Priority in Expropriation

Filstream International v. CA
284 SCRA 716 (1998)

In resolving the instant petitions, the Court is tasked to strike a balance between the
contending interests when the state exercised its power of eminent domain. On one side we
have the owners of the property to be expropriated who must be duly compensated for the loss
of their property, while on the other is the State which must take the property for public use.
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide
tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only
a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public
use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them.
The basic rules still have to be followed, which are as follows: no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution); private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution).Thus the
exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not without limitations.
Even Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code is very explicit that it must comply with the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws. He governing law that deals with the subject of
expropriation for purposed of urban land reform and housing in Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 and 10 of which specifically provide as
follows:

Sec. 9. Priorities in the acquisition of Land Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its sub-divisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas of Priority Development, Zonal Improvement sites, and
Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been
acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.

Held
Very clear from the abovequoted provisions are the limitations with respect to the order
of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as means to
acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other
modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private
property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use.
City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, Antonio, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodolfo, all surnamed
Aguilar
G.R. No. 137152
January 29, 2001

Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same
from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within the Area
for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation No. 1967, as
amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1517.[10] This
declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso facto, regardless of
the area of the land. There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and
therefore last in the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within
the declared APDs which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the order
of priority.
According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact
mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition. Section 9, however, is not a single
provision that can be read separate from the other provisions of the law. It must be read
together with Section 10 of R.A. 7279 which also provides:

Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition.The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this
Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be
exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein
defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the
procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.

For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties

shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily
through negotiated purchase: Provided that qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of
the land shall be given the right of first refusal. Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279
are to be acquired in several modes. Among these modes are the following: (1) community
mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation
to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels of land owned by small
property owners are exempt from such acquisition. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in
the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their
acquisition. Section 10 deals with the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring
lands for socialized housing. These are two different things. They mean that the type of lands
that may be acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes
authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made
subject to the modes and conditions set forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies
within the APD, such as in the instant case, may be acquired only in the modes under, and
subject to the conditions of, Section 10.
Public Use
Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs. Reyes
Facts:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) complaints with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in
barangays of Cebu City, under PTAs express authority to acquire by purchase, by negotiation
or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and without the tourist zones as
indicated in its Revised Charter (PD 564).
This is in line with the policy of the government to promote tourism and development
wherein they will construct in Barangays Malubog, Busay and Babag, a sports complex
(basketball courts, tennis courts, volleyball courts, track and field, baseball and softball
diamonds, and swimming pools), clubhouse, golf course, childrens playground and a nature
area for picnics and horseback riding for the use of the public.
Complimentary and support facilities for the project will also be constructed, including
public rest houses, lockers, dressing rooms, coffee shops, shopping malls, etc., whereby said
facilities will create and offer employment opportunities to the residents of the community and
further generate income for the whole of Cebu City.
The defendants, now petitioners, had a common allegation that the taking is allegedly
not impressed with public use under the Constitution. In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners
alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific constitutional provision
authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes.

Issue: Whether or not the taking of the parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports
complex by the Philippine Tourism Authority is for public use in contemplation of the eminent
domain law.
Ruling:
Yes. The taking of the parcels of land for the purpose of constructing a sports complex
by the Philippine Tourism Authority is for public use in contemplation of the eminent domain law.
The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that
public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded.
The petitioners contention that the promotion of tourism is not public use because
private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants,
hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. Private bus
firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using public streets and
highways do not diminish in the least bit the public-character of expropriations for roads and
streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not
make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines
and shipping companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later
sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and other
private concerns.
The right of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the 282 hectares already
identified as fit for the establishment of a resort complex to promote tourism is, therefore,
sustained.
Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty-five (25) hectares in Antipolo,
Rizal including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an
area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the
market value.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties.
The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing
the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing
upon payment of just compensation."
On January 17, 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of possession when
the NHA deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P158, 980.00. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the possession
of their property without due process of law, which was however denied. Hence, the resort to
the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of the due process clause since socialized housing''
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not really for a public purpose.

Ruling:
No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due process clause since socialized housing'' for the
purpose of condemnation proceeding is really for a public purpose.
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory
and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be valid must be for public
use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use
is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may
be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Province of Camarines Sur Vs. CA, 222 SCRA 170 (1993)

Facts:
This is an appeal for certiorari on the decision on the issue on whether the expropriation of
agricultural lands by LGU is subject to prior approval of the DAR.
December 1988, Sangguniang Panlalawigan of CamSur authorized the provincial
governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site in order to
establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project
for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the resolution, Gov. Villafuerte filed two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto San Joaquin and Efren San Joaquin. Upon motion for the issuance of writ or
possession, San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing.
San Joaquins later moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price offered for their property. The court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
province to take possession of the properties.
San Joaquins filed for motion for relief, but denied as well. In their petition, Asked by the
CA, Solicitor General stated that there is no need for the approval of the president for the
province to expropriate properties. However, the approval of the DAR is needed to convert the
property from agricultural to non-agricultural (housing purpose).
CA set aside the decision of the trial court suspending the possession and expropriation
of the property until th province has acquired the approval of DAR.

Ruling:
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order
No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it
would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the applications
for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer
expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect,
it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for
a public purpose or public use.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether
the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression
of legislative policy. The courts defer to such legislative determination and will intervene only
when a particular undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
Manosca Vs Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996)
Facts:
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig. Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel
was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia
Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on
06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133,
Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are associated with
an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in
Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y.
Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been
declared as a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical
interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized . . . .
ISSUES: Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an
application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni
Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the
03rd August 1989 order of the trial court
Ruling:
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as
condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not
be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the
subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent
domain is generally so described as "the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in
the government" that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature
of a forced purchase by the State.9 It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within
the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of
governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty. The only
direct constitutional qualification is that "private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation." This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse
and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
The term "public use," not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency. Black
summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking property by
eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers same benefit or
advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right
of public to use proposed facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has
right of use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a "public advantage" or
"public benefit" accrues sufficient to constitute a public use.
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public"
has long been discarded.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ vs PEZA
Facts:
A petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and the Resolution of Court of Appeals
which ordered to proceed the hearing of expropriation proceeding in determination of just
compensation for LOT 1406B.
PEZA who initiate before the RTC of Cavite expropriation proceedings on three parcels
of irrigated lands. One of those lands is registered in the name of Jimenez Salud; Lot 1406 (A
and B).
More than ten years later, the trial court upheld PEZA's right to expropriate, among
others, the lot of petitioner. Petitioner sought reconsideration alleging that the lot would only be
transferred to a private corporation, and would not be utilized for a public purpose.
The trial court reconsidered the order and released Lot 1406 A from expropriation while
the expropriation of Lot 1406 B was maintained. PEZA appealed the order to the CA. Later on,
the petitioner and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement whereby
1) PEZA agrees to withdraw its appeal while Salud agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit
its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said
lot by PEZA from 1981-1993; and
2) The parties agree to swap Lot 1406B with Lot434 and that instead of being paid the
just compensation for Lot 1406B, the estate of Salud shall be paid with Lot 434. The
compromise agreement is immediately final and executory. The CA remanded the case to the
trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement. The trial court approved the
same. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 inasmuch as it was not the
registered owner of the said lot.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to partially annul the order. The trial court then
annulled the compromise agreement and ordered the turnover of Lot1406B to petitioner. The
CA upheld the rescission of the compromise agreement, however, set aside the order of the trial
court regarding the turnover of the lot and ordered the trial judge to proceed with the hearing of
the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just compensation. This is in
accordance with Art 2041 of the Civil Code which states that "if one of the parties fails or refuses
to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as
rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

Issue: Whether or not the phrase "original demand" pertains to the return of Lot 1406B which is
sought to be expropriated or the determination of just compensation even with a compromise
agreement.
Held:
In order to determine the original demand the Expropriation proceedings involve two
phases. The first phase ends either with an order of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to
take the land and the public purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of
dismissal. Either order would be a final one since it finally disposes of the case.
The second phase concerns the determination of just compensation to be
ascertained by three commissioners. It ends with an order fixing the amount to be paid to the
defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this order finally disposes of the
second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an appeal.
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11, 1991 order of
expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a compromise agreement
regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the
terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the same.
Obviously, the trial court could only validly order the rescission of the compromise
agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the subject of the
compromise. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to petitioner.
Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such that
failure to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No statement
to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement only
to clarify what was subject to payment. Hence, the "original demand" referred to means the
fixing of just compensation. When PEZA failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner
can again demand for the payment but not the return of the expropriated Lot 1406-B.
When the purpose of the expropriation is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes in use. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use
Respondent PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation No.
1980 dated May 30, 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power
of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree No. 66.
Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B as testified by Chief Civil Engineer was to be devoted
for the construction of government offices. Anent this issue, suffice it to say that PEZA can vary
the purpose for which a condemned lot will be devoted to, provided that the same is for public
use. Petitioner cannot impose or dictate on the respondent what facilities to establish for as long
as the same are for public purpose.
In view of all the foregoing, there is no question that the lots were expropriated for public
purpose. The justice and equity dictate the trial court for hearing of the expropriation
proceedings on the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt
payment to the petitioner. The petition is denied.

Mactan Cebu Interrnational Airport v Lozada Jr

Facts:
Petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse, annul, and set aside decision dated
February 28, 2006 and the Resolution dated February 7, 2007 of the CA.
Lot No. 88 located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was Anastacio Deiparine.was
subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by Republic, Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), for the expansion and improvement of the Lahug Airport.
1947, the lots were already occupied by the U.S. Army and were turned over to the
Surplus Property Commission, the Bureau of Aeronautics, the National Airport Corporation and
then to the CAA.
During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, respondent Bernardo L. Lozada,
Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 9045 was issued
in Lozadas name.
Trial court ruled for the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market
value of the lot. However, the projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug
Airport, however, was not pursued.
Lozada and other owners contacted CAA about the reacquisition of lots under
the previous proposition because the public purpose of the said expropriation (expansion of the
airport) was never actually initiated, realized, or implemented. Instead, the old airport was
converted into a commercial complex. it became the site of a jail while a portion thereof was
occupied by squatters.
Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was unconditional, and
respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property notwithstanding
non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiff-respondents, which
 decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners argued that the
judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in fee simple to
the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not of an expropriated property can be returned to the owner if the purposed
of public use (expansion of airport of Lahug which is now Mactan Cebu International) was not
fulfilled.
Held:
Yes but there are conditions set, the Decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 should be read
in its entirety, wherein it is apparent that the acquisition by the Republic of the expropriated lots
was subject to the condition that the Lahug Airport would continue its operation. The condition
not having materialized because the airport had been abandoned, the former owner should then
be allowed to reacquire the expropriated property.
The testimony of Lozada was based on personal knowledge as the assurance from the
government was personally made to him. His testimony on cross-examination destroyed neither
his credibility as a witness nor the truthfulness of his words.
Verily, factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding
and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed. A petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law and not of fact. Not one of the exceptions
to this rule is present in this case to warrant a reversal of such findings.
The right of respondents to repurchase Lot No. 88 may be enforced based on a
constructive trust constituted on the property held by the government in favor of the former.
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees
sole duty is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of
course, the wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust
must himself do equity.
When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to give,
the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have
received. In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions which,
with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the party
who is bound to return.
Respondents must likewise pay petitioners the necessary expenses they may have
incurred in maintaining Lot No. 88, as well as the monetary value of their services in managing it
to the extent that respondents were benefited thereby.
In accordance with Article 1190 of the Civil Code vis-vis Article 1189, which provides that
if a thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure to the benefit of the
creditor, respondents, as creditors, do not have to pay, as part of the process of restitution, the
appreciation in value of Lot No. 88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time.
The petition is denied
Respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioners the just compensation
Respondents are ORDERED to pay petitioners the necessary expenses the latter incurred in
maintaining Lot No. 88, plus the monetary value of their services
Petitioners are ENTITLED to keep whatever fruits and income they may have obtained
 Respondents are also ENTITLED to keep whatever interests the amounts they received as just
compensation may have earned in the meantime, as well as the appreciation in value of Lot No.
88, which is a natural consequence of nature and time

**Government Withdrawal
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,
FACTS:
NHA filed with RTC of Cebu Branch 11 a complaint as amended regarding the eminent domain
against Heirs of Guivelondo docketed as civil case.

The petitioner alleged that defendant heirs et. al were the rightful private owners of the land
which the petitioner intends to develop a socialized housing project.

The respondent heirs filed a manifestation of waiving their objections to petitioners power to
expropriate their properties, thereafter trial court declares plaintiff has a right to expropriate the
properties of the defendant heirs and appointed 3 commissioners who ascertain the just
compensation of the said properties be fixed at 11, 200.00 php. per square meter.

Petitioner NHA filed 2 motion for reconsideration:

(August 30, 2000) that assails inclusion of lots 12, 13 and 19 as well as (August 31, 2000) the
amount of just compensation, however the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts partial judgment.

Trial court issued an Omnibus Order:

GRANTED- August 30, 2000 motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Commissioners
Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and 19 within its coverage
DENIED- August 31, 2000 motion for reconsideration of respondent Heirs on the ground that
the fixing of the just compensation had adequate basis and support.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari; the trial court issued an Entry of
Judgment over the Partial Judgment dated August 7, 2000 as modified by the Omnibus Order
dated October 11, 2000; respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted

Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the Partial Judgment
and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same.

Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition.

Trial court served on petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by the
trial court to enforce the Partial Judgment of August 7, 2000 and the Omnibus Order of October
11, 2000.

Court of Appeals set aside the dismissal of the petition and reinstated the same.
Thereafter, a temporary restraining order was issued enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve
the status quo.

respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment

Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether NHA, in an action for expropriation, after he has been placed in possession of the
property and before the termination of the action, may dismiss the petition?

RULING:
In the case at bar, NO, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10,
1999, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs
of Isidro Guivelondo.

Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal in any court.

Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is
determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the
determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by
the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

The outcome of the first phase of expropriation proceedings, which is either an order of
expropriation or an order of dismissal, is final since it finally disposes of the case. On the other
hand, the second phase ends with an order fixing the amount of just compensation. Both orders,
being final, are appealable.

An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the
petitioner has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate
and its public use can no longer be questioned.

A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be
corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.

Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for purposes of exercising the power of
eminent domain.
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general
welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing
projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for all who need it, all at
once.

The public purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any way diminished by the amount
of just compensation that the court has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban
poor dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land cost more than petitioner
had expected. It is worthy to note that petitioner pursued its petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals assailing the amount of just compensation and its petition for review with this Court
which eloquently indicates that there still exists a public use for the housing project. It was only
after its appeal and petitions for review were dismissed that petitioner made a complete turn-
around and decided it did not want the property anymore.

Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner
cannot be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to
abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.

NHA (National Housing Authority) - Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-
corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.

Petition for review is DENIED.

The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts Order denying petitioners Motion
to Dismiss the expropriation proceedings is AFFIRMED.
NPC & Pobre v. CA, G.R. No. 106804
Facts:
Antonio Pobre owns a land which he developed into a resort subdivision (Tiwi Hot Springs
Resort Subdivision), beneath which is thermal mineral water and steam. (Property is located in
Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay).

For one year, Pobre leased to NPC eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.

NPC (National Power Corporation):

is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power
and to transmit electric power nationwide; authorized by law to acquire property and exercise
the right of eminent domain.

The Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present
beneath the property and suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial
use.

NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three instances:

First, Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan;
Second, trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPCs payment of P25 per square
meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam
wells. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the
site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of
some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobres complaints and NPC continued with
its dumping; Third, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an
additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC needed
the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site

NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6
September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial courts issuance of a
writ of possession to NPC.

Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC
damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPCs
actions and for the payment of damages.

NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found
an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property
due to Pobres opposition.

The trial court ruled that because of the pollution generated by NPCs geothermal plants NPC
had rendered Pobres entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The Property has become
useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobres entire Property and pay for it. But NPC
insists that it has the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint, relying on
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court (the Rules in effect at that time)

CA Affirmed the decision but deleted the award for attorneys fees.

Issue:
Whether NPC has the right to automatically dismiss complaint for eminent domain.

Ruling:
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to automatically
dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at
the start of the taking.

If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial
scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights
may have suffered in the meantime.

The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily.

Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no longer makes the dismissal of the
complaint automatic.

The right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action before the defendant has filed his answer or asked
for summary judgment must be first confirmed by the court in an order issued by it.

(It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67
of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to
dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.)

Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure - Expropriation -required the defendant to file a single
motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property for the purpose specified in the complaint. In expropriation cases under Section 3 of
Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer.

The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his
right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then
see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due
process of law.

Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land
to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the
landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy
available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre
and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically
taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property.

In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, the Court
compelled the National Housing Authority (NHA) to pay just compensation to the landowners
even after the NHA had already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a
government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, and
then just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary
and capricious and was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held
liable to the landowners for the prejudice that they had suffered.

In this case, NPC appropriated Pobres Property without resort to expropriation proceedings.
NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute
expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the
second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just
compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.

This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for
expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were
no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.

We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived
when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPCs taking of Pobres
property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just
compensation is a transgression of procedural due process.

The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such entities
cannot trifle with a citizens property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements.
Recovery of Expropriated Land

ATO v Gopuco, GR 158563, June 30, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 72 consisting of 995
square meters located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13061-T.
The Lahug Airport had been turned over by the Unites States Army to the Republic of the
Philippines sometime in 1947 through the Surplus Property Commission, which accepted it in
behalf of the Philippine Government. In 1947, the Surplus Property Commission was succeeded
by the Bureau of Aeronautics, which office was supplanted by the National Airport Corporation
(NAC). The NAC was in turn dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA).
Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the Lahug
Airport, including the herein respondent, that the government was acquiring their lands for
purposes of expansion. Some landowners were convinced to sell their properties on the
assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used
by the airport. Others, including Gopuco, refused to do so.
Thus, on 16 April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties, docketed as Civil Case No.
R-1881. On 29 December 1961, the CFI promulgated a Decision,
1. Declaring the expropriation of [the subject lots, including Lot No. 72] justified and in lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain;
2. Declaring. A balance of P1,990 in favor of Apolonio Go Puco, Jr. with legal interest from
November 16, 1947 until fully paid. ;
3. After the payment of the foregoing financial obligation to the landowners, directing the latter to
deliver to the plaintiff the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title to their respective lots; and
upon the presentation of the said titles to the Register of Deeds, ordering the latter to cancel the
same and to issue, in lieu thereof, new Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of the plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which has the right to
acquire property under the power of eminent domain.
Ruling:
The Petition Granted. Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most
exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to
as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and taxation,
an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to
grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the
state for public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential part of
governance .
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. This prescription is intended to provide a safeguard
against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the
power is sought to be enforced.
In this case, the judgment on the propriety of the taking and the adequacy of the
compensation received have long become final. We have also already held that the terms of
that judgment granted title in fee simple to the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, pursuant
to our ruling in Fery, as recently cited in Reyes v. National Housing Authority, no rights to Lot
No. 72, either express or implied, have been retained by the herein respondent.

Republic v Lim, GR 161656, June 29, 2005

Facts:
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case
No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in
the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area
of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT
No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the
CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14,
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum
of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March
11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. Another
heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote
the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on
said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.
Issue:
Whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for government to subsequently decide to
abandon the property and return it to the landowners.
Held:
Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession
of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property.
This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government
to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the
duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals, we defined just
compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property
owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of
fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions
similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the
party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.