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RECENT CASES IN LEGAL ETHICS

Lawyers Oath

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolids finding that respondent violated the lawyers oath which
he took before admission to the Bar, which states:
I, ___________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Ecraela vs.
Pangalangan, 769 SCRA 361, A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015)

Practice of Law is a privilege.

It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a privilege laden with conditions, and granted
only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers as
instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. As officers of the courts and keepers
of the publics faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and so
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency but also this high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. ( Cobalt Resources, Inc. vs. Aguado, 789 SCRA 121, A.C. No. 10781 April 12, 2016)

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but
must also be retained in order to maintain ones good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
(Ecraela vs. Pangalangan, 769 SCRA 361, A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015)

Negligence of a lawyer

It is beyond debate that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and
confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being
bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care
and devotion. To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always
mindful of the formers cause and to be diligent in handling the formers legal affairs. As an essential
part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the
lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. (Ramiscal vs. Orro, 784 SCRA 421, A.C.
No. 10945 February 23, 2016)

Conflict of interests

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing
parties.The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in Hornilla v. Salunat,
405 SCRA 220 (2003): There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistentinterests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyers duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one
client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not
only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
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or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Vasco-Tamaray vs. Daquis, 782 SCRA 44, A.C. No. 10868
January 26, 2016)

Attorneys fee distinguished from acceptance fee

There is a distinction between attorneys fee and acceptance fee. It is well-settled that attorneys fee is
understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its ordinary sense, attorneys fee refers to
the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its
extraordinary concept, attorneys fee is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the
losing party as indemnity for damages. On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed
by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a
client, he is precluded from handling cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of
interest. Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the client which is
therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to
compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal
services rendered. (Yu vs. Dela Cruz, 781 SCRA 188, A.C. No. 10912 January 19, 2016)

On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the
case. This is because once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling cases of
the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest. Thus, he incurs an opportunity cost
by merely accepting the case of the client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance
fee. Since the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost opportunity, it is not
measured by the nature and extent of the legal services rendered. (Dalupan vs. Gacott, 760 SCRA 386,
A.C. No. 5067. June 29, 2015)

Attorneys fee: ordinary concept and extraordinary concept

It is well-settled that attorneys fee is understood both in its ordinary and extraordinary concept. In its
ordinary sense, attorneys fee refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for
legal services rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorneys fee is awarded by the court
to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages. In the present case,
the Investigating Commissioner referred to the attorneys fee in its ordinary concept. (Dalupan vs.
Gacott, 760 SCRA 386, A.C. No. 5067. June 29, 2015)

Purpose of disbarment

In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
the respondents administrative liability. xxxx (Sison, Jr. vs. Camacho, 779 SCRA 142, A.C. No. 10910
January 12, 2016)

Ground for disbarment; good moral character, a continuing requirement

This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not
only failed to retain good moral character in their professional and personal lives, but have also made a
mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when
the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his philandering ways was proven by preponderant
evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit. We ruled: As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member of the bar and an officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a mistress but must also
so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is flouting those
moral standards. x x x x
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The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would
not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit
unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza,
[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad
enough to cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. To reiterate,
possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig, the Court disbarred
respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting
to various legal strategies to render a faade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the
existence of his first marriage. We said: The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. (Ecraela
vs. Pangalangan, 769 SCRA 361, A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015)

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03A lawyer shall
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Respondent
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the Bar. He made
a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. (Bunagan-Bansig vs.
Celera, 713 SCRA 158, A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014)

Ground for disbarment; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment
of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondents
conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a
crime that involves moral turpitude.

To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. *It must involve+ an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney. The Court is mindful that a lawyers
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the
supreme penalty of disbarment since it may, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe penalty
of suspension. As held, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Here, however, the
circumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as
recommended by the OBC. (Re: Decision dated 17 March 2011 in Criminal Case No. SB-28361 entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Joselito C. Barrozo., 763 SCRA 243, A.C. No. 10207 July 21, 2015)

Duty to account for the clients money

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Money entrusted
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to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A
lawyers failure, to return upon demand, the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him
by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs
public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. (Sison, Jr. vs. Camacho, 779 SCRA
142, A.C. No. 10910 January 12, 2016)

Disbarment may still be imposed upon a disbarred lawyer for records purposes

We note that in CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres, 736 SCRA 1 (2014), the Court had
already disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In view of the
foregoing, we can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or disbarment against Atty. Torres,
considering that he has already been previously disbarred. We do not have double or multiple
disbarments in our laws or jurisprudence. Nevertheless, considering that the issues and the infraction
committed are different from his previous infraction, we deem it proper to resolve the instant case and
give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in respondents personal file in the Bar
Confidants Office. (Sanchez vs. Torres, 741 SCRA 620, A.C. No. 10240 November 25, 2014)

Quantum of proof in administrative cases against lawyers; presumption of innocence

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against
lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent. (Ecraela vs.
Pangalangan, 769 SCRA 361, A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015)

Violation of MCLE Rule (Bar Matter 850)

Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law. Xxxx

Respondents failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the directives of the MCLE
Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing
of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the Court from using its
administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of
Governors to declare such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months. We agree. In
addition, his listing as a delinquent member of the IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be
permitted to practice law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement,
under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare
respondent as a delinquent member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third,
and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required noncompliance
and reinstatement fees. (Arnado vs. Atty. Homobono Adaza, 768 SCRA 172, A.C. No. 9834 August 26,
2015)

Guidelines in lifting an order of suspension

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed
in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
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1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the
Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement
with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has
desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or
her suspension;

4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her,
and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order
of suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
(Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010)

The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued the guidelines
on the lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the
Court will not hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that
respondent, as an officer of the Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his
clients and of the public.

In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly
suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 years.
Accordingly, respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to
the Courts resolution in A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B.
Adiong, where the Court clearly stated that in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall
be served successively by the erring respondent. It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent
to show to the Court that he has desisted from the practice of law for a period of at least 2
years.

Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondents Petition
for Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting
to the fact:

1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him successively;

2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in any court
during the periods of suspension, as follows:

(a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to November 13, 2005;
(b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18, 2008;
(c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to May 12, 2005; and
(d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the Resolution dated
March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated July 27, 2006.

3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the Court in the
following cases, attaching proofs thereof:
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(a) In A.C. No. 5835 the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum from the date of
promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been returned; and
(b) In A.C. No. 6441 the amount of P30,000.

Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago.

Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the Respondent under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
(Carlos Reyes, et al. v. Atty. Jeremias Vitan, A.C. No. 5835, No. 6051, No. 6441, No. 6955, August
10, 2010)

Reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only
as a matter of justice.

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement.

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 (2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall
include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for
the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient
time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The age of the
person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to
good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development
of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5.
There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004, respondents
present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first guideline
above. The principle which should hold true not only for judges but also for lawyers, being officers of the
court, is that judicial *c+lemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced
with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a
showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable.
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More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondents disbarment was his
fraudulent acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was presented to
show that he had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for his
previous faults. The dismissal of the criminal complaint against him for estafa Through Falsification of
Public Documents, filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the same was based on lack of
probable cause. Likewise, its dismissal, could not prove that he was actually innocent of the
administrative charges against him, since the parameters and considerations of an administrative case
are evidently different from that in a criminal case. As in this case, the lack of probable cause against
respondent as found by the prosecutor does not negate his administrative liability already adjudged by
this Court. That the prosecutor found that respondent merely rendered legal services to the Ting
siblings does not mean that he rendered the same in accordance with the lawyers oath and ethical
canons.

While the Court sympathizes with the predicaments of disbarred lawyers may it be financial or
reputational in cause it stands firm in its commitment to the public to preserve the integrity and
esteem of the Bar. As held in a previous case, in considering *a lawyers+ application for reinstatement
to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral
reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Ultimately, with the above
discussed guidelines not complied with, the Court has to be objective and, therefore, denies the
petition. (Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a Member of the
Philippine Bar, 768 SCRA 149, A.C. No. 5161 August 25, 2015)

Violation of Notarial Rule

Time and again, we have held that notarization of a document is not an empty act or routine. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus, making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. For this reason, notaries public must observe with the utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.

It must be emphasized anew that where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial act without such commission is a
violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making
it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging
in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely
within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By acting as a notary
public without the proper commission to do so, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code,
which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. All told,
Atty. Solbita cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of
the Philippine Bar. By his unauthorized notarization, he clearly fell miserably short of his obligation
under Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. (Gacuya vs. Solbita, 785 SCRA 590, A.C. No. 8840
March 8, 2016)