagination is included on these sheets, with page numbers
given more often than folio numbers. The description is
handwritten mostly in the old letters This student has
found that despite the usefulness of the descriptions, he
had to resort to the inspection of each specific defter
before he could discover its preoise content. Thus, in
one sense, the usefulness of the captions and descriptions
of the defter are rather limited, for one would not get a
clear idea of the contents unless the actual registers were
consulted and examined. In one case, one whole section
of a register was not even noted in the oaption.
Although only a little over a dozen references had been
made in the dissertation to Maliye registers, I had consulted
more than a hundred of these registers both for my own work
and for information on the range of material and information
available under this classification. In the following
section of my bibliographical note, I shall concentrate
only on a consideration of some of the registers whioh I
had used in the dissertation.
159
The following is a rendition of the caption for Maliye
defteri No. 7744j prepared in the Bayvekalet Arîvi*

\SV. v V tt
oXû U
/ j
<>oi\0 4 e^X-o^t y>-V. </& V '-I*'
^/cO^VUi gJ^cJjV- ^ [Si'cJ
6>\\\. \N a / y X ^ c J <-^1^ <J^> * 0 Jfc\lxs> g / u
.-CcSâJ L <\j cÛAi ^XiSyi- WV- o Lai-'
(/^t ^ [ cX ^ c ^ \ Q^
V'^' ujj^ I ojJdyV ^ X J
s~> ys*) VyZi>) <5^ Lf ^

I X X W tx_>W) l
This defter records in detail the provisions and services
whioh the Ottoman Sublime State provided for its plenipoten
tiaries and the English and Dutch ambassadors, from the date
of their departure with their retinues until their return*
June 28, 1698 - May 9? 1699 (Although both the description-
and the iomal have the dates Muharrem 8, 1110 - Saban 23 1110,
the last entry in the defter, on page twenty-eight, has an
item dated Silkide 8, 1110). The first seven pages, 1B - 4a>
contain thirty-seven separate entries, whioh are preceded by*
R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .
160
JUI
J
Sj if C-*-" 1 'S*.f '-' **U Ii
( Z j iLvJ < j \ f Z / ^ J , ( J k f ^ J ^ c ^ c 0 _ > yaj
tjrU#<S^ i/^> c U A , _l/3ol - o A L 1/^ > | X - ^
ul_i-JW6b 'A A.^ cj o *aLP^ VJ*y>
<C ^'t ^_y ^ c j ' \w. -- r^ A C>
a j . U f 41! ---------- .--- ; jr> o-
'('Cm a
Eighteen ef the thirty-seven entries under the general
heading icmal, fall under the figure 33,869 guruf-i esedi.
The entries indicate the payments in the following forms
. I .- J _
___
___
___
___
___.__
___
__;---------------------------------------------------------- - >
Sî, 6-fy j bj, <J *-f^Sf > * ->y \f. ^J

* oJîp O LAL> <fSuUs-?s (S)y
a^ <J -'v y ->\i y oJi o3 <i ..
<x -*.1 * > ^ 1 * cr*"V"* ^ ^/1
On 3^ there is a list of the items purchased, with the
total cost of 11,047*5 guru^-i esedi and 5 pare* The
reamining nineteen of the thirtyseven entries enumerate
the items of provisions, indicating the price per weight
measurement. The following are the prices, per weight
measurement of most of the items of provisions listed:
161
per pare
Coffees two entries one kiye 46
Flour 16 40
Clear butter 4 40
Sugar one 81.5
Barley 13 keyl 40
Honey one kiye 9

Starch (from Wheat) one 10
Onions one 2
Chick peas one 5

Vinegar one 5
Almond one 5
Eggs two 1
Lemon-juice one 10
Hens one 9
Milk one kiye 3
Cinnamon one 960
Ginger one 45
Pepper one 80
Saffron one 2,000

Tamaris one keyl 20
From folio 4 through. 14 , there are entries, with dates
and amounts of provisions dispensed and received. Included
are entries for transportation, by wagon and river-oraft, of
the goods provided for the Ottoman peace mission, the mediating
162
ambassadors and their retinues. In the notation of trans
portation hy river-oraft, the names of the "captains'* are
listed with the number of crews eaoh craft carried, and the
amount of provisions transported.
Maliye defteri 6006
This register consists of three separate defters.
The first defter, covering ff. 2^ 21a, is divided into
three separate parts. The first (from 2^ - 6^) is a record
of the contributions from prominent men of state and vakfs of
the Sultans to the 1109 campaign budget. Here it may be
recalled that the new Grand Vezir Amcazade HEtseyin Pa$a, had
upon his appointment in Rebiytllewel, 110$, after the Ottoman
defeat at Senta, prepared for a defensive campaign, at the same

time as the preliminary negotiations for peace were being
oarried out. Thus, the Sublime State did not desist from
such preparations until the peace was nearly assured.
The caption on f. 2^, under which the amount of expected
contribution from each prominent office holder is listed, is
rendered in the following manner*
whioh,name'the officer and the contribution expected, and
amounts collected. Thus, fifty keses (of five hundred
163
guru^-i esedi each) were expected uid contributed by the
Grand Vezir, two hundred keses expeeted from the Vali of
Egypt? fifteen keses from the Refterdar Efendi, three
from the ReisQlkfittab. The latter contributed a kintsr
(about one hundred andtwenty pounds) of olesir but ter
The entry for the ReisSlkEittabs contribution is entered
thus* cJ.Uc>
Ojt- ^ y) e'i& WV <U>.

Cjr^tS cM>S J
>mj i
QSlC.j \Ky<* ^ ^
v :.>jx o^l- \ \ \ .SL~ j> aj
^ i ^ IJ tS^t > o \\\. <%_L\j* Sj oL> ^ ^ <*
The total amount expected from both men of state and
the vakfs was seven hundred and eighty-five keses (i.e.
392,500 gurup-i esedi).
The second part of this same defter, covering 7a - 13a,
starts with a 00 py of a petition to the Sultan, concerning
both the contributions from the men of state and the vakfs
for the campaign. The copy of the petition is preceded
by the usual talhis. which was done by the Grand Vezir.
164
The Grand Vesir's ferman is preceded by the Sultan's authori
zation!
This statement was written by the Sultan, presumably after
having read the petition and the ts.lh.is made of it by the
Grand Vezir.
The Grand Vezir's ferman authorizing execution according
to the Sultan's order! n 1

cJ ^ 01-*y
''Summary", abstracting the request of the Defterdar
Efendi, as stated in the text of the petition!
The petition of the Defterdar Efendi concerning the
collection of the assigned contributions for 1109 campaign
from both men of state and vakfs.
The Defterdar's petition is followed by the talhiw of the
Grand Vezir's ferman, requiring the collection of the oontri-
165
tations according to the Hatt-i HQmayun, and the deposit of
the money in the inner treasury.
The second part of the defter contains a list of the
vakfs of Istanbul) UskSdar, and EySp, and the amounts of
surpluses whioh accrued from each vakf. The endowments
are listed under their superintendents. Thus, under the
superintendence of the Grand Vezir, fell the vakfs of the

Sultanss Mehmed (Fatih), Selim (Yavuz), Siileyman (Kanuni)
and several others of deceased Pa?as, Ky&hyas, Efendis, and
ladies a total of twenty-six vakfs, whereas those under
the superintendence of the Seyhhlislam number over a hundred.
Although the sum of 100,000 guru$-i esedi (i.e. 200 keses)
was expected from this surplus, as a contribution towards
defraying the expenses of the 1109 campaign, only one hundred
and thirty-seven keses and 282 guru^-i esedi were available.
Since it was stipulated that maintenance, expenditures and
salaries from these vakfs were not to be curtailed, the
surplus available ran short of the expected two hundred keses.
The third part of this defter is devoted to the regis
tration of collections expected from prominent men of
state, toward payment of the costs of rebuilding the burnt
Yenigeri barracks in Istanbul. The estimated oost of the
repair required is listed at 220 keses. Slightly over
142 keses were colleoted from the high officials, whose
166
names and contributions ars listed. The date of the
estimate is given as RebiySlewel, 1110, and the date of
the collection of the contribution as ew a l 11, 1110.
b &
The second defter in this collection covering 23 35
pertains to the rehabilitation and resettlement of Transyl
vanian and Magyar kuruc who had served under
Tokoly Imre, as allies of the Sublime Ottoman State.
Article X of the Austro-Ottoman peace treaty, states that
Transylvanian and Magyar subjects who had abandoned their
homes and property in the Austrian-held territories were
tc settle within the frontiers of the Sultan. There,
they were to be placed at some distance from the Austro-
Ot toman boundary.
The defter under review concentrates on the conditions
of the resettlement of the one thousand and ninety-seven
warriors of Transylvania and Hungary with their families
within Ottoman territory, in accordance with the Sultans
orders. Up to the date of the issuance of the order for
their rehabilitation, these Ottoman allies were concentrated
primarily in the city of Nioopolis (Bulgaria). The regis
tration of the expenses incurred during the process of their
transportation and resettlement, initially in the south
eastern regions of Vidin, oovers the greater part of the
defter. As it had already been noted, in footnote 55
167
page 5 6 , the name of each one of these warriors is listed
under the name of his commanderkapudan.
The Sultan had bestowed upon them the right to settle,
plow and oultivate the hass villages in the vicinity of
Qetrofoa, within the boundaries of present-day Bulgaria,
at a distanoe of ten hours from the town of Berkovag.
These villages had been abandoned by their inhabitants
during the Austrian invasion which left them in ruins, and
most of the indigenous population had already deserted to
the Austrian side. However, since it was discovered that
the lands of these villages were rocky and stony, henoe
impossible to cultivate, the Sultan issued an order, dated
midRebiyiilewel, 1111, two months after the first, bestowing
on these Ottoman allies similarly abandoned and destroyed
villages and lands near ehirk$yU ehirk3y1i is near m o d e m
Pirot in Bulgariar and others, which were dependencies of
Vidin. The houses and properties were given to each
warrior in the form of mulk (full ownership), and were
to be passed from father to son or heir, without any charge.
Ogur was expected from these lands but only after five years
had elapsed from the date of settlement. Ho other foxm
of tax or tribute, like the eizye, was to be expected from
them.
Those who chose to enter oommercc and trading were
168
to l>e allowed to do so. However, they were expected to
pay the gflmruk as required from others under similar circum
stances# As for religious practice, their priests were
authorized to conduct their religious rites, like marriage
and death ceremonies, without molestation or demands for
any form of indemnity and tribute. The churches which
existed in the parts to be inhabited by these Hungarian
and Transylvanian warriors were to be restored, but no new
ones were allowed to be built. Conflicts of any nature
which might arise between those people were to be regulated
and dealt with by their chiefs, unless they were found
impossible to resolve# Under such circumstances, they were
t o resort to any one of the kadis located in the vicinity
for consultation and arbitration.
The third and last defter in this collection of three,
is devoted to the registration and resettlement of the Otto
man troops which were about to be evacuated from fort
KamenetsPodolsk, in fulfillment of article III of the
Ottoman-Polish peace treaty. The defter, covering 35^ to
55 was compiled in accordance with the ferman of the Grand
Vezir, dated Muharrem 18, 1111. The distribution of these
troops and their families among forts Bender, OzH (Ochakov),
Kilburun, Akkerman, Kulli, Ten! Hissar and Baba Dag, is
given. There were amongst others, 839 piyade, 770 suvari
and 2016 yeniêris* An account of the repair of the said
169
forts and their buildings for the accommodation of these
troops covers the greater part of the register. uun~
ever, there is a large section devoted to the enumeration of
the amounts and expenses of provisions provided for these
troops during the initial stages of their settlement, as

well as several years thereafter. Among the entries of
orders to the several kadis, saraskers and superintendents,
pertaining to several facets of resettlement of these
troops, there are entries for as late as Safer, 1120.
In this last section of my review of specific Maliye
defters I shall trace the changes which took place in the
conditions in Rami Mehmed Efendis right of holding the
Aleppo zeamet (1693-1703)= It is hoped that this

exeroise may illustrate the categories and kinds of regis
ters found in the classification of the financial registers.
It may be recalled that while Rami Mehmed Efendi was
the secretary of the SeisQ.lku.ttab Bureau, he had held zeamet

in Wallachin on the Danube, and that the Aleppo zeamet was
not offered to him until 1692, after he was critically
injured at the battle of Belgrade. Although the precise
date on which he was offered the Aleppo zeamet is not known,
it is possible to estimate an approximate date. rhe hasa
lands whioh later formed the zeamet given to Rami Mehmed
Efendi were in January, 1692 , still in the hands of the
170
three sons of a deceased Ahmed Paâ, who had held It co
jointly for- the previous fourteen years. (Maliye defteri
No. 987 3 covering 1st Muharrem, 1103 - 23rd Ramazan, 1103.
The given title for this defter iss ^

cA-VU
a \
The entry concerning the Aleppo territory is on 67 ).
The first reference to the fact that Rami Mehmed Efendi,
the then Beylikol, held the Aleppo zeamet can "be seen in
M.D. 2967, 10*5 (The given title to this defter iss

2X ^ 7 U).
However, there is a section which pertains to tezakir
(certificates) issued, presumably from the offices of the
Defterdar, starting from folio 10 . The entry notes
the issuance of a iezkire, dated October 30, 169!^Safer 18,
1104, given Rami Mehmed Efendi or his agent, for the amount
of 7611 akges due to the treasury from the zeamet which the
Beylikei held, for an instalment on dues for the year 1103 .
(This same entry is repeated in Maliye defteri 1516, 6a.
The given title for the defter is*
Thus, sometime between January and October, I6 9 2 , Rami Mehmed
Efendi was awarded the Aleppo zeamet.
As for the payment of dues for the year 1104, there is

*U
an entry in Maliye defteri 8 9 6 , 22 , whioh points out that
two instalments, one for 5909 akges and the other for
59,400 akges were paid on behalf of Rami Mehmed Efendi on
171
February 15, 1693/Cumaziyvtlauir, 1104 ana May 25, 1693/
HawaSau 20 a 1104 r3Sp6Cti76ly#
The earliest text of the berat asserting the sale to
Sami Mehmed Efendi of the zeamet in Aleppo, is found in
Maliye defteri 10141, 48^. (Given title of the register
iss clli \a^ U-~ _ > ) . The berat is
dated February 14? 1694/Cemaziyelahir, 1105, bearing an
imperial authorization of the berat, dated April 4, 1694/
faban 6, 1105. On the same folio the instalments due
to the treasury for the year 1105 are noted in eight
separate entries/payments-
When Sultan Mustafa II ascended the throne, February 6,
1695 Sami Mehmed Efendi*a zeamet was, upon his appeal,
renewed cn February 20, 1695- (The text of the renewal

a
berat can be seen, in Maliye defteri 5879, 235 ) The
Reis&lk&ttab's dismissal from office in 1108 did not affect
his right to farm the taxer from his zeamet in Aleppo.
In Maliye defteri 1044, 67a, there is a summary, icmal
of the instalments whieh the then former Reisulkuttab
paid to the treasury for the years 110? and 1 1 0 9 , totalling
246,160 akpes, given in seventeen separate payments.
Treasury payments due from Rami Mehmed Efendi*s zeamet for
the year 1109 (during part of whioh he was still out of
office), Eire noted in Maliye defteri 10145, 57^ Because
172
of shortages in the treasury, some of the payments for the
year 1109 were called in the previous year? For the same
reason, the payments for the year 1110 were collected in
1109. Maliye defteri 4879? 17*.
On February 8, 1701, as a reward for his long services
to the Sublime State, Rami Mehmed Efendi was awarded the
Aleppo zeamet as an outright mELlk. Except for a small
sector, which was a vakf, and henoe inalienable, the whole
zeamet was to be held by him and his family or progeny
after him, without obligations and in perpetuity. I
could not find a copy of the temiiktezkire in the Maliye
defteri. However, there is an original copy of temiik
tezkire which can be seen in Emiri Tasnifi in folder Ho.
12120. This teskire is apparently the one given to
Rami Mehmed Efendi by the Hifanoi, issued February 8, 1701/
aban 28, 1112, and oheoked and noted by the Defterdar
Efendi* (It should be noted here that only in this
text and the following, it is revealed that Rami Mehmed
Efendi had earlier purchased the right to farm the taxes
of the zeamet in Aleppo for life).
About a fortnight later, in mid-ewal, 1112/ February
28 - March 7, 1701, a decree was issued through the Chancery
to the Vali, Molla and Mubassel (tax-colleotor) of Aleppo,
informing them of the changed status of Rami Mehmed Efendis
173
holdings in the said sanoak. Since, as noted earlier,
a religious endowment (vakx ox the Zulkadaxri Sultan Guri)
fell within the boundaries of the zeamet, these same
officers were instructed of the despatch of a certain
katib of the Deftorder*s offices, whose duty it was to
mark and differentiate the boundaries between the zeamet,
the vakf and other miri territory in the vicinity, as
well as register the farm hands on the zeamet
(MQhimme defteri, 111, 266a ).
The change in status of this property is noted in
Maliye defteri 10148, 64a* An entry pertaining to
Rami Mehmed Efendi*s payments due to the treasury from
the said zeamet for the year 1114, is cancelled by a
notation that the said territory had, according to a
Sacred Ferman dated ipaban 28, 1112 as stated in the
appropriate defter, been awarded in the form of -'Ik
to the Reisulk&ttab
APPEHDXX
AuetroOttoman Articles
T. The country of Transilvania shall remain entire as it is

now in the possession and dominion of His Imperial Majesty*
and shall he oiroumsorihed from the confines of Podolia to
the extreme frontier of Walachia* with its mountains * which
before the present war were the ancient boundaries between
Transilvania on one part, and Walachia and Moldavia on the
other; and from the confines of Walachia, to the river
Marosohe (Mure?), with its mountains also, which were the
ancient boundaries* so that by observing the ancient bounda
ries on both sides, the same shall not beextended on either
side.
IX. The province subject to the castle of Temeswaier (Timisoara),

with all its districts and rivers, shall remain in the possession
and power of the sublime Ottoman Porte. And the ancient limits
of Transilvania, established in the foregoing article, from the
extreme frontier of Walachia to the riverMarosohe, shall be its
limits on the side of Transilvania. Thence its boundaries
shall be carried on from the hither banks of the Marosohe to
the rives Teyp.se (Tiesa), and from the hither bank of the Teysse
to the Danube; but the plaoes within the limits, viz. Caransebe?,
Lugas (Lugoj), Lippa (Lipova), Csanad, Kiso&nisia, Betache,
Betsokerok, and the hither Sablia, and between the ancient
limits of Transilvania, as they were settled before the war,
and what other place soever be found aocordlng to the rule
abovementioned, between the banks of the Marosohe and the
Teysse, in the territories of Temeswaier, shall be demolished
by the imperialists, on this condition, that they shall never
be rebuilt by virtue of any other treaty. . And the said
oountry of Temeswaier shall be left altogether free, and no
other plaoes, either greater or less, which have the appear
ance of a fortifioatioa, shall hereafter be built, either in
the said places, or near the banks of the Marosohe and the
Teysse.
The use of the Marosohe and Teysse, between the provlnoe
of Temeswaier and the provinces subject to the Emperors power
and possession, shall be common to the subjects of both aspires,
whether for watering of oattle of all sorts, or for fishing, or
other convenience necessary for the subjects.
And whereas ships or burden bound from the parts there
mentioned, subject to the Imperial dominion, either in passing
or repassing through the river Marosohe to the river Teysse, or.
through the Teysse to the Danube, ought not to meet with any
obstruction; the navigation of the German ships, or of any
others which are subject to the Emperor, shall by no means be
174
175
disturbed in their passage to and fro, but the same shall be

freely and commodiously carried on everywhere in both the
said rivers; and for the preservation of a reciprocal friend
ship and good-will, the subjeots of the Ottoman Porte shall
share the conveniences of the said rivers, without any hin
drance to the fisher-boats, and mills shall be placed by the
participation and consent of the governors of both dominions,
only in such places where they may not be s. hindrance to the
navigation of either empire. But- lest the passage of the
Imperial ships should suffer any detriment, by turning off the
water of the Marosohe, it shall not be lawful to divert or
turn off the water of the said rivers, for the sake of mills,
or on any other aocount.
All the islands whatsoever in the said rivers, which are
actually in the Emperors power, shall remain as they are in
his possession; and the subjects of both dominions shall live
peaceably and quietly, and be restrained by the severest edicts
from insults, and from breach of the articles.
III. Whereas the country between the rivers Teysse and Danube,
commonly called Batska (Backs), is in the sole possession and
pewsr of His Imperial Majesty, so it shall remain hereafter
in the said Imperial power and dominion, and Titul (Titel)
shall never be more fortified than it is.
IV. A line shall be drawn from the extremity of the strand

on this side of the Teysse over against Titul, and from the
angle of land which is there formed by the conjunction of
the Teysse and the Danube, quite to the bank of the Danube;
and another line from the hither side of the Teysse to the
river Bossut (Bosut), and to the hither bank of Mcravitz,
and from thence to the place where the biggest branch of the
Bossut falls into the Save; and there shall bo no fortifi
cation upon the Moravitz, but only open villages built on
both aides of it, so that the said line shall be confirmed
and distinguished either by ditches, or stones, or posts, or
some other way to serve as the limits of both empires in the
manner following.
The country towards Belgrade, within the aforesaid limits,
shall remain solely in the possession and dominion of the most
potent Emperor of the Turks*
But the country situate on the other side of the said
line shall remain in the sole possession and power of the most
potent Emperor of the Romans; and according to those limits
shall be the possession of the rivers which are in the terri
tories remaining the possession of both parties.
V. That part of the Save which waters those countries belong

ing to the Emperor of the Romans, shall be possessed by his
176
said Majesty, and the other part shall he possessed by the

Ottoman Emperor.
That part of the Save which runs betwixt both empires,
together with the islands therein, shall be common to the
subjects of both for navigation to and fro, and for any
other conveniences; and both shall religiously observe
the commerce peaceably, and without molestation.
The country belonging to the dominion of His Imperial
Ottoman Majesty, as far as the river Unna (Una) towards
Bosnia, shall be limited and bounded by the hither shore
of the river Unnas and all the Imperial garrisons that are
in Bovi, Dubizza, Jessenovizza, Doboy and Brod on the part
of Bosnia, and any other such place in this traot, shall be
drawn out from thence/thence, and the same shall be left
intirely free, fsic-!
But whereas Castanoviz, and the islands below the country
of ITovi, towards the Save, together with the farthermost bank
of the said river Unna, are and remain in the power of the
Emperor of the Homans* they shall bs distinguished henceforth
by the aforesaid limits.
Finally, the plaoes beyond the Unna, far remote from the
Save, which are garrisoned and possessed by both parties,
together with the lands belonging to the same before the
present war, shall also remain in the power of either party
who possesses them, on oonditlon that commissioners who shall
be deputed on both sides, do separate and divide the districts
and territories that are to remain in the possession of both,
in the parts of Croatia, by particular lines distinguishable
by ditohes, stones, stakes, or any other marks for avoiding
And whoever on either side shall presume to alter, change,

pullup, take away, or in any respect to violate any of these
marks, the strictest inquiry shall be made after him; and if
he be apprehended, he shall be most severely punished for an
example to others.
The commissioners shall be deputed as soon as possible,
to distinguish and fix the bounds of Croatia; and they shall
be enjoined to give diligent attention to the tranquility and
seourity of both dominions, and that they faithfully and
dearly separate and distinguish the territories without
prejudice or affection.
Whereas the fortifications of the castle of Brod, situate
on the other side of the Save (towards the Ottoman empire)
which were lately made by the Imperialists, ought to be
demolished at the time of withdrawing the Imperial garrison,
and the said plaoe lies very commodiously for traffic, a city
may be built there with a handsom convenient preoinot; provided
nevertheless that it be not turned into the form of a castle or
fort.** (From William Horsley, Tho Folltloal History of Bur0*00 .
800-1716. London, 1746, pp. 268-70).
177
Polish-Ottoraan Articles
"I. The ancient friendship being again renewed by the providence

of the most high Goa, together with a hearty reconciliation and
good neighbourhood^ all hostilities shall oease for ever on both
sides, and the subjeots shall enjoy and be established in their
former seourity and tranquility; and the frontiers of the provin
ces subject to Poland shall be separated and distinguished by
their ancient boundaries from the Imperial frontiers, as well
of Moldavia, as of other districts subject to the Sublime Empire*
H . All the fortresses whether greater or lesser, comprehended

within the ancient limits of Moldavia before the last war but
one, and whioh have hitherto been detained by the Poles, shall
be evacuated by their soldiers, and the province of Moldavia
shall remain entirely free in the pacifio state it was in before
the last war.
IH. The fortress of Caminieo (Kamenets-Podolsk), which is also

situant within the ancient limits of Poland as they stood before
the two last wars, shall be entirely evacuated by the Mussulmen,
and hereafter no demand shall be made by the Sublime Empire to
the provinces of Podolia and Ukrain. And whereas the anoient
limits of Poland and Moldavia are manifest, if there be a con
venient time the evacuation shall commence at the beginning of
March next, and if possible, sooner; and as soon as the
fortresses and plaoes of Moldavia are evacuated, by the with
drawing of the Polish militia, and Moldavia thereby remains
free, the evacuation of the fortress of Caminieo shall also
ftcamwnna at the beginning of March, after the affair of
the svaouation is perfected, it shall be put in execution
without hesitation, delay and neglect; and the ev&ouation
of fort Caminieo shall be finished by the 15th of May next
at farthest. And to the intent that the same may be evacu
ated with ease and speed, the Poles shall give all the assist
ance possible with waggons and horses for the transportation
and the affair of the evacuation shall bo oarried on every
where with security so that if in the evacuation of the forts
and other places howsoever fortified any of the subjeots have
a mind to go out, they may safely depart with their houshbld
Csio] goods, and other effects; and whoevsr has a mind to stay,
sTTaTl have the same protection without impediment. And
since the evacuation of the forts and plaoes on both sides is
to commence in the beginning of March next, the Polish ambassa
dor, who is speedily to be dispatched to the resplendent Port,
shall make representation to the Imperial throne of the guns
left at Caminieo, whether their own, or such as were found
there.
178
IV. None of the subjects of the sublime Empire, of what

condition soever, especially the Tartars of any nation soever,
shall on the score of any pretence or controversy whatsoever
exercise hostilities against the subjeots of the Sing and
republic of Poland, and against their frontiers, nor commit
excursions, carry off person to captivity, drive away cattle
nor do them any damage or injury; and the viziers, beglerbeys,
and the Han of Grim Tartary, with the other sultans, and the
Woywod of Moldavia, shall be expressly commanded by royal
edicts, to be very diligent in observing and keeping peace
and tranquility on the frontiers, and that they do not injure
the subjeots of Poland, carrying off their people, driving
away their cattle, or by hurting or molesting them in any
other way; and that they inquire most strictly after the
disturbers and trangressors of the articles of peace....
V. Whereas the kingdom of Poland has been free time out

of mind, it shall not be disturbed by any hostility on the
part of the sublime Empire, nor the nations therunto subject,
under colour of any pretension whatsoever; nor shall be bound
to comply with such pretensions by virtue of the articles of
peace.1* (Efrom William Horsley, The Politioal History of
Europe. 800-1716. London, 1746, pp. 276-78).

The Reisulkuttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Reisulkuttab and Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

6 4 -7 3 5

A B O U -E L H A J, R ifa 'a t A li, 1 9 3 3 -

U niversity Microfilms, Inc., A n n Arbor, M ichigan

the Faculty of the Departments of Oriental

Studies and History

of the Requirements for the Degree

Rifaat Ali Abou-El-Haj

This study deals with two major, interrelated problems8

1. Because knowledge of the military situation leading to

peace negotiations had, prior to I698 , been considered as

sufficient qualification for leading an Ottoman peace mission,

the delegates were invariably drawn from the ranks of the

military commanders. With the overwhelming defeat of the

Ottoman forces at Senta in 1697? however, oiroumstanoes had

changed to suoh an extent as to necessitate the requirement

of other, additional qualifications in leaders of the dele

gation. This study proposes that by selecting Rami Mehmed

Efendi to lead the mission of 1698 , the Ottoman State had

chosen one of its few administrators who met the qualifications

required by this new situation. Due to its militant ideology

(the ever-expanding, frontier of Islam), and as a direot result

of drawing the leaders of peaoe missions from the ranks of the

military personnel, the Ottoman State possessed no corps of

trained diplomats to conduct negotiate ons after the drastic

change in circumstances in I698 . This study, by tracing the

rise of the office of the Reisftlkiittab in general and of the

incumbent Reisftlkttttab Rami Mehmed Efendi in particular, within

the Ottoman administrative system, suggests that by the time

he held that office Rami Mehmed Efendi had acquired sufficient

knowledge of and experience in the fields of foreign and

domestic affairs to be able to deal competently with the

had not only broken with tradition and established a new

2. Neither of the two previous studies of the negotiations

1895) and W.B Munson, "The Peace of Karlowitz" Dnipublished

Ph.De dissertation, The University of Illinois, Urbana, 19403),

has attempted to investigate the position and performance of

Ottoman sources, considers in detail the meetings at Karlowitz

between the Ottoman and the Holy League delegations, analyzes

proposed and accepted by the principles in order to indicate

documents, it is suggested by the author that the delegation

of the Ottoman State to the peaoe conference of 1698-99, despite

quite well in defending and upholding the interests, honour and

dignity of the Ottoman State.

T O E OS? TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . iv

I. THE DIPLdLLIC SGEHE I688 -I698 .. . . . 1

H. THE OTTOMAN PEACE MISSION.......... . 20

Life and Career I654 -I698

a. Campaign and Military Affairs

Preliminaries* July-Novemberj 1698

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY................ 149

APPENDIX . . . ........................... 174

For the guidance and assistance which X received from

the faculty members of the Departments of Oriental Studies

and History at Princeton University during the course of

preparation of this thesis, I wish to acknowledge my debt.

During my stay in Istanbul, Princeton and Canton the staffs

of the Baffbakanllk Arfivi, the Firestone Library and the

Owen D. Young Library gave generously of their time in the

location of both substantive and supporting sources? A

Foreign Area Study Fellowship, then of the Ford Foundation,

made possible my research in Istanbul during the year

I96O-I96I and in Princeton through January, 1962. The

Foundation's financial support, does not in any way,

imply its concurrence with or adherence to the ideas and