Atemporal Processes in Physics

Author(s): Richard Schlegel

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), pp. 25-35
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association
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 ATEMPORAL PROCESSES IN PHYSICS
RICHARD SCHLEGEL
propertyto be in two places at
It can scarcelybe said to be a self-contradictory
the same time any morethan for an object to be at two times in the same place.
The perplexitiesof the quantumtheory of energysometimesseem to suggest that
the possibilityought not to be overlooked;...
A. S. Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, Cambridge, 1920
There are three elements involved in physical time. The most primitive of
the three is the fact of extension in time. We express this fact by saying that
things "endure" in time, or by saying that the universe is not an event of one
moment only. Extension in time is such a fundamental and pervasive element
of our experience, that we can hardly define it other than by denotatively indi-
cating it. Time extension is basic to the other two elements of time.
Measurement of time extension requires the second element: a uniformly
recurring or cyclic process which we use as a clock. The clock is constituted by
some process like the motion of a pendulum or the vibration of a crystal which is
presumably uniform in time, so that each occurrence-of the process requires the
same "amount" of time extension (i.e., the same length of time) as does any other
occurrence of the process. We then measure time passage by counting the num-
ber of occurrences. We generally assume that the frequencies of fundamental
cyclical physical processes, like wave disturbances emitted from an atom, are
in a constant relationship to each other, or to the length of time wvhichhas been
chosen as the unit of time measurement. Thus, if the lowest frequency of oscil-
lation of the light from atom A is cl sec-', and if the frequency of oscillation of a
pendulum in a situation physically prescribed with respect to masses and dis-
tances is c2 see-', then c1, C2, and c3 are constants independent of time, where
C3 = C1/C2. A contraryassumption-as in recent discussionsby E. A. Milne
and others of "different" time scales-is in effect a discarding of the uniformity
of nature postulate: the existence of a relationship between the natural constants
which varies in time is then being assumed.
The third element required by our concept of time is a non-cyclic, or progres-
sively changing, physical process. This element of the time situation is some-
times disregarded in discussions of time measurement, but is actually just as
important as is a clock for such measurement. A cyclic process alone-as a
clock-can give no time measure because it gives no way of distinguishing be-
tween cycles. This point is fundamental to the argument of this paper. An
observer, or a group of observers, can set up a clock as their standard, and
measure the time interval between various non-cyclic events by means of this
clock. However, if all the events in the observers' universe were elements in a
cycle and hence uniformly recurring in nature, there would be no time extension
beyond the extension of any one cycle, since there would be no way in which the
events of any two cycles could be distinguished from each other. So slight a
change in the events of the universe as a progressive denumeration or counting of
the cycles by an observer would be sufficient, however, to give the non-cyclic
change which is required for time extension beyond the extension of each cycle.
25

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26 RICHARD SCHLEGEL

The requirement of progressive change in the universe for time extension is

recognized in the discussions of the relation of the second law of thermodynamics
to time. The second law presumably guarantees that there is non-cyclic change
in the universe, and so time is therefore continually "moving forward", i.e.,
increasing in extension. If the events of the universe uniformly recurred in some
grand cycle, then we could in no conceivable manner speak of time having any
extension beyond the extension of any one cycle, and the events of the universe
would be a finite, cyclical group under the operation "addition of time".
It should be pointed out that if the second element above-cyclic, recurring
processes of some sort-were completely lacking in a universe, then too there
would be no time in our customary sense, even though the third element, pro-
gressive change, were present. Without cycles with which to compare progres-
sive change, there could be memory and recording of past events, but no manner
of judging relative time extension between events. The extension of time would
be continually increasing, but we would have no means for measuring time.
It is clear that time is a fundamental aspect of our natural world. Any human
life presents progressive change from birth to death, and the universe as a whole
seems to be undergoing continual progressive change, as mentioned above. In
this same world there are cyclic processes, ranging from atomic to astronomical
dimensions, which can be used to measure the time extension of progressive
changes. There are processes of nature, however, which are isolated from the
progressively changing aspects of the larger universe, and which are atemporal,
in the sense that they involve uniform cyclical change only.
The movement of electromagnetic radiation in an otherwise force free region
is an atemporal process in the above sense. As long as the radiation is not inter-
acting with matter or other radiation each oscillation is exactly alike to any
other, and hence there is no extension of time beyond the extension of any one
oscillation. That is, there is no time extension beyond one oscillation in the
sub-universe or domain of the radiation being considered. This domain is iso-
lated from the remainder of the universe. Whenever the radiation interacts
with the world outside of its domain it undergoes an energy change of some sort,
and therefore its time extension increases, by virtue of the progressive change
which has occurred in the system.
It is not mere sophistry to say that processes which altogether lack progressive
change are atemporal processes. They are "out of time"7in a genuine physical
sense, just because time extension exists only to the extent that there is progres-
sive change which will enable one to distinguish between the recurring cycles
which are utilized as measures of time. Electromagnetic radiation, when it is
free from interaction and hence is not being observed, consists presumably of
uniformly recurring cycles; if each cycle (oscillation) is considered to be a clock,
then since each oscillation is like every other, in the domain of the radiation there
is no extent of time beyond that required for any single cycle of the clock. The
question of the motion of the radiation from point to point, observed by one out-
side the domain of the radiation to take place in an extension of time greater than
the extent of a single cycle, will be considered later in this paper.

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 ATEMPORAL PROCESSES IN PHYSICS 27

A hypothetical observer in the domain of free radiation would at most expeli-

ence time extension of a length l/l seconds, where v is the frequency of the
radiation. (This observer, we assume, is no more able to undergo progressive
change than is the photon which he is observing.) Or, if the observer moved
along with the radiation, as would be physically demanded if he is to remain in
the radiation domain, he would then be in a constant phase relationship with
respect to a given cycle, and time extension would be zero for him. This observer
would be measuring the proper time of the radiation, and his observation, that
time r remains equal to zero, would agree with the result obtained on the basis
of relativity theory for electromagnetic radiation in free space. The space-time
interval is zero for such radiation, on relativistic considerations, and the proper
time i cannot be other than zero.
We ordinarily assume the continuity of time. This assumption rests ulti-
mately on the continuity of number. We assume that we can measure the time
extent of any part of a non-cyclic natural process by comparing the process with
a cyclic process which is being observed. We further assume that we can count
the cycles of the latter process, and can further observe the phase, or fraction
of any one cycle, to any desired degree of accuracy. There appear to be no
objections to these assumptions as long as we place no conditions on, or desire
no information about, the energy exchanges which are involved in the time-
keeping processes. If we do consider the energy of our cyclical, clock-like
process, we find the uncertainty relation between time and energy, just as in
conventional quantum mechanics.
Let us consider a cyclic process of frequency v which has an energy E. If
the process is completely isolated from the rest of the universe the process is an
atemporal one, with no distinction between cycles. Then the uncertainty in
the energy of the process bE is zero, and the uncertainty in time bt is indefinitely
large since there is no relationship to the "events in time" of the surrounding
universe. If the system is quantized with respect to interactions with the uni-
verse outside of its domain, energy changes will be limited in smallness to the
quantum of energy hv. If there are interactions with the outside such that be-
tween any one cycle and any other there is a change BE of the system equal in
magnitude to at least hv, then any two cycles can be distinguished, and there is
progressive as well as cyclic change. Each cycle would then mark a further
extension of time, and time could be measured with an accuracy given by the
extension of a given cycle. (Any specification within a single cycle would require
some further recurring events.) In the general case, if in the time scale of the
universe surrounding the isolated cyclic process the frequency of the process
were v sec-, and there were a change of energy equal to hv every Xth cycle, then
time in the system could be known to within X (time of a single cycle) seconds.
x-
That is, we would have bt -
seconds. During this period the energy of the
system changes by hv, so bE - hv. Therefore, SE *bt = hX, or 5E *St _ h. The
limit of accuracy would be obtained for an energy change of hv associated with
each cycle. In that case X l 1 and SE t h. This statement of the uncer-
.

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28 RICHARD SCHLEGEL

tainty relation between time and energy is in principle no different from the usual
statement of quantum mechanics; for there too, the relation rests ultimately on
the utilization of a cyclic system (described by the state-function) with no speci-
fication within a cycle (arbitrary phase angle).
We have argued that an isolated, uniform cyclic process has no time extension
beyond the extent of a single cycle. A state which has neither progressive nor
cyclic change of any kind, and which is completely isolated from the larger uni-
verse of change, is a state for which time extension is zero. This state could be
considered a limiting case of the isolated, cyclic process, in which the extent of a
cycle has gone to zero. Such a state, in which "absolutely nothing ever hap-
pens", would be an atemporal process. In the natural world such processes
probably have no more than a momentary existence, if even that. ('Momen-
tary' from the point of view of the ordinary temporal world of experience from
which they are isolated.) There is one type of process, however, which changes,
but in neither a progressive nor cyclic manner, and which appears to be atemporal
in our sense of that term. These processes are the "reversible processes" of
thermodynamics. The existence of reversible processes in nature is open to
controversy; the only possibility for their existence is apparently in biological
processes which are not at present understood. But the importance of reversible
processes as hypothetical events is sufficiently important in thermodynamics to
justify a discussion of them.
In a well regarded textbook the reversible process is defined as "one that is
performed in such a way that, at the conclusion of the process, both the system
and the local surroundings may be restored to their initial states, without pro-
ducing any changes in the rest of the universe".' The reversible process takes
place in a domain which is totally isolated from the remainder of the universe,
since the process involves no change outside its domain. Suppose that a reversi-
ble process comprises a number of states of a system and "local surroundings",
indicated as si, S2, S3 ... , sn,, where n may be as large as desired. Now, within
the system, there is neither cyclic nor progressive change necessarily; rather,
the situation is that from any state sj the system may be restored to any chosen
initial state si. Hence, we may either regard the system as: a) being indeter-
minate with respect to its state; or b) as consisting of states which are all equiva-
lent, in that any state may be reached from any other. Progressive change would
imply certain arbitrary conditions on the manner in which states succeed each
other, but on either view (a) or (b) above such conditions will not be necessarily
met by the succession of states. If progressive change is not present, the reversi-
ble process is an atemporal process, with at most a limited time extension result-
ing from the presence of some uniform cyclical succession of states. On the other
hand, the states si, s2, ... , s. may succeed each other in a non-cyclic manner,
such that there is progressive change and continual increase of extension of time
in the system. We see then, that a reversible system may or may not be an
atemporal system. The key to the ambiguity of the time status of such a system
lies in the fact which is described in the above definition by the phrase "may be
I Zemansky, Heat and Thermodynamics,2nd. edition, p. 131.

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 ATEMPORAL PROCESSES IN PHYSICS 29

restored to their initial states". The reversible process is isolated from the
universe outside its domain, so therefore the structure of the domain, or of the
process, would apparently determine whether or not a given reversible process
is atemporal or not.
In general, it must be emphasized that the atemporal process can only be
inferred from observations, and cannot be directly observed. This is true be-
cause the universe In which scientists and other observers live is as far as we
know a thoroughly temporal universe. Any process which interacts with this
universe by way of being observed at once partakes to some extent in the pro-
gressively changing and therefore temporal nature of our universe; for quantum
mechanics has led us to believe that any observation of a system always requires
the transfer of a finite amount of energy to or from the system.
We shall now further consider the space and time aspects of the process of
electromagnetic radiation. For the sake of precision of discussion we will begin
with the following remarks about points and events.
1. "Points" indicate lack of extension in space or time. But we shall assume
that any two points which are not identical define a certain extension in space or
time. The density of points in a given extension may be arbitrarily chosen,
excepting that a finite extension may not contain an infinite number of points.
It is convenient for the purposes of this paper to so define points-no assumptions
about continuity of space or time are thereby implied.
2. We will use the term "event" as the most general term for any physical
entity or occurrence. An event may be confined to a single point in space or
time, or may be extended in space or time. If an event is extended and is finite
we can define terminal or boundary space and time points for the event. The
event contains all the points within its boundaries.
We can consider any physical object, or any part of it, to be an event. The
ordinary assumptions of physics about such events in space and time (i.e., about
physical objects) can be expressed by the following propositions.
In a given space coordinate system and in a given time system:
1. An object may occupy a given set of space points at a single time point,
i.e., may be extended in space.
2. If an object is given as occupying a given set of space points the object
may undergo transformations which carry it to a different set of space points.
(Transformations which constitute deformations are a special problem which
need not be considered here.)
3. The set of space points which an object occupies when at rest in the
cobrdinate system at a given time point is the maximum set (in terms of num-
ber) which the object can occupy, and this maximum is constant for different
time points. We use the term "maximum set" in order to allow for relativistic
decreases resulting from motion of the event with respect to the co6rdinate
system.
4. The set of time points which an object can occupy, while occupying a
given set of space points, has no necessary restrictions upon it.
We see that the above four propositions express the notions of endurance in

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30 RICHARD SCHLEGEL

time, extension in space, and possibility of motion, for a physical object. Propo-
sition 3 implies the impossibility of infinite motion, since such would imply that
an object could occupy an indefinite number of space points for a given time
point.
The asymmetry for objects which is implied by propositions 3 and 4 is of pri-
mary interest. An object can occupy an indefinite number of time points while
occupying a given set of space points; but an object can otcupy only a certain
maximal number of space points while occupying a given time point. In other
words, a physical object-say an atom-can continue to occupy a given space
region for an indefinite length of time, provided the contingent physical circum-
stances are properly arranged. But we cannot ordinarily arrange physical cir-
cumstances so that an object will occupy an indefinitely large spatial region at
a given instant of time. Hehce, time and space extension do not bear equivalent
relationships to each other in the world of physical objects, and we see here an
example of the obvious truth that in that world time is not a dimension similar
to the three spatial dimensions.
The above asymmetry results because of the "forward flow" of time associated
with progressive change in the natural world. Excepting for atemporal proc-
esses, as have been discussed, an object occupying a given set of space points is
part of a pattern of changes at these or other points, with the result that time is
continually increasing in extension for the object, or, in other words, that the
object is continually occupying new time points. There is no similar necessity
requiring that an object occupying a given number of space points must con-
tinually change the space points which it occupies. At least, the world we ordi-
narily know is such that we can set up physical, spatial reference frames with
respect to which an event does not change its space point occupation. In general
we cannot find similar time frames, since neither we nor any significant parts of
the universe about us appear to lack progressive chainge.
Our common assumptions about space and time have of course a considerable
element that is based on our particular space and time relations. We are accus-
tomed to control ourselves and other objects with respect to a fixed physical
frame, namely the earth and the stars, and so think of space point occupation as
being somewhat subject to chance or circumstance. But we are not able to
control the progressive change of ourselves, and so we come to ascribe a necessity
to the continual change of the time points of an event. One can imaginatively
conceive, however, of a natural world in which the asymmetry betwveenspace
and time is reversed, such that objects must be forever changing their spatial
position, but would be subject to fortuity in their time aspects; the creators of
physics in this world would no doubt be temporally mortal or immortal, as they
chose.
We will now discuss the phenomena of radiation with respect to the content of
the four propositions given above. First of all we want to point out that the
classical concept of field is not in agreement with the propositions. For if -an
entire field is considered to be a physical event, then no matter what the co6r-
dinate system the field does not occupy a numerically constant set of space points

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 ATEMPORAL PROCESSES IN PHYSICS 31

at different time points; rather, the field occupies an increasingly larger set of
space points as time increases. Thus, the field about an electric charge in a
vacuum is presumably increasing in radius at the rate of 3 X 1010cm. per second.
Or, alternatively, we can consider the charge plus the field as a fait accompli,
taking the potential resulting from the charge to be zero at a boundary infinitely
distant from the charge. In this case the field is an object of infinite, and hence
indeterminate extension, and as such is not an event described by the proposi-
tions. What we are saying here is simply a repetition of a commonplace in the
history of physics: that the nineteenth century field physics involved a change in
assumption from the particles-in-space-and-nothing-more physics of the eight-
eenth century.
Light or radiation moving out from a source into a vacuum, spreading equally
in all directions, constitutes a classical electromagnetic field; and whether we
consider a spreading wave front (a kind of shell of increasing size) or whether we
consider an increasing volume of field energy, we are again envisioning a physical
event which is continually increasing in the number of space points which it
occupies, or else it occupies an infinite and indeterminate number of space points.
In either case, the radiation as a field is in violation of the propositions given for
physical objects. However, the interaction between matter and radiation, the
latter considered as a photon, does not lead to any immediate disagreement with
the propositions. The interaction is an event-i.e., an energy transformation
and particle excitation-at a space time point, or at most, within a relatively
small set of space and time points. Since any observation of radiation consists
of such an interaction event, "immediate" evidence here favors a photon rather
than wave picture of radiation. Similarly for any kind of physical system;
although a wavefunction may describe the state of the system, immediate obser-
vation is of an event which is definitely specified with respect to space and time
points.
It would be easy, therefore, if we could consider all wave phenomena as over-
all, macroscopic processes which are constituted by individual corpuscular (pho-
ton) processes which can be described by the same general propositions about
events in space and time which obtain for the everyday physical objects of classi-
cal physics. In point of fact, however, we know that although the photon is
concentrated at a point in the photo-electric and Compton effects, which means,
in interactions with matter generally, still, in passing through space the photon
has wave properties and is not concentrated at a point. Thus, in passing through
a Young's fringes optical system, a single photon will "divide", with part of it
going through one slit and part through another, such that the two parts can
constructively or destructively interfere with each other on recombination.2
So the situation which we must consider is that the photon, although an event
at a space point when observed, is an event occupying a large set of space points
previous to its observation. We can never trace the path of a single photon by
2 The fact that a single photon goes through an optical system as a spreading wave front
is shown by the experiments of Dempster on isolated photons. See Dempster and Batho,
Phys. Rev., 30, 644 (1927).

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32 RICHARD SCHLEGEL

direct observation, but from observations on other photons we can infer the
position of the source of a photon, and we directly observe the point of inter-
action at which the photon is destroyed. Between the source and interaction
point we must necessarily assume that the photon is an event occupying not a
point but a relatively large set of points; this inference is required by the experi-
ments which indicate the reflection, refraction, and interference behaviour of a
single photon. In a vacuum the photon travels, we know, with a velocity c.
We can say then that in such a case the photon event occupies a set of space
points which lie on a surface of increasing area that is moving from the source
with a velocity c. The experiments to date do not tell us whether or not the
photon wave spreads entirely in a spherical manner, but we do know that the
wave front passes through optical systems in a manner similar to that of macro-
scopic (many photon) waves. The set of points occupied by the photon can be
thouight to have a structure which is determined by the mirrors, lenses, and other
media of the region considered. Probably the photon event does not occupy a
set of space points in the same way that a physical object occupies space. But
at least, the set of space points is required in the description of the photon's
behaviour; in the lack of more precise knowledge, we use the word "occupy".
Now for radiation in the large, or for the classical electromagnetic field
generally, there is a diminution of intensity as the radiation spreads from its
source; in a vacuum this diminution is calculated by the ordinary inverse square
law, according to which the intensity of radiation decreases as the inverse square
of its distance from its source. Hence, even though the radiation maintains a
constant frequency, the total radiation event is progressively changing as time
goes on. There would be no justification for stating that the radiation process,
considered as an over-all effect of many photons, is an atemporal process; on the
contrary, the process exhibits the progressive change that is the characteristic
of continually increasing extension in time.
A single photon on the other hand, in its observed effect on interaction with
matter, remains unchanged with the passage of time Thus, all evidence indi-
cates that a photon has a like effect, determined by its frequency, whether it is
observed at a distance of one centimeter from its source or at a distance of one
light year. In its passage from source to observation (interaction) point the
photon must occupy a large set of space points, since it does spread out in the
fashion of a wave front; and yet, at its interaction point, the photon is an event
at a space point, or at a relatively small number of space points. Quantum
mechanical wave functions may give us a calculus of probabilities for estimating
the point at which a photon will interact, but we apparently have no knowledge,
or analogy, by which to explain the process of "concentration" of the photon
from a large spatial region to a point in space. The particle and wave aspects of
reality, to quote Professor Dirac, " . . . are connected in some curious manner.' '3
We can only hope for the further knowledge or theory that will explicate the
"curious manner".
In this paper we are concerned only with describing the spatial and temporal
3 Principles of QuantumMechanics, 2nd. edition, Oxford, 1930, p. 2.

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 ATEMPORAL PROCESSES IN PHYSICS 33

behaviour of the photon. The striking aspect of the photon is that its effect
is the same, no matter where it is observed with respect to the source. This is
in contrast to the situation with respect to the classical electromagnetic field,
as discussed above. Since observation does show the photon event to be the
same at all space points, we can view the passage of a photon from source to
interaction point as an atemporal process, which is limited in time extension to
the time points of a single cycle, or oscillation, of the photon, i.e., to an extension
of 1/v. Speaking approximately we can say that the photon as it spreads out
occupies various sets of space points at a single time point. The photon process
is atemporal just because there is no progressive change in the photon as long
as it is not interacting with the rest of the physical world. We can say that the
photon, from the point of view of its own domain is an event which occupies
various sets of space points at a given time point, and the set of maximum size
is determined by the surrounding physical world. The photon may be emitted
within a small black body enclosure, so that the photon occupies at most a rela-
tively small set of space points; or the photon may be emitted into empty space,
with the result that a set of space points of astronomical dimensions is eventually
occupied. The smallest sets occupied are those associated with the events of
emission and 'interaction.
Now it may be objected that the photon process is not an atemporal one, but
is temporal because the probability of interaction per unit of space with a photon
decreases as one goes farther from the photon source, as is shown by the intensity
decrease of macroscopic radiation as one goes farther from the source. Hence,
it could be argued, the space point sets which the photon occupies show a, pro-
gressive change in structure as the photon goes farther from the source. The
change in structure gives the progressive change required for time extension.
To this objection we would make the reply, already stated, that observation never
detects a change of any sort in the photon, and that the photon delivers energy
hp in an interaction no matter how far it may be removed from its source. The
different probabilities for interaction at different space points can be viewed
not as a progressive change in the photon process as such, but rather as a conse-
quence of the geometric properties of the space point set which the photon is
occupying. I do not think that one could definitively decide whether the photon
process is atemporal or temporal, without knowing more than we do today about
the way in which a photon occupies space. But we shall here adopt the point
of view that the constancy of observed effects justifies considering the photon
to be an atemporal process as long as it is not suffering interaction with other
physical events.
le see that the four propositions describing events which are the physical
objects of the eighteenth century mechanistic physics are inadequate for the
atemporal photon event, just as they are inadequate for the classical electro-
magnetic field. The variance is obviously even greater for the photon event.
Proposition 3 is false, just as for the electromagnetic field, in that the set of space
points occupied by the photon is not constant. But furthermore, proposition 1
does not correctly describe the photon if it is considered to be an atemporal

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34 RICHARD SCHLEGEL

process, for at a given time "point" i.e., in a time extension 1/v-the photon
may occupy various sets of space points. And also, proposition 4 is clearly wrong
for the photon event; for since the time extension of the atemporal photon is
limited to l/v, there is a definite restriction on the number of time points which
a photon event can occupy. Proposition 4 holds for physical objects and sta-
tionary, completed electromagnetic fields; properly, the proposition can not even
be considered for photons or spreading electromagnetic fields, since neither of
these events occupy a given (constant) set of space points.
We see that the photon process, considered to be atemporal, shows an asym-
metry which is the reverse of that displayed by ordinary physical objects. There
is a necessary restriction on the time points occupied by the photon events, but
at a given time point a number of different sets of space points may be occupied.
The arrangement of physical circumstances will determine what different space
point sets are occupied at a given time point. For physical objects, in contrast,
only one set of space points may be occupied at a given time point, but there is
no restriction on the number of time points occupied by the object while it is at
a given set of space points.
The existence of the photon requires, then, the assumption that physical events
may be such that an event may occupy various sets of space points at a given time
point. We arrive at this assumption by employing a concept of time which
implies that certain processes are of limited time extension, and hence atemporal.
The assumption is far different from what would be allowed by the assumptions
of classical physics. But we have argued that time is a physical concept, deter-
mined by the natural world which we observe. Hence, there is no necessary,
a priori restriction on time-to-space relations, excepting the avoidance of self
contradiction as required by logic. Whether a physical event can occupy only
one set, or whether it can occupy many sets of space points at what is effectively
a single time point, is a question to be decided by observation of nature.
The analysis which we have given of the space and time extension of a photon
clearly shows that the photon, because it is a point event at the time of observa-
tion, is not therefore equivalent to a corpuscle, which is an event fulfilling the
propositions 3 and 4 throughout its life time. Likewise, even though the photon
spreads as a wave in its passage between points of emission and interaction, it is
not therefore a conventional wave, for it does not change in nature as it spreads
over more space points, as does a proper wave-rather, it is only the probability
of interaction at a given point which changes for the photon. Hence, it appears
that we should consider radiation to be a self-consistent and natural event, pre-
senting its own peculiar attributes and problems, and perhaps requiring changes
of the kind here suggested in our assumptions about the space and time relations
of physical events. Such a view would seem to be more promising than con-
sidering radiation to be a duality of corpuscles and waves-for in obvious fact,
radiation is neither one of these.
If we adopt the hypothesis that the photon process is atemporal, we then must
consider the emission and absorption or interaction of radiation, in the domain
of the radiation, to be a process which is completed in a time extension of 1/v

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 ATEMPORALPROCESSESIN PHYSICS 35

seconds, where v is the frequency of the radiation, regardless of the distance

between the emission and interaction events. Emission would not be an event,
prior in time, which causes the interaction, an event later in time. Rather,
both events would have to be considered as a total process to which ordinary
temporal causality is not applicable. The view that the emitter and the absorber
are equivalent with respect to time sequence in a radiation (i.e., photon) process
has previously been suggested in physics, most recently by Wheeler and Feyn-
man. This equivalence is proposed by them for a laboratory observer, studying
the photon process in terms of the time scale of the progressively changing world.
The atemporal nature of the photon process, as suggested by the analysis of
physical time given here, would require the Wheeler-Feynman equivalence. The
discrepancy in time extension, for the photon process, between the laboratory
observer's domain and the photon's domain need not trouble us, since the rela-
tivity of time scales has been established by the special theory of relativity. In
the photon's domain we would expect the time extension to vanish, and in the
laboratory observer's domain time has the scale which has been adopted to
measure the progressively changing world about us.
I wish to express appreciation to Professor David Bohm of Princeton Uni-
versity for reading a first draft of this paper and commenting on it. Several
valuable suggestions made by him have been incorporated into the paper.
Princeton University, Princeton, N. J.

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