Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2014) 17:413426

DOI 10.1007/s10677-013-9453-0

Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy

Amy Mullin

Accepted: 1 August 2013 / Published online: 11 August 2013

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract This paper addresses the issue of paternalism in child-rearing. Since the parent
child relationship seems to be the linguistic source of the concept, one may be tempted to
assume that raising a child represents a particularly appropriate sphere for paternalism. The
parentchild relationship is generally understood as a relationship that is supposed to
promote the development and autonomy-formation of the child, so that the apparent source
of the concept is a form of autonomy-oriented paternalism. Far from taking paternalism to be
overtly unproblematic in such paradigmatic, pedagogical settings, this article analyzes how
an effort should be made to understand a childs capacities and which standards parents
should be held to when deciding whether interference truly serves the childs interests.

Keywords Autonomy . Paternalism . Children . Parentchild relationship .

Autonomy-oriented paternalism

1 Introduction

In this essay I explain what I mean by autonomy and the features of relationships between
parents and children that support its development, in order to discuss when paternalistic
interference with childrens desires is justifiable. Those who view young children as entirely
heteronomous may judge it always appropriate to interfere with childrens wills when that
interference serves childrens interests, so long as childrens long-term interest in developing
autonomy is taken into account. Thus, for instance Feinberg (1980), stresses the importance
of ensuring that children can become autonomous in the future. I argue that even children
under ten are capable of some degree of autonomy in particular areas of their lives. Therefore
we cannot simply assume that actions that thwart their wills are justified whenever the
interventions serve childrens long-term interests. This is because we respect the capacity for
autonomous action, even when it runs counter to what we recognize as being in the actors
interest, to reflect what an autonomous actor finds meaningful.
First a few brief definitions are in order. I will explain what I mean by autonomy,
paternalism, and a parent. Autonomy is a term used in a variety of ways. I am interested
in personal autonomy, understood as self-governance in the service of goals or commit-
ments, to people, relationships, values, types of experiences or things. I agree with Dworkin

A. Mullin (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
e-mail: amy.mullin@utoronto.ca
414 A. Mullin

(1988, 31) that autonomy is connected to an agent finding his or her activity meaningful but
focus on individual actions and pursuits, or local autonomy, rather than autonomy over a
lifespan.1 My understanding of autonomy is consistent with its use in self-determination
theory (SDT), as a capacity to act in ways that are personally meaningful to the actor.
Psychologists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan, who developed SDT, give a brief overview of
its major tenets and influence in Deci and Ryan 2008b. An autonomous actor embraces the
goals associated with his or her activities. Autonomous motivation contrasts both with a lack
of motivation and with motivation associated with a sense of pressure or control exerted by
others with respect to specific outcomes desired by those in control.
By paternalism, I mean an intervention by one person (the intervener) in the activities of
another (the intervened) that is aimed at achieving significant good for or avoiding
significant harm to the intervened. This view is consistent with Dworkins (2010) including
his openness as to whether paternalism interferes with autonomy or only with liberty. The
interventions might directly thwart the expressed (or unexpressed but understood) will or
desires of the intervened by a variety of means. These means include physical restraint,
threats, denying necessary means to the intervened, or, when the intervener is in a position of
authority, a simple assertion of the interveners will. Alternatively the interventions could go
unnoticed by the intervened, for instance by the intervener lying to, distracting, withholding
information from, or otherwise surreptitiously shaping the choices and actions of the
intervened. Throughout the body of this essay, since I will be focusing on parents and
children, a relationship from which the term paternalism is derived, I can avoid the
awkwardness of speaking of interveners and the intervened.
In contrast with the extensively philosophically debated terms autonomy and paternalism,
it may seem surprising that I seek to define the term parent, since it is subject to little
philosophical debate. However, it is important to clarify that I am talking about a type of social
relationship, rather than a biological or legal one. When I speak of parents, I mean adults who are
in long-term relationships with children, who interact with them regularly and closely, who accept
significant ongoing responsibility for a childs care and development, and are taken by others to
have this responsibility. Thus biological parents who do not interact extensively in the manner
described above are not what I mean by a parent, nor are legally recognized parents who have
little to do with a child. Other relatives and paid caregivers with long-term and socially recognized
relationships with and responsibility for children would count as parents as I use the term.
In this essay I discuss parents paternalism. Other adults may be justified in acting
paternalistically towards children in circumstances where it is clear that a child intends to
act or is acting in ways that will cause him or her significant harm. However, justifications
for paternalism are best understood within the context of the relationship between parents
and children. In these relationships, we largely avoid problems about adults reluctance to
interfere with the legal authority other adults have over children, and can also assume that
the adults in question are relatively well-informed about their children, recognize a respon-
sibility to care for them, and are recognized by others to have this authority.

2 Thwarting Childrens Wills and Developing Autonomy

One of parents recognized responsibilities is development of childrens autonomy (in the

broad sense of a capacity to guide their activities to conform with goals the children
themselves find meaningful). When autonomy is understood in this way, cross-cultural

1
I explain how my view relates to other accounts of personal autonomy in Mullin 2007.
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 415

studies show that parents in a wide variety of cultural contexts recognize its importance and
aim to help children to develop it (Killen and Wainryb 2000).2 Yet the people charged with
this responsibility are those who must most often thwart their childrens wills. Saying no is
often recognized as an important step in childrens development of autonomy via self-
assertion (Crockenberg and Litman 1990). Yet parents saying no or otherwise limiting
their childrens power to act without interference is likewise an important step, by providing
children with a clear set of rules and guidelines, and encouraging the ability to control
momentary impulses (Joussemet et al. 2008, esp. 195). Children cannot govern their
behavior to reflect what they care about without self-control.
The establishment of warm and mutually satisfying relationships is likewise vital to a
childs interest in self-control and ability to form meaningful goals (Grusec and Davidov
2007). In addition to supporting development of self-control, and forming warm relation-
ships with children, it is important that parents provide autonomy support. I discuss
autonomy support in a later section of this essay, but its main ingredients involve adults
giving children reasons and explanations for their requests, demonstrating interest in chil-
drens feelings and perspectives, and offering children structured choices that reflect those
feelings and perspectives. Autonomy support also involves avoiding undermining autono-
my, for instance by pressuring a child to change what he or she feels and cares about
(Joussemet et al. 2008).
In order to develop childrens autonomy, parents need to encourage them to develop
skills, acquire knowledge, care stably about some goals, and develop self-control. In order to
do so, parents will often need to interfere with childrens desires, especially but not only their
fleeting impulses, in order to focus them on the kinds of activities that will enable them to
become autonomous in a broad range of contexts, and in order to prevent them from
engaging in activities that might prevent them from surviving and thriving. This suggests
that paternalism towards children may not only be consistent with respect for the value of
autonomy, and the childs development of it, but may also be required for it. Interventions
could be justified if they help develop impulse-control, or the skills and knowledge required
to assess ones situation and appreciate how goals meaningful to the actor may be pursued.
Before proceeding to discuss factors relevant to the justification of paternalism towards
children, I will first expand on my brief remarks above about autonomy. Next I will say more
about what current psychological research indicates about support for development of
autonomy. Only then can I give a clear account of when paternalism toward children is
justified.

3 Autonomy

There are many different conceptions of autonomy, united by an association with self-
governance. I operate with a conception of personal (as opposed to political) autonomy
according to which it is valuable both as a contributor to well being3 and as a source of
meaning. I conceive of autonomy as something we can possess in degrees which can differ
over time, and not only as we develop into adults or experience cognitive decline due to

2
This contrasts with research suggesting that parents value autonomy differentially in a manner influenced by
gender and class. See Xiao 2000. However, in Xiaos work, unlike my own, autonomy is closely associated
with independence (799).
3
SDT claims that autonomy contributes in many ways to well being. Deci and Ryan 2008a.
416 A. Mullin

illness, injury or aging.4 In order to self-govern there must be sufficient volitional stability
for us to contrast self-governance with action based on shifting impulses. The ability to care
more about some outcomes than others in a relatively stable way is the most important
requirement for autonomy.
Next, the autonomous person must be able to exercise some self-control with respect to
his or her commitments or goals. We can ascertain whether people are relatively stable with
respect to what they care about by observing their actions and reactions (including emotional
responses). When I refer to relatively stable goals or commitments, I am using these terms as
generically as possible, to reflect the wide range of things, activities, people, experiences and
relationships that can matter to us, whether or not we have consciously reflected on the
matter and whether or not we can articulate our goals. For many children, goals in this sense
can include the well being of those they love, the ability to continue relationships with
friends and loved ones, keeping prized possessions, engaging in favourite activities, feeling
pleasure, pleasurable excitement, and feeling comfortable and at ease, mastering new and
challenging tasks, being recognized for skills and accomplishments, and avoiding significant
stress and pain. Some self-control is necessary even to participate in intrinsically rewarding
activities (to avoid distraction by others or ones own shifting thoughts and feelings), but
significantly more self-control is required to persist in pursuing ones goals with respect to
activities that are not intrinsically rewarding, and in the face of the need to forego more
fleeing pleasures, to work hard, and risk failure. Children are capable of significant self-
control in service of their goals (as is clear to anyone who has watched young children
persevere in sports requiring much practice, some pain, and periods of disappointment).
In addition, an autonomous person must be able to recognize how ones actions could
facilitate or threaten pursuit of goals in a particular context. This will include the ability to
imagine alternative courses of action and to think realistically about which alternatives could
be realized. Finally, one must have enough confidence in ones abilities to help bring about
desired outcomes to motivate action. While I agree with Paul Bensons stress on the
importance of self-trust to autonomy, my understanding of self-trust is not as intellectualized
as his, since he understands self-trust as requiring that one think of oneself as an authority
and be willing to defend ones reasons for actions to others (2005). Instead my understand-
ing is that we must consider it possible to achieve the outcomes we aim at and take our own
goals as worth pursuing because we care about them, as opposed to requiring others to
endorse them. This need not be made explicit to ones self or others.
On my view, personal autonomy does not always require explicit long-term planning or
critical reflection, although autonomy may sometimes benefit, depending on the circumstances,
from both. This is consistent with Harry Frankfurts work (1999) on the importance of our loves
and passions as a potential source of autonomy, Robert Noggles argument (1997) that a
requirement that the autonomous person engage in critical self-reflection unduly favors some
types of lives over others, and Nomy Arpalys work (2000) on the role that emotions, rather than
self-conscious reasoning, can play in acting for good reasons. It is also in keeping with much
recent work on autonomy downplaying the role of self-conscious reflection, including that of
John Christman (2005) and Diana Meyers (2005). Meyers stresses the continuity between
conscious and unconscious thought processes, while Christman notes that emotions and
affects can sometimes serve as better guides to what motivates us stably than self-conscious
reflection. My view, however, contrasts with that of Marina Oshana (2005). She believes
that we are not autonomous unless we have a self-conception and make choices that not
only cohere with but are also guided by that self-concept whereas I believe that it is

4
Many theorists see autonomy as varying with domain and in degree. See Meyers 1989 and Friedman 2003.
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 417

enough to be guided by a stable self. 5 I agree that autonomy will be quite limited so long as our
various goals are not well-integrated with one another (so that we have relatively stable
preferences about which should be prioritized when they clash). However, we need not be able
to clearly articulate what our goals are or which ones matter more at a given stage of ones life
(so long as their relative priority in a period is fairly stable). It is possible for ones self-
conception to fail adequately to capture what one cares about (because of self-deception,
perhaps prompted by a desire to have our self-conception fit with what others find admirable).
Therefore our emotions can be more reliable guides to what we care stably about than our self-
image (even though, as I have argued elsewhere, our emotions can be inaccurate guides to what
we care about when they reflect pressures of the moment or emotional inertia) (Mullin 2007).
My view that children are capable of autonomy reflects my view that higher cognitive
processes play less of a role than was previously thought in enabling autonomy. It also
reflects my belief that children have pockets of volitional stability, as well as instances when
they are as capable as many adults of controlling their impulses in order to aim at outcomes
that matter deeply to them. I therefore disagree with philosophers such as Tamar Schapiro
(1999, esp. 729) who think of children as heteronomous because of lacking a voice of their
own. When it comes to acting autonomously (in a manner that reflects what we care about),
dependence on others need not be a barrier (although it will be when those others seek to
control us, and do not support our autonomy). This is in keeping with work within disability
theory about the distinction between autonomy and independence (See Ells 2001, 606).
Autonomous activity requires possession of stable goals that matter to us - and the ability to
pursue those goals. Dependence on others can threaten that ability when meeting our needs for
care is made contingent upon following the requirements of those who provide the care (or fund
it). Living in unjust or oppressive circumstances can shape what we come to care about in
oppressive ways. However, so long as the circumstances do not undermine the kind of
confidence required for autonomy (that what we care about gives us a reason to act, and that
we are capable of pursuing what we care about), and do not feed us false and deceptive
information, then the oppression and injustice that shape our commitments needs to be criticized,
but we retain autonomy in action. By contrast, if our ability to care stably about goals or basic
self-trust is undercut or we are given false information or deceived, then our ability to make
choices that reflect what we really care about is removed or disrupted, either at the start by
disabling development of autonomous motivation, in the middle, by preventing action in
accordance with such motivation, or at the end, by confusing us about how to pursue our goals.
Autonomy is a matter of degree. It varies with the stability of our goals, our capacities for
self-control in different contexts, the varying accuracy of our assessment of our options, and our
changing degrees of self-confidence in our abilities to achieve what we desire. It is undermined
by situations in which others have the power and inclination to control us. It may be present to a
greater extent in some domains (for instance the workplace, familial life, friendships or
romantic relationships) than others. It also depends upon a broad set of skills, capacities, and
resources some personal and some social (such as information), that are developed and
sustained over time, including, crucially, by parents in their relationships with their children.

4 Supporting Autonomy

How do parents develop their childrens capacities for autonomy? I focus on Self-
Determination Theorys (SDT) understanding of autonomy support. According to SDT,

5
I discuss Frankfurt, Arpaly and Oshana on this point in Mullin 2007.
418 A. Mullin

people from all cultures have needs for autonomy, competence (an ability to rise to
challenges) and relatedness (or affiliation with other individuals and groups) (Deci and Ryan
2008b). SDTs understanding of the nature of autonomy is consistent with mine in that it is
seen as a kind of motivation that includes both the motivation to achieve outcomes that are
intrinsically rewarding and the motivation to engage in activities that the person him or
herself regards as perhaps boring or taxing but worthwhile in virtue of the connection
between the activity and the desired outcome. If children are motivated to study solely by
grades and fear of parental disapproval of bad grades, then their motivation is controlled
because the children value neither the activity of learning nor the outcome of having learned
but instead act in response to external pressure. If they are motivated in part by a desire to
learn and an understanding that learning can be intrinsically rewarding and relevantly
connected to other goals they endorse, then their motivation is autonomous. Autonomous
motivation is associated with well-being, psychological health, and the ability to persist in
pursuit of goals (Deci and Ryan 2008a).
Autonomy support comes in different forms depending on the relationships in which it is
provided, and the capacities and deficits of those providing and receiving it. For young
children receiving autonomy support from their parents, this support must create a context in
which the child connects his or her activities to outcomes she or he cares about, and has
some control over the way in which the outcomes are pursued. Therefore support for
autonomy involves adults showing interest in childrens perspectives, providing clear
information about what is expected and why outcomes can be endorsed from those perspec-
tives, and a willingness to be responsive to childrens interests and perspective in terms of
how the outcome is to be achieved and why it is valuable. Autonomy supporting parents will
explore childrens reasons for reluctance and seek to be responsive to them.
Autonomy support can also come in the form of modeling how to respond to challenges
to ones beliefs or new information, and a parents willingness to entertain other peoples
perspectives, admit mistakes, and respond to new and relevant information. This may be
modeled by parents listening to their childrens opinions and arguments (about why a child
should be allowed to quit an activity the parent thinks valuable, or pursue an activity a parent
thinks unimportant). Parents can model the importance of being open to relevant information
and opinions by listening to their childrens views about ways in which the parents
themselves need autonomy support. Given typically very close relationship between chil-
dren and parents, and a childs ample time for observation, a child may notice, for instance, a
parent devoting an inordinate amount of time to an activity (cleaning up for a party, trying to
impress others at work) in a manner inconsistent with what the parent professes to value or
finds satisfying.
Given that we know that autonomy support is important in close relationships
between adults (Deci et al. 2006), parents have an opportunity, in their willingness to
learn from their children, to model the need to continue, as adults, to be open to new
information and new perspectives, including those provided by people we care about
and trust. In this way children can develop autonomy as they learn to identify the
factors that increase it. This includes the ability to learn about what one really does
care most about, and acquisition of information about the contexts that make it more or
less difficult to ensure that ones choices and activities reflect ones commitments and
what one finds intrinsically rewarding. At the same time, children could realize, by
seeing their parents continuing to struggle and to learn, that maintenance of or increases
in autonomy is a lifelong project.
Autonomy supporting parental strategies are not appropriate to all circumstances, as they
typically require time to be effective, and may need to be supplemented by other forms of
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 419

control in circumstances where the parents need to act quickly to prevent serious and lasting
harm to a child, or have compelling competing calls upon their time and attention.6
However, many studies, based variously on clinical observation of interactions between
parents and children, on self-reports of parents and children, and behavioral assessment of
children by other adults, suggest that when parents are able to act in ways that are autonomy
supporting, including with children as young as two, outcomes are very positive (Joussemet
et al. 2008). These positive outcomes are not limited to development of autonomy, but also
include more rewarding social interactions and better performance at school.
In addition to autonomy support (as a style of parental guidance of a childs activities), we
know that emotionally close relationships to which both partners contribute are important to
the development of autonomy, in part by increasing childrens tendency to find the goals of
those in their community to be personally meaningful. While internalizing the goals of those
we care about might seem to be an instance of heteronomy, the ability to find goals
personally meaningful is crucial to the capacity for autonomy, and is to be contrasted with
behaving in ways that feel externally controlled by others. Moreover, as I have argued
elsewhere, close relationships with parents are often important to young children and are one
important source of the volitional stability so necessary for development of autonomy as
children often care about their parents, value the relationship, and aim to do things to make
their loved ones happy (2007).

5 Factors Relevant to the Justification of Paternalism

Now that I have explained what I mean by autonomy and discussed research about its
support and development, I can focus on features relevant to determining whether an
instance of intervention with a childs activity, based on a claim that the intervention serves
the childs interests, can be justified. In order for a putative case of parents paternalism to be
justified, the parent must be acting on the basis of a well-informed judgment that the child is
not able to decide for herself, in a given instance, how to pursue her own good or a well-
informed judgment that the child is unable to pursue her own good, once determined.
However, other features of the situation need to be considered.
The chief factors relevant to justifying paternalism towards children are: (a) the
intervention must be reasonably aimed at the childs own good and the child must lack
the ability to make a good decision about the matter at hand. This could be because of
lack of understanding about the impact of ones actions and choices, inability to guide
actions to conform with goals, or because the child has formed goals that can reasonably
predicted to conflict with his or her long term interests. (b) The intervention should
respect the capacities the child does have. (c) The intervention should recognize the
deficits the adult might have. (d) Finally, the intervention should not hamper the
development of autonomy, unless justified by a larger good connected to the childs
well being. Many such larger goods, such as preservation of the childs life and basic
capacities, are themselves necessary for the development of autonomy, and hence will
not require paternalistic actors to assess the relative contributions that different factors,
including autonomy, play in enabling well-being.

6
Parents may observe that a child is willing to risk some pain, damage or loss, in pursuit of a goal, and may
choose not to intervene if they believe the harm will not be long-lasting and the child seems well-informed
about the risks and rewards involved.
420 A. Mullin

5.1 The Aims of the Intervention

If interference with a childs activities is to be a justified instance of paternalism, the

parents intervention must be aimed at the childs own good as opposed to being
undertaken to protect other children from the childs intended hurtful course of action,
or to promote the adults interests where they conflict with the plans of the child.
However, even when an intervention is based on views about the best interests of the
child, the parent may be wrong about features of the situation or mistaken about what
will advance the childs interests. In either such case, the childs welfare may not be likely to be
improved.
For instance, a parent may think a play date she has arranged, over the childs protests,
will help develop social skills and lead to development of a friendship whereas the child may
know the invited guest to be a bully or someone with whom he has no significant common
interests. Or a parent may have idiosyncratic and mistaken views about what will serve the
childs interests. This could be because the parent is inaccurate in his appreciation of the
characteristics of the child, for instance if the parent misjudges the extent to which the child
differs from him (and so is not interested in the kinds of activities the parent finds
rewarding). Alternatively, this could be because the parents views about what will make a
childs future life satisfying are not realistic or are overly influenced by views that are not
widely shared by others and not likely to be applicable as the child matures. I will discuss
these kinds of mistaken beliefs and judgments in my remarks, below, about the need for
parents to recognize their own potential for error or areas of incapacity.
When a child does not understand the ramifications of her choices or actions, it is easier to
justify paternalism than when a child is well informed and understands the range of
outcomes that may follow. Similarly, it is easier to justify intervening in the choices and
activities of adults who do not have an accurate understanding of the context in which they
are acting. Hence there are more advocates of soft paternalism that seeks to change
behavior without directly removing choices (Glaeser 2006), than hard paternalism, that
accepts a broader range of reasons to interfere with the will of others, including when those
others are acting in an informed and voluntary manner. While hard and soft paternalism are
typically used to refer to forms of government intervention with peoples choices (Dworkin
2010), we can see that interventions by individuals in the private affairs of others are
similarly easier to justify when that interference concentrates on ensuring that behavior is
voluntary and informed, or when the interference still makes it easy for the intervened to
pursue their self-defined goals.
It is interesting to observe the far greater respect we typically offer to the choices of
imprudent adults than to childrens similarly imprudent choices, presumably because we feel
we owe children protection from themselves and a chance to become adults who may then
act more or less prudently. Therefore we may reasonably stop a child who has had several
concussions from playing a sport he loves in order to protect his ability to function with his
full cognitive capacity in the future. Although many children find it hard to appreciate the
long-term significance of some of their choices, so too, do some adults. However, with
children a failure to take their own futures seriously is often bound up with various failures
in understanding what different futures might be like, something remedied by the greater life
experience of even imprudent adults. Moreover, young children are almost always in the
care of one or several people who are supposed to have significant responsibility for their
care and development, and who have intimate knowledge of the childrens capacities and
interests. This may be an important pragmatic reason why there are stronger social expec-
tations that children will be protected from their imprudent choices (even when those choices
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 421

reflect an understanding of their situation, a goal they stably have, and the ability to exercise
self-control) than similarly imprudent adults. This suggests that when adults mutually
take themselves to have significant responsibility for the well-being of other adults with
whom they are in close relationships, they might also have an expected and acceptable
role to play in protecting their fellow adults from imprudent choices. Much would
depend, of course, on the mutuality of the understanding of the responsibilities on the
part of the various adults involved, and whether interventions were in keeping with overall
support for autonomy.

5.2 Appreciating Childrens Capacities and Showing Respect for Children

On my view even young children have some arenas of action where they have autonomy.
Any such arena must be one where a child has volitional stability, understands the
relevant options and their consequences, and is able to exercise self-control in support
of his or her goals. If, in addition, the childs goal does not significantly threaten her
future interests then, out of respect for present autonomy, parents should treat childrens
voices as more than merely consultative. This contrasts with Harry Brighouses view
(2003) that we should listen to children only in order to learn more about their welfare
and/or give them opportunities to make decisions to develop their future autonomy.
Children may be able to make informed decisions about what and with whom to play,
how to celebrate milestones and achievements, and how to pursue some of their
ambitions. They may be able to direct their behavior to realize those goals. In such
cases we should recognize their decisions and associated actions as important sources of
present autonomy not only an opportunity to develop future autonomy - and interfere
only when they risk considerable harm.
Parents who support autonomy will use experience of their children in particular
circumstances to guide decisions about when to intervene, rather than assumptions about
what children in general are able to do and to appreciate. Autonomy supporting parents
will typically make tradeoffs between what might maximize a childs satisfaction in a
given situation versus what the child finds meaningful (and provides opportunities to
learn from mistakes) in circumstances that do not involve very significant ongoing costs
to the child.
Where children are unable to appreciate all the factors relevant to making a good
decision, but have goals that matter to them, adults who need to override childrens choices
should strive to do so in a manner that still shows respect to them and recognizes the value of
having autonomous goals. A certain kind of respect for children is shown when interventions
are paternalistic. Since those interventions are driven by concern for childrens well-being,
children are treated as having direct moral statustheir well-being is taken as worthy of
directing action. When interventions are driven, furthermore, by close observation of the
nature of a given child, we may also say they demonstrate what Robin Dillon terms care-
respect, or a cherishing of the particular nature of the child in a context of valuing his or her
well being (2010). Paternalistic interventions fail to show care-respect when they do not
flow from an appropriate appreciation of the features of the child in question, including
attention to what matters to the child and what she or he is capable of doing to realize his or
her goals. However, failure to intervene paternalistically could also lack care-respect by
failing to appreciate areas in which a child is not capable of recognizing or advancing
his or her own goals.
To show respect for their children in paternalistic interventions, parents must strive to
recognize the knowledge and capacities that a child has, and the childs own goalswhen
422 A. Mullin

the situation is not a crisis and therefore permits time for an exchange of views. This is
consistent with arguments about showing respect for patients in cases of paternalism by
medical practitioners. McCullough and Wear argue that autonomy is respected if a persons
most important commitments are respected and if situations that permit ongoing opportuni-
ties for choice (such as chronic care) are recognized as allowing more opportunity to engage
with the person and respect their values than situations of crisis (1985). When a child is
capable of understanding an explanation and there is time to give it, parents should strive to
explain reasons for rejecting the means the child has chosen to achieve her goals, or the
factors the child has failed to consider in choosing means or goals. Sometime an explanation
must come after the intervention, for reasons relating to safety, but at other times we may
avoid the need for paternalistic intervention by engaging in dialogue, coming to understand
the childs perspective, and explaining that of the adult.
This corresponds to soft paternalism in ensuring that the childs decision is informed and
voluntary. For example, a child may want to stay up late to continue engaging in a favourite
activity (playing a game, reading a book, visiting with company) that the adult recognizes as
important to the child and either valuable or unproblematic. However, the child may need
reminding of a tendency to become overexcited and irritable when tired, and parent and child
may be able to come to an agreement about bedtime that might reflect how unusual the
opportunity to engage in the desired activity is, and how many demands are unavoidable
early the next morning. Even though negotiation with a child may eventually lead to a parent
having to thwart the childs will (sometimes not for paternalistic reasons but because of the
impact on others), discussion about goals, outcomes, and the costs and benefits of an activity
are more conducive to respecting and/or developing a childs ability to act in ways that are
guided by goals she endorses than treating a child who is capable of such a dialogue with
less respect by using distraction or lies.
When, by contrast, a child is overly impulsive and unable to practice self-control in the
service of her goals, then tactics that do not involve attempts to understand and explain may
not reflect a lack of respect. Tactics like distraction could then be appropriate ways to
encourage a child to veer away from behavior that threatens her well-being or development
of knowledge and skills. Parents can support autonomy in this context by enlisting a child in
the project of improving her self-control (for instance working together to calm the child
down). Later, parents can support autonomy by helping the child understand when her
emotional responses reveal what she cares about, as opposed to reflecting merely feeling
overwhelmed, and by helping her imagine different possible ways of pursuing her goals.
Giving a child opportunities to pursue goals that may reasonably be attained may also
support autonomy by developing a childs confidence in her ability to achieve goals she
values, and helping a child learn about her options and their likely consequences will clearly
support autonomy.
In this section I have been suggesting that respect is key to justification of a paternalistic
intervention. It matters whether the intervention can be seen to flow from respect for the
child. We may respect particular individuals for different reasons, and respect is a complex
concept, even when we concentrate only on respect for other people. As Dillon has argued,
there are some key overlapping strands to respect for persons, including the importance of
paying appropriate attention to the person who is respected, and giving proper weight to
their moral claims (2010). If we treat children as morally important only because their
welfare has intrinsic value, and override their attempts to pursue goals driven by what
matters to them, then we fail to fully respect them and their autonomy. However, if we
disregard the features that threaten their ability to recognize what matters to them, or to
pursue their goals, we also fail to respect them.
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 423

5.3 Parents Recognition of Their Own Areas of Weakness

When we focus on paternalistic interventions, we typically focus on whether the intervened

has or lacks relevant information about his or her situation, and has or lacks the ability to
pursue goals and appreciate how his or her interests may be affected by courses of
action. When we focus on paternalistic interventions by parents with the liberty of their
young children, it is easy to assume that the parents will be not only better judges than
their children but also good and accurate judges. However, it is important to consider
whether even generally competent adults should, when time permits, be expected to
listen to others views, including the views of the child in question, about the likeli-
hood of significant harm (or much lesser good) coming to the child in the absence of
intervention. Does the justification for paternalism sometimes require broad social
consensus as to the interests of children or consultation with concerned parties as to the interests
of the child at issue?
If interventions are to be justified, then parents need to become aware of the ways in
which their assessments of their childrens interests may err, including errors about how
children develop or mistakes about the opportunities available to the child. Parents can also
over-identify with their children, and so confuse what would serve the parents interests and
what would serve the childs.
Knowledge about cognitive errors made generally (rather than only specifically in
relation to ones children) can also help parents become aware of possible errors in
their determinations of the best interests of their children. For instance, awareness of
the power of cognitive dissonance, and our tendency to reduce dissonance between our
actions and our beliefs, or amidst our beliefs, may prove helpful (Tavris and Aronson
2007). Parents need to beware the tendency, for example, to attempt to justify past
decisions by continuing courses of behavior they would otherwise discontinue, when
given reasons to desist. While literature about cognitive errors is typically used to
justify paternalism on the part of the state,7 this literature is relevant to generating
reasons for hesitance on the part of those who propose to intervene paternalistically in
the actions and choices of children. Parents need to be aware that cognitive biases may
undermine their justifications for paternalism just as policy makers must recall that
government decision-making may be subject to cognitive biases (Glaeser 2006).
While parents do not have time to second guess themselves every time they are inclined
to intervene paternalistically in the lives of their children, awareness of their own specific
tendencies to err, of common mistakes made by parents, and of general tendencies to make
cognitive errors, could give reason to pause before intervening in matters that are very
important to their children. This is especially relevant when parents views about what is in
childrens interests are generally at odds with those around them. Awareness of the human
tendency to notice and agree with views that confirm our own (See Tavris and Aronson
for a discussion of confirmation bias) suggests that parents have reason to listen to
disparate views and at least consider whether they have merit, especially when those
views come from their children.
This is not to say that parents should aim for maximally open futures for their children, or
seek to minimize the influence their practices and values have upon those children, particularly

7
See, for instance, arguments for asymmetric paternalism (interventions that can create large benefits for
those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational) in Camerer et al.
2003, 1212.
424 A. Mullin

while they are young and still in their care.8 Children must have goals that matter stably to them
if they are to act autonomously and often those goals will reflect what they see mattering to the
people they care about. If they are to develop self-control they must have close relationships
with their caregivers. Mutuality and intimacy would be compromised by the absence of shared
attitudes and values with respect to many (though not necessarily all) important elements of
family life. Instead, parents who wish their children to be able to guide their activities to cohere
with what the children care about, at least some of the time, should be open to recognizing
capacities and strengths in their children with respect to autonomous action and weaknesses and
errors in themselves. This openness should increase a tendency to behave in manners known to
support autonomy while decreasing a tendency to behave in manners known to undermine it.

5.4 Avoiding Undermining Autonomy

Nonetheless, parents may sometimes need to rely on the types of external control that
conflict with autonomous motivation when a child simply cannot see or believe in the
connection between activities the parent knows she needs to engage in and outcomes that the
child can recognize as having some value. So, for instance, a parent may explain that she
recognizes that learning to read is very hard and that before the child is able to do so well
enough, she may not enjoy attempts at mastering the ability. The parent may offer an
external reward (money to spend on a hobby, or the ability to play a favourite game with
the parent) for practice at reading, while also explaining that the parent expects the child will
come eventually both to enjoy reading and understand that it is an important life skill
necessary to acquire many different types of knowledge the child will later want to acquire.
Even though we know that external rewards tend to undermine acquisition of autonomous
motivation (Deci et al. 1999), they may have a role to play when the tasks involved
in acquiring skills and knowledge are so arduous or unpleasant that it is difficult for a
child to persevere.
We also know that frequent reliance on physical control and psychological control
(making threats, invoking guilt, and withdrawing love) can undermine childrens develop-
ment of autonomy, as does behavior that makes children feel they lack the capacities to
realize their goals. Parents should therefore aim at childrens development of realistic self-
confidence, accurate self-assessment, and faith in their increasing ability to make strides
towards achieving their goals over time.
However, some social contexts can make it more difficult for parents to avoid
undermining development of autonomy, including contexts where the parents are themselves
judged on their ability to closely control their children (Joussemet et al. 197) and situations
that present considerable threat to childrens safety and well-being (Gurland and Grolnick
2005). When the context in which parenting takes place requires a great deal of paternalistic
intervention simply in order to keep children safe, then it will be difficult to support
autonomy and easy to undermine it. Children in such contexts will learn that they cannot
trust themselves to act reasonably in many situations but must rely regularly upon their
parents if they are to stay safe. Therefore there are additional reasons (beyond concern for
childrens welfare or for justice) for all who value childrens development of autonomy to

8
Lotz 2006 discusses what is meant by an open future. She argues we should encourage children to learn
about other options and should expose them to other ways of life. This position can be strengthened by
showing how childrens autonomy requires these kinds of practices. My arguments about reasons for parents
to recognize their weaknesses and errors, and the need for children to acquire relevant information and
develop imaginative skills give reasons for parents to listen to other views about what serves childrens
interests, and to be responsive to childrens interests in other ways of life.
Children, Paternalism and the Development of Autonomy 425

work to improve the conditions in which some parents must raise their children. In addition,
there are reasons to refrain from conveying harsh judgments about parents ability to control
their children, so long as the children are behaving in a manner that threatens neither
themselves nor others.

6 Conclusion

In conclusion, I have offered an account of autonomy that suggests why parents in a variety
of cultural contexts value it and hope to have their children develop it. This is because many
parents hope their children will find their activities meaningful rather than feeling indifferent
between options, or pressured to act in ways that do not connect to goals they care about.
This account also allows us to learn from psychological research (especially but not
exclusively self-determination theory) about ways in which parental interactions with their
children can hinder or support autonomy. This understanding of autonomy and what is
required to support it, in turn, helps us understand when parents paternalism towards their
children is justified and the features of those interventions that are important to determining
when it is. These features include clear assessments of the aims of interventions, accurate
assessments of childrens capacities, respect for them, and recognition of areas of weakness
and incapacity in parents judgments.9

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