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The two cases were jointly tried by RTC-Br. 55, which, rendered a
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS CARLO GERARD VIRAY
vs.SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA USI
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Facts
On April 28, 1986, Geodetic Engineer Abdon G. Fajardo prepared a
subdivision plan (Fajardo Plan) for Lot 733,registered in the name
of Ellen P. Mendoza (Mendoza) under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. (TCT) 141-RP of the Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in which
Lot 733 was divided into six (6) smaller parcels of differing size
dimensions, designated as: Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B, Lot 733-C, Lot
733-D, Lot 733-E, and Lot 733-F.
The following day, Mendoza executed two separate deeds of
absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to Jesus Carlo
Gerard Viray (Jesus Viray), and the second deed conveying Lot
733-A to spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay (Sps.
Viray). As of that time, the Fajardo Plan has not been officially
approved by the Land Management Bureau (LMB), formerly the
Bureau of Lands. And at no time in the course of the controversy
did the spouses Viray and Jesus Viray, as purchasers of Lots 733-A
and 733-F, respectively, cause the annotations of the conveying
deeds of sale on TCT 141-RP.
The aforementioned conveyances notwithstanding, Mendoza,
Emerenciana M. Vda. de Mallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent
spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or the Usis), as
purported co-owners of Lot 733, executed on August 20, 1990 a
Subdivision Agreement,or the1st subdivision agreement (1st SA).
Pursuant to this agreement which adopted, as base of reference,
the LMB-approved subdivision plan prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Alfeo S. Galang (Galang Plan), Lot 733 was subdivided
into three lots, i.e., Lots A to C.TCT 141-RP would eventually be
canceled and, in lieu thereof, three derivative titles were issued to
the following, as indicated: TCT 1584-RP for Lot 733-A to
Emerencia M. Vda. Mallari; TCT 1585-RP for Lot 733-B to Sps. Jose
B. Usi and Amelita B.Usi; and TCT 1586-RP for Lot 733-C to Ellen P.
Mendoza.
On April 5, 1991, another Subdivision Agreement (2nd SA) was
executed, covering and under which the 8,148-sq. m. Lot 733-C
was further subdivided into 13 smaller lots (Lot 733-C-1 to Lot
733-C-13 inclusive). The subdivision plan for Lot 733-C, as likewise
prepared by Engr. Galang on October 13, 1990, was officially
approved by the LMB on March 1, 1991.
Based on the ocular inspection and survey conducted on Lot 733,
as an undivided whole, by Geodetic Engr. AngelitoNicdao of the
LMB, Lot 733-A of the Fajardo Plan that Sps. Viray bought is within
Lot 733-B (Galang Plan) allotted under 1st SA to Sps. Jose and
AmelitaUsi; andLot 733-F of the Fajardo Plan is almost identical to
the combined area of Lots 733-C-8 to 733-C-12 awarded to Ellen
Mendoza and her childrenMcDwight, Bismark, Beverly and
Georgenia, and a portion (1,000 square meters) of Lot 733-C-10 of
the Galang Plan awarded to Sps. Jose and AmelitaUsi.
The Usis and Mendoza filed a suit for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale filed before the RTC, Pampanga assailing the validity
and seeking the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed
by Mendoza conveying Lot 733-A (Fajardo Plan) to defendants
Sps. Viray.A similar suit for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale
commenced by Mendoza against Jesus Viray, also seeking to
nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale conveying Lot 733-F (Fajardo
Plan) to Jesus Viray and to declare the plaintiff as entitled to its
possession.
Joint Decision finding for the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, as
defendants, and accordingly dismissing the separate complaints
to annul the deeds of sale subject of the joint cases.
On appeal, the CA, in effect affirmed in toto the RTC dismissal
decision.
A forcible entry case filed on November 19, 1991 by the late Jesus
Viray against the Sps. Usi before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Pampanga, to eject the Usis from Lot 733-F (Fajardo
Plan).
The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of Jesus Viray, which
decision eventually became final and executory, the Usis having
opted not to appeal it.
The spouses Usi, instead of appealing from theMCTC Decision,
sought, after its finality, its annulment before the RTC, whichboth
RTC and CA, upon appeal, dismissed.
A Petition for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoriawas instituted on
December 12, 2001 by Sps. Usi against the late Jesus Viray, as
substituted by Vda. de Viray, et al., before the RTC, Pampanga,
involving Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang Plan),
asserting that the execution of the MCTC Decision would oust
them from their own lots even though the dispositive portion of
said forcible entry Decision mentioned Lots 733-A and 733-F
(Fajardo Plan) and not Lots 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-C-10 (Galang
Plan) which are registered in their names.
Vda. de Viray moved for the dismissal of these publiciana/
reivindicatoria actions on grounds, among others, of
litispendentia and res judicata.
An action for Cancellation of Titles or Surrender of Original Titles
with Damages was commenced by Vda. de Viray, et al., against
the Sps. Usi, Mendoza and eight others before the RTC,
Pampanga, seeking the cancellation of TCT Nos. 3614-R.P., 2099-
R.P., 2101-R.P., 7502-R.P. and 2103-R.P. covering Lots 733-C-8 to
733-C-12 as subdivided under the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 which
taken together is basically identical to Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan)
sold to Jesus Viray.
In sum, of the six (6) cases referred to above, the first four (4)
have been terminated and the main issue/s therein peremptorily
resolved. Only two cases of the original six revolving around Lot
733 remained unresolved. The first refers to the petition for
review of the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 which, in
turn, is an appeal from the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
01-1118(M), a Petition for AccionPubliciana/ Reivindicatoria and
Damages, and the second is Civil Case No. (02)-1164(M) for
Cancellation of Titles or Surrender of Original Titles with Damages.
The first case is subject of the present recourse, while the second
is, per records, still pending before the RTC, Pampanga, its
resolution doubtless on hold in light of the instant petition.
The Ruling of the RTC in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M)
In Civil Case No. 01-1118(M), the Macabebe, Pampanga RTC
rendered judgment dismissing the petition of the Sps. Usi for
AccionPubliciana/Reivindicatoria, where it held that the Sps. Usi
failed to establish by preponderance of evidence to support their
claim of title, possession and ownership over the lots subject of
their petition.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA rendered the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside
the appealed RTC decision, and declaring as legal and valid, the

right of ownership of petitioner-appellant respondents spouses
Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi over Lot Nos. 733-B, 733-C-1 and 733-
C-10 covered by TCT Nos. 1585-R.P., 2092-R.P, and 2101-R.P.,
respectively.
The Issue
WON the two (2) subdivision agreements dated August 20, 1990 and
April 5, 1991, respectively, partake of a bona fide and legally binding
partition contracts or arrangements among co-owners that validly
effectuated the transfer of the subject lots to respondent spouses
Usi, which the validity of deeds of absolute sale upon which the
petitioners hinged their claim of ownership and right of possession
over said lots depended.
The Courts Ruling
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
The subdivision agreements not partition of co-owners
Partition, in general, is the separation, division, and assignment of a
thing held in common by those to whom it may belong.
Contrary to the finding of the CA, the subdivision agreements forged
by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for the partition of
pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually
conveyances, disguised as partitions, of portions of Lot 733
specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of the subsequent
subdivision of Lot 733-C.
It is fairly clear that Lot 733, even from the fact alone of its being
registered under the name of the late Moses Mendoza and Ellen
Mendoza, formed part of the couples conjugal property at the time
Moses demise on April 5, 1986. Equally clear, too, is that Vda. de
Mallari became a co-owner of Lot 733 by virtue of the purchase of
its 416-square meter portion on February 14, 1984, during the
lifetime of Moses. Be that as it may and given that the Sps. Usi have
not been shown to be co-owners of Mendoza and Vda. de Mallari
prior to the sale by Mendoza on April 29, 1986 of Lots 733-A and
733-F (Fajardo Plan) to the Sps. Viray and Jesus Viray, respectively,
then the execution of the 1st SA on August 20, 1990 could not have
been a partition by co-owners of Lot 733. The same could be said of
the 2nd SA of April 5, 1991 vis--vis Lot 733-C, for the records are
similarly completely bereft of any evidence to show on how the
purported participating co-owners, namely Sps. Usi, the Sps. Lacap,
the Sps. Balingit and the Sps. Jordan became co-owners with
Mendoza and her children, i.e., McDwight, Bismark, Beverly and
Georgenia.
The April 29, 1986 Deeds of Absolute Saleof Lot 733-A and Lot 733-
F are Valid
It must be noted that the RTC, in its decision in Civil Case Nos. 88-
0265-M and 88-0283-M, upheld the validity of the separate April 29,
1986 deeds of absolute sale of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan).
The combined area of Lot 733-A (366 sq. m.) and Lot 733-F (3,501) is
less than one half of the total area coverage of Lot 733 (9,137). The
sale of one-half portion of the conjugal property is valid as a sale. It
cannot be gainsaid then that the deeds, executed as they were by
the property owner, were sufficient to transfer title and ownership
over the portions covered thereby. And the aforesaid RTC decision
had become final and executory as far back as December 11, 1995
when the Court, in G.R. No. 122287, in effect, affirmed the RTC
decision. Likewise, the MCTCs decision in Civil Case No. 91 (13) for
forcible entry, declaring Vda. de Viray, as successor-in-interest of
Jesus Viray, as entitled to the physical possession, or possession de
facto, of Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan), and the RTCs decision in Civil Case
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No. 99-0914M, disposing of the belated appeal of the MCTC decision
in the forcible entry case, have become final and executory on
February 12, 2003 under G.R. No. 154538.
From the facts, there is no valid sale from Mendoza to respondents
Usi. The parties did not execute a valid deed of sale conveying and
transferring the lots in question to respondents. What they rely on
are two subdivision agreements which do not explicitly chronicle the
transfer of said lots to them.
Given the above perspective, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice
Jesus Viray) have, as against the Sps. Usi, superior rights over Lot
733-A and Lot 733-F (Fajardo Plan) or portions thereof.
Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after peremptorily
prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim of ownership and
possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be
deprived of their rights by the expediency of the Sps. Usi
maintaining, as here, an accionpubliciana and/or
accionreivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover
possession of real property. The third, accioninterdictal, comprises
two distinct causes of action, namely forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, the issue in both cases being limited to the right to physical
possession or possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership that either party may set forth in his or her pleadings,
albeit the court has the competence to delve into and resolve the
issue of ownership but only to address the issue of priority of
possession. Both actions must be brought within one year from the
date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand to vacate following the expiration of the
right to possess, in case of unlawful detainer.
When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more
than one year, one may avail himself of accionpubliciana to
determine the better right of possession, or possession de jure, of
realty independently of title. On the other hand,
accionreivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which
necessarily includes recovery of possession.
Now then, it is a hornbook rule that once a judgment becomes final
and executory, it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land, as what remains to be done is the purely ministerial
enforcement or execution of the judgment. Any attempt to reopen a
close case would offend the principle of res judicata.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Vda. de
Viray (vice Jose Viray) and the Sps. Viray over the disputed parcels of
land cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru
actions to recover possession and vindicate ownership filed by the
Sps. Usi. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287 (Ellen P. Mendoza and Jose
and AmelitaUsi v. Spouses AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay
and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray), has in effect determined that the
conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the
Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray (vice Jose Viray) on April 29, 1986 were
valid. This determination operates as a bar to the Usisreivindicatory
action to assail the April 29, 1986 conveyances and precludes the
relitigation between the same parties of the settled issue of
ownership and possession arising from ownership. It may be that
the spouses Usi did not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question in their action for annulment
of the deed sale of sale. But it cannot be gainsaid that said action is
closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, and affects the title,
of the lot covered by the deed. The prevalent doctrine, to borrow

from Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,"is that an
action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does
not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and
nature of the case, which is to recover said real property."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
dated July 24, 2009 and Resolution dated June 2, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90344 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated June 21, 2007 in Civil Case No. 01-1118(M) of the
RTC, Branch 55 in Macabebe, Pampanga is accordingly REINSTATED.
CASE DIGEST 3: RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, MARIA PIEDAD represented by INSPIRACION
DANAO vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and EMETERIA M.
GURIEZA, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
A COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND DAMAGES was filed
by Bonifacio against Sps.Gurieza before the Municipal Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. BONIFACIO alleged that he is the
absolute owner of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of residential
land designated as Lot 1227, located at La Torre, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, withan area of 4,640.98 square meters which he acquired
through intestate succession from his late father who inherited the
same from the latters parents, Alejandro Piedad and Tomasa
Villaray. He also claimed that his ownership of the subject lot took
place even before his fathers death and was validated through a
Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition executed by
Alejandro and Tomasas legal heirs. Further, BONIFACIO alleged that
before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the subject lot
and assigned numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of which
were Sps. Gurieza.
However, SPS. GURIEZA allegedly took interest of the bungalow and
the subject lot after learning from an employee of DENR that Lot
1227 is public land. Using such information, SPS. GURIEZA had the
subject lot declared under their name for tax purposes, caused a
subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey
authority and titling with the Bureau of Land Management, CENRO
DENR Nueva Vizcaya.
When BONIFACIO learned of Sps. Guriezas acts, he authorized Ofelia
Bay-ag to file a protest before the DENR which deferred further
action on their (Sps. Guriezas) application before it. Thereafter,
Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao, to the
country to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject
lot unconditionally; and for this purpose, Danao initiated a complaint
before the barangay court. However, during the mediation
proceedings, SPS. GURIEZA refused to heed Danaos demand and
even challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus, BONIFACIO was
constrained to file the instant case as his last resort.
SPS. GURIEZA denied Bonifacios claim and maintained that in 1974,
the subject lot was a vacant and virginal public land and that the
DENR allowed them to possess and occupy the same in the concept
of an owner. As such, they acquired the same through acquisitive
prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity of
the Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was only signed by a
few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa.
MTC ruled in Bonifacios favor, and ordered Sps. Gurieza to vacate
the subject lot. It found that Bonifacio had a better right of
possession over the subject lot as evidenced by the house he built
thereon as early as the 1950s when he took possession of the said
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lot, as well as the affidavits of witnesses who are pioneer residents
of the area, attesting that Sps. Guriezas claim over such lot is
preposterous. MTC also found that Sps. Guriezas continuous stay on
the subject lot was by Bonifacios mere tolerance and such stay
became illegal when they refused to vacate the said lot despite the
latters demand. RTC affirmed the MTC ruling in toto. CA reversed
and set aside the RTC ruling, and consequently, ordered the
dismissal of Bonifacios Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacios Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
and Damages against Sps. Gurieza is proper. YES
RULING:
UNLAWFUL DETAINER is an action to recover possession of real
property from one who unlawfully withholds possession thereof
after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession
under any contract, express or implied. The POSSESSION OF THE
DEFENDANT IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The ONLY ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED IN AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE
is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
An EJECTMENT CASE, based on the allegation of possession by
tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer. Where the
PLAINTIFF allows the defendant to use his/her property by tolerance
without any contract, the DEFENDANT is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he/she will vacate on demand, failing which, an
action for unlawful detainer will lie.
Thus, under SECTION 1, RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF COURT, the
COMPLAINT MUST BE FILED "within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession" and must allege that: (a)
the DEFENDANT originally had lawful possession of the property,
EITHER by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the DEFENDANTS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY
became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to defendant
of the expiration or the termination of the defendants right of
possession; (c) thereafter, the DEFENDANT remained in possession
of the property and deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof;
and (d) WITHIN ONE (1) YEAR from the unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the COURT holds that
Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful
detainer. The following established facts impel this conclusion:
FIRST, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio
already had possession of the subject lot and even built a bungalow-
type house thereon. Moreover, when HE MIGRATED TO HAWAII,
Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said house and lot,
the last being Sps. Gurieza. SECOND, when Bonifacio learned that
Sps. Gurieza declared the subject lot under their name for tax
purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an
application for survey authority and titling with the CENRODENR
Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to terminate their
tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they
leave immediately, rendering the Sps.Guriezas stay on the subject
lot illegal. THIRD, instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps. Gurieza
defied Bonifacios demand and asserted their ownership over the
same. LASTLY, BONIFACIO, THROUGH DANAO, made his final
demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008, as evidenced by a
Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of the area
where the subject lot was located, stating that the Sangguniang

Barangay had tried to settle the dispute between the parties but
failed to do so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within
the one (1) year period from his last demand.
CASE DIGEST 4: RULE 70 FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA AND REMEDIOS VELASCO
vs.WATERFIELDS INDUSTRIES CORPORATION, represented by its
President, ALIZA MA, G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014, DEL CASTILLO,
J.:
FACTS:
The SPOUSES MANZANILLA are the owners of a 25,000-square meter
parcel of land in BarangaySan Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. On May
24, 1994, they leased a 6,000-square meter portion of the above-
mentioned property to Waterfields, as represented by its President
Aliza R. Ma (Ma). The PARTIES executed on June 6, 1994 an
Amendment to the Contract of Lease. Save for the
COMMENCEMENT OF THE LEASE WHICH THEY RECKONED on the
date of the execution of the amendment and the undertaking of the
spouses Manzanilla to register the agreements, the PARTIES agreed
therein that all other terms and conditions in the original Contract of
Lease shall remain in full force and effect. Beginning April 1997,
however, WATERFIELDS failed to pay the monthly rental.
On July 30, 1998, the SPOUSES MANZANILLA filed before the MTC a
COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AGAINST WATERFIELDS. They alleged
in PARAGRAPH 4 thereof that they entered into a Contract of Lease
with Waterfields on May 24, 1994, and in PARAGRAPH 5, that the
same was amended on June 6, 1994 and July 9, 1997. However,
WATERFIELDS had committed violations of the lease agreement by
not paying the rentals on time. And in yet another violation, it failed
to pay the 18,000.00 monthly rental for the past six months prior to
the filing of the Complaint, that is, from December 1997 to May
1998 or in the total amount of 108,000.00. Demands upon
Waterfields to pay the accrued rentals and vacate the property were
unheeded so the SPOUSES MANZANILLA considered the contract
terminated and/or rescinded. Hence, SPOUSES filed the Complaint
and prayed therein that the former be ordered to (1) vacate the
subject property and, (2) pay the accrued rentals of 108,000.00 as
of May 1998, the succeeding rentals of 18,000.00 a month until the
property is vacated, the interest due thereon, attorneys fees, and
cost of suit.
WATERFIELDS admitted paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Complaint and
alleged that: (1) when the lease agreement was executed, the
property subject thereof was just bare land; (2) it spent substantial
amounts of money in developing the land, i.e., building of water
dikes, putting up of a drainage system, land filling and levelling; (3) it
built thereon a processing plant for fruit juices, preserved vegetables
and other frozen goods for which it spent around 7,000,000.00;
and (4) it caused the installation in the said premises of an electrical
system for 80,000.00 and water system for 150,000.00.
WATERFIELDS further alleged that although the first two years of its
operation were fruitful, it later suffered from business reverses due
to the economic crisis that hit Asia. Be that as it may, WATERFIELDS
claimed that it did not fail or refuse to pay the monthly rentals but
was just utilizing the rental deposit in the amount of 216,000.00
(equivalent to one year rentals) as rental payment in accordance
with Section 4 of the original Contract of Lease. Hence, it argued that
the SPOUSES MANZANILLA have no cause of action against it.
WATERFIELDS also asserted that the precipitate filing of the
Complaint against it is tainted with bad faith and intended to cause it
grave injustice considering that it already spent an enormous
amount of almost 10,000,000.00 in developing the property.
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MTC found no merit in Waterfields claim that it did not fail or refuse
to pay the monthly rentals as it was applying the rental deposit to its
payment of the same. Consequently, the MTC declared that
Waterfields violated the lease agreement due to non-payment of
rental. RTC affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. The CA
concluded that the spouses Manzanilla have no cause of action
against Waterfields.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners action for Unlawful Detainer
against Waterfields is proper. YES
RULING:
For the purpose of bringing an unlawful detainer suit, TWO
REQUISITES MUST CONCUR: (1) there must be failure to pay rent or
comply with the conditions of the lease, and (2) there must be
demand both to pay or to comply and vacate. The FIRST REQUISITE
refers to the existence of the cause of action for unlawful detainer,
while the SECOND refers to the jurisdictional requirement of
demand in order that said cause of action may be pursued. IMPLIED
IN THE FIRST REQUISITE, which is needed to establish the cause of
action of the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer suit, is the presentation
of the contract of lease entered into by the plaintiff and the
defendant, the same being needed to establish the lease conditions
alleged to have been violated.
Thus, in Bachrach Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that the EVIDENCE NEEDED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN
AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE is (1) a lease contract and (2) the
violation of that lease by the defendant.
It must be stressed that in this case, the VIOLATION OF THE LEASE
THROUGH NON-PAYMENT OF RENT is what constitutes the cause of
action. Hence, ONCE THE FAILURE TO PAY RENT IS ESTABLISHED, a
cause of action for unlawful detainer arises. The problem, however,
is that the CA acted on its mistaken notion as to when a cause of
action arises. It did not base its determination of the existence of the
cause of action from the fact that Waterfields failed to pay rents
from December 1997 to May 1998. To it, the CAUSE OF ACTION in
this case only arose after the contract was terminated and the rental
deposit was found sufficient to cover the unpaid rentals. This is
erroneous since as already discussed, it is the FAILURE TO PAY RENT
which gives rise to the cause of action.
Prescinding from this, the CAs acknowledgement that Waterfields
failed to pay rent, as shown by its declaration that the latter is the
debtor of the spouses Manzanilla with respect to the unpaid rentals,
is clearly inconsistent with the conclusion that no cause of action for
ejectment exists against Waterfields. FAILURE TO PAY THE RENT
must precede termination of the contract due to nonpayment of
rent. It therefore follows that the CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER IN THIS CASE must necessarily arise before the
termination of the contract and not the other way around as what
the CA supposed. Indeed, in going beyond the termination of the
contract, the CA went a bit too far in its resolution of this case.
All told, the COURT sustains the RTC in affirming the MTC's grant of
the spouses Manzanilla's Complaint for ejectment against
Waterfields.
Case Digest No 4: DELA CRUZ vs SPOUSES HERMANO
Facts:
Respondents Anotonio and Remedios Hermano are the
registered owners of a house and lot situated in Tagaytay
City covered by TCT No. T-24503. On June 13, 2002,

Antonio sued petitioner, Dela Cruz, before MTCC of
Tagaytay City for ejectment and damges. In his complaint,
he averred that they (spouses Hermano) are the registered
and lawful owners of the said house and lot, which they
use as their rest house or vacation place. They further
alleged that petitioner occupied and possessed the
aforesaid house and lot sometime on September 1, 2001
pursuant to the alleged Memorandum of Agreement
between her and certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez
without respondents authority and consent.
Petitioner admitted to the existence of TCT No. T-24503
but contended that the tue and actual owner thereof was
Don Benitez. Allegedly, Antonio and his wife, respondent
Remedios Hermano, had already sold the property to
Benitez; the latter, in turn, sold it to petitioner by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale, which they executed on 1 March
2001. Petitioner claimed that Antonio knew about the sale
and her immediate occupation of the premises. She also
claimed that the place was actually uninhabited when she
occupied it and that it was Benitez who had provided the
keys thereto. Moreover, Antonio allegedly knew that her
caretakers had been managing the property since March
2001, and that he never questioned their presence there.
Thus, petitioner contended that estoppel had set in, as he
had made her believe that she had the right to occupy and
possess the property.
The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the complaint. According to MTCC,
Antonios proper remedy was an action for recovery,
instead of the summary proceeding of ejectment, because
there was no showing of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. RTC affirmed MTCCs decision. CA reversed
based on its finding that the case was an ejectment
complaint for forcible entry, and that Antonio had
sufficiently alleged and proved prior physical possession,
as well as petitioners entry and possession by stealth.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether Antonio has adequately pleaded and proved a case
of forcible entry.
Ruling:
NO. After an exhaustive review of the case record, the
Court finds that the Complaint was sufficient in form and
substance, but that there was no proof of prior physical
possession by respondents.
The Complaints allegations sufficiently established the
jurisdictional facts required in forcible entry cases.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in
actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the
complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth,
and that the action was filed anytime within one year from
the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took
place. This requirement implies that in those cases,
possession of the land by the defendant has been unlawful
from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by
unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation
until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The
one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual
entry into the land, except when entry was made through
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stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from
the time the plaintiff learned about it.
The allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Complaint
adequately aver prior physical possession by respondents
and their dispossession thereof by stealth, because the
intrusion by petitioner was without their knowledge and
consent. The Court thus agrees with the findings of the CA
that contrary to those of the RTC that the case was an
action for ejectment in the nature of accion
reivindicatoria, the case was actually for forcible entry and
sufficient in form.
Likewise, the Court agrees with the CAs findings that the
Complaint was timely filed. It is settled that where forcible
entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive
period should be counted from the time the person who
was deprived of possession demanded that the deforciant
desist from dispossession when the former learned about
it. xxx And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of
the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules,
simply because the stealthy intruder managed to conceal
the trespass for more than a year, would be to reward
clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful.
However, the title to the property of respondents and
their Tax Declaration proved possession de jure, but not
their actual possession of the property prior to petitioners
entry.
Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the
possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that
which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a
forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or
actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of
ownership. These are different legal concepts under which
the law provides different remedies for recovery of
possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can
prove prior possession can recover the possession even
against the owner. Whatever may be the character of the
possession, the present occupant of the property has the
security to remain on that property if the occupant has the
advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a
better right lawfully causes eviction.
Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax payments are not
conclusive proofs of possession. They are merely good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner based on the
presumption that no one in ones right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in ones actual or
constructive possession.
Respondents, in this case, failed to discharge their burden
of proving the element of prior physical possession.
Case Digest No 5: ZACARIAS vs ANACAY
Facts:
On December 24, 2008, petitioner Amada Zacarias thru
her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias filed a
complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer
against respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her
household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel
of land with an area of 769 square meters in Silang, Cavite
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name
of petitioner and issued by Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L.
Bayot on August 31, 2007.
As mediation between the parties was unsuccessful, the
case was referred to MTCC, which rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint, It held that the allegations of the
complaint failed to state the essential elements of an
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 |6
action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner
had permitted or tolerated respondents occupation of the
subject property was unsubstantiated. Since petitioner
was deprived of the physical possession of her property
through illegal means and the complaint was filed after
the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the
MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
The RTC reversed MCTC pointing out that petitioner did
not state that respondents entered her property through
stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful
possession and acceded to the request of respondents to
stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents
reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that
time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer
because the respondents unlawfully withheld the property
from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for
one year.
The CA reversed RTCs decision granting respondents
petition. For RTC, the MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction
over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful
detainer. Since the prescriptive period for filing an action
for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert
her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the
one-year period to file her action from the time of her
demand for respondents to vacate the property.
For petitioner, unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
considering that she merely tolerated respondents stay in
the premises after demand to vacate was made upon
them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and
she was only forced to take legal action when respondents
reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the
lapse of the period agreed upon.
Issue: W/N the present case partakes that of an unlawful detainer.
Ruling:
NO. The invariable rule is that what determines the nature
of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the
class of cases for which Section 1 of Rule 70 provides a
summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to
give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
evidence. Such remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of
physical possession of his land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal
detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession
after the expiration or termination of his right thereto
under any contract, express or implied.
In Cabrera vs Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer
if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latters right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Petitioners complaint failed to allege a cause of action for
unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the
respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the
petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by
the petitioner of such lawful possession. Petitioners
insistence that she actually tolerated respondents
continued occupation after her discovery of their entry
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred,
she discovered respondents occupation in May 2007.
Such possession could not have been legal from the start
as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less
was it based on any contract, express or implied. We stress
that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer
is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration
or termination of the right to possess.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where
the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial
court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential
that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have
been present right from the start of the possession which
is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.
In Sarona vs Villegas: The word "tolerance" confirms our
view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for
two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that
right authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court -
provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible
entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed
to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court.
Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the
result may well be that no action of forcible entry can
really prescribe.
In Go, Jr. vs CA: It is settled that one whose stay is merely
tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land
the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in
unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiffs
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. This is where petitioners cause of action fails.
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant
was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as
alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant
started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house

thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners
and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendants
entry into the land was effected clandestinely, without the
knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized
as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As
explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muoz vs. Court
of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be
recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of
unlawful detainer not of forcible entry x x x.
The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed
to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare
allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she
discovered that the defendants have enterep the subject
property and occupied the same", as correctly found by
the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered
the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and
without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive
of forcible entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the
MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly
erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201286 July 18, 2014
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS,
RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C.
ARANAS, and RUFINA C. RAMIREZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Resolutions dated 12 May 20112 and 9 March 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784.
The Facts
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 1595-A containing an area of 27,551 square meters
situated in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-57604.
On 5 February 2003, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 29, a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with
a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and
Attorneys Fees against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog).
At the time of the complaint, the land was declared for taxation
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 01-08-05410 with an
assessed value of 57,960 and a market value of 264,930.
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Respondents Claim:
In the Complaint, respondents stated that they were the co-
owners of the land. They alleged that Tagalog occupied a
portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to
month basis by virtue of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a
house with light materials on the land and when a strong
typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalogs house was damaged. Thereafter,
respondents alleged that Tagalog discontinued payingthe rent
and stopped inhabiting the house.
Sometime before December 2002, respondents demanded that
Tagalog remove the scattered debris on the land, notified her
of their intention to use the land, and subdivide and develop it
for their personal use. Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate
the premises asserting that the verbal contract of lease was
deemed terminated upon the expiration of the monthly
contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she
was still a lessee.
Sometime in January 2003, respondents alleged that Tagalog
constructed a two-storey residential house made of cement,
large steel bars, hollow blocks, sand and gravel on the land.
Respondents informed the Office of the Municipal Engineer
ofBalamban, Cebu of Tagalogs act of constructing a house on
the land without their consent and without the required
building permit. Respondents alleged that despite the warning
given by the Office of the Municipal Engineer to stop the
construction, Tagalog still continued withthe construction.
Respondents then referred the matter to the Barangay Captain
of Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu but again, as respondents alleged,
Tagalog only ignored the advice given by the Barangay Captain.
Petitioners Claim:
In her Answer, Tagalog alleged that the lease contract was still
valid and subsisting and had never been terminated by the
parties. She added that she had not abandoned her possession
over the land and has continuously paid the rent on a month to
month basis. Tagalog denied having been notified of the
respondents intention to use and subdivide the land and
further alleged that she sought and was granted permission to
repair her dwelling structure and undertook the repair without
enlarging the area of her occupation. Tagalog admitted being
summoned by the Office of the Municipal Engineer and
Barangay Captain and she alleged that both offices found that
she had long ceased the repair work. As a defense, Tagalog
prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the
action was for ejectment and unlawful detainer which was
beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTCs Ruling:
In a Decision dated 5 May 2008, the RTC decided the case in
favor of respondents. The RTC ruled that, in the complaint,
respondents prayed for the recovery of possession of the
leased property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which
was within the original jurisdiction of the court was primordial
and the prayer for eviction was merely incidental there being
no written contract of lease between the parties.
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the RTC in an Order dated 30 May 2008. Tagalog then filed

an appeal8 with the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution dated 12
May 2011, the CA dismissed the case for failure of Tagalog to
file the required brief within the extended period requested.
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 9 March 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue for our resolution iswhether the Regional Trial
Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner contends that the subject of the action is
unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court or
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with
RTC, a second level court, the RTCs decision should
rendered void for lack of jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations
in the complaint. In order to determine whether the lower
court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the
nature of the complaint filed before it.
In the present case, the complaint was for recovery of
possession, preliminary mandatory injunction with a prayer
for temporary restraining order with damages and attorneys
fees.
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of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the land. In such case,
the RTC has jurisdiction.
However, in this case, the unlawful withholding of possession
of the land before the filing of the complaint with the RTC
lasted only for more or less three months. Also, neither of the
parties brought forth the issue of ownership which was the
reason given by the RTC for taking cognizance of the action.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and any judgment, order or
resolution issued without it is void and cannot be given any
effect. This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was
raised for the first time on appeal or even after final
judgment. In this case, Tagalog raised the issue of jurisdiction
in her Answer.
Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before it.
for Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court to dismiss
the an action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction
the over the subject matter. In sum, since respondents' complaint
be should have been filed with the MTC, the RTC seriously erred in
proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court
without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It
then follows that the appeal brought before the appellate
court, as well as the decisions or resolutions promulgated in
accordance with said appeal, is without force and effect.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the
Resolutions dated 12 May 2011 and 9 March 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02784. We DISMISS Civil Case No.
T-1059 without prejudice to the parties seeking relief in the
proper forum. SO ORDERED.

Based on the allegations in respondents complaint, it is clear

that the case involves only the issue of physical possession or
unlawful detainer as defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the
withholding by a person from another of the possession of a
land or building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold THIRD DIVISION
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An
ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, G.R. No. 182953
possession de jure but physical possession only or possession JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA,
de facto, where dispossession has lasted for not more than one JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO,
year. JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO Present:
LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO,
The right to recover possession of the land based on the BERNARDO FLORESCA, CARPIO MORALES, J.,
expiration of the verbal monthly contract of lease is governed MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE Chairperson,
by Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Since the lease is paid monthly DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEA, BRION,
under a verbal contract of lease without a fixed period, the EDUARDO ESPINO, ANTONIO BERSAMIN,
lease period is from month to month. Respondents demanded GALLEGOS, VICTOR VILLARAMA, JR., and
that Tagalog vacate the land sometime before December 2002, SANDOVAL, FELICITAS SERENO, JJ.
after the termination ofthe monthly verbal lease contract. They ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ,
filed the complaint with the RTC in February 2003. Since the ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY
complaint was filed within one year from the expiration of the BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON, Promulgated:
right to hold possession, this case is clearly an unlawful JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
detainer suit within the jurisdiction of the MTC. The conclusion DIMANDAKO, October 11, 2010
would be different if the action is for the recovery of the right Petitioners,
to possess and dispossession lasted for more than one year
which would justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action in an ordinary civil versus -
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of the
land independently of the title and is filed after the expiration

MANALITE HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
(MAHA),
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The Case:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to nullify the Decision
dated October 19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050. The case stemmed
from a complaint for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer filed by
respondent Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA)
against AMARA W CIGELSALO Association (AMARA) and its
members.
Facts:
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
222603. Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and
stealth, petitioners entered the premises and constructed their
temporary houses and an office building. Petitioners likewise
even filed a civil case to annul MAHAs title on September 2,
1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial court. After said
dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the
land. Petitioners pleaded that they be given one year within
which to look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA
acceded. The said one-year period, however, was repeatedly
extended due to the benevolence of MAHAs members. Later
on, petitioners came up with a proposal that they become
members of MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions
of the property by sale pursuant to the Community Mortgage
Program (CMP). MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners
possession, giving them until December 1999 to comply with
the requirements to avail of the CMP benefits. Petitioners
nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus, on
August 9, 2000, MAHA sent formal demand letters to
petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latters refusal to
heed the demand, MAHA filed the complaint for Forcible
Entry/Unlawful Detainer.
In their Answer with Counterclaims, petitioners denied the said
allegations and averred that they are the owners of the subject
lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof for more
than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They
claimed that as the years went by, they established the AMARA
and bought the subject property from Julian Tallano. The
property later became known as the Tallano Estate and
registered under TCT No. 498. They likewise argued that the
allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the
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court acting as an ejectment court, and that the complaint was
irregular and defective because its caption states that it was
for Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer. MAHA, additionally, had
no legal capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its
officers were likewise fictitious.
MTCs Decision:
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a
decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. The
MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of forcible entry,
but MAHA failed to establish the jurisdictional requirement of
prior physical possession in its complaint. Also, the trial court
held that MAHAs failure to initiate immediate legal action after
petitioners unlawfully entered its property and its subsequent
declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners cannot be
construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify the
treatment of the case as one for unlawful detainer.
RTCs Decision:
The RTC rendered a Decision dated January 10, 2006, reversing
the decision of the MTCC. The RTC held that the lower court
erred in dismissing the case by considering the complaint as
one of forcible entry which required prior physical possession.
The RTC found that MAHA was able to allege and prove by
preponderance of evidence that petitioners occupation of the
property was by mere tolerance. MAHA tolerated the
occupation until all those who wanted to acquire MAHAs rights
of ownership could comply with membership obligations and
dues. Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said
obligations within the given period; thus, their occupation
became illegal after MAHA demanded that they vacate the
property.
CAs Decision:
In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA held that while the complaint in the
beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible
entry, the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of
action was actually for unlawful detainer. The CA noted that the
complaint alleged supervening events that would show that
what was initially forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA
thereby converting its cause of action into one for unlawful
detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the
required one-year period counted from the date of last
demand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint
was captioned as both for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
does not render it defective as the nature of the complaint is
determined by the allegations of the complaint. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads,
Petitoners Claim:
Petitioners assert that the jurisdictional requirement of prior
physical possession in actions for forcible entry was not alleged
with particularity in the complaint, as it merely alleged that
respondent had been deprived of its possession over the
property.They also maintained that they were not withholding
possession of the property upon the expiration or termination
of their right to possess because they never executed any
contract, express or implied, in favor of the respondent. Hence,
there was also no unlawful detainer.

Issues:
(1) whether or not the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to make up a case of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer; and
(2) whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTCs
decision finding a case of unlawful detainer.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the
action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case
are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule
70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 thereof.
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action
under the aforequoted rule, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry,
which is an action to recover possession of a property from the
defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the
beginning as he acquired possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer,
which is an action for recovery of possession from the
defendant whose possession of the property was inceptively
lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession
despite the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and
prove, that he was in prior physical possession of the property
in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by
any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the
complaint of how the possession of defendant started or
continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that
defendant holds possession of the land or building after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint
would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a case of
unlawful detainer.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the
property, MAHA tolerated petitioners stay and gave them the
option to acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. Petitioners continued stay on the premises
was subject to the condition that they shall comply with the
requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 10
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate
the property as their right of possession had already expired or
had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners
to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the
land. Well settled is the rule that a person who occupies the
land of another at the latters tolerance or permission, without
any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners argument that MAHAs title is void for having
been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was
improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue
for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Since the only issue involved is the physical or material
possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and not
possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed
out in a separate action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October
19, 2007 and Resolution dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93050 are hereby AFFIRMED. With
costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]
SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS. OSCAR C. FARRALES AND
DAISY C. FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims that on August 6, 2002 he and his
wife, Dr. Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, bought a 428-square meter
registered property on 7 Administration St., GSIS Village, Project 8,
Quezon City,[1] from Teresita, Rommel, and Dennis Farrales.]
Teresita operated a boarding house on the property.
Because the Abads did not consider running the boarding house
themselves, they agreed to lease the property back to Teresita for
P30,000.00 a month so she could continue with her business.[4] But,
although the lease had a good start, Teresita suddenly abandoned
the boarding house,[5] forcing the Abads to take over by engaging
the services of Bencio Duran, Teresita's helper, to oversee the
boarding house business.[6]
On December 8, 2002 Oscar and Daisy came, accompanied by two
men, and forcibly took possession of the boarding house.
Two days later or on December 10, 2002, the day the Abads left for
abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered and took possession of the
property once again. Because of this, on March 10, 2003 petitioner
Servillano Abad (Abad) filed a complaint[8] for forcible entry against
the two before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City.[9]
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they forcibly seized the
place. They claimed ownership of it by inheritance. They also
claimed that they had been in possession of the same from the time
of their birth.[10]That Oscar had been residing on the property since
1967 as attested to by a March 31, 2003 certification issued by
Barangay Bahay Toro.[11]

The MeTC rendered a decision[16] in favor of Abad, stating that
Oscar and Daisy could not acquire ownership of the property since it
was registered. And, as owner, Abad was entitled to possession.
Questions Presented The case presents the following questions:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently allegedin his complaint the
jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession of the disputed
property to vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action; and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad sufficiently proved that he
enjoyed prior physical possession of the property in question.
The Court's Rulings
Two allegations are indispensable in actions for forcible entry to
enable first level courts to acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that
the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property; and,
second, that the defendant deprived him of such possession by
means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.[29]
There is no question that Abad made an allegation in his complaint
that Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered the subject property. The only
issue is with respect to his allegation, citing such property as one "of
which they have complete physical and material possession of the
same until deprived thereof." Abad argues that this substantially
alleges plaintiffs prior physical possession of the property before the
dispossession, sufficient to confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the
action. The Court agrees. The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not
required to use in his allegations the exact terminology employed by
the rules. It is enough that the facts set up in the complaint show
that dispossession took place under the required conditions.[30]
It is of course not enough that the allegations of the complaint make
out a case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must also be able to prove
his allegations. He has to prove that he had prior physical
possession[31] for this gives him the security that entitles him to
remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully
ejects him.[32]
Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical possession of the
property after buying the same since they immediately rented it to
Teresita who had already been using the property as a boarding
house. Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita was an act of
ownership that amounted to their acquiring full physical possession
of the same.[33]
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita began only in
September 2002.[34] Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have
proved that they had been renting spaces in the property as early as
2001 as evidenced by receipts that they issued to their lessees. This
was long before they supposedly entered the property, using force,
in 2002.
Possession in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physical
possession or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is
the issue.[9]
The absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible
entry warrants the dismissal of the complaint.[40]
G.R. No. 178159 : March 2, 2011.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 11
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA DIONISIO, Petitioners, v.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands inSan Rafael,
Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo)
cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs
permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it
upon demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente and Anita
Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz. In April 2002,
the Dionisios found out that Emiliana had left the property and that
it was already Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under
the strength of a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan" dated April 7,
1977.
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded that Wilfredo vacate the
land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an
eviction suit against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
San Rafael, Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in
which he declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as
1977. At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend
their complaint.The Dionisios filed their amended complaint on
August 5, 2003; Wilfredo maintained his original answer.
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked Wilfredo to vacate the
property and pay rent and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the
action was one for forcible entry. The CA, however, reversed. The CA
held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively
changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of
possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC.Further,
since the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on
August 5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from
demand required in ejectment suits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the amended complaint changed the cause of
action
2. Whether or not the action is within the jurisdiction of the MTC
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the complaint; nature of
the action.
First issue: To determine if an amendment introduces a different
cause of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires
the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is
completely different from that stated in the original complaint.
Here, both the original and the amended complaint have identical
allegations, and required Wilfredo to defend his possession based
on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left
out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded
that he leave.It did not introduce a new cause of action.
Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation under the
DARABs jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 12
action is determined by the allegations of the complaint. The records
show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a
tenant of the land.
Second, the Court ruled that this is not an action for forcible entry,
since the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were
in possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that
kind of eviction suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for unlawful detainer: (1) the
defendant has possession of property by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession became illegal upon
plaintiffs notice to defendant, terminating the latter's right of
possession; (3) the defendant remains in possession, depriving the
plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from
plaintiff's last demand that defendant vacate the property, the
plaintiff files a complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had
possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the owner, such
tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendants
possession.
Here, while there was no specific allegation of "tolerance" in the
complaint, the Court concedes that the rules do not require the
plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of such
rules.The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands
tenant and that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow,
Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave upon
demand.These allegations clearly imply the Dionisios "tolerance" of
her (or any of her assignees).
RULE 70: CASE #10
G.R. No. 176341, July 07, 2014
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Contending that it is obliged to pay back rentals only from
the time the demand to vacate was served upon it and not
from the time it began occupying the disputed premises,
petitioner Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation (Pro-
Guard) seeks recourse to this Court.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the
September 6, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58867 which denied the Petition for
Review filed therewith by Pro-Guard as one of the
petitioners. Likewise assailed is the CAs January 23, 2007
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On July 24, 1984, Manuel A. Torres, Jr., (Manuel) assigned
to respondent Tormil Realty and Development
Corporation (Tormil) three parcels of land located in Pasay
City and all the improvements thereon in exchange for
shares of stock in the said corporation.4 Despite the
assignment, however, title to the real properties remained
in Manuels name as he neither registered the transaction
in the Registry of Deeds nor provided Tormil the necessary
documents to have the titles over the properties
transferred in its name. Later, Manuel unilaterally revoked
the transaction.
Subsequently, Manuel, together with two other
persons, one of whom is Edgardo Pabalan (Edgardo),
established Torres Pabalan Realty, Incorporated (Torres-
Pabalan).
As part of his capital contribution, Manuel
assigned the same aforesaid parcels of land to Torres-
Pabalan.
Construction of the Torres Building on the
subject real properties was completed in 1985 and its units
rented out.
Edgardo, who was also then the General
Manager and Administrator of Tormil, acted as the
building administrator and occupied the 2nd floor.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) docketed as
SEC Case No. 31535 (SEC case) to compel Manuel to fulfill
his obligation by turning over the documents necessary to
effect the registration and transfer of titles in its name of
the properties assigned to it by Manuel.
Edgardo also then set up in October 1989 a law
office (law office) with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura
(Augustus) in the 2nd floor of the building. Torres Building
was thereafter declared by Torres-Pabalan for tax
purposes
On March 6, 1991, the SEC rendered judgment in
favor of Tormil,7 and this was later affirmed by the SEC en
banc.8
Manuel appealed to the CA. During the
pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into an agreement
with Edgardo in March 1994 for the rent of a unit in the
3rd floor of Torres Building. As payment, Pro-Guard was to
provide security services to Torres-Pabalan.
Subsequently, the CA,9 and later this Court,10
upheld the ruling in the SEC case such that it became final
and executory on December 12, 1997.11
By October 1998, not only were the titles to the
subject parcels of land registered in Tormils name,12 but
also the tax declaration over the Torres Building.13
On November 5, 1998, Tormil sent letters14 to
Edgardo and Augustus (for the law office) and Pro-Guard
asking them to validate their possession/enter into a lease
contract with Tormil and at the same time settle their past
and current rentals.
Since these letters were ignored, Tormil, on
November 16, 1998 sent them separate demands to

vacate the premises and pay the monthly rental of
P20,000.00 from the time of their occupation thereof until
the same are actually turned over to Tormil.15
As these were unheeded, Tormil asserting right
of possession based on its ownership of the Pasay
properties, filed before the Pasay City Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) separate ejectment suits against Edgardo
and Augustus, and Pro-Guard16 which were raffled to
Branch 44.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormils
ownership of the parcels of land where the building stands
and asserted that Torres-Pabalan was the owner of the
same.
Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the
building were surreptitiously and unlawfully cancelled on
the sole basis of the SEC Case.
Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was
paying rentals to the owner, Torres-Pabalan, in the form of
security services provided to the latter. It likewise called
attention to the fact that it was no longer in the premises
as Tormil forcibly ousted it therefrom.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
The MeTC adjudged that Tormil has proven its right to
possess the property. Said court brushed aside the claim
that Torres-Pabalan owns the building since its SEC
Certificate of Registration was already cancelled, and that
the construction of the building was completed in July
1985 or prior to the time said corporation was
incorporated in September 1986. Finding the defendants
occupancy of the units as only upon Tormils tolerance, the
MeTC concluded that their possession became unlawful
when Tormil decided to assert its right of ownership over
the building after the ruling in the SEC case was upheld
with finality by this Court.
Thus, in its June 28, 1999 Decision,17 the MeTC ordered
Edgardo and Augustus to vacate the unit they possessed,
as well as to pay attorneys fees and costs.
With respect to Pro-Guard, it
adjudged:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corporation and
all persons claiming rights under [it] to vacate and surrender
possession of Unit M, 3rd Floor, Torres Building, 157 Buendia Ext.,
Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Pasay City;
4. ordering defendant Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. to pay
[Tormil] the fair and reasonable rental of the premises [in] the
amount of P20,000.00 per month with legal interest from June, 1995
until the premises is fully vacated;18
Contending that Tormil has no right to possess the building, the
defendants appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City
and the same was raffled to Branch 109 thereof. In the meantime,
Pro-Guard informed the MeTC that it had already vacated the
premises as early as March 20, 1999.19
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 13
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision20 dated December 15, 1999, the RTC did not find
merit in the appeal, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In view of the foregoing and pursuant to several decision[s] of the
Supreme Court and the provision of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of
Court to the effect [that] the occupancy and possession of the
subject premises by the defendants-appellants became illegal when
they failed and refused to heed the demand letters of herein
plaintiff-appellee to vacate the same and surrender possession
peacefully, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the decision
of the trial court and hereby affirms the same IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.21
On appeal to the CA, Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard reiterated
their arguments on Torres-Pabalans ownership of the building and
on its right to possess it.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA adjudged Tormil to have sufficiently proven its case for
unlawful detainer. It held that based on its Torrens titles over the
subject parcels of land and the tax declarations over the building
thereon, Tormil has the right to possess the disputed properties. It
debunked the claim of Edgardo, Augustus and Pro-Guard that the tax
declarations in Tormils name are invalid, ratiocinating that their
issuance by the City Assessor are presumed to have been regularly
performed.
Ultimately, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the RTC
Decision,22viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THE
Petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and ordered
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
15 December 1999 and Order dated 02 May
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109 in Civil Case Nos. 99-0618 & 99-
[0619] are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.23
In asking for a reconsideration, one aspect which Edgardo, Augustus
and Pro-Guard objected to was the order for them to pay P20,000.00
monthly rental and the reckoning point of payment. Pro-Guard, in its
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,24 argued that the CA
should have modified the RTC judgment by reckoning the payment
from the date of Tormils notice to vacate.
The CA found no reason to reverse its judgment,25 impelling Pro-
Guard to elevate the case to this Court.
Issue:
WHETHER THE [CA] ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE [METC] AND THE [RTC] ON THE AWARD OF THE [METC] IN
RECKONING THE DATE OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS IN THE AMOUNT OF
P20,000.00 PER MONTH WITH LEGAL INTEREST FROM JUNE 1995
UNTIL THE PREMISES IS FULLY VACATED CONTRARY TO PREVAILING
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.26

Ruling
While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the unlawful detainer suit, is
entitled to the fair rental value for the use and occupation of the unit
in the building, such compensation should not be reckoned from the
time Pro-Guard began to occupy the same, but from the time of the
demand to vacate.
In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior
lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually
becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to
possess.27 In other words, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the Rules of Court requires
the filing of such action within a year after the withholding of
possession,28 meaning that if the dispossession has not lasted for
more than one year, [then] an ejectment proceeding (in this case
unlawful detainer) is proper
Here, from the moment Pro-Guard started to occupy the unit in
March 1994 up to November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to
possess the premises was not challenged. It was only after Tormil
prevailed over Manuel in its ownership of the same that it
terminated Pro-Guards right to possess the unit it was occupying
through a letter to vacate dated November 16, 1998. Hence, it is
only from that point that Tormil is considered to have withdrawn its
tolerance of Pro-Guards occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guards
possession became unlawful at that same moment. This is supported
by the allegation in the complaint for ejectment that Tormil initiated
the same not because of non-payment of rentals, but because of
withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance or [t]oleration is defined as the
act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of,30 while tolerated acts are those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of the property allows his
neighbor or another person to do on the property; they are generally
those particular services or benefits which ones property can give to
another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who
permits them out of friendship or courtesy.31
With regard to the effects of withdrawal of tolerance, it is settled
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x A person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.32
Thus, in Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc.,33 the lessor ended its
tolerance of the sublessees occupation of the property and
demanded that they vacate the premises on March 29, 1995. We
upheld the ejectment of the sublessees and ordered them to pay
monthly rentals beginning April 1995 until they vacate the
premises. Indeed, it is inconsistent to demand payment of rentals
during the period of tolerance.
Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-Guard is obliged to consign
the payment of rentals. One legal cause for consignation is when
two or more persons claim the same right to collect.34 Various
claimants to a debtors payment must have the appearance of a
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 14
right to collect such that the debtor would have a reasonable
doubt, not based on negligence, as to who is entitled to the
payment.35
Whether Pro-Guard was indeed aware of the legal dispute then
pending before the SEC and subsequently before the courts is of no
moment. When the dispute regarding the validity of Manuels
assignment to Tormil of the realties was pending before the SEC,
Tormil did not claim to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of the
premises. It neither sought payment of rentals which it now claims
Pro-Guard should have consigned during the pendency of its suit
against Manuel. As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-Guard, the
lease contract remained to be then between it and Torres-Pabalan.
The latter was occupying and running the building, as evidenced by
several tax declarations in its name which, while not conclusive
proofs of ownership, nevertheless, are good indicia of possession
in the concept of owner.36 Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act
on behalf of Torres-Pabalan, administered the premises. Pro-Guard
is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them.37
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP
58867 are MODIFIED in that Pro-Guard is to pay for the fair and
reasonable rental of the premises in the amount of P20,000.00 per
month with legal interest beginning November 16, 1998 up to the
time that the premises are fully vacated.
RULE 70 #11
G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998
MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA ARCAL, and VIRGILIO
ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN & LETTY RICAFRENTE,
RENIE & CENY RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE RICAFRENTE, CORA
GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, CARMEN
TAMBOC, BOY AGUILAR, NORMING ARCAL, NORA and ALEX
BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC, ANCHANG ARGUSON, IDRENG and JULIA
ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON, ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY
ARGUSON, FIDENG and CILENG MURANIA, ROSIE and ALDO
CALAGO, ENGAY and SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING
AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and RAMON LUNGCAY, TISAY and
ABET DONES, YOLLY and ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER PAULINO,
CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and PATRICIO BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA,
BERTING and NORMA BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE, DELLY
and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and
GORIO CLARETE, NENA VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and
NONONG IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES, SONNY and DONG
REYES, and WALLY and DAISY REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS
This petition seeks the review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40824 dated
November 15, 1996 and its Resolution dated January 13,
1997.
Petitioners as plaintiffs filed on August 31, 1995
a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal
Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite against private respondents as
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 15
defendants. Subject of the complaint was a 21,435 square
meter parcel of land designated as Lot No. 780 of the Santa
Cruz de Malabon Estate Subdivision, Cavite and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26277 in the names of
Maria, Josefina, Marciana and Marcelina 1 Arcal. 2
The complaint alleged, among others, that:
Defendants herein occupied the subject parcel of land
described above thru plaintiffs' implied tolerance, or
permission but without contract with herein plaintiffs.
From the dates of their occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect
any single centavo from defendants, nor the latter pay to
plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
On June 18, 1984, plaintiffs herein, except Virgilio Arcal,
filed an ejectment suit against substantially all of
defendants herein with the Municipal Trial Court of Tanza,
Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 285 covering the subject
parcel of land in dispute:
Meanwhile, on September 18, [1984], 3 Lucio Arvisu the
alleged son of Gaudencio Arvisu and Natalia Ricafrente
Arvisu, and substantially all defendants herein filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires, Cavite,
a civil case for "Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
Damages" against Salud Arcal Arbolante, Marcelina Arcal
(deceased), Maria Arcal, Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal.
On May 28, [1985], 4 the said complaint was ordered to be
dismissed by the trial court for failure to prosecute. An
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals but in the
resolution of the latter Court promulgated on November
28, 1986, said appeal was considered abandoned and
dismissed for failure of appellants to file their brief.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by plaintiffs herein,
except Virgilio Arcal, with the Municipal Trial Court of
Tanza, Cavite, the said court rendered a favorable
judgment in favor of plaintiffs ordering defendants therein,
among others, to vacate the property in question and
remove residential houses and improvements introduced
therein and return the possession thereof to plaintiffs.
Unfortunately, on appeal with the RTC, the foregoing
decision was reversed and set aside, and the said
complaint for ejectment was dismissed without prejudice
to the filing of the proper action after the prejudicial
question in Civil Case No. TM-146 is resolved in a fair and
adversary proceeding. Said decision attained finality for
failure of plaintiffs' former counsel to interpose an appeal.
Several demands were made by plaintiffs for defendants to
vacate the premises in question, the last written demand
was made by plaintiffs' lawyer on July 23, 1995, but they
proved futile as they refused and failed, and still refuse and
fail to vacate the premises, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs .
In a Decision dated October 26, 1995, the
municipal trial court held that petitioners are registered
owners of the property and as such they have the right to
enjoy possession thereof.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite,
Branch 23, affirmed in toto the municipal trial court's
decision.6
Private respondents filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, arguing inter alia that "the
respondent trial court erred in not dismissing the case for
lack of jurisdiction, the complaint being one for recovery of
right of possession." 7
The appellate court, ruling in favor of private
respondents, granted the petition, reversed and set aside
the decision of the trial court and dismissed Civil Case No.
370. 8
In considering that the complaint was not one
for unlawful detainer, adverting that private respondents
had previously filed complaints questioning petitioners'
ownership of the land, the appellate court made the
following disquisitions:
In commencing this suit for unlawful
detainer, private respondents are banking on
their allegation that they merely tolerated
petitioners to stay on the premises in question,
but which tolerance they already withdrew on
July 23, 1995. However, the other allegations and
admissions of private respondents in their
complaint would show that the case is not one of
unlawful detainer as petitioners did not actually
occupy the subject property upon the tolerance
of private respondents.
Thus, the written demand to vacate of
July 3, 1995 made by private respondents on
petitioners did not terminate any right of the
latter to stay on the subject premises supposedly
founded on tolerance.
As further alleged and admitted by
private respondents in their complaint, a certain
Lucio R. Arvisu and substantially all of petitioners
filed against them on September 18, 1984 an
action for "Annulment of Title, with
Reconveyance and Damages" before the RTC of
Trece Martires, Branch 23, docketed therein as
Civil Case No. TM-59. Although that case was
later dismissed for failure to prosecute, there is
no question that its institution constituted an
open challenge to the title of private respondents
over the premises in dispute.
We are therefore convinced that the
allegations of private respondents in their own
complaint do not sufficiently support an action
for unlawful detainer.
ISSUE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED
BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TANZA,
CAVITE, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL
DETAINER SUIT, AND IN DISMISSING THE SAME
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 10
RULING
We grant the petition. The CA erred in its
decision.
From a reading of the allegations of the
complaint quoted above, we find that the action is one
for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they
are the registered owners of the subject property. The
cases filed by a certain Lucio Arvisu and several of the
private respondents casting doubt on petitioners'
ownership of the property, namely Civil Case No. TM-59 for
'Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and Damages' and
Civil Case No. TM-146 for 'Registration of Claim Under
Section 8, R.A. No. 26,' were resolved with finality adverse
to private respondents. 13
Petitioners also alleged in the complaint that the
possession of the property by private respondents was
with petitioners' tolerance, 14 and that they (petitioners)
had served written demands upon private respondents,
the latest demand being on July 23, 1995, but that private
respondents refused to vacate the property. 15
The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful,
but such possession becomes unlawful upon demand to
vacate made by the owner and the possessor by tolerance
refuses to comply with such demand. 17 A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him. The status of
the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant
whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be
counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 18
Because of the pendency of the cases involving
ownership, the proceedings in the first ejectment case
were suspended. Petitioners could not but await the
outcome of these cases and preserve the status quo in the
meantime these were pending. As the Court has stated:
In giving recognition to the action of
forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the
law is to protect the person who in fact has
actual possession; and in case of controverted
right, it requires the parties to preserve
the status quo until one or the other of them
sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership. It is obviously just that the person
who has first acquired possession should remain
in possession pending this decision; and the
parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to
engage in a petty warfare over the possession of
the property which is the subject of the dispute.
To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order.
Therefore, where a person supposes himself to
be the owner of a piece of property and desires
to vindicate his ownership against the party
actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him
to institute an action to this end in a court of
competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be
permitted, by invading the property and
excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the
latter the burden of instituting an action to try
the property right. 23
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An unlawful detainer suit involves solely the
issue of physical or material possession over the property
or possession de facto, that is, who between the plaintiff
and the defendant has a better right to possess the
property in question. 27 Where, however, the issue is who
has the better and legal right to possess or to whom
possession de jure pertains, accion publiciana is
proper. 28 In the case at bar, petitioners' complaint for
unlawful detainer was confined to recovery of de facto or
physical possession of the property and was resorted to
after private respondents had indubitably failed in their
suits assailing petitioners' right of ownership.
Notably, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over
ejectment cases even if the defendant raises the question
of ownership and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding provisionally the issue of
ownership.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 15, 1996 and Resolution dated January 13,
1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The judgment of the Municipal Trial Court in Civil
Case No. 370 and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Cavite, Branch 23 affirming said disposition of the
inferior court are hereby REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Facts:
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria,
inherited from their father, the late BibianoQuijano, the parcel of
land in Cebu City.
Eliseo sold a portion of his shareto respondent Atty. Daryll A.
Amante and describing the portion subject of the sale.
Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of
his share to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating
that the sale was with the approval of Eliseos siblings, and
describing the portion subject of the sale.
Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
to divide their fathers estate, resulting in the portions earlier sold
by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner
instead of to Eliseo.
Petitioner demanded to vacate, but respondent refused. Hence,
complaint for ejectment before MTCC-Cebu, alleging among others
the portion possessed by Respondent was thru the mere tolerance
of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from
their father had not yet been subdivided.
MTCC: favored Petitioner.
- Eliseo effectively conveyed to the respondent only the
portion that would ultimately be allotted to him once the
 R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 17
property would be subdivided; that because the disputed for forcible entry because the complaint contained no
property was adjudicated to the petitioner under the deed allegation thathis entry in the property had been by force,
of extrajudicial settlement and partition, she was its owner intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.
with the consequent right of possession; and that, as such,
she had the right to demand that the respondent vacate
the land.
RTC: reversed.

- the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper

because the serious question of ownership of the disputed
property was involved.
CA: affirmed.

- the rule that inferior courts could pass upon the issue of
ownership to determine the question of possession was
well settled.
Issue 1: WON the issue on owenership can be raised in an ejectment
suit.

Ruling 1: Yes. (Book based)

- An ejectment case can be eitherfor forcible entry or

unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed to
provide expeditious means to protect the actual
possession or the right to possession of the property
involved.19The sole question for resolution in the case is
the physical or material possession (possession de facto)of
the property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure)nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the
trial court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Hence,even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, like here, the court may pass upon the issue but
only to determine the question of possession especially if
the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the
question of possession.20 The adjudication of ownership
in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving
the title to the property.
Issue 2: WON unlawful detainer is proper, considering Petitioner
alleged possession by mere tolerance

Ruling 2: No.

- To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis

of such lawful possession must then be established. With
the averment here that the respondents possession was
by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance
must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not
suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts
indicative of her or her predecessors tolerance, or her co-
heirs permission for him to occupy the disputed
property.31 But she did not adduce such evidence.
Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear and definite
as to his possession of the disputed property being merely
tolerated by Eliseo.
- Considering that the allegation ofthe petitioners tolerance
of the respondents possession of the disputed property
was not established, the possession could very well be
deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action
for unlawful detainer has to fail.34 Even so, the Court
would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one

G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his Attorney-in-fact
EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mangaserrepresented by his attorney-in-factDugeniafiled
a complaint for Forcible Entryagainst respondent Ugaybefore MTC-
Caba, La Union, alleging that he was the registered owner and
possessor of a parcel of land situated in Santiago Sur, Caba, La
Union, portion of which is unlawfully occupied by respondent
without his knowledge and consent.
Respondent answered that petitioner was never in actual possession
of the property occupied by him when he occupied the same. That,
he assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the premises
if he would only be shown to have intruded into petitioner's titled
lot after the boundaries were pointed out to him.
MTC: favored Respondent.
- petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to prove that the
lot occupied by respondent was within his lot titled
RTC: reversed
- petitioner had clearly shown his possession of the
property as evidenced by his OCT and tax declarations.
CA: reversed
- when the law would speak of possession in forcible entry
cases, it is prior physical possession or possession de facto,
as distinguished from possession de Jure. What petitioner
proved was legal possession, not his prior physical
possession.
Issue: WON Petitioner proved prior physical possession
Ruling: Yes.
- As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits
indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de Jure
or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an
ejectment case."
- The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of
cases that while prior physical possession is an
indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the
dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from
the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is
subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and
legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
- Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts
to which the law gives the force of acts of possession.
Examples of these are donations, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, inscription of
possessory information titles and the like.The reason for
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 18
this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he
is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to
subject the property to the action of his will.
- If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and
disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it
would create an absurd situation. It would be putting
premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title
holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to
register their land, and who religiously paid real property
taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their
properties simply because they have to prove their literal
and physical possession of their property prior to the
controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort
to ordinary civil procedure by filing either an
accionpubliciana or accionreinvidicatoria and undergo
arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders
continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's
land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary
procedure of an action for forcible entry.
- Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner,
the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior,
actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and
peaceful possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg
to stand on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of
ownership, the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior
possession of the subject property.
- G.R. No. 203760
- HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his mother and natural
guardian, SUSAN G. CANENCIA vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD
- December 3, 2014
- PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
-
- FACTS:
- Petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late
Vicente T. Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-
square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land. Since his birth,
petitioners family has lived in the residential house
erected thereon.9 Upon Vicentes death, petitioner,
together with his mother, continued their possession over
the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry
into the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey
building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m. portion thereof,
despite petitioners vigorous objections and protests.
- Respondent admitted that during Vicentes lifetime, he
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the
subject land. Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of
the portion where the subject building was being
constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-13031 in
her name. Hence, she took possession of the said portion
not as an illegal entrant but as its owner.

- The MTC found that Vicente actually subdivided the
subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an area of
187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second
lot, with an area of 172.80 sq. m. and where the subject
building was erected, was given to one Anthony de la Paz
Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed
marriage, but was eventually acquired by respondent from
the latter through sale. Based on this finding, the MTC
concluded that petitioner had no cause of action against
respondent since she was merely exercising her rights as
the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot.
- Also, the MTC observed that petitioners complaint failed
to aver the required jurisdictional facts as it merely
contained a general allegation that respondents entry into
the disputed portion was made by means of force and
intimidation, without specifically stating how, when, and
where were such means employed. With such failure, the
MTC intimated that petitioners remedy should either be
an accionpubliciana or an accionreivindicatoria instituted
before the proper forum.
- The RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling.
- The CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the case to
the latter court for trial on the merits.
- -
- ISSUE:
- Whether the CA correctly set aside the RTC Ruling and
ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial
on the merits in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession.
- courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over
- RULING:
- The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and
the CA that the allegations in the petitioners complaint do
not make a case for forcible entry but another action
cognizable by the RTC.
- As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, "[t]he
invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the
action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the
case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court]
provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on
its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint
must necessarily allege that one in physical possession of
a land or building has been deprived of that possession
by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint
should expressly employ the language of the law, but it
would suffice that facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. In other
words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the
defendants act of dispossession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 19
possession of the property. This requirement is
jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate
a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter."
- A plain reading of petitioners complaint shows that the
required jurisdictional averments, so as to demonstrate a
cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied
with. Said pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original
owners, i.e., Vicentes, successor-in-interest, was in prior
physical possession of the subject land but was eventually
dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion thereof on March 26,
2007 by respondent who, through force and intimidation,
gained entry intothe same and, thereafter, erected a
building thereon.
- The "how" (through unlawful entry and the construction of
the subject building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and
"where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the
dispossession all appear on the face of the complaint. In
Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan, the Court held that the acts of
unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a
structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior
possessor, would necessarily imply the use of force, as
what had, in fact, been alleged in the instant complaint.
Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by express
provision of Section 33 (2) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court. Even
in cases where the issue of possession is closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level
ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make
an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of
settling the issue of possession. It must be clarified,
however, that such adjudication is merely provisional
and would not bar or prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the property. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
-
-
- G.R. No. 158231
- BABY ARLENE LARANOvsSPS. ALFREDO
CALENDACIONand RAFAELA T. CALENDACION
- June 19, 2007
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
-
- FACTS:
- Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated
in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna
covered by TCT No. 175241 of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna. On September 14, 1998, petitioner and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the
latter agreed to buy a 50,000-square meter portion of
petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500,000.00 as
down payment and the balance payable in nine
installments of P500,000.00 each, until September 2001.

- Pending full payment of the purchase price, possession of
the riceland was transferred to respondents under the
condition that they shall account for and deliver the
harvest from said riceland to petitioner. Respondents,
however, failed to pay the installments and to account for
and deliver the harvest from said riceland.
- On March 7, 2000, petitioner sent respondents a demand
letter to vacate the riceland within 10 days from receipt
thereof, but as her demand went unheeded, she filed on
April 5, 2000 a Complaint against respondents for
unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC.
- Respondents admit the execution of the Contract to Sell
but deny that it contains all the agreements of the
parties. They allege that petitioner has no cause of action
against them because the three-year period within which
to pay the purchase price has not yet lapsed; that the MTC
has no jurisdiction over the case because the complaint
failed to allege that a demand to pay and to vacate
the riceland was made upon them.
- The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner.
- Respondents filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
- WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is
hereby affirmed subject to the modification that
defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P400,000.00), as yearly reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of
said riceland computed from 1999 until such
time that defendants have actually vacated the
same.
- Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with
the CA.
- CA rendered a Decision, setting aside the Decision of the
RTC and dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer.
- installment due or comply with the conditions of the
- ISSUE:
- Whether the complaint is one for unlawful detainer.
- -
- RULING:
- Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
- Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and
when. Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or
a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any
such lessor, vendor, vendee or other person
may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper
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Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and
costs. (Emphasis supplied)
- In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful
but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession
is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is in actual
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in
possession.
- Applied to the present case, petitioner, as vendor, must
comply with two requisites for the purpose of bringing
an ejectment suit: (a) there must be failure to pay the
installment due or comply with the conditions of the
Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be demand both to
pay or to comply and vacate within the periods specified
in Section 2 of Rule 70, namely: 15 days in case of land
and 5 days in case of buildings. The first requisite refers
to the existence of the cause of action for
unlawful detainer, while the second refers to the
jurisdiction requirement of demand in order that said
cause of action may be pursued.
- Both demands to pay installment due or adhere to the
terms of the Contract to Sell and to vacate are necessary
to make the vendee deforciant in order that
an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the vendor's demand
for the vendee to vacate the premises and the vendee's
refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of
the possession. Such refusal violates the vendor's right of
possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful detainer. However, prior to the institution of
such action, a demand from the vendor to pay the
Contract to Sell and to vacate the premises is required
under the aforequoted rule.
Thus, mere failure to pay the installment due or violation
of the terms of the Contract to Sell does not automatically
render a person's possession unlawful. Furthermore, the
giving of such demand must be alleged in the complaint;
otherwise, the MTC cannot acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
- It is clear from the foregoing that the allegations in the
Complaint failed to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. What is clear is that in the Complaint,
petitioner alleged that respondents had violated the terms
of the Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint failed to
state that petitioner made demands upon respondents to
comply with the conditions of the contract the payment of
the installments and the accounting and delivery of the
harvests from the subject riceland. The 10-day period
granted respondents to vacate even fell short of the 15-
day period mandated by law. When the complaint does
not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of a valid cause

for unlawful detainer, the MTC does not have jurisdiction
to hear the case.
[A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998]
SALVACION P. ONQUIT vs. JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and
SHERIFF IV DANILO O. MATIAS,
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which the
complainant and her two brothers were co-defendants. Complainant
raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Respondent
Judge denied all motions raised by defendants ruling that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and
not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to respondent
Judge, the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would not
automatically divest the court its jurisdiction. Subsequently, plaintiff
in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by
respondent Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
against the defendants, including herein complainant. A seizure
order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay
from the land in question. Complainant details several allegations as
follows:
(1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural
riceland, thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's
court;
(2) That the plaintiffs injunction bond was approved by respondent
Judge without first serving a copy
to the complainant resulting in a violation of due process.
Complainant avers that it left her no opportunity to object to the
sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of the writ of injunction was
notserved on complainants counsel;
(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance of Seizure Order
was not served on the complainant thereby depriving her of a
chance to oppose it;
(4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that complainant
and his co-defendants ought to leave the land because it is certain
that they will lose their case;
(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the issuance of
the seizure order, he seized all the palay harvested without issuing a
receipt, despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the
plaintiff
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
authority, bias and grave misconduct in assuming jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well as
the pleadings and exhibits submitted, we find no grave abuse of
authority, grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent
Judge.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 21
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible
entry case did not taint her action with grave abuse of authority,
even if defendant had alleged that the land in question was under
agricultural tenancy, and that there was an issue of jurisdiction.
Well-settled is the principle that the courts shall not be divested of
jurisdiction over a case merely by what is raised in the answer.
What determines the nature of an action and a court's jurisdiction
over it are the allegations set up by the plaintiff.Basic is the rule
that the material averments in the complaint, which in this case is
for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And,
jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction
over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as
a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship
between the parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence
to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of
respondent Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that,
considering the evidence presented, the land in question is an
irrigatedriceland, but not tenanted. This matter was even brought
up on a petition for certiorari with prohibition to the Regional Trial
Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied.[20] These
antecedents are sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge
did not act with grave abuse of authority in assuming jurisdiction
over the case filed in her sala.
With regard to the allegation of having failed to furnish to the
defendants a copy of the bond and the writ of preliminary
injunction, we give credence to the findings made by the Office of
the Court Administrator, as follows:
However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court in
conjunction with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof provides that the party
filing the bond shall forthwith served a copy of such bond on the
other party, who may except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon. This means that the plaintiff and not the
Court or the respondent Judge for that matter, who is duty bound to
serve a copy of the injunction bond to the defendants. x xx
Nevertheless, the failure of the plaintiff to serve a copy of the
injunction bond to the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a
reversible error. For in this case the defendant may ask the court to
order the plaintiff to serve upon him the copy of the bond.
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of complainant that
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to (sic) the
defendants. Records show that said writ was served to (sic) the
defendants on February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused
to acknowledge receipt therefor, nevertheless the executing Sheriff
left each a copy to (sic) the defendants.
[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996]
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, et al., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS:
Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the
heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia, Letecia Arastia-Montenegro and
Juanita Arastia (Arastia Siblings), filed a complaint for violation of
Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988) before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a Special Agrarian

Court. In their answer, petitioners averred that they had been in
continuous and peaceful possession of their respective tillages since
1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratix of
the landholding in question and moved for the dismissal of the case
and that RTC has no jurisdiction over the said case.
RTC denied said motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction
ordering petitioners and/or any other person acting in their
command and/or their behalf to desist and refrain from occupying
their respective portions they are allegedly cultivating pending the
termination of this litigation, and/or unless a contrary order is issued
by this Court. Subsequently, petitioners filed before SC a petition for
certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of the lower court over the
agrarian case which SC dismissed for failure to comply with Circular
No. 1-88, specifically No. 4 thereof. Meanwhile, petitioners filed
before Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
a complaint against Estrella Arastia, alleging that through the use
and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted and
drove them out of their landholdings, harvested and appropriated
their standing rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops, took their
deep well and set fire on their houses. As a consequence thereof,
they suffered damages in the total amount of P3,300,000.00 for
which Estrella Arastia should be held liable. They prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to
enjoin defendant therein from preventing their re-entry and re-
occupation of the landholdings pending the resolution of the case.
The case was referred to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) of barangays San Isidro, Santiago, San Rafael and Lourdes in
Lubao, Pampanga for fact-finding and exploration of the possibility
of an amicable settlement. After conducting the necessary
proceedings, the BARCs found that petitioners had been in
possession and cultivation of their respective farm holdings.
However, despite receipt of summons and the DARAB orders,
Estrella Arastia did not file an answer nor comply with said orders.
DARAB construed this as her waiver and affirmation of what had
been submitted by petitioners, and that she had no evidence to
submit for its consideration. Based on the findings of the BARCs, the
DARAB issued an order declaring the 300-hectare land as within the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988;
maintaining petitioners possession and cultivation of their
respective landholdings from where they were forcibly ejected on
September 29, 1989 and restraining the respondent or any other
persons acting in her behalf from entering, intruding, and disturbing
the farming activities of the said petitioners in their respective
farmholdings. On the strength of the said writ of preliminary
injunction from DARAB, petitioners resumed occupation and
cultivation of the subject land. Such actions resulted in the dispatch
of several policemen to the area. They reminded petitioners of the
writ of preliminary injunction issued earlier in Agrarian Case No.
2000 and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their
refusal to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently
charged them with resistance and/or disobedience to the lawful
order of persons in authority before the MTC. On the same day,
however, they were released from police custody.
Insisting on their right to work on the land, petitioners again entered
the land. Without a warrant of arrest, herein respondent police
officers arrested petitioners for having entered the landholding and
for resisting and intimidating said police officers. Petitioners were
detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on and they were
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 22
charged with direct assault upon agents of a person in authority.
Thereafter, the municipal court ordered the transfer of petitioners
to the provincial jail in San Fernando, Pampanga on the ground that
the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and
the fact that petitioners, having refused to receive copy of the
complaint and the affidavits of the complainants, did not "intend to
file counter-affidavit. On October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor
filed an information for direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3171 before the
Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. On December 22 and 29,
1992 and January 21, 1993, thirty (30) of the forty-five (45)
petitioners posted bail in the criminal case for direct assault. In their
Memorandum which was received by the Court on May 17, 1995,
petitioners furnished the information that most if not all of the
petitioners were already released on bail and therefore cannot avail
of the writ of habeas corpus for being moot and academic. And yet,
invoking Soriano v. Heirs of Domingo Magali, Malabanan v. Hon.
Ramentoand Salonga v. Pano where the Court considered the issues
raised notwithstanding that certain events had supervened to
render the case moot and academic, petitioners insist that dismissal
of the case on such ground should not bar the resolution of this case
on the merits.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them
and the Arastias, petitioners should be reminded that the allegations
in a compliant are determinative factors of said issue. On this
matter, the Court declared:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon
the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover
upon the claim asserted therein a matter resolved only
after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion
to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely upon the
defendant.
In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia alleged
that she and the rest of the plaintiffs therein were the registered
owners of the parcels of land in question which herein petitioners
illegally intruded into, damaged and cultivated under the status of
holding "actual title over the properties;" that the definite findings
and rulings of the DAR showed that "no tenancy relationship"
existed between the parties and that petitioners were definitely not
qualified beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under Republic Act
No. 6657 as they were not in any way tenants and/or legitimate
tillers of the subject land, and that the acts of petitioners violated
Section 73 (b) of said law.
Petitioner's raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the
complaint did not automatically divest the lower court of jurisdiction
over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to continue exercising
authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining
whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case. In a plethora of
cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the

litigation. After such hearing, if tenancy had in fact been shown to
be the real issue, then the court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian Case No.
2000, Estrella Arastia was merely ejecting petitioners from the land
on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between them.
However, her invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657
which considers as a prohibited act "forcible entry or illegal detainer
by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail
themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform
Program," obviously led the court to docket the case as Agrarian
Case No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian
court.
Such actions were in consonance with Section 56 and 57 of said law
which vest upon the Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian-related cases:
(1) "petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners" and (2) "prosecution of all criminal offenses" under the
same law. A criminal offender under Republic Act No. 6657 is,
pursuant to Section 74 of the law, "(a)ny persons who knowingly and
willfully violates the provisions of this Act." Thus, the lower court
correctly assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000.
It was within petitioners' rights to question the issuance of the writ
before this Court through G.R. No. 100663. However, in filing the
petition, they failed to comply with Circular No. 1-88. The
consequent dismissal of the case for noncompliance with said
circular deprived this Court with authority to look into the validity of
the writ once again. To repeat, such dismissal constituted res
judicata on the issue of validity of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Consequently, petitioners are treading on shaky ground in
questioning the legality of their arrest in this petition for habeas
corpus for the reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ
of preliminary injunction illegally issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000
and, in the same breath, allege that they could use force or "legally
resist and even intimidate another, be he a private individual or an
agent of a person in authority, who interferes with the legitimate
exercise of (his) rights" as possessors and cultivators of the Arastia
property.
If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the law,they
are not without other legal recourses. Certainly, through their
counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting whatever rights
petitioners believe they may have, they should pursue DARAB Case
No. 161-P'89 and whatever actions are available for them under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive to
settle the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation, this rule cannot apply if
the result would negate the rational application of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners may not engage in procedural shortcuts to revive
the settled issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly on the ground of the
existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties in the
instant petition for habeas corpus arising from their arrest for having
assaulted persons in authority.
[G.R. No. 142503. June 20, 2003]
ROMUALDO C. PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 23
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: Cruz is the owner of a lot he inherited from his
mother, whoacquired the same from petitioner Romualdo Perez.
Cruz claimed that Perez requested his permission to build his house
on a small portion of said property, as Perez had nowhere to erect
his dwelling on.This request was granted, as they are close relatives.
Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed an application for
issuance of title covering the subject land with the DENR. When Cruz
learned of Perezs design, he immediately opposed the
application. Accordingly, Cruz demanded that Perez remove his
house from the land and vacate the same. When petitioner failed to
heed the demand, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against him.
Perez denied Cruzs ownership of the property by claiming to
be owner of the lot in question, having inherited the same from his
grandmother. He asserted that he had been in continuous
possession for many years. To support his claim, Perez presented
Tax Declaration No. 26682 and official receipts of tax
payments. Perez submitted that the MTC had no jurisdiction over
the case as the issue involved was one of ownership, not mere
possession.
On February 12, 1992, the MTC dismissed the case on the
ground of want of jurisdiction, holding that the main issue is one of
ownership, not mere possession de facto.Cruz appealed said
decision to the RTC.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, Region III, disapproved the survey of the lot
submitted by Perez. Cruz was then directed to file the appropriate
public land application for the land subject of the controversy.
On June 29, 1992, the RTC Branch 13, rendered its
decisionreversing the MTC ruling, and ordering the remand of the
records for trial on the merits.On remand, the MTC decided for the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
Perez appealed. The RTC of Malolos Branch 10 REVERSED the
appealed decision. The question of ownership was inextricably
intertwined with the issue of possession. Since the issue of
possession could not be resolved without first addressing the
question of ownership, the case should have been dismissed,
following case law.
Cruz then elevated the matter to the CA by way of petition for
review.The Court of Appeals held that the decision of the Regional
Director of Lands disapproving the survey application of petitioner
Perez and affirming the right of respondent Cruz to file the
application for titling of the subject land rendered moot and
academic the possessory action in the RTC. Said decision awarding
the land to Cruz gave him a better right of possession over the
disputed lot as against Perez, a non-awardee.[15] It likewise held
that the RTC of Malolos, Branch 10, erred in reversing the decision
of the RTC of Malolos, Branch 13, because said decision already
acquired finality.
Perez then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court
denied it.
ISSUE: WON MTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for
ejectment.

RULING:It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the complaint. In civil cases, if a complaint is filed
involving a subject matter within the jurisdiction of an inferior court,
but if after the trial, it appears that the subject matter falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of a superior court, the inferior court
cannot render judgment but must dismiss the case.
In the complaint for ejectment filed before the Hagonoy MTC,
it was alleged by Cruz that Perez pleaded that he be allowed to
construct his house as he had no other parcel of land on which to
build a house. The complaint further alleged that it was by mere
tolerance that Cruz, now respondent herein, allowed Perez to
occupy a small portion of the lot.
Taking the allegations in the complaint as basis, in our view,
there is no doubt that the case is one for unlawful detainer. The
Hagonoy MTC had the jurisdiction to hear and decideCivil Case No.
979.
It was held that a person who occupies the land of another at
the latters tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by the implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against him.
Anent petitioners claim that the issue is not one of mere
possession but rather of ownership, we held that in ejectment
cases, the defendant cannot deprive the court of jurisdiction by
simply claiming ownership of the property involved. Precisely with
the aim of preventing a possible anomaly, the provisions of the
Rules of Court governing unlawful detainer and forcible entry were
revised. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of physical possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.[26] Should the inferior court make any determination on
the issue of ownership, the same shall not be conclusive and shall be
without prejudice to the right of the parties to ventilate before the
proper court their claims of ownership over the same land.
The question of ownership is yet to be resolved with finality
and conclusiveness. Although the DENR has disapproved the
cadastral survey submitted by petitioner Perez, he could contest
respondent Cruzs application for said lot, which yet remains to be
titled. That administrative agency should be the arena where the
parties could tackle the issue of ownership.
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA SORDEVILLA,
petitiomers vs.
MARIA COPRADA, respondent
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS: In 1997, petitioners filed an ejectment case against Coprada
before the MCTC of Magdalena, Laguna. Petitioners claimed that
they are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Laguna. In 1945,
respondent was able to persuade the petitioners to allow her and
her family to use and occupy the land for their residence.
When respondents circumstances have improved, petitioners
verbally demanded that respondent vacate the subject land but the
latter refused. Petitioners were therefore constrained to lodge an
ejectment case.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 24
Respondent alleged that sometime in the early 1960s, petitioner
Victoria offered the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to the respondent,
who readily agreed. The price was paid in installments and was fully
paid in 1962. The agreement was never reduced to writing.
The MCTC dismissed the complaint. It held that laches had already
set in which prevented petitioners from questioning the validity of
the purported sale between Victoria and Maria.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MCTCs judgment. The RTC ruled
that respondents occupation was by virtue of petitioners tolerance.
Hence, respondent is bound by an implied promise that she will
vacate property upon demand. Her possession over the subject
property became unlawful after the petitioners demanded her to
vacate.
Respondent filed an MR, which was denied. Dissatisfied, respondent
filed with the CA a petition for review.
The CA granted the petition and reversed the decision of the RTC,
and affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent
from the subject property
RULING: Yes.In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by
the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between
them. However, defendant's possession became illegal when the
plaintiff demandedthat defendant vacate the subject property due
to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under their
contract, and defendant refused to heed such demand.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of
ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon
the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the
property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was
raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to
which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more weight.
x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person
illegally occupying his property. This right is imprescriptible and can
never be barred by laches.
Bugarin vs Palisoc
Sunflower Neigborhood vs CA
G.R. No. 157985
FIRST DIVISION
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA ABAYATA, ANTONIO
ALEGRE, REMEDIOS ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS,
LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL, PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY
BASOY, FELY BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES, ANNA
MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO,
ROMULO FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL, SALOME
CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA
MADEJA, JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG, VALENTIN
MANONG, EDMUNDO/FELY MINA, TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION

PASCUA, ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO, ARMANDO
ROMERO, SANCHO VILLAFUERTE, and FERNANDO YAMID,
Petitioners,
- versus -
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and REYNALDO T.
NEPOMUCENO,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
December 2, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
. ministerial.[11] The defendant may stay it only by (a) perfecting an
The facts in this case, culled from the record, are as follows.
The present controversy arose from a complaint for ejectment, \
filed before the MeTC by private respondents Cecilia B. Palisoc and
Marina B. Mata. In a decision[4] dated February 27, 2002, the court
declared respondents as the rightful possessors of the properties in
dispute. It also ordered the petitioners to vacate the premises and
pay to private respondents the rentals.
Petitioners appealed while private respondents moved for execution
pending appeal.MeTC decision with the modification that
petitioners must start paying rentals from the date of the appealed
decision.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition to
the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. RTC denied the motion and
granted private respondents motion for execution for failure of
petitioners to post a supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals.
Thus, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued and petitioners
were served with the writ and notice to vacate.
Petitioners filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to
Issue Special Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of
Republic Act No. 7279[5] was not complied with. Private
respondents filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of
Special Order of Demolition. The RTC declared the decision denying
petitioners appeal final and executory, and remanded the records of
the case to the MeTC.
However, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
with Prayer for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction before the Court
of Appeals. They also filed an Urgent Vigorous Opposition and
Motion to Suspend Proceedings on respondents Motion Reiterating
the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition before the
MeTC.
MeTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo T. Nepomuceno reported that
petitioners refused to vacate the premises. Petitioners instead filed
a Motion to Quash and Recall the Order dated April 30, 2003 and/or
Special Order of Demolition. The MeTC denied the motion and
issued the Special Order of Demolition,
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: are the Orders of the MeTC proper?
RULING:
Petitioners contend that the Orders of the MeTC violated the
mandatory requirements of Section 28[7] of Rep. Act No. 7279 since
there was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or
demolition and there had been no consultation on the matter of
resettlement. They also claim that there was neither relocation nor
financial assistance given. They insist that the MeTC orders are
patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.[8]
Private respondents for their part argue that Rep. Act No. 7279 is
not applicable. They aver that there was no proof that petitioners
are registered as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries in
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 25
accordance with procedure set forth in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Registration of Socialized Housing
Beneficiaries issued by the Department of Interior and Local
Government and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council. They aver that even if Rep. Act No. 7279 was applicable, the
required notices under the law had already been complied with.
According to them, petitioners were already notified when the writ
of execution was served.[9]
We find for respondents.
Under Section 19,[10] Rule 70 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is
immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful
possessor, and the courts duty to order the execution is practically
appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic
deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal.[12]
Once the Regional Trial Court decides on the appeal, such decision is
immediately executory under Section 21,[13] Rule 70, without
prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court.[14]
However, petitioners failed to file a petition for review. Records
show that petitioners received on March 12, 2003 the RTC decision
denying their motion for reconsideration. They had until March 27,
2003 to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
Instead, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Clearly, petitioners petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.
Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal
where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or
negligence.[16] Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not
prevent the RTC decision from becoming final and executory.[17]
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the court of
origin.
Thus, we find that the MeTC cannot be faulted for issuing the
assailed orders to enforce the RTC judgment.
It also appears that the order of demolition had already been
executed. Petitioners had already vacated the area and private
respondents now possess the properties free from all occupants, as
evidenced by the sheriffs turn-over of possession dated May 19,
2003. Thus, the instant case before us has indeed become moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review assailing the Order dated April
30, 2003 and the Special Order of Demolition dated May 9, 2003 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77, is DENIED
for mootness and lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136274. September 3, 2003]
SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO
ARAGAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING
PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, MeTC, Branch 77,
Paraaque City and ELISA MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The antecedent facts follow.
Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as
executrix of the testate estate of Macaria Maglaqui, filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Alfredo Mogar and 46 other
persons[4] who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B,
C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United Paraaque Subdivision IV, Metro
Manila. These parcels of land are covered by individual transfer

certificates of title[5] registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui,
private respondents mother.
The MeTC of Paraaque City, eventually decided in favor of private
respondent. On appeal, the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Mogar et al. elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals but their petition was dismissed.
After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was issued by
the MeTC of Paraaque City. The writ, however, was not immediately
implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77 of the
same court. Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Paraaque
City, Branch 257, presided over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin
the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this petition
was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued
by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.
The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due
to the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by Judge
Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case filed by
the Municipality of Paraaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria
Maglaqui.
Meanwhile, another group of persons occupying portions of the
parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the unlawful detainer
case, organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood
Association (Sunflower), the petitioner herein. Sunflower,
represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for
prohibition/injunction with preliminary injunction against private
respondent also with the RTC of Paranaque City, Branch 257.
Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from the
demolition order as they were not parties to the original unlawful
detainer case. To include their houses in the demolition would be to
deprive them of due process. This time, Judge How granted the
injunction and ordered the exclusion of the houses belonging to
petitioner from demolition.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding
that, as the judgment in the unlawful detainer case had already
become final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently,
the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of
demolition on September 14, 1998.
In order to stay the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower
filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a status quo order. The
court granted it. Prior to the issuance of our resolution, however,
the writ of demolition was implemented on Petitioner thus filed a
motion to allow its members to return to the premises, which was
granted. Thereafter, the court required both parties to submit their
memoranda.
ISSUE: whether petitioners members, who were not parties to the
unlawful detainer case, may be ejected from the land subject of this
case.
RULING:
Before we proceed, it should be pointed out that any issue relating
to the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of ParaNaque has
been rendered moot by the dismissal of that case.
We rule in the affirmative. It is well-settled that, although an
ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an
opportunity to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on anyone
who has not been impleaded if he or she is: (a) a trespasser,
squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the
property to frustrate the judgment; (b) a guest or occupant of the
premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) a transferee
pendente lite; (d) a sublessee; (e) a co-lessee or (f) a member of the
family, relative or privy of the defendant.[9]
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 26
In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners members are
trespassers or squatters who do not have any right to occupy the
property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership
of the parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the
subject property is owned by Macaria Maglaqui, mother of private
respondent.[10] Petitioner failed to establish any right which would
entitle its members to occupy the land in any capacity, whether as
lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioners only defense against the
eviction and demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the
original detainer case. This defense, however, has no legal support
since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by
the judgment.
Petitioners argument that the parcels of land occupied by its
members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not included in the original
ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent
filed with the MeTC of Paraaque City, Branch 78, clearly included
Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under litigation in the
unlawful detainer case.[11] Thus, petitioners members, together
with all the parties in the unlawful detainer case, must vacate the
disputed land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 46861 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G.
MIAQUE, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO) seeks the nullification of the Court of Appeals'
Resolution1 dated March 29, 2006 and Resolution2 dated May 30,
2006 in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603. The Resolution dated March 29,
2006 granted the application for temporary restraining order (TRO)
of Bernie G. Miaque, while the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issued
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the
writ of execution issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo
despite Miaque's alleged continued failure and refusal to make
current the supersedeas bond and to pay to the A TO the rental and
concession privilege fees.
Facts:
Main case of ejectment:
In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Miaque in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Iloilo City, Branch 3. The ATO sought the following, among others:
(1) That Miaque be ordered to permanently vacate and
peacefully return to the ATO possession of:
(a) the 800-square meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the
New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport;
(b) the 310-square meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the
Iloilo Airport Terminal; and
(c) all areas occupied or otherwise utilized by Miaque
incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the
Iloilo Airport; and
(2) That Miaque be ordered to immediately pay the ATO the
amount of not less than 1,296,103.10, representing unpaid
space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October 15,
2000 plus interest and additional rental and fees which may be
proven during the trial.

MTCC: judgment is rendered finding [Miaque] to be unlawfully
detaining the following premises and was ordered to vacate the
premises
RTC: affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety. Miaques motion for
reconsideration was denied.
CA:dismissed Miaquesthe petition and affirmed the RTC Decision
In a new case in the Court of Appeals, Miaque filed a petition for
certiorari (with prayer for issuance of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction) in CA docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No.
01603, where he assailed the RTCs Order dated March 20,
2006which caused the issuance of the writ.
The ATO claims that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the TRO and the subsequent writ of preliminary injunction
through the Order dated March 29, 2006 and the Resolution
dated May 30,2006, respectively. According to the ATO, the Court
of Appeals ignored the governments right under the law, Rules of
Court, jurisprudence and equity to the possession as well as to the
payment of rental and concession privilege fees which, at the time
of the filing of this petition, already amounted to 2 Million. Such
right had already been decided with finality by this Court, which
affirmed the Decision dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, but the Court of Appeals has repeatedly
thwarted it.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
TRO and the subsequent WPI
Held: YES
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the challenge to the Order
dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO, effective for 60 days, is
moot as its effectivity had already lapsed.
Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the key to that
question: Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court. The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom.
This reflects Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure:
Sec. 21. Appeal. - The judgment or final order shall be appealable to
the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in
accordance with Section 22 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129. The decision
of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule,
including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken
therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
The above provisions are supplemented and reinforced by Section 4,
Rule 39 and Section 8(b), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which
respectively provide:
Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. Judgments in actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be
immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition
and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless
otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the
appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending,
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 27
modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership,
accounting, or award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or
otherwise as may be considered proper for the security or
protection of the rights of the adverse party.
The totality of all the provisions above shows the following
significant characteristics of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it:
(1) The judgment of the RTC against the defendant-appellant is
immediately executory, without prejudice to a further
appeal that may be taken therefrom; and
The first characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is immediately
executory -- is emphasized by the fact that no resolutory
condition has been imposed that will prevent or stay the
execution of the RTCs judgment.
The RTCs duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of
Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by
mandamus.Section 21 of Rule 70 presupposes that the
defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is
unsatisfied with the RTCs judgment and appeals to a higher
court. It authorizes the RTC to immediately issue a writ of
execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due
course.5 The rationale of immediate execution of judgment
in an ejectment case is to avoid injustice to a lawful
possessor.5 Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the
appellate court may stay the writ of execution should
circumstances so require.
(2) Such judgment of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the RTC or, in the
appellate courts discretion, suspended or modified.
The second characteristic -- the judgment of the RTC is not
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom reinforces the
first.1The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is
enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion,
immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken
therefrom. The execution of the RTCs judgment is not
discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court.
On the other hand, execution of the RTCs judgment under
Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution but a
ministerial duty of the RTC. In connection with the second
characteristic of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case
appealed to it, the consequence of the above distinctions
between discretionary execution and the execution of the
RTCs judgment in an ejectment case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals is that the former may be availed of in the RTC
only before the Court of Appeals gives due course to the
appeal while the latter may be availed of in the RTC at any
stage of the appeal to the Court of Appeals. But then again,
in the latter case, the Court of Appeals may stay the writ of
execution issued by the RTC should circumstances so require
To reiterate, despite the immediately executory nature of the
judgment of the RTC in ejectment cases, which judgment is not
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, the Court of Appeals may
issue a writ of preliminary injunction that will restrain or enjoin
the execution of the RTCs judgment. In the exercise of such
authority, the Court of Appeals should constantly be aware that
the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound
discretion of the court with the caveat that it should be made
with great caution.
In this case, the decisions of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 01 (38), of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 02-27292, and of the Court of Appeals in
CAG.R. SP No. 79439 unanimously recognized the right of the ATO
to possession of the property and the corresponding obligation of

Miaque to immediately vacate the subject premises. This means
that the MTCC, the RTC, and the Court of Appeals all ruled that
Miaque does not have any right to continue in possession of the
said premises. It is therefore puzzling how the Court of Appeals
justified its issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction with the
sweeping statement that Miaque "appears to have a clear legal
right to hold on to the premises leased by him from ATO at least
until such time when he shall have been duly ejected therefrom
by a writ of execution of judgment caused to be issued by the
MTCC in Iloilo City, which is the court of origin of the decision
promulgated by this Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439."
Unfortunately, in its Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting a
writ of preliminary injunction in Miaquesfavor, the Court of
Appeals did not state the source or basis of Miaques "clear legal
right to hold on to the [said] premises." This is fatal.
The sole basis of the Court of Appeals in issuing its Resolution
dated May 30, 2006 is its view that the RTC "has no jurisdiction to
order the issuance of [the] writ of execution" because, when it
gave due course to the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No.
79439, the RTC was already divested of jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 8(a), Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals is mistaken. It disregards
both (1) the immediately executory nature of the judgment of
the RTC in ejectment cases, and (2) the rule that such judgment
of the RTC is not stayed by an appeal taken there from. It ignores
the nature of the RTCs function to issue a writ of execution of its
judgment in an ejectment case as ministerial and not
discretionary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated
May 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 is
ANNULLED for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals is directed to conduct its proceedings in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 expeditiously and without delay.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and LEONILA DELA CRUZ-
TABINO, Petitioners,
vs.
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Proclamation No. 518 (Proc. 518) excluded from the operation of
Proc. 423 which established the military reservation known as
Fort Bonifacio situated in the then municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Pateros and Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City certain
portions in said reservation known and identified as
BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo, situated in Makati, and declared
the sameopen for disposition in accordance with Republic Act
(RA) No. 274, and RA 730 in relation to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Among others, Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square
meters for disposition to any bona fideoccupants/residents of said
BarangaysCembo, South Cembo, West Rembo, East Rembo,
Comembo, Pembo, and Pitogo who have resided in or occupied
such areas on or before January 7, 1986.
In 1985, petitioner Mauricio M. Tabino (Mauricio) a technical
sergeant in the military and his brother, respondent Lazaro M.
Tabino a colonel in the military occupied a 353-square meter
lot in Pembo, Makati City. Mauricio established residence within
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the lot, while respondent continued to reside in Novaliches,
Quezon City.9 The lot was later subdivided into two portions,
denominated as Lots 2 and 3.
Lot 2 containing an area of 184 squaremeters was applied for
coverage under Proc. 518 by Mauricio, while Lot 3 containing an
area of 169 square meters was applied for by respondent.
Respondent was later on issued by the Fort Bonifacio Post
Commander a Revocable Permit to occupy his lot, but the permit
authorized him to occupy an area of only 150 square meters.
In 1988, Lot 3 was awarded to respondent, and a Certificate to
such effect was issued by the Bureau of Lands (now Land
Management Bureau).
On May 11, 2004, respondent filed an ejectment case against
Mauricio and the latters wife, Leoniladela Cruz (petitioners) with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati (MeTC).
The ejectment case is based on the theory that respondent is the
true and sole owner of the 353-square meter lot; that he used
Mauricio only for the purpose of circumventing the 300-square
meter limit set by Proc. 518 by asking the latter to apply for the
purchase of a portion of the lot after subdividing the same into
two smaller lots; that Mauricios stay in the premises is merelyby
tolerance of respondent; that petitioners introduced permanent
structures on the land; and that petitioners refused to vacate the
premises upon respondents formal demand. Respondent thus
prayed that petitioners be ordered to vacate Lots2 and 3 and to
pay the former rentals, attorneys fees, and costs of suit.
Petitioners countered n their Answer1 that respondent had no
right to eject them; that the parties trueagreement was that
petitioners would act as caretakers of respondents Lot 3, and for
this, respondent would pay petitioners a monthly salary of
800.00; that respondent failed to honor the agreement; and that
relative to Lot 2, there was a pending Protest filed with the
Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)National Capital Region.
It appears that petitioners and respondent both filed Protests
with the DENR relative to Lots 2 and 3. DENR granted the
petitioners and denied the respondent.
MeTC: ruled in favour of the petitioners
The only issue to be resolved in this action to recover possession of
the subject property is the question on who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the premises. In ejectment
cases, the word "possession" means nothing more than physical
possession, not legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil
law.
RTC: affirmed MeTCs decision in toto.
CA: Assailed RTCs decision
In reversing the trial court, the CA held that the 1994 affidavit
which petitioners do not dispute should be taken as an
admission by Mauricio that he was merely appointed by
respondent as the caretaker of Lot 2, and that respondent is the
true possessor and owner thereof. This being the case, petitioners
occupy the premises by mere tolerance of respondent, and are
bound to the implied promise that they shall vacate the
sameupon demand. The CAadded that while respondent was
authorized to occupy only 150 square meters, this was irrelevant
since the only issue that must be resolved n an unlawful detainer
case is actual physical or material possession, independent of any
claim of ownership; since respondent has satisfactorily shown by
preponderant evidence that he was in actual possession of Lots 2
and 3, he is entitled to recover the same from petitioners.
The CA also held that while respondents application for Lot 2 was
denied by the DENR in its June 13, 2006 Decision since he was

already an awardee of another lot within Fort Bonifacio, the issue
of possession was not touched upon. For this reason, the DENR
Decision has no bearing on the unlawful detainer case.
Additionally, the DENR rulings are still the subject of appeals, and
thus could not have conclusive effect.
ISSUE: WON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE DENR IN RESOLVING
CONFLICTING CLAIMS AS TO WHO HAS A BETTER RIGHT OF
POSSESSION BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENT OVER
SUBJECT PARCELS OF LOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE COURT UNDER AN
EJECTMENT CASE.
HELD:
Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise
the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-
shopping, after having voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC trying the ejectment case.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in
ordering petitioners to vacate the premises. With the pendency of
the DENR Protests Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939
respondents claim of possession and his right to recover the
premises is seriously placed in issue. If the ejectment case Civil
Case No. 85043 is allowed to proceed without awaiting the
result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where
the existing structures thereon would have to be demolished. If
petitioners position, as affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld
with finality by the courts, then it would mean that respondent
had no right to occupy or take possession of the subject lots,
which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the
ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a
consequence of the demolition of petitioners residence and
other permanent improvements on the disputed lots.
On this point, it is worth stressing that the courts generally accord
great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative
agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction.
Moreover, notwithstanding the issue of physical possession
having been ruled upon by the Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 107957, it
is well to note that in the case of Estrella vs. Robles, it was
explained that the Bureau of Lands determines the respective
rights of rival claimants to public lands, but it does not have the
wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the
means to prevent disorders or breaches of the peace among the
occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and
alienation and any power to decide disputes over possession is
but in aid of making the proper awards.
(CITED JURISPRUDENCE)
In Samonte v. Century Savings Bank, this Court made the following
pronouncement:
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of
a pending civil action. In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, and Amagan
v. Marayag, we ordered the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the
ejectment of petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their
house and would create confusion, disturbance, inconvenience, and
expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time and
effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best
be temporary but the result of enforcement would be permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.32
On the other hand, Vda. de Legaspi v. Hon. Avendao,which
Samonte refers to, states:
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x xxWhere the action, therefore, [is] one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right ofthe
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a
proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less
productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession,
with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court
in which the issue of legal possession, whether involving
ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for
preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or
decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final
judgment in the more substantive case involving legal possession
or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as
a matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be
immediately set at rest in favor of the prior possession regardless
of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have
superior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any
attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and
without resorting to the courts.34
More significantly, Amagan v. Marayag dictates, thus
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended
by the mere filing before the regional trial court (R TC) of another
action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an
exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended
even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the
demolition of petitioners' house would result from the
enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
August 25, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
107957 is MODIFIED, in that the directive for petitioners to vacate
the subject premises is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN, DANTE Q. CATACUTAN,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, FERNANDO
Q. CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN
AND TERESITA PUNZALAN, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that their motherhad acquired a parcel of land in
Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga. They contend that respondents
(Spouses Punzalan) constructed their house on a portion of said lot
without their consent and knowledge. But petitioners allowed them
to stay, thinking that they would vacate once their need for the
property arises. However, when they made a demand, the Spouses
Punzalan refused to vacate. Thus,petitioners wrote the spouses a
formal demand letter to vacate. Still, they refused to leave the
property.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MCTC of
Sta. Ana-Candaba, Pampanga. The MCTC then rendered a Decision
in favor of the petitioner;
The Spouses Punzalan, thus, brought the case before the San
Fernando RTC, which affriemd the decision of MTC.

Aggrieved, the Spouses Punzalan elevated the case to the CA. CA
Reversed the ruling of RTC and ruled in favor of the Spouses
Punzalan for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners insist that their complaint states a cause of action for
unlawful detainer and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
Issue: WON complaint states a cause of action for unlawful detainer
and thus, the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
Well settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court in ejectment
cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought.The complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of
cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. States:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to
the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
Under the aforequoted rule, there are two (2) entirely distinct and
different causes of action, to wit: (1) a case for forcible entry, which
is an action to recover possession of a property from the defendant
whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he
acquired possession by fierce, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an action for
recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the
property was lawful at the inception by virtue of a contract with the
plaintiff, be it express or implied, but subsequently became illegal
when he continued his possession despite the termination of his
right or authority.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's initial
possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
illegal upon the plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination
of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant
remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the
property.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 30
The Court finds that the allegations actually make up a case of
forcible entry. The Spouses Punzalan constructed their dwelling
house on a portion of petitioners' lot, without the latter's prior
consent and knowledge. This clearly falls under stealth, which is
defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and
to gain entrance into, or to remain within residence of another
without permission.Here, the evidence clearly reveal that the
spouses' possession was illegal at the inception and not merely
tolerated, considering that they started to occupy the subject lot
and thereafter built a house on the same without the permission
and consent of petitioners. The spouses' entry into the land was,
therefore, effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the
owners. Consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth
which is forcible entry.
PETITIONERS TOLERANCE CAME LATER, NOT FROM INCEPTION AS
REQUIRED BY THE RULES.
The allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential
elements of an action for unlawful detainer. The allegation that the
Spouses Punzalan entered the subject property and constructed
their house on a portion of the same without petitioners' knowledge
and consent is more consistent with an action for forcible entry,
which should have been filed within a year from the discovery of
said illegal entry.
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant,
it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement
of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for which
the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain
any averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners' claim that
they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by the
Spouses Punzalan right from the start. This failure of petitioners to
allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MCTC
corollarily failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners may be the lawful possessors of the subject property, but
they unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to recover
possession. Nevertheless, they may still opt to file an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.
Petition is DENIED.
[ GR No. 191527, Aug 22, 2016 ]
BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
BAPTIST CHURCH +
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. (BFBC) and Philippine Baptist
S.B.C., Inc. (PBSBC) filed a case for ulawful detainer against Faith in

Christ Jesus Baptist Church, Inc. (FCJBC) and Reynaldo Galvan
(Galvan) before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), , Angeles City. The
complaint sought the ejectment of FCJBC from the subject parcel of
land with improvements, located at 35-3 Sarita St., Diamond
Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, and owned by PBSBC.
On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between
PBSBC and BFBC where the latter borrowed money from the former
to enable it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter,
respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held
therein their religious activities.
While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan
and his companions began attending BFBC's religious activities at the
subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was
interested on the property because after some time Galvan formed
and incorporated FCJBC and took control of the subject property.
BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days
from notice and to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month
beginning October 2001 as reasonable compensation for its use.
Due to non-compliance with its demand, BFBC and PBSBC filed a
Complaint[6] for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and
Galvan.
The MTC rendered its Decision in favor of BFBC . The MTC ruled that
the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer.It
ordered the FCJBC to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property to plaintiff within three (3) months from receipt of
this Decision;
Both parties filed their respective appeal memoranda with the RTC.
RTC affirmed the Decision of the MTC. FCJBC moved for
reconsideration, but was denied on November 24, 2006. Thus, FCJBC
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the appellate court.
The appellate court granted the petition, It REVERSED and SET ASIDE
the decision of the RTC. The complaint for unlawful detainer is
DISMISSED.
ISSUE: Whether the instant case is one of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry.
It is a Forcible Entry.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of ;.
action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is
illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior
possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one
decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party in actual
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 31
possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.[14]
From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and
forcible entry are entirely distinct causes of action, to wit: (a) action
to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the
beginning - forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful
detention by a person who originally acquired possession lawfully -
unlawful detainer.
The rule is that the allegations in the complaint determine both the
nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court. The cause of
action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint
states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define
and describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more
than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not
even an indispensable part of the complaint. The complaint must
specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer or forcible
entry if the complaint filed was for unlawful detainer, or forcible
entry, respectively.
If entry is illegal, then the cause of action which may be filed against
the intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the
other hand, entry is legal but thereafter possession became illegal,
the case is one of illegal detainer which must be filed within one
year from the date of the last demand
Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.[21]
FCJBC's occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of
contractual or legal basis. There was, likewise, no allegation that
BFBC and PBSBC tolerated FCJBC's possession of the subject
property. Neither was there any averment in the complaint which
shows any overt act on the part of BFBC and PBSBC indicative of
permission to occupy the land.
This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it
has been long settled that in forcible entry cases, no force is really
necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful
possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over
the property, and this is all that is necessary. Unfortunately, BFBC
and PB SBC's failure to allege when the dispossession took place and
how it was effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional
ground.

Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action
for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry
on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth, the
one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned
thereof. If the dispossession did not occur by any of the means
stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this case, the proper recourse is to
file a plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial
Court.[25] Consequently, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
January 18, 2017 G.R. No. 221071
EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R. DIZON, Petitioners, vs. YOLANDA
VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.
REYES, J.:
FACTS:Eddie started working as a seafarer in the 1980s. He has two
children, namely, Bryan and James Christopher R. Dizon (James).
Eddie is married to Verona Juana Pascua-Dizon (Verona). Verona
was a housewife. She and her mother, together with Bryan and
James, resided in the house erected on a 240-square-meter lot
(disputed property). The registered owners were "[Verona], married
to [Eddie]."
Eddie left the Philippines to work on board a ship. Sometime in
2009, Verona died.Eddie claimed that he was unaware of Verona's
hospital confinement. It took a while before Eddie's employer finally
permitted him to go home. Verona was already buried before
Eddie's arrival.
Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed), was shown to
Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property conveyed to herein
respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran (Vida).
Eddie alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's
signatures thereat were forgeries. Eddie filed a civil case for
nullification of the Deed, and for payment of damages and
attorney's fees.
MTCC:Vida filed an action for unlawful detainer against the
petitioners. Vida alleged that she is the registered owner of the
disputed property. While the Deed evidencing the conveyance in her
favor was executed, Eddie pre-signed the same before he left to
work abroad. After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the petitioners'
stay in the disputed property. Vida sent a formal letter requiring the
petitioners to vacate the disputed property, but to no avail.
MTCC directed the petitioners and their co-defendants to turn over
to Vida the possession of the disputed property, and pay monthly
rent until the said property is vacated.
The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of
sale; title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting
the same property.
RTC: reversed the MTCC ruling.To justify an action for unlawful
detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the
beginning of the possession. Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the
MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.
R u l e 7 0 _ C a s e D i g e s t s _ L E 1 0 7 _ 2 0 1 7 | 32
CA: Vida was able to sufficiently allege and consequently established
the requisites of unlawful detainer.
In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
However, where the issue of ownership is raised, the courts may
pass upon the issue of ownership in order to determine who has the
right to possess the property. The Court stresses, however, that this
adjudication is only an initial determination of ownership for the
purpose of settling the issue of possession, the issue of ownership
being inseparably linked thereto. The lower court's adjudication of
ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional and would not
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title
to the property. It is, therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of
ownership, which is the subject matter of a separate case for
annulment of the Deed filed by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vida has a cause of action for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners considering that the Deed she relied
upon in filing her complaint was falsified, hence, null.
RULING: The Court finds merit in the petitioners' arguments.
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is
concerned, the registration of the property in said person's name
would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property.
A certificate of title merely confirms or' records title already existing
and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be
used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property. Good faith must concur with registration because,
otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens
title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-
standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding
upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of
the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee.
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the
same remained in the name of the original registered owners,
Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and
respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession - of
the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all attributes
of ownership over the same, including possession - whether de facto
or dejure; respondent thus has no right to exclude them from this
right through an action for ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and
void, the matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone
conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title
does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to
collateral, attack;" petitioners were not precluded from questioning
the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.