PROJECT REPORT

Danger of Nuclear Proliferation

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Dr. Sabina Salim Amit Gupta

U.I.L.S 11/12

Panjab University Mandeep Warwal

174/12

Vikrant Attri

175/12

Section-A

B.A.L.LB

Page | 1
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It gives us immense pleasure in submitting this project report on Environment

Law on The Nuclear Danger, a project report on Nuclear Proliferation.
However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of
many individuals. We would like to extend our sincere thanks to all of them.

We are highly indebted to our Environment law teacher, Dr. Sabina Salim, for
her valuable guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing
necessary information regarding the project.

The work contained herein is an amalgamation of the remarkable work of

various authors and we are thankful to them for their publications that have
helped us prepare this research paper to the best of my abilities.

Page | 2
An introduction to the world of nuclear weapons

A nuclear weapon is a weapon, which derives its destructive force from nuclear
reactions of fission or fusion. As a result, even a nuclear weapon with a relatively
small yield is significantly more powerful than the largest conventional explosives,
and a single weapon is capable of destroying an entire city.

In the history of warfare, nuclear weapons have been used twice, both during the
closing days of World War II. The first event occurred on the morning of August 6,
1945, when the United States dropped uranium gun-type device code-named "Little
Boy" on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The second event occurred three days later
when a plutonium implosion-type device code-named "Fat Man" was dropped on the
city of Nagasaki. The use of these weapons, which resulted in the immediate deaths
of around 100,000 to 200,000 individuals and even more over time, was and remains
controversial critics charged that they were unnecessary acts of mass killing,
while others claimed that they ultimately reduced casualties on both sides by
hastening the end of the war. 1

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, nuclear weapons have been
detonated on over two thousand occasions for testing and demonstration purposes.
The only countries known to have detonated such weapons are the United States,
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and Peoples Republic of China, India, and
Pakistan. These countries are the declared nuclear powers (with Russia inheriting
the weapons of the Soviet Union after its collapse).
Various other countries may hold nuclear weapons but have never publicly admitted
possession, or their claims to possession have not been verified. For example, Israel
has modern airborne delivery systems and appears to have an extensive nuclear
program with hundreds of warheads, though it officially maintains a policy of
"ambiguity" with respect to its actual possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea
has recently stated that it has nuclear capabilities (although it has made several
changing statements about the abandonment of its nuclear weapons programs, often

1
http://www.1066.co.nz/Mosaic%20DVD/whoswho/text/Nuclear_weapon[1].htm last seen on 28th March,
2016.
dependent on the political climate at the time) but has never conducted a confirmed
test and its weapons status remains unclear. Iran currently stands accused by a
number of governments of attempting to develop nuclear capabilities, though its
government claims that its acknowledged nuclear activities, such as uranium
enrichment, are for peaceful purposes. South Africa also secretly developed a small
nuclear arsenal, but disassembled it in the early 1990s. Apart from their use as
weapons; nuclear explosives have been tested and used for various non-military
uses.

Nuclear weapons were symbols of military and national power, and nuclear testing
was often used both to test new designs as well as to send political messages. Other
nations also developed nuclear weapons during this time, including the United
Kingdom, France, and China. These five members of the "nuclear club" agreed to
attempt to limit the spread of nuclear proliferation to other nations, though at least
three other countries (India, South Africa, Pakistan, and most likely Israel) developed
nuclear arms during this time. At the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the
Russian Federation inherited the weapons of the former USSR, and along with the
U.S., pledged to reduce their stockpile for increased international safety. Nuclear
proliferation has continued, though, with Pakistan testing their first weapons in 1998,
and North Korea claiming to have developed nuclear weapons in 2004. In January
2005, Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed to selling nuclear
technology and information of nuclear weapons to Iran, Libya, and North Korea in a
massive, international proliferation ring.

WHAT IS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?

Nuclear Proliferation is a term used to describe the spread of nuclear weapons and
weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information, to nations which are not
recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. One
critique of the NPT is that it is discriminatory in recognizing as nuclear weapon states
only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and requiring all other
states joining the treaty to forswear nuclear weapons.

Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons,
the governments of which fear that more countries with nuclear weapons may
increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, (up to and including the so-called
"countervalue" targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international
or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of states.2

Four countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapons States have acquired,
or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons:India, Pakistan, North Korea,
and Israel. None of these four is a party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded
to the NPT in 1985, then withdrew in 2003 and conducted announced nuclear tests
in 2006, 2009, and 2013. One critique of the NPT is that it is discriminatory in
recognizing as nuclear weapon states only those countries that tested nuclear
weapons before 1968 and requiring all other states joining the treaty to forswear
nuclear weapons.

IMPACT OF NUCLEAR POWER3

Three distinct atmospheric problems have been debated intensely since about the
mid-1970s, though two of them are quite old issues: the possible reduction of
stratospheric ozone from chemical emissions; the generation of acid rain; and
climatic change stemming from the greenhouse effect. What these three problems
have in common is quite simple: they all

(1) are complex and punctuated by large uncertainties,

(2) could be long-lasting,

(3) transcend state and even national boundaries,

(4) may be difficult to reverse,

(5) are inadvertent by-products of widely supported economic activities, and

(6) may require substantial investments of present resources to hedge against the
prospect of large future environmental changes.

2
http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/nuclear-proliferation%20/ last seen on 28th March, 2016.
3
Dahat, Prashant R., Danger of Deploying Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space (June 2, 2009). Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1419084, last seen on 28th March, 2016.
Ozone depletion

Of these problems, the only one to have received any substantial public policy action
is that centering on the reduction of stratospheric ozone. Ironically, it is perhaps the
easiest of the problems to reverse.

The importance of the stratospheric ozone layer in shielding the Earth's surface from
the harmful effects of solar ultraviolet radiation has been recognized for several
decades. According to scientists, even relatively small decreases in the stratospheric
ozone concentration can have a serious impact on human healthan increased
incidence of skin cancer, particularly among fair- skinned people.

Acid rain

Scientific studies have shown that the process that results in the formation of acid
rain generally begins with the discharge of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides into the
atmosphere. These waste gases are released by the combustion of fossil fuels by
automobiles, electric power, plants, and smelting and refining facilities. Some
biological processes also emit them. The gases combine with atmospheric water
vapor to form sulfuric and nitric acids. When rain or some other form of precipitation
falls to the surface, it is highly acidic, frequently with a pH value of less than 4. (The
term pH is defined as the negative logarithm of the hydrogen on concentration in
kilograms per cubic meter. The pH scale ranges from 0 to 14, with lower numbers
representing greater acidit). The consequent acidification of surface and subsurface
waters is widely believed to have a detrimental effect on the ecology of the affected
areas.

Greenhouse effect induced by carbon dioxide and other trace gases

Finally, the most long-lasting and potentially least reversible global problem is the
greenhouse effect. As noted above, this effect is induced by carbon dioxide,
chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and more than a dozen other gases in concentration
in the atmosphere. The role played by carbon dioxide is the most significant. The
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen steadily since the mid-1800s largely as
a result of the combustion of coal, oil, and natural gas on an ever-widening scale. In
1850 the global CO2 level of the atmosphere was roughly 280 parts per million,
whereas by the late 1980s it had increased to approximately 350 parts per million.

CONSTRAINTS ON POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS4

Two different approaches developed with respect to imposing constraints on the

acquisition of nuclear weapons. Both of them deal with the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by non-nuclear-weapon States. One approach involved negotiations for a
global treaty committing nuclear-weapon States not to transfer nuclear weapons and
non-nuclear-weapon States not to acquire them. The other approach concerned the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.
Although based on the same principle of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, the
latter approach encompasses additional constraints, both on nuclear and non-
nuclear States parties to such zones and is, as such, broader in scope.

1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex) is regarded by many as

an important achievement in the area of nuclear-arms regulation. The Treaty was
opened for signature on 1st July 1968 and entered into force on 5th March 1970.
Among the nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the
United States are parties to the Treaty and serve as its depositaries. China and
France, while not parties to the Treaty, have on various occasions stated that they
do not support nuclear proliferation and would not act contrary to the Treaty's
provisions. By the end of June 1990 the Treaty had 141 parties, making it the most
widely accepted arms limitation instrument. A considerable number of non-nuclear-
weapon States advanced in nuclear technology have become parties to the treaty.
On the other hand, such States have not yet become party to it.

The basic provisions of the Treaty are to: prevent the spread of nuclear weapons
(arts. I and II); provide assurance, through international safeguards, that the peaceful
nuclear activities of non-nuclear-weapon States will not be diverted to making such
weapons (art. III); facilitate, to the maximum extent consistent with the other
purposes of the Treaty, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through full co-
operation - with the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear

4
Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study, A Report by the Secretary-General, Department of Disarmament
Affairs.
explosion technology being made available to non-nuclear parties under appropriate
international observation (arts. IV and V); express the determination to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control (art. VI).
The NPT also has considerable relevance to several other arms control and
disarmament measures, e.g. a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, negative security
assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

The Treaty also contains provisions for periodic review of its operation(art. VIII). It
also states that a conference shall be convened 25 years following the entry into
force (Le. in 1995) "to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely,
or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods" (art. X).

Three review conferences have been held so far: in 1975, 1980 and 1985. The
Fourth Review Conference is scheduled to take place in August/September 1990.
China and France have indicated their intention to attend as observers.

At the time of the Third Review Conference there were 131 parties to the Treaty. The
strong convergence of interests of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States
parties to check the further spread of nuclear weapons provided a basis for the
successful conclusion of the Conference with the adoption by consensus of a Final
Document. This document, although critical of the implementation of the Treaty in
some areas and recommending further strengthening of the international

system for non-proliferation in others, confirmed unanimously the sustained validity

of the fundamental aims of the Treaty and concluded that it continues to meet its
basic objective.

2. Nuclear-weapon-free zones

The idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as a means of keeping the

regions concerned free of nuclear weapons began to attract the attention of the
international community in the 1950s. Many proposals have been made since that
time. While some of them are still being considered in various forums, agreement
has been reached on two of them.
(a) Treaty of Rarotonga

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) was opened for
signature on 6 August 1985 and entered into force on 11 December 1986. Eleven
out of 15 members of the South Pacific Forum had become parties to the Treaty as
at June 1990. The four countries that have not signed the Treaty are: Tonga,
Vanuatu, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands. The Treaty area encompasses large sea areas, but most provisions apply
only on land and, consequently, nothing in the Treaty affects the exercise of the
rights of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

The Treaty of Rarotonga creates a "nuclear-free", rather than a "nuc1ear-weapon-

free", zone. The prime intention of the Treaty was to keep the regiQn free of the
stationing of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and environmental pollution by
radioactive waste. Moreover, the parties wished to prohibit all types of nuclear
explosions. Accordingly, the operative articles of the Treaty refer consistently to
"nuclear explosive devices", a term which covers all nuclear devices, irrespective of
the purpose, military Qr peaceful, which has been given for their existence.

Each party to the Treaty undertakes not to manufacture, acquire, possess or have
control over any nuclear explosive device inside or outside the zone. Moreover, it
undertakes to conduct any nuclear co-operation with other States in accordance with
strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful non-
explosive use, and to support the effectiveness of the international non-proliferation
system based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the safeguards system of IAEA.
While exercising its sovereign rights to decide for itself whether to allow foreign ships
(which may be nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed) to visit its ports or foreign aircraft
to visit its airfields or fly over its territory, each party undertakes to prevent any
nuclear explosive device from being stationed in its territory. It also undertakes to
prevent all testing of such devices on its territory and not to assist others in doing so.
It further undertakes not to dump radioactive wastes anywhere at sea within the zone
and to prevent such dumping or storing by anyone in its territorial sea.

The States outside the Zone that have jurisdiction over territories within it (France,
the United Kingdom and the United States) would, upon becoming parties to
Protocol 1, apply the Treaty's key provisions to those territories. The five nuclear-
weapon States would, upon becoming parties to Protocol 2, undertake not to use or
threaten to use nuclear explosive devices against parties to the Treaty, and any such
State Would, upon becoming party to Protocol 3, refrain from nuclear testing within
the zone.

The Soviet Union and China have ratified Protocols 2 and 3. France, the United
Kingdom and the United States have indicated that they do not intend at this time to
become parties to any of the Protocols. However, the United States declared that
none of its practices and activities within the Treaty area were inconsistent with the
Treaty and its Protocols, while the United Kingdom stated that it would respect the
intentions of States of the region on Protocols 1 and 3.

South Pacific nations have expressed disappointment that France has not signed the
Protocol 3 and continues to test within the zone. France put forward its position on
this matter to the General Assembly on 2 June 1988.

(b) Treaty of Tlatelolco

The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of
Tlatelolco) was the first treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely
populated area. It was also the first agreement to establish a system of inter'national
control and a permanent supervisory organ, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

The Treaty was signed on 14 February 1967. at Tlatelolco, a borough of Mexico City.
The basic obligation of the parties to the Treaty, defined in article 1. is to use
exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities under their
jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the very
presence of nuclear weapons for any purpose and under any circumstances. Parties
to the Treaty also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing,
directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing. use, manufacture.
production. possession or control of any nuclear weapons.
Annexed to the Treaty are two Additional Protocols, which create a system of
obligations for extra-continental and continental States having responsibilityde jure
or de facto for terr'itories in the zone of application of the Treaty as well as
obligations for the nuclear-weapon States. Thus, under AdditionalProtocol I,
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States would agree to
guarantee nuclear-weapon-free status to those territories for which they are, de jure
or de facto internationally responsible. The Protocol has been signed and ratified by
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. France has signed it
and has declared that it will in due course take an appropriate decision, considering
that not all States concerned in the zone are yet parties to this Treaty. Under
Additional Protocol II, nuclear-weapon States pledge to respect fully the
"denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes" and "not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties". By 1979, all five
nuclear-weapon States had adhered to it. and in that connection made individual
declarations with respect to various provisions of the Treaty and its Protocols.

As at June 1990, the Treaty was in force for 23 Latin American States that had
ratified it and had waived the requirements for entering into force set out in article 28
(that all States in the zone be parties to the Treaty, that all States to which the
Protocols apply adhere to them and that relevant safeguards agreements be
concluded with lAEA). Several States within the denuclearized zone are not yet
parties to the Treaty, among them Cuba, which has not signed the Treaty. Argentina
has signed but has not ratified it, and Brazil and Chile have ratified it but not waived
the requirements for its entry into force. Argentina, as a signatory, has officially
declared that it would not act against the objectives of the Treaty.

(c) Various proposals

The discussion of the question of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various

parts of the world is continuing between regional States concerned and within the
United Nations disarmament bodies. While supporting the concept as such, many
Member States stress the importance of certain prerequisites for the successful
implementation of the concept of nuclear-weapon,free zones. Among the principles
and objectives most referred to are the following: the initiative should come from the
States in the region concerned and the arrangements to establish a nuclear-weapon-
free zone should be based on agreement freely arrived at , among the States of the
prospective zone; the arrangements should take into account the specific
characteristics of the region in question; such arrangements should contain
provisions concerning verification of the commitments undertaken; the nuclear-
weapon States should undertake obligations to respect the status of the
denuclearized zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the
States of the zone. In addition, some States judge proposals for such zones also
from the standpoint of their potential contribution not only to the security of the region
concerned, but to international security in general.

For many years, debates have taken place in the General Assembly on the
possibility of setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, 21 the MiddleEast,
and South Asia. RI In addition, there have been proposals for the creation of such
zones in other regions, including Northern Europe, Central Europe, the Balkans and
South-East Asia. Some exploratory work has been carried out both at the regional
and international level on these possibilities. However, no concrete negotiations
have yet been initiated on any of these proposals. Although there has been
considerable support for some proposals, not all of them have received support by
all countries concerned.
DE-FACTO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

( GLOBAL PROLIFERATION CASES)

India: 1974

Peaceful technology sharing under the Atoms for Peace in the 1950s has become
the bedrock for the Indian nuclear program, as Homi Sethna, chairman of the
Indian Atomic Energy Commission from 1972-83, acknowledged.5 More than 1,000
Indian scientists have participated in US nuclear energy research projects from
1955-1974, and the United States assisted India in building and fueling the Tarapur
reactors.6 Signing the Atoms for Peace program agreement, India specifically
insisted on a clause not to exclude peaceful explosions.7 Had the initial efforts been
aimed at producing the bomb,8 the Indian test would certainly have come before
1974,9 but the country focused on civilian use of nuclear power and advocated
against nuclear weapons proliferation. In the 1950s, as nuclear weapons were
routinely tested, India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, called for an end to all
nuclear weapons testing.10 India participated in the negotiation of the NPT, but
refused to join, criticizing it as discriminatory.

How did a decision to build the bomb spring in a country that revers Mahatma
Gandhi? As Indian politician Jaswant Singh argues in his article Against Nuclear
Apartheid, the rise of China, continued strain with Pakistan, and the fact that the five

5
Homi Sethna, Opening the Door to Nuclear Development, Atoms for Peace, p. 102.

6
J. A. Yager, ed., Non-proliferation and US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1980), p.
216.

7
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., New Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation Policy, Science, New Series, Vol. 256 No.
5061 (May 29, 1992), pp. 1293-1297: 1294

8
G. G. Mirchandani, Indias Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), pp. 3-7.

9
The development of reprocessing technology made sense in light of the Indian vision, shared by most other
states at the time, of succeeding generations of breeder reactors. G. G. Mirchandani and P. K. S. Namboodiri,
Ibid.

10
Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77 No. 5 (Sep. / Oct. 1998), pp. 41-52.
nuclear weapon states showed no signs of moving decisively toward a world free of
atomic danger made the 1980s and 1990s a greatly troubling period for India. 11 A
successful nuclear test in China in 1964, which had attacked India on its Himalayan
border two years before, was the last straw needed to spur Indian efforts to research
and design nuclear weapons. In 1965, the second war between India and Pakistan
broke out, strengthening the case for developing nuclear weapons. The desire to
boost its position in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War motivated India to test a nuclear
device in 1974.12 Ironically, plutonium for this explosion was produced by an
unsafeguarded Canadian reactor using the heavy water sold to India by the United
States in the 1960s. The reaction of the US Congress to the Indian nuclear tests
resulted in amendments to the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which prohibited the
United States from providing additional nuclear assistance to India and a few other
states.

Even after the first nuclear test, India claimed the peaceful character of its nuclear
program and even allegedly halted research. When the time came, however, the
country easily reverted from power generation to producing weapons. The second
series of nuclear tests, known as Operation Shatki, was conducted in 1998 within
months of Pakistans missile tests. The incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
vowed not to compromise Indias national sovereignty and security: We do not wish
to see India blown apart by Pakistan or China because we did not possess the
deterrent nuclear power.13 Another aspect of Indias decision to build the bomb was
pride, as often happens in post-colonial countries. We dont want to be blackmailed
[...]. Nuclear weapons will give us prestige, power, standing. An Indian will talk
straight and walk straight when we have the bomb, a Bharatiya Janata Party
spokesman said in 1993.14Thus, desires to redress perceived discrimination and
improve national security in precarious political environment provided an impetus to

11
Ibid.
12
Indias Nuclear Weapons ProgramIndias First Bomb: 1967 1974, Nuclear Weapons Archive, Mar. 30,
2001, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaFirstBomb.html. , last seen on 28th March, 2016.

13
Krishna M. Bhatta and Mahesh Mehta, the Bharatiya Janata Party, Policy On Major Issues: Nuclear
Issue,http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/BJPPolicy.txt, last seen on 28th March, 2016.

14
George Perkovich, Nuclear Proliferation, Foreign Policy, No. 112 (fall 1998), pp. 12-23: 16
build the bomb.

Israel: 197915

Israel probably developed nuclear capabilities in late 1960s, receiving its nuclear
weapons production facilities from the French firms allegedly acting with the
blessings of their government.16 The Suez crisis in 1956 reinforced both Israels
determination to acquire nuclear weapons and Frances inclination to provide the
necessary technology.17 The Israelis asked for a natural uranium-fuelled, heavy-
water moderated reactor to take advantage of their indigenous uranium deposits.
The French-Israeli cooperation resulted in construction of a reactor and reprocessing
facility at Dimona, Israel.

The country has not publicly conducted a nuclear test, and its arsenal believed to
consist of 75 to 200 weapons, comprising bombs, missile warheads, and possibly
non-strategic (tactical) weapons18 has never been officially confirmed or denied. At
the same time, Israel officially declared that it will not be the first state to introduce
nuclear weapons into the Middle East. The state has insisted on maintaining this
policy even after its nuclear secrets were leaked to a British newspaper by technician
Mordechai Vanunu. The US government pursued a policy of silence towards the
Israeli nuclear weapons program.

Israel founder Ben-Gurions decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken up as a

matter of national survival. However, if an Arab state should acquire nuclear
weapons, the risk a nuclear confrontation in the Middle East will grow exponentially.

Pakistan: 1998

15
The date of the Vela Incident, an unidentified double flash of light detected by US Vela satellite on 22
September 1979, which is thought to be the result of a joint South African-Israeli nuclear test. Thomas C. Reed
and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation, (MBI
Publishing Co., 2009).

16
Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia Universty Press, 1998), p. 45

17
Leonard Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), p. 168.

18
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.last seen on 28th March, 2016
Pakistans program began in the mid-1950s with Islamabads participation in the
Atoms for Peace initiative. India's 1974 testing of a nuclear device gave new
momentum to Pakistani nuclear aspirations. An independent nuclear deterrent
seemed necessary because Pakistans conventional forces were significantly weaker
than its neighbors, as was proven by Pakistans defeat in the 1971 war with India.
As Ali Bhutto, who established the Pakistani nuclear program in 1972, remarked,
people would "eat grass" to keep up with India.19

The French suspended their contracts with Islamabad in 1977 in response to US

pressure. However, Pakistani nuclear program was revitalized in 1975 when Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German-trained metallurgist, returned to the country.
Previously employed by a contractor at the European Urenco enrichment
consortium, Khan used stolen centrifuge designs to develop a large, unsafeguarded
centrifuge plant at Kahuta. Under Khan's direction, a clandestine proliferation
network of materials, knowledge, and machines from Pakistan to Libya, Iran, and
North Korea developed.20

The US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment in 1985, prohibiting US

assistance to Pakistan unless it was proven that the state possessed no nuclear
explosive devices. But even after the 1987 interview with an Indian journalist, in
which Khan stated that Pakistan had the ability to produce nuclear weapons, 21 the
United States, waging war in Afghanistan, continued to ignore on Pakistani
capabilities. Only in 1990 was the US economic and military aid cut off and sanctions
to deter the country from developing nuclear weapons enacted.22 The United States
took the matter even more seriously after Indian explosions in May 1998, 23 but it was

19
William Epstein, Why states go- and dont go- nuclear, Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 430, Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals (Mar. 1977), pp. 16-28: 19

20
A Brief History of Pakistans Nuclear Program, Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke, last seen on 28 th March, 2016

Christopher C. Lary, A.Q. Khan and the limits of the non-proliferation regime, 2005 NPT Renewal
21

Conference, Disarmament Forum.

22
Robert M. Hathaway, Confrontation and Retreat: The US Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests,
Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_01-02/rhchart. Last seen on 30th March, 2010

23
Farzana Shaikh, Pakistan's Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non-Proliferation Regime, International Affairs
too late. Only two weeks after the Indian testing, Pakistan announced that it had
successfully conducted five nuclear tests.24

North Korea: 2006

North Korea was harboring plans to get the bomb early on and may have been
prodded by South Korean nuclear venture. While the IAEA Board of Governors
never made a formal finding of South Koreas noncompliance,25 Seoul did enrich
uranium to levels near weapons grade. South Korea said it had voluntarily reported
an isolated activity,26 and was not punished in the end, but the consequences of
decisions of all the countries involved will continue to reverberate. 27 North Korean
nuclear aspirations are also linked to the need for development assistance and,
more importantly, prestige. Even when negotiating the halt its nuclear program, the
North demands that the world call it a nuclear state to increase its international
importance.28

North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 and, after South Korea announced that no
US nuclear weapons existed on its territory, signed the IAEA safeguards
agreement.29 In 1991 the state joined the United Nations and entered into a

(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 78, No. 1 (Jan. 2002).

24
Michael Tkacik, Pakistans Nuclear Program, Conference Papers -- Southern Political Science Association;
2008 Annual Meeting, p. 1

25
"Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance, Survival, Vol. 51 No. 1 (Feb. 2009), pp. 143 - 164.

26
Jungmin Kang, Peter Hayes, Li Bin, Tatsujiro Suzuki and Richard Tanter, "South Korea's nuclear surprise: as
more and more countries adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol, all kinds of nuclear secrets will come spilling
out. Currently under microscope: South Korea," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (Jan. 1, 2005)

27
The official position is that "it was a one-time experiment conducted without government authorization and
it was geared toward the country's nuclear energy program". Ironically, "without the authorization or knowledge
of the government" was also an explanation offered by Pakistan in explaining the rogue activities of Dr A. Q.
Khan in the realm of global nuclear proliferation. Ehsan Ahrari, Nuclear genie out of S Korean bottle, Asia
Times, Sep. 8, 2004. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FI08Dg05.html. Last seen on 30th March, 2016.

28
The US Forces Joint Command (JFCOM) listed North Korea as a nuclear power in 2008 document,
subsequently issuing a clarification regarding the nuclear status of North Korea, stating that this does not reflect
US policy. Kang Hyun-kyung, N. Korea Links Nuclear Status to National Prestige, The Korea Times, Apr. 5,
2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/special/2009/06/180_44330.html. Last seen on 30th March,
2016.

29
Daniel Poneman, The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Information Brief, The Forum for
denuclearization agreement with its southern neighbor. Because of these positive
developments, no alarms sounded when a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility
appeared at its Yongbyon plant in 1989.30 Tensions reemerged only when the IAEA
inspections uncovered troublesome information on the Norths programs. Since then
a one-step-forward and one-step backward dance became a continued pattern of
action between the international community and North Korea until the nuclear club
expanded yet again as North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon in October 2006.
On May 25, 2009, the country conducted a second nuclear test, in violation of UNSC
resolution 1718. The state pulled out of multilateral talks on its nuclear activities, and
is believed to possess 5-15 warheads.

SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFICATION:

The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to
provide security for non-nuclear weapon states which have given up the nuclear
option, to encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear disarmament
leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The most important factor underpinning the safeguards regime is international

political pressure and how particular nations perceive their long-term security
interests in relation to their immediate neighbours. The solution to nuclear weapons
proliferation is thus political more than technical, and it certainly goes beyond the
question of uranium availability. International pressure not to acquire weapons is
enough to deter most states from developing a weapons program. The major risk of
nuclear weapons' proliferation will always lie with countries which have not joined the
NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities, and those which
have joined but disregard their treaty commitments.

Scope of Safeguards:

It is important to understand that nuclear safeguards are a means of reassurance

whereby non-nuclear weapons states demonstrate to others that they are abiding by
their peaceful commitments. They prevent nuclear proliferation in the same way that

International Policy, Mar. 7, 2003.

30
Ibid.
auditing procedures build confidence in proper financial conduct and prevent
embezzlement. Their specific objective is to verify whether declared (usually traded)
nuclear material remains within the civil nuclear fuel cycle and is being used solely
for peaceful purposes or not.

Non-nuclear-weapons state parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards

measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities
maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions
involving nuclear material. Almost 900 nuclear facilities and several hundred other
locations in 57 non-nuclear-weapons countries are subject to regular inspection.
Their records and the actual nuclear material are audited. Inspections by the IAEA
are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and
instrumentation.

The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion of nuclear material
from peaceful use by maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level they
provide assurance to the international community that countries are honouring their
treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful
purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community
and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate
compliance with these commitments.

The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion
of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on;

Material Accountability tracking all inward and outward transfers and the
flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This includes sampling and analysis of
nuclear material, on-site inspections, review and verification of operating
records.
Physical Security restricting access to nuclear materials at the site of use.
Containment and Surveillance use of seals, automatic cameras and other
instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear
materials, as well as spot checks on-site.

All NPT non-weapons states must accept these 'full-scope' safeguards, which apply
to all nuclear facilities in the country. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT
states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply to relevant
plants (see further section below). IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to
verify completeness and accuracy of records.

Uranium supplied to nuclear weapons states is not, under the NPT, covered by
safeguards. However normally there is at least a "peaceful use" clause in the supply
contract, and in the case of Australia, a bilateral safeguards agreement is required
which does cover all uranium supplied and all materials arising from it (as "Australian
obligated nuclear materials" AONM). Neither the peaceful use clause nor the
bilateral treaty mean that materials are restricted to facilities on the state's list of
facilities eligible for IAEA inspection.

The NPT is supplemented by other safeguards systems such as those among

certain European nations (Euratom Safeguards) and between individual countries
(bilateral agreements) such as Australia and customer countries for its uranium, or
Japan and the USA.

The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be
forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iran and North Korea, safeguards are
backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.

Safeguard Problems (1980s-1990s):

Iraq, Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of
international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq and
Iran had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium, in
Iraq's case, to weapons grade. North Korea used research reactors (not commercial
electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-
grade plutonium.

The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material
was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources,
and the key nuclear facilities concerned were built by the countries themselves
without being declared to the IAEA or placed safeguards arrangements. Iraq, as an
NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nor, more recently,
did Iran. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of
its NPT safeguards agreement, using a Russian "research" reactor and clandestine
reprocessing plant.

Nevertheless, the activities were detected and in Iraq and North Korea, brought
under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this
process, but North Korea posed possibly the most intractable situation confronted by
the IAEA. This has since been matched by Iran.

So, while traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations
by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been
declared, outside the known materials flows and facilities.
Addressing undeclared nuclear activities the Additional Protocol

Following discovery of Iraq's clandestine programme, in 1993 a programme was

initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and a model
protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. This was to boost the
IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no
connection to the civil fuel cycle.

Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's
existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others
required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This
must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to their
existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. NPT Weapons States (and India)
have also agreed to accept the principles of the model Additional Protocol, though
the function there is different.

Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:

The IAEA is given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-

related activities, including R&D, production of uranium and thorium
(regardless of whether it is traded) and nuclear-related imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors have greater rights of access. This includes any suspect
location, at short notice (e.g. two hours), and the IAEA can deploy
environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit
activities.
States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get
automatic visa renewal and can communicate more readily with IAEA
headquarters.

All these elements enhance the IAEA's ability to provide assurances that all nuclear
activities and material in the country concerned has been declared for safeguards
purposes.

As of August 2014, 124 states plus Taiwan, Greenland and Euratom had Additional
Protocols in force, and 20 more including Belarus and Iran had them approved and
signed but not yet in force. There are 70 states plus Taiwan with significant nuclear
activities. Those remaining without an Additional Protocol include Israel, Pakistan
and North Korea all outside the NPT anyway.

Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of

its particular situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has. This will involve
greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective
methodologies which reassure NPT States.

Where non-weapons states have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and an
Additional Protocol in force, the IAEA is able to say each year not only that declared
nuclear material remains in peaceful activities, but also that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities.

For Nuclear Weapons States, the purpose of the Additional Protocol is different,
namely to provide the IAEA with information on nuclear supply to, and cooperation
with, non-weapons states. Such information assists the IAEA in its objective of
detecting any undeclared activities in non-weapons states. (In this context India is
understood to be effectively a Nuclear Weapons State, and the Additional Protocol
for it was agreed by the IAEA in March 2009, and ratified by India in June 2014.)

Limitations of safeguards

Apart from situations addressed by the Additional Protocol, the greatest risk of
nuclear weapons proliferation lies with countries which have not joined the NPT and
which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel
are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain
beyond scrutiny.

A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle
facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out
of the NPT. Bilateral agreements such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for
sale of uranium address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are
outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the
NPT it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it
were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely.
IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and
do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does
not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide application of
those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity
make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely.

The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide credible assurance that
there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This
will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation.

By mid 2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the Additional Protocol.
However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, 25 have yet to bring it into
force.

However, of 71 countries with significant nuclear activities, four NPT parties have not
yet signed the Additional Protocol and another ten have not fully ratified it (another
four of the 71 are outside the NPT).

STATES OF IMMEDIATE PROLIFERATION CONCERN :31

Iran is pursuing a uranium-enrichment program and other projects that could provide
it with the capability to produce bomb-grade fissile material and develop nuclear
weapons within the next several years. In contrast, North Korea has the material to
produce a small number of nuclear weapons, announced its withdrawal from the
NPT, and tested nuclear devices. Uncertainty persists about how many additional
nuclear devices North Korea has assembled beyond those it has tested. In
September 2005, Pyongyang committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs.

Iran: No known weapons or sufficient fissile material stockpiles to build weapons.

However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the institution charged
with verifying that states are not illicitly building nuclear weapons, concluded in 2003
31
Supra at 18.
that Iran had undertaken covert nuclear activities to establish the capacity to
indigenously produce fissile material. In July 2015, Iran and six world powers
negotiated a long-term agreement to verifiably and significantly Iran's capacity to
produce material for nuclear weapons, and the IAEA is continuing its investigation
and monitoring of Tehrans nuclear program.

North Korea: Is estimated to have 6-8 plutonium based warheads as of 2015. In

August 2013, North Korea restarted the 5-megawatt heavy-water graphite-
moderated reactor it used to extract plutonium in the past for its nuclear warheads,
although operation of the reactor since then has not been constant. North Korea
unveiled a centrifuge facility in 2010, but it is unclear if Pyongyang is using the facility
to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons. Experts estimate that North Korea
could have the material for an additional 4-8 uranium based warheads as of 2015.

Syria: In September 2007, Israel conducted an airstrike on what U.S. officials have
alleged was the construction site of a nuclear research reactor similar to North
Koreas Yongbyon reactor. Intelligence officials briefed members of congress on the
airstrike eight months later in April 2008, discussing the evidence leading to their
judgment that the site was an undeclared nuclear reactor. While the extent of Syrian-
North Korean nuclear cooperation is unclear, it is believed to have begun in 1997.
Subsequent IAEA investigations into the U.S. claims uncovered traces of undeclared
man-made uranium particles at both the site of the destroyed facility and Syrias
declared research reactor. Syria has failed to provide adequate cooperation to the
IAEA in order to clarify the nature of the destroyed facility and procurement efforts
that could be related to a nuclear program.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Charnysh, Volha, NAPF Intern, A Brief History of Nuclear Proliferation.

Zarate, Robert, The Non-Use and Abuse of Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence

in the Cases of North Korea and Iran (April 8. 2013)

Department of Disarmament Affairs, Report of the Secretary-General, Nuclear

Weapons: A comprehensive Study,

Dahat, Prashant R., Danger of Deploying Weapons and Nuclear Power in

Space (June 2, 2009).