GAVINO CORPUZ vs.

Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPE

G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000

Facts:

Petitioner Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer

(OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and was issued a

Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land, formerly owned

and registered under a certain Florentino Chioco.

To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land in favor

of Virginia de Leon. Upon expiration, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria

Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for four years as guarantee for the loan. The parties

executed a contract which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during

the duration of the mortgage.

Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with DARAB. He alleged

that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation and destroyed the

palay he planted on the land. In the respondent's Answer, she claimed that the contract

allowed her to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter

paid his loan.

Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed a "Waiver of Rights" over the

landholding in favor of respondents. Petitioner denied alleging that the signatures on the

Waiver were forged.

Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled that petitioner abandoned and

surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya recommending the

reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified

farmer[s]-beneficiaries." The appellate court affirmed decision, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Did the petitioner abandon or voluntarily surrendered his rights as a beneficiary under

PD 27?

HELD:

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Supreme Court DENIED instant petition and the assailed Decision and Resolution was

AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioners appeal. The sale, transfer or conveyance

of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian

reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these

rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally

permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said

land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the

property, validly awarded it to private respondents.

VERDE vs. MACAPAGAL

G.R. No. 151342; June 23, 2005

NATURE OF THE CASE: Petitioner brought this case before the Court via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whereas the proper remedy for him was to file an appeal
from the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 since the issue raised deals purely with
a question of law. Nevertheless, as the subject petition was filed within the prescribed fifteen-day
period, and in view of the substantial issue raised therein, the Court gave due course to the same and
treated it as a petition for review on certiorari.

FACTS:

1. Macapagal and Estrella were the owners of 2.5 hectares of agricultural land, subject of this dispute,
situated in Bulacan. After their demise, said piece of land passed on to their children (respondents
herein) who are now the pro-indiviso owners of the same. On the other hand, petitioner is the leasehold
tenant of the subject land having succeeded his father, Francisco Verde, in the tenancy thereof.

2. Respondents initiated an action for ejectment against petitioner before the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board in Bulacan. Respondents alleged in their complaint that sometime in 1993,
without their knowledge and consent, petitioner mortgaged the subject land to dela Cruz upon the
condition that the latter would be the one to work on 1/2 of said property. When confronted regarding
this matter, petitioner not only admitted that he had, indeed, mortgaged the subject land to dela Cruz
but also asked for forgiveness from respondents and assured the latter that he would pay them the
agreed amount of rental. In addition, petitioner purportedly guaranteed that he would redeem the
mortgage immediately after the 1993 planting season and would never mortgage the property again.
Apparently, petitioner failed to fulfill his promise to respondents as dela Cruz still farmed the subject
land in 1994. Respondents went on to argue that petitioners mortgaging the property to dela Cruz
constituted abandonment which is a ground for termination of agricultural leasehold relation under
Section 8, Republic Act No. 3844, as amended.

3. Respondent then brought the matter before the BARC of Bulacan for conciliation. However,
proceedings before the BARC were ineffective as the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Attached to the complaint was the joint sworn statement executed by Sanciangco and Cruz who
declared that in 1993, de la Cruz was the one who attended to of the subject land by virtue of the
contract of mortgage between him and petitioner and that de la Cruz was still the one who cultivated
the subject land in 1994.

4. Petitioner filed his Anwer denying the material allegations of the complaint and claimed that he only
hired the services of de la Cruz and the latters carabao because from 1993-1994, he did not have the
means to own a beast of burden. He also stated that from 1975 up to the filing of this action, he
continues to occupy, possess and cultivate the subject land as a bona fide tenant. However, Dela Cruz
maintained that in 1993 to 1994, he was hired to work on the land tenanted by petitioner because
during those years, the latter did not have a carabao. For their part, Sayco and Cruz alleged that ever
since the tenancy over the subject land was transferred to petitioner by the death of his father, he had
continuously farmed and possessed said property.

DARAB Ruling: After filing a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Provincial Adjudicator,
respondents then filed an appeal before the DARAB, which affirmed the earlier ruling of the Provincial
Adjudicator that petitioner did not give up actually and absolutely his tenancy right over the subject land
as the complaint itself stated that petitioner was supposed to cultivate the property during the 1993-
1994 agricultural seasons and that the alleged mortgage must not be mistaken from personal loan, the
latter referring to borrowed money where defendant then was in dire need of financial help.

CA Ruling: Respondents filed an Appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the decision assailed, the appellate
court reversed and set aside the decision of the DARAB. According to CA, Section 24 of Rep. Act No.
1199 prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land subject
of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that there should be personal cultivation by
the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the family of the lessee or other persons
who are dependent upon him for support or who usually help him in his activities. In the present case,
as dela Cruz is clearly not a member of petitioners immediate farm household nor did he depend upon
petitioner for support or helps the latter in operating the farm enterprise, the requirement of personal
cultivation is obviously lacking.

Hence, the recourse was raised by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON because of the hiring by the petitioner of Dela Cruzs services and that of his carabao, the
agricultural lease relationship between the parties in this case ceased to exist.

Case for Petitioner: Petitioner argues that (a)being a bona fide tenant of the subject land, he is entitled
to security of tenure such that he cannot be dispossessed of the land he had been tilling for around
twenty years on the basis of mere conjecture and hypothesis; (2) that the CA erred in reliance on the
joint sworn statement of Sayco and Cruz; (3) that dela Cruzs own affidavit sufficiently refuted the
allegations of the said joint sworn statement; (4) that as dela Cruz was supposedly a party to the alleged
contract of mortgage, the appellate court should have given credit to his affidavit instead of depending
on the statements of Sanciangco and Cruz; (5) that an agreement involving mortgage of real rights of a
leasehold tenant must be reduced into writing pursuant to the statute of frauds, otherwise, said
agreement cannot bind third parties; (6) that respondents were not able to substantiate their claim that
he had abandoned the subject land more so since he continues to till the same; and (7) that under RA
No. 3844, the agricultural lessee is required to notify the agricultural lessor of his intention to abandon
the leaseholding; wherein this case, he claims that said notification is lacking.

Case for Private Respondent: Respondents contend that Petitioners intent to abandon the subject
property was manifested when he mortgaged the landholding to dela Cruz and allowed the latter to till
said property from 1993 up to 1994 in contravention of Rep. Act No. 1199 which limits personal
cultivation of a tenanted land to the tenant himself and to his immediate household. Also, respondents
argue that Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, requires the agricultural lessee to provide the agricultural
lessor with a notice only in case of voluntary abandonment. However, as this case involves involuntary
abandonment, the prescribed notice under the law does not apply.

SC RULING with RATIO: NO. Under Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 1199, a tenant is required to perform the
following tasks: (1)The preparation of the seedbed which shall include plowing, harrowing, and watering
of the seedbed, the scattering of seeds, and the care of the seedlings; (2) The plowing, harrowing, and
watering of the area he is cultivating, except final harrowing of the field as an item of contribution
specified in Section thirty-two of this Act; (3) The maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies,
and irrigation canals in his holdings; (4) The pulling and bundling of the seedlings preparatory to their
transplanting; (5) Care of the growing plants; (6) Gathering and bundling of the reaped harvest; (7) The
piling of the bundles into small stacks; (8)The preparation of the place where the harvest is to be
stacked; (9) Gathering of the small stacks and their transportation to the place where they are to be
stacked; and (10)Piling into a big stack preparatory to threshing. As can be gleaned from the foregoing,
the use of a carabao, for which petitioner hired the services of dela Cruz, is only one phase of farm
labor which is supposed to be rendered by a tenant. Cultivation does not refer solely to the plowing
and harrowing of the land. The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs farm
laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship provided an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in
the hands of hired helpers. Section 27(2) of Rep. Act No. 3844 permits the agricultural lessee, in case of
illness or temporary incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers, incapacity being any cause or
circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling his contractual and other obligations under the
Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2001 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the DARAB dated 30 October 2000 is REINSTATED.
No costs.
Embassy Farms v. CA
Facts:
Alexander G. Asuncion (AGA for short) and Eduardo B. Evangelista (EBE for short) entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement. EBE obligated himself to transfer to AGA 19 parcels of
agricultural land in Bulacan registered in his name, together with the stocks, equipment and
facilities of a piggery farm owned by Embassy Farms, Inc., a registered corporation wherein
ninety (90) per cent of its shares of stock is owned by EBE. EBE also obligated himself to cede,
transfer and convey "in a manner absolute and irrevocable any and all of his shares of stocks" in
Embassy Farms Inc. to AGA or his nominees (to constitute 90% of the paidinequity of said
corporation). EBE also obligated to turnover to AGA the effective control and management of the
piggery upon the signing of the agreement.
On the other hand, AGA obligated himself, upon signing of the agreement to pay to EBE the total
sum of close to P8,630,000.00. AGA obligated himself to organize and register a new corporation
with an authorized capital stock of P10,000.000.00 which upon registration will take over all the
rights and liabilities of AGA.
Pursuant to the MOA, EBE turned over to AGA the effective control and management of the
piggery at Embassy Farms. EBE served as President and Chief Executive of the Embassy Farms.
EBE also endorsed in blank all his shares of stock including that of his wife and three nominees
with minor holdings in Embassy Farms Inc. However, despite the indorsement, EBE retained
possession of said shares and opted to deliver to AGA only upon full compliance of the latter of
his obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement.
Notwithstanding the nondelivery of the shares of stocks, in a Deed of Transfer of Shares of Stock,
AGA transferred a total of 8,602 shares to several persons. For failure to comply with his
obligations, EBE intimated the institution of appropriate legal action. AGA preempted EBE by
filing an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages alleging among
others, EBE's misrepresentation on the piggery business since said business is actually losing and
EBE's failure to execute the deeds of conveyance.
Pasig Court granted a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the plaintiff, his nominees,
agents, security guards, employees and all persons claiming under him: from disposing of in any
manner removing and carrying away the stocks including rights sucklings, equipment and other
facilities in Embassy Farms; from harrassing defendant and his employees and associates; and
preventing defendant, assisted by his said employees and associates from discharging, performing
and exercising his duties, prerogatives as director, president and chief executive of Embassy
Farms, Inc. until further orders from this Court subject to defendant's filing a bond with this Court
in the amount of P1,750,000.00
Pasig Court on EBE's motion issued an order to break open the premises of Embassy Farms to
enforce the writ of preliminary injunction. Embassy Farms, Inc. filed a petition with the Court of
Appeals for prohibition with preliminary injunction. Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals
enjoined the enforcement of the Pasig Court's order. Embassy Farms Incorporated instituted an
action for Injunction with damages against EBE and alleged that EBE forced his way inside the
Embassy Farms and while inside took some cash and check
Upon a motion to dismiss filed by EBE, the Malolos Court issued an order which denied MTD
for lack of merit, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining defendant, his agent
and/or any person; claiming right under him to refrain or desist from interfering in the
management and operation of Embassy Farms until further orders from this Court, subject to
plaintiff's filing of a bond executed in favor of defendant conditioned for the payment of all
damages which the latter may sustain by reason of this injunction and in case said defendant is
adjudged entitled thereto.
EBE filed a motion for the reconsideration. Without awaiting the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration, EBE filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with preliminary injunction
with the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals issued a consolidated resolution sustaining the order.
It noted that EBE has not delivered the certificate of stock outstanding in his name in the books of
the corporation to AGA because the latter allegedly has not complied with the terms and
conditions of the memorandum of agreement; that there had been no delivery of the certificate in
order to produce or effect the transfer of such shares of stock.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court committed a reversible error when it sustained the order
dated of the Pasig Court and lifted the restraining order it had issued.
Petitioner contended that the Pasig Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide EBE's
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 53335 because
the ouster of EBE and his reinstatement as President and Chief Executive Officer of Embassy
Farms is an intracorporate matter within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Petitioner also claimed that the Pasig Court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Embassy Farms because it was not made a party in the Civil Case. Neither
could the orders of the Pasig Court be enforced at Loma de Gato, Marilao, Bulacan, the
principal office of the corporation, because it is located outside of the National Capital Judicial
Region. It likewise claimed that the writ of preliminary injunction issued in Civil Case No. 53335
was irregularly issued because it was issued one day ahead of the injunction bond.
Ratio:
We do not agree with the petitioner.
The case at bar is merely an offshoot of a controversy yet to be decided on the merits by the Pasig
Court. The action for rescission filed by AGA in Civil Case No. 53335 now pending before the
Pasig Court will ultimately settle the controversy as to whether it is AGA or EBE or both parties
who have reneged on their obligations under the memorandum of agreement. We do not want to
preempt the Pasig Court on the main case.
It is clear from the pleadings that although EBE has indorsed in blank the shares outstanding in
his name, he has not delivered the certificate of stocks to AGA because the latter has not fully
complied with his obligations under the memorandum of agreement. There being no delivery of
the indorsed shares of stock AGA cannot therefore effectively transfer to other person or his
nominees the undelivered shares of stock. For an effective transfer of shares of stock the mode
and manner of transfer as prescribed by law must be followed..
Corporation Code of the Philippines, shares of stock may be transferred by delivery to the
transferree of the certificate properly indorsed. Title may be vested in the transferree by the
delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. However, no transfer shall be valid, except as
between the parties until the transfer is properly recorded in the books of the corporation
When AGA filed on April 10,1986 an action for the rescission of contracts with damages the
Pasig Court merely restored and established the status quo prior to the execution of the
memorandum of agreement by the issuance of a restraining order on July 10, 1987 and the writ of
preliminary injunction on July 30, 1987. It is unjust and unfair to allow AGA and his nominees to
control and manage the Embassy Farms despite the fact that AGA who is the source of their
supposed shares of stock in the corporation is not asking for the delivery of the indorsed
certificate of stock but for the rescission of the memorandum of agreement. Rescission would
result in mutual restitution so it is but proper to allow EBE to manage the farm. Compared to
AGA or his nominees EBE would be more interested in the preservation of the assets, equipment
and facilities of Embassy Farms during the pendency of the main case. Contrary to petitioner's
contention the dispute at bar is not an intracorporate controversy within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Basically the conflict here is between AGA and EBE arising from a contract denominated as a
memorandum of agreement. Here the controversy in reality involves the contractual rights and
obligations of AGA and EBE under the memorandum of agreement and not to the enforcement of
rights and obligations under the corporation code or the internal or intracorporate affairs of the
corporation. AGA or his nominees are not even the lawful stockholders of Embassy Farms
because EBE for a justifiable reason has withheld the delivery of the indorsed certificate of stocks
so that the supposed transfer by virtue of the memorandum of agreement could not be properly
recorded in the book of the corporation. The dispute therefore does not fall within the special
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission but with regular Courts. AGA or his
nominees unduly dragged the petitioner Embassy Farms in order to resist the order of the Pasig
Court and to confuse the real and legitimate issue in the case at bar,
Generally, an injunction under Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 is enforceable
within the region. The reason is that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin acts being performed or about to be performed outside its
territorial boundaries. However, to avoid an irreparable prejudice, we allowed in Dagupan
Electric Corporation et al, v. Pano the enforcement of an injunction to restrain acts
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. In Dagupan case We
ruled that a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try a case although the acts sought be
restrained are committed outside its territorial jurisdiction where the principal business
addresses of the parties and the decisions on the acts to be restrained are located and
originated within the Court's jurisdiction.
Here to avoid an injustice and irreparable injury, We apply the exception rather than the
general rule. Both parties are residents of the National Capital Region (AGA-San Juan;
EBE-Paraaque). AGA filed the case with the Pasig Court and the injunction as an
equitable remedy intended to preserve the status quo is directed against AGA, his nominees
and agents.
Besides, as noted by the Pasig Court all orders to be enforced and executed at Embassy
Farms emanated from its main office which is located at the 2nd Floor, Agora Complex,
Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Finally, on the issue whether or not the writ of injunction was irregularly issued as it was
issued on July 30, 1987 one day ahead of the injunction bond, suffice it to say that aside
from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals that the date July 31, 1987, appearing on
the bond is a typographical error it must be pointed out that with the injunction bond the
party enjoined is amply protected against loss or damage in case it is finally decided that the
injunction ought not to have been granted

G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000

Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa
vs CA, Isabel Candelaria and Jamie Dinglasan
Ponente: Pardo

Facts:
This case involves two parcels of land located in Oriental Mindoro owned by Isabel Candelaria. October
1974, Candelaria entered into a 3-year lease agreement with Pio Malabanan wherein Malabanan agreed
to clear, clean and cultivate the land, to purchase calamansi, and other seedlings, to attend and care for
whatever plants thereon exist, to make the necessary harvest of fruits.

Malabanan, later hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and to clear it. On May 1977, Candelaria gave
Malabanan a 6-year usufruct over the land. 1983, Malabanan died. Candelaria constituted Jaime
Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact, having powers of administration over the land.

October 1984, Candelaria entered into a new lease contract with Victoria Dinglasan, Jaime's wife with a
1-year term. On December 1984, Bejasas agreed to pay Victoria rent in consideration of an "pakyaw na
bunga" agreement, with a term of 1 year.

After the 1 year period, Victoria demanded for Bejasas to vacate, but Bejasas continued to stay and did
not give any consideration for its use, be in rent or share. Candelarian again entered with a 3-year lease
agreement with Dinglasans, and made Jaime her attorney-in-fact again. Jaime then filed a complaint
before Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking for ejectment of Bejasas.
COSLAP dismissed the complaint.

Jaime then filed it with RTC for recovery of possession; the case was referred to DAR. DAR certified that
ht e case was not proper for trial before the civil courts. Trial court dismissed the complaint of Jaime
including the leasehold claim of Bejasas. Bejasas then filed a complaint for confirmation of leasehold and
recovery of damages against Candelaria and Jaime.

RTC favored the Bejasas. On appeal, CA reversed the decision saying that (1) there was no tenant
relationship, (2) Bejasas are mere overseers and not as permanent tenants, (3) the pakyaw contract
have expired, (4) sharing of profits was not proven, (5) the element of personal cultivation was not
proven.

Issue: Whether there is tenancy in favor of Bejasas.

Ruling:

There is no tenancy relationship. There was no proof of shared harvests. Between Candelaria (as owner)
and the Bejasas, there is no relationship. Candelaria never gave her consent. As to the authority of
Dinglasans, they had authority to bind the owner in a tenancy agreement, but there is no proof of such
presented.