1

Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja

Reagan v CIR, 30 SCRA 968

Facts: A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is
raised by petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American
corporation providing technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He
would dispute the payment of the income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the
United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at
Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the
sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.

Issue: Whether or not the sale was made outside the Philippine territory and therefore beyond
our jurisdictional function to tax.

Held: The Court held that nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent
and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion there of
that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its
laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent
of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty.

It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction
of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does
the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the
exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means
follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as
native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does
not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
2
Western Mindanao State University
Colloge of Law
LLB 1C

Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2

People v. Gozo 53 SCRA 476
G.R. No. L-36409

FACTS: The accuse Loreta Gozo brought a house and lot located inside the US Naval Reservation within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house without acquiring the necessary
permits and then later on erected another house. Then, she was charged by the City Engineers Office
for violating Mun. Ord No. 14 Series of 1964 which requires her to secure permits for any demolition
and/or construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She
appealed and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot
because it is within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

ISSUE: Whether or not, does the city government has administrative jurisdiction and should enforce its
Municipal Ordinance over the US Naval Reservation?

HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such
ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of
(Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the City of
Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base. Under the
terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction
of such offenses.
3
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: Magallona v Ermita, 655 SCRA 476

FACTS: The antecedent facts of this case emerged upon the passing of Republic Act 3046 in 1961. The
laws purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the Philippines as it was deemed to be an
archipelago. RA 3046 stood unchallenged until 2009, when Congress amended it and passed RA 9522.
This amending law shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. The
petitioners filed a case assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522.

ISSUE: W/N RA 9522 (AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS
AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) is constitutional.

HELD: The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and made it clear that it
has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS
III. The Court found that the framework of the regime of islands suggested by the law is not incongruent
with the Philippines enjoyment of territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands
and the Scarborough.
4
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGESTS
Tondo Medical vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioners Tondo Medical filed for the petition , assailing the decision of the Court of appeals after it
was denied for the nullification of the Health sector Reform Agenda (HSRA).That such collection would
add burden to the economically disadvantaged citizens.

Issue:
Whether or not the Health sector Reform Agenda run counter to the provisions of the Constitution.

Held:
The Court denied the petition of the petitioner and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
5
Alsam B. Adjilul
LLB 1C
College of Law WMSU

Bases conversion and development authority vs. Comission on election

580 SCRA 295

Facts:
On May 22, 1996, State Auditor Nida M. Blanco of the COA, disallowed in audit the Loyalty
Service Award for 1995, the Children's Allowance for the period January to December of 1995, the
Anniversary Bonus for 1995, and the 8th step salary increase effective January, 1995, for being excessive
and/or illegal and not in accordance with the Central Bank benefit package. Petitioner claims that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in affirming the
disallowance of the (1) Loyalty Service Award, (2) 8th step increment, and (3) Children's Allowance.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Commission On Audit (COA) Decision
No. 99-057 dated March 23, 1999 and Resolution No. 2000-89 dated March 7, 2000, for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Held:
Yes, the petition is partly granted. The assailed Decision No. 99-057 dated March 23, 1999 and
Resolution No. 2000-89 dated March 7, 2000 issued by the COA are modified in the sense that the
disapproval of the Childrens Allowance is set aside. We hold that respondent COA, in disallowing the
Childrens Allowance, committed grave abuse of discretion.
6

Case Digest : In Re Letter of Associate Justice Reynato Puno, 210 SCRA 589

FACTS:

1. On November 14,1990, Associate Justice Reynato Puno wrote the Court seeking the correction
of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.

As a background, petitioner was first appointed as Assoc. Justice of the Court of Appeals on June
20,1980 and took his oath of office for the said position on November 29,1982.

2. On Jan. 17,1983, the CA was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
pursuant to Batas Pambansa 129. Subsequently, the petitioner was appointed as Appellate
Justice in the First Special Cases Division of the IAC.

3. On Nov. 7,1984, the petitioner accepted his appointment as Deputy Minister of Justice ceasing
his membership in the Judiciary.

4. After the EDSA People Power Revolution in February 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 33, affecting reorganization in the Judiciary.

5. A Screening Committee recommended the return of the petitioner as AJ of the new Court of
Appeals and listed him as number 11 in the roster of Appellate Court Justices. However, when
the appointment papers were signed by President Aquino on July 28,1986, Justice Punos
seniority ranking changed from No. 11 to No. 26.

6. On Nov. 29,1990, the Court en banc issued a Resolution granting the petitioners request.

7. Later, Associate Justices Jose Campos Jr. and Luis Javellana, two (2) of the justices affected by
the ordered correction, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the present CA is a
new court and that the courts where the petitioner was previously appointed have already
ceased to exist and therefore the petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court
nor claim that he was returning to his former court.

8. When the Court asked the petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration, Justice
Puno argued that, by virtue of E.O. 33 read in relation to BP 129 and by President Aquinos
pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (Freedom Constitution) that no right provided in
the ungratified 1973 Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution, his seniority
ranking should now be at number 5.

Petitioner likewise claimed that although he power of appointment is executive in character and cannot
be usurped by any other branch of the government, such power can still be regulated by the
Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by EO 33 for the power of
appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law.

ISSUE:
 The main issue is whether or not the present Court of Appeals is now a new court such that it
would negate any claim to precedence or seniority.

HELD:

The Court granted the motion for reconsideration and recognized and upheld the seniority
ranking of the members of the Court of Appeals, including that of Assoc. Justice Puno, at the time the
appointments were approved by President Aquino in 1986.
7
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
Case no. 7 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan GR no. 104768, July 21, 2003

FACTS:
President Aquino issued Executive Order no. 1, creating a Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG) task to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinate and close associates. Based on the mandate of EO no. 1, AFP board investigated
reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major Josephus Q. Ramas and alleged mistress
Elizabeth Dimaano.
They confiscated sum of money, communication equipments, jewelries and land titles in a
search they conducted at the house of Ms. Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the confiscated items is valid.

HELD:
No, since the government under Pres. Cory Aquino is a revolutionary government established by
the authority of the legitimate sovereign, and established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution. The
action taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with law. Sec.1 of Art. II provides that The Philippines is
a Democratic and Republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
8
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC
Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan Keh
75 PHIL 113

FACT

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the
Philippine government under the Japanese).

ISSUES

Whether the government established in the said Japanese occupation is in fact a de facto government.

HELD

Yes, civil case filed can be continued since the the government establish during the Japanese occupation
is a de facto, all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a de facto
government is valid. Being a de facto government, judicial acts done under its control, when they are
not political in nature, to the extent that they effect during the continuance and control of said
government remain good.
9
ACCFA vs CUGCO

Facts:

On 4 Sept 1961 a CBA was agreed upon by labor unions (ASA and AWA) and ACCFA. The said CBA was
supposed to be effective on 1 July 1962. Due to non-implementation of the CBA the unions held a strike
on 25 Oct 1962. And 5 days later CUGCO, the mother union of ASA and AWA filed a complaint against
ACCFA due to unfair labor practices among others which CUGCO was able to win in court. On 25
Apr1963, ACCFA appealed the decision and while the appeal was pending, RA 3844 was passed which
effectively turned ACCFA to ACA. On 17 Mar 1964, ASA and AWA then petitioned that they may have
sole bargaining rights with ACA. While this petition was not yet decided upon, on 19 March 1964, EO 75
was also passed which placed ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration. Notwithstanding the
latest legislation passed, the trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor of ASA and AWA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not ASA and AWA can be given sole bargaining rights with ACA.

HELD:

The Unions have no bargaining rights with ACA. EO 75 placed ACA under the LRPA and by virtue of RA
3844 the implementation of the Land Reform Program of the government is a governmental function
NOT a proprietary function. Being such, ACA can no longer step down to deal privately with said unions
as it may have been doing when it was still ACCFA. However, the growing complexities of modern
society have

rendered the classification of the governmental functions as unrealistic, if not obsolete. Ministerial and
governmental functions continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and are absorbed within the
activities that the government must undertake in its

sovereign capacity if it to meet the increasing social challenges of the times and move towards a greater
socialization of economic forces.
10
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143976. April 3, 2003]
Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon. ARTURO G. TAYAG as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan; and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 145846 April 3, 2003]
Spouses OSCAR and HAYDEE BADILLO, petitioners, vs. Hon. BASILIO A. GABO JR. as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malolos, Bulacan; and the NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from
paying appellate docket fees when it sues or is sued in relation to its governmental function of providing
mass housing. It is likewise exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the execution of a
forcible entry case. In order to have some bases for fixing the reasonable amount of rent in a forcible
entry case, courts must rely on the evidence presented by the parties.
The Case
Before us are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside two rulings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The first one is the July 19,
2000 Order1[1] issued by Branch 79 in Case No. P-410-M-2000, annulling both the May 23, 2000
Order2[2] and the May 30, 2000 Writ of Execution3[3] issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan. The dispositive portion of this assailed RTC Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the [O]rder of the [t]riaI [c]ourt dated May 23, 2000 is hereby annulled.
The [W]rit of [E]xecution issued by the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte
Bulacan is also annulled.
Prohibiting the [t]rial [c]ourt from enforcing the [W]rit; and commanding the Municipal Trial Court to
transmit the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan together with the Money Order of
[t]wo hundred [p]esos Annex I and 1-2 as appellate docket fee and the alleged Supersedeas Bond per
[Annex] A, A-1, A-2 to A-3 of the OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO CLARIFY (with manifestation) filed by
Petitioner NHA received by this [C]ourt on July 17, 2000 although dated July 14, 2000.4[4]
The second ruling being contested is the October 23, 2000 Decision5[5] of Branch 11 in Civil Case No.
512-M-2000, which modified the February 1, 2000 Decision6[6] of the MTC of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan. The challenged RTC Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as defendants are ordered to vacate
plaintiffs property and return the possession thereof to the latter and to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
severally P20,000.00 for attorneys fees and P20,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay the costs are
concerned.7[7]
Since the parties were the same and the issues related, the two Petitions were consolidated by this
Court in its Resolution of October 17, 2001.8[8]
The Facts
Petitioners are plaintiffs in a forcible entry/ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 263-94 in the MTC
of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, entitled Spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo v. Triad Construction and
Development Corporation and National Housing Authority. In its February 1, 2000 Decision,9[9] the
MTC ordered the NHA to vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof to petitioners; to pay
rental for its use and occupation at the rate of P10 per square meter per month; and to shoulder the
attorneys fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.
The disputed parcel of land was part of the Bagong Silang Resettlement Project (BSRP) of the NHA. The
NHA contended that the property was part of the Tala Estate and was among the 598 hectares reserved
by the government for its housing resettlement site, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971.
11
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989

SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

G.R. No. L-61045 December 1, 1989

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant,

vs.
SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, appellees.

Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.

Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. L-55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated
March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City and its
modification with respect to the denial of petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid
decision of the lower court. The original appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to
this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the aforecited number. And in the
resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially
by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought
to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the
Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of
vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

The within petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-
spouses on April 17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the
aforestated accident.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:

. . . . . Judgment is here rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the
heirs of the deceased P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of
the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased Francisco Fontanilla; and to
pay the costs. (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132)

Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid decision which respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent
National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No.
67237- R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.

Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which
resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.

Petitioners allege:

1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable. under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New
Civil Code which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
Should moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-
spouses individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of
the same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of them.

2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation
Administration acted with gross negligence because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the
National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to give assistance to
the, victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to
exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.

3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the amount of which (20%) had been
sufficiently established in the hearing of May 23, 1979.

4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower court upon
which the disallowance of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees was based and not
for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration,
contends thus:

1. The filing of the instant petition is rot proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent National
Irrigation Administration to the Court of Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal
issue raised in respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the question as to whether or not
the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus
becomes necessary that before petitioners' claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved,
there should first be a finding of negligence on the part of respondent's employee-driver. In this regard,
the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically contain such finding.

2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief" dated
December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G. R. No.61045) of the
respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an explicit admission of
said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because
while petitioners question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of
law before this Court which posture confirms their admission of the facts.

3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident
involves a question of fact which petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final as to the petitioners and for
this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with the law.

5. Respondents do not assail petitioners' claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the shock
and subsequent illness they suffered because of the death of their son. Respondent National Irrigation
Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages because it is an agency of
the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle,
not a special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for
the tortious act should. not be borne by respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who
should answer for the consequences of his act.

6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation
Administration in exercising due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of
due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent but a regular driver
of the vehicle.

The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees can very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176
and 2180 of theNew Civil Code.

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing cotractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.

2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as
an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).

In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.

Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to
do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If
the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions,
then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's
tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting
through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984
Ed.)

Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions,
by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:

Section 1. Name and domicile.-A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National
Irrigation Administration, hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately
after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of business in the City of Manila and shall
have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.

Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIA's proprietary functions. Thus-

Sec. 2. Powers and objectives.-The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:

(a) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

(b) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be necessary to
finance the continuous operation of the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than
twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and

(d) To do all such other tthings and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly necessary,
incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objectives.

Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of
respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in
determining its liability since it has been established that respondent is a government agency
performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary employer which,
under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has
failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.

It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco
Fontanilla wasthrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was
thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented portion of
the road." (Emphasis supplied,) [page 26, Rollo]

The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force
and impact upon the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the
impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the
radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation
report (Exhibit "E"). (Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo]

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city
limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away
from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This
is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and
the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by
their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling
at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution
and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation,
such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking
whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.

Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and
supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the
wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion vs.
Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).

Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio vs. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618),
this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the
highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be traversed
constitutes negligence.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages
and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.

SO ORDERED.
12
Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A. GROUP 12 June 26, 2013
CASE: People V Gozo
GR No. L-36409

FACTS: Lozeta Gozo was charged by the City Engineers Office of the City of Olongapo for violating a
municipal ordinance which required residents to secure mayors permit prior to the construction,
demolition or repair of a building in the city. Court of First Instance of the said city convicted her. She
appealed the decision and argued that the local government unit of the City of Olongapo has no
administrative jurisdiction over the Naval Base of Americans where her house was erected.

ISSUE: Whether or not the local city government has administrative jurisdiction over naval bases of
foreign country located within the city?

HELD: Yes. There is no portion in the Philippine territory that is not ours, and beyond our power and
control. Within our territory, any statutory powers maybe exercised freely and legally. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or
divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses commiteed therein. The consent to the bases of
foreign countries were given/ granted on the basis of comity, courtesy and expediency. Military bases
are not and cannot be of foreign territory.
13
Submitted by : Johnny D. Mendoza Group 13 June 26, 2013
Case : Agustin versus Edu, 88 SCRA 195

FACTS : Petitioner Agustin asserts that Letter of Instruction 229 and Administration Number 1 issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and LTO Commissioner respectively requiring all vehicle owners, users or
drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls
or is disabled , are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal
protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order
issued are unconstitutional

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition as the LOI and LTO Admin order are
not unconstitutional. The LOI was based on theresolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs
and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations, and hence the SC adopted this
International Law as part of the law of the land on the basis of the provisions on the 1987 Philippine
Constitution in Article II Section 2.
14
JBL Reyes v. Bagatsing, GR No. 653,Oct. 25,1983 (Case No. 1)

Facts: Petitioner retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition [ABC], sought a permit
from the city of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. 26, 1983 from 2-5pm, starting from
the Luneta, a public park, to the gate of the U.S. Embassy. However, such permit was denied due to
police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners may able to exercise their constitutional rights to free speech and
assembly, with an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of their rights, all the necessary steps
would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally."

Held: Negative. On the grand that the holding of rally in front of the U.S. Embassy violates Ordinance No.
7295 of the city of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstration within the radius
of five hundred (500) feet from the foreign mission or chancery; and for other purposes.
15
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18
G.R. No. 118295.

FACTS: Petitioners Senators Taada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the
Philippine Senate of the Presidents ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). They argued and contended that the national treatment and parity
provisions of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of our Constitution,
and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUES: Whether or not, does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization?

HELD: NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization.
[The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments,
goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not
encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not
prohibit them either.]
[The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule
out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion
nor mendicancy in the international community.]
16
Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C
Case: BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000

FACTS
The Philippines and United States joined into an agreement until its expiration in 1991 but the defense
and security relationship continued between RP-US pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18,
1997, there were negotiations by both panels and eventually the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was
approved by President Fidel V. Ramos. It was later on ratified on October 5, 1998 by President Joseph E.
Estrada, which was transmitted to the Senate thru Executive Secretary Zamora and agreed by the Senate
where it was approved by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into
force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.

ISSUE
Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

HELD
No. The VFA is not unconstitutional. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains provisions requiring the
concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 2, Art. II some generally
accepted principles have been incorporated in treaties. It is inconsequential whether the US treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty.
Sec. 21, Art VII No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 24, Art. XVIII provides After the expiration in 1991of
the agreement between RP and the US concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for
that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
17
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C

1. Lim vs. Executive Secretary, GR 151445, April 11, 2002

Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by Arthur Lim and
Paulino Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reyes, to bar the holding of
Balikatan Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to send and deploy their
troops in the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, mutual
military assistance can only be held in case of an armed external attack. However, under the Visiting
Force Agreement, the US Armed Forces are allowed to engage in activities but not in combat
operations except for self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents in the case have committed grave abuse of discretion by
holding Balikatan 02-1.

Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms of the Visiting Force
Agreement. The US Armed Forces can engage in any activity except combat operations.
18
Mijares v. Ranada G. R. No. 139325
Group 5 Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations
during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand
Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final
Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject
matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the
non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject
matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court
ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

HELD:

Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same amount required for other
actions not involving property. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed
on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioners
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final
Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is
incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this
might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to
enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. 33 of
B.P.129 refer to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of
rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. 16 of
B.P.129 reveal that the complaint for13 enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary
estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based
on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the
proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is
7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.
19
SHANGRI-LA V DEVELOPERS
GR NO.159938 March 31, 2006

Facts:
At the core of the controversy are the Shangri-la mark and S logo. Respondent, Developers Group of
Companies, Inc (DGCI) claims ownership of the said mark and logo in the Philippines. They filed its
registration on October 18, 1982 with the Bureau of Patent, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT) pursuant to sections 2 and 4 of RA 166.
On the other hand, Kuok Group of Companies has used the name Shangri-la in all Shangri-la hotels and
hotel-related establishments around the world as well as the S logo.
The Petitioner (Shangri-la), contends that they own the Shangri-la mark and S logo for they have
been using it since 1962 not in the Philippines but in other parts of the world before the respondent
even registered the said mark and logo.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners are entitled to protection under both RA 166 (the old trademark law) and
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property

HELD:
The Petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. The fact that international law has
been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law
over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rule of international law are given standing equal not superior, to national legislative
enactments. However, with the double infirmity of lack of two-month prior use, as well as bad faith in
the respondents registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of
infringement.
20
Pharmaceutical vs. DOH GR 173034 Mangaliman, Aileen P.

Facts: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of
the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a
co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said
executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on
October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom
Constitution. One of the pr J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, GR No. 65366 October 25, 1983eambular clauses
of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in
1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should
be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are
not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the
DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.

Issue: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued
by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES. under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the
same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to
make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules Under
the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the
WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as
part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law
enacted by the legislature.
21
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8
21_INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, 338 SCRA 81 2000

FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President ordered the PNP and
the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for crime prevention and suppression. The IBP questioned
the validity of the order on the grounds that the deployment of Philippine Marines is in derogation of
ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy.

HELD:
No. The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe
the civilian character of the Police force. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible
use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed.
22
DonitaLouA Bemida
Consti class I-C

Lim v Executive Secretary, GR 15445, April 11, 2002

Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed on February 1, 2002 by Arthur Lim and Paulino
Ersando against the respondents, Gloria Arroyo and Angelo Reye, to bar the holding of Balikatan
Exercises in Mindanao. In January 2002, the US Armed Forces started to send and deploy their troops in
the Philippines. The petitioners said that under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, mutual military
assistance can only be held in case of an armed external attack. However, under the visiting Force
Agreement, the US Aimed Forces are allowed to engage in activities but not in combat operations
except for self-defense

Issue: whether or not the respondents in the case have committed grave abuse of discretion by
holding Balikatan 02-1.

Held: No. Because the said joint military exercise is permitted under the terms or the Visiting Force
Agreement. The Us Armed Forces can engage in any activity except combat operations.
23
CASE DIGEST:
Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000

I. FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement called the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government
and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the total membership
of the Philippine Senate.

The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the
guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine
governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.

Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
State.

II. ISSUE

Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. HELD

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

Submitted by:
ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A.
Group 10
24
Summary of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973).

Facts

Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an abortion except on medical
advice to save the life of the mother.

Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for violating
the state abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought an injunction
against enforcement of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was
county District Attorney Wade (D).

A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing
to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was warranted. The court also
ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the Does complaint was not justiciable.

Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas abortion statutes were
void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the
plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that injunctive relief against
enforcement of the laws was not warranted.

The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-appealed the
district courts judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.

Issues

1. Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical advice to save
the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States?

2. Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion?

3. Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion?

4. Did the fact that Roes pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was decided
by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot?

5. Was the district court correct in denying injunctive relief?

Holding and Rule (Blackmun)

1. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures on the
mothers behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other
interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
 2. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a womans right to terminate
her pregnancy, against state action.

3. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy, it
has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant womans health and the potentiality of
human life at various stages of pregnancy.

4. No. The natural termination of Roes pregnancy did not render her suit moot.

5. Yes. The district court was correct in denying injunctive relief.

The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be left to the
judgment of the pregnant womans doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies, states may
promote their interests in the mothers health by regulating abortion procedures related to the health
of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote their interests in the
potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.

The Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet evading
review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of judicial
review, and not merely when the action is initiated.

The Court held that while 28 U.S.C. 1253 does not authorize a party seeking only declaratory relief to
appeal directly to the Supreme Court, review is not foreclosed when the case is brought on appeal from
specific denial of injunctive relief and the arguments on the issues of both injunctive and declaratory
relief are necessarily identical.

The Does complaint seeking injunctive relief was based on contingencies which might or might not
occur and was therefore too speculative to present an actual case or controversy. It was unnecessary for
the Court to decide Hallfords case for injunctive relief because once the Court found the laws
unconstitutional, the Texas authorities were prohibited from enforcing them.
25
Group 12
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 25: Meyer V. Nebraska, 262 US 390 ( 1992 )

Fact : In 1919 Nebraska passed a law prohibiting anyone from teaching any subject in any other
language except English. In addition, foreign languages could be taught only after the child had passed
the eighth grade. Robert T. Meyer, the Plaintiff, an instructor in Zion Parochial School, who taught in
German to a ten-year-old child , was convicted under this law and claiming that his rights and the rights
of parents were violated.

Issue : Whether or not the law violated people's liberty, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Held : Yes, the Nebraska law is unconstitutional. The legislative purpose of the law was to promote
assimilation and civic development. But such restriction does violence to both the letter and the spirit of
the Constitution.
26
Case Digested & Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA Group 13 June 24, 2013

CASE : Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510

FACT : Two appellees, non-public schools -Society of Sisters and Hill Military Academy, obtained
preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregons Compulsory Education
Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to a public
school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

ISSUE : Whether or not the Oregons Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control?

HELD :The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and
has no reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.The state has the
power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.
27
Submitted by: Nur-Aina Cabrido Waja
CASE # 3.) WISCONSIN V YODER 406 U.S 205
FACTS:

Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Amish Church and respondent Adin
Yutzy is a member of the Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried and convicted of violating the
compulsory-attendance law because they did not enrol their children in a public or private high school.
Three Amish students, from different families, ceased to attend New Glarus High School in New Glarus,
Wisconsin following completion of 8th grade. The students stopped attending school as per request of
their parentseach students parent requested that the youths stop attending school because of their
religious beliefs.

Issue:

Does a state law requiring children to attend school until the age of 16 violate Amish rights under the
free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment?

HELD:

After the school district brought a complaint against them, Yoder, Miller, and Yutzy were charged with
violating Wisconsins compulsory school attendance law. The Amish argued that the law violated their
free exercise of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment. Trial testimony showed the Amish
believed that sending their children to high school would not only expose them to censure by the church
community but also would endanger their salvation as well as that of their children. The trial court
determined that the states law did interfere with the Amish freedom to act in accordance with their
sincere religious beliefs but that the requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a
reasonable and constitutional exercise of governmental power. The parents were convicted and fined $5
each. They appealed to a Wisconsin Circuit Court, which affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, agreed with the parents First Amendment argument and reversed their
convictions. The state then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
28
Jameson D. Lacson - Group 2
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 US 629 (1968)

FACTS: Appellant, who operates a stationery store and luncheonette, was convicted of selling "girlie"
magazines to a 16-year-old boy in violation of 484-h of the New York Penal Law. Ginsberg argued before
the court that the State of New York did not have the power to classify two different sets of the
population in regards to obscene material and that it was an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.
Appellant's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court. He was denied leave
to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: Whether or not, does the New York government deprives the freedom of the boy?

HELD: No, the New York government does not violates the freedom of the 16-year-old boy as provided
by the constitution that the government shall support the duty of the parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character.
29
OPOSA V. FACTORAN, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

FACTS:

An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Secretary of Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to cancel existing Timber License agreements in the country and
to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (sec.
15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution).The petitioners asserted that they represented others of their
generation as well as for the future generation. The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the
law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court for a writ of review issued
by a higher court to a lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the minors have a legal standing to file the case?

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to file the
case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility particularly in cases related to ecology
and the environment. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that
environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on
behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of contracts must give
way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest of public welfare.
30
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 120865-71

Facts:
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal
shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3)
owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.

Issue:
Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
Held:
Yes, The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases
with authority to issue a cease and desist order and on matters affecting the construction of illegal
fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
31
Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T. Baddiri
LLB- 1 C Subject: Constitutional Law 1

CASE: MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

FACTS:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed

acomplaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against severalgovernment agencies,
among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay, and to
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The complaint alleged that the
water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, which was
confirmed by DENRs Water Quality Management Chief, Renato T. Cruz that water samples collected
from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coli form content
ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml which is beyond the standard 200
MPN/100ml or the SB level under DENR Administrative Order No. 34-
90.The reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, the RTC held petitioners liable and ordered to clean up
and rehabilitate Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-
diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
Herein petitioners appealed before the Court of Appeals contending that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general. They also asserted
thatthe cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled bymandamus.The CA
sustained RTCs decision stressing that petitioners were not required to do tasks outside of their basic
functions under existing laws, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Section 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water
Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the
cleanup of specific pollution incidents;

2. Whether or not petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that the cleaning up and rehabilitating Manila Bay is a ministerial in nature and can
be compelled by mandamus.Sec. 3(c) of R.A. No. 7924 (the law creating MMDA) states that the MMDA is
mandated to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. SC also noted that MMDAs duty in the area of solid
waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but also in its
charter, therefore, it is ministerial in nature and can be compelled by mandamus.
32
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990

FACTS:

Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the products naphta
cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its production
in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan to Batangas.
Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private
respondent BPCs application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to where to have their
plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the
investors without considering the national interest

COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and ordered
the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained.

The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual controversies as
provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he wrote the reasons as to how
the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify the BOIs action in
letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own government, could have been very
beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not
mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.

Justice Grio Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that the petition was not well-taken because the
1987 Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a certain project, as well as any decision of
the BOI regarding the amended application. She stated that the fact that petitioner disagrees with BOI
does not make the BOI wrong in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to the President
of the country and not to the Court, as provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.

Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion, stated that the Constitution does not vest in
the Court the power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in this case.
33
Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Group 7
1C

Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18 (1997)

Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the Department
of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective
authorities the WTO ( World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December
14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO agreement. This
petition was filed questioning the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement as it violates Sec.19, Art II of
the constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is contrary to the
provisions of sec.19, Art. II of the constitution.

Held:
No, it is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favour of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interest
against foreign competition and trade practice that are unfair.
Furthermore, the Constitution policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services.
34
Pamatong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Petitioner: Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong
Respondent: Commission on Elections
Facts:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can invoke the Constitutional Provision Article II, Section 26.

Held:
The equal access provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled Declaration of
Principles and State Policies. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-
executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
35
Araneta v Gatmaitan

Facts:

The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as
amendments to EO 22, as a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living in the
coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the area are in danger of major depletion
because of the effects of trawl fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction
to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to
declare E.O 22 as null and void.

Issue:

W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers
unduly delegated to the Pres.

Held:

VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in
the waters of the Phil and b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide regulations/
restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry
into effect its legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the
inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen. concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with
law.
36
Submitted by: Peaflor, Rijan C. LLB 1 Section C
Case: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008

Facts:
The Provincial Board of Mindoro approved a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one
permanent settlement. The said resolution was agreed by the Secretary of Interior as required under
Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of non-
Christian sites to be designated by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein charged
on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial officials.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid.

Held: The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.
37
PEOPLE VS.MACEREN

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in

harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.

FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law
creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law
does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider
the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?

HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations
and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to
executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending,
or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making
power.
38
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA(166 SCRA 533)

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of Legislative Power

EXCEPTION: Subordinate Legislation

Tests for Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

FACTS:
Vitaliano Saco, the Chief Officer of a ship, was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for damages against the Eastern Shipping Lines with the POEA, based on Memorandum
Circular No. 2 issued by the latter which stipulated death benefits and burial expenses for the family of
an overseas worker. Eastern Shipping Lines questioned the validity of the memorandum circular.
Nevertheless, the POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
W/N the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2is a violation of non-delegation of power

HELD:
SC held that there was valid delegation of powers .In questioning the validity of the memorandum
circular, Eastern Shipping Lines contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the
regulation, and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
39
Submitted by : JOHNNY D. MENDOZA, Group 13 June 26, 2013

CASE :Tablarin versus Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

FACTS :The petitioners Tablarin, et. al., tried to stop the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August
1985 and from requiring prospective medical students the taking and passing of the NMAT ( National
Medical Admission Test ) as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission to a medical
college.

ISSUES :Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

HELD : Yes. The NMAT requirement is constitutional as a condition to the admission to a medical college
on the basis of the Medical Act of 1959 in which the basic objectives are to govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
40
Submitted by: Pritzel Ann A. Reyes,
LLB 1c
Cebu Oxygen Acetylene Co. Vs Drilon, 176 SCRA 24(1989)

FACTS:
The Assistant Regional director ordered petitioner to pay the deficiency of 200 in monthly salary and
231 in 13th month pay of its employees for the period stated. The petitioner protested the order of the
Regional Director on the ground that the anniversary wage increase under the CBA can credit against
the wage increase mandated by RA NO.6640, hence petitioner contended that in as much as it was liable
for a salary differential of 62pesos and 13th month pay differential of 31pesos. Petitioner argued that the
payment of the differentials constitutes full com0pliance with RA 6640. Apparently the protest was not
entertained. Petitioner brought the case immediately to this court without appealing the matter the
Sec. Of Labor and Employment on May 91988, court order a temporary restraining order enjoining the
Assistant Regional Director from forcing the order dated April 7, 1988

ISSUE:
Whether or not section 8, R.A No.6640 is constitutional.

HELD:
The petitioner is hereby granted! The petitioner is directed to pay its 208 employees so entitled the
amount of 62 pesos each salary differential for two months and 31 pesos as 13th month pays in full
compliance.
41
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: Osmea v. Orbos. 220 SCRA 703

Fact:
Petitioner John H. Osmea assailed that the delegation of legislative authority to the ERC violates Sec.
28 of Article VI of the Constitution. Hence, the appellant appealed that there is unjustifiable delegation
of legislative power to the ERB.

Issue:
Whether or not there is an unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to the ERB of the exercise of the
power of taxation.

Held:
No, The SC finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to levy additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised.
42
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)

FACTS: Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress Passed RA 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao calling for a plebiscite to create an autonomous region. Consistent with the
authority granted by Article XIX, section 13 or RA 6734 which authorizes the President to merge the
existing regions, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O No. 429 providing for the reorganization of the
Administrative Regions in Mindanao.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RA 6734 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the Presidents
discretion.

HELD: No, Congress merely allowed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because
the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should have
regional offices. The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes.
43
RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
309 SCRA 661

Facts:
The Petitioner is the Mayor of san Nicholas, who represented the people in an agreement to a
construction company that provides electrification of the barangays in the municipality.
The ground for notice is there is misrepresentation on the amounts presented in the reports in
comparison to the petitioner and the Audit of COA.
Petitioners seek reconsideration of the case on grounds that the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), received an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue: Whether or not there was invalid delegation of the legislative power to the DBM.

Held:
No, The court ruled that there was no undue delegation of powers. The rule is that the powers
delegated cannot be delegated to another.
44
Alsam B.Adjilul

LLB 1C

College of Law WMSU

People vs. Vera 65 Phil 56

Facts:

Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado, including intervenor Alfredo Oliveros,
were found guilty of the crime of homicide by CFI of Camarines Sur dated July 25, 1966. However, at the
time the decision of the respondent CFI was promulgated and read to petitioners on August 23, 1966,
the judge who rendered and signed it, the Honorable Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to hold office as of July
31, 1966. On appeal, all the herein petitioners including intervenor, no jurisdictional question was
included among the alleged errors. Then came the decision of respondent CA on February 13, 1969.
Thereafter, the present petitioners, including the intervener, filed petition for certiorari before Supreme
Court on July 2, 1969 to review the aforesaid decision of respondent CA. Three legal questions were
raised, in such petition. Again, no jurisdictional question was raised. Two motions for reconsideration
were thereafter filed, however both motions for reconsideration were denied on August 26, 1969.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioners could still raise the question that Judge Surtida having retired previous to
the promulgation of the sentence, it must be declared null and void.

Held:

It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the sentence is one of competent jurisdiction. It is
an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by the
then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners.
The canons of fairness are not thereby set at naught. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of having
been the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They were given all the opportunity to defend
themselves not only before the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur but likewise before
respondent Court of Appeals. In an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent
CA, they did not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they failed to receive
the protection that due process accords every accused. What was said by Justice Cardozo fits the
occasion
45
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R. CALDERON, and
GRANDY N. TRIESTE
vs.
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG

Facts:

This case is a petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7,
Series of 1998 in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of
the national legislature.

The petitioners, Rodolfo A. Malapira, Stephen A. Monsanto, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N.
Triestesent complaint letters to the Court regarding the confiscation of their drivers licenses
and removal of license plate numbers. The respondents, Metropolitan Manila Authority enacted
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, which gives them authority to detach the license plate/tow and
impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of
traffic in Metro Manila which whichappear to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at
bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of motor vehicles may not
be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43.

The said ordinance, as well as Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, is justified on the basis of the General
Welfare Clause embodied in the Local Government Code. However, the flaw in the measure was that
they violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan
Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 in the
exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only as agents of the national legislature
are valid

Held:

Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining
all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor
vehicles (except when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers licenses for traffic violations
within the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipal corporations was
applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be valid the following requisites should be
complied: 1) must not contravene theConstitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. PD 1605 does not allow either
the removal of license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such
sanctions. Thus Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the
enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has
the force and effect of a statute.
46
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
Case no. 46 Abakada Guro Party List vs. Purisima 562 SCRA 251

FACT:

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR
and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
Petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335.
petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished
and completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight
committee permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Congress has the legislative power to settle the dispute.

HELD:
No, although in Sec.1 Art. VI state that The Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum
There is a limit in a legislative power, the procedural limits curtail the manner of passing law.
47
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC

United States v. Ang Tang Ho

43 Phil 1

Fact
Act no. 2868, "An act penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice and corn
under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale of the said products and
authorizing the Governor General, with consent of the council of state, to issue necessary rules and
regulations. On August 1, 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53, which was publish August 20, 1919.
The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tong Ho, a rice dealer, sold ganta of rice at
80 centivos. The said amount was higher than what is prescribed in the EO, the sale was done August 6,
1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO, he was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus 500 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.

Issue
Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

Held
Yes, the conviction of Ang Tong must be reversed since the act is done prior the EO is published. The law
contains no guide for the Governor General in determining if the rise in price is extraordinary and for
determining what the price should be, it fails to present conditions to be consider in promulgating the
law, lastly the said act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the
Governor General.
48
SUBMITTED BY: CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO (Group 9)

CASE 48: Employers Confederation v National Wages and Productivity Commission

GR No.96196

FACTS:

On 15 October 1990, the Regional Board of the National Capital Region issued Wage Order No.
NCR-01, increasing the minimum wage by P17.00 daily in the National Capital Region.
On 23 October 1990, the Board issued Wage Order No. NCR01-A, amending Wage Order No.
NCR-01. Provided, that all workers and employees in the private sector in the National Capital Region
already receiving wages above the statutory minimum wage rates up to one hundred and twenty-five
pesos (P125.00) per day shall also receive an increase of seventeen pesos (P17.00) per day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Wage Order No. NCR-01-A providing for new wage rates is constitutional.

HELD:

The Court ruled in favor of the National Wages and Productivity Commission and Regional Tripartite
Wages and Productivity Board-NCR, Trade Union Congress of the Philippines and DENIED the petition of
Employers Confederation of the Philippines.
49
People of the Philippines vs Rosenthal

Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmea were founders and shareholders of the ORO Oil Company. The
main endeavor of the company is to mine, refine, market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other
oil products. Rosenthal and Osmea were found guilty of selling their shares to individuals without
actual tangible assets. Their shares were merely based on speculations and future gains. This is in
violation of Sections 2 and 5 of Act No. 2581. Section of said law provides that every person,
partnership, association, or corporation attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative
securities of any kind or character whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular
Treasurer the various documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-
pesos. Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that whenever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands is
satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person, partnership,
association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above defined and provided for
sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person, partnership, association or corporation a
certificate or permit reciting that such person, partnership, association or corporation has complied with
the provisions of this act, and that such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or
agents are entitled to order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale; that said
Treasurer shall furthermore have authority, when ever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to
cancel said certificate or permit, and that an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer may be
had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance. Rosenthal argued that Act 2581 is
unconstitutional because no standard or rule is fixed in the Act which can guide said official in
determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued, thereby making his opinion the
sole criterion in the matter of its issuance, with the result that, legislative powers being unduly
delegated to the Insular Treasurer, Act No. 2581 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Internal Treasurer.

HELD: The SC is of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to
follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. The
certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership, association or
corporation applying therefor has complied with the provisions of this Act, and this requirement,
construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be
issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been complied with. Upon the
other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly
conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation is in the public interest. In view of the intention and
purpose of Act No. 2581 to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis
than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells,
distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations, we incline to hold that public interest
in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter
pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. And the term public interest is not
without a settled meaning. Rosenthal insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is
invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken
assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide
determinations. The purpose of the Act, the requirement it imposes, and the context of the provision in
question show the contrary. . .
50
Agustin v. Edu

88 SCRA 195

Facts: President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners, users or
drivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their cars acquire from any
source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Instruction was assailed by petitioner Leovillo
Agustin to have violated the constitution guarantee of due process against Hon Edu, Land
Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio,
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public
Highways. Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation was ordered to be
suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary because vehicles
already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use as a warning device. Also petitioner contest
that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of police power because it is deemed harsh,
oppressive and unreasonable for the motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant
millionaires because of such law.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.

Held: Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may interfere
with personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of the State.
Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence
that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to
present the factual foundation that is necessary to invalidate the said letter of instruction. In cases
where there is absence in the factual foundation, it should be presumed that constitutionality shall
prevail. Pres. Marcos on the other hand possesses vital statistics that will justify the need for the
implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna Conventions on Road Signs and
Signals, our country must abide with the standards given as stated in our Constitution that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law as part of the law of the land.
In the case at bar, the Vienna Convention also requires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged
to buy an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications
provided by law. Petitioners allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed
to be an unfounded speculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order regarding
the implementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law immediately executory.
51
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 51 : Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659

Fact : The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January
1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A.

Issue : Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process?

Held : Whereas Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, because due process is
violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and
protect his rights.
52
United states vs. Panlilio, 28 PHIL 608

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering
from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused
illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed
to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in
which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another.

ISSUE:

Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture?

HELD:

NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made
unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No.1760
provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished.
However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections
3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them.

Case Digested &Submitted by: Jonelle Tom Dua

Group 13
53
SUBMITTED BY: NUR-AINA C. WAJA
G.R. No. 135808 October 6, 2008
CASE # 5
SEC v INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION ( 567 SCRA 354)

FACTS:
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhad (GHB). The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power
purchase contract with National Power Corporation. In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the
expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44
million. The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its
negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares
utilizing this material insider information. On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order
finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities
Act of 1936, when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on 20 August 1998. It determined that there were no
implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or any of the provisions of the
Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted
that it found no statutory authority for the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections
8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.

ISSUE: WON ABSENCE OF IRR WOULD INVALIDATE THE PROVISIONS OF LAW

HELD:
The mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
reasonable construction that will support the law may be given. To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would
empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules.
Its refusal was premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate
authority under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations of
Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. The petition is GRANTED. This Court further
DECLARES that the investigation of the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act may be undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities
Regulations Code. No costs.
54
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: Gerochi v. DENR, GR No. 159796, July 17, 2007

Fact:
Petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi assailed the provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A 9136 and Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR
be declared unconstitutional. The appellant appealed that there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative
power to the ERC.

Issue:
Whether or not there is unjustifiable delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.

Held:
The SC ruled for the dismissal of the petition that there is no unjustifiable delegation of legislative power
to the ERC. Legislative power may be delegated into two exceptions by immemorial practices or by the
Constitution itself.
55
PSL Inc., v. LLDA 608 SCRA 442

Facts:
Petitioner Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. (petitioner) is a company engaged in the business of laundry
services. On 5 September 2001, the Environmental Quality Management Division of Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA) conducted wastewater sampling of petitioners effluent which
showed non-compliance. After a series of subsequent water sampling, PSL still failed to conform tothe
regulatory standards. Another wastewater sampling which was conducted on 5 June 2002, inresponse to
the 17 May 2002 request for re-sampling received by LLDA, finally showed compliancewith the effluent
standard in all parameters. On 16 September 2002, LLDA issued an Order to Pay indicating therein that
the penalty should be imposed from the date of initial sampling to the date the request for re-sampling
was received by the Authority Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the LLDA denied.

Issue:
WON the grant of implied power to LLDA to impose penalties violate the rule on non-delegation of
legislative powers.

HELD: LLDAs power to impose fines is not unrestricted. It was only after the investigation finding the
petitioner failing to meet the established water and effluent quality standards that the LLDA imposed
the penalty of P 1,000.00 per day. The P 1,000 penalty per day is in accordance with the amount of
penalty prescribed under PD 984.
56
DonitaLouA Bemida
Consti class I-C

People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640

Facts: Que Po Lay who was in possession of a $7,000 worth foreign exchange like U.S dollars, checks and
money orders, was sentenced to a six month imprisonment with 1,000php fine and subsidiary
imprisonment after he was found guilty of violating the Central Bank Circular No. 20. The Solicitor
General said that under the Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930, the publication of the circular in the
Official Gazette is not required for force and effect

Issue: Whether or not circulars should be published for it to become effective.

Held: Yes, because circulars prescribe a penalty for violation and should therefore be published before
the public sees its content. The people have to be informed of its contents and penalties.
57
People vs. Dacuycuy 173 SCRA 90
Group 5 Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:
Private respondents were charged with violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
They also charged constitutionality of Sec.32 (be punished by a fine of not less than P100 nor more
than P1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.) of said R.A on grounds that it a.) imposes
a cruel and unusual punishment, b.) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Judge
Dacuycuy ruled that the said section is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue of
delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE:

W/N Sec. 6 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power and is valid.

HELD:

NOT VALID! The duration of penalty for the period of imprisonment was left for the courts to determine
as if the judicial department was a legislative dept. The exercise of judicial powers not an attempt to
use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the admin. of justice and the
app. of existing laws to the facts of particular cases. Said section violates the rules on separation of
powers and non-delegability of legislative powers
58
Carbonilla vs Board of Airllines Representatives

657 SCRA 775

FACTS:

The Bureau of Customs issued Customs Administrative Order No/ 1-2005 (CAO 1-2005)
amending CAO 7-92. The Department of finance approve CAO 1-2005 on 9 February on 23 August 2004,
CAO 7-92 AND CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to section 3506 in relation to section 608 of the
Tariff and Costumes Code of the Philippines (TCCP).

BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005 reiterating its concerns
against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 03 March 2005, the Acting District Collector of BOC
informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance already approved CaO 1-2005 on 09 February 2005. As such,
the increase in the overtime rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR still requested for an
audience with the Secretary of Finance which was granted on 12 October 2005.

On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Eugenio L De Leon, Chief, Bonded
Warehouse Division, BOC NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the proposed increase in the
overtime rates. BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter.

The BOC then sent a letter to BAR's member airlines demanding payment of overtime services to BOC
personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BAR's member airlines refused and manifested their
intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of Customs and/or the Secretary of Finance to
suspend the implementation of CAO 1-2005.
.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the CAO 1-2005 in the exercise of such delegated power valid.

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner Bureau of Customs is DIRECTED to implement CAO 1-2005 immediate. When an
administrative regulation is attacked for being unconstitutional or invalid, a party may raise its
unconstitutionality or invalidity on every occasion that the regulation is being enforced. For the Court to
exercise its power of judicial review, the party assailing the regulation must show that the question of
constitutionality has been raised at the earliest opportunity. This requisite should not be taken to mean
that the question of constitutionality must be raised immediately after the execution of the state action
complained of. That the question of constitutionality has not been raised before is not a valid reason for
refusing to allow it to be raised later. A contrary rule would mean that a law, otherwise unconstitutional,
would lapse into constitutionality by the mere failure of the proper party to promptly file a case to
challenge the same
59
Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 (1994) Mangaliman, Aileen P.

FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. The petitioners contend on the following:

1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in
the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into
two separate districts.

2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of
the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond
that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.

4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section

ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional.

HELD:
Yes. The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative"
proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution). Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless
otherwise provided by law."

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself.

Hence, the court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit.

60
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C GROUP 8

JUANITO MARIANO, JR. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 242 SCRA 211 (1995)

FACTS:
Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail certain
provisions of R.A. No. 7854, An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional on the ground that Sec. 52 of R.A. No. 7854 violates
Art.VI Sec.5(4) and not in accord with Sec.5(3) Art. VI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional.

HELD:
No. The reapportionment of the legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than general reapportionment law. The
petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec.5(3) Art.VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000. Said Section provides that a city with population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.
61
SUBMITTED BY: CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO(GROUP 9)

CASE 61 : Sema v COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

FACTS:

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly by merits of Section 19,
Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.

On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato
City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Thus,COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 7902, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district as "Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).

ISSUE:

Whether: 1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces is constitutional. 2. That affirms, whether a province created by ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives, and Comelec Resolution 7902

HELD:
1. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL in granting the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities; 2. MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is VOID
and COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
62
Submitted by: Peaflor, Rijan C. LLB 1 Section C
Case: Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, GR No. 176970, December 8, 2008

FACT: Cagayan de Oro City has only 1 Legislative District and so R.A. 9371 also known as AN ACT
PROVIDING FOR THE APPORTIONMENT OF THE LONE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF CAGAYAN
DE ORO was passed increasing the Citys Legislative District into two. Resolution No. 7837 was then
promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) implementing the said Law. According to
Petitioner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, the said Resolution cannot be implemented without a Plebiscite.
Petitoner Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo filed with the Supreme Court a petition for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 7837 on the grounds that it is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite is necessary for the implementation of the Law which provides for
apportionment of a legislative district.

HELD: Conduct of a Plebiscite is no longer required since Cagayan de Oro City constitutionally remains a
single unit and its administration is not distributed along territorial lines. Its zone remains fully intact;
there is only the addition of one more legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts
for purpose of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro
City into two districts.
63
Aquino v. COMELEC GR No. 189793

Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716
entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd)
in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo.
Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form
additional district where the new first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a
minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that
provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum
population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in
choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether
or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.

Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a
province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a
province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in
cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of
1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from the present of four. Based on
the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And
lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
64
Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 64 : Aldaba V. Comelec, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Fact : On May 01, 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City, by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223, 069. The population of Malolos
City on May 01, 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an
undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254, 030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.

Issue : Whether or not the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250, 000 for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos?

Held : Whereas the Supreme Court declaring Republic Act 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of
Section 5 (3) Article VI of the 1987 Constitutio. Because it did not satisfy the 250, 000 population
requirement.
65
Submitted by : Johnny D. Mendoza Group 13 WMSU ConsLaw 1 Case # 65
Case : Ocampo versus HRET, GR No. 158466, June 15 2004

FACTS : On May 23, 2001, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez the
duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila pursuant to the14 May 2001 elections.On 31 May
2001, Ocampo filed with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) an electoral protest
against Crespo with the following complaints: (1) misreadingof votes garnered by Ocampo; (2)
falsification of election returns; (3) substitution of electionreturns; (4) use of marked, spurious, fake and
stray ballots; and (5) presence of ballots written byone person or two persons (HRET Case 01-
024).Ocampo alleges he be proclaimedthe duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.On 27
March2003, the HRET issued a Resolution holding that Crespo was guilty of vote-buying anddisqualifying
him as Congressman of the 6th District of Manila.

ISSUE : Whether or not Ocampocan be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman.

HELD : No. A second place among the remaining qualified candidates in the election cannot be
proclaimed as the winner. xxxJurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second placer
cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified candidates. The fact that the candidate
who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the elective officexxx
66
Pritzel Ann A. Reyes
LLB 1c
Case No.66 Ang Bagong Bayani Vs Comelec, 359 SCRA 698 (2001)

FACT:
Ang Bagong Bayani and Akbayan citizens party filed before the comelec a petition under the rule 65 of
the rule of the court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.3785 issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner seek
the disqualification of private respondent, requiring mainly that the party-list system was intended the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties. The none marginalized and
overrepresented.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Omnibus Resolution No.3785 is constitutional.

HELD:
YES! Political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list election. under the
constitution and R.A 7941. Private respondent cannot be disqualified from the party-list election merely
on the ground that they are political parties.
67
Submitted by: Tabor, Emee Grace B.
Case: VC Candangen, et al v. COMELEC, GR No. 177179, June 5, 2009

Fact: Petitioner filed a petition for registration as sectoral organization under R.A 7941. Further, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a resolution denying the petitioners petition for registration.
Incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC in denying the petition for registration
gravely abused its discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion for denying their petition for registration.

Held:
The COMELEC En Banc ruled for the dismissal of the petition. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
unreliable and fanciful exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, petitioner
failed to show that the COMELEC, through the questioned issuances, gravely abused its discretion.
68
Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C

Case: VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY (VFP) VS. COMELEC

Facts

On June 1998, COMELEC proclaimed thirteen party list representatives from 12 parties

and organizations. Petitioner assailed ordering the proclamation of additional thirty-eight

previously defeated parties to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as

provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RE 7941, The party-list

representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of

representatives including those under the party-list

Issue

Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.

Held

No, the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is merely a ceiling and not

mandatory. This is to promote proportional representation in the election of party-list

representatives.

However, it is necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions to have

obtained at least two percent of the total cast votes for the party-list system in order to

be entitled a party-list seat. Those who obtained more than two percent will have

additional seats but not more than three seats

Note:

The Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list, computed as follows:
No. of District representatives To be elected x .20
No. of party-list =
.80 representatives

Section 12 of RA 7941, a new tally and ranking of qualified party-list candidates is now in order,
according to the percentage of votes they obtained as compared with the total valid votes cast
nationwide, formula shown below:
Votes Cast for the Party x 100
% of cast votes = Total Cast Votes Nationwide

(The votes obtained by disqualified party-list candidates are not to be counted in determining
the total votes cast for the party-list system)
69
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C

Partido v. COMELEC, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2013

Facts: A Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation was filed on June 22, 2004 by petitioners Partido
Manggagawa and Butil together with CIBAC against the respondent Commission en banc, asking for the
proclamation of new elected members and an additional seat for each party. On July 31 of the same
year, the Commission en banc issued Resolution No. NBC 04-011failing to resolve the petitioner's issue.
Petitioners Partido Manggagawa and Butil filed an immediate petition on August 18, 2004, seeking for
the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Issue: Whether or not the Comelec en banc can apply the November 23, 2009 resolution in Ang
Bagong Bayani case.

Held: No. Because in the November 20, 2003 Resolution, the Court granted an additional seat to
BUHAY because it has obtained more than 4% of the entire votes.
70
Al-mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman Prof. Atty. Edilwasif T, Baddiri
LLB-1 C Consti Law 1
Case: G.R. No. 180443
LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES
and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents.
Fact:
The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs)
that provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements.
In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May
14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party,
Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad,
Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and
Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases.
On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-054 thuswise:
WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the
nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth
nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second
nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's
nominees therefore shall be:
1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane R. Borje
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC
were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by
Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which
included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of
CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had
always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board
approval, was accomplished with the Boards acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the
intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office
As a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.

Issues:
The issues are the following:
a. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
b. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
 c. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-
List System Act; and
d. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing
the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after
the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Held:
WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus.
We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a
party-list organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to
the Commission on Elections.
Accordingly, we annul and set aside:
(a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens Battle
Against Corruptions withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil
Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by
Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and
(b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-List
Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List
Representative representing Citizens Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives.
We make no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
71
Case Digested &Submitted by : Mohammad Shahid S. Sangkula
Case # 71 : Aquino V. Comelec, 243 SCRA 400 ( 1995 )

Facts : Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for
the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party,
and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
Congressman.

Issue : Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate
for Congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?

Held : Yes, what is required is not just temporary residence but domicile as this has been defined in
jurisprudence. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
72
Sub. By: Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Case # 72: Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300 ( 1995)

Facts:
On March 8,1995 petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Officer, providing the
information in item number 8: RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHER I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ---- years and seven months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position filed a petition for the
Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that the petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency.
On March 29, 1995 petitioner filed an amended/ corrected certificate of candidacy changing the
entry seven months to since childhood.
On April 24, 1995, the second division of the commission on election ( COMELEC) by a vote of 2-
1, came up with a resolution finding private respondents petition for disqualification in SPA 95-009
meritorious, striking out the petitioners corrected/amended certificate of candidacy of March 31,1995
and cancelling her original certificate of candidacy.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner had complied the residency requirement as provided for in Art VI,
Sec. 6, of the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
Yes, the petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualification to run for a seat in the House
of Representatives in the First District of Leyte. A perusal of the resolution of the COMELECs Second
Division reveals a starting confusion in the application settled concepts of Domicile and Residence
in election law.
In Co vs Electoral Tribunal, the Supreme Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution adhere to the definition given to the term residence in election law regarding it as having
the same meaning as domicile.
73
Domino v. COMELEC
July 19, 1999 (310 SCRA 546)
Petitioners: Juan Domino
Respondent: Commission on Elections, Grafilo, Java, et. al.
Facts:
Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani but the COMELEC promulgated a resolution
declaring Domino disqualified for lack of the one-year residency requirement.
Domino filed a Motion for reconsideration of the Resolution which was denied by the COMELEC
en banc. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year
residence requirement.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Held:
No. He did not meet the residency requirement. The term residence, as used in the
law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as
domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The contract of lease
of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile.
While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that
be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his
previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of
registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August
1997, Domino still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the constitution.
74
SUBMITTED BY:CLIFF EUGENE T.SISIO (Group 9)

CASE 74: Maquera vs. Boraa, 15 SCRA 7

FACTS:

Republic Act 4421 requiring all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices shall post a
surety bond equivalent to one year salary to which he is a candidate.

ISSUE:

The Court was asked to rule on whether Republic Act 4421 is constitutional

HELD:

Republic Act 4421 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As democratic form of government requires that

political rights be enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or economic distinctions. Among the
political rights of a Filipino citizen is the right to vote and be voted for a public office.
75
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and other consolidated petitions),
November 3, 2008
DECISION
(En Banc)
VELASCO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

These consolidated petitions challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public
office; (2) students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and employees of public and private
offices; and (4) persons charged before the prosecutors office of a crime with an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day.

The challenged section reads:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to
safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug
used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant
to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to
the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

xxx xxx xxx

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug
test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 6486.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos.
157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.
36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]

1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates
for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the
provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it
cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As
couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before
or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume
office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f)
thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools

Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the
following principles: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty
to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition
for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the
right to enrol is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private offices

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required
or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution,
intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees'
privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the
collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated
in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she
may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as
may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the
companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know basis; that the drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality
of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper
safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the
norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil
servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors office with a crime with an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts
in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced
to incriminate themselves.
76
Dimaporo v. Mitra

FACTS: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur
during the 1987 congressional elections.

Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM. Secretary and Speaker
of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR under Art IX of Sec 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume performing
his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to regain
his seat in the Congress.

Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is
not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of Congress.
Grounds may be termed to be shortened:

1. Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality thereof.

2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior

3. Disqualification as determined by a resolution of the electoral tribunal in an election contest

4. Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position

HELD: No.

In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935
Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the
highest degree of responsibility and integrity.

If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an
office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to serve the
mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore he should be considered ipso facto
resigned.
The filling of a certificate shall be considered as an overt act or abandoning or relinquishing his mandate
to the people and he should therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he
could be of better service.
77
EFFECTIVITY CLAUSE Farinas vs Executive Secretary
GR No.147387December 10,2003

Facts:
Before the court is a petition to declare as unconstitutional Sec.14 of RA9006 (The fair election act)
insofar as it expressly repeals Sec.67 of BP 881(The Omnibus Election Code) filed by Farinas et al,
minority members of the minority bloc in the HR. Impleaded as respondents are the Executive sec,
Speaker of the House etal.

Issue/s:1.
WON the effectivity clause which states .This Act shall take effect upon its approval (Sec.16) is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution

Held:1.
An effectivity clause which provides that the law shall take immediately upon its approval is defective,
but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect fiftten day safter its publication in
the OG or newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs Tuvera, the court laid down the rule: The
clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself.Publication isi ndispensable in every case
78
Quinto vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, December 1, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD:
NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials.
Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there
was no violation of the equal protection clause.
79
Case No. (3) Codilla v. De Venecia GR No. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002

Facts: Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. in the May 14, 2001 elections as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation, stating there is clear and convincing evidence showing that the petitioner is undoubtedly
guilty of the charges for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. To which the petitioner was not
proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as
against Locsins 53,447 votes. Instead By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner,
totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. And issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
the Winning Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives. The petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while
the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of
the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead proclaimed ruled on in favor
of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin. After granting the petition of the petitioner to declare as null and void the
proclamation, the petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia,
informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en bancresolution annulling the proclamation of
Rep. Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte.[

Issue: 1.Whether or not the petitioner is not guilty of violation Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code.
2. Whether or not Petition for Mandamus and Memorandum[59] dated October 8, 2001 for Speaker
De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated be
compelled.

Held: 1. Affirmative, Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner was denied of due
process during the entire proceedings.
2. Affirmative. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land.
There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion. Thus, the Petition for
Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of
petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR.
80
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Tolentino v. COMELEC G.R. 148334

FACTS:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator Guingona) as Vice-President.Congress
confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
(Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that
election. Resolution No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest
number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,
which ends on 30 June 2004.

ISSUES:
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally
(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held
on 14 May 2001.

HELD:
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to conduct the special
election within the confines of R.A.No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the Senates proposal, as embodied
in Resolution No. 84.This Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of
discretion in adopting means to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections
subject only to the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse
of discretion.
81
No. L-25554. October 4, 1966
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., petitioner, vs.
Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, respondents

Facts:

The Philippine Constitution Association has filed a suit against the Auditor General of the Philippines,
Ismael Mathay and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently
enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by Republic Act No.4131 (approved June 10, 1964) to the speaker and members of the House
of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

Republic Act No.4131 authorized the increase in salary of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. Section 1 of the said Act expressly provides that the salary increases herein fixed shall
take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Section 7 of the same Act provides
that the salary increase of the President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall take effect on the effectively of the salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House of Representatives but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective.

Held:

The court granted the Writ of prohibition.

In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of
the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using
the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office thereby rendering
more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature.
82
People vs Jalosjos

Facts:
The accused appellant Jalosjos, pleads that he be allowed to fully discharge his public duties as a
congressman despite having been convicted.

Issue:
Whether or not the fuctions of a public official in Congress may exempt him from the rules that apply to
convicted people in general.

Held:
The Court held that elected as a public official in congress is NOT a reasonable classification in a criminal
law enforcement. The court denied the motion filed.
83
Alsam B. Adjilul
LLB 1C
College of Law WMSU
Nicanor T. Jimenez VS Bartolome Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876
FACTS:

Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert and Jose Lukban they are the persons mentioned in the open letter of
Cabangbang to the President. Bartolome Cabangbang member of the House of Representatives and
wrote the letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was not in session which defendant-
Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines . A
civil action was originally instituted by the petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for recovery
of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Cabangbang. The letter contains information that: 1. There is an insidious plan or a massive
political build up; 2. There is a planned coup dtat; 3. Modified #1, by trying to assuage the President
and the public with a loyalty parade, in a effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind General
Arellano.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

2. Whether or not it is libelous.

HELD:

1. It was held that the letter is not considered a privilege communication because the publication: a. was
an open letter, b. the Congress was not in session; c. it was not a discharge of an official function or
duty.
2. It was held not libelous because the letter clearly implies that the plaintiffs were not the planners but
merely tools, much less, unwittingly on their part. The order appealed is confirmed.
84
86 ANTONINO VS. VALENCIA (57 SCRA 70)

The speech and utterances must constitute legislative action- that is actions that are done in relation
with the duties of a Member of the Congress.

FACTS:

Gaudencio Antonino then a Senator and Liberal Party head of Davao attributed the loss of LP
candidateto the support given by defendant Brigido Valencia then Secretary of Public Works and
Communicationsto the independent LP candidate which divided the LP votes. Antonino was quoted in
metropolitan newspapers when he said that had not Valencia sabotaged and double-crossed the LP,
its official candidate would have won. On 28 Feb 1964, Antonino while attending a Senate session filed a
formal request with a Senate Committee to investigate the actions of Valencia as Sec. of Public Works
and Communications in connection with acquisitions of public works supplies and equipments. Copy of
the formal request was furnished to the Commission on Appointments with the request that they be
considered in passing upon Valencias appointment to the Cabinet. Two-page press release was issued
by the office of the Sec of Pub Works and Com and the contents were published or reported on the front
pages of 6 metropolitan newspapers. The press release depicted Antonino as a consistent liar; that he
prostituted his high public offices as monetary board member and senator for personal ends and
pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the
Constitution and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Antonino then filed the present civil action
against Valencia. Valencia filed a counterclaim and claims that he did not issue or cause the publication
of the press release and that they were made in good faith and in self defense and that they were
qualifiedly privileged in character. Lower court ruled against Valencia holding that he caused and was
liable for the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his
defenses of qualified privilege and defensive libel. Valencia appealed to SC. During the course of the
appeal, Antonino died in a plane crash. Sen. Magnolia Antonino as adminastrix substituted her husband
as plaintiff-appelle.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the press release is libelous? Whether or not the press release is protected as a qualified
privilege communication?

HELD:

Press release is libelous. Statements released were defamatory and libelous in nature where malice in
law is presumed because they were against the honor, integrity and reputation o f plaintiff. Defendant
Valencia made his imputations against the plaintiff publicly and unofficially as to be qualifiedly
privileged. The malice in the act of the defendant was proven when the Court observed that had the
defendant been prompted by a sense of duty and not because of malice, the charges should have been
filed with the Senate or any of its Committees and not publicized widely by all metropolitan newspapers.
Defendant-appellants claim of defensive libel is likewise rejected because his argument that he had
been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly the former justified to hit back with another libel is based
upon a wrong premise. Plaintiff Antoninos act was not libelous because the letter he sent was a
privileged communication because the defendant was charged by the plaintiff in his capacity as a
Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed privately and officially to the
Senate and Commission on Appointments.

Judgment affirmed
85
Submitted by: Kursum Penaflor Tiplani
85 Pobre vs. Defensor Santiago AC no. 7399, August 25, 2009

FACT:
Senator/Atty. Mirriam Defensor Santiago crossed the limit of decency and good professional
conduct due to the rejection of her nomination as Chief Justice of the Phil. Supreme Court made by the
JBC. She uttered humiliating words to the Philippine Chief Justice in her privilege speech at the House of
Senate, she was quoted as stating I want to spit in the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and
his cohorts of the Supreme Court, and calling the Supreme Court as Supreme Court of Idiots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Senator Mirriam Defensor Santiago be criminally liable or be subjected to
disciplinary actions.
HELD:
No, as Art. VI, Sec. 11of the Constitution provides that A Senator or member of the House of
the Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be question nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
The Constitution enshrined parliamentary immunity over the lady Senator, but as being a lawyer she
violated Canon 8 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
86
Richie G. Ignacio LLB IC

Liban v. Gordon
GR. No. 175352, July 15, 2009

Fact

Dante Liban filed a petition to the supreme court declaring Richard Gordon has having forfeited his seat
in the Senate. Respondent incumbency as member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting of the Board of Governors, petitioner
allege accepting the Chairmanship of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate
provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

Issue

Whether or not the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a GOCC.

Held

No, PNRC is a private organization performing a public functions/services, PNRC Chairman is elected by
Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official.
Therefore, Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat or function, when he was elected as
Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
87
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 June 26, 2013
CASE: Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. 113 SCRA 31 March 25, 1982

FACTS: Justice Istanislao Fernandez, a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero group to which the petitioner Puyat group objected on
Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could appear as counsel before any administrative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case
without violating Sec.II Art.VIII (Now Sec.14 Art.VI) of the Constitution.

HELD: No. Assemblyman Fernandez could not be said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could
theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of the matter in litigation.
88
Jan 25, 2010
Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated
to the position of Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly
the only other member of the minority, he was assuming position of minority leader. He explained that
those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party number 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus,
Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of
respondent as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number
out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any
total. The plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the
Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal
does it thereby delineate who comprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And
there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of
these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who
will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority
leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the
minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes, not necessarily
more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or
faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority. Between two unequal parts or
numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to
say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government
with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there
could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the dominant
minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present
Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or
statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination
thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and
House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it
is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
that the Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings. xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of
creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long
practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of
the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation,
modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at
the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon
the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it
may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for
the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold
-- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the
Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and
judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the
petition would easily fail.
89
Avelino v Cuenco

on January 4, 2012

Political Law Election of Members/Quorum/Adjournment/Minutes

On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges
against the then Senate President Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On
the next session however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He
however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from
delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al were being blocked by Avelino and his allies
and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then
moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the
said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and
he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made
of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently
recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the
President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.

HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by
the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want
petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.

Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
(Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.

**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the
USA.

Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)?
Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?

The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into
the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding
Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When
the Constitution declares that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does
not mean all the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a
difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the
latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one,
at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for
Cuenco, one against and one abstained.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)

Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are
willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that
there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two
are absentee senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number
of senators nor does it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12
(half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously
there was no quorum.

The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of
subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the
majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of
the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from
the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President,
and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such
formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail,
because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this
reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the
requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the
petition is dismissed.

Justice Feria: (Concurring)

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision was amended in
the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the
number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must
be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make attendance
of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered
to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the
use of the words of all the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of
the original Constitution which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National
Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to
require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House. Therefore, as Senator
Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of
the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a
majority.
90
Submitted by: MR BASAEZ, DIOSCORO A. GROUP 12 June 26, 2013
CASE: People v Jalosjos
GR. No. 132875-76

FACTS: The accused-appellant Romeo F. Jalosjos, a full pledged member of the Congress who was
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of the house of representatives, including attending at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellant be allowed to attend Congressional sessions and
committee hearings despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense.

HELD: No. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for
the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years, is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundation.
91
Submitted by: CymerMohamad
Arroyo VS De venecia 277 SCRA 268

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chaircalled out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chairand Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The
enrolled billwas signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House

Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasureof the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject
to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously
present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.
92
Pritzel Ann A. Reyes
LLB 1c
Case No.92 Osmea vs Pendatum 109 PHIL 863 (1960)

FACTS:
Osmea filed petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary junction against
Congressman Pendatum and 14 others in their capacity as a member of the Special Committee created
by the House of Resolution #59. Osmea filed the abatement of the Resolution #59, requiring the
petitioner to establish by proof or evidence his charges against the President. Osmea was suspended
for 15th months for the serious disorderly behaviour.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its member.

HELD:
For unparliamentarily conduct, members of the congress have been or could be censured, committed to
prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
93
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan 356 SCRA 636

Facts:
On 20 April 2001, private respondent Dr. Celia P. Morales (Morales) filed an Affidavit-Complaint against
petitioners Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Orlando O. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. de
la Cruz (Mangahas, et al.) for violation of Sec. 3 (f) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The complaint was docketed as OMB-1-01-0382-D.
In her complaint, private respondent Morales basically alleged that:
1. On June 27, 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, thru the initiative
of Councilor Zaldy G. Matias (nephew of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas), seconded by Councilor
Carlos R. Malaca, persuaded to pass and enact KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998, granting the request of
Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas for the conversion of their agricultural land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-125720 into a memorial garden despite insufficiency of the requirements
thereof as provided by law;

2. After receiving a copy of the said Kapasyahan, it appeared that the conversion of the agricultural land
of Mr. and Mrs. Edgardo Manalastas into a memorial garden was hurriedly done and apparently not in
accord with the necessary legal requirements based on their failure to: (a) notify the adjacent residential
lot owners of the said plan and/or development; (b) secure proper recommendation(s) and permit from
different government departments, bureaus and agencies concerned; and (c) follow and comply with
the proper procedures as prescribed by law;
3. In questioning the same, my son sent a letter dated 13 April 1999 addressed to the SB and prayed,
among others the immediate REVOCATION and CANCELLATION of the said Kapasyahan;
4. Secretary of the Sanggunian,admitted therein that KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998 was only a DRAFT
RESOLUTION;
6. On 20 April 1999, another KapasyahanBlg. 34, taon 1999 was issued by the SB refraining or stopping
the Manalastas to further develop their project without first securing the proper permits and
certification from the different government departments and bureaus concerned, unfortunately,
however, the same was never implemented;
7. On 14 May 1999, my son decided to send another letter addressed to the SB and prayed the issuance
of a permanent revocation of KapasyahanBlg. 39, taon 1998 in lieu of a temporary revocation previously
issued;
8. My daughter, Felicitas Morales sent another letter dated 28 September 2000 addressed to the SB,
informing them of the presence of persons who had continued and still continue to develop the project
of Manalastas despite the prohibition previously issued to that effect. However, to our prejudice, no
action whatsoever was taken by the said public officials concerned, thereby extending undue favor to
the Manalastas;
9. The undersigned was forced to send another letter dated 24 January 2001 addressed to the SB
10. On 12 March 2001, another letter was sent by the undersigned addressed to the SB, requesting that
I be given a chance to be heard in a form of public hearing in order to air my grievances against the
illegal conversion of the land and for the unfair, unjust and oppressive treatment which we suffered and
continue to suffer up to the present;
11. Four (4) days prior to the scheduled public hearing on 6 April 2001, the Office of the Sanggunian
headed by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.I. Alvarez sent a notice to all the members of the SB, namely,
Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G. Matias, Danilo A. de Guzman, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante
Y. Arcilla, Jocelyn dela Cruz, Crisanto V. Velayo II, Alfredo M. Alejandria, Jr. and Alejandro C. Velayo, for
purpose(s) of informing them of the said public hearing;
12. When the notice was served to the following councilors, namely: Leoncio D. Mangahas, Zaldy G.
Matias, Carlos R. Malaca, Orlando Q. Oanes, Dante Y. Arcilla and Jocelyn R. dela Cruz, I was informed by
the Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and the Secretary of the Sanggunian, Mr. Eduardo H.
Almera, that the said councilors have maliciously refused to sign the said notice, thereby giving undue
advantage in favor of the Manalastas who up to this present time has been continuously developing
their project despite the prohibition thereof;
13. However, despite the fact that they were properly notified, the above-named councilors in the
preceding paragraph have deliberately and maliciously neglected and/or refused to attend the
scheduled public hearing last 6 April 2001, thereby unjustly and oppressively discriminating the
undersigned without sufficient justification whatsoever;
14. Due to the unlawful acts committed by the six (6) councilors, the undersigned most respectfully
submits that they be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 3(f) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act (R.A.
3019 as amended by R.A. 3047, P.D. 77 and B.P. 195) which provides that: Neglecting or refusing, after
due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable time on matter
pending before him for purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the
matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest
or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
15. As of this date, no public hearing yet has ever been conducted, hence, to the prejudice of the
undersigned;
16. With full sincerity and honesty, I believe that there will be no more public hearing that will be
conducted due (to) the admission made by Hon. Vice-Mayor Marcelino D.L. Alvarez and Mr. Eduardo H.
Almera as contained in their Joint Affidavit.

ISSUES:
A.Actuations of the CA
1. Court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition for having been late for a day
2. Court of appeals erred in denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that no copy of
petition wad furnished to the offive of the solicitor general.
B. Actuations in the court
1. The court abused its discretion when it denies the motion to quash and ordered to suspend the
petitioners

HELD:
Premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
94
Submitted by: Ulysses John P. Almocera (Group 3)
Case: (par. 4) US v. Pons, 34 PHIL 729 (1916)

FACTS: Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived
at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to
Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the
ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and
fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the
sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not
in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the
case, Act 2381 should be null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was
indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go
beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
95
Donita Lou A. Bemida
Consti Law I-C

Casco Phil Commercial Co. v. Giminez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

Facts: The Central Bank of the Philippines, on July 1, 1959, imposed a 25% uniform margin fee for
foreign transactions and issued a memorandum declaring the exemptions of charging. Petitioner
Casco Philippine Commercial Co., manufacturer of synthetic resin glues, in November and December
1959 paid a sum of P33,765.42 for the margin fee of the imported urea and formaldehyde. Upon
Resolution No. 1529, the petitioner asked for a refund of the amount. The Central Bank refused to grant
the reimbursement and said that what was exempted was urea

Issue: Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempted from payment.

Held: No. Because urea and formaldehyde are raw materials for glues and urea formalhyde is a
synthetic resin.
96
Astorga vs. Villegas 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
Group 5 Ladjagais, Mohammad Hussein

FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to the Senate. Senator Arturo
Tolentino made substantial amendments which were approved by the Senate. The House, without
notice of said amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presiding officers of both houses
certified and attested to the bill. The President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065.
Senator Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 was a wrong
version of the bill because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved by the
Senate. Both the Senate President and the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065
as invalid. Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of the Congress is
conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.

ISSUE:

W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.

HELD:

Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew their signatures therein, the court
declared that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law. The Constitution
requires that each House shall keep a journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the absence of
attestation or evidence of the bills due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress
to verify such. Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment were introduced and approved
and were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for signature, the court can declare
that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not become a law.
97
Philippines Judges Association vs. Prado
G.R. No.105371, November 11,1993
FACTS:
THE PHILIPPINES JUDGE ASSOCIATION, President , BERNANDO P ABISAMIS NATIONAL
CONFIDERATION OF THE JUDGES OF THE PHILIPPINES ,petitioner vs. HONORABLE PETE PRADO
Secretary of DOTC, respondent. Petitioners assailed that statute violates Article VI section26 of the
constitution with the presumption the Bill have not undergone a careful study among the legislature and
executive branch. The most serious challenging of petition of RA 7354 specifically sec 35 violates the
EQUAL PROTECTECTION CLAUSE of the constitution Article III section I
However, respondent assert we are complying the contention of the petitioner as far as the
procedure of deliberation is concern. Accordingly requiring every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to express in its Title could not only be
unreasonable but would actually renders legislation impossible

ISSUES:
Whether the R.A. 7354 specifically SECTION 35 repealing clause violates the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.

DECISION:
The petition partially GRANTED and SECTION 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE privilege shall be RESTORED. Temporarily restraining order dated June
02, 1992 is made permanent. SO ORDERED
98
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 Mangaliman, Aileen P.
Facts:

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that
the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since
there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No.
1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation
because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of such
service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum
products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House
version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision
cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.

Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative
on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the
Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to
increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory
power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis
and evaluation, as well as policy making.

Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners
also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already
evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Issue:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

Held:

The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by
which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities
to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the
two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a
VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the
Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly,
the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is
a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be
accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds.

The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order
issued by the Court is LIFTED.
99
Jeffrey M. Espos LLB-1C
99_PIMENTEL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, 644 SCRA 741

FACTS:
Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole from conducting further hearings on the
complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 706. It was
on the ground that the rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the
complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the majority quorum requirement
under Art. VI Sec.16(2) of the Constitution.

HELD:
No. The referral of the investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is
an extraordinary remedy that does not violate Senator Villars right to due process. In the same manner,
the adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of Ethics Committee does not violate
Senator Villars right to due process. And as Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.
100
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 June 26, 2013
Case: Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63PHIL134 1936

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of
office.

ISSUE: Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over Electoral Commission and the subject of the controversy
upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?

HELD: Yes, the Electoral Commission has just acted within its legitimate exercise of its constitutional
Prerogative. Therefore the petition for a writ of probation against the electoral commission is hereby
denied, with cost against the petitioner.
101
Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil 192)
August 31, 1946

Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero, petitioners

Jose A. Avelino et al., respondents

Facts:
1. On May 25, 1946, a pendum resolution was submitted ordering the following candidates:
Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero to their seats as members of chamber.
Furthermore, they should not swear into office for their success on the elections was
proposed to be invalid. The resolution was passed by their constituents who questioned the
validity of the votes they garnered.

2. It was reported that during the National Elections, provinces Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac
and Bulacan was under terrorism. Moreover, the election returns of the said provinces were
null or void for they believe that the great majority of voters were coerced or intimidated
suffered from the paralysis of judgment, the people were deprived of their right to suffrage.

3. The ballot boxes from Nueva Ecija were stolen by armed bands in the barrios of
municipalities of Bongabon, Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba.

4. Many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home
towns to avoid being victimized or losing their lives. Moreover, bodies were found with
notes attached to their necks Bumoto kami kay Roxas after the election.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Supreme Court has the powers to intervene with the petition

2. Whether or not the petitioners Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Vera should be
deferred to seat as members of the chamber

Held:

1. No. The Supreme Court refused to intervene with the petition. According to the
constitution, there should be separation of powers with the three branches namely: the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. Each is independent from each other and each
has specific roles to perform. The role of judiciary is to foresee that the laws are properly
delivered to the society and that these laws are constitutional. Furthermore, the Supreme
 Court held that the case was not a contest and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature
to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for as mentioned above, the legislative has the
power to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Also, no man or group of
men be permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in violation
of law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice.
102
G.R. No. 84297 December 8, 1988

CARMELOF.LAZATIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and LORENZO G. TIMBOL, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioner and private respondent were among the candidates for Representative of the first district of
Pampanga during the elections of May 11, 1987. During the canvassing of the votes, private respondent
objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not
rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the
COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On
May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the
COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also
filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second
petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Petitioner challenged the COMELEC
resolution before this Court in a petition entitled"Carmelo F. Lazatin v. The Commission on Elections,
Francisco R. Buan, Jr. and Lorenzo G. Timbol," docketed as G.R. No. 80007. In a decision promulgated on
January 25, 1988, the Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On
February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as HRET an election protest, docketed as Case No. 46.

Petitioner moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on the ground that it had been filed late, citing
Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). However, the HRET filed that the protest had
been filed on time in accordance with Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, petitioner has come to this Court, challenging the jurisdiction of the HRET over
the protest filed by private respondent.

A. The Main Case

This special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order seeks the annulment and setting aside of (1) the resolution of the
HRET, dated May 2, 1988, in Case No. 46, holding that the protest filed by private respondent had been
filed on time, and (2) its July 29, 1988 resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.

Without giving due course to the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of the HRET while the private respondent filed
his comment with a motion to admit counter/cross petition and the petitioner filed his consolidated
reply. Thereafter, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition, taking the comments filed as the
answers to the petition, and considered the case submitted for decision.

Resolution of the instant controversy hinges on which provision governs the period for filing protests in
the HRET. Should Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code be held applicable, private respondent's
election protest would have been filed out of time. On the other hand, if Sec. 9 of the HRET Rules is
applicable, the filing of the protest would be timely. Succinctly stated, the basic issue is whether or not
private respondent's protest had been seasonably filed.

To support his contention that private respondent's protest had been filed out of time and, therefore,
the HRET did not acquire jurisdiction over it, petitioner relies on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides:

Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn
petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or
city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results
of the election. [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner argues that even assuming that the period to file an election protest was suspended by the
pendency of the petition to annul his proclamation, the petition was filed out of time, considering that
he was proclaimed on May 27, 1987 and therefore private respondent had only until June 6, 1987 to file
a protest; that private respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation on May 28, 1987 and the
period was suspended and began to run again on January 28, 1988 when private respondent was served
with a copy of the decision of the Court in G.R, No. 80007; that private respondent therefore only had
nine (9) days left or until February 6, 1988 within which to file his protest; but that private respondent
filed his protest with the HRET only on February 8, 1988.

On the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on time, the HRET relied on Sec. 9 of its Rules, to
wit:
Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the
Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of
the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each
protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the
proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed
within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987
Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him
to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the tribunal as of the date of effectivity of
these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, ruled the HRET:

On the basis of the foregoing Rule, the protest should have been filed within fifteen (15) days from
November 22, 1987, or not later than December 7, 1987. However, on September 15, 1987, the
COMELEC acting upon a petition filed by the Protestant (private respondent herein), promulgated a
Resolution declaring the proclamation void ab initio. This resolution had the effect of nullifying the
proclamation, and such proclamation was not reinstated until Protestant received a copy of the
Supreme Court's decision annulling the COMELEC Resolution on January 28, 1988. For all intents and
purposes, therefore, Protestee's (petitioner herein) proclamation became effective only on January 28,
1988, and the fifteen-day period for Protestant to file his protest must be reckoned from that date.

Protestant filed his protest on February 8, 1988, or eleven (11) days after January 28. The protest,
therefore, was filed well within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of this Tribunal. (Rollo, p.
129.]

The Court is of the view that the protest had been filed on time and, hence, the HRET acquired
jurisdiction over it.

Petitioner's reliance on Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. Sec. 250 is couched in
unambiguous terms and needs no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed before the
COMELEC contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, or any regional, provincial
or city official. Furthermore, Sec. 250 should be read together with Sec. 249 of the same code which
provides that the COMELEC "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials,"
reiterating Art. XII-C, Sec. 2(2) of the 1973 Constitution. It must be emphasized that under the 1973
Constitution there was no provision for an Electoral Tribunal, the jurisdiction over election contests
involving Members of the Batasang Pambansa having been vested in the COMELEC.

That Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code, as far as contests regarding the election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the Batasang Pambansa is concerned, had ceased to be effective under the
1987 Constitution is readily apparent. First, the Batasang Pambansa has already been abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in a bicameral Congress. Second, the Constitution vests exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in the respective Electoral Tribunals [Art. VI, Sec. 171. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC is limited by constitutional fiat to election contests
pertaining to election regional, provincial and city offices and its appellate jurisdiction to those involving
municipal and barangay offices [Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(2)].

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on the conduct of
the election were generally made applicable to the congressional elections of May 11, 1987. It must be
emphasized, however, that such does not necessarily imply the application of all the provisions of said
code to each and every aspect of that particular electoral exercise, as petitioner contends. On the
contrary, the Omnibus Election Code was only one of several laws governing said elections. *

An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the
May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to
file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether
the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute.

The Court is of the considered view that it may not.

The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations
relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is
beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission [63
Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court, speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:

... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in
character to limit the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a
settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional
provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission,
therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]

A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except under the 1973 Constitution, the power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative
branch has been exclusively granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine Assembly
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the House of Representatives under the Philippine
Autonomy Act (Jones Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached to the
legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under
the amended 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].

Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is that of being the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislative body. Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution states it in this wise:

See. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the Electoral Commission under the
1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the legislature and the Electoral
Commission Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No. L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401. The same may be said
with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.

The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly apportion the powers of the three
branches of government, lodge the power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent, impartial and non-partisan body
attached to the legislature and specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral Commission
and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the
1973 Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the Executive and the Legislature was
blurred by constitutional experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving members
of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency with general jurisdiction over the conduct of
elections for all elective national and local officials.

That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members,
consonant with the return to the separation of powers of the three branches of government under the
presidential system, is too evident to escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained
the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive authority to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections; to deputize
law enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register political
parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for inclusion and exclusion of voters and
prosecute, where appropriate, violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its rule-
making power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of election law, the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code are fully applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But the
same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to hear and decide election
contests. This has been trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973 Constitution
vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city
officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal
and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to
prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical
precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by
the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

B. Private-Respondent's Counter/Cross Petition

Private respondent in HRET Case No. 46 prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner herein from discharging his functions and duties as the
Representative of the first district of Pampanga during the pendency of the protest. However, on May 5,
1988, the HRET resolved to defer action on said prayer after finding that the grounds therefor did not
appear to be indubitable. Private respondent moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the
HRET on May 30, 1988. Thus, private respondent now seeks to have the Court annul and set aside these
two resolutions and to issue a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction on the
premise that the grounds therefor are too evident to be doubted.

The relief prayed for in private respondent's counter/cross petition is not forthcoming.

The matter of whether or not to issue a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction during the
pendency of a protest lies within the sound discretion of the HRET as sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives. Necessarily,
the determination of whether or not there are indubitable grounds to support the prayer for the
aforementioned ancilliary remedies also lies within the HRETs sound judgment. Thus, in G.R. No. 80007,
where the Court declined to take cognizance of the private respondent's electoral protest, this Court
said:

The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself)
despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the
rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises, to the sound judgment of
the Electoral Tribunal.

Moreover, private respondent's attempt to have the Court set aside the HRET's resolution to defer
action on his prayer for provisional relief is undeniably premature, considering that the HRET had not
yet taken any final action with regard to his prayer. Hence, there is actually nothing to review or and and
set aside. But then again, so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not
be reviewed by this Court. As stated earlier, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and "excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict or curtail it or even affect the same." (Lachica v. Yap, supra, at 143.] As early as 1938 in Morrero
v. Bocar(66 Phil. 429, 431 (1938)), the Court declared that '[the judgment rendered by the [Electoral]
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference, except, in
any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process of law." Under the 1987 Constitution, the scope of the Court's authority is made
explicit. The power granted to the Court includes the duty "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government (Art. VIII, Sec. 11. Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the HRET's judgment. In the instant case, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the Court's collective power, since no grave abuse of discretion that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed for has been
clearly shown.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Private respondent's Counter/Cross Petition is
likewise DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
103
SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A Group 6 June 26, 2013
CASE: Aquino v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 400

FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for
the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party,
and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman
as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium
unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside in
Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile.

Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which
is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
104
Submitted by: CymerMohamad
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS vs. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL 166 SCRA 377

Facts:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolutions of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal dated February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively, the petitioners'
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.

Senator Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal were being asked to inhibit themselves in hearing SET
Case No. 002-87 as they are considered interested parties, therefore leaving the Senate Electoral
Tribunal senateless, and all remaining members coming from the judiciary.

Issue:

WON the SET can function without the Senator members.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
Tribunal to not let Senator-Members to inhibit or disqualify himself, rather, just let them refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
105
Case No. (2) Bondoc v. Pineda,201 SCRA 792 (1991)

Facts: Petitioner Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidate of Marciano
M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of Representative for the
Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Who lost the elections held on May 11, 1987. Filed a
protest (HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which is composed
of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are
members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. of LDP is one of the
members in the Tribunal, insisted on a re-appreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts
which lead the petitioner to won over the respondent by 23 votes.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura
from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP be granted.

Held: Negative. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and
rescinding the election of Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal was declared null and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution. And Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution, Members of the HRET, as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled
to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure.
106
Al-khajer K. Jawadil
Robles v. HRET 181 SCRA 780 (1990)

FACTS:
The independence of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, (HRET, for brevity) as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by this Court in many cases. (Lazatin v. House
Electoral Tribunal, 168 SCRA 391; Robles v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780).
The power of the HRET, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election returns and
qualifications of its members is beyond dispute.

ISSUES:
Petitioner Rosette Y. Lerias filed her certificate of candidacy as the official candidate of the UPP-KBL for
the position of Representative for the lone district of Southern Leyte in the May 11, 1987 elections. In
her certificate of candidacy she gave her full name as "Rosette YniguesLerias". Her maiden name is
Rosette Ynigues. Respondent Roger G. Mercado was the administration candidate for the same
position.During the canvass of votes for the congressional candidates by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Southern Leyte, it appeared that, excluding the certificate of canvass from the
Municipality of Libagon which had been questioned by Mercado on the ground that allegedly it had
been tampered with, the candidates who received the two (2) highest number of votes were Roger G.
Mercado with 34,442 votes and Rosette Y. Lerias with 34,128 votes. In the provincial board's copy of the
certificate of canvass for the municipality of Libagon, Lerias received 1,811 votes while Mercado
received 1,351. Thus, if said copy would be the one to be included in the canvass, Lerias would have
received 35,939 votes as against Mercado's 35,793 votes, giving Lerias a winning margin of 146 votes.
But, the provincial board of canvassers ruled that their copy of the certificate of canvass contained
erasures, alterations and superimpositions and therefore, cannot be used as basis of the canvass. The
provincial board of canvassers rejected the explanation of the members of the municipal board of
canvassers of Libagon that said corrections were made to correct honest clerical mistakes which did not
affect the integrity of the certificate and said corrections were made in the presence of the watchers of
all the nine (9) candidates for the position, including those of Mercado who offered no objection.

HELD:
The decision of the Honorable Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 16 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Court declares that petitioner Rosette YniguezLerias is the duly elected representative of the Lone
District of the Province of Southern Leyte.
107
Submitted by: Myra Grace C. Penaflor Group 3, Class C
Case: Case Digest on Arroyo vs. HRET, Syjuco GR. No. 118597 July 14, 1995

Facts
Congressional candidate private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., filed an election protest before public
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) five days after the Makati board of
canvassers proclaimed petitioner Joker P. Arroyo the duly elected congressman for the lone district of
Makati in the May 11, 1992 national and local elections. Syjuco sought the revision and recounting of
ballots then resulted to declaring Protestant Augusto l. Syjuco, jr. as the duly elected Representative,
Lone District of Makati. Tasked by public respondent HRET to investigate on the matter, now retired
Supreme Court Justice Emilio Gancayco confirmed the irregularities and anomalies engineered by some
HRET officials and personnel, they found out that Arroyo votes were consistently reduced at the revision
and the deducted votes were found and included in the stray ballots, while Syjuco was always constant
and there were instances where ballots were deducted from the protestee (Arroyo) and that
another modus operandi is to falsify the revision reports by intercalation, false entries or simply
switching of true results of the counting.

Issue
Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Whether or not the Supreme Court can intervene the creation of the Electoral Tribunal.

Held
Yes, the Supreme Court can intervene, Section 17, Art VI. The Supreme Court granted Makati Cong.
Joker Arroyos petition to declare that public respondent HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it proceeded to decide in favor of his rival Augusto Syjuco, Jr.s
election protest based on the latters precinct level document based anomalies/evidence theory. On
this basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote tally made by the Electoral Tribunal.
108
Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002

Facts:
Petitions for prohibition, mandamus and preliminary
injunction were filed before the court that the respondents be
ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the
composition of the HRET and CA to include part-list representatives
in accordance with the Party List System Act (RA 7941) and Sec 17 and
18, Art VI.
Having in mind that out of 220 members of the House, 14 of
which are party-list representatives (PLR), the petitioners put
forward that LP reps (having a total of 13 members) be ousted and be
replaced by PLR nominees.

Issue:
(I) Whether or not the present composition of HRET and CA
violates the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation because no party-list representatives are members
thereof.

Held:
No. There has no violation.
The court dismissed the case on the following grounds:
(I) The present composition of the HRET and CA does not violate
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because:

a. Sec 17 and 18 of Art. VI explicitly confers to the House the

power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among
their members will occupy the seats allotted to the House in HRET and
CA. And even if the PLR comprise the sufficient no. and have their
own nominees, their primary recourse would be the House (and not the
Supreme Court) in accordance with the doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction.
b. The petitioners have no locus standi on the case, thus failed
to meet the requirements set forth for judicial review. The
petitioners were not unlawfully deprived of seats in HRET and CA and
neither were they nominees to take the seat.
109
Submitted by: Al- mukthar Las Pinas Abdurahman
Case: AGGABAO vs. COMELEC No. 163756 Jan 26, 2005

Facts:

The petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao is a candidate for Congressional for the 4th District of Isabela
and respondent Anthony Miranda is a rival for the same during the May 10, 2004 elections. Miranda
moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds 1. Tampered 2. Prepared under duress
3. Deffered from other authentic copies and 4. Contained manifest errors. Petitioner objected that the
ground raise by latter are for pre-proclamation controversy which is not allowed in election for the
member of House of Representatives. May 22, 2004. The Provicial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded
the contested COCVs and used instead the 4th and &th copies of the COCVs and Base on result Miranda
garnered the highest number of votes for congressman. Aggabao asserted that PBC acted without
jurisdiction, hence he filed petition assailing Resolution No.7233 claimed COMELEC En Banc acted
without jurisdiction when it ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the Second Division has
not yet resolved the appeal.

Issue:
WON Aggabao resort to certiorari lies [ NO]

Held:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec.17.The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organization registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
110
SUBMITTED BY: Arajil, Saldon A Group 6 June 26, 2013
CASE: Limkaichong v. COMELEC, GR No. 17883

FACTS: Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental. Paras, her rival, and
some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still a Chinese
and that her mom, though Filipino lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to Limkaichongs dad. .
About 2 days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified candidate. On
the following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the
COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently conducted
elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not
suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification cases which shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras
petitioned arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the COMELEC can no longer exercise
jurisdiction over the matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise jurisdiction from then on.
COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Whether or not COMELEC
should still exercise jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD: The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En
Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending
her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the execution of
the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section
2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order
and ruling.
111
Sub. By: Safrazhad Samsi-Akarab
Case #111: BANAT vs COMELEC G.R. No: 177508 August 7, 2009

FACTS:
The Congress passed a bill and signed into law as RA 9369 less than four months before the May 14,
2007 local elections.
On May 7, 2007, petitioner filed a petition alleging that RA 9369 violated Sec. 26(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution, assailing among others the constitutionality of the provisions contained in Sec. 37.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 37 of RA 9369 violates Sec. 17, Art.VI, of the Constitution.

HELD:
No, it does not violate Sec. 17, Art. VI, of the constitution. The Congress and COMELEC en banc do not
encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET (Presidential Electoral Tribunal) and SET ( Senate Electoral
Tribunal), since the powers are exercised in different occasion and for different purpose.
112
Drilon, et al v. Speaker
GR No. 180055, July 31, 2009
Petitioner: Franklin Drilon et al
Respondent: Jose de Venecia et al
GR No. 183055, July 31, 2009
Petitioner: Sen. Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal
Respondents: Sen. Manuel Villar et al

Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives elected their respective contingents to the Commission on
Appointments. The petitioner went to respondent then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for
Liberal Party in the CA. Because the LP was not represented in the CA, it spawned the filing for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order.

Issue:
Whether the House of Representatives respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction in constituting the Commission on Appointments in
contravention of the required proportional constitution by depriving Liberal Party of its constitutional
entitlement to one seat in the CA.

Held:
The first petition GR No.180055, has thus indeed been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal
Party member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as prayed for, the petition is withdrawn.
As for the second petition GR no. 183055, it fails. Senator Madrigal failed to show that she sustained
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. Her petition does not in fact allege that her party was
deprived of a seat in the CA, or that she or PDP Laban possesses personal and substantial interest to
confer on he/ it locus standi.
The constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party list representatives those
who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.
Thus, even assuming that party list representative comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not of this Court.
113
Case Digested & Submitted by: RODJIE C. LUSPO Group: 9 June 26, 2013
CASE : Guerrero vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137004 July26, 200

FACT: Guillermo Ruiz sough to disqualify respondent Farinas as a candidate for the position of
Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. On may 8, 1998, Farinas filed his Certificate of
Candidacy substituting Chevylle Farinas who widrew on April 3, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition of Ruiz for lack of merit. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the
determination of the validity of certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is already within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HOUSE OF Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELECs decision to discontinue
exercising jurisdiction.
114
CASE DIGEST:
Garcia v. HRET, GR No. 134792, August 12, 1999

I. FACTS
On May 29, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against private respondent. The petition attacked the ineligibility of private
respondent to hold office as Member of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required filing fee. On June 10,
1998, the HRET dismissed the petition for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules.
Thereafter, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the cash deposit on June 26, 1998, at the
same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal. The HRET, however, denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

II. ISSUES
1. whether or not HRET can take cognizance of the petition, and
2. whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and in refusing to reinstate the same even after
payment of the required cash deposit.

III. HELD
Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar the Supreme Court from entertaining
petitions which charge HRET with grave abuse of discretion. That the Court may very well inquire into
the issue of whether the complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may
be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo
warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.
The cash deposit required in quo warranto cases must be paid together with the filing fee at the time
the petition is filed. In the case at bar, petitioners paid the required cash deposit after the dismissal of
the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the
petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call
of the HRET, which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on
well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
Tribunal. Therefore, the Court found that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying
its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition
for certioraricannot prosper.

Submitted by:
ABDULLAH, Abdulhaq A.
Group 10
115
116
Case Digested and submitted by: Jingle B. Puasa Group:12 June 26, 2013
Daza vs Singson 180 SCRA 496 (1989)

Facts:
Daza was removed from the Commission on Appoinments and assumed by Singson On December 5,
1988, after the chamber elected a new set of representatives.

Issue: Whether petitioners removal is unconstitutional.

Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,
is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission
on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.
117
Submitted by: CymerMohamad

COSETENG VS MITRA 187SCRA 377

Facts: Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under
KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments
(CA) and House Tribunal a request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and
later on, added RoqueAblan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban
ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House
majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with
Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs
(considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of
respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their
election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority
(LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She
further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from
the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the
jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the proportional representation clause in Art VI of
the Constitution and that petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the
Coalesced Majority.

Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but
because revision in House representation in CA wasbased on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House,
comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left
the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced
Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member
Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in
the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her
party and they signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioners contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected
by their parties because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in DazavsSingson in that the Constitution
conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government branches.