People v.

Ramos
May 9, 1978
Santos J.
Bahjin

Facts:

Two criminal cases identical in every respect, except for the fact that they pertain to different editions of
the same textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise
known as the Copyright Law, as amended.

Information: Accused, as the proprietor aid general manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise
engaged in the business of publishing, selling and distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and
illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies of the high school textbook, entitled General
Science Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing
that said book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., and was being distributed
exclusively by its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons, Inc.

Ramos filed motions to quash. She argued that the alleged offense was made on July 17, 1963, and since
the Sec 24 of Act No 3134 provides for a 2-year prescription period, the criminal cases were filed beyond
the said period; and that assuming that the the last actual sale is the starting point of computation, the
offense would still have prescribed, since evidence shows that the last sale was made on August 30,
1963.

The prosecution opposed the motions to quash, arguing that the violation committed is a continuing
offense, and the 2-year prescriptive period is counted from September 3, 1963, or one day before the
search in defendants' premises, which confirmed her possession of spurious and pirated copies of the
textbook. According to the prosecution, the completion of the last act or series of acts which constitute
the offense happened on the said date.

In her reply to the opposition of the prosecution, Ramos reiterated her arguments and also said that
even assuming that the prescriptive period began to run on September 3, 1963, two years mean a
period of 730 days in accordance with Art 13 of the Civil Code, and since 1964 is a leap year, the 730th
day fell on September 2, 1965.

Hon. De Veyra, the judge hearing one of the criminal cases, granted the motion to quash, ruling that the
crime has already prescribed. This order was appealed by the prosecution to the SC.

Meanwhile, in the other criminal case, Hon. Ramos denied the motion to quash. The judge ruled that
the prescriptive period should be counted from September 4, 1963, the date the copies of the textbook
were seized from the accused, thus the case was filed on time. Motion for Reconsideration of the
accused was denied. Thus, she filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.

The appealed order and the petition for certiorari were consolidated.

With regard to the appealed order, the Solicitor General recommended that the order granting the
motion to quash be affirmed. Thus, the Phoenix Publishing, as the offended party, moved to intervene.
Phoenix argues that the applicable prescriptive period is 4 years as provided in Act No. 3326.
Issue 1: Whether Act No. 3326 is applicable (No)
Ratio:

- Sec 1 of Act No. 3326 provides that Violations penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules...
- Thus, Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not provide for its own prescriptive period. It has
no application here, where the Copyright Law in its Sec 24 provides for a 2-year prescription period.

Issue 2: Whether the offense has prescribed (Yes. The last day for filing the cases is September 2,
1965, considering that 1964 is a leap year.)

Ratio:

- The resolution of this issue depends on whether February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be
counted as one day, as proposed by the prosecution; or as separate days, as alleged by the defense.

- The said issue is now a settled. In Namarco v Tuazon it was held that February 28 and 29 of a leap year
should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. The Court explained:
Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the Supreme Court thereof held... that, when the law
spoke of months, it meant a 'natural' month or 'solar' month, in the absence of express provision to the
contrary. Such provision was incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently promulgated.
Hence, the same Supreme Court Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code,
'whenever months are referred to in the law. it shall be understood that months are of 30 days,' not the
'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are 'designated by name,' in which case, 'they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have.' This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines,
by Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, pursuant to which 'month shall be understood to
refer to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have
reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance with which a month is to be
considered as the regular 30-month and not the solar or civil month with the particularity that... ours
has added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in Article 13 that it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days.

- Since the cases were filed on September 3, 1965, it was filed one day too late, considering that the
730th day fell on September 2, 1965 - the year 1964 being a leap year.

- In the same Namarco case, the Court said regarding the opinion of some justices that Art 13 of the Civil
Code is unrealistic:
... If public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the Revised Administrative Code,
this may be done through legislative process, not by judicial decree.

- There is no merit in the allegation that the reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from
September 4, 1963, the date when the police authorities discovered several pirated books in accused's
store. The accused was charged with having allegedly sold and distributed spurious and pirated copies of
the textbook, not of illegal possession of the same.

- The prosecution's claim that the preliminary investigation interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period, is also without merit. As held in People v Tayco, the running of the prescriptive period is
interrupted not by the act of the offended party in reporting the offense to the fiscal, but the filing of
the complaint or information in court.