REMEDIAL LAW

J. BERSAMIN

General Principles on Jurisdiction

SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO v. VICTOR ALBINA, VICENTE
UY and ALEX VELASQUEZ
G.R. No. 168749, June 6, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts rendered
without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that amounts to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As such, the judicial
inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or not the
NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding the case on
the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. The CA is competent in a
special civil action for certiorari to review the factual findings of the NLRC. The CA is given the
power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues, without
contravening the doctrine of the immutability of judgments.

Facts:

At around 4:00 a.m. of August 16, 1996, a clog-up occurred at the kettle sheet guide. At
that time, the respondents were on duty working in their assigned areas. As a consequence, 20
GI sheets were clogged-up inside the kettle, causing damage to the petitioner. On the same
day, a memorandum was issued by Mr. Yapjoco, manager of the petitioner, requiring all the
respondents to submit written explanation on the aforesaid incident and why no action shall
be taken against them for gross negligence. In response to the memorandum, the respondents
submitted their respective explanations.

Subsequently, in a memorandum dated August 20, 1996, Mr. Yapjoco, informed all the
respondents to attend a conference in connection with the aforesaid incident. On August 26,
1996, individual notices of suspension were sent to the respondents pending final decision
relative to the incident. On August 29, 1996, Mr. Yapjoco again sent individual notices of
termination of employment to all respondents, stating that after the management conducted
an investigation on the circumstances surrounding the incident, the respondents were found
guilty of gross neglect of duty and by reason thereof, they were terminated from their
employment.

Respondents Victor Albina, Vicente Uy and Alex Velasquez charged the petitioners in
the RAB of the NLRC in Cebu City with having illegally dismissed them as kettleman, assistant
kettleman, and inspector, respectively.

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The Labor Arbiter ruled that although the dismissal of the respondents was justified
because of their being guilty of gross negligence, the petitioners should pay them their
separation pay at the rate of month per year of service.

The NLRC dismissed the appeal for failure to comply with Article 223 of the Labor
Code and consequently, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

The respondents assailed the result through their petition for certiorari in the CA. The
CA granted the petition for certiorari. It ruled that the NLRCs affirmance of the LAs decision
did not accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law and jurisprudence; that the
dismissal of the respondents appeal constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and that based on its review the respondents had been illegally
dismissed considering that the petitioners did not establish that the respondents were guilty
of gross and habitual neglect.

Issue:

Whether or not the authority of the CA to review of the decisions of the NLRC through
certiorari is confined to determining issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling:

No. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that
amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limited in scope and narrow in character. As such,
the judicial inquiry in a special civil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only
whether or not the NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.

The CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing the evidence and deciding the case
on the merits despite the judgment of the NLRC already being final. The CA is competent in a
special civil action for certiorari to review the factual findings of the NLRC. The CA is given
the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues, without
contravening the doctrine of the immutability of judgments. This power flows from its original
jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari, by which it can grant the writ of
certiorari to correct errors of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC should the latters factual
findings be not supported by the evidence on record; or when the granting of the writ of
certiorari is necessary to do substantial justice or to prevent a substantial wrong; or when the
findings of the NLRC contradict those of the L.A; or when the granting of the writ of certiorari
is necessary to arrive at a just decision in the case. Any decision by the NLRC that is not
supported by substantial evidence is a decision definitely tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The judicial function of the CA in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction over the
NLRC extends to the careful review of the NLRCs evaluation of the evidence because the

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factual findings of the NLRC are accorded with great respect and finality only when they rest
on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the CA is not infallible. Indeed, to deny to this CA power
is to diminish its correction jurisdiction thought the writ of certiorari.

The policy of practicing comity towards the factual findings of the labor tribunals does
not preclude the CA from reviewing the findings and from disregarding the findings upon a
clear showing of the NLRCs capricious, whimsical or arbitrary disregard of the evidence or of
circumstances of considerable importance crucial or decisive of the controversy. In such
eventuality, the writ of certiorari should issue, and the CA, being also a court of equity, then
enjoys the leeway to make its own independent evaluation of the evidence of the parties as
well as to ascertain whether or not substantial evidence supported the NLRCs ruling.

TUNG HUI CHUNG and TONG HONG CHUNG vs. SHIH CHIU HUANG a.k.a. JAMES
SHIH
G.R. No. 170679, FIRST DIVISION, March 9, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

A compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata between the parties,
and is immediately final and executory, unless rescinded upon grounds that vitiate consent.
Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it is more than a mere contract between the parties.
Any effort to annul the judgment based on compromise on the ground of extrinsic fraud must
proceed in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

The petitioners, both Australian citizens, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila an amended complaint to recover from the respondent a sum of money and damages
(with prayer for a writ of attachment). The suit involved the contract to sell, whereby the
respondent, as the vendor, undertook to deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, shares of
stock worth P10,606,266.00 in Island Information and Technology, Inc. (the corporation), a
publicly listed corporation.

Later on, the parties filed their Joint Motion for Approval of a Compromise Agreement.
The compromise agreement stipulated that the parties agreed to settle their respective claims
and counterclaims, and the respondent acknowledged therein his obligation to the petitioners
in the amount of $250,000.00, which he promised to pay in US$ currency. The RTC approved
the compromise agreement on October 20, 2003.

But the respondent did not pay the second installment pursuant to the compromise
agreement despite demand. Instead, he filed in the CA a petition for annulment of judgment
seeking to nullify the order dated October 20, 2003 approving the compromise agreement.

On September 30, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision. The CA opined that
based on the huge difference between the obligation of $250,000.00 as stated in the

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compromise agreement and the relief prayed for in the amended complaint worth
P10,606,266.00, there could be no other conclusion than that the respondent had been
deceived into entering into the compromise agreement.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari which seeks the review and
reversal of the decision promulgated on September 30, 2005, whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) annulled and set aside the judicially-approved compromise agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in nullifying and setting aside the judgment based
on the compromise agreement.

RULING:

The annulment by the CA was legally and factually unwarranted.

To start with, a compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make

reciprocal concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. It is an
accepted, nay, even highly encouraged practice in the courts of law of this jurisdiction. It
attains the authority and effect of res judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and
becomes immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent.
Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a mere contract between the parties,
and becomes a judgment of the court, to be enforced through writ of execution.

The CA did not recognize that what it was asked to annul and set aside was no longer the
compromise agreement of the parties but already the judgment based on the compromise
agreement. The failure to recognize led the CA into granting the unprecedented relief of
annulling the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud and lack of consent. In so doing,
the CA acted without jurisdiction.

First of all, the action before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari that had
been brought on March 7, 2005, which was way beyond the period of 60 days from the
rendition of the judgment based on the compromise agreement on October 20, 2003. The long
delay grossly violated Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which allowed the petition for
certiorari to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment being assailed.

Secondly, the grounds relied upon by the respondent in his petition for certiorari in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88804 - that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
excess or lack of jurisdiction for issuing the writ of execution that was patently unjust, one-
side, unfair, fraudulent and unconscionable compromise agreement; and for issuing the writ of
execution of the compromise agreement that lacked consideration - were not proper grounds
for assailing the judgment based on the compromise agreement. Even assuming that such
grounds for the petition for certiorari were true, which they were not, the judgment based on

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the compromise agreement could not be assailed on that basis. As the foregoing excerpt of the
assailed decision bears out, the annulment of the judgment based on the compromise
agreement was premised on fraud and lack of consent on the part of the respondent as a
contracting party, which were far from the jurisdictional error on which the petition for
certiorari should have rested.

The impropriety of the petition for certiorari to demand the annulment of the
compromise agreement was blatant and unquestionable. The RTC, after finding the
compromise agreement to be in order and not contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy, issued the October 20, 2003 order approving the compromise agreement. With
this stamp of judicial approval, the compromise agreement became more than a mere contract
of the parties. The judicially approved agreement was thereby turned into a final judgment,
immutable and unalterable, regardless of whether or not it rested on erroneous conclusions of
fact and law, and regardless of whether the change would be by the court that rendered it or
the highest court of the land. This doctrine of immutability is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice, for, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law.

Lastly, if the ground of the respondent to assail the judgment based on the
compromise agreement was extrinsic fraud, his action should be brought under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court. Under Section 2 of Rule 47, the original action for annulment may be based
only on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, but extrinsic fraud, to be valid ground, should
not have been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition
for relief. If the ground relied up is extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if the ground is lack of jurisdiction, the action must
be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppels. Regardless of the ground for the action,
the remedy under Rule 47 is to be availed of only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. Ostensibly, the respondent could have availed himself of the petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Hence, his failure to resort to such remedy
precluded him from availing himself of the remedy to annul the judgment based on the
compromise agreement.

LEONORA A. PASCUAL VS. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG

G.R. No. 162063, March 31, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land to
a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not specifically
direct such act.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Writs of Execution; A judgment is not

confined to what appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.Admittedly, the phrase placing the winning party,

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Catalina Almazan Villamor in the premises of the land in question was not expressly stated in
the dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the
absence of that phrase did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was
in full consonance with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to
what appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A special civil action for certiorari is the
proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.We also conclude that the CA rightly
sustained the RTCs dismissal of Pascuals petition for certiorari because of the impropriety of
her chosen remedy. A special civil action for certiorari is the proper action to bring when a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The exercise of judicial function consists in the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or to ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, the issuance by Daquioag of
the assailed memorandum implementing the writ of execution did not derive from the
performance of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. He was not thereby called upon to
adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to exercise any discretion of a judicial
nature, but only performing an administrative duty of enforcing and implementing the writ.

FACTS:

Petitioner Leonora Pascual filed a Free Patent Application over 3 lots located at
Barangay Number 7, Alejo Malasig (Pait). Respondent Catalina AlmazanVillamor presented a
protest, claiming that Pascual had no right to apply for title over the properties.

The Executive Director of Region I of the DENR in San Fernando, La Union gave due
course to the protest of AlmazanVillamor, and rejected the free patent application of Pascual.

Pascual appealed to the Secretary of the DENR, who affirmed the decision of the
Regional Executive Director. Pascual thereafter appealed to the Office of the President (OP),
which affirmed the decision of the Secretary of the DENR. Still dissatisfied with the result,
Pascual elevated the decision of the OP to the CA by petition for review, but the CA outrightly
denied due course to her petition for review because of procedural lapses. The decision of the
OP attained finality upon her failure to timely move for the reconsideration of the denial of
due course by the CA.

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The Regional Executive Director of the DENR issued the writ of execution
directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte to execute the decision. Respondent CENRO Daquioag issued a
memorandum directing respondents Land Management Officer III Emilio Doloroso, Special
Land Investigator Alberto B. Baguio and Cartographers/DPLI Renato C. Tumamao and Nilo C.
Geralde to implement the writ of execution against Pascual.

Pascual brought a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance of
writ of injunction in the RTC. The RTC dismissed Pascuals petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. Pascual appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA. The CA promulgated its judgment,
declaring that the memorandum of Daquioag did not go beyond the clear import of the
decision of the OP; hence, Daguioag did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON Daguioag acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because his memorandum went beyond the clear import of the decision of the
OP?

RULING:

NO. As a general rule, a writ of execution should strictly conform to every

particular of the judgment to be executed, and not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks
to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed; the
execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.

Admittedly, the phrase placing the winning party, Catalina Almazan Villamor in
the premises of the land in question was not expressly stated in the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR. But the absence
of that phrase did not render the directive to enforce invalid because the directive was in full
consonance with the decision sought to be executed. A judgment is not confined to what
appears on the face of the decision, for it embraces whatever is necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.

Under the decision of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR, as upheld by the
Secretary of the DENR and the OP, the three lots subject of Pascuals free patent application
were covered by the Titulo Propiedad of Marcos Baria, the predecessorininterest of Almazan
Villamor.

The denial of Pascuals free patent application was based on the recognition of
Almazan Villamors ownership of the subject properties. The consequence of the denial was
the directive for Pascual to refrain from entering the property, and from possessing the subject
property declared to be owned by Almazan Villamor. Upon the final finding of the ownership
in the judgment in favor of Almazan Villamor, the delivery of the possession of the property

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was deemed included in the decision, considering that the claim itself of Pascual to the
possession had been based also on ownership.

Accordingly, Daquioags memorandum placing AlmazanVillamor in possession

of the properties was not inconsistent with the decision of the Regional Executive
Director of the DENR, as affirmed by the OP. With the clear recognition of Almazan
Villamors ownership, and in default of any credible showing by Pascual of any valid
justification for her to continue in possession of the properties despite the denial of her free
patent application, possession must be restored to AlmazanVillamor as the rightful owner
and possessor of the properties.

Hence, Daquioags assailed memorandum could not be disparaged as having

been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. The RTC correctly held that placing AlmazanVillamor in possession of the
properties was necessary to give effect to the order requiring Pascual to refrain from entering
the premises.

Finally, we also conclude that the CA rightly sustained the RTCs dismissal of Pascuals
petition for certiorari because of the impropriety of her chosen remedy. A special civil action
for certiorari is the proper action to bring when a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasijudicial function has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The exercise of judicial function consists in the power to determine
what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the
rights of the parties. The term quasijudicial function applies to the action and discretion of
public administrative officers or bodies that are required to investigate facts or to ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. However, the issuance by Daquioag of
the assailed memorandum implementing the writ of execution did not derive from the
performance of a judicial or quasijudicial function. He was not thereby called upon to
adjudicate the rights of the contending parties or to exercise any discretion of a judicial
nature, but only performing an administrative duty of enforcing and implementing the writ.

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 169823-24, FIRST DIVISION, September 11, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

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That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with
assisting the President in [t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship, expressly
granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to their
private or public status.

Ill-Gotten Wealth; During the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail
the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the
unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold
here that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the
PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases
were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans
like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 397 SCRA 171
(2003), the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the
State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to
the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only
through the PCGGs exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie
case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the
discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the presumption
of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official functions. Considering
further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful
transactions was possible prior to 1986.

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 charging
Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials and with a violation of Section
4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the
then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and

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there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and
presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINIs ownership
of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial
and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion)shares of stock in The
Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of
P100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction
Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the
mechanical and electrical construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant Project("Project") of the National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan,
all for and in consideration of accused Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns
and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the
contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct,
respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office
and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to
be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively,
which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and
confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being
then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being
further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First Lady
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family, taking advantage of
such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project
("PROJECT") of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and
receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S. Dollars
($1,000,000.00), more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having business,
transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for
and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure
and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering
and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently,
request and receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks,
commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as
accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E.

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Marcos, for Burns and Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse
the construction contract, for the PROJECT.

CONTRARY TO LAW

On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions
had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the
prescribed form.

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain
the Sandiganbayans favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then
entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. The motion to quash was however denied by
the Sandiganbayan in its resolution dated January 17, 2005.

Disini then commenced a special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court,
challenging the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged.

HELD:

Yes.The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories

with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

The fact that Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the PCGG with
assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his
administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly
granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to
their private or public status.

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METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 169677, FIRST DIVISION, February 18, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial
of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. But a
separate trial may be denied if a party is thereby deprived of his right to be heard upon an issue
dealt with and determined in the main trial.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Separate Trials; The rule on separate trials in civil actions
is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court. The court, in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues. The text of the rule grants to the trial court
the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the exercise of
such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice to any party.

Same; Same; Same; Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at
least such a trial should be undertaken only with great caution and sparingly; Separate trials of
issues should be ordered where such separation will avoid prejudice, further convenience,
promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear that
neither party had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue; hence, the motion to
that effect should be allowed only to avoid prejudice, further convenience, promote justice,
and give a fair trial to all parties, to wit: Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried
piecemeal, or at least such a trial should be undertaken only with great caution and sparingly.
There should be one full and comprehensive trial covering all disputed matters, and parties
cannot, as of right, have a trial divided. It is the policy of the law to limit the number of trials
as far as possible, and separate trials are granted only in exceptional cases. Even under a
statute permitting trials of separate issues, neither party has an absolute right to have a
separate trial of an issue involved. The trial of all issues together is especially appropriate in an
action at law wherein the issues are not complicated, x x x, or where the issues are basically
the same x x x x x x Separate trials of issues should be ordered where such separation will
avoid prejudice, further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair trial to all parties.

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are
extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case,
or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will
further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate
trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.We conclude that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank
(Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was distinct and separate from

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that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan veered away from the
general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting
aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense,
and inconvenience to the parties and the courts. Exceptions to the general rule are permitted
only when there are extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues
raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when
separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will
promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties.
Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

Same; Courts; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by

Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249, vests the Sandiganbayan with original
exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued in 1986 by then President Corazon C.
Aquino.Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic
Act No. 8249, vests the Sandiganbayan with original exclusive jurisdiction over civil and
criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2,
No. 14 and No. 14-A, issued in 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino. Executive Order No.
1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses
their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or by using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that the ill-gotten wealth includes
assets and properties in the form of estates and real properties in the Philippines and abroad.
Executive Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A pertain to the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases relative to the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction not
only over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases.The Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim against Asian Bank, for the Court has ruled in Presidential
Commission on Good Government v. Sandiganbayan, 326 SCRA 346 (2000), that the
Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction not only over principal causes of action
involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all incidents arising from, incidental to,
or related to such cases. The Court made a similar pronouncement sustaining the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan in Republic of the Philippines (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan (First Division),
258 SCRA 685 (1996), to wit: We cannot possibly sustain such a puerile stand. Pea itself
already dealt with the matter when it stated that under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, all
cases of the Commission regarding alleged ill-gotten properties of former President Marcos
and his relatives, subordinates, cronies, nominees and so forth, whether civil or criminal, are
lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, and all incidents
arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases necessarily fall likewise under the
Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively
by the Supreme Court.

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FACTS:

The Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting

and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda
R. Marcos and other defendants to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
nominees, dummies and agents.

The Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to implead Asian
Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It appears that
Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as the registered owner by virtue of
TCTs issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Asian Bank was also in
possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Quezon City.

When the Republic was about to terminate its presentation of evidence against the
original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial against Asian Bank.

Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion until it was first given
the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary evidence the Republic had
already presented against the original defendants, and contended that it would be deprived of
its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it without having been sufficiently
apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced before it was brought in as an
additional defendant.

Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian Bank was proper because its cause
of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and independent from its cause of action
against the original defendants; and that the issue with respect to Asian Bank was whether
Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the issuance of the TCTs for
the properties in its name that such properties were the subject of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 0004, while the issue as to the original defendants was whether they had "committed the
acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful accumulation of wealth which would, as
a consequence, justify forfeiture of the said properties or the satisfaction from said properties
of the judgement that may be rendered in favor of the Republic."

The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the Republics motion
for separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but the
Sandiganbayan denied its motion. Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action for
certiorari as the successor-in-interest of Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.

ISSUES:

WON the Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank; NO.

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WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian Banks alleged bad
faith in acquiring the properties. YES.

RULING:

The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republics motion for
separate trial, but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over the Republics claim against
Asian Bank (Metrobank).

Separate Trials are Improper

The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of
Court. The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate
trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues
should be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice to any party.

The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal
Courts (US Federal Courts).

The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and
parameters whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on
separate trials has been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle
to adopting such principles and parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on
separate trials. This is because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the
practices in the US Courts in the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure
that have themselves originated from or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the
Federal Courts and the various US State Courts.

We conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in

ordering a separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against
Asian Bank was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the
Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at
one time, unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will
generally lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts."

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary
grounds for conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when
separate trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will
further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when
separate trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must
apply.

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As we see it, however, the justification of the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate
trial did not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin
with, the issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context, the separate trial
would not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian
Bank was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants.
Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate trial on the
basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties would be thereby
adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic without Metrobank
being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome would surely be
prejudicial towards Metrobank.

The representation by the Republic in its comment to the petition of Metrobank, that
the latter "merely seeks to be afforded the opportunity to confront the witnesses and
documentary exhibits," and that it will "still be granted said right during the conduct of the
separate trial, if proper grounds are presented therefore," unfairly dismisses the objective
possibility of leaving the opportunity to confront the witnesses and documentary exhibits to
be given to Metrobank in the separate trial as already too late. The properties, though already
registered in the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile declared liable to forfeiture in
favor of the Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the deprivation of its properties without
due process of law. Only a joint trial with the original defendants could afford to Metrobank
the equal and efficient opportunity to confront and to contest all the evidence bearing on its
ownership of the properties. Hence, the disadvantages that a separate trial would cause to
Metrobank would far outweigh any good or benefit that the Republic would seemingly stand
to gain from the separation of trials.

We must safeguard Metrobanks right to be heard in the defense of its registered

ownership of the properties, for that is what our Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the
grant by the Sandiganbayan of the Republics motion for separate trial, not being in
furtherance of convenience or would not avoid prejudice to a party, and being even contrary
to the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and, therefore, a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter involving Metrobank
Presidential Decree No. 1606,30 as amended by Republic Act No. 797531 and Republic Act No.
8249,32 vests the Sandiganbayan with original exclusive jurisdiction over civil and criminal
cases instituted pursuant to and in connection with Executive Orders No. 1, No. 2, No. 14 and
No. 14-A, issued in 1986 by then President Corazon C. Aquino.

Executive Order No. 1 refers to cases of recovery and sequestration of ill-gotten wealth
amassed by the Marcoses their relatives, subordinates, and close associates, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or by using their
powers, authority, influence, connections or relationships. Executive Order No. 2 states that
the ill-gotten wealth includes assets and properties in the form of estates and real properties in
the Philippines and abroad. Executive Orders No. 14 and No. 14-A pertain to the

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Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases relative to the ill-gotten wealth of
the Marcoses and their cronies.

The amended complaint filed by the Republic to implead Asian Bank prays for reversion,
reconveyance, reconstitution, accounting and damages. In other words, the Republic would
recover ill-gotten wealth, by virtue of which the properties in question came under
sequestration and are now, for that reason, in custodia legis.

Although the Republic has not imputed any responsibility to Asian Bank for the illegal
accumulation of wealth by the original defendants, or has not averred that Asian Bank was a
business associate, dummy, nominee, or agent of the Marcoses, the allegation in its amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 that Asian Bank acted with bad faith for ignoring the
sequestration of the properties as ill-gotten wealth has made the cause of action against Asian
Bank incidental or necessarily connected to the cause of action against the original
defendants. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the
claim against Asian Bank. The Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction not only
over principal causes of action involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth, but also over all
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases.

Civil Procedure

RAY PETER O. VIVO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION

(PAGCOR)
G.R. No. 187854, November 12, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

A government officer cannot claim that his right to due process was violated when he
actively participated with the proceedings and filed a motion for reconsideration. Any procedural
defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the part of the officer.

FACTS:

The petitioner (Vivo) was employed by respondent PAGCOR and was the Managing
Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal. Sometime in February 2002, he
received a letter from Teresita S. Ela, the Senior Managing Head of PAGCORs HR
Department, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct,
rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and
confidence, that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the
same time being placed under preventive suspension.

The petitioners counsel, replying to Elas letter, assailed the basis for placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension. Later on, the petitioner received the summons for
him to attend an administrative inquiry before the Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) of
PAGCOR. At the petitioners request, however, the inquiry was conducted at his residence on

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said date. He was also furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations
against him.

Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCORs Adjudication

Committee. The latter summoned the petitioner to appear before it. His counsel moved for
the re-scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date, but the
Adjudication Committee denied the request upon the reason that the presence of counsel was
not necessary in the proceedings.

The petitioner received the letter from Ela informing him of the resolution of the
PAGCOR Board of Directors to the effect that he was being dismissed from the service.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and this being denied, he appealed his dismissal
to the CSC. The CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioners right to due process,
and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. According to the Commission, the
right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the
corresponding Board Resolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the
PAGCOR Board of Directors.

After the CSC denied its motion for reconsideration, PAGCOR elevated the case to the
CA. The CA promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon
its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners right to administrative due process was violated (NO)

RULING:

The petitioner was not denied due process of law, for he was afforded the fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain his side. That, to us, was sufficient to meet the requirements
of due process.

The petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by
PAGCOR as set forth herein. He was heard through the written statement he submitted in
response to the memorandum of the charges against him. He actively participated in the
administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the
opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings before the Adjudication Committee. He
was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss him from the service to the CSC. There
is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the
termination of his employment, the first notice being made through Elas letter informing him
on his being administratively charged for the offenses mentioned, and the second being
through the letter advising him that PAGCORs Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss

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him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded.

As the CA found, and correctly so, the petitioners pleadings explicitly admitted that
his dismissal had been effected through board resolutions. That he was not furnished copies of
the board resolutions did not negate the existence of the resolutions, and did not invalidate
the contents of the board resolutions. Consequently, the CSCs conclusion that his dismissal
had been unauthorized was unfounded. In any case, even assuming for the sake of argument
that there was no board resolution approving his dismissal, the lapse did not render his
dismissal illegal but unauthorized. However, as the CA succinctly put it, an unauthorized act
could be the subject of ratification.

As regards the supposed denial of the petitioners right to counsel, we find nothing
objectionable in the denial of the request. In an administrative proceeding like that conducted
against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As
such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are
themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.

It is noteworthy, however, that the petitioner was actually assisted by his counsel from
the outset of the administrative case against him. The petitioners counsel, ensured that the
petitioners every concern reached PAGCOR, and that he was clarified of any matter affecting
his rights all throughout the investigation and hearings.

In any event, any procedural defect in the proceedings taken against the petitioner was
cured by his filing of the motion for reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to
the CSC. The Court held in Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission that any defect in the
observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and that
denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who was afforded the
opportunity to be heard. In Autencio v. Maara, the Court observed that defects in procedural
due process may be cured when the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that PAGCOR had properly
observed the requirements of due process in its administrative proceedings against the
petitioner.

RE: QUERY OF MR. ROGER C. PRIORESCHI RE EXEMPTION FROM LEGAL AND

FILING FEES OF THE GOOD SHEPHERD FOUNDATION, INC.
A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, 19 August 2009, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

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The clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the Rules of Court indicate
that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant.

On May 22, 2009, Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi (Prioreschi), the administrator of the Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., addressed a letter to the Chief Justice asking whether
foundations or associations that work with and for the most indigent persons may be
exempted from docket and other legal fees. According to Prioreschi, this is in consideration
of the fact that his foundation reached out to the poorest among the poor, which even
society seems to have neglected.

ISSUE:

Whether associations and foundations like the Good Shepherd Foundation, which
works for and reaches out to the poor, may be exempted from the payment of legal fees.

RULING:

NO. This is because the clear intent and precise language of the provisions of the
Rules of Court indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent
litigant. As such, courts cannot grant to foundations like Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.
the same exemption from payment of legal fees granted to indigent litigants, even if the
foundations are working for indigent and underprivileged people.

Another reason posed by the Court is that to grant that request may give rise to abuse,
particularly by corporations and entities bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the
fees. Lastly, the scrutiny of compliance with the documentation requirements may prove too
time- consuming and wasteful for the courts.

FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. FEDERICO AGCAOILI

G.R. No. 165025, 31 August 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where
the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount
paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject
to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.

Fedman Development Corporation (FDC) was the owner and developer of a

condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building (FSB). Interchem Laboratories
Incorporated (Interchem) purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a contract to sell. A master deed
with restriction was executed and formed Fedman Suite Condominium Corporation (FSCC)
to manage FSB and hold title over its common areas.

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Interchem then transferred the rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili
(Agcaoili). In 1983, the centralized air-conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down.
Agcaoili reported and demanded its repair, however, he did not get any response. This
prompted Agcaoili to defer the payment of his condominium dues and monthly
amortizations.

FDC then cancelled the contract to sell involving Unit 411 and cut-off the electric
supply to the unit. Agcaoili sued FDC and FSCC for injunction and damages in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The case was settled through a compromise agreement. However, in 1986,
FDC again disconnected the electric supply to Unit 411. Agcaoili thus moved the execution of
the decision of the RTC. RTC favored Agcaoili.

FDC appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). One its contentions was Agcaoilis
failure to specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees,
hence, Agcaoili failed to pay the correct docket fees and RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case even if Agcaoili failed to
pay the correct amount of docket fees since his complaint did not specify the amounts of
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

RULING:

YES. The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the
prescribed docket fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. In
an action where the reliefs sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket
fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount being claimed. Therefore, the
complaint or similar pleading must specify the sums of money to be recovered and the
damages being sought in order that the clerk of court may be put in a position to compute
the correct amount of docket fees.

If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being
sought, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making
a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-
specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the
Government on the part of the plaintiff.

The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the
time of filing, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees
within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription. The "prescriptive
period" that bars the payment of the docket fees refers to the period in which a specific

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action must be filed, so that in every case the docket fees must be paid before the lapse of
the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws, particularly Chapter 3, Title V,
Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of actions

Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the
complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys
fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket fees. Such
payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili
must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court.

FRANCISCO ALONSO, substituted by MERCEDES V. ALONSO, TOMAS V. ALONSO

and ASUNCION V. ALONSO v. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 188471, 20 April 2010, FIRST DIVISION (BERSAMIN, J.)

Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest,
unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in interest is one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
a party-plaintiff in an action.
Francisco Alonso (petitioner) was the only son and sole heir of the late spouses
Tomas N. Alonso and Asuncion Medalle. Francisco died during the pendency of this case,
and was substituted by his legal heirs, namely: his surviving spouse, Mercedes, his son
Tomas and his daughter Asuncion V. Alonso.

In 1992, Francisco discovered documents showing that his father Tomas had acquired
Lot No. 727 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate from the Government in or about the year 1911;
that the original vendee of Lot No. 727 had assigned his sales certificate to Tomas, who had
been consequently issued Patent No. 14353; and that on 1926, the Director of Lands had
executed a final deed of sale in favor of Tomas N. Alonso, but the final deed of sale had not
been registered with the Register of Deeds because of lack of requirements, like the approval
of the final deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required
by law.

Francisco subsequently found that the certificate of title covering Lot No. 727-D-2 had
been administratively reconstituted from the owners duplicate of TCT No. RT-1310 in the
name of United Service Country Club, Inc., the predecessor of (respondent) Cebu Country
Club, Inc (CCC); and that upon the order of the court that had heard the petition for
reconstitution of the TCT, the name of the registered owner in TCT No. RT-1310 had been
changed to that of CCC; and that the TCT stated that the reconstituted title was a transfer
from TCT No. 1021.

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With his discoveries, Francisco formally demanded upon CCC to restore the
ownership and possession of Lot 727-D-2 to him. However, CCC denied Francisco's
demand and claim of ownership, and refused to deliver the possession to him so Francisco
commenced an action for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of deed/title, the
cancellation of certificates of title, and the recovery of property. The RTC decided in favor of
CCC. The CA affirmed. Francisco appealed to the SC which subsequently denied the petition
and declared that the lot in question legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines.
The said decision became final and executory.

Later the Government, through the OSG, filed in the RTC a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution. CCC opposed. In the meantime, the Congress ultimately enacted a R.A.
No.9443 to validate the TCTs and reconstituted titles covering the Banilad Friar Lands
Estate in Cebu City.

Thereafter, both CCC and the OSG brought the passage of R.A. No. 9443 to the
attention of the RTC for its consideration in resolving the OSGs motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution. Therefore, the RTC denied the motion. Upon being directed by the RTC to
comment on the motion for reconsideration, the OSG manifested in writing that the
Government was no longer seeking the execution of the decision, subject to its reservation
to contest any other titles within the Banilad Friar Lands Estate. Thereafter, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration stating, among others, that the real-party-in-interest was
the Government, not the Alonsos.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Alonsos were the real parties-in-interest to question the denial by
the RTC of the OSGs motion for the issuance of a writ of execution; and
2. Whether or not R.A. No. 9443 gave the petitioners a legal interest to assail the RTCs
orders.

RULING:

1. NO. The Alonsos are not proper parties to appeal and assail the order of the RTC. The
Court found that the Alonsos did not validly acquire ownership of Lot No. 727-D-2, and
declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally belonged to the Government. Such a
pronouncement renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of the judgment would
not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold no right whatsoever in Lot No. 727-
D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to assail the questioned orders of
the RTC, because they stand to derive nothing from the execution of the judgment
against Cebu Country Club.

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Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party-in-interest is one
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest,
an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a real or
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy; or from a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. One having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party- plaintiff in an action.

In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the only party
adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the denial.
However, its manifest desistance from the execution of the decision effectively barred
any challenge against the denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial final and
immutable.

2. NO. R.A. No. 9443 gives petitioners no legal interest to assail the denial of the motion
for execution.

The law expressly declares as valid all existing TCTs and Reconstituted Certificates of
Title duly issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu Province and/or Cebu City covering any
portion of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, and recognizes the registered owners as absolute
owners. To benefit from R.A. No. 9443, therefore, a person must hold as a condition precedent
a duly issued Transfer Certificate of Title or a Reconstituted Certificate of Title. Wherefore, the
Court declares that Cebu Country Club, Inc. is the exclusive owner of Lot No.727-D-2 of the
Banilad Friar Lands Estate, as confirmed by Republic Act No. 9443.

IN RE: RECONSTITUTION OF TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE NOS. 303168

AND 303169 AND ISSUANCE OF OWNERS DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE IN
LIEU OF THOSE LOST
G.R. NO. 156797, 6 July 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter
and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct
causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Petitioner Lim, as co-owner, filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of TCT No.
303168 and TCT No. 303169 of the Registry of Deeds (which had been lost or destroyed as a
consequence of the fire that had burned certain portions of the Quezon City Hall), and for
the issuance of owners duplicate copies of said TCTs. The RTC dismissed the said petition
upon finding that Lim was guilty of forum-shopping based on the report of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) that Lim had also applied for administrative reconstitution

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and failed to disclose such fact despite the certification against forum shopping attached to
the petition. The RTC likewise denied Lim's motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed the petition of Lim on the ground
of forum shopping.

RULING:

NO. The dismissal was unwarranted and arbitrary for emanating from an erroneous
application of the rule against forum shopping. The application for judicial reconstitution is
ordered reinstated.

Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another
forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari. Forum shopping
happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of
rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other, there is forum shopping.

Lim was not guilty of forum shopping because the factual bases of his application
for the administrative reconstitution of the TCTs and of his petition for their judicial
reconstitution, and the reliefs thereby sought were not identical.

When he applied for the administrative reconstitution in the LRA, he still had his
co-owners duplicate copies of the TCTs in his possession, but by the time the LRA resolved
his application, allowing the relief prayed for, his co-owners duplicate copies of the TCTs
had meanwhile been destroyed by fire, a fact that he had duly reported in an affidavit
presented to the Office of the Register of Deeds for Quezon City. The loss by fire was
corroborated by the certification issued by the Chief of Fire District I of Manila. Thus, the
intervening loss of the owners duplicate copies that left the favorable ruling of the LRA no
longer implementable gave rise to his need to apply for judicial reconstitution in the
RTC pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.

The RTC should have also noted soon enough that his resort to judicial
reconstitution was not because his earlier resort to administrative reconstitution had been
denied (in fact, the LRA had resolved in his favor), but because the intervening loss to fire
of the only permissible basis for administrative reconstitution of the TCTs mandated his
resort to the RTC.

Neither did the petitioners omission from the petition for judicial reconstitution of
a reference to the application for administrative reconstitution in the LRA justify the
dismissal of the petition. The petition for judicial reconstitution and the application for
administrative reconstitution addressed different situations and did not have identical
bases. Besides, only the RTC could grant or deny any relief to him at that point.

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The motu proprio dismissal of the petition was yet another glaring error of the RTC.
A violation of the rule against forum shopping other than a willful and deliberate forum
shopping did not authorize the RTC to dismiss the proceeding without motion and
hearing.

AIR ADS INCORPORATED v. TAGUM AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION (TADECO)
G.R. No. 160736, 23 March 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

A plaintiff or petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to

rectify the defect in the certification where the court states in its order that the action is
dismissed due to such defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in
which case the plaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata.

In an action to recover damages between Elva O. Porment and Tagum Agricultural

Development Corporation (TADECO) and Edwin Yap, TADECO filed an answer with
compulsory counterclaims and filed a third party complaint against Air Ads, Inc. and
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer). However, ACCRA Law Office
(TADECOs counsel) upon realizing that Pioneer was a client of its Makati Office, filed a
notice of dismissal without prejudice in its third party complaint but only against Pioneer
Insurance and Surety Corporation. Hence, TADECO filed another motion to withdraw
notice of dismissal without prejudice against Pioneer through another counsel, Dominguez
Law Office, alleging that the notice of dismissal without prejudice etc. filed by ACCRA Law
Office had been made without its consent which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted.

Following the grant of its motion to withdraw the notice of dismissal, TADECO, still
through Dominguez Law Office, filed a motion to admit third party complaint in
substitution of the third party complaint filed by the third party plaintiff's former
counsel, explaining that the substitute third party complaint was being filed to avoid
putting ACCRA Law Office in an awkward situation, and to avoid the appearance that new
counsel Dominguez Law Office was merely adopting the previous third party complaint.

RTC granted the motion to admit third party complaint in substitution of the third
party complaint filed by TADECOs former counsel ACCRA Law.

Air Ads then filed a motion to dismiss against the third party complaint, averring that
it had been dropped as third party defendant under TADECO's substitute third party
complaint; and arguing that the filing of the substitute third party complaint had the effect
of entirely superseding the original third party complaint, which should consequently be
stricken out from the records.

TADECO, countered that it had never been the intention of Dominguez Law Office to
file a new third party complaint against Air Ads because Dominguez Law Office
represented TADECO only in regards to the third party complaint against Pioneer.

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RTC denied Air Ads' motion to dismiss, holding that the notice of dismissal etc.
filed by ACCRA Law Office did not have the effect of dropping Air Ads as a third party
defendant due to the notice of dismissal etc. CA also dismissed the petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the filing of an identical petition following the dismissal of the first
petition on the ground of defective and insufficient verification and certification
constitute forum shopping.
2. Whether or not a substitute third party complaint has the effect of superseding
the original third party complaint.

RULING:

1. NO. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly provides that
the dismissal of a petition due to failure to comply with the requirements therein is
without prejudice unless otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly, the plaintiff or
petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the defect in
the certification where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to
such defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case
the plaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata. In the context of the
aforequoted rule, the dismissal of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73418, being without any
qualification, was a dismissal without prejudice, plainly indicating that Air Ads could
not be barred from filing the second petition.

Indeed, Air Ads' options to correct its dire situation included the refiling, for,
although the Rules of Court declares that the failure to comply with the requirements of
Section 5 of Rule 7 shall not be cured by amendment, nowhere does the rule prohibit the
filing of a similar complaint or pleading following the dismissal without qualification of the
earlier one.

2. NO. The records indicate that: firstly, both TADECO and Pioneer were clients of
ACCRA Law Office; secondly, TADECO engaged Dominguez Law Office as its counsel
in lieu of ACCRA Law Office with respect only to its third party complaint against
Pioneer; thirdly, the RTC dismissed the third party complaint only against Pioneer upon
the notice of withdrawal filed by TADECO through ACCRA Law Office; and fourthly,
the RTC granted the motion to admit the substitute third party complaint only against
Pioneer. These rendered it plain and clear that the substitute third party complaint
merely replaced the third party complaint earlier filed against Pioneer.

Air Ads' urging that the filing of the substitute third party complaint effectively
superseded the third party complaint impleading it as third party defendant ostensibly harks
back to Section 8 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, which states that the amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, the substitution of the third party
complaint could not produce the effect that an amendment of an existing pleading produces.

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Under Section I, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amendment is done by adding or striking out
an allegation or the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a
mistaken or inadequate allegation or description in any other respect. A perusal of the original
and the substitute third party complaints shows that their averments are substantially the
same; and that the substitute third party complaint did not strike out any allegation of the
prior one.

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES, JANET
BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS, petitioners, vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.,
respondent.
G.R. No. 156759 June 5, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the
attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the
officer resort to substituted service.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over the person, or
jurisdiction in personam the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject
the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action is
an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in
actions in rem or quasi in rem.Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam
the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular
action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action is an element of due
process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi
in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and
the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res
that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action is not the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of due process.

Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a
defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is
an action in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction
over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.As
a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an ac tion in rem or quasi
in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. In the latter

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instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the defendant, and such
extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the requirements of fair play or due
pro-cess, so that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and
the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest
may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to
protect his interest if he is so minded. On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in
personam does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case
against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he
voluntarily appears in court.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Summons; Service of Summons; As the initiating party, the
plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by the act of
filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires jurisdiction over his person
either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.As the
initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant, the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the summons, or by a voluntary
appearance in the action. Upon the filing of the complaint and the payment of the requisite
legal fees, the clerk of court forthwith issues the corresponding summons to the defendant.
The summons is directed to the defendant and signed by the clerk of court under seal. It
contains the name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; a direction that the
defendant answers within the time fixed by the Rules of Court; and a notice that unless the
defendant so answers, the plaintiff will take judgment by default and may be granted the relief
applied for. To be attached to the original copy of the summons and all copies thereof is a
copy of the complaint (and its attachments, if any) and the order, if any, for the appointment
of a guardian ad litem.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim brought
against him.The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an
action in personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the claim
brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not acquired in a civil
action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid waiver of such proper
service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant knowingly does an act
inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction as to him, like
voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due process lies in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence the defendant may have in support of his defense. With
the proper service of the summons being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be
heard on the claim against him, he may also waive the process. In other words, compliance

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with the rules regarding the service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is
of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Substituted Service; If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may
then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.Under the Rules of
Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the defendant himself
whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a copy of the summons
to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and sign for it, in tendering
it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order to ensure the
realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the
defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the summons
may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the sum mons at his residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter
mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the
defendant is made through his substitute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Only when the defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to.It is no longer
debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is
considered ineffective. This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the usual
method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Only when the defendant cannot be served personally
within a reasonable time may substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of
prompt personal service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant
himself and the fact that such efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of
service or sheriffs return. Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt
personal service as basis for resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant
either expressly or impliedly.

FACTS:

Respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western Police District in Manila,
sued AbanteTonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its
Managing Director Nicolas V. Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet
Bay, Jesus R. Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published in the June 6,
2000 issue of Abante Tonite. RTC issued summons to be served on each defendant, including
Abante Tonite, at their business address.

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RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service
of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the
address were futile because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He
returned in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but
he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to
substituted service of the summons, and explained in his sheriffs return that some competent
persons working in petitioners office had informed him that Macasaet and Quijano were
always out and unavailable, and that Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos and Reyes were always out
roving to gather news.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging lack of jurisdiction over
their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted service of summons.

ISSUE:

Whether the resort to substituted service of summons is proper.

RULING:

The resort to substituted service of summons is valid and effectual.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in handing a
copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses to receive and
sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be rigidly enforced in order
to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable
reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person within a reasonable time, the service of the
summons may then be effected either (a) by leaving a copy of the summons at his residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copy at his office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The latter mode of service is known as substituted service because the service of the summons
on the defendant is made through his substitute.

Only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time may
substituted service be resorted to. Hence, the impossibility of prompt personal service should
be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant himself and the fact that such
efforts failed, which statement should be found in the proof of service or sheriffs return.
Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of prompt personal service as basis for
resorting to substituted service may be waived by the defendant either expressly or impliedly.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon
each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September 18,
2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because Macasaet
and Quijano were always out and not available and the other petitioners were always roving
outside and gathering news. After Medina learned from those present in the office address on

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his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any of petitioners going to the office during
the business hours of that or any other day, he concluded that further attempts to serve them in
person within a reasonable time would be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his
conclusion. He was not expected or required as the serving officer to effect personal service by
all means and at all times, considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to
substituted service should he be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time.
In that regard, what was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining.
While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such
strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of
the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

RE: LETTER COMPLAINT OF MERLITA B. FABIANA

AGAINST PRESIDING JUSTICE ANDRES B. REYES, JR., ET AL.
A.M. No. CA-13-51-J, EN BANC, July 2, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*

Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; In administrative proceedings, the burden

of substantiating the charges falls on the complainant who must prove her allegations in the
complaint by substantial evidence.In administrative proceedings, the burden of
substantiating the charges falls on the complainant who must prove her allegations in the
complaint by substantial evidence. Here, the allegation of willful disobedience against
respondent CA Justices was unsubstantiated and baseless. The issues raised in the first
petition (C.A.-G.R. No. 109382) were limited to the NLRCs jurisdiction over the appeal by
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal, and to the reduction of the amounts
awarded as moral and exemplary damages. In contrast, the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No.
109699) concerned only the propriety of awarding monetary benefits. Under the
circumstances, the promulgation by the Court of the resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No.
189726 did not divest the respondents as members of the First Division of the CA of the
jurisdiction to entertain and pass upon the second petition (C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 109699),
something that they sought to explain through their resolution promulgated on June 4, 2010.
The explanation, whether correct or not, was issued in the exercise of judicial discretion. It is
not for us to say now in a resolution of this administrative complaint whether the explanation
was appropriate or not, nor for the complainant to herself hold them in error. The recourse
open to the heirs of Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for the correction of the
resolution, if they disagreed with it, and, should their motion be denied, to assail the denial in
this Court through the remedy warranted under the law.

Administrative Law; Judges; Although the Supreme Court does not shirk from the
responsibility of imposing discipline on the erring Judges or Justices and employees of the
Judiciary, it shall not hesitate to shield them from baseless charges that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; The consolidation of two or more
actions is authorized where the cases arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the

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same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the
court has jurisdiction and that consolidation will not give one party an undue advantage or that
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Court, the consolidation of cases for trial is
permissive and a matter of judicial discretion; But the permissiveness of consolidation does not
carry over to the appellate stage where the primary objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary
expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal realization of the dual function of all appellate
adjudications.

Same; Same; Same; In the appellate stage, the rigid policy is to make the consolidation of
all cases and proceedings resting on the same set of facts, or involving identical claims or
interests or parties mandatory.Such consolidation should be made regardless of whether or
not the parties or any of them requests it.

FACTS:

This administrative matter stems from the claim for death benefits by the heirs of the
late Marlon Fabiana (heirs of Fabiana) against manning agent Magsaysay Maritime Corp and
its principal Air Sea Holiday GMBH-Stable Organizations Italia.

From the decision of the NLRC, granting the claims to the heirs of Fabiana, the parties
then separately brought their respective petitions for certiorari to the CA. First petition: C.A.
G.R. SP No. 109382; second petition: C.A. G.R. SP No. 109699.

The heirs of Fabiana sought the consolidation of the two petitions. Their request for
consolidation was not acted upon, however, but was soon mooted a month later by the First
Division of the CA promulgating its decision on the first petition. Such decision was in favor to
the heirs of Fabiana affirming the decision of NLRC with modification insofar as the interest.

The heirs of Fabiana appealed to the Supreme Court by petition for review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 189726). However, the Court, through the Third Division, denied the
petition through the resolution of January 13, 2010 ruling that the CA did not commit any
reversible error in the challenged decision.

In the meanwhile, the heirs of Fabiana moved to dismiss the second petition on the
ground that the intervening promulgation by the First Division of the decision on the first
petition had rendered the second petition moot and academic.

However, the First Division of the CA, then comprised by Presiding Justice Reyes, Jr.,
Associate Justice Dicdican (ponente) and Associate Justice Cruz, denied the motion to dismiss
filed in the second petition, holding that:
It is not true that the petition in this case has been rendered moot and academic by the
decision promulgated by this Court on September 29, 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 109382. The said

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decision rendered by this Court passed upon two limited issues only, namely, the NLRCs
jurisdiction to allow the petitioners appeal thereto despite flaws in their verification and non-
forum shopping papers and the propriety of the reduction by the NLRC of the amount of
damages awarded to the private respondents. A reading of the said decision will unmistakably
bear this out. However, in the case at bench, the petitioners have assailed omnibously the
NLRCs awards in favor of the private respondents for death benefits, sickness allowance, salary
differentials and other monetary claims. We have to pass upon the propriety of all these
monetary awards.

The second petition was ultimately resolved by the Sixth Division of the CA dismissing
the petition upon not finding the NLRC to have gravely abuse its discretion.

Thus, the heirs of Fabian accuses Court of Appeals (CA) Presiding Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, as the
former Members of the CAs First Division, of having openly defied the resolution
promulgated by the Court on January 13, 2010 in G.R. No. 189726, whereby the Court had
allegedly fixed with finality complainants claims for death benefits and other monetary
claims, including damages and attorneys fees, against the Maritime Company arising from the
death of her husband.

ISSUE:

WON the Justices willfully disobeyed the resolution of January 13, 2010.

HELD:

NO. In administrative proceedings, the burden of substantiating the charges falls on

the complainant who must prove her allegations in the complaint by substantial evidence.
Here, the allegation of willful disobedience against respondent CA Justices was
unsubstantiated and baseless. The issues raised in the first petition were limited to the NLRCs
jurisdiction over the appeal by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and its principal, and to the
reduction of the amounts awarded as moral and exemplary damages. In contrast, the second
petition concerned only the propriety of awarding monetary benefits. Under the
circumstances, the promulgation by the Court of the resolution of January 13, 2010 in G.R. No.
189726 did not divest the respondents as members of the First Division of the CA of the
jurisdiction to entertain and pass upon the second petition. The explanation, whether correct
or not, was issued in the exercise of judicial discretion. It is not for us to say now in a
resolution of this administrative complaint whether the explanation was appropriate or not,
nor for the complainant to herself hold them in error. The recourse open to the heirs of
Fabiana, including the complainant, was to move for the correction of the resolution, if they
disagreed with it, and, should their motion be denied, to assail the denial in this Court
through the remedy warranted under the law.

In this regard, we reiterate that a judges failure to correctly interpret the law or to
properly appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily incur administrative liability,

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for to hold him administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming he has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make his position doubly
unbearable. His judicial office will then be rendered untenable, because no one called upon to
try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment. Administrative sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only
when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is committed with evident bad faith, or
only in clear cases of violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and good
behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure, or fixed and defined by pertinent
jurisprudence. To be clear, although we do not shirk from the responsibility of imposing
discipline on the erring Judges or Justices and employees of the Judiciary, we shall not hesitate
to shield them from baseless charges that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice.

When is consolidation of cases authorized. The consolidation of two or more actions is

authorized where the cases arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or
like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court
has jurisdiction and that consolidation will not give one party an undue advantage or that
consolidation will not prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties. As to parties, their
substantial identity will suffice. Substantial identity of parties exists when there is a
community of interest or privity of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second, even if the latter has not been impleaded in the first case. As to issues, what is
required is mere identity of issues where the parties, although not identical, present
conflicting claims. The justification for consolidation is to prevent a judge from deciding
identical issues presented in the case assigned to him in a manner that will prejudice another
judge from deciding a similar case before him. We are perplexed why the CA did not act on
and grant the request for consolidation filed on August 20, 2009 by the heirs of Fabiana. In
fact, the consolidation should have been required as a matter of course even without any of
the parties seeking the consolidation of the petitions, considering that the two cases rested on
the same set of facts, and involved claims arising from the death of the late Marlon Fabiana.

It is true that under the Rules of Court, the consolidation of cases for trial is permissive
and a matter of judicial discretion. This is because trials held in the first instance require the
attendance of the parties, their respective counsel and their witnesses, a task that surely
entails an expense that can multiply if there are several proceedings upon the same issues
involving the same parties. At the trial stage, the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and
undue vexation to the parties is the primary objective of consolidation of cases. But the
permissiveness of consolidation does not carry over to the appellate stage where the primary
objective is less the avoidance of unnecessary expenses and undue vexation than it is the ideal
realization of the dual function of all appellate adjudications.

Where consolidation of cases mandatory. In the appellate stage, therefore, the rigid
policy is to make the consolidation of all cases and proceedings resting on the same set of
facts, or involving identical claims or interests or parties mandatory. Such consolidation
should be made regardless of whether or not the parties or any of them requests it. A

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mandatory policy eliminates conflicting results concerning similar or like issues between the
same parties or interests even as it enhances the administration of justice.

In this connection, the Court reminds all attorneys appearing as counsel for the
initiating parties of their direct responsibility to give prompt notice of any related cases
pending in the courts, and to move for the consolidation of such related cases in the proper
courts. This responsibility proceeds from their express undertakings in the certifications
against forum-shopping that accompany their initiatory pleadings pursuant to Section 5 of
Rule 7 and related rules in the Rules of Court, to the effect that they have not theretofore
commenced any actions or filed any claims involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of their knowledge, no such other actions or claims are
pending therein that if there were such other pending actions or claims, to render complete
statements of the present status thereof and if they should thereafter learn that the same or
similar actions or claims have been filed or are pending, they shall report that fact within five
days therefrom to the courts wherein the said complaints or initiatory pleadings have been
filed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. OLIVIA ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL

G.R. No. 159450, 30 March 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a trivial matter
to be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to evidence without express
leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the accused pursuant to the express provision of
the Rules of Court.

Olivia Aleth Garcia Cristobal, a teller of Prudential Bank was charged with qualified
theft for unlawfully taking cash money amounting to $10,000.00 or P250,000.00 in
Philippine currency.

Upon the State resting its case against the accused, Cristobals counsel filed a
Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence, praying for the dismissal of
the charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

However, the Regional Trial Court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to
Defer Defense Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her
filing her demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule
119, of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence.

On May 26, 2000, therefore, the RTC rendered its decision finding and pronouncing
the accused guilty of qualified theft. The accused appealed, but the Court of Appeals
affirmed her conviction on July 31, 2003, albeit modifying the penalty.

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ISSUE:

Whether the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present
evidence in her defense.

RULING:

YES. CA and RTC did not err in deeming petitioner to have waived her right to
present evidence. Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with
prior leave of court.

If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present defense
evidence is unqualified.

Unavoidably, the Courts attention is drawn to the apparent negligence of appellant's

counsel in failing to secure prior leave of court before filing her Demurrer to Evidence.
However, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that in law, the negligence of appellant's
counsel binds her. Indeed, jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound
by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.

The CA did not thereby err. Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to
have waived her right to present evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of
court for her demurrer to evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of
her right to present evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and
intelligence of the waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first
obtaining express leave of court effectively waived her right to present her evidence.

The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial
consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of court required in
Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court. They were well aware of the risk of a
denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly admitted the
facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences therefrom. The Court cannot step in

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now to alleviate her self- inflicted plight, for which she had no one to blame but herself;
otherwise, the Court may unduly diminish the essence of the rule that gave her the
alternative option to waive presenting her own evidence.

Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED

BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R.
ROSARIO.
OCA I.P.I. No. 12-204-CA-J, EN BANC, March 11, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.*

Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade their judicial
office, and interfere with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary. The complainant
may be held liable for indirect contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.

Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; Substantial Evidence; In administrative

proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence.In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to
the dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge
against any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But
when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer
the heavy sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of culpability on the
part of the judicial officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in character.

Criminal Law; Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment; Knowingly rendering an unjust

judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense; To commit the offense, the offender must be a
judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law.

Same; Same; Only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make determination and declaration that the
judgment or final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust.But
who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order that the judicial officer
knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May such determination and declaration be made
in administrative investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public
prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious only a superior court acting by virtue
of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make
such determination and declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative
hearing officer may be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the
Constitution or by law elsewhere in the appellate court.

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FACTS:

AMALI is the owner and developer of the condominium project located along EDSA
corner Fordham St. in Wack Wack, Mandaluying City.

Due to the projects location, AMALI would have to use Fordham St. as an access road
and staging area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the consent of
the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). AMALI set up a field office along
Fordham St. that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the
field office and set up a dence to deny access to AMALIs construction workers, which
prompted AMALI to file a petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the
RTC in Pasig City.

In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-storey building
of mixed use after AMALIs petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved.

WWRAI filed a civil case of an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer
for injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari in the CA to
enjoin the RTC from proceeding in the civil case.

After hearing, the CA issued a TRO. The CA issued a preliminary injunction and
required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which also served
as its motion for partial reconsideration. AMALI also filed an urgent Motion to Resolve and to
Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth
Division, which included Assoc. Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.

The Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision granting the
petition of WWRAI.

AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in the SC. AMALI then
brought this administrative complaint alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with
the counsels of WWRAI in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of
the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor
WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent Justices are liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the CPR; and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

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No. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations of the complaint by substantial evidence. Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal
of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any
official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial evidence. But when the
charge equates to a criminal offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy
sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial
officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt, especially because the
charge is penal in character.

AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices.

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal offense. Article

204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment
in any case submitted to him for decision is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown
to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely committed an error of judgment or
taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. The term knowingly means sure
knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an injustice. Thus, the complainant
must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary
to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge of
rendering an unjust decision. In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge,
greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. Bad faith is, therefore, the ground
for liability. The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable.

Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final resolution of the
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt rather
than promote the orderly administration of justice and further clog the courts dockets. Those
who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal rules and abuse of
court processes in their efforts to vindicate their rights.

Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held to account or to
answer for performing his judicial functions and office because such performance is a matter
of public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render and administer justice area
function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted.

Accordingly, we now demand that AMALIs authorized representative, Joseph B. Usita,

its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of AMALI who
had authorized Usita to file the present complaint, show cause in writing why they should not
be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and baseless charges against
respondent Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless

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administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt under
Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. WESLEY AN UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES,

INC.
G.R. NO. 207970, FIRST DIVISION, January 20, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming
party when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the
parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment
on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an
issue of fact.

It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly

known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it
are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgment on the Pleadings; The essential query in
resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact
generated by the pleadings.The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues
of fact exist in a case or not depends on how the defending partys answer has dealt with the
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The defending partys answer either admits or denies
the allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations
of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the
truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being
disputed, will require evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Specific Denial; Any material averment in the complaint not so
specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated
damages.The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse partys
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it
omits to deal with them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific
denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the
denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending party specifying each
material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. The
second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an averment, and the
denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate
facts as is true and material and denying only the remainder. The third is done by the
defending party who is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of a material averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material

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averment in the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment
of the amount of unliquidated damages.

Same; Same; Same; Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the
sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaints material allegations were admitted or
properly denied.We should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioners Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the
answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaints material allegations were
admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondents averment of payment of the total of
P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that
a factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on
the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondents answer in Civil Case No. 09-
122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if
only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the
respondents denial of liability as insincere.

FACTS:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation
dealing with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment
and supplies at the respondent's hospital under four contracts executed at different dates.

According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only P67,357,683.23 of its total
obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54. However, on
February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent, respectively represented by Rafael P.
Fernando and Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr., entered into an agreement, whereby the former
agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted
obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and
rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to
recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of
Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired. Due to the
respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money in
the RTC, Branch 1, in Manila (Civil Case No. 09-122116).

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis
pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it
had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the
February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of
that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

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After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its
answer (ad cautelam). On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its
complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations.

The RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The
CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding
balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the
respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

ISSUE:

Did the CA commit reversible error in affirming the RTC's denial of the petitioner's
motion for judgment on the pleadings?

RULING:

The appeal is meritorious. In Civil Case No. 09-122116, the respondent expressly
admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the complaint. The admissions relate to the
petitioner's allegations on: (a) the four transactions for the delivery and installation of various
hospital equipment; (b) the total liability of the respondent; (c) the payments made by the
respondents; (d) the balance still due to the petitioner; and (e) the execution of the
February 11, 2009 agreement. The admission of the various agreements, especially the February
11, 2009 agreement, significantly admitted the petitioner's complaint. To recall, the petitioner's
cause of action was based on the February 11, 2009 agreement, which was the actionable
document in the case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of the February 11, 2009
agreement, and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the February 11, 2009 agreement, judgment on the pleadings
became proper.

The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof,
inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past
officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines." Was the manner of denial effective as
a specific denial?

The SC answered the query in the negative. Paragraph no. 6 alleged that the
respondent's total obligation as of February 15, 2009 was P123,901,650.00, but its balance
thereafter became only P54,654,195.54 because it had since then paid P67,357,683.23 to the
petitioner. Paragraph no. 7 stated that the petitioner had agreed with the respondent on
February 11, 2009 to reduce the balance to only P50,400,000.00, which the respondent would
pay in 36 months through 36 postdated checks of P1,400,000.00 each, which the respondent
then issued for the purpose. Paragraph no. 8 averred that after four of the checks totalling
P5,600,000.00 were paid the respondent stopped payment of the rest, rendering the entire

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obligation due and demandable pursuant to the February 11, 2009 agreement. Considering that
paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint averred matters that the respondent ought to
know or could have easily known, the answer did not specifically deny such material
averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters
clearly known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been
known by it are insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.

That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its
special and affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis
pendentia and forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by
their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner's claim, and thus
did not negate the material averments of the complaint.

Lastly, we should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for
Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the
answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material
allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's averment of
payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for
rescission had no relevance to the resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the
respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly
wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed
payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial
of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.

NILO V. CHIPONGIAN v. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, and

the CA
G.R. No. 162692, AUGUST 26, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Intervention; Words and Phrases; Intervention is a

remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by
such proceedings.Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded
in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a
right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. If an intervention makes a third
party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the
main case. Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings No. SP--797,
his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case,
rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the rules specifically applicable to special
proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, which deals with appeals in special
proceedings.

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Same; Same; Judgments; Final Judgment Rule; Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final
judgment rule by providing that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable.Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an
appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or
of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. In the context of
the final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and
judgments in special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case,
but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a
particular matter in the case.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Intervention; The dismissal of the petitioners intervention
constituted a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, that is,
his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister.The dismissal of the petitioners
intervention constituted a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell
under paragraph (c) of Section 1, supra, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim
against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was
a final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with either or both
paragraphs, which are boldly underscored above for easier reference, the dismissal was the
proper subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing of his
intervention.

Same; Same; Appeals; Special Proceedings; The proper mode of appealing a judgment or
final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal.The proper mode
of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by notice of appeal and record
on appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, viz.: Section 2. Modes
of appeal.(a) Ordinary appeal.The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a
judgment or final order in special proceedings has thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of
appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to
the adverse party.Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final
order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within
which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a
record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse
party, to wit: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is

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required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within
thirty (30) days from notice of judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas
corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final
order appealed from. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new
trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed. (n)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Record on Appeal; Considering that the petitioner did not
submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of
the judgment dismissing his intervention.Considering that the petitioner did not submit a
record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the
judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable.
He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to appeal, being statutory in nature,
required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As such, his
perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and
his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and
beyond review on appeal.

Facts:

The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, sister of Nilo Chipongian,
Isabel had predeceased Vicente. The couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel,
Vicente and Nilo had executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of
Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente.
Vicente executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not
extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel.

Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benite Lirio, a sister of Vicente, and Feodor
Benitez Aguilar, a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Vicente in RTC. The RTC appointed Feodor as the administrator of Vicentes estate.

Nilo intervened and sought to exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from
inclusion in the estate of Vicente by virtue of the affidavit executed by Vicente.

The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint-in-intervention.

Nilo instituted his petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that the RTC had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
his appeal, and denying his motion for reconsideration.

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The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit and ruled that failure to
comply with the requirement for payment on time of the appeal fees renders the decision
final.

Issue:

WON CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

Ruling

NO. The Court affirms the decision of the CA subject to the clarification on the correct
justification for the dismissal of the appeal being upon the petitioners failure to perfect his
appeal in accordance with Section 2(a) and Section 3 of the Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Intervention is a a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the

proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right
or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. If an intervention makes a third party a
litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the main
case. Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened, his complaint-in-intervention, once
admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof
subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court, which deals with appeals in special proceedings.

Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an appeal
may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable. In the context of the
final judgment rule, Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in
special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the
remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in
the case.

The dismissal of the petitioners intervention constituted a final determination in the

lower court of the rights of the party appealing, that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of
his deceased sister. As such, it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1, because it had the effect of
disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as under paragraph (e) of Section 1,
because it was a final determination in the trial court of his intervention. Conformably with
either or both paragraphs, the dismissal was the proper subject of an appeal in due course by
virtue of its nature of completely disposing of his intervention.

The proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings is by

notice of appeal and record on appeal. This is pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.

Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in
special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within which to

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perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on
appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party.

For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal
was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period
of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision
dismissing his intervention. However, the entire time from the filing of his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 2, 1998 until his receipt of the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration on March 18, 1999 should be deducted from the reckoning of the period to
perfect his appeal. He filed the notice of appeal on March 19, 1999, and paid the appellate
court docket fees on March 31, 1999. Initially, the RTC denied due course to the notice of
appeal on the ground that it had been filed beyond the reglementary period; hence, the
petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration against the order denying due course. On July
5, 1999, the RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the
notice of appeal, but still denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had
not perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees. Hence,
he filed a Motion to Set Aside Order, to which he appended the copies of the official receipts
of the payment of the appellate court docket fees. Nonetheless, on August 13, 1999, the RTC
denied the Motion to Set Aside Order, and a copy of the order of denial was received by his
counsel on August 27, 1999.

Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with
Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As
a result, the dismissal became final and immutable.

He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to appeal, being statutory in
nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As such,
his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional,
and his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final
and beyond review on appeal.

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA v. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and TABANGAO REALTY,
INC.
G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

When two identical actions are filed and one has already become final and executory, the
identical action sharing the same cause of action should be deemed included in the decision
rendered in the case that became final and executory. The pending case should have been
dismissed based on res judicata.

An appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration if it is final order is allowed. What

is not allowed is an appeal of a denial of an interlocutory order

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FACTS:

Shell entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products with
Pacific a single proprietorship belonging to petitioners Sps. Mendiola. To secure Pacifics
performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed a real estate
mortgage in favor of Shell covering their real estate and its improvements located in
Paraaque.

Pacific defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial

foreclosure proceedings. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to
be held at the main entrance of the Paraaque Municipal Hall, petitioners proceeded to the
announced venue on the scheduled date and time but did not witness any auction being
conducted. They later learned that the auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff
in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc.

After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency
remained and the same was not paid by petitioners. Thus, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to
recover the deficiency (Manila case). In his answer with counterclaim Ramon asserted that the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law.
Consequently, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the
extrajudicial foreclosure (Makati case).

Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in favor of
Shell. Sps. Mendiola appealed but the appeal was decided adversely with the CA affirming the
Manila RTCs decision and finding that he was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the
Makati case.

Undaunted, they next appealed to the Court which denied their petition for review and
upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. Nonetheless, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati
case, finding that there had been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled date and
that they had been consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their liability.

Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision but Makati RTC denied their motion.
Aggrieved, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal.

Instead of filing their appellees brief, petitioners submitted a motion to dismiss

appeal, mainly positing that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibited an appeal of the
order denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied petitioners motion to dismiss
appeal.

Hence, petitioners brought these special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition.

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ISSUE:

1) Whether or not CA committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining an appeal of the

denial of motion for reconsideration (NO)
2) Whether or not the Makati case could prosper independently of the Manila case (NO)

RULING:

1) The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit.

Appeal by Shell and Tabangao of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was not
proscribed. While it is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure expressly limited an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking
of an appeal from an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration, the Court issued
its Resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to approve certain amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and
65 of the Rules of Court effective on December 27, 2007. Among the amendments was the
delisting of an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of what are not
appealable. The amended rule now reads that an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not
an interlocutory order but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do
other than to execute the order. Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order
of dismissal itself.

2) Makati case should not prosper independently of the Manila case.

The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to proceed on the ground of litis
pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have been dismissed
on the ground of being barred by res judicata.

The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of
petitioners credit purchases under the distributorship agreement with Shell. Specifically, the
right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case
had Shell not validly foreclosed the mortgage. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed
the logical relation between the two actions.

Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the former
judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must

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have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d)
there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter
and cause of action.40

The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shells complaint to
recover the deficiency, and its decision on the merits already became final and executory.
Hence, the first, second and third elements were present.

Finally, as to whether there is identity of causes of action between the two (2) cases, the
conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently
unsound. The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. The test to
determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence
will sustain the actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or evidence will sustain the actions, then they are
considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.
Petitioners Makati case and Shells Manila case undeniably required the production of the
same evidence. In fact, Shells counsel faced a dilemma upon being required by the Makati
RTC to present the original copies of certain documents because the documents had been
made part of the records of the Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal
of the Manila RTCs judgment. Also, both cases arose from the same transaction (i.e., the
foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in invalidating the extrajudicial
foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shells right to recover the deficiency.

By virtue of the concurrence of the elements of res judicata, the immediate dismissal of
the Makati case would have been authorized.

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, petitioner, vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending partys
motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the
particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave
nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming party
has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Final Order and Interlocutory Order,

Distinguished.The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-
Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), thuswise: The distinction between a final order and
an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to
enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals

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with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the
merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

Same; Same; The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on
the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals.Whether an order is final or
interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is
appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court to the effect that appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable; but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil
action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-
Garrido v. Tortogo, 655 SCRA 553 (2011), is apt: xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from
an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily
suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case
for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental
questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower
court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has
been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the
judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is
certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Same; Same; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Under the fresh period rule, an aggrieved party
desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reckoned from receipt
of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.Section 3 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal.The appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall
be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) Under the rule,
Javellana had only the balance of three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within
which to perfect an appeal due to the timely filing of his motion for reconsideration
interrupting the running of the period of appeal. As such, his filing of the notice of appeal only
on July 19, 2000 did not perfect his appeal on time, as Priscilla insists. The seemingly correct
insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering that the Court meanwhile
adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), by which an
aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a fresh

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period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from receipt of
the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum seeking and possibly getting
a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
or supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.The Court
expounded on the nature and purpose of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and Issuance of Owners Duplicate Certificates of
Title In Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim, Petitioner, 624 SCRA 81 (2010): Forum
shopping is the act of a party litigant against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause or supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending
cases, there is identity of parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be
a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. For forum shopping to exist, both
actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts and circumstances and must
raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does not exist where
different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two
objectives were sought.

FACTS:

Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed
of conditional sale two parcels of land located in Barangay Mallis, Guiguinto, Bulacan. They
agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the deed and the balance of
P80,000.00 upon the registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens System (the
registration being undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that
should Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose
(Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma Jose, would receive the payment of
the balance and proceed with the application for registration. After Margarita died and with
Juvenal having predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendors undertaking fell on the
shoulders of Priscilla, being Margaritas sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the properties under the Torrens System,

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and, instead, began to improve the properties by dumping filling materials therein with the
intention of converting the parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.

Faced with Priscillas refusal to comply, Javellana commenced an action for specific
performance, injunction, and damages (Civil Case No. 79-M-97) against her in the Regional
Trial Court. Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not state a
cause of action which the RTC granted on June 24, 1999. Javellana filed a motion for
reconsideration which, on June 21, 2000, the RTC denied. Accordingly, Javellana filed a notice
of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order.
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to
assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his complaint which the CA
eventually denied.
CA then promulgated its decision in appealed case reversing and setting aside the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 79-M-97, and remanding the records to the RTC for further proceedings in
accordance with law. The CA explained that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action; that Priscilla, as sole heir, succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with
respect to the parcels of land.

ISSUES:

Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in not outrightly
dismissing Javellanas appeal because:

1. the June 21, 2000 RTC order was not appealable;

2. the notice of appeal had been filed belatedly; and
3. Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of his appeal pending in the
CA.

RULING:

1. Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal (June 21, 2000
RTC order) was a final order and appealable.

The denial of Javellanas motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final
order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an appeal from the final
order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified that the prohibition against appealing
an order denying a motion for reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

2. Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA.

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Priscilla insists that Javellana filed his notice of appeal out of time. She points out that
he received a copy of the June 24, 1999 order on July 9, 1999, and filed his motion for
reconsideration on July 21, 1999 (or after the lapse of 12 days); that the RTC denied his motion
for reconsideration through the order of June 21, 2000, a copy of which he received on July 13,
2000; that he had only three days from July 13, 2000, or until July 16, 2000, within which to
perfect an appeal; and that having filed his notice of appeal on July 19, 2000, his appeal should
have been dismissed for being tardy by three days beyond the expiration of the reglementary
period.

The seemingly correct insistence of Priscilla cannot be upheld, however, considering

that the Court meanwhile adopted the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, by
which an aggrieved party desirous of appealing an adverse judgment or final order is allowed a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC reckoned from
receipt of the order denying a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has already
retroactively extended the fresh period rule to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

3. No forum shopping was committed.

In Young v. Sy, in which the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the orders
concerning the dismissal of her case due to non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in
the CA assailing the same orders four months later, the Court ruled that the successive filings
of the notice of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain the same objective of nullifying
the trial courts dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that warranted the dismissal of
both cases.

Yet, the outcome in Young v. Sy cannot be applied here even if the orders of the RTC
being challenged through appeal and the petition for certiorari were the same. This is because
the appeal and the petition for certiorari actually sought different objectives. In his
appeal, Javellana aimed to undo the RTCs erroneous dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97 to
clear the way for his judicial demand for specific performance to be tried and determined in
due course by the RTC; but his petition for certiorari had the ostensible objective to prevent
(Priscilla) from developing the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case
until his appeal is finally resolved.

ROLANDO SOFIO and RUFIO SOFIO, petitioners, vs. ALBERTO I. VALENZUELA,

GLORIA I. VALENZUELA, REMEDIOS I. VALENZUELA, and CESAR I. VALEN-ZUELA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 157810 February 15, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

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The Court will not override the finality and immutability of a judgment based only on the
negligence of a partys counsel in timely taking all the proper recourses from the judgment. To
justify an override, the counsels negligence must not only be gross but must also be shown to
have deprived the party the right to due process.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; A decision

that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The
reason is that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere; and it is essential
for the effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.A decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. This
doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice to the effect that, at the risk of occasional error, the
judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set by law. The rea son is that
litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere; and it is essential for the
effective and efficient administration of justice that once a judgment has become final the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Given this doctrine, courts
must guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result, and must frown upon
any attempt to prolong controversies. The only exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the
correction of clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to
any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the judgments rendering execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains
here.

Same; Same; Same; Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc; Judgment nunc pro tunc is one placing in
proper form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the
truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors,
such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may
have been.We stress that a judgment nunc pro tunc has been defined and characterized
thuswise: The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and
the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the
record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to
render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did
erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been. (Wilmerding vs. Corbin Banking Co., 28 South., 640, 641; 126 Ala., 268.) Based
on such definition and characterization, the petitioners situation did not fall within the scope
of a nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was not mere
clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the
reinstatement of the DARAB decision.

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Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Any act performed by the counsel within the scope of his general
or implied authority is still regarded as an act of the client.Although the petitioners former
counsel was blameworthy for the track their case had taken, there is no question that any act
performed by the counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is still regarded
as an act of the client. In view of this, even the negligence of the former counsel should bind
them as his clients. To hold otherwise would result to the untenable situation in which every
defeated party, in order to salvage his cause, would simply claim neglect or mistake on the
part of his counsel as a ground for reversing the adverse judgment. There would then be no
end to litigation, for every shortcoming of the counsel could become the subject of challenge
by his client through another counsel who, if he should also be found wanting, would similarly
be disowned by the same client through yet another counsel, and so on ad infinitum. This
chain of laying blame could render court proceedings indefinite, tentative and subject to
reopening at any time by the mere replacement of the counsel.

Same; Same; When the counsels mistake is so great and so serious that the client is
prejudiced and is denied his day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the clients deprivation of his property without due process of law, the client is not
concluded by his counsels mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client
another chance to present his case.The gross negligence of counsel alone would not even
warrant a deviation from the principle of finality of judgment, for the client must have to show
that such negligence resulted in the denial of due process to the client. When the counsels
mistake is so great and so serious that the client is prejudiced and is denied his day in court, or
when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the clients deprivation of his
property without due process of law, the client is not concluded by his counsels mistakes and
the case can be reopened in order to give the client another chance to present his case. As
such, the test herein is whether their former counsels negligence deprived the petitioners of
due process of law. For one to properly claim gross negligence on the part of his counsel, he
must show that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients
cause. Considering that the Court has held that the failure to file the appellants brief can
qualify as simple negligence but cannot amount to gross negligence that justifies the
annulment of the proceedings, the failure to file an appellees brief may be similarly treated.

FACTS:

Respondents Alberto, Gloria, Remedios, and Cesar, all surnamed Valenzuela, are
brothers and sisters. They are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in
Barangay Ayungon, Valladolid, Negros Occidental. Alberto had been planting sugarcane in the
entire property, but poor drainage had led him to abandon his cultivation of an .80-hectare
portion of the property. Unknown to the respondents, petitioner Rolando Sofio, a son of their
tenant in another lot, had obtained permission to farm the abandoned area for free from
Socorro Valenzuela, the respondents mother who was then still managing the property. In
succeeding years, Alberto had also left other portions of the property uncultivated because of
the low price of sugar. Apparently, Rolando had also taken over the vacated portions to plant
palay. He shared the cultivation with his brother, co-petitioner Rufio Sofio. Respondent Gloria

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learned for the first time that Rolando had been permitted by her mother to cultivate the .80
hectare portion without paying any rentals; and that the petitioners had actually expanded
their cultivation to a total area of 1.8 hectares. Respondent demanded the return of the land
but the petitioners refused the demand.

Subsequently, emancipation patents (EPs) were issued to Rolando and Rufio covering
their respective areas of tillage. The respondents brought in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against the petitioners, seeking the
cancellation of the EPs, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that the petitioners
cultivation of their land had been illegal because they had not consented to it. DARAB ruled
in favor of the petitioner. However, CA reversed DARAB on May 27, 1998 and ruled in favor of
the respondents ordering the return of the agricultural land.

The decision of May 27, 1998 became final and executory after the petitioners neither
moved for reconsideration nor appealed by certiorari to the Court. The respondents later filed
an ex parte motion for execution. The writ of execution was then issued. The petitioners then
filed in the CA a motion to recall entry of judgment with motion for leave of court to file a
motion for reconsideration alleging that their former counsel, Atty. Romulo A. Deles, had
been guilty of gross negligence for not filing their appellees brief in the CA, and for not filing a
motion for reconsideration against the May 27, 1998 decision of the CA. The motion was then
denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the CA is correct in denying the motion to recall the entry of judgment on
the ground that the decision had long become final and executor.
2. Whether the CA is correct in denying the motion to recall the entry of judgment on
the ground that petitioners counsel negligence is binding upon them.

RULING:

1. The Court finds no cause to disturb the decision of the CA promulgated on May 27,
1998, especially as the decision had long become final and executory.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is intended to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the correction of
clerical errors; (b) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to any party; (c)
void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgments
rendering execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions obtains here.

Petitioners alleged that their situation fall within the scope of a nunc pro tunc
amendment. However, the object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new
judgment and the ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper

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form on the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the
truth, so as to make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors,
such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it
did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the
judgment may have been.

Based on such definition and characterization, the petitioners situation did not fall
within the scope of a nunc pro tunc amendment, considering that what they were seeking was
not mere clarification, but the complete reversal in their favor of the final judgment and the
reinstatement of the DARAB decision.

2. Although the petitioners former counsel was blameworthy for the track their case had
taken, there is no question that any act performed by the counsel within the scope of his
general or implied authority is still regarded as an act of the client. In view of this, even the
negligence of the former counsel should bind them as his clients.

However, when the counsels mistake is so great and so serious that the client is
prejudiced and is denied his day in court, or when the counsel is guilty of gross negligence
resulting in the clients deprivation of his property without due process of law, the client is not
concluded by his counsels mistakes and the case can be reopened in order to give the client
another chance to present his case.

For one to properly claim gross negligence on the part of his counsel, he must show
that the counsel was guilty of nothing short of a clear abandonment of the clients cause.
Considering that the Court has held that the failure to file the appellants brief can
qualify as simple negligence but cannot amount to gross negligence that justifies the
annulment of the proceedings, the failure to file an appellees brief may be similarly treated.

Moreover, the petitioners themselves were guilty of being negligent for not monitoring
the developments in their case. They learned about the adverse CA decision more than two
years after the decision had become final and executory. Had they vigilantly monitored their
case, they themselves would have sooner discovered the adverse decision and avoided their
plight. It was the petitioners duty, as the clients, to have kept in constant touch with their
former counsel if only to keep themselves abreast of the status and progress of their case. They
could not idly sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case.

JUSTINA MANIEBO v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 158708, 10 August 2010, EN BANC (Bersamin, J.)

An appeal under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either
dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay,

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or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may
process by requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss,
within 10 days from notice.

The Mayor of the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro issued a

promotional permanent appointment to (petitioner) Maniebo as Cashier III in the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer because she appeared to possess the qualifications for the position,
including the Career Service (Professional) Eligibility appearing in her Personal Data Sheet.
When the report of her rating was verified against the Masterlist of Eligibles, however, it
was discovered that the Maniebo had actually failed in the civil service examination for
obtaining a rating of only 60%. The CSC Regional Office (CSCRO) No. IV subsequently
held a preliminary investigation that resulted in the finding that a prima facie case of
falsification existed against the Maniebo. In her defense, Maniebo denied knowledge of the
falsified nature of her eligibility rating.

CSCRO No. IV then rendered its decision finding Maniebo guilty of Possession of
Spurious report of rating, falsification, and grave misconduct, and accorded the penalty of
dismissal. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the said decision and denied
Maniebo's subsequent motion for reconsideration. On appeal, The Court of Appeals (CA)
found her petition for review defective and dismissed it for Maniebo's failure to accompany
the petition for review with the requisite certified true copies of the material portions of the
record referred to therein, i.e., the preliminary investigation and charge for possession of
spurious report of rating, the answer, the decision of CSCRO no. IV, the CSC Resolution,
and other supporting papers and the evidences submitted. The CA also denied her motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this petition where Maniebo argues that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of a proper appeal. She insisted that the
dismissal of her appeal due to technicalities would constitute a deprivation of property
without due process of law because what was at stake herein was her right to employment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing Maniebo's

petition for review for failure to attach certified copy of the annexes when the rules and
jurisprudence do not require that all annexes attached to the petition should be certified.

RULING:

NO. The CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible one. Its dismissal was
founded on the correct application of the applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court expressly lists down the pleadings and other matters that a petition for
review should contain, thus:

Section 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the
full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement
of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review;

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(c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true

copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from,
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing
that it was filed within the period fixed herein.

The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers. The requirement is intended to immediately
enable the CA to determine whether to give due course to the appeal or not by having all the
material necessary to make such determination before it. This is because an appeal under
Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may either dismiss if it finds the
petition to be patently without merit, or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the
questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by
requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within
10 days from notice.

VENANCIO GIVERO, et al. v. MAXIMO GIVERO and LORETO GIVERO

G.R. No. 157476, 16 March 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

An appeal brought under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court restricts the review
only to questions of law.

An action for quieting of title to and recovery of real property was filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) by Maximo and Loreto Givero against Venancio Givero, et al. The
dispute involves a portion of Lot No. 2618 of the Matnog Cadastre (with an area of 5,000
square meters, more or less) that Givero, et al., particularly Venancio, have claimed to belong
to them, but which claim was denied by Maximo and Loreto who have insisted that the
whole of Lot No. 2618, consisting of 12,952 square meters, more or less, was the share of
their late father Rufino Givero, a brother of Venancio, pursuant to the oral partition among 11
children (including Venancio and Rufino) made by the spouses Teodorico Givero and
Severina Genavia.

The RTC ruled in favor of Maximo and Loreto. The trial court held that the
testimonies of Venancios brother Luciano and sister Maria saying that the property in
question is the share of their brother Rufino and that the share of Venancio is found in
Balocawe, is corroborated by the judicial admission made by Venancio in his answer that the
Balocawe properties were divided among some of his brothers and sisters, retaining for
himself 7,580 sq. meters under Title No. P- 9542. His payment of the tax delinquency of said
property, granting the same is true, did not make him the owner of said property. But the
most telling evidence against the claim of ownership by Venancio is the unrebutted
testimony of Maximo to the effect that the property claimed by Venancio is within the
original area of 12,952 sq. meters in the Deed of Donation. Venancio also admitted that the

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share of his brother Rufino, was given to his widow in the form of a donation in which
Venancio was a witness. Having participated in the delivery of the share of Rufino to
his heirs and knowing the metes and bounds of said property, he is estopped from claiming
ownership of any portion of that property. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Givero, et al. may assail the fact that Maximo and Loreto did not
preponderantly establish the existence of oral partition.
RULING:

NO. What Givero, et al. assail in this appeal is the evaluation of the credibility of the
testimonies of Luciano and Maria, Venancio's brother and sister, who affirmed their own
participation in the oral partition by Teodorico. Furthermore, Givero, et al. insist that
Maximo and Loreto did not preponderantly establish the existence of the oral partition.
Givero, et al. thereby raised factual issues. However, the Court may not review all over
again the findings of fact of the RTC, especially as such findings were affirmed by the CA.
This appeal is brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, whose Section 1 restricts the
review only to questions of law.

The restriction of the review to questions of law emanates from the Court's not being
a trier of facts. As such, the Court cannot determine factual issues in appeals taken from
the lower courts. As the consequence of the restriction, the Court accords high respect, if
not conclusive effect, to the findings of fact by the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, unless
there exists an exceptional reason to disregard the findings of fact, like the following,
namely:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

None of the exceptions has any application herein. Besides, the findings of fact
upheld by the CA are entirely consistent with the established facts.

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DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG v. RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA

G.R. No. 156375, 30 May 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not limited in its review of the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to the issues assigned by the appellant, but can decide on the
basis of the entire records of the proceedings of the trial court and such memoranda or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

Renato and Melba Zamora (Zamoras) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer in
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, alleging that the Dolores Adora Macaslang (Dolores)
sold to the latter, a residential land that the Zamoras requested to be allowed to live in the
house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. They
further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the petitioner failed or refused to
vacate the premises.

Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint, Dolores did not
file her answer. The Municipal Trial Circuit Court declared her in default and proceeded to
receive Zamoras oral testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, the MTCC rendered
judgment against her.

Dolores appealed to the Regional Trial Court alleging that extrinsic fraud was
practiced upon her which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason
of which she has been impaired of her rights and that she has a meritorious defense in that
there was no actual sale considering that the absolute deed of sale relied upon by the
Zamoras is a patent nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and
trickery. RTC ruled in favor of Dolores and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. Hence, Zamoras appealed to the Court of Appeals, assailing the RTCs
decision for disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or
non-existence of a cause of action. CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision and
reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the Zamoras. CA ruled that the RTC could not
resolve issues that were not assigned by the petitioner in her appeal memorandum.

Dolores disagrees with the CA and contends that the RTC as an appellate court could
rule on the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action and the lack of demand to
vacate even if not assigned in the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC may rule upon an issue not raised on appeal.

RULING:

YES. The CA might have been correct had the appeal been a first appeal from the
RTC to the CA or another proper superior court, in which instance Section 8 of Rule 51,
which applies to appeals from the RTC to the CA, imposes the express limitation of the

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review to only those specified in the assignment of errors or closely related to or dependent
on an assigned error and properly argued in the appellants brief, viz:

Section 8. Questions that may be decided. No error which does not affect
the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment
appealed from or the proceeding therein will be considered unless stated in
the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned
error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain
errors and clerical errors.

But Dolores appeal herein, being taken from the decision of the MTCC to the RTC,
was governed by a different rule, specifically Section 18 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:

Section 18. xxx

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had
in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.

As such, the RTC, in exercising appellate jurisdiction, was not limited to the errors
assigned in the Dolores appeal memorandum, but could decide on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the trial court and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the RTC.

SPOUSES ELBE and ERLINDA LEBIN v. VILMA MIRASOL and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT BRANCH XXVII
G.R .No. 164255, 7 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. The party who intends to appeal must always comply with the
procedures and rules governing appeal, or else the right of appeal may be lost or squandered.

Spouses Elbe and Erlinda Lebin (Spouse Lebin) offered to the administrator if the
Estate of L.J. Hodges to purchase Lot 18. The administrator sought the judicial approval of the
offer, stating that Erlinda Lebin was the actual occupant of the lot. Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted the motion for approval of the offer. Vilma Mirasol (Mirasol) also offered to purchase
the lot where her house stood which was initially identified as Lot 4, but subsequent survey
revealed that her house was actually built on Lot 18. Mirasol filed on December 6, 1985 a
petition for relief. Pending resolution of the petition for relief, Spouses Lebin paid the last
installment for the lot and moved for execution of deed of sale, but was not acted upon. The

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RTC, on May 3, 1995, RTC issued an order ruling that the property be divided in two equal
portions between Sps. Lebin and Mirasol.

On March 24, 1995, Spouses Lebin moved for reconsideration and/or new trial but
was denied by the RTC in an order issued on March 2, 1998. This prompted Spouses Lebin to
file notice of appeal on March 27, 1998, and allegedly a record on appeal on May 5, 1998, but
Mirasol moved to dismiss their appeal on June 15, 2000 insisting on their belated filing. RTC
granted the motion to dismiss on February 1, 2002. On March 12, 2002, Spouses Lebin moved
for reconsideration but was denied on May 21, 2004. Spouses Lebin directly appealed to the
Supreme Court questioning the February 2002 and May 2004 orders of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing Spouses Lebins appeal for their failure to
timely file a record on appeal.

RULING:

NO. Spouses Lebin filed the record on appeal 43 days from March 23, 1998, the day
they were served with the order denying their motion for consideration/new trial dated
March 2, 1998. They should have filed the record on appeal within 30 days from their notice
of the judgment to perfect their appeal.

Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that judgment or final order in
special proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. The reason for this is the multi-part
nature of special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally determined and
terminated independently of other parts. It enables trial court to continue with the rest of
the case and affords appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the appealed
matter. The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and should be exercised in manner
prescribed by law. Filing of the record on appeal, serving a copy upon adverse part, and
paying docket and lawful fees are required to perfect an appeal. Non- compliance may be
ground for dismissal of appeal.

The motion of reconsideration vis-a-vis the order of May 3, 1995 interrupted the
running of the period of 30 days. The period to appeal started to run from the date of receipt
of the May 3, 1995 order which was on May 15, 1995. They filed their motion for
reconsideration on May 24, 1995. By then, nine (9) days out of the 30 days already elapsed. The
May 2, 1998 order was received on May 23, 1998. Thus, the period to appeal resumed on the
date of the receipt of order and ended 21 days after which was on April 13, 1998. Yet, Sps. Lebin
filed record on appeal only on May 5, 1998 which was 22 days beyond the end of reglementary
period. For that reason, RTC rightly granted Mirasols motion to dismiss the record on
appeal. Failure to file on time rendered the orders of the RTC final and unappealable.

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MAGLANA RICE AND CORN MILL, INC. and RAMON DAO v. ANNIE TAN and MANUEL
TAN
G.R. No. 159051, 21 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J).

Appeal under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law subject to some exceptions. A

question of law must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by litigants.

A vehicular accident involved a truck owned by Maglana Rice and Corn Mill, Inc.
(Maglana), driven by its employee, Ramon Dao (Dao) and a sedan owned by Spouses Annie
and Manuel Tan (Spouses Tan), driven by the latter. The truck hit the car at its rear causing
damage to both vehicles. Spouses Tan demanded for reimbursement for repair of car but
Maglana refused demand. Consequently, Spouses Tan filed complaint in Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC). Both gave different and conflicting version of their stories. MTCC
accorded greater credence to version of Spouses Tan. Regional Trial Court (RTC) upheld
MTCC decision. On appeal, Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed RTC. Hence, the appeal to
Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorati reiterating that the fault for the accident
was attributable to Spouses Tan.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the appeal should be outrightly dismissed.

2. Whether or not the appeal was frivolous making Maglana and Dao liable for treble costs
of suit.

RULING:

1. YES. The issue that the appeal posed concerns the real cause of the vehicular accident.
The issue was obviously a factual one because it requires ascertainment of who among the
drivers were negligent. As such, the appeal failed. Petition for review on certiorari,
according to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, shall raise only questions of law. The
appeal raised question of fact which arouse from the difference as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts. It is not reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Court is not a trier of
fats because the appreciation of factual issues are function of lower courts, whose
findings are binding subject to exceptions. It include: a) findings grounded on speculation;
b)inference manifestly mistaken or absurd; c) there is grave abuse of discretion; d)
judgment based on misapprehension of facts; e) finding of facts are conflicting; f)CA went
beyond the issues of the case; g) findings are contrary to those of the trial court; h) findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; i) facts set
forth are not disputed by respondent; j)findings of facts are premised on supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by evidence on record; and k) CA manifestly overlooked
relevant facts not disputed which, if considered, would justify different conclusion.

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2. YES. Maglana and Dao presented no ground sufficient to persuade the Court to treat their
appeal as under those exceptions as to warrant review of uniform findings of fact and
conclusions made by MTCC, RTC, CA. They did not desist despite their attorney being aware
of the limitation to questions of law of any appeal to the Court. The appeal was made
notwithstanding being patently frivolous. Frivolous appeal is one where no error can be
brought, or where result is obvious, or arguments are totally bereft of merit. Losing party has
no right to prosecute frivolous appeal. Given the frivolousness of the appeal, treble costs of
suit should be imposed.

CATALINA BALAIS-MABANAG v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY,

CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ, and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ
G.R. No. 153142, 29 March 2010, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to
forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the
opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the
execution of a final decision.

The Coronels executed a document entitled receipt of down payment, stipulating that
they received from (respondent) Ramona, through Ramona's mother, (respondent)
Concepcion, the sum of P50,000.00 as downpayment on the total purchase price of
P1,240,000.00 of their inherited house and lot. It stipulated therein that the TCT thereof
shall be transferred immediately upon the receipt of the downpayment, and will
consequently execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona, provided that the latter
shall also immediately pay the balance on the purchase price.

However, later on, the Coronels sold the property to Catalina (petitioner) for the
higher price of P1,580,000.00 after the latter delivered an initial sum of P300,000.00. For
this reason, the Coronels rescinded their contract with Ramona by depositing her down
payment in the bank in trust for Ramona.

Concepcion, (through an attorney-in-fact) and Ramona, filed a complaint for specific

performance and damages and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the TCT.
Whereas, Catalina had a notice of adverse claim annotated on the TCT and filed a motion
for intervention in the civil case instituted by Concepcion. In the meantime, the Coronels
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioner and a new TCT was issued in the
name of the Catalina.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Concepcion and Ramona. The CA affirmed. Thereafter,
the decision of the RTC became final and executory.

Acting on Ramona and Concepcion's motion for execution, the RTC issued a writ of
execution on October 1, 1997. However, Catalina and the Coronels filed their motion to stay
execution and supplemental motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on March 10,
1998.

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Upon failure of the Catalina and the Coronels to comply with the writ of execution,
the RTC approved the motion for appointment of suitable person to execute deed, etc., and
ordered Branch Clerk of the RTC to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona in
lieu of Catalina and the Coronels. Thereafter, the latter filed in the CA a petition for
certiorari assailing the RTCs orders dated October 1, 1997 and March 10, 1998, but the CA
dismissed the petition on July 30, 1998. The SC also dismissed the petition for review for
being filed out of time. Thereafter, Ramona and Concepcion moved for the resolution of
their pending motion. After the RTC granted the same, Catalina moved to reconsider the
order but was again denied. Following the denial, Catalina commenced a special civil action
of certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs action. The CA dismissed her petition and denied
her motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the registration by the Registrar of Deeds of the
deed of absolute sale despite the lack of indication of the citizenship of the buyer of the
subject property; and in sustaining the order of the RTC directing the Branch Clerk of Court
to execute the deed of absolute sale without first requiring the defendants to execute the
deed of absolute sale as required by the decision.

RULING:

NO. Firstly, in the complaint, Concepcion categorically averred that she was a
Filipino citizen, neither was this ever denied nor disproved by Catalina during the trial or,
at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed
to have waived the objection pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."

Secondly, res judicata barred Catalina's objection. Catalina cannot now insist that the
RTC did not settle the question of the Ramona and Concepcion's qualifications to own land
due to non- citizenship. It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity. A judgment involving the same parties, the
same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to every matter offered
and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any other
admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties,
identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of action.

It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge
Ramonas qualifications to acquire land. Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, only the

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Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the
capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is
based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any
individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen,
the affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual.

Moreover, the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of Court was valid.
The fact that the petitioner and her counsel maneuvered to thwart, or, at least, to delay the
inevitable execution of the judgment warranted the RTCs directing the Branch Clerk of
Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the judgment. The RTCs effort to
implement the judgment could not be stymied by the petitioners deliberate refusal to
comply with the judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for the RTC to order the Branch
Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona, which move was
precisely authorized by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or
other specific acts; vesting title. If a judgment directs a party who execute a conveyance of
land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other
specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified,
the court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other
person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by
the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of
directing a conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in
others, which shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.

CATALINA CHU, et al. v. SPOUSES FERNANDO CUNANAN and

TRINIDAD CUNANAN, et al.
G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

For res judicata to bar institution of subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: a) former judgment must be final; b)rendered by a court having jurisdiction over subject
matter and parties; c) must be judgment on the merits; and d) there must be identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action between first and second actions.

Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Spouses Chu) executed a deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage involving five parcels of land to Trinidad Cunanan (Cunanan). They
agreed that the ownership would be transferred only upon complete payment. Cunanan
was able to transfer the title to her name without knowledge of Spouses. She also
transferred two lots to Spouses Amado and Gloria Carlos (Spouses Carlos) and assigned
remaining lots to Cool Town Realty. Spouses Chu filed a case to recover the unpaid balance
which they later on amended to a complaint seeking annulment of the deed of sale. They
impleaded Cool Town Realty and Registry of Deeds. Considering that Spouses Carlos sold the
lots to Benelda Estate, Spouses Chu impleaded the latter as additional defendant. Benelda
Estate filed a motion to dismiss claiming that complaint states no cause of action because

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it had acted in good faith in buying the lots. The case against Benelda Estate was dismissed on
appeal.

Spouses Chu, Spouses Cunanan, and Cool Town Realty entered into compromise
agreement wherein 50% of Spouses Cunanans share in a parcel of land was transferred to
Spouses Chu for full settlement of their case. Regional Trial Court (RTC) approved the
compromise agreement. Spouses Chu brought another suit against Spouses Carlos and
Benelda Estate seeking cancellation of the title. Benelda Estate moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of bar by prior judgment. They also impleaded Spouses Cunanan who moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of bar by prior judgment and that Spouses Chu
already waived their claim. RTC denied the motion holding that there was no identity of
parties and subject matter and that Spouses Cunanan did not establish that Spouses Chu
waived their claim by virtue of compromise agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second suit filed by Spouses Chu is barred by res judicata although
the compromise agreement did not expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and made no
reference to the lots now registered under Benelda Estates name.

RULING:

YES. Compromise agreement encompasses objects specifically specified therein

and may include other objects by necessary implication. Being expressly
acknowledged as a juridical agreement between parties, it has the effect and authority of
res judicata upon parties. In the construction of compromise agreement, it must be read as a
whole. The intent of the parties was to settle all the claims against each other and all
respective claims alleged in the complaint, which was broad enough to cover whatever claims
that Spouses Chu might assert based on the deed of sale. To limit the compromise agreement
would contravene the objective of the civil case filed which was to enforce or to rescind the
entire deed of sale. Clearly, Spouses Chu splitted their action. Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court prohibits splitting of cause of action because there would be no end to litigation.

The contravention merited dismissal of case on the ground of res judicata. The old
axiom was founded on broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should
be an end to litigation and that an individual should not be vexed twice for one and the same
cause. The elements of res judicata were present. The first case was terminated by compromise
agreement approved by the RTC which has jurisdiction over the cause of action being
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The compromise agreement explicitly settled the entirety
of the case by resolving all claims of the parties. There is identity of parties when parties in
both action are the same or there is privity between them or they are the successor in
interest. The requirement of identity of parties was fully met because although Spouses Carlos
and Benelda Estate were not part of the compromise agreement, they were privies of Spouses
Cunanan as transferees and successor in interest. Both case were rooted in one cause of

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action failure to pay of Spouses Cunanan. The contract was single and indivisible; thus, there
can only be one action where the contract is entire.

ANDREW D. FYFE, RICHARD T. NUTTALL, AND RICHARD J. WALD v. PHILIPPINE

AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 160071, FIRST DIVISION, June 06, 2016, BERSAMIN, J.

Petitioners should have filed the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
considering that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law has limited the ground of review to "questions
of law." Accordingly, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal of the petitioners because pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court an appeal of questions of law arising in the courts in
the first instance is by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

It is noted, however, that since the promulgation of the assailed decision by the CA on
May 30, 2003, the law on the matter underwent changes. On February 4, 2004. Republic Act No.
9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) was passed by Congress, and was approved by
the President on April 2, 2004. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285, the Court promulgated on
September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, which are now the present rules of procedure governing arbitration. Among others,
the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution requires an appeal by petition for
review to the CA of the final order of the RTC confirming, vacating, correcting or modifying a
domestic arbitral award.

FACTS:

In 1998, the respondent underwent rehabilitation proceedings in the Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC), which issued an order dated July 1, 1998 decreeing, among
others, the suspension of all claims for payment against the respondent. To convince its
creditors to approve the rehabilitation plan, the respondent decided to hire technical advisers
with recognized experience in the airline industry. This led the respondent through its then
Director Luis Juan K. Virata to consult with people in the industry, and in due course came to
meet Peter W. Foster, formerly of Cathay Pacific Airlines. Foster, along with Michael R.
Scantlebury, negotiated with the respondent on the details of a proposed technical services
agreement. Foster and Scantlebury subsequently organized Regent Star Services Ltd. (Regent
Star) under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. On January 4, 1999, the respondent and
Regent Star entered into a Technical Services Agreement (TSA) for the delivery of technical and
advisory or management services to the respondent, effective for five years, or from January 4,
1999 until December 31, 2003.

In addition to Foster and Scantlebury, Regent Star engaged the petitioners in

respective capacities, specifically: Andrew D. Fyfe as Senior Ground Services and Training
Adviser; Richard J. Wald as Senior Maintenance and Engineering Adviser; and Richard T.

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Nuttall as Senior Commercial Adviser. The petitioners commenced to render their services to
the respondent, immediately after the TSA was executed.

On July 26, 1999, the respondent dispatched a notice to Regent Star terminating the
TSA on the ground of lack of confidence effective July 31, 1999. In its notice, the respondent
demanded the offsetting of the penalties due to the petitioners with the two-year advance
advisory fees it had paid to Regent Star.

On June 8, 1999, the petitioners, along with Scantlebury and Wald, wrote to the
respondent to seek clarification on the status of the TSA in view of the appointment of Foster,
Scantleburry and Nuttall as members of the Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver (PRR) for the
respondent. A month later, Regent Star sent to the respondent another letter expressing
disappointment over the respondent's ignoring the previous letter, and denying the
respondent's claim for refund and set-off. Regent Star then proposed therein that the issue be
submitted to arbitration in accordance with the TSA.

Thereafter, the petitioners initiated arbitration proceedings in the Philippine Dispute

Resolution Center, Inc. (PDRCI) pursuant to the TSA. After due proceedings, the PDRCI
rendered its decision ordering the respondent to pay termination penalties.

Respondent filed its Application to Vacate Arbitral Award in the Regional Trial Court
which was eventually granted.

The petitioners appealed to the CA by notice of appeal. The CA promulgated the now
assailed resolution granting the respondent's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. It declared that the
appropriate remedy against the order of the RTC vacating the award was a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for being an
inappropriate remedy.
2. Whether the panel of arbitrators has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners claim.

RULING:

1. CA did not err in dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for availing of an
inappropriate remedy.

The CA emphasized that the petitioners should have filed the petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 considering that Section 29 of the Arbitration Law has
limited the ground of review to "questions of law." Accordingly, the CA correctly
dismissed the appeal of the petitioners because pursuant to Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court an appeal of questions of law arising in the courts in the first instance is by petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45.

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It is noted, however, that since the promulgation of the assailed decision by the CA on
May 30, 2003, the law on the matter underwent changes. On February 4, 2004. Republic Act
No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004) was passed by Congress, and was
approved by the President on April 2, 2004. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285, the Court
promulgated on September 1, 2009 in A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC the Special Rules of Court on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, which are now the present rules of procedure governing
arbitration. Among others, the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution
requires an appeal by petition for review to the CA of the final order of the RTC
confirming, vacating, correcting or modifying a domestic arbitral award.

Although the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides that the
appropriate remedy from an order of the RTC vacating a domestic arbitral award is an appeal
by petition for review in the CA, not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
the Court cannot set aside and reverse the assailed decision on that basis because the decision
was in full accord with the law or rule in force at the time of its promulgation.

2. Panel of Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitioners'

claim.

The SEC's suspension order effective July 1, 1998 deprived the arbitration panel of the
jurisdiction to hear any claims against the respondent. The claim for payment brought against
a distressed corporation like the respondent should not prosper following the issuance of the
suspension order by the SEC, regardless of when the action was filed.

JUANITO MAGSINO v. ELENA DE OCAMPO and RAMON GUICO

G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition for review to be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders
of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and the
requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply
with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition for review.

FACTS:

The petitioner filed against the respondents a complaint for forcible entry with prayer
for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order in the MTC. The
MTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents. On appeal, the RTC rendered its
decision affirming the judgment of the MTC.

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Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for review. The CA

promulgated its first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for review holding thusly that
it is procedurally flawed because the petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings
and other material portions as would support the allegations of the petition, such as: (a) Copy
of the Complaint, Answer, and Motion to Dismiss; and (b) Copies of the appeal memoranda
filed by the parties.

The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the first assailed resolution, arguing
therein that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC submitted with the petition for review
were sufficient for the CA to resolve the issues without resort to the record because the issues
involved are questions of law. Furthermore, should the CA have really desired to inform itself
more, all that it needed to do was simply to order the elevation of the records, and that all
rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative of doing substantial justice.

The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration for evident want of merit.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that
the petitioner did not comply with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court (NO)

RULING:

The appeal of the petitioner absolutely lacks merit.

As earlier mentioned, the CA issued the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition
for review because the petitioner did not attach to his petition the complaint, the answer, and
the motion to dismiss, all filed in the MTC; and the copies of the parties memoranda on
appeal presented in the RTC. Such dismissal was pursuant to Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:

Section 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other
lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof.

We begin by reminding the petitioner that the right to appeal is not a natural right and
is not part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance
with the law. Being the party who sought to appeal, he must comply with the requirements of
the relevant rules; otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to appeal. It cannot be
overemphasized, indeed, that the procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of
Court must be followed because strict compliance with them was indispensable for the orderly
and speedy disposition of justice.

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The CA was only just in denying his motion for reconsideration through the second
assailed resolution. A careful perusal of the said provision would reveal that the documents or
annexes therein mentioned are required to be appended to the petition and the mandatory
character of such requirement may be inferred from Section 3 of Ruled 42. Precisely, the
annexes mentioned in Section 2(d) of Rule 42 are required to be appended to the petition in
order to enable this Court to determine even without consulting the record if the petition is
patently without merit or the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration, in which case the petition should be dismissed outright, or whether there is a
need to require the respondent to comment on the petition. In short, the mere fact that a
petition for review is filed does not call for the elevation of the record, which means that until
this Court finds that the elevation of the record is necessary, such record should remain with
the trial court during the pendency of the appeal.

In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled with the
unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply with the
attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition.

THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,

CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, respondents.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator,
but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in
the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Civil Law; Succession; The approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination
of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.The
assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory.
This is because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final
determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant
determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings.

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special
proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable may be the subject of an appeal in due course.An appeal would not be
the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders. The final judgment
rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court, which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and
resolutions) of a court of law that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter
therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable may be the subject of an appeal in due
course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory because it
deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.

Same; Same; Same; The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and
appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and
determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and
equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of
the estate.The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of
the estate of the decedent is to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution
(partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate. Hence,
the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v.
Peralta, 71 Phil. 66 (1940), the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the
RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in the
absence of positive abuse of discretion, for in the administration of the estates of deceased
persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not
interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there
has been a positive abuse of discretion. As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse
of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; There is no dispute that the
jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited.There is no dispute
that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial
court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and
may be still revised.

Same; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the
presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee

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the legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be.The
fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the
properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in
favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the
transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of
regularity could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. As the Court
has observed in Suntay v. Court of Appeals: x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale
in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention nor the
function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first
place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the
parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract.

Civil Law; Land Titles; The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands.The fact that the properties were already
covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for
immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly
surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because: The Torrens system is
not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.
However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the
unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the
Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality
of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that
may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed their duties.

Same; Succession; Collation; Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir
and the surviving spouse, to bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or
she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.Article 1061 of the Civil Code
required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to bring
into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in
order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any
advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the

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inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.

Same; Same; The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included
in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) as an intestate court.The determination of which properties should be
excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was well within the authority
and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all
properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be
actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children; and his two children by
his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
(Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for
corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had left no real properties but only personal properties consisting of cash,
furniture and fixtures, pieces of jewelry, shares of stock of Mervir Realty, and shares of stock of
Cebu Emerson.

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas motion.

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC denied the
administratrixs motion for approval of inventory on March 14, 2001 finding and holding that
the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.

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Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the
order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected located in
Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353), had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in
the name of Mervir Realty. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

Teresita filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the order of the RTC. In its
assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for
including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir
Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in
the name of Mervir Realty, a third party.

ISSUES:

1. Was certiorari the proper recourse to assail the questioned orders of the RTC to CA?
2. Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in directing the inclusion of the
properties in the estate of the decedent?

RULING:

1. Petition for certiorari is the proper recourse to CA since the assailed order of
March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas motion for the approval of the inventory and the
order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory.

The inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of
their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of
the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and
subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

An appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the
assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41,
Rules of Court, which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable may be
the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or
resolution (interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.

2. The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes
duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to

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submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months.Within

three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the
court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the
court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession
as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that
no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the
inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another person or entity.

Although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty,
the RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that
had involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdios name. Indeed, the
RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had
remained registered in the name of Emigdio.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of
Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in
view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment.
This is because the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a
system of registration of titles to lands.

SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES

HONORIO C. MONTANO and SUSANA P. MONTANO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. 157445 April 3, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record
as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of a petition for review.
The allegations of the petition must be examined to determine the sufficiency of the attachments
appended thereto.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The mere failure to attach copies
of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course when

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the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and other attachments
of the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations.The mere failure to attach copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition for review is not necessarily fatal as to warrant the outright denial of due course when
the clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both
lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the RTC, and other attachments of the
petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations. For the guidance of the CA, therefore, the
Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings
and portions of the records to the petition in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, 498
SCRA 59 (2006), which involved the dismissal of a petition for certiorari assailing an
unfavorable decision in a labor dispute for failing to attach copies of all pleadings (like the
complaint, answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations in the petition, to wit: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are
required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second,
even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the
petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a
petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course
or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided
on the merits. The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA
under Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached
documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.

FACTS:

Segundina, the petitioner, assails the dismissal by the Court of Appeals (CA) of her
petition for review through the resolution promulgated on June 25, 2002 on the ground of her
failure to attach to her petition copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations. She prays that the dismissal be set aside, and that the case be
remanded to the CA for resolution of her appeal on the merits, unless the Court should find it
convenient instead to decide her appeal itself.

Petitioner amplifies that she attached to her petition for review the certified true
copies of the MTC decision, the RTC decision. Segundina insists that the failure to attach the
complaint, answer and reply to her petition for review did not warrant the outright dismissal
of the petition for review; that the MTC decision had already stated the respective claims and
defenses of the parties, making the attachment of the complaint, answer and reply to serve no
useful purpose, but, instead, only to increase her expenses for photocopying.

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ISSUE:

Whether it is proper for CA to deny the petition for review filed by the petitioner on
the ground that copies of pleadings filed in the lower courts were not attached.

RULING:

CAs dismissal of the petition for review filed by the petitioner is not proper.

Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition shall be attached to the petition for review under the same Rule. The failure of the
petitioner to comply with requirement regarding the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 42.

However, the mere failure to attach copies of the pleadings and other material portions
of the record as would support the allegations of the petition for review is not necessarily fatal
as to warrant the outright denial of due course when the clearly legible duplicate originals or
true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of
court of the RTC, and other attachments of the petition sufficiently substantiate the allegations.

The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching
the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition in Air Philippines Corporation v.
Zamora, 498 SCRA 59 (2006), which involved the dismissal of a petition for certiorari assailing
an unfavorable decision in a labor dispute for failing to attach copies of all pleadings (like the
complaint, answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations in the petition, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition.
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is
whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition,
whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to
convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already
attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized
in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is
attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be
given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the
case be decided on the merits.

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The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule
42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is
whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.

In its resolution denying Segundinas motion for reconsideration, the CA brushed aside
her position of not needing to attach other portions of the records of the MTC and the RTC by
reminding that she was the party who had raised exceptions to the findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the MTC and the RTC. The CAs reminder was unfounded, however,
considering that her petition focused only on questions of law, like the effects of the lack of
her consent to the sale, the want of consideration for that sale, and the conduct of the
foreclosure sale in a place other than that stipulated in the deed of real estate mortgage. It was
plain that she was not assailing the propriety of the findings of fact by the MTC and the RTC,
but only the conclusions reached by said lower courts after their appreciation of the facts. In
dealing with the questions of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of the
MTC and the RTC.

The Court considers the attachments of Segundinas petition for review (i.e., the
certified true copies of the MTC decision, the RTC decision, and the RTC order) already
sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her appeal even
without the pleadings and other portions of the records. To still deny due course to her
petition for not attaching the complaint and the answer despite the MTC decision having
substantially summarized their contents was to ignore the spirit and purpose of the
requirement to give sufficient information to the CA.

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD v. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN

ESTEBAN
G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.*

A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the
decisions, resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly
those specified in Section 1 of Rule 43. In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice
was not an officer performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of
Quezon City on the matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially
executive function to determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was
committed, and whether there was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty
thereof. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justices
resolution on the determination of probable cause was, therefore, an improper remedy.

Moreover, the determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or

information in court is exclusively within the competence of the Executive Department, through
the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear
showing that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CAs

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determination that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents
involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the actual
killing of Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many
persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There
was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either
homicide or murder.

FACTS:

The petitioner is the mother of the late Chase Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but
bloodied body was discovered between vehicles parked at the carport of a residential house
located at Quezon City. Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip less
than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body.

Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home from visiting his
girlfriend. Around 7:00 p.m., Chases sister Ariane was sitting at the porch of their house when
she noticed a white Honda Civic car parked along the street. Recognizing the driver to be
Philip, Ariane waved her hand at him and as Philip appeared nonchalant and did not
acknowledge her gesture, Ariane decided to stay behind and leave with their house helpers
only after Chase had left on board the white Honda Civic car.

One househelper of a resident of the place was with her co-employee at 7:30 pm that
day when they heard somebody crying for help coming from the crime scene. Even so, neither
of them bothered to check who had been crying for help. Around 7:45 p.m., respondent
Teodora arrived at the place on board a vehicle bearing plate XPN 733. At that time, three cars
were parked at the carport.

At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village,
noticed that the side of the Honda Civic used by Philip had red streaks, which prompted him
to move towards the parked cars. He checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side of
another Honda Civic were smeared with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and
lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. He called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe
immediately barricaded the crime scene.

The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint as
there was lack of evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that
no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with the crime, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory. On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal
of the complaint. The petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for review under
Rule 43, Rules of Court, but the CA just dismissed the petition.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

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Whether the CA committed an error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of

Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for
the killing of Chase. (NO)

RULING:

We deny the petition for review, and sustain the decision of the CA.

We note, to start with, that the petitioner assailed the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice by filing in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a grave
mistake that immediately called for the outright dismissal of the petition. The filing of a
petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justices resolution on the
determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate
jurisdiction vis--vis the Secretary of Justice. It is the rule that the courts could intervene in
the Secretary of Justices determination of probable cause only through a special civil action
for certiorari.

Secondly, even an examination of the CAs decision indicates that the CA correctly
concluded that the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and
affirming the finding of probable cause by the OCP. The determination of the existence of
probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a
preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed, and that it was committed by the accused.

Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CAs determination

that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents involvement
in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the actual killing of
Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons
had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There was also
nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either homicide or
murder.

Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial evidence. However for

circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably
guilty thereof.

The records show that the affidavits of the witnesses establishing circumstantial
evidence were unsworn. The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of
the other witnesses was in violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The
requirement for the certification was designed to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence
from being considered for purposes of the preliminary investigation. Further, it has been held

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that unsworn statements or declarations are self-serving and self-serving declarations are not
admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose by implication from
acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection to the
admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay character.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the complaint

shows that out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective
witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a competent officer. On the other hand,
some pieces of circumstantial evidence, though duly supported by sworn statements of
witnesses, when taken as a whole, do not, however, lead to a finding of probable cause that
respondents committed the crime charged.

We likewise agree with the DOJ Secretary that there was no motive on the part of the
respondents to kill the victim. This was supported by the sworn statements of Richard Joshua
Ulit, Pamela-Ann Que and Egbert Ylo, who all knew the victim and respondent Philip and
claimed that the two were good friends and that they were not aware of any misunderstanding
that occurred between the concerned parties. Jurisprudence is replete that motive becomes of
vital importance when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator.

It is clear from the foregoing disquisitions of the CA that the Secretary of Justice
reasonably reached the conclusion that the dismissal by the OCP of Quezon City of the
complaint for murder had been based on the lack of competent evidence to support a finding
of probable cause against the respondents.

ROBERTO BORDOMEO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 161596, FIRST DIVISION, February 20, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:

As an extraordinary remedy, certiorari cannot replace or supplant an adequate remedy in

the ordinary course of law, like an appeal in due course. It is the inadequacy of a remedy in the
ordinary course of law that determines whether certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Situations when the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper.Jurisprudence recognizes certain situations when
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper, such as: (a) when it is necessary
to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and
whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d)
where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one
purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. Yet, a reading of
the petition for certiorari and its annexes reveals that the petition does not come under any of
the situations. Specifically, the petitioners have not shown that the grant of the writ of
certiorari will be necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice to them.

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Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; - In a special civil action
for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the petitioner carries the
burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not a merely reversible error but a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned
order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be
grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse
of discretion, least of all grave, because its justifications were supported by the history of the
dispute and borne out by the applicable laws and jurisprudence.

Labor Law; Separation Pay; Backwages; The computation of separation pay and
backwages due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the date when they were
deemed to have been actually separated from their employment, or beyond the date when their
reinstatement was rendered impossible.

FACTS:

The IPI Employees Union-Associated Labor Union (Union) had a bargaining deadlock
with the IPI management. This deadlock resulted in the Union staging a strike and IPI
ordering a lockout. After assuming jurisdiction over the dispute, DOLE Secretary Ruben D.
Torres rendered this decision. IPI assailed the issuances of Secretary Torres directly in
this Court through a petition for certiorari, but the Court dismissed its petition on the
ground that no grave abuse of discretion had attended the issuance of the assailed decisions.
Considering that IPI did not seek the reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, the entry
of judgment issued in due course.

With the finality of the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE
Secretary, the Union, represented by the Seno, Mendoza and Associates Law Office, moved in
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board in DOLE, Region VII on June 8, 1994 for their
execution. Atty. Audie C. Arnado, as the counsel of 15 out of the 50 employees named in the
December 5, 1991 judgment of Secretary Torres, likewise filed a so-called Urgent Motion for
Execution. Regional Director Alan M. Macaraya of DOLE Region VII issued a Notice of
Computation/Execution increasing the number of the workers to be benefitted to 962
employees classified into six groups and allocated to each group a share in the
P43,650,905.87 award.

Assistant Regional Director Jalilo dela Torre of DOLE Region VII issued a writ of
execution for the amount of P4,162,361.50 (which covered monetary claims corresponding to
the period from January 1, 1989 to March 15, 1995) in favor of the 15 employees represented by
Atty. Arnado. Assistant Regional Director dela Torre issued another Writ of Execution for the
amount of P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees. Objecting to the

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reduced computation for them, however, the second group of employees filed a
Motion Declaring the Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void.

IPI challenged the May 24, 1995 writ of execution issued in favor of the 15 employees by
filing its Appeal and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order in the Office of
then DOLE Undersecretary Cresenciano Trajano.

Acting DOLE Secretary Jose Brillantes, acting on IPIs appeal, recalled and
quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, and declared and considered the case
closed and terminated. Aggrieved, the 15 employees sought the reconsideration of the
December 22, 1995 Order of Acting DOLE Secretary Brillantes. DOLE Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing granted the Motion for Reconsideration, and reinstated the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution, subject to the deduction of the sum of P745,959.39 already paid pursuant to
quitclaims from the award of P4,162,361.50. Aggrieved by the reinstatement of the May 24, 1995
writ of execution, IPI moved for a reconsideration.

Pending resolution of IPIs motion for reconsideration, Regional Director Macaraya

issued a writ of execution in favor of the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado to recover
P3,416,402.10 pursuant to the order dated August 27, 1996 of Secretary Quisumbing.
Thereafter, the sheriff garnished the amount of P3,416,402.10 out of the funds of IPI with China
Banking Corporation, which released the amount. Hence, on September 11, 1996, the 15
employees represented by Atty. Arnado executed a Satisfaction of Judgment and
Quitclaim/Release upon receipt of their respective portions of the award, subject to the
reservation of their right to claim "unsatisfied amounts of separation pay as well as backwages
reckoned from the date after 15 March 1995 and up to the present, or until separation pay is
fully paid."

Atty. Arnado still filed an omnibus motion not only in behalf of the 15 employees but
also in behalf of other employees named in the notice of computation/execution, with the
exception of the second group, seeking another writ of execution to recover the further sum of
P58,546,767.83.

The employees belonging to the second group reiterated their Motion Declaring the
Writ of Execution dated June 5, 1995 null and void, and filed on May 15, 1996 a Motion for
Issuance of Writ, praying for another writ of execution based on the computation by Regional
Director Macaraya.

Secretary Quisumbing, affirming his August 27, 1996 order, denied IPIs Motion for
Reconsideration for being rendered moot and academic by the full satisfaction of the May 24,
1995 writ of execution. He also denied Atty. Arnados omnibus motion for lack of merit. The
employees represented by Atty. Arnado moved for the partial reconsideration of the December
24, 1997 order of Secretary Quisumbing. Resolving this motion, Acting DOLE Secretary Jose M.
Espaol, Jr. affirmed his order.

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Records reveal, however, that Virgilio Saragena, et al. brought to this Court a
petition for certiorari to assail the December 24, 1997 and March 27, 1998 Orders of the
Secretary of Labor. As stated at the start, the Court dismissed the petition of Saragena, et
al. for having been filed out of time and for the petitioners failure to comply with the
requirements under Rule 13 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The entry of judgment was
issued on December 7, 1998.

Atty. Arnado filed a Motion for Execution with the DOLE Regional Office. Another
Motion for Execution was filed by Atty. Arnado on July 6, 1999, seeking the execution of the
December 26, 1990 order issued by Secretary Torres and of the April 12, 1995 notice of
computation/execution issued by Regional Director Macaraya.

Ultimately, on July 4, 2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued her Order
affirming the order issued on March 27, 1998, and declaring that the full execution of the order
of March 27, 1998 "completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this case." Only herein petitioners
Roberto Bordomeo, Anecito Cupta, Jaime Sarmiento and Virgilio Saragena assailed the July 4,
2001 order of Secretary Sto. Tomas by petition for certiorari in the CA.

On May 30, 2003, the CA rendered its decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion.

Hence, they commenced this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the special civil action for certiorari is proper?

RULING:

NO. Firstly, an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days from notice of the judgment or
final order raising only questions of law, was the proper remedy available to the
petitioners. Hence, their filing of the petition for certiorari on January 9, 2004 to assail the
CAs May 30, 2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon
their allegation of grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA was improper. The averment
therein that the CA gravely abused its discretion did not warrant the filing of the petition for
certiorari, unless the petition further showed how an appeal in due course under Rule 45 was
not an adequate remedy for them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary remedy, certiorari
cannot replace or substitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, like an appeal
in due course.

It is the adequacy of a remedy in the ordinary course of law that determines

whether a special civil action for certiorari can be a proper alternative remedy.

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Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of
certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy
remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A
remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency.

The instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to

destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth
and range of the discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise
of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the
circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will
be granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.

Even so, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court still requires the petition for certiorari to comply
with the following requisites, namely: (1) the writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, a
board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In dismissing the petitioners petition for certiorari, the CA in effect upheld the
Secretary of Labors declaration in her assailed July 4, 2001 decision that the full
satisfaction of the writs of execution had completely closed and terminated the labor
dispute. Yet, the petitioners have ascribed grave abuse of discretion to the CA for doing so.

We do not agree. We find no just cause to now issue the writ of certiorari in order to
set aside the CAs assailed May 30, 2003 decision.

It is worthy to note that all the decisions and incidents concerning the case
between petitioners and private respondent IPI have long attained finality. The records
show that petitioners have already been granted a writ of execution. In fact, the decision has
been executed. Thus, there is nothing for this Court to modify. The granting of the instant
petition calls for the amendment of the Court of a decision which has been executed. In this
light, it is worthy to note the rule that final and executory decisions, more so with those
already executed, may no longer be amended except only to correct errors which are
clerical in nature. Amendments or alterations which substantially affect such judgments as
well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for lack of jurisdiction
(Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 127).

This Court in the case of CA GR No. 54041 dated February 28, 2001, has ruled that
the Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 24, 1997 and

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March 27, 1998 have become final and executory. It may be noted that the said orders
affirmed the earlier orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated December 22, 1995
and August 27, 1996 granting the execution of the decision in the case between petitioners and
IPI.

There is nothing on the records to support the allegation of petitioners that the
Secretary of Labor and Employment abused her discretion.

In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a
case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal
committed not a merely reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of
discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to be grave. Grave abuse of discretion
means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the CA committed no abuse of discretion, least
of all grave, because its justifications were supported by the history of the dispute and
borne out by the applicable laws and jurisprudence.

And, secondly, the records contradict the petitioners insistence that the two writs of
execution to enforce the December 26, 1990 and December 5, 1991 orders of the DOLE
Secretary were only partially satisfied. To recall, the two writs of execution issued were the one
for P4,162,361.50, later reduced to P3,416,402.10, in favor of the 15 employees represented by
Atty. Arnado, and that for P1,200,378.92 in favor of the second group of employees led by
Banquerigo.

There is no question that the 15 employees represented by Atty. Arnado, inclusive of

the petitioners, received their portion of the award covered by the September 3, 1996 writ of
execution for the amount of P3,416,402.10 through the release of the garnished deposit of IPI
at China Banking Corporation. That was why they then executed the satisfaction of judgment
and quitclaim/release, the basis for the DOLE Secretary to expressly declare in her July 4, 2001
decision that the full satisfaction of the writ of execution "completely CLOSED and
TERMINATED this case." Still, the 15 employees demand payment of their separation pay and
backwages from March 16, 1995 onwards pursuant to their reservation reflected in the
satisfaction of judgment and quitclaim/release they executed on September 11, 1996.

The demand lacked legal basis. Although the decision of the DOLE Secretary dated
December 5, 1991 had required IPI to reinstate the affected workers to their former positions
with full backwages reckoned from December 8, 1989 until actually reinstated without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits, the reinstatement thus decreed was no longer possible.
Hence, separation pay was instead paid to them. This alternative was sustained in law and
jurisprudence, for "separation pay may avail in lieu of reinstatement if reinstatement is

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no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement may likewise be awarded if the employee decides not to be reinstated."

Under the circumstances, the employment of the 15 employees or the possibility

of their reinstatement terminated by March 15, 1995. Thereafter, their claim for separation
pay and backwages beyond March 15, 1995 would be unwarranted. The computation of
separation pay and backwages due to illegally dismissed employees should not go beyond the
date when they were deemed to have been actually separated from their employment, or
beyond the date when their reinstatement was rendered impossible.

The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of
separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because
of strained relations between the employee and the employer. Backwages represent
compensation that should have been earned but were not collected because of the unjust
dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the employees service
while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented
from working.

The award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no
illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and an employee who is
dismissed without just cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and
reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof:

Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and

reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and
the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and
backwages.

The normal consequences of respondents illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement

without loss of seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no
longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to
payment of backwages.

Clearly then, respondent is entitled to backwages and separation pay as his

reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held
by the appellate court, the backwages due respondent must be computed from the time he
was unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June 30,
2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.

The Court, however, does not find the appellate court's computation of
separation pay in order. The appellate court considered respondent to have served

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petitioner company for only eight years. Petitioner was hired in 1990, however, and he must be
considered to have been in the service not only until 1999, when he was unjustly dismissed,
but until June 30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually separated (his
reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from petitioner company or for a total of 15
years.

JUAN B. BAEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. CRISANTO C. CONCEPCION, IN HIS

CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE RTC-BULACAN, MALOLOS CITY, AND
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE RODRIGO GOMEZ, REPRESENTED BY ITS
ADMINISTRATRIX, TSUI YUK YING, respondents.
G.R. No. 159508 August 29, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Certiorari; Interlocutory Orders; An interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a

certiorari challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings in which it is issued; But a
petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without
jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the
orders denying his motion to dismiss. It is settled, however, that an order denying a motion to
dismiss, being merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. An
interlocutory order is not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not
terminating the proceedings in which it is issued. To allow such order to be the subject of
review by certiorari not only delays the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the
courts. But a petition for certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued
without jurisdiction, or with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This is because as to such order there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Although the Court, the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) have concurrence of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
the petitioner had no unrestrained freedom to choose which among the several courts might his
petition for certiorari be filed in.Although the Court, the CA and the RTC have concurrence
of jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner had no unrestrained freedom to
choose which among the several courts might his petition for certio rari be filed in. In other
words, he must observe the hierarchy of courts, the policy in relation to which has been
explicitly defined in Section 4 of Rule 65 concerning the petitions for the extraordinary writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.The Court must
enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy
is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to
shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of

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the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions
for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.

Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Revival of Judgments; Article 1144 of the Civil Code
requires, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought before it is barred by prescription,
which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action.The petitioners defense of
prescription to bar Civil Case No. 722-M2002 presents another evidentiary concern. Article
1144 of the Civil Code requires, indeed, that an action to revive a judgment must be brought
before it is barred by prescription, which was ten years from the accrual of the right of action.
It is clear, however, that such a defense could not be determined in the hearing of the
petitioners motion to dismiss considering that the complaint did not show on its face that the
period to bring the action to revive had already lapsed. An allegation of prescription, as the
Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, 515 SCRA 627 (2007), can effectively be used
in a motion to dismiss only when the complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has
already prescribed, [o]therwise, the issue of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters
requiring a full blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in a mere motion to
dismiss.

FACTS:

A parcel of land with an area of 1,233 square meters, was adjudicated to Leodegario B.
Ramos (Ramos) upon his mothers death. Ramos, alleging that Gomez had induced him to sell
the 1,233 square meters to Gomez commenced in the RTC an action against Gomez, also
known as Domingo Ng Lim, seeking the rescission of their contract of sale. On October 9,
1990, before the Valenzuela RTC could decide the Civil Case on the merits, Ramos and
Gomez entered into a compromise agreement. The petitioner, being then the counsel of
Ramos in the Civil Case, assisted Ramos in entering into the compromise agreement. The RTC
approved their compromise agreement.

Gomez meanwhile died. He was survived by his wife Tsui Yuk Ying and their minor
children (collectively to be referred to as the Estate of Gomez). The Estate of Gomez sued
Ramos and the petitioner for specific performance in the RTC for failure to comply with the
compromise agreement. However, the case was amicably settled by agreement that the parties
shall comply with the compromise agreement reached on October 9, 1990.

Ramos failed to cause the registration of the deed of absolute sale pursuant to the
second paragraph of the compromise agreement of October 9, 1990 despite the Estate of
Gomez having already complied with Gomezs undertaking to deliver the approved survey
plan and to shoulder the expenses for that purpose. Instead, Ramos and the petitioner caused
to be registered the 1,233 square meter portion in Ramoss name.

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The Estate of Gomez commenced Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 on September 20, 2002 in
the Valenzuela RTC, ostensibly to revive the judgment by compromise rendered on October 9,
1990, praying that Ramos be ordered to execute the deed of absolute sale covering the 1,233
square meter lot pursuant to the fourth stipulation of the compromise agreement of October
9, 1990. The petitioner was impleaded as a party-defendant because of his having guaranteed
the performance by Ramos of his obligation and for having actively participated in the
transaction. The petitioner moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 on the
ground of prescription. RTC ordered the dismissal of the civil case but it reversed itself
subsequently and reinstated Civil Case No. 722-M-2002. The RTC reasoned that on July 6,
1995, the Estate of Gomez brought a complaint for specific performance against Ramos and
the petitioner in the RTC in Valenzuela (Civil Case No. 4679-V-95) in order to recover the 1,233
square meter lot and that such action toll the running of the prescriptive period.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration by RTC, a special civil action for
certiorari was commenced directly in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the petition for certiorari should prosper.

RULING:

The petition for certiorari shall not prosper.

The orders that the petitioner seeks to challenge and to annul are the orders denying
his motion to dismiss. It is settled, however, that an order denying a motion to dismiss, being
merely interlocutory, cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. An interlocutory order is
not the proper subject of a certiorari challenge by virtue of its not terminating the proceedings
in which it is issued. To allow such order to be the subject of review by certiorari not only
delays the administration of justice, but also unduly burdens the courts. But a petition for
certiorari may be filed to assail an interlocutory order if it is issued without jurisdiction, or
with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. This is because as to such order there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner, however, has not
demonstrated how the assailed orders could have been issued without jurisdiction, or
with excess of jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Nor has he convinced the Court that he had no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In fact and in law, he has, like filing his
answer and going to pre-trial and trial. In the end, should he still have the need to seek the
review of the decision of the RTC, he could also even appeal the denial of the motion to
dismiss. That, in reality, was his proper remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Furthermore, although the Court, the CA and the RTC have concurrence of
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, the petitioner had no unrestrained freedom to choose
which among the several courts might his petition for certiorari be filed in. In other words, he

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must observe the hierarchy of courts, the policy in relation to which has been explicitly
defined in Section 4 of Rule 65 concerning the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. There being no special, important or compelling reason
that justified the direct filing of the petition for certiorari in this Court in violation of the
policy on hierarchy of courts, its outright dismissal is unavoidable.

Still, even granting that the petition for certiorari might be directly filed in this Court,
its dismissal must also follow because its consideration and resolution would unavoidably
demand the consideration and evaluation of evidentiary matters. The Court is not a trier of
facts, and cannot accept the petition for certiorari for that reason.

The petitioners defense of prescription to bar Civil Case No. 722-M2002 presents
another evidentiary concern. Article 1144 of the Civil Code requires, indeed, that an action to
revive a judgment must be brought before it is barred by prescription, which was ten years
from the accrual of the right of action. It is clear, however, that such a defense could not be
determined in the hearing of the petitioners motion to dismiss considering that the
complaint did not show on its face that the period to bring the action to revive had
already lapsed. An allegation of prescription, as the Court put it in Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo
Guevara, 515 SCRA 627 (2007), can effectively be used in a motion to dismiss only when the
complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has already prescribed, [o]therwise, the issue
of prescription is one involving evidentiary matters requiring a full blown trial on the merits and
cannot be determined in a mere motion to dismiss.

At any rate, the mere lapse of the period per se did not render the judgment stale
within the context of the law on prescription, for events that effectively suspended the
running of the period of limitation might have intervened. In other words, the Estate of
Gomez was not precluded from showing such events, if any. Verily, the need to prove the
existence or non-existence of significant matters, like supervening events, in order to show
either that Civil Case No. 722-M-2002 was barred by prescription or not was present and
undeniable. Moreover, the petitioner himself raised factual issues in his motion to dismiss,
like his averment of full payment or discharge of the obligation of Ramos and the waiver or
abandonment of rights under the compromise agreement. The proof thereon cannot be
received in certiorari proceedings before the Court, but should be established in the RTC.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, BY ATTY. LUCIO L. YU, JR.,

complainant, vs. EXECUTIVE JUDGE MARIA A. CANCINO-ERUM, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 210, MANDALUYONG CITY, AND JUDGE CARLOS A. VALENZUELA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 213, MANDALUYONG CITY, respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2182 September 5, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Raffle of Cases; The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the raffle the
exclusive method of assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial station by
providing in Section 2 of Rule 20.The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the

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raffle the exclusive method of assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial
station by providing in Section 2 of Rule 20, as follows: Section 2. Assignment of Cases.The
assignment of cases to the different branches of a court shall be done exclusively by raffle. The
assignment shall be done in open session of which adequate notice shall be given so as to
afford interested parties the opportunity to be present. Previously, under the Revised Rules of
Court (1964), the distribution of cases among different branches by raffle was not exclusive,
considering that Rule 22 then allowed other methods, to wit: Section 7. Assignment of cases.
In the assignment of cases to the different branches of a Court of First Instance or their
transfer from one branch to another whether by raffle or otherwise, the parties or their
counsel shall be given written notice sufficiently in advance so that they may be present
therein if they so desire.

Same; The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning
cases among several branches of a court in the same station is two-fold.The avowed purpose
of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning cases among several branches of a
court in the same station is two-fold: one, to equalize the distribution of the cases among the
several branches, and thereby foster the Courts policy of promoting speedy and efficient
disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the impartial adjudication of cases and thereby
obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of cases to predetermined judges.

Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Orders; The urgent nature of an injunction or

Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO) case demands prompt action and immediate attention,
thereby compelling the filing of the case in the proper court without delay.

Judges; Administrative Law; To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but must also be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption.In the absence of any showing that
improper motives or corruption had actuated the respondents, the respondents should be
presumed to have acted in utmost good faith in assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 according
to the existing practice of raffling cases adopted by the Raffle Committee. As such, they could
not be held guilty of either gross ignorance of the law or grave misconduct. To constitute gross
ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and corruption.
Grave misconduct refers to a wrongful act inspired by corruption or intention to violate the
law.

Same; Administrative Complaints; An administrative complaint against a judge is

inappropriate as a remedy for the correction of an act or omission complained of where the
remedy of appeal or certiorari is a recourse available to an aggrieved party.We have always
regarded as a fundamental precept that an administrative complaint against a judge is
inappropriate as a remedy for the correction of an act or omission complained of where the
remedy of appeal or certiorari is a recourse available to an aggrieved party. Two reasons
underlie this fundamental precept, namely: (a) to hold otherwise is to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment; and (b) to follow a different rule can

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mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or otherwise, and our judges will then be immersed in
and be ceaselessly occupied with answering charges brought against them instead of
performing their judicial functions.

FACTS:

This administrative complaint emanated from the filing by one Belinda Martizano
(Martizano) of a suit to restrain the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), Land Transportation Office (LTO), Stradcom Corporation (STRADCOM), Insurance
Commission, and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from implementing DOTC
Department Order No. 2007-28 (DO 2007-28), an issuance that constituted the LTO the sole
insurance provider of compulsory third party liability (CTPL) that was required for the
registration of motor vehicles. The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. MC08-3660 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Mandaluyong City, claimed that the implementation of DO 2007-28
would deprive Martizano of her livelihood as an insurance agent. She applied for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO). On July 21, 2008, Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was
raffled and assigned to Branch 213 of the RTC, presided by respondent Judge Carlos A.
Valenzuela.

The charges against the respondents were both based on the non-raffling of Civil Case
No. MC08-3660. Allegedly, Judge Erum violated Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court by
assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213 without the benefit of a raffle. Judge
Erum announced that Civil Case No. MC08-3660 was being assigned to Branch 213 because
Branches 208, 212, and 214 had already been assigned an injunction case each, leaving only
Branch 213 without an injunction case. She then explained the practice that once a
TRO/injunction case had been raffled to a Branch, that particular Branch would be
automatically excluded from the raffle until all the other Branches had each been assigned a
TRO/injunction case. Thus, there being only four regular RTC Branches in Mandaluyong City
(i.e., Branches 208, 212, 213 and 214), every fourth TRO/injunction case filed was no longer
raffled but automatically assigned to the remaining Branch.

Against Judge Valenzuela, GSIS asserted that he showed manifest partiality as a

member of the Raffle Committee by consenting to the assignment of Civil Case No. MC08-
3660 to his Branch without the benefit of raffle; that the issuance of a TRO restraining the
implementation of DO 2007-28 was an unjust order and constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents should be held administratively liable for violating the
standing rules on the raffle of cases?

RULING:

The respondents should not be held administratively liable.

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The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has expressly made the raffle the exclusive method of
assigning cases among several branches of a court in a judicial station by providing in Section
2 of Rule 20. The avowed purpose of instituting raffle as the exclusive method of assigning
cases among several branches of a court in the same station is two-fold: one, to equalize the
distribution of the cases among the several branches, and thereby foster the Courts policy of
promoting speedy and efficient disposition of cases; and, two, to ensure the impartial
adjudication of cases and thereby obviate any suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
predetermined judges.

The Court issued SC Circular No. 7 on September 23, 1974 to serve as guide on the
manner of raffling cases. The Court reiterates that the raffle should always be the rule rather
than the exception. Only the exceptions expressly recognized under item IV of Circular No. 7
shall be permitted. Despite not strictly following the procedure under Circular No. 7 in
assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213, the respondents as members of the Raffle
Committee could not be held to have violated the rule on the exclusivity of raffle because
there were obviously less TRO or injunction cases available at anytime for raffling than the
number of Branches of the RTC. Given the urgent nature of TRO or injunction cases, each of
them had to be immediately attended to. This peculiarity must have led to the adoption of the
practice of raffling such cases despite their number being less than the number of the
Branches in Mandaluyong City. The practice did not absolutely contravene Circular No. 7 in
view of the circular itself expressly excepting under its fourth paragraph, supra, any incidental or
interlocutory matter of such urgent nature (like a TRO application) that might not wait for the
regular raffle.

Still, GSIS posits that assigning Civil Case No. MC08-3660 to Branch 213 without raffle
could easily create an anomalous situation whereby all that a litigant with an injunction
complaint in Mandaluyong has to do is to time the filing of his her case by waiting until the
favored judge is the only sala left without an injunction case.

The position of GSIS untenable. The urgent nature of an injunction or TRO case
demands prompt action and immediate attention, thereby compelling the filing of the case in
the proper court without delay. To assume that a party desiring to file an injunction or TRO
case will just stand idly by and mark time until his favored Branch is the only Branch left
without an assigned injunction or TRO case is obviously speculative. Moreover, the
anomalous situation is highly unlikely in view of the uncertainty of having the favored
Branch remain the only Branch without an injunction or TRO case following the series of
raffle.

The charge of knowingly rendering unjust orders in Civil Case No. MC08-3660 levelled
against Judge Valenzuela should likewise be dismissed for lack of factual support and legal
basis. His explanations for issuing the assailed orders, which the Court finds to be fully
substantiated by the records and the pertinent laws, are sufficient. In addition, GSIS did not
resort to any of several adequate remedies, like bringing a petition for certiorari or taking an
appeal in due course, which remedies were available at its disposal had it really considered the

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issuance of the orders and Judge Valenzuelas explanations unwarranted or in contravention of

the law.

GSISs proceeding against Judge Valenzuela through this administrative complaint

instead was definitely not its viable option at all. We have always regarded as a fundamental
precept that an administrative complaint against a judge is inappropriate as a remedy for the
correction of an act or omission complained of where the remedy of appeal or certiorari is a
recourse available to an aggrieved party. Two reasons underlie this fundamental precept,
namely: (a) to hold otherwise is to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to
try the facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment; and (b) to follow a different rule can mean a deluge of complaints, legitimate or
otherwise, and our judges will then be immersed in and be ceaselessly occupied with
answering charges brought against them instead of performing their judicial functions.

JOWETT K. GOLANGCO v. JONE B. FUNG

G.R. No. 157952, 8 September 2009, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling unless the
ruling is attended by grave abuse of discretion or tainted by whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the function of certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior
court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from its arbitrary acts.

Jowett K. Golangco (Golangco) commenced a criminal case for libel against Jone B.
Fung (Fung). However, after almost six years, the prosecution presented only two witnesses.
The prosecution requested that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued and served on Atty.
Oscar Ramos (Atty. Ramos) to compel him to testify in the criminal case. However, due to
his unavailability, the hearing was reset. On the day set for hearing, the prosecution still
failed to present Atty. Ramos as its witness because no subpoena had been issued to and
served on him for the purpose.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an order terminating the prosecution's
presentation of evidence and required them to file a written order of evidence within twenty
days. Golangco assailed on certiorari the order, claiming that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion for not issuing the subpoena to require Atty. Ramos to appear and testify
in the date of the hearing. He contended that his prior request for subpoena should have
been treated as a continuing request.

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The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his petition for certiorari, ruling that there is
still a need to ask for a new subpoena, and faulting Golangco for his failure to exercise due
diligence in the prosecution of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari filed by Golangco will prosper.

RULING:

NO. There was no capricious or whimsical act that can be attributed to the RTC in
issuing the assailed order, which was merely interlocutory. Certiorari will be refused where
there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is
still pending and undetermined in the lower court. It is not intended to correct every
controversial interlocutory ruling unless the ruling is attended by grave abuse of discretion
or tainted by whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for the
function of certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to
relieve persons from its arbitrary acts acts that courts or judges have no power or authority
in law to perform.

As long as the trial court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged error committed in
the exercise of that jurisdiction amounted to nothing more than an error of judgment that is
reviewable by appeal, not by a special civil action for certiorari.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA v. SPOUSES LORENZO

MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ
G.R. No. 159941, 17 August 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent
or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an
equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari.

Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta (Heirs of Spouses Reterta) commenced an action

for quieting of title and conveyance of a land situated in Trece Martires City. Heirs of Spouses
Reterta contend that they have inherited the land from their father, who is the grantee of the
land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation.

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Respondent Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez (Spouses Mores and Lopez)
filed a motion to dismiss the action insisting that the land is a friar land; hence, Heirs of
Spouses Reterta had no legal personality to commence the action.

The Municipal Trial Court dismissed the action of quieting of title. The Regional
Trial Court also dismissed the motion for reconsideration.

Heirs of Spouses Reterta raised the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via petition for
certiorari but the court dismissed the petition contending that special civil action of
certiorari is not a proper remedy but rather appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

RULING:

YES. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when
appeal is available notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due
course to and granted the petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the
broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the
undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the
order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the
availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared that the requirement that there must
be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits
of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a
party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow,
inadequate, and insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public
interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not
constitute sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if
appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy,
not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without
the writ that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment,
order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that Heirs of Spouses
Reterta need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have
an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for failure of the trial court to comply
with the Rules of Court.

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SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156684, 6 April 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

For certiorari to prosper, it must be established that: (a) The writ is directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;(b) Such tribunal,
board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) There is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City, through a resolution, authorized then

City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to expropriate the land of Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay
for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving
city inhabitants. Spouses Yusay immediately became alarmed, and filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution due to its
being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.

The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack
of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government.
However, RTC set aside its decision and declared that the resolution was null and void. The
RTC held that the petition was not premature.

Aggrieved, the City appealed to the Court of Appeals, however, CA concluded that the
reversal of the decision by the RTC was not justified. The Spouses Yusay moved for
reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action for certiorari and prohibition commenced by the Spouses
Yusay in the RTC was a proper recourse.

RULING:

NO. Certiorari and prohibition do not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the
Sanggunian Panlungsod.

For certiorari to prosper, therefore, the petitioner must allege and establish the
concurrence of the requisites under the law.

The first requisite is that the respondent tribunal, board, or officer must be
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie
against the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual

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controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted

Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or
opinion.

Prohibition does not lie against expropriation. The remedy of prohibition was not
called for considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to expropriate Spouses Yusays property was issued. As of then, it was
premature for Spouses Yusay to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent
domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the
proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no
expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, Spouses Yusay as the owners
could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. Hon. VICENTE Q. ROXAS, et al.

G.R. No. 161204, 6 April 2011, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The requirements imposed by the Rules of Court were not to be lightly treated or
disregarded due to the omitted documents being essential in a special civil action for certiorari,
a proceeding by which a superior court determines whether the respondent court or judge acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

National Housing Authoritys (NHA) was the registered owner of two large parcels of
land. NHA sought the reconstitution of TCT No. 1356 after fire razed the entire premises of
Quezon City Registry of Deeds. The Regional Trial Court then set the petition for initial
hearing and directed NHA to submit twelve copies of the petition, certified true copies or
originals of the annexes, certified true copies of tax declarations and tax receipts, and other
jurisdictional requirements as provided by law. NHA failed to comply with the directive and
to appear at the initial hearing. Thus, the RTC issued an order archiving the case until
compliance by NHA with the jurisdictional requirements.

On December 27, 2000, the RTC issued a resolution denying the NHAs petition for
reconstitution for lack of merit for failure to comply with jurisdictional requirements
continuously despite several opportunities afforded petition considering that case has been
archived since April 13, 1999.

NHA sought reconsideration, explaining that it was ready and very much willing to
comply with all of the requirements except for the certified true copies of the tax
declarations and tax receipts that the Assessors Office of Quezon City had not yet
completed because of the voluminous documents involving the hundreds of hectares
covered by TCT No. 1356. The RTC set NHAs motion for reconsideration for hearing on May
8, 2001 and directed NHA to comply with the legal requirements in order to show its good
faith. In compliance, NHA submitted twelve copies of its petition for reconstitution (with
annexes and original copies of the tax declarations and a letter from the QC Assessors
Office informing NHA of the failure to accede to NHAs request for the tax declarations and
tax receipts. At the RTCs order, NHA filed its memorandum, to which it attached a certified
true copy of a photocopy of TCT No. 1356.

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Nonetheless, the RTC denied NHAs motion for reconsideration for lack of merit for
failure to present any additional documents on Motion for Reconsideration in compliance
with jurisdictional requirements a few of which were directed to be complied with.

The Court of Appeals summarily dismissed the petition for certiorari because of the
failure of NHA to attach to the petition the certified true copies of all the relevant pleadings
and documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing NHAs petition for certiorari on technical
grounds.

RULING:

NO. NHA, as the petitioner, had the obligation to comply with the basic
requirements for the filing of a petition for certiorari prescribed in Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, specifically to accompany the petition with a "certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46." Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, which governs
original cases filed in the CA (of which NHAs petition for certiorari was one), reiterates the
requirements prescribed in Rule 65, thus:

Section 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with

requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses
of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for
the relief prayed for.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of
the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The
certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized
representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by
his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall
be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original.

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he
has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if

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there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency
thereof within five (5) days therefrom.

The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of
court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition.

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (n) However, as the CAs
resolution of September 7, 2001 revealed, NHA did not attach "the petition for reconstitution
filed with the trial Court and other resolutions or orders of the court before its dismissal of
the petition, documents which are considered relevant and pertinent thereto."

The omission was fatal to the petition for certiorari of NHA. Section 3, Rule 46, of the
Rules of Court, supra, expressly provides that: "The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition."
Dismissal of the petition was the recourse of the CA, because the requirements imposed by the
Rules of Court were not to be lightly treated or disregarded due to the omitted documents
being essential in a special civil action for certiorari, a proceeding by which a superior court
determines whether the respondent court or judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

MANILA, HON. AUGUSTINE VESTIL, as Presiding Judge of RTC-CEBU, Br. 56,
MANDAUE CITY, SPS. FELIX NG AND NENITA NG, and SPS. MARTIN T. NG AND
AZUCENA S. NG and AGRIPINA R. GOC-ONG, respondents.*
G.R. No. 161122 September 24, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BESAMIN J.

A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or

prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the
outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party.1 Hence, such person cannot
bring an action for the annulment of the judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, except if he has been a successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action, or the action or proceeding is in rem the judgment in which is binding against him.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; A petition for annulment of

judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.

Same; Judgments; Parties; A judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of the
action in court.It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only
upon the parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the

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commencement of the action in court. xxx The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by
a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has not been made a party conforms
to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but
is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title.The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever there is a cloud on title to
real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In the
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and the
other claimants, not only to put things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has
no rights to the immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the
benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property.

Same; Reconveyance; The remedy of an action for reconveyance belongs to the

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons
name, and such landowner demands the reconveyance of the property in the proper court of
justice.The other proper remedy the CA suggested was an action for reconveyance of
property. According to Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, 77 SCRA 196 (1977), the remedy belongs to
the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
persons name, and such landowner demands the reconveyance of the property in the proper
court of justice. If the property has meanwhile passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value, the landowner may seek damages. In either situation, the landowner respects the
decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review provided the one-year period from
the land coming under the operation of the Torrens System of land registration already
passed.

FACTS:

The petitioner acquired a parcel of land situated in San Roque, Lilo-an, Metro Cebu
through a deed of absolute sale executed between the petitioner, as vendee, and Agripina R.
Goc-ong (a respondent herein), Porferio Goc-ong, Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo Goc-ong,
Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino Goc-ong (collectively, the Goc-ongs),
as vendors.

The petitioner later on discovered the joint affidavit executed by the Goc-ongs,
whereby the Goc-ongs declared that they were mortgaging the property to Felix Ng, married
to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin T. Ng, married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs) to secure
their obligation, subject to the condition that should they not pay the monthly installments,
the Ngs would automatically become the owners of the property. With the Goc-ongs
apparently failing to pay their obligation to the Ngs as stipulated, the latter brought a
complaint for the recovery of a sum of money, or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure of
mortgage in the Regional Trial Court.

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The RTC ruled in favor of Ngs declaring them to be the owners of the property in
question. The petitioner then commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) an action for the
annulment of the decision of the RTC but the CA dismissed the petition for being an improper
remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was a proper recourse
for the petitioner to set aside the decision rendered by RTC.

RULING:

SC uphold the CAs dismissal of the petitioners action for annulment of

judgment.

It is elementary that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the
parties and those who are their successors in interest by title after the commencement of
the action in court. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly so provides.
Accordingly, the petitioners resort to annulment of judgment under Rule 47 was unnecessary
if, after all, the judgment rendered by RTC did not prejudice it.

Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 47 extends the remedy of annulment only to a party

in whose favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition for relief from
judgment are no longer available through no fault of said party. As such, the petitioner, being
a non-party in Civil Case decided by RTC, could not bring the action for annulment of
judgment due to unavailability to it of the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, or
setting the judgment aside through a petition for relief.

The petitioner probably brought the action for annulment upon its honest belief that
the action was its remaining recourse from a perceived commission of extrinsic fraud against
it. It is worthwhile for the petitioner to ponder, however, that permitting it despite its being a
non-party in Civil Case to avail itself of the remedy of annulment of judgment would not help
it in any substantial way. Although Rule 47 would initially grant relief to it from the effects of
the annulled judgment, the decision of the CA would not really and finally determine the rights of
the petitioner in the property as against the competing rights of the original parties. The Court
agrees with the CAs suggestion that the petitioners proper recourse was either an action
for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property.

The petitioner may vindicate its rights in the property through an action for quieting
of title, a common law remedy designed for the removal of any cloud upon, or doubt, or
uncertainty affecting title to real property. The action for quieting of title may be brought
whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may
be prejudicial to said title. In the action, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not only to put things in their proper
places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable, respect and not disturb
the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any
desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

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The other proper remedy the CA suggested was an action for reconveyance of
property. According to Vda. de Recinto v. Inciong, the remedy belongs to the landowner
whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, and
such landowner demands the reconveyance of the property in the proper court of justice. If
the property has meanwhile passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the
landowner may seek damages. In either situation, the landowner respects the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review provided the one-year period from the land
coming under the operation of the Torrens System of land registration already passed.

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEVARD, INC., petitioner, vs. FAR EAST
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HECTOR I.
GALURA, respondents.
G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for the annulment of a judgment, must emanate from an act
of the adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of
its day in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioners own
counsel.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; The Supreme Court introduced
a new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that [t]he
annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction

Same; Same; Same; If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud,
the Court of Appeals (CA) may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein.The objective of the remedy of annulment of
judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant
to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the
ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without
prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order
or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on motion order the
trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. The
remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the assailed judgment or final
order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each error allegedly committed
by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; The remedy of petition for annulment of judgment, although seen as
a last remedy, is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition
for relief.The first requirement prescribes that the remedy is available only when the
petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner. This means that the remedy,
although seen as a last remedy, is not an alternative to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver, therefore, that the petitioner failed to
move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for relief without fault on his part. But
this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for the petition is lack of jurisdiction
(whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud), simply because the judgment

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or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or
by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred by laches.

Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of
annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does.Not every kind of fraud justifies the action
of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic
Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 168, (1996), where the unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where
the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these
and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of
the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former
judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.

Same; Same; Same; Intrinsic Fraud; Intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his
day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including
a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery,
and proper scientific or forensic applications.In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a
party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is
that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not
deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud
through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination,
resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed,
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have
been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not,
therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.

Same; Same; Lack of Jurisdiction; Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in
rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.Lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law
defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter
is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the
petitioner. A judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in
Banco Espaol-Filipino v. Palanca, in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can
be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head. But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law,
may be waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly.

Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within
four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be
brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.The third requirement sets the time for the
filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years from
the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

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Civil Law; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could
nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.Laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. Its other name is stale demands, and it is based upon grounds of public
policy that requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike
the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. The existence
of four elements must be shown in order to validate laches as a defense, to wit: (a) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for
which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (b) delay in asserting the rights of the
complainant, who has knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct and has been afforded
an opportunity to institute a suit; (c) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant
that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit; and (d) injury
or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is
not deemed barred.

Same; Estoppel; Estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation
about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his
admission or representation.Estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a
representation about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else
relying on his admission or representation. Thus, our law on evidence regards estoppel as
conclusive by stating that whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be
permitted to falsify it.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Pleadings and Practice; The
petition for annulment of judgment should be verified, and should allege with particularity the
facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioners good
and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The petition should be
verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment,
as well as those supporting the petitioners good and substantial cause of action or defense, as
the case may be. The need for particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the
circumstances constituting either fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal
requirement in the rules of pleading. The petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies,
together with sufficient copies corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain
essential submissions, specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution, to be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and
indicated as such by the petitioner; (b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the
cause of action or defense; and (c) the sworn certification that the petitioner has not
theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the
CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other
action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn
that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the

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CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly
inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five days therefrom.

Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals
alone of the pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.
Pinausukans failure to include the affidavits of witnesses was fatal to its petition for
annulment. Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and
submission of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the
CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. In that regard,
however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by the affidavits of the
witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can
the petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for
annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the
pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of it. The distinction
between the verification and the affidavits is made more pronounced when an issue is based
on facts not appearing of record. In that instance, the issue may be heard on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, subject to the court directing that the matter
be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.

FACTS:

On various dates, Bonier de Guzman (Bonier), then the President of petitioner

corporation (Pinausukan, for short), executed four real estate mortgages involving the
petitioners parcel of land situated in Pasay City in favor of Far East Bank and Trust Company
(now Bank of Philippine Islands), to be referred to herein as the Bank. When the unpaid
obligation secured by the mortgages had ballooned to P15,129,303.67, the Bank commenced
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages.

Learning of the impending sale of its property by reason of the foreclosure of the
mortgages, Pinausukan, represented by Zsae Carrie de Guzman, brought against the Bank and
the sheriff an action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC averring that
Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and had constituted the mortgages
on the corporate asset without Pinausukans consent through a board resolution.

The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing despite having
agreed thereto. Accordingly, on October 31, 2002, the RTC dismissed case for failure to
prosecute. The order of dismissal attained finality. The sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial
sale concerning the property of Pinausukan. The notice was received by Pinausukan a week
later. Claiming surprise over the turn of events, Pinausukan inquired from the RTC and
learned that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor (Atty. Villaflor), its counsel of record, had not
informed it about the order of dismissal issued on October 31, 2002.

Pinausukan brought the petition for annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of
the order of October 31, 2002 dismissing the Civil Case for the annulment of real estate
mortgages. Its petition, under the verification of Roxanne de Guzman-San Pedro (Roxanne),
who was one of its Directors, and concurrently its Executive Vice President for Finance and
Treasurer, stated that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to
keep track of the case he was handling, and in failing to apprise Pinausukan of the
developments on the case.

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The CA dismissed the petition for annulment, citing the failure to attach the affidavits
of witnesses attesting to and describing the alleged extrinsic fraud supporting the cause of
action as required by Section 4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment.

RULING:

CA correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for being

procedurally and substantively defective. The procedural defect consisted in Pinausukans
failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or documents
supporting the cause of action. It is true that the petition, which narrated the facts relied
upon, was verified under oath by Roxanne. However, the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses together with the petition was not dispensable for that reason. Roxannes
verification related only to the correctness of the allegations in the petition and was not the
same [or] equivalent to the affidavit of witnesses that the Rule requires. The true office of the
verification is merely to secure an assurance that the allegations of a pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith.

Worthy to reiterate is that the objective of the requirements of verification and

submission of the affidavits of witnesses is to bring all the relevant facts that will enable the
CA to immediately determine whether or not the petition has substantial merit. In that regard,
however, the requirements are separate from each other, for only by the affidavits of the
witnesses who had competence about the circumstances constituting the extrinsic fraud can the
petitioner detail the extrinsic fraud being relied upon as the ground for its petition for
annulment. This is because extrinsic fraud cannot be presumed from the recitals alone of the
pleading but needs to be particularized as to the facts constitutive of it.

The substantive defect related to the supposed neglect of Atty. Villaflor to keep track
of the case, and to his failure to apprise Pinausukan of the developments in the case, which the
CA did not accept as constituting extrinsic fraud. Such neglect of counsel, even if it was true,
did not amount to extrinsic fraud because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the
prevailing party, and did not occur outside the trial of the case. Moreover, the failure to be
fully aware of the developments in the case was Pinausukans own responsibility. As a litigant,
it should not entirely leave the case in the hands of its counsel, for it had the continuing duty
to keep itself abreast of the developments if only to protect its own interest in the litigation. It
could have discharged its duty by keeping in regular touch with its counsel, but it did not.
Consequently, it has only itself to blame.

HERMINIA ACBANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,
TUGUEGARAO CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L. LOPEZ,
respondents.
G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

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Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; As a general rule, a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to
him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question.The ruling in Chua v.
Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 437 (1998), is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit: As a general rule, a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage
to him arising from the loss of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate
execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires
that the following requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a
supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the
pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is
a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being
ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed
to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically
follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment
if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within
the period for the perfection of the appeal.

FACTS:

Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Spouses Lopez) commenced an

ejectment suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs)
in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64). The defendants did
not file their answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in favor of the
Spouses Lopez.

The petitioner appealed to the RTC. In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for
the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants had not
filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution
pending appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for the execution in
the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution; and that, therefore,
there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond unnecessary. RTC
granted the motion for immediate execution.

The petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this Court
submitting that RTC committed grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution.

ISSUE:

Whether the perfection of appeal alone stays the immediate execution of a judgment
in an ejectment suit.

RULING:

NO. A judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory,

but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file a
supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency
of the appeal.

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Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion
for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution
of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled
to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs failure to comply with all
of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the
notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution
without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.

THE CITY OF ILOILO v. HON. JUDGE RENE B. HONRADO

G.R. No. 160399, DECEMBER 9, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

The essential office of preliminary injunction is to preserve the rights of the parties before
the final adjudication of the issues. Where injunction is the main relief sought in the action,
therefore, the trial court should desist from granting the plaintiffs application for temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction if such grant would tend to prejudge the case
on the merits. The preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of the case, or decide
controverted facts, but should still look to a future final hearing.

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is

an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order
requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. Its essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to
protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the
trial on the merits. Another essential role is preventive of the threats to cause irreparable harm
or injury to a party before the litigation could be resolved. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 655
SCRA 553 (2011), we have explained the preservative or preventive character of injunction as a
remedy in the course of the litigation.

Same; Same; Same; Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court set the guidelines for when
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified.Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court set the guidelines for when the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified,
namely: (a) when the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
or (b) when the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) when a party,
court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

FACTS:

The Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued D.O. No.

2002-31 (with the subject AUTHORIZATION OF PRIVATE EMISSION TESTING
CENTERS(PETC). Item No. 2 of Department Order No. 2002-31 stated:

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J. BERSAMIN

2. To ensure that cut throat or ruinous competition, that may result to

the degradation of level of service of the project is avoided, authorization of
PETC should strictly be rationalized taking into consideration the vehicle
population expected to be serviced in the area. As basis, one (1) PETC lane
shall be authorized for every 15,000 registered vehicles in an LTO Registering
District.

JPV Motor Vehicle Emission Testing and Car Care Center (JPV), a partnership
authorized to operate a PETC in Iloilo City, was granted a capacity of four lanes that could
cater to 15,000 motor vehicles per lane for the total capacity of 60,000 motor vehicles. At the
time JPV filed the complaint in civil case to prevent the petitioner from acting on the pending
application for the operation of another Private Emission Testing Center (PETC) in Iloilo City,
there were 53,647 registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City. Accordingly, JPV averred in its
complaint that there was no need for another PETC because it already had capability to serve
all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo City pursuant to D.O. No. 2002-31.

Petitioner contested the injunctive relief, insisting that such relief, if issued, would
result into a monopoly on the part of JPV in the operation of a PETC; that the writ of
injunction would prevent the exercise by the City Mayor of his discretionary power to issue or
not to issue business permits; and that JPV did not establish the existence of its right in esse to
be protected by the writ of injunction.

RTC granted the application of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction. By way of
certiorari, petitioner directly challenge to the Court the orders issued by the RTC on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

WON committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the application for the writ of
preliminary injunction.

RULING:

YES. Generally, injunction, being a preservative remedy for the protection of

substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences that cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation.
The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is
that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. The
application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason
for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential conditions
for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that appear to
be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from
both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is reasonably
necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation.

Although the RTC had the broad discretion in dealing with JPVs application for the
writ of preliminary injunction, it was bound by the Courts exhortation against thereby
prejudging the merits of the case in Searth Commodities Corp v. Court of Appeals:

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The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.

If it was plain from the pleadings that the main relief being sought was to enjoin
the petitioner from exercising its legal power as a local government unit to consider
and pass upon applications for business permits for the operation of businesses like
the PETC, and to issue business permits within its territory, we find it appalling how the
RTC casually contravened the foregoing guidelines and easily ignored the exhortation by
granting JPVs application for injunction on June 24, 2003 in the initial stage of the case. Such
granting of JPVs application already amounted to the virtual acceptance of JPVs
alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner from considering and passing upon
the applications of other parties to operate their own PETC in Iloilo City based on
JPVs still controversial capability to serve all the registered motor vehicles in Iloilo
City pursuant to Department Order No. 2002-31. The granting amounted to the
prejudgment of the merits of the case, something the RTC could not validly do. It apparently
forgot that the function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not to determine the merits
of the case, or to decide controverted facts, because an interlocutory injunction was but a
preliminary and preparatory order that still looked to a future final hearing, and, although
contemplating what the result of that hearing would be, it should not settle what the result
should be.

Thus, the RTC did not exercise its broad discretion soundly because it blatantly
violated the right to be heard of the petitioner, whose right to substantiate its defense of the
power to regulate businesses within its territorial jurisdiction should be fully recognized. To
stress yet again, the main relief could not be resolved without receiving the evidence of all the
parties that would settle the contested facts. Under the circumstances, the challenged orders
of the RTC were undeniably tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

CITY GOVERNMENT OF BUTUAN, et al. v. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING

SYSTEM
G.R. No. 157315, 1 December 2010, THIRD DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The party requesting that a writ of preliminary injunction must not be issued must
be able to show cause and has the burden of proving such. In the absence of such finding
or if it is not meritorious, the Court may issue a temporary restraining order in order to
protect the party whose rights are about to be infringed.

Mayor Leonides Plaza sought support from the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng

Butuan City in her decision in revoking the application for a mayors permit of Bombo
Radyo/Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), and eventually close down the CBSs
radio station. She anchored her revocation on the ground that the radio station violated
the zoning ordinance of the city and that the temporary agreement has not been
renewed. As such, the city government expressed their favor upon the Mayors
decision.

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In order to protect their interest, CBS filed a complaint for prohibition, mandamus,
and damages against the city government in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City
(RTC) with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction
to restrain the city government in closing down their premises and business operations.

The case was raffled to Judge Dabalos who initially inhibited since the
inflammatory speech of the radio station was directed against him, thereby it might curtail
the ends of justice due to partiality that may arise in its determination. From there, the
case was re-raffled to other judges who also recused either due to conflict of interest or
personal matters thereby sending the case back to Judge Dabalos since there was no
other court to entertain the case and that his reason for inhibition is not a plausible
ground that would merit such recusal.

A TRO was issued by the court in which the parties would be set for hearing to
resolve the pending application for injunction and for the city government to show
cause why it should not be granted.

The city government and CBS appeared on the date set for hearing and Judge
Dabalos granted the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction based on the ground that
the city government did not produce any evidence that would merit its prayer that no
writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued to CBS and that since the corporation has
been granted a franchise by the legislature and that the right to free speech be protected
and guarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court erred in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction without
even requiring Consolidated Broadcasting System to present evidence to show whether
it has a clear right to be protected.

RULING:
NO. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes that the one who seeks that
the preliminary injunction not be issued has the burden of proving that it must not be
granted.

A preliminary injunction is only issued to parties who has sufficient interest or

title to the right sought to be protected. As such, it must be proven by the party that
there is an existing right to be protected prima facie, the act being sought by the other
party is violative of his existing right, and that there is a significant necessity for that
preliminary injunction to be issued so that his right may be protected.

In this regard, while CBS was not required to present evidence, the court took
judicial notice of the fact that CBS has a franchise granted by the Legislature and that
the subsequent act of the city government in revoking its application and mayors
permit would be tantamount to a violation of its rights under the franchise.

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Rule 58 of the Rules of Court further illustrates that the one who seeks that the
preliminary injunction not be issued has the burden of proving that it must not be
granted which states that upon the granting of the TRO, the party who seeks the non-
issuance of the preliminary injunction must show cause. As the city government failed
to adduce evidence or even present evidence that will merit non-issuance of preliminary
injunction, the grant is valid insofar as the procedures are concerned.

PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA v. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.

G.R. No. 168008, 17 August 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse. Where the plaintiff does not
demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected by injunction, his suit for injunction
must be dismissed for lack of a cause of action.

Adventist University of the Philippines (AUP) is a non-stock and non-profit

educational institution incorporated under Philippine Laws under North Philippine Union
Mission (NPUM). During its 3rd Quinquennial Session of General Conference of Seventh
Day Adventist Day, the NPUM committee elected the members of the Board of Trustees.
Petitioner Petronilo Barayuga (Barayuga) was elected as Secretary. However, after 2
months, he was appointed as president of AUP.

A group from NPUM conducted an external performance audit, which revealed

that Barayuga committed serious violations of fundamental rules and procedure in
disbursement and use of funds.

NPUM Executive Committee conducted a general conference to determine the

veracity of the findings. The committee recommended the removal of Barayuga. The latter
protested; however, it was denied.

Barayuga brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a suit for injunction and
damages with prayer of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). He contends that AUP
relieved him as President without valid ground despite his 5-year term.

AUP contends that Barayuga is only an appointive official and the committee
decided to remove him from office due to his gross violations.

RTC issued the TRO enjoining AUP, et.al. The Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the
RTCs writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TRO
and writ of injunction.

RULING:

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YES. A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence

submitted by the plaintiff establishing: (a) a present and unmistakable right to be
protected; (b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right; and (c)
a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence
of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion
and will result to nullification thereof.

The Court emphasized that where the complainants right is doubtful or

disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans proof of an
actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.

Hence, the Court held that based on the foregoing principles guiding the issuance of the TRO
and the writ of injunction, the issuance of the assailed order constituted patently grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC, and that the CA rightly set aside the order of the RTC.

ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO v. ELIZA M. TORTOGO, et al.

G.R. No. 156358, 17 August 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of

equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial
rights. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of
facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be
struck down for being issued in grave abuse of discretion.

Domingo Pahila commenced an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary
and restraining order to evict Eliza M. Tortogo, et al. (Tortogo, et al.) from his properties.
Pahila died and was substituted by petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido (Pahila-Garrido).

The defendants in this case were divided into two. The first group relied on the
defense that they are agricultural tenants of the land. The second group has the common
defense that Pahila- Garridos title was not valid because their respective areas were subject
to their acquisition from the State as the actual occupants.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) favored Pahila-Garrido. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the decision of the MTCC. In the Court of Appeals (CA), only
the second group appealed, which was dismissed by the CA. The first group did not appeal;
hence the RTCs decision became final and executory.

MTCC issued the writ of execution. Tortogo, et al. filed a motion to quash the writ
due to the supervening finding that the lot covered in the writ was foreshore land belonging
to the State, the court denied the motion.

However, after a year, Tortogo, et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
after the writ of execution was served upon them. Judge Gorgonio Ybaez of RTC Negros
granted the petition and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO).

ISSUE:

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Whether or not RTC Judge Ybaez lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and
executory decision of the MTCC.

RULING:

NO. The issuance of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction is patently without
basis and violated the requirements of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. A writ of
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights.
Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in the absence of facts
bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck
down for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect
a right not in esse, which is merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action.

Tortogo, et al. did not establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by
injunction. They did not, to begin with, hold any enforceable claim in the property subject
of the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. The Memoranda and investigative
report, whereby the DENR appeared to classify the property as foreshore land, conferred
upon the respondents no interest or right in the land. Under all circumstances, the
classification was not a supervening event that entitled them to the protection of the
injunctive relief. Their claim to any right as of then was merely contingent, and was
something that might not even arise in the future.

Presumably well aware that Tortogo, et al. held absolutely no valid and existing
right in the land, the RTC Judge had plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the
enforcement of the writ of execution through the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction. RTC Judge Ybaez obviously acted arbitrarily and whimsically, because
injunction protected only an existing right or actual interest in property. Thus, he was
guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of discretion, and compounded his guilt by
stopping the enforcement of a final and executory decision of the MTCC.

NERWIN INDUSTRIES CORPORATION vs. PNOC-ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167057, FIRST DIVISION, April 11, 2012, BERSAMIN, J.

Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from
issuing any temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary
mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions
or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting under the Governments
direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of-way, site or location of any
National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the National
Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e)
undertaking or authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

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Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and
issues a TRO or a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a
government contract or project acts contrary to law.

Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is

an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a particular act or acts.A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to protect
or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued only
when it is established that: (a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually; or (b) The commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts
complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or (c) A
party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

Same; Same; Same; Judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be
wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing Temporary Restraining Orders (TROs) or writs
of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial; It is but a preventive
remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm
or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.Judges dealing with applications for
the injunctive relief ought to be wary of improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs
of injunction that tend to dispose of the merits without or before trial. Granting an application
for the relief in disregard of that tendency is judicially impermissible, for it is never the
function of a TRO or preliminary injunction to determine the merits of a case, or to decide
controverted facts. It is but a preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened
wrong, further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be
settled. Judges should thus look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their
courts to render a meaningful decision. Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial
on the merits. It is well worth remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should
issue only to prevent the threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant
before the claim can be justly and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.

FACTS:

The National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-

qualify and to bid for a contract, otherwise known as IPB No. 80, for the supply and delivery of
woodpoles and crossarms needed in the countrys Rural Electrification Project. The said
contract consisted of four (4) components, namely: PIA, PIB and PIC or woodpoles and P3 or
crossarms, necessary for NEAs projected allocation for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. along
with other bidders, Nerwin submitted its application for eligibility.

Nerwin emerged as the lowest bidder for all schedules/components of the contract.
NEA then conducted a pre-award inspection of Nerwins manufacturing plants and facilities,

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including its identified supplier in Malaysia, to determine its capability to supply and deliver
NEAs requirements.

The NEA administrator recommended to NEAs Board of Directors the approval of the
award to Nerwin of all schedules for IBP No. 80. However, the Board passed a resolution
reducing by 50% the material requirements for IBP No. 80. In turn, it resolved to award the
four schedules of IBP No. 80 at a reduced number to Nerwin. Nerwin protested the said 50%
reduction, alleging the same was a ploy to accommodate a losing bidder.

In the interim, PNOC-Energy Development Corporation purporting to be under the

Department of Energy, issued a Requisition or an invitation to pre-qualify and to bid for
wooden poles needed for its Samar Rural Electrification Project (O-ILAW project).

Upon learning of the Requisition for the O-ILAW project, Nerwin filed a civil action in
the RTC Manila alleging that the Requisition was an attempt to subject a portion of the items
covered by IBP No. 80 to another bidding; and praying that a TRO issue to enjoin the
proposed bidding for the wooden poles.

PNOC-EDC sought the dismissal of the civil case stating that the complaint averred no
cause of action, violated the rule that government infrastructure projects were not to be
subjected to TROs.

The RTC granted the TRO. This was annulled and set aside by the CA.

ISSUE:

WON a preliminary injunction or a TRO may issue against government

infrastructures.

HELD:

NO. The RTC gravely abused its discretion, firstly, when it entertained the complaint
of Nerwin against respondents notwithstanding that Nerwin was thereby contravening the
express provisions of Section 3 and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8975 for its seeking to enjoin
the bidding out by respondents of the OILAW Project and, secondly, when it issued the TRO
and the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.

RA 8975 merely supersedes PD 1818 which earlier underscored the prohibition to

courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving
infrastructure or National Resources Development projects of, and public utilities operated by,
the government. This law was, in fact, earlier upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the
Supreme Court in an administrative case against a Judge.

The text and tenor of the provisions being clear and unambiguous, nothing was left for
the RTC to do except to enforce them and to exact upon Nerwin obedience to them. The RTC
could not have been unaware of the prohibition under Republic Act No. 8975 considering that
the Court had itself instructed all judges and justices of the lower courts, through
Administrative Circular No. 112000, to comply with and respect the prohibition against the
issuance of TROs or writs of preliminary prohibitory or mandatory injunction involving
contracts and projects of the Government.

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The questioned acts of respondent also constitute gross ignorance of the law
for being patently in disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules which
judges are expected to know and apply properly. IN FINE, respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, which are serious charges under Section 8 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding

prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or person, to refrain
from a particular act or acts. It is an ancillary or preventive remedy resorted to by a litigant to
protect or preserve his rights or interests during the pendency of the case. As such, it is issued
only when it is established that:
(a) The applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually or
(b) The commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant or
(c) A party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the
rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Judges dealing with applications for the injunctive relief ought to be wary of
improvidently or unwarrantedly issuing TROs or writs of injunction that tend to dispose of the
merits without or before trial. Granting an application for the relief in disregard of that
tendency is judicially impermissible, for it is never the function of a TRO or preliminary
injunction to determine the merits of a case, or to decide controverted facts. It is but a
preventive remedy whose only mission is to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. Judges should thus
look at such relief only as a means to protect the ability of their courts to render a meaningful
decision. Foremost in their minds should be to guard against a change of circumstances that
will hamper or prevent the granting of proper reliefs after a trial on the merits. It is well worth
remembering that the writ of preliminary injunction should issue only to prevent the
threatened continuous and irremediable injury to the applicant before the claim can be justly
and thoroughly studied and adjudicated.

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R. DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 188056, EN BANC, January 8, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.:*

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Hierarchy of Courts; Every litigant who brings the
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be
mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and
enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court.

Department of Justice (DOJ); The fact that the Department of Justice is the primary
prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its

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preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise
a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 360 SCRA 618 (2001), the
Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding,
stating: x x x [t]he prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare
his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose
except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Quasi-Judicial Agencies; A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a

court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and
adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same
effect as the judgments of a court of law. That is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a criminal
information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the Secretary of
Justice reviews the public prosecutors orders or resolutions.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; The main objective of mandamus is to
compel the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough,
the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to
compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have
the Secretary of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how
and where the Secretary of Justices assailed issuances excluded them from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.

Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; Although the Constitution

guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible
concept.In The Ombudsman v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135 (2008), the Court has clarified that
although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy
disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of
the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are sought and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.

Prospectivity of Laws; As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.As a
general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such
exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or
a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away
vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already
existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws

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are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally
attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

FACTS:

Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates in the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's
"buy back agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their
written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number
of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.

The Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No.
182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ
Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of
petitioners were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the Court via
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary
of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO No. 182
violated their right to due process, their right to the equal protection of the laws, and their
right to the speedy disposition of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of
justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No. 182 all
the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
violated their right to equal protection under the Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of Justice,
maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays
that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Court. NO.

WON respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO

No. 182. NO.

WON DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 violated petitioners
constitutionally guaranteed rights. NO

RULING

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The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of

substance and merit, is dismissed.

Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming

directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the
direct filing of the petition.
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum
from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court
is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings the
petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be
mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined
and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court.

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners direct resort to the Court
was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The sole
office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse
of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites
must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the
assailed order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start with, they
merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended
to ensure his subordinates efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The function involved was purely
executive or administrative.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews

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the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons
who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment
on the accused, not the fiscal.

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that the public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial
body, is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court of
law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial body
quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a
court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory functions, and its awards and
adjudications determine the rights of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same
effect as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public
prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a
criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or whenever the
Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutors orders or resolutions.

Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However,

we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what manner and
at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted without or
in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. On the other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by
any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of

its validity. The Court has extended the presumption of validity to legislative issuances as
well as to rules and regulations issued by administrative agencies.

DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the Secretary of
Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer
the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof" as expressed in
Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and
Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it

became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity,
either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of
Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further

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show that the performance of the DOJs functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and
other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That
was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their right
to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them by the Legacy Group. Instead,
the issuances were designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the
prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible for the wrong through the
creation of the special panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to
conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against
petitioners.

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in DO No.
182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City,
claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of the equal
protection of law.

The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009.

Petitioners attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of the

Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as
long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,
2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro,
where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the
preliminary investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account
that the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro at the
time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in
Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification taken into
consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could
not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the non-application
of the exemption to them would cause them some inconvenience.

Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would be
considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant
transgression of petitioners constitutional rights to speedy disposition of their cases."

We cannot favor their contention. The Court has clarified that although the
Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is
a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances surrounding
each case must be evaluated and taken into account. There occurs a violation of the right to a
speedy disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured,
or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of
the time involved is not determinant of the concept.

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The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation
to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with
during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the consolidation of
the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and
of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.

On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more cases
reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet,
any delays in petitioners cases occasioned by such other and subsequent cases should not
warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The Constitution prohibits only the delays that
are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. In fine,
we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy
disposition of their cases.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182
was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial
statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or
take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of
already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is
not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested
right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182 constituted
obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of Justice
to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes and the
prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional, provincial, and city prosecutors
of the country; has broad discretion in the discharge of the DOJs functions; and administers
the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry
out their objectives, policies and functions.

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the bounds
of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any person or entity
who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to
call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued by, as well
as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.

METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. vs. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, INC.,

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G.R. No. 154390, FIRST DIVISION, March 17, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The genuineness and due execution of a deed of real estate mortgage that has been
acknowledged before a notary public are presumed. Any allegation of fraud and forgery against
the deed must be established by clear and competent evidence.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; As a notarized document, the deed

carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and had in its
favor the presumption of regularity.The contested deed of real estate mortgage was a public
document by virtue of its being acknowledged before notary public Atty. Noemi Ferrer. As a
notarized document, the deed carried the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution, and had in its favor the presumption of regularity. Hence, it was admissible
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity, and was entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. To rebut its authenticity and genuineness, the contrary evidence must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the deed should be upheld.

FACTS:

Metropolitan Fabrics, Incorporated owned a 5.8 hectare industrial compound at

Novaliches, Quezon City. Pursuant to a P2 million, 10-year 14% per annum loan agreement
with Manphil Investment Corporation (Manphil) dated April 6, 1983, the said lot was
subdivided into 11 lots, with Manphil retaining four lots as mortgage security. The other seven
lots were released to MFI.

In July 1984, MFI sought from PCRI a loan in the amount of P3,443,330.52, the balance
of the cost of its boiler machine, to prevent its repossession by the seller. PCRI is licensed to
engage in money lending, was represented by Domingo Ang ("Domingo") its president, and
his son Caleb, vice- president.

Caleb recommended the approval of the P3.44 million loan with an interest ranging
from 24% to 26% per annum and a term of between 5-10 years. It sufficed for Caleb that
Enrique was a well-respected Chinese businessman, that he was the president of their Chinese
family association, and that he had other personal businesses aside from MFI, such as the
Africa Trading.

Enriques daughter Vicky testified during trial that on August 3, 1984, even before the
signing of the mortgage and loan documents, PCRI released the P3.5 million loan to MFI. It
found that the blank loan forms, consisting of the real estate mortgage contract,
promissory note, comprehensive surety agreement and disclosure statement, which
Domingo himself handed to Enrique, "had no entries specifying the rate of interest
and schedules of amortization." On the same day, to reciprocate the gesture of PCRI,
Enrique, together with his wife Natividad Africa, vice-president, and son Edmundo signed the
blank forms.

Vicky likewise testified that in order to return the trust of Domingo and Caleb and
their gesture of the early release of the loan that Enrique and Vicky entrusted to them their 7
titles, with an aggregate area of 3.3665 hectares. They left it to PCRI to choose from among the
7 titles those which would be sufficient to secure the P3.5 million. It was agreed that once
PCRI had chosen the lots to be covered by the mortgage, PCRI would return the remaining
titles to MFI. Significantly, Vicky testified that MFI delivered to PCRI 24 checks, bearing no

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dates and amounts, to cover the amortization payments, all signed in blank by Enrique and
Natividad.

In September 1984, the first amortization check bounced for insufficient fund due to
MFIs continuing business losses. It was then that MFI allegedly learned that PCRI had filled
up the 24 blank checks with dates and amounts that reflected a 35% interest rate per annum,
instead of just 24%, and a two-year repayment period, instead of 10 years. Vicky avers that her
strong protest caused PCRI to desist from depositing the other 23 checks, and that it was
about this time that PCRI finally furnished MFI with its copy of the promissory note and the
disclosure statement.

Vicky asserted that MFI found the terms reflected in the loan documents to be
prohibitive, burdensome and unconscionable, and that had they known them when they took
out the loan on August 3, 1984, they could either have (1) negotiated/bargained or (2) rejected
the terms of the loan and withdrawn the loan application.

Vicky also testified that talks were held in between Domingo and Enrique as well as
between Vicky and Caleb concerning the possible offsetting of the loan by ceding some of
their properties to PCRI. PCRIs account statement showed that MFIs total loan obligation
amounted to P4,167,472.71 The March 25, 1986 statement from PCRI, however, showed that all
7 titles were placed as collateral for their P3.5 million loan. MFI maintained that per their
appraisal report, four of the properties were already worth P6.5 million while the three other
lots were valued around P4.6 million.

On September 4, 1986, Enrique received a Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated August

29, 1986, announcing the auction of the seven lots on September 24, 1986 due to unpaid
indebtedness of P10.5 million.

Vicky insisted that prior to the auction notice, they never received any statement or
demand letter from PCRI to pay P10.5 million, nor did PCRI inform them of the intended
foreclosure. The last statement they received was dated February 12, 1986, and showed amount
due of only P4,167,472.71.

MFI protested the foreclosure, and the auction was reset to October 6, 1986, then to
October 16, 1986, and finally October 27, 1986 after they assured PCRI that they had found a
serious buyer for three of the lots. The buyer, Winston Wang of Asia Cotton and his lawyer,
Atty. Ismael Andres together with PCRI agreed to release the mortgage upon payment of P3.5
million. Winston Wang would pay to MFI P500,000.00 as down-payment, which MFI would in
turn pay to PCRI as partial settlement of the P3.5 million loan.

On January 19, 1987, Winston Wang confronted Vicky about their sale agreement and
PCRIs refusal to accept their P3 million payment, because according to Caleb, the three lots
had been foreclosed. Vicky was shocked, because the agreed 60-day period to pay the P3
million was to lapse on January 13, 1987 yet.

At the auction sale on October 27, 1986, PCRI was the sole bidder for P6.5 million.
Vicky however also admitted that discussions continued on the agreement to release three lots
for P3.5 million. Upon PCRIs continued failure to honor their agreement, Atty. Ismael Andres
threatened to sue PCRI in a letter if they would not accept the P3 million payment of his
client. Atty. Andres also sent them similar letters and after several more discussions, PCRI
finally agreed to accept the P3 million from Winston Wang.

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Vicky also testified that although Wang would pay directly to Caleb, MFI
pursued the transaction because of PCRIs promised to release the 4 other remaining
properties after the payment of P3.5 million loan principal as well as the interest in
arrears computed at P3 million, or a total of P6.5.

MFI paid to PCRI P490,000.00 as agreed, and likewise complied with the required
documentation. Winston Wang also paid the balance of P3 million for the three lots he was
buying. The discussion then turned to how the MFIs P3 million interest arrearages would be
settled, which they agreed to be payable over a period of one year, from October 26, 1987 to
October 26, 1988.

In October, 1988, however, MFI were able to raise only P2 million. After a meeting at
PCRIs office, the period to pay was extended to October 26, 1989, but subject to 18% interest
per annum, which Caleb however allegedly refused to put in writing. MFI were later able to
raise P3 million plus P540,000.00 representing the 18% interest per annum. On October 26,
1989, Vicky and Enrique tendered the same to Caleb at his office. Caleb however
became furious, and now insisted that the interest due since 1984 was already P7
million computed at 35% per annum.

On January 16, 1990 and again on March 5, 1990, PCRI sent the MFI a letter demanding
that they vacate the four remaining lots. Caleb was also now asking for P10.5 million. On June
7, 1990, the PCRIs vice-president, wrote Vicky reiterating their demand to vacate the premises
and remove pieces of machinery, equipment and persons therein, which MFI eventually
heeded.

In arguing that the 35% interest rate imposed by PCRI was exorbitant and without
their consent, the plaintiffs cited the promissory note and amortization schedule in their loan
agreement with Manphil dated April 6, 1983 and with IBAA on April 21, 1983 which both
showed a rate of interest of only 14% and a ten-year term with two years grace period.

The RTC declared the real estate mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure made by
PCRI null and void. The CA however reversed the decision of the RTC due to estoppel and
prescription of the action to annul the mortgage contract.

The CA ruled that the action for annulment of title and reconveyance was based on the
allegation of fraud which attended the mortgage contract between the parties. Article 1391 of
the Civil Code provides that actions to annul a contract based on fraud should be brought
within four years from discovery of the fraud. If the transaction involves registered land, the
four-year period is computed from the registration of the conveyance/transaction on account
of constructive notice and not on actual knowledge. In the instant case, the mortgage over the
seven lots was annotated on the back of their respective titles on September 05, 1984, so that
the action to annul the mortgage should have been commenced before September 05, 1988.
The case below was filed only in 1991.

Moreover, assuming the defendants were guilty of continuing fraud, the plaintiffs
inaction for seven years is contrary to human experience and thus estoppel may have already
set in. Nor is it at all clear just how the continuing fraud was committed by PCRI. Instead,
what is more readily apparent from the findings of fact of the trial court is that upon the
incessant importuning of the plaintiffs, the defendants gave them every reasonable chance to
pay their loan and recover their properties.

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Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the action to annul the mortgage has already prescribed.

RULING:

Yes. The action to assail the mortgage already prescribed.

To resolve the issue of prescription, it is decisive to determine if the mortgage was void
or merely voidable.

It appears that the original stance of petitioners was that the deed of real estate
mortgage was voidable. In their complaint, they averred that the deed, albeit in printed form,
was incomplete in essential details, and that Metropolitan, through Enrique Ang as its
president, signed it in good faith and in absolute confidence.

Yet, petitioners now claim that the CA committed a reversible error in not holding that
the absence of consent made the deed of real estate mortgage void, not merely voidable. In
effect, they are now advancing that their consent was not merely vitiated by means of fraud,
but that there was complete absence of consent.

As the records show, petitioners really agreed to mortgage their properties as security
for their loan, and signed the deed of mortgage for the purpose. Thereafter, they delivered the
TCTs of the properties subject of the mortgage to respondents.

Petitioners neither alleged nor established that they had been forced or coerced to
enter into the mortgage. Also, they had freely and voluntarily applied for the loan, executed
the mortgage contract and turned over the TCTs of their properties. Where the consent was
given through fraud, the contract was voidable, not void ab initio. This is because a voidable
or annullable contract is existent, valid and binding, although it can be annulled due to want
of capacity or because of the vitiated consent of one of the parties.

With the contract being voidable, petitioners' action to annul the real estate mortgage
already prescribed. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code, provides that if the
consent of the contracting parties was obtained through fraud, the contract is considered
voidable and may be annulled within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud.
The discovery of fraud is reckoned from the time the document was registered in the Register
of Deeds in view of the rule that registration was notice to the whole world.

Thus, because the mortgage involving the seven lots was registered on September 5,
1984, they had until September 5, 1988 within which to assail the validity of the mortgage.
But their complaint was instituted in the RTC only on October 10, 1991. Hence, the action,
being by then already prescribed, should be dismissed.

BERLINDA ORIBELLO v. CA and REMEDIOS ORIBELLO

G.R. No. 163504, AUGUST 5, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not have
the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the decree of adoption issued by the
erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Occidental Mindoro by virtue of the equal rank and
category between the RTC and the CFI.The RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine or
to review the validity of the decree of adoption issued by the erstwhile CFI of Occidental
Mindoro by virtue of the equal rank and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper
court with jurisdiction to do so was the CA, which has been vested by Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 with the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of
the judgments of the RTC, to wit: Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.The [Court of Appeals] shall exercise:
x x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional
Trial Courts.

Same; Same; Appeals; The judgment or final order of a court of law can be set aside only
through a direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction.It is also relevant to
mention that the judgment or final order of a court of law can be set aside only through a
direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction. For this reason, any attack in
this action for partition against the validity of the adoption decree issued by the CFI of
Occidental Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a collateral attack
against the judgment in the adoption case.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Partition; The object of partition is to enable those who own
property as joint tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint
tenancy so as to vest in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or
tenements.Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the remedy of judicial
partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy between
persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a division
or partition thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part corresponding to
him. The object of partition is to enable those who own property as joint tenants, or
coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest in each a
sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial Partition; To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial
partition, there are two (2) stages defined under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.To accord with
the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages defined under Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court. The first relates to the determination of the rights of the parties to the
property held in common. The second concerns the physical segregation of each partys just
share in the property held in common. The second stage need not be gone into should the
parties agree on the physical partition.

FACTS:

Before the RTC of La Union was an action for partition and damages involving twelve
parcels of land. Eight of said parcels are declared for taxation purposes in the name of Toribio
Oribello, two in the names of Toribio and Rosenda Oribello, one in the names of Toribio and
Berlinda Padilla Oribello, and one in the names of Toribio and Ma. Emilia Oribello.

Toribio was twice married. His first wife was Emilia. On September 10, 1981, their
marriage was dissolved pursuant to the decision of the Superior Court of California, USA.

On March 10, 1982, Toribio married Berlinda Oribello. He died intestate on August 18,
1993.

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The action was instituted by Remedios Oribello and was anchored on the theory that
Remedios is an adopted daughter of Toribio.

Berlinda denied that Remedios is an adopted daughter of Toribio. She averred that the
decree of adoption was fraudulently secured and that the proceedings in the first adoption
case and the decree of adoption are void ab intio.

RTC dismissed the action.

On appeal, the CA vacated and set aside the decision of the RTC and the case was
remanded to the lower court for the second phase of a partition suit without prejudice to the
filing, if still available, of either a petition for relief from the decree of adoption rendered in Sp.
Proc. No. R-94 of the then Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro (Branch II) or an
action for annulment thereof.

The CA pointed out that even if the adoption proceedings had suffered from
infirmities, the RTC did not have the authority to annul the adoption decree and to dismiss
the complaint for partition for that reason; and that at any rate the petitioner still had the
option either to file a petition for relief or an action for the annulment of the adoption decree
in the appropriate court.

ISSUE:

I. WON the validity of the adoption decree in favor of the respondent should not be
assailed in an action for partition.
II. WON Remedios was entitled to the partition.

RULING:

I. YES. The CA correctly held that the validity of the adoption decree in favor of the
respondent should not be assailed in an action for partition.

The RTC did not have the jurisdiction to determine or to review the validity of the
decree of adoption issued by the erstwhile CFI of Occidental Mindoro by virtue of the equal
rank and category between the RTC and the CFI. The proper court with jurisdiction to do so
was the CA, which has been vested by Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 with the exclusive
original jurisdiction over actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC, to wit: Sec. 9.
Jurisdiction.The [Court of Appeals] shall exercise: x x x x (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction
over actions for annulment of judgments of Regional Trial Courts.

It is also relevant to mention that the judgment or final order of a court of law can be
set aside only through a direct attack commenced in the court of competent jurisdiction. For
this reason, any attack in this action for partition against the validity of the adoption decree
issued by the CFI of Occidental Mindoro cannot be permitted because such would constitute a
collateral attack against the judgment in the adoption case.

II. NO. The respondent did not discharge her burden of proof as the plaintiff to show that
she was entitled to the partition.

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It is our studied conclusion that the RTC correctly ruled against the right of
respondent Remedios Oribello to demand the partition of the real property belonging to the
late Tomas Oribello on the ground that she had not substantiated her right to the partition by
preponderance of evidence. As the plaintiff, she had the burden of proof, as the party
demanding the partition of property, to establish her right to a share in the property by
preponderance of evidence, but she failed to provide the factual basis of her right to the
partition warranted the dismissal of her claim for judicial partition.

Before going further, it is relevant to relive the nature of the remedy of judicial
partition. The proceeding under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court is a judicial controversy
between persons who, being co-owners or coparceners of common property, seek to secure a
division or partition thereof among themselves, giving to each one of them the part
corresponding to him. The object of partition is to enable those who own property as joint
tenants, or coparceners, or tenants in common to put an end to the joint tenancy so as to vest
in each a sole estate in specific property or an allotment in the lands or tenements.

To accord with the nature of the remedy of judicial partition, there are two stages
defined under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first relates to the determination of the
rights of the parties to the property held in common. The second concerns the physical
segregation of each partys just share in the property held in common. The second stage need
not be gone into should the parties agree on the physical partition.

SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. JIMMY F. FLORES,

EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA FLORES, HECTOR FLORES, MARITES
FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F. FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA
MAGPANTAY, MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA BANZUELA
VDA. DE FAYLONA, respondents.
G.R. No. 160786 June 17, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its
execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or
stop the execution, must alter or modify the situation of the parties under the decision as to
render the execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on
unproved or uncertain facts.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution; Immutability of Judgments;

Execution is a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment; Exceptions.Although it is
true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain
herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in
order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and successors-
in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the portion supposedly
subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally impermissible, considering
that the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct
what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what
court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial
justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or

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property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;
(d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A supervening event is an exception to the execution as
a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter
already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties
therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.We deem it highly
relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to
render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening event consists of facts
that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that
develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware
of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time. In
that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the
writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter the judgment in order to
harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who alleges a supervening
event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent evidence;
otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects of a final and
immutable judgment.

Same; Same; Same; Demolition Orders; According to Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of
Court, when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted
by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said
improvements except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee
after due hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the
improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court.The issuance of the special order of
demolition would also not constitute an abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance
would certainly be the necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and
immutable decision. According to Section 10(d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court, when the property
subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due
hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the improvements
within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special order being designed to carry out
the final judgment of the RTC for the delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to
their respective owners, the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be upheld.

FACTS:

Involved in the suit is a lot inherited by both Francisco (Faylona) and Gaudencia
(Faylona) from their deceased parents. It appears that after Franciscos death, his widow and
Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the western half of the same lot was
assigned to Franciscos heirs while the eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however,
no actual ground partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencias death. It thus result that both
the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in common the land in dispute, which co-
ownership was recognized by Gaudencia herself during her lifetime, whose heirs, being in
actual possession of the entire area, encroached and built improvements on portions of the

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western half. In the case of the petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage and
poultry pens extended to the western half.

Such was the state of things when, on July 22, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court at San
Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, among whom are the
private respondents, desiring to terminate their co-ownership with the heirs of Gaudencia,
filed their complaint for judicial partition in this case.

In a decision dated November 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment for the
private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in such a way that the
western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs
of Gaudencia. From the aforementioned decision, the heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners included,
went on appeal to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. An Entry of
Judgment was then issued. Thereafter, the same court issued a writ of execution. The
implementing sheriff returned the writ PARTIALLY SATISFIED, with the information that
petitioners failed to remove that portion of their residence as well as their garage and poultry
fence that encroached the western half of the property.

Private respondents then filed a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, alleging that they
have become one of the co-owners of the western half, purportedly because one of the
successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona Jimmy Flores who was co-plaintiff of the
private respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the western half. Petitioners further
alleged that the said sale constituted a supervening event occurring after the finality of the
November 20, 1989 decision that rendered the execution inequitable as to them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of his 1/4 share in the western
portion of the lot constituted a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final
judgment against petitioners inequitable.

RULING:

The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his 1/4
share in the western portion of the lot was a supervening event that rendered the
execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of
right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a supervening event, such
circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their contention would be to reopen the final and
immutable judgment in order to further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the
heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating the
portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The reopening would be legally
impermissible, considering that the November 20, 1989 decision could no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification was meant to correct
what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law and regardless of what
court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. This is pursuant to the doctrine of
immutability of a final judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial
justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or
property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case;

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(d) the cause not being entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension.

Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the property in litis
their demand for the segregration of the share of Jimmy Flores. Instead, their correct course
of action was to initiate in the proper court a proceeding for partition of the western portion
based on the supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the
execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects
the matter already litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the
parties therein as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable. A supervening
event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment became final and executory, or of new
circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including matters that the
parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in
existence at that time. In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay of
execution or the quashal of the writ of execution, or he may move the court to modify or alter
the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening event. The party who
alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by
competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive effects
of a final and immutable judgment.

Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed share in the western
portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify or alter the judgment
regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was also regarded with suspicion by the CA
because petitioners had not adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents,
including Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale
itself.

HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO, REPRESENTED BY: LOLIBETH SOTTO NOBLE, DANILO

C. SOTTO, CRISTINA C. SOTTO, EMMANUEL C. SOTTO and FILEMON C. SOTTO; and
SALVACION BARCELONA, AS HEIR OF DECEASED MIGUEL BARCELONA, petitioners,
vs. MATILDE S. PALICTE, respondent.
G.R. No. 159691 June 13, 2013, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Elements of.Res judicata exists when as
between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action these elements are present,
namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former
judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and
subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of action in both actions
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Same; Same; Same; An identity of parties existed because the parties were the same, or
there was privity among them, or some of the parties were successors-in-interest litigating for

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the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.An identity of parties
existed because the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the
parties were successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and
in the same capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared
identity of interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of
parties, or even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases,
even if the latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact
that a previous case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.

Same; Same; Same; Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the
merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties
or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous
suit.Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation
principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

FACTS:

Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang
(Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the
Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.

In June 1967, Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the
deceased wife of Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint
against the Estate of Sotto seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited
from Carmen. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Pilar and other heirs of Carmen. To
satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on execution was effected against six parcels of
land and two residential houses belonging to the Estate of Sotto. The levied assets were sold at
a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four of the parcels of land in her own name.

On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo and the heirs of Miguel (herein
petitioners) instituted the present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC alleging in
their complaint that despite the redemption of the four properties having been made in the
sole name of Matilde, the four properties still rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for
having furnished the funds used to redeem the properties. They prayed that the RTC declare
the four properties as the assets of the Estate of Sotto, and that the RTC direct their partition
among the heirs of Filemon.

It must be noted that the present action is the fifth suit to reach the Supreme Court
dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto (Filemon) respecting four real
properties that had belonged to Filemons estate (Estate of Sotto). In the four previous cases,
the Court upheld the right of Matilde over the four parcels of land redeemed under his name.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the present action for partition was already barred by prior judgment.

RULING:

The present action for partition is already barred by prior judgment.

Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other
action these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the
former judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of
causes of action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

The first three elements were present. The decision of the Court in the first case,
second case, third case and the fourth case all of which dealt with Matildes right to the
four properties had upheld Matildes right to the four properties and had all become final.
Such rulings were rendered in the exercise of the respective courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and were adjudications on the merits of the cases.
What remains to be determined is whether the present action and the previous cases involved
the same parties, the same subject matter, the same causes of action, and the same factual and
legal issues.

In all the five cases (present action included), an identity of parties existed because the
parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties were
successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of
interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or
even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the
latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact that a
previous case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.

Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions, was the same, that is, Matildes
right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she had the exclusive
right to them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon, like petitioners
predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the properties belonged to the Estate of Sotto.

And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was
successful, would amount to res judicata in relation to the present action for partition.

PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION vs.

LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 161589, FIRST DIVISION, November 24, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

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 REMEDIAL LAW
J. BERSAMIN

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined from the allegations of the
initiatory pleading.

The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such
averments and the character of the relief sought are to be consulted. The court must interpret
and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of whether or not the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The reliefs to which the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts averred, although not the reliefs demanded,
determine the nature of the action. The defense contained in the answer of the defendant is
generally not determinant.

FACTS:

The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star Building located in Makati City
with an area of 1,068.67 square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of the
premises through the petitioners authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc.
(Century Properties). Under the terms of the contract of lease dated January 31, 1997, the
petitioner gave the respondent possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the
effect that in case of the respondents default in its monthly rentals, the petitioner could
immediately repossess the subject property.

On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to purchase the entire
1,068.67 square meters, including the subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell,
denominated as a reservation agreement, in which they set the purchase price at
US$3,420,540.00.

After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying the stipulated monthly
amortizations. In the September 23, 1997 letter, the respondent asked the petitioner to modify
the terms of the reservation agreement to allow it to purchase only the subject property.

Through its letter of February 17, 1998, the respondent submitted the following
proposals, namely: (1) that the US$538,735.00 paid under the reservation agreement be applied
as rental payments for the use and occupation of the subject property in the period from
March 1997 to February 28, 1998; (2) that the balance of US$417,355.45 after deducting the
rental payments from March 1997 to February 28, 1998 should be returned to it; and (3) that
the respondent be allowed to lease the subject property beginning March 1998.

The petitioner, through its counsels letter of March 9, 1998, rejected the respondents
proposals, and demanded the payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondents
unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under the reservation agreement. The petitioner further
evinced its intention to cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the
rentals of the subject property corresponding to the period from August 1997 to March 1998,
during which no amortization payments were made.

In the letter dated February 4, 1999, the petitioners counsel informed the respondent
of the cancellation of the reservation agreement and the forfeiture of the respondents
payments; and demanded that respondent pay the rentals of P9,782,226.50 and vacate the
subject property.

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In another letter dated May 25, 1999, the respondent was informed that in view of their
continued refusal and/or failure to pay the balance of the agreed-upon purchase price of the
office unit they are currently occupying, the petitioner is making a notarial cancellation of the
Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the unit and to forfeit the payments made. The letter
likewise was the final and formal demand made to the respondents to peacefully and quietly
vacate the same within 10 days from receipt of the letter.

On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for ejectment in the MeTC following
the respondents failure to comply with the demands to pay and vacate.

The respondent resisted the complaint, arguing that the contract of lease dated
January 31, 1997 had been simulated or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated,
extinguished and/or novated by the reservation agreement and the petitioner had
unjustifiably refused to renegotiate or to amend the reservation agreement.

The MeTC, ruled in favor of the petitioner, and found that the respondents lawful
possession of the property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had become
unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply with its obligation to pay the monthly
rentals for the subject property and that, in any event, the reservation agreement proved that
the petitioner had held the better right to possess the subject property as the owner thereof.

The RTC however nullified the decision of the MeTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, holding that the appropriate action was either accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of
possession by the petitioner was the respondents failure to pay the amortizations arising from
the violations of the reservation agreement.

The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, declaring that the respondents possession
was not by virtue of the contract of lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which
was more of a "contract of sale."

Hence, this appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer.

HELD:

Yes. The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing from the averments
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence,
such averments and the character of the relief sought are to be consulted.

The court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments
of ultimate facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless of whether or not the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
defense contained in the answer of the defendant is generally not determinant.

A complaint for unlawful detainer must allege that: (a) the defendant originally had
lawful possession of the property, either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) the defendants possession of the property eventually became illegal or unlawful upon

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notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the expiration or the termination of the defendants
right of possession; (c) the defendant thereafter remained in possession of the property and
thereby deprived the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff instituted the action
within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

The complaint herein sufficiently alleged all the foregoing requisites for unlawful
detainer, to wit:

3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiffs authorized agent, Century
Properties Management Inc. (CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the x x x Philippines x x x entered into a Contract
of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former a portion of the 25th Floor of the
PSB (hereinafter referred to as the PROPERTY). x x x.

4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from the plaintiff the 25th
Floor of the PSB by virtue of a Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.

5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default in its amortization

payments on the above-mentioned purchase.

8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the plaintiff and CPMI
that the Reservation Agreement be cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-
mentioned Contract of Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded to
such request x x x.

9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract of Lease, the

defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff the rentals for the use of the
PROPERTY when they fell due.

10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial cancellation of the

aforementioned purchase and demanded that defendant peacefully vacate the
PROPERTY. x x x.

11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed and/or refused and
continues to refuse and fail to peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.

After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this suit in the MeTC on July
9, 1999, well within the one-year period from the date of the last demand.

The afore quoted allegations of the complaint made out a case of unlawful detainer,
vesting the MeTC with exclusive original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein,
the cause of action of the petitioner was to recover possession of the subject property from the
respondent upon the latters failure to comply with the formers demand to vacate the subject
property after the latters right to remain thereon terminated by virtue of the demand to
vacate.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that what was ultimately
proved was as to how entry by the respondent had been made or when the dispossession had
started might have departed from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier stated, jurisdiction
over the subject matter was determined from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly
set forth a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

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FE U. QUIJANO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, respondent.

G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendants occupation,
the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an
improper remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any
allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation,
threats, strategy or stealth.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; An ejectment case can be either for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary proceeding designed to provide expeditious
means to protect the actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved.An
ejectment case can be either for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. It is a summary
proceeding designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the
physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and neither a
claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the
defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, like here, the court may
pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of possession especially if the question
of ownership is inseparably linked with the question of possession. The adjudication of
ownership in that instance is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving the title to the property.

Civil Law; Co-Ownership; In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to

different persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her rights
over the whole property.In a co-ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different
persons, with each of them holding the property pro indiviso and exercising her rights over
the whole property. Each co-owner may use and enjoy the property with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that
until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be determined, and every
co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro indiviso
property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Unlawful detainer involves the
defendants withholding of the possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after
the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold possession under the contract,
whether express or implied.There is no question that the holder of a Torrens title is the
rightful owner of the property thereby covered and is entitled to its possession. However, the
Court cannot ignore that the statements in the petitioners complaint about the respondents
possession of the disputed property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo could be the basis
for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the defendants withholding of the
possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or termination
of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, whether express or implied. A
requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally
lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.

FACTS:

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 REMEDIAL LAW
J. BERSAMIN

The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their
father, the late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land. Prior to any partition among the heirs,
Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A.
Amante (respondent). Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his
share in the property to the respondent.

Thereafter, Fe(petitioner), Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial

partition to divide their fathers estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land)
among themselves. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the
respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo. Due to the petitioners
needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that the latter
vacate it. Despite several demands, the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file
against him a complaint for ejectment and damages in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City (MTCC). She alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land,
a portion of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a residential
building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had
inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them;
and that the respondents occupation had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite
repeated demands. The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had
been by mere tolerance of Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful
possessor of the property, having bought it from Eliseo.

MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner. Regional Trial Court (RTC)
reversed the judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint, holding that the summary
proceeding for ejectment was not proper. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy of the petitioner under
the circumstances.

RULING:

The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano Quijano,
and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death. Prior to the partition, the estate
was owned in common by the heirs. Even if an heirs right in the estate of the decedent has
not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil
Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the
disputed property to the respondent, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and
could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but
transferred only the sellers pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a
co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.

As Eliseos successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right
under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge
the partition undertaken without his consent. Article 497 states:

Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the
division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected without
their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed,

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 REMEDIAL LAW
J. BERSAMIN

unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal
opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor
or assignor to maintain its validity.

The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property
he was buying was not exclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the coheirs had entered
into an oral agreement of partition vis--vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated
in his answer to the complaint. His knowledge of Eliseos co-ownership with his coheirs, and
of their oral agreement of partition notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his
right under Article 497. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to participate in or to
object to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was ultimately
agreed upon by the Quijanos.

Having resolved that the petitioner is entitled to the portion of land occupied by the
respondent, we now proceed on the propriety of an action for unlawful detainer to eject the
respondent.

The Court cannot ignore that the statements in the petitioners complaint about the
respondents possession of the disputed property being by the mere tolerance of Eliseo could
be the basis for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the defendants withholding of
the possession of the property to which the plaintiff is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the formers right to hold possession under the contract, whether express or
implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was
originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.

With the averment here that the respondents possession was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not
suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her or her
predecessors tolerance, or her coheirs permission for him to occupy the disputed property.
But she did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be herself not clear and
definite as to his possession of the disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo. In
contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his assertion that his possession of the
disputed property was in the concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo, and
actually presented the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the property to him.

Considering that the allegation of the petitioners tolerance of the respondents

possession of the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be
deemed illegal from the beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.
Even so, the Court would not be justified to treat this ejectment suit as one for forcible entry
because the complaint contained no allegation that his entry in the property had been by
force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth.

Regardless, the issue of possession between the parties will still remain. To finally
resolve such issue, they should review their options and decide on their proper recourses. In
the meantime, it is wise for the Court to leave the door open to them in that respect. For
now, therefore, this recourse of the petitioner has to be dismissed.

MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 177600, OCTOBER 19, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

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 REMEDIAL LAW
J. BERSAMIN

ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA v. HON. JUDGE ALEXANDER S. BALUT

G.R. No. 178684, OCTOBER 19, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and
supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then
superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext
that the trial court should still act and proceed independently of the executive determination of
probable cause to charge the proper offense.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The act of issuing the warrant of
arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implied that the judge has
determined the existence of probable cause for the offenses charged.The language and
meaning of the Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges
against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder, were clear and forthright
enough to require elaboration. Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused, did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination
of probable cause independently of the executive determination. We should remind that the
trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the existence of probable cause
against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the
information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of
probable cause for the offenses charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the
judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and
proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper
offense.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Contempt of Court; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court
is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in
this manner: Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The contempt power of the courts has been discussed in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr., 429 SCRA 258
(2004), to wit: Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with
him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to
protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and
the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and
contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power
assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt
power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, inasmuch as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the
good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.

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J. BERSAMIN

Same; Same; Same; The power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised
cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously.Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt
is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt
powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be
contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

FACTS:

A shooting incident took place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur that resulted in
the death of Dante Limbona and Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of two others.
In the course of the preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor found probable
cause to charge Balindong, et al. with Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. The
Information was thereupon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
Branch 12. However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the charges against Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua
Balindong and Kennedy Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden Balindong
and Ali Balindong.

Zenaida Limbona, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for review questioning the
Provincial Prosecutors resolution before the DOJ. Then Sec. Serafin Cuevas modified the
assailed resolution and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead two (2) informations
for murder with attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an
information for attempted murder.

The corresponding Amended Informations were accordingly filed before the RTC.
Then, pursuant to the decision of CA, the RTC issued a resolution finding probable cause to
charge Balindong, et al for murder with attempted murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder. The warrants of arrest were accordingly issued against Balindong, et al., who,
undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to question the Decision of the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review on certiorari.

On December 16, 2004 , SC promulgated its decision which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 which annulled the DOJ
Resolution dated March 12, 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions
issued on 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18
February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED, and the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, is ORDERED to implement
its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of
warrants of arrest against all the accused. The said court is directed
to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

The Supreme Court ruled to ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay heed to
the directives of the Court and against misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desists
from any further unauthorized pleadings under pain of contempt.

Balindong, et al. filed before RTC a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal Even the Appropriate

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Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. Judge Lee issued the assailed Order
granting Balindong, et al.s motion for redetermination of probable cause and consequently
ordering the downgrading of the crimes charged.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action
for certiorari in the CA alleging the judges committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order.

The Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and
Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect of contempt.

Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases which were re-raflled to
Branch 76, whose Presiding Judge was Judge Alexander S. Balut.

Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of
Arrest. As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut opted to defer action to await the Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 177600. He further suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants issued
for the arrest of Balindong, et al. hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.

ISSUES:

In G.R. No. 177600 - WON Balindong, et al are precluded from still seeking from the
RTC the judicial determination of probable cause against them after the decision had become
final and executory.

In G.R. 178584 - WON Judge Balut and Balindong, et al. may be cited for contempt of
court.

RULING:

In G.R. No. 177600 - YES.

The language and meaning of the Decision promulgated, that the proper criminal
charges against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two
counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder, were clear and forthright
enough to require elaboration. Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused, did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination
of probable cause independently of the executive determination. We should remind that the
trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the existence of probable cause
against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the
information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of
probable cause for the offenses charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the
judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and
proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper
offense.

Moreover, Balindong, et al. could not reasonably support their position that they could
still have the trial court determine the existence of probable cause in their criminal cases
independently of the executive determination of probable cause by the DOJ by relying on
Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of the Rules of Court.

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Ostensibly, Section 14, applies only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on
the part of public prosecutor in charging the proper offense.

It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor make a mistake in charging the
proper offenses against Balindong, et al.? The answer is no.

There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. Balindong, et al. fully exhausted
the procedure to determine the proper offenses to be charged against them by going all the
way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their quest was ultimately settled with finality by the
Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for reconsideration and declaring that such
offenses were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder,
and one count of attempted murder. Thus, this Court even issued its judicial imprimatur on
the probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and one count of attempted murder. For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14, supra,
as basis for the RTC to still reach a determination of probable cause different from those
sanctioned in G.R. No. 159962 would be untenable.

In G.R. No. 178684 - NO.

Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his
judicial discretion on the matters in question.

It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R.
159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith
had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et
al., or that he had thereby acted with a wilful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Courts bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing
of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he
could not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of
venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the
successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of petitions for certiorari
bearing on the handling of the criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including this
Court, must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution.
Indeed, he expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire to avert any conflicting
determinations pending the promulgation of the Courts Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And
thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lees, who downgraded the
offenses from two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder,
and one count of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide,
and ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee
thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to

its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

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Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect
and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a
court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with
the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given
to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, inasmuch as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of
society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.

Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule
unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must
manifest wilfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION, et al. v. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 155849, 31 August 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism
is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety.

President Fidel Ramos issued E.O. 213 entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping
Rates. The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a letter, advising
respondent Distribution Association of the Philippines, et al. (DMAP) that computation
of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA will no longer be required for
freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with the
resolution.

DMAP challenged E.O. 213 in the Court of Appeals (CA); a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition was filed. The CA dismissed the petition.

DMAP then held a general membership meeting (GMM), its President and
adviser publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, which stated, The Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months.

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, et al. brought a special civil action for contempt
against DMAP, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted
indirect contempt of court for debasing the Supreme Court by making scurrilous,
malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo.

DMAP filed a comment denying the intention to malign, discredit, or criticize

the Court. It explained that their statement was not per se contemptuous.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute
or amount to indirect contempt of court.

RULING:

NO. Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of
willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was
not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Thereby, DMAP were not guilty of indirect contempt of court.

The Court reminded that the power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court
invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. Judges exercise the power to punish
contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court, not
for retaliation or vindictiveness.

DENIS HABAWEL AND ALEXIS MEDINA v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST

DIVISION
G.R No. 174759, 7 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

A pleading containing derogatory, offensive, or malicious statements when

submitted before a court or judge in which proceedings are pending is direct contempt
because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court
or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.

Denis Habawel and Alexis Medina were counsels of Surfield Development

Corporation (Surfield), which sought refund of excess realty taxes. City Government of
Mandaluyong denied the claim. Surfield filed special civil action for mandamus in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), but was dismissed on the ground that action has already
prescribed, Surfield failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and grant of tax refund
is not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus. Surfield, represented its
counsels, elevated the dismissal to Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) via petition for review.

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CTA dismissed the case for failure to file administrative remedies. Habawel and Medina
sought reconsideration in behalf of Surfield and insisted on CTAs jurisdiction. They
argued that CTA First Division manifested lack of understanding or respect to doctrine of
stare decisis in not applying rulung in Ty v. Trampe and was totally ignorant or unaware of
Section 7(a)(3) Republic Act No. 9282, a new provision allegedly applicable to their case.
Aside from explaining its lack of jurisdiction over the case, CTA requested Habawel and
Medina to explain within five (5) days why they should not be liable for indirect
contempt.

Habawel and Medina submitted a compliance in which they appeared to

apologize but nevertheless justified their language as necessary to call the CTAs
attention to the grievousness of the error. CTA found the apology wanting in sincerity,
observing that the words chosen were so strong that it brings disrepute to courts
honor and integrity. CTA adjudged them of direct contempt. Habawel and Medina
submitted that they cannot be held guilty of direct contempt because the phrase gross
ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to describe error of judgment and not
directed to competence of decision maker, there was no offensive or rude statements
contained in their motion, and they had repeatedly offered apology.

ISSUE:
Whether or not submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive, and
malicious statements to the court constitutes direct contempt.

RULING:

YES. The statements made by Habwel and Medina in their motion for
reconsideration clearly overstepped the bounds of propriety as attorneys. An attorney may
be critical of the courts and their judges provided the the criticism is made in respectful
terms through legitimate channels. Courts and judges are not sacrosanct; thus, they
should expect critical evaluation of performance. However, criticisms should be bona fide
and not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. An imputation of gross ignorance
especially in abeyance of any evidence is a serious allegation and constitutes direct contempt.
It is equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt administration of justice even if not read in open court.

By branding the CTA as totally ignorant or unaware of the new provision and making
equally harsh statements, they assailed the legal learning of the members of the said
court. It would have been ethically better for them to have retreated and admitted their
error upon being informed by CTA about the untenability of their legal position which
was later on upheld by the Supreme Court, but they persisted and blamed CTA. No
attorney should ever brand a court or judge as grossly ignorant of the law especially if
there was no sincere or legitimate reason for doing so.

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Special Proceedings

ANITA MANGILA VS JUDGE HERIBERTO PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 160739, FIRST DIVISION, July 17, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

Restraint that is lawful and pursuant to a court process cannot be inquired into through
habeas corpus.

Constitutional Law Habeas Corpus The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Equally well settled however, is that the writ will
not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.

Remedial Law Criminal Procedure Warrants of Arrest Under Section 6(b) of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a
warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion
should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and
the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause
existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. In the context of this rule, Judge
Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently,
the CA properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she had been
arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan,
a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

Same Same It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should be ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila
had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from
detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct
of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention
of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire
records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans transmittal of
them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the CA, therefore, that the
writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.

FACTS:

Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with
syndicated estafa in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042
(Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995) were filed in the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities in Puerto Princesa City (MTCC). The complaints arose from the recruiting and
promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private complainants as overseas
contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing fees,

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membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).

On the following day, Judge Heriberto M. Pangilinan, Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron
Palayon, one of the complainants, Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila
and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire records of the cases, including the
warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for further
proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules.

As a consequence, Mangila was arrested and detained at the headquarters on Taft

Avenue, Manila of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Claiming that Judge Pangilinan did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation; that the preliminary investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he
issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was without
sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from
detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas corpus was available to her
because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of arrest
considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the
City Prosecutor who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant.

The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack of merit. Mangila moved for
the reconsideration of the denial of her petition for habeas corpus, but the CA denied the
motion. Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from
detention?

RULING:

NO. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and
effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.

The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in
whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record.

When the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June
16, 2003,Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to
conduct preliminary investigations involving "all crimes cognizable by the proper
court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath
of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a
probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1wphi1 In the context of this
rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts.
Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she
had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge
Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.

It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC
judges to conduct preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005
pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

With Mangilas arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully
issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve
her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant
to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.

Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge

Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because
of its having been issued without an exhaustive examination of the complainants and the
witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable cause; and without
consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were
enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.

Mangila fails to persuade.

Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayons evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which
finding the Court justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the
Office of the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation
he conducted, her petition for habeas corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she
could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that there was a failure to
adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the equivalent of a violation of her
constitutional rights.

Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant
of arrest by hinting that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of
determining the existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that consideration was presumed.

And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no
probable cause should beultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila
had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from
detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the

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conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to
the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the CA,
therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another
available remedy.

ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR,

and BEVERLY LONGID vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO TEODORO, RON ALDO
PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES, Gen. ALEXANDER YANO, Gen. JESUS VERZOSA, Brig.
Gen. REYNALDO MAPAGU, Lt. P/Dir. EDGARDO DOROMAL, Maj. Gen. ISA GANI
CACHUELA, Commanding Officer of the AFP-ISU based in Baguio City, PSS EUGENE
MARTIN, and several JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 186050

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, SECRETARY GILBERTO TEODORO, SECRETARY

RONALDO PUNO, SECRETARY NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
P/DGEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN. ISAGANI
CACHUELA, and POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE MARTIN vs. ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON
BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, and BEVERLY LONGID
G.R. No. 186059, EN BANC, June 21, 2016, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to

temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where
no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive
but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken.
To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a
valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar
analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the
amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these cases.

Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP reached an
impasse, it must be pointed out that there was still an active lead worth pursuing by the
PNP. Thus, the investigation had not reached a dead end - which would have warranted the
case's archiving - because the testimony of Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the part of
the PNP which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing investigation of James's
abduction. Therefore, the RTC's recommendation that these cases should be archived is clearly
premature, and hence, must be rejected.

FACTS:

The instant case arose when James M. Balao (James), founding member of the
Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of nongovemment organizations working for the
cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region, was abducted by five (5) unidentified
armed men on September 17, 2008, in front of Saymor's Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet.
After efforts to find him proved futile, James's siblings filed a petition for the issuance of a writ
of amparo in James's favor before the RTC.

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In a Judgment dated January 19, 2009, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo, thereby directing herein public officers to: (a) disclose where James is being detained
or confined; (b) release him from his unlawful detention; and ( c) cease and desist from
inflicting harm on his person. The RTC held that James' s unlawful disappearance was due to
his activist/political leanings and because the CPA was seen as a front of the Communist Party
of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA). The RTC further ruled that the
investigation conducted by the public officers was "very limited, superficial, and one-sided"
which, thus, unmistakably violated James's right to security of his person.

In the December 13, 2011 Decision, the Court reversed the grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo, holding that the totality of evidence presented in these cases did not fulfill the
evidentiary standard provided for by Amparo rule so as to establish that James was a victim of
an enforced disappearance. Notwithstanding these findings, the Court, however, concurred
with the RTC's observations describing the investigations made by the public officers as "very
limited, superficial, and one-sided" and, hence, ineffective.

In light of the foregoing, the Supreme Court partly modified the RTC ruling, by
reversing the grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo, ordering the incumbent Chief of
Staff of the AFP and Director General of the PNP to continue and pursue with extraordinary
diligence - as required under Section 17 of the Amparo rule the investigation of James's
abduction. The Court remanded the case to the RTC so as to monitor and ensure that the
investigative efforts by the public officers would be discharged with extraordinary diligence.

In a Notice dated November 28, 2013, the Court directed the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct independent and
parallel investigations on the disappearance of James. In a Further Partial Compliance dated
October 30, 2014, the RTC informed the Court that it scheduled a hearing on March 7, 2014 to
determine, among others, the results of the investigation being conducted by the Special
Investigation Task Group (SITG)-Balao, as monitored by the AFP and PNP, and that of the
CHR.

After hearing on the reports of AFP and CHR, the RTC opined that the investigation of
James's abduction had reached an impasse, thereby recommending that these cases be
archived considering that the investigation of the AFP had reached a standstill with its
conclusion that Maj. Tokong(one of the suspects for disappearance of James) did not conduct
surveillance operations on James, and that the testimony of another witness (Gonzales)
presented a new angle in the abduction that must be further verified. Gonzales
testified that James appeared to have wanted to leave the CPA, considering that he was
inquiring on how to obtain a visa to go to Japan; and he suspected the colleagues of James in
the CPA as his abductors, considering that they were the only persons - i.e., such as his
housemates - who knew or had information of his schedule, activities, or whereabouts, and
more importantly, the CPA had been dictating what his cousins should say or do, and had
prevented them from communicating with him.

ISSUE:

Whether the SC should adopt the resolution of RTC to archive the case.

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RULING:

Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not
dismiss, the case should it determine that it could not proceed for a valid cause, viz. :

Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not dismiss the petition,
but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such
as the failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.

Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to

temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but
where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is
kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can
be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is
impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their
lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and
conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these cases.

Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the AFP reached an
impasse, it must be pointed out that there was still an active lead worth pursuing by the
PNP. Thus, the investigation had not reached a dead end - which would have warranted the
case's archiving - because the testimony of Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the
part of the PNP which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing
investigation of James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's recommendation that these cases
should be archived is clearly premature, and hence, must be rejected.

Criminal Procedure

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. vs. PEREZ

G.R. No. 166836, FIRST DIVISION, September 4, 2013, BERSAMIN, J.

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of
residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel
the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a
logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance in the HLURB
posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal case for
violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct. A
prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction
to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid conflicting decisions. The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in

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Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a

prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the
specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for
the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the
former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of
the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.

The action for specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in
the HLURB. This situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of
late a proliferation of administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of
these agencies that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the
resort to the judicial adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized
skills, and knowledge of such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one
thrust of the proliferation is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of
private rights under contracts are no longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by
the regular courts.

FACTS:

San Miguel Properties Inc. a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business,
purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes), then represented by
Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver
appointed by the SEC 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque.

The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were fully
delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a
total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April
1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not
delivered to San Miguel Properties.

On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels
of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its
rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as
receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the
SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.

Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pias City charging respondent directors and
officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section
39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957. At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF
Homes for specific performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20
TCTs in its favor.

On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias rendered its resolution, dismissing San
Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the
ground that no action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that

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had appointed him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957
exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on
the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by
the HLURB; and that no prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there
appeared to be no probable cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in
the three deeds of sale.

The DOJ, over a petition for review of the resolution of the OCP, ruled that unless and
until the HLURB rules on the validity of the transactions involving the lands in question with
specific reference to the capacity of Atty. Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions,
there is as yet no basis to charge criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land
titles. In other words, complainant cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such
time that the HLURB shall have ruled and decided on the validity of the transactions involving
the lots in question.

ISSUE:

Whether the administrative case to compel the delivery of the TCTs filed before the
HLURB is a prejudicial question on the criminal complaint for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957.

HELD:

Yes. Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative
agency, raises a prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for
specific performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be
resolved.

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer
of residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to
compel the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is
properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative
determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-
delivery of the TCTs.

The action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not
San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining 20 TCTs,
while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes directors and officers were
criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to be not entitled
to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent
BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for
the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 would
evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.

A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the sufficiency of the
allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case.

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CONSING, JR., vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 161075, FIRST DIVISION, July 15, 2013, Bersamin J.

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise
a prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant
for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.

FACTS:

Rafael Consing negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la
Cruz various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. The loans were secured by a
real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land registered under the name of de la Cruz.

In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed
to purchase one-half of the property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz
and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of
P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a joint
venture partner of Unicapital.

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the
title to the property was really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties
from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. The title held by De la
Cruz appeared to be spurious.

Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19,
1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands.

Consing then filed in the RTC for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin Unicapita
from proceeding against him for the collection of money on the ground that he acted
as a mere agent of his mother. On the same day, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of public document against Consing and Dela Cruz. Unicapital,
furthermore, filed a civil case against Consing and Dela Cruz for recovery of a sum of money
and damages with application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Consing moved to defer his arraignment for the criminal case on the ground of the existence
of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of civil case against him. The RTC issued an
order suspending the proceedings of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question which suspension was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether prejudicial question exists that would warrant the suspension of the
proceedings.

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HELD:

No. There exist no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.

In the case at bar, no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in the civil case involving the injunctive relief is
whether or not Consing merely acted as an agent of his mother Cecilia Dela Cruz, while in the
civil case involving damages and attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid for the purchase of the lot.

Even if Consing is declared to be acting as an agent of his mother in the

transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved for injunctive relief is irrelevant to
the guilt or innocence of Consing and Dela Cruz in the criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBIs right to be paid damages and the purchase price of
the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the
criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages,
it does not ipso facto follow that Consing and Dela Cruz be held guilty of estafa through
falsification of public document. A ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be
paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve them from any liability in
the criminal case where the guilt may still be established under penal laws.

MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 177600, OCTOBER 19, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

ZENAIDA M. LIMBONA v. HON. JUDGE ALEXANDER S. BALUT

G.R. No. 178684, OCTOBER 19, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and
supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then
superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext
that the trial court should still act and proceed independently of the executive determination of
probable cause to charge the proper offense.

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; The act of issuing the warrant of
arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers implied that the judge has
determined the existence of probable cause for the offenses charged.The language and
meaning of the Decision promulgated in G.R. No. 159962, that the proper criminal charges
against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts
of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder, were clear and forthright
enough to require elaboration. Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused, did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination
of probable cause independently of the executive determination. We should remind that the
trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the existence of probable cause

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against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the
information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of
probable cause for the offenses charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the
judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and
proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper
offense.

Same; Special Civil Actions; Contempt of Court; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court
is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.Contempt of court is defined in jurisprudence in
this manner: Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the
court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due
administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The contempt power of the courts has been discussed in Sison v. Caoibes, Jr., 429 SCRA 258
(2004), to wit: Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with
him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to
protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and
the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and
contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power
assumed by a court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or
interference with the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt
power was given to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, inasmuch as
respect for the courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the
good order of society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.

Same; Same; Same; The power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised
cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously.Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt
is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt
powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be
contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

FACTS:

A shooting incident took place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur that resulted in
the death of Dante Limbona and Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of two others.
In the course of the preliminary investigation the investigating prosecutor found probable
cause to charge Balindong, et al. with Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. The
Information was thereupon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
Branch 12. However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor downgraded the charges against Lt. Col. Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua
Balindong and Kennedy Balindong and dropped the charges against Amer Oden Balindong
and Ali Balindong.

Zenaida Limbona, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for review questioning the
Provincial Prosecutors resolution before the DOJ. Then Sec. Serafin Cuevas modified the
assailed resolution and directed the Provincial Prosecutor to file instead two (2) informations

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for murder with attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an
information for attempted murder.

The corresponding Amended Informations were accordingly filed before the RTC.
Then, pursuant to the decision of CA, the RTC issued a resolution finding probable cause to
charge Balindong, et al for murder with attempted murder, frustrated murder and attempted
murder. The warrants of arrest were accordingly issued against Balindong, et al., who,
undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to question the Decision of the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for review on certiorari.

On December 16, 2004 , SC promulgated its decision which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated 22 May 2003 which annulled the DOJ
Resolution dated March 12, 2001 and reinstated its Resolutions
issued on 04 August 1999, 01 December 1999 and 16 March 2000 is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18
February 2004 by this Court is hereby LIFTED, and the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219, is ORDERED to implement
its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of
warrants of arrest against all the accused. The said court is directed
to submit a report thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

The Supreme Court ruled to ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay heed to
the directives of the Court and against misrepresenting the import of its rulings and to desists
from any further unauthorized pleadings under pain of contempt.

Balindong, et al. filed before RTC a Motion to Re-Determine the Existence or Non-
Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal Even the Appropriate
Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides. Judge Lee issued the assailed Order
granting Balindong, et al.s motion for redetermination of probable cause and consequently
ordering the downgrading of the crimes charged.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action
for certiorari in the CA alleging the judges committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order.

The Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 173290 adjudging Judge Lee and
Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect of contempt.

Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases which were re-raflled to
Branch 76, whose Presiding Judge was Judge Alexander S. Balut.

Balindong, et al. filed their Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of
Arrest. As the new trial judge, however, Judge Balut opted to defer action to await the Courts
ruling in G.R. No. 177600. He further suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants issued
for the arrest of Balindong, et al. hence, Limbona commenced G.R. No. 178684.

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ISSUES:

In G.R. No. 177600 - WON Balindong, et al are precluded from still seeking from the
RTC the judicial determination of probable cause against them after the decision had become
final and executory.

In G.R. 178584 - WON Judge Balut and Balindong, et al. may be cited for contempt of
court.

RULING:

In G.R. No. 177600 - YES.

The language and meaning of the Decision promulgated, that the proper criminal
charges against Balindong, et al. were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two
counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder, were clear and forthright
enough to require elaboration. Accordingly, the Court, by thereby ordering the RTC to
implement its Resolution dated 03 December 2003 relative to the issuance of warrants of
arrest against all the accused, did not need to dwell specifically on the judicial determination
of probable cause independently of the executive determination. We should remind that the
trial judge, by issuing the warrants of arrest, already found the existence of probable cause
against Balindong, et al. Indeed, the act of issuing the warrant of arrest upon filing of the
information and supporting papers implied that the judge has determined the existence of
probable cause for the offenses charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the
judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and
proceed independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper
offense.

Moreover, Balindong, et al. could not reasonably support their position that they could
still have the trial court determine the existence of probable cause in their criminal cases
independently of the executive determination of probable cause by the DOJ by relying on
Section 14, Rule 110, in relation to Section 19, Rule 119, both of the Rules of Court.

Ostensibly, Section 14, applies only to a situation in which there has been a mistake on
the part of public prosecutor in charging the proper offense.

It becomes logical to ask: Did the public prosecutor make a mistake in charging the
proper offenses against Balindong, et al.? The answer is no.

There was no mistake in charging the proper offenses. Balindong, et al. fully exhausted
the procedure to determine the proper offenses to be charged against them by going all the
way up to the Secretary of Justice. Their quest was ultimately settled with finality by the
Secretary of Justice denying their second motion for reconsideration and declaring that such
offenses were two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder,
and one count of attempted murder. Thus, this Court even issued its judicial imprimatur on
the probable cause for two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated
murder, and one count of attempted murder. For Balindong, et al. to rely on Section 14, supra,
as basis for the RTC to still reach a determination of probable cause different from those
sanctioned in G.R. No. 159962 would be untenable.

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In G.R. No. 178684 - NO.

Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his
judicial discretion on the matters in question.

It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court in G.R.
159962 and G.R. No. 173290. To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith
had moved him to suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong, et
al., or that he had thereby acted with a wilful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Courts bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear showing
of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of judgment, for which he
could not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases, from the transfer of
venue at the behest of Secretary Tuquero from Cagayan de Oro to Quezon City; to the
successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the succession of petitions for certiorari
bearing on the handling of the criminal cases brought to the higher courts, including this
Court, must have probably persuaded Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution.
Indeed, he expressed in his Order of July 16, 2007 the desire to avert any conflicting
determinations pending the promulgation of the Courts Decision in G.R. No. 177600. And
thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge Lees, who downgraded the
offenses from two counts of murder with attempted murder, two counts of frustrated murder,
and one count of attempted murder to double homicide with multiple frustrated homicide,
and ordered the issuance of the warrants of arrest for such downgraded offenses. Judge Lee
thereby directly contradicted the ruling in G.R. No. 159962.

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting in opposition to

its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
courts orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such
conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.

Thus, the power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him
accordingly is an inherent power lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect
and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein, and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious
refusal to comply with court orders. Indeed, the power of contempt is power assumed by a
court or judge to coerce cooperation and punish disobedience, disrespect or interference with
the courts orderly process by exacting summary punishment. The contempt power was given
to the courts in trust for the public, by tradition and necessity, inasmuch as respect for the
courts, which are ordained to administer the laws which are necessary to the good order of
society, is as necessary as respect for the laws themselves.

Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously. Self-restraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule
unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must
manifest wilfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

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JUAN PONCE ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 213847, AUGUST 18, 2015, BERSAMIN, J., EN BANC*

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperilling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial.

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the PDAF. Enrile filed a motion that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him.

The Sandiganbayan denied Enriles motion on the ground of its prematurity

considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law. Accordingly, Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion to Fix Bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied.

ISSUES:

WON Enrile be granted bail.

RULING:

YES. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the
trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to
assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is
reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to
accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.

Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. The general rule is,
therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right

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to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the MeTC, MTC, MTCC, or
MCTC are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is
a matter of right prior to conviction by the RTC for any offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC
of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the
RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.

Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or

reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of

guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, such
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the
accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court,
should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected
to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral, to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19) Otherwise petition should be denied.

Enriles poor health justifies his admission to bail. Nonetheless, in now granting
Enriles petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose
of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines responsibility in the

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international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in
criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the
detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape
from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal
processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when
he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail
during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and
historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail
despite imperilling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him
to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of
bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be
circumstances decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider

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in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due
process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

ATTY. FRANKLIN GACAL v. JUDGE JAIME INFANTE

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, 5 October 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

Bail cannot be allowed to a person charged with capital offense, or an offense

punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without a hearing upon notice to the
prosecution.

Judge Gregorio Balanag issued a warrant of arrest of Faustino Ancheta in

connection with murder case without recommending bail. Upon review, Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr. (Prosecutor Barcelona) affirmed findings and
filed an information for murder, but recommended bail. Judge Jaime Infante (Judge Infante)
issued twin orders, one granting bail and another releasing Ancheta from custody. Atty.
Franklin Gacal (Atty. Gacal), the private prosecutor in the case, filed very urgent motion for
reconsideration. Judge Infante directed public prosecutor to comment. He denied the
motion on the ground that it was pro forma for not bearing the conformity of public
prosecutor and directed that the consideration of bail issue be held in abeyance until the
comment be submitted. Prosecutor Barcelona stated that he recommended bail as a matter
of course; that the orders of Judge Infante approving recommendation was proper; and that
his recommendation was in effect a waiver of right to a bail hearing.

Atty. Gacal filed a charge against Judge Jaime Infante for gross ignorance of law, gross
incompetence, and evident partiality for his failure to set a hearing before granting bail to
the accused and for releasing him immediately after allowing bail. He insisted that issue of
bail urgently required a resolution that involved judicial determination and was, for that, a
judicial function; that Judge Infante should not be too dependent on prosecutors
comment considering that the resolution was entirely within his discretion as the judge;
and that granting bail without petition for bail being filed by accused or a hearing being held
is gross ignorance of law and the rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not hearing of the application for bail can be dispensed with in granting
bail to an accused.

RULING:

NO. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person charged with
capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. Murder is a capital offense. Hearing is

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absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether prosecutions

evidence is weak or strong. Therefore, it is a ministerial duty to conduct a hearing the
moment an application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Even when there is no
petition for bail, a hearing should still be held because this hearing is separate and distinct
from initial hearing to determine existence of probable cause. The recommendation and
comment of prosecutor was non-binding and did not warrant dispensing with the hearing.

In Cortes v. Catral, the Court outlined the following duties of judge once application
for bail is filed:

1. In all cases whether bail is matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is matter of discretion, conduct a hearing regardless or whether or
not prosecutor refuses to present evidence to show that guilt of accused is strong;
3. Decide whether the guilt is strong based on the summary of evidence of
prosecution; and
4. If guilt is not strong, discharge the accused upon approval of bail bond;
otherwise, petition.

CHARLIE TE v. HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA

G.R. No. 164974, AUGUST 5, 2015, BERSMAIN, J., FIRST DIVISION

Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Search Warrants; The requirement that the search
warrant be issued in the name of the People of the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did
not depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in court
against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had been
issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the
Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the
questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. We also note that the impleading is further
expressly demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 3. Contents and
filing of petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements.The petition shall contain the
full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of
the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the
relief prayed for. x x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (n) (emphasis
supplied) Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition was
fatal. The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 1. Search
warrant defined.A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

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Same; Same; Same; Every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.We
may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal
action; and that the application for the search warrant was not of the same form as that of a
criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is rather a
legal process that may be likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the State to
procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under
the States police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of
the Philippines. Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines. It defies logic and
common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that the application against him was
not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party or parties. The
immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

FACTS:

Presiding Judge Augusto Breva issued a search warrant against Charlie Te upon the
application of respondent Special Investigator U R. Bahinting of the Sarangani District Office
of the NBI (NBI SARDO) on the basis of his finding of probable cause for violation of Section
2(b) of BP Blg. 33, as amended by PD No. 1865, for hoarding large quantities of liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to Pryce Gases, Inc. The application for the
search warrant was filed at the instance of Pryce Gases through its letter to the NBI SARDO
complaining about the collection and hoarding by the petitioner of embossed or name-plated
Pryce Gases LPG cylinders in violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and 169 of Republic Act No.
8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines).

Charlie Te presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence
and to Order Return of Seized Items, raising therein the lack of probable cause, failure to
specify the single offense committed, illegality of the nighttime search, improper application
of the plain view doctrine, and inclusion of other offenses. In his order, Presiding Judge Breva
denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return
of Seized Items.

Charlie Te assailed the order on certiorari before the CA, mainly positing that
Presiding Judge Breva had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. However, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the
People of the Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that a copy of the
petition had been served on the OSG. Charlie Te argues that his petition for certiorari did not
need to implead the People of the Philippines because there was yet no criminal case
commenced in court.

ISSUE:

WON the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as respondents in the

petition for certiorari filed in the CA to annul and set aside the order of the RTC denying the
petitioners motion to quash the search warrant issued against him.

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RULING:

YES. Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not
depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had already been commenced in court
against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had been issued
in the name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the
Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil action for certiorari brought to nullify the
questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge. The Impleading is further expressly
demanded in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 3. Contents and filing of
petition; effect of noncompliance with requirements.The petition shall contain the full names
and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters
involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed
for. x x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Accordingly,
the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition was fatal.

The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 1. Search
warrant defined.A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

Verily, the search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is rather a legal
process that may be likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the State to
procure relevant evidence of a crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under
the States police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the name of the People of
the Philippines.

Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and the search
warrant itself were upon the behest of the People of the Philippines. It defies logic and
common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that the application against him was
not made by the People of the Philippines but by the interested party or parties. The
immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and issued by and under the
authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

ENRILE vs. MANALASTAS

G.R. No. 166414, FIRST DIVISION, October 22, 2014, Bersamin J.

The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a
plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment
and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is
not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability
of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.

FACTS:

Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile was involved mauling incident involving
their neighbors. Claiming themselves to be the victims in that mauling, Josefina Guinto
Morano, Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran Morano charged the Enriles in the MTC with

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frustrated homicide (victim being Rommel) with less serious physical injuries (victim being
Josefina) and with less serious physical injuries (victim being Perla).

The MTC issued its joint resolution, whereby it found probable cause against the
petitioners for less serious physical injuries and set their arraignment on September 8, 2003.

In a motion for reconsideration, petitioners argued that the complainants had not
presented proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby
rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for
less serious physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still
pending in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure. The petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a
motion for the deferment of the arraignment.

On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases
for less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and
reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004. It explained that the
grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be fully ventilated in a full
blown trial on the merits.

Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
order denying their motion to quash before RTC Judge Manalastas.

RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition and ruled that the issues raised in the
motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on
the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private
complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners
by means of competent evidence. RTC likewise stated that, it would be premature to dismiss,
the subject criminal cases filed against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be
determined only after trial on the merits.

The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
nullify the orders issued by the RTC but the same was dismissed by the CA, the petition for
certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy being an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the denial of motion to quash by the MTC, affirmed by the RTC was proper.

HELD:

Yes. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to
enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final
judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an
interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari
because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.

The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint

or information is, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the
elements of the offense.

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By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack
of one of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were averring
that the facts charged did not constitute offenses. Based on the law, the elements of the crime
of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries
upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim for
labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical assistance for more than 10 days.

The complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries were
specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that: (a) the
petitioners "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one
JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAO;" and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries upon the
complainant "that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his
customary labor for the same period of time;" while that in Criminal Case No. 03-277 alleged
that: (a) the petitioners "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right and give
hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAO;" and (b) the
petitioners inflicted upon the complainant "physical injuries [that] will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication."

The complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries.
Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the
details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such
matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not
quashable.

As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove
the duration of the victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take
place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. The scope of the
investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is required is
only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed
the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed.

Moreover, opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by
bringing the special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the petitioners deliberately
disregarded the fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action for certiorari.
These conditions were, firstly, the petitioners must show that the respondent trial court
lacked jurisdiction or exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and, secondly, because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there
was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BOBBY BELGAR

G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.

Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient and competent, may warrant the conviction of the
accused of rape.

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The Prosecution proved through AAAs testimony that: (1) Belgar had poked the knife at
her neck; (2) he had dragged her outside the house and had brought her to a nearby tree; (3) he
had injected an unknown substance into her belly that had then rendered her unconscious; (4)
upon waking up, she had found herself lying naked on the ground; (5) she had felt pain in her
vagina, which held a red and white substance in it; and (6) he had been the only person last seen
by her before she had passed out. The lack of direct evidence against him notwithstanding, these
circumstances sufficed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because they formed an
unbroken chain that unerringly showed Belgar, and no other, had committed the rape against
her.

FACTS:

On January 20, 2000, AAA and her two sisters were sleeping in their house when she
was awakened because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who was
poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to shout or he would stab her
and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house and brought her to a nearby tree, where he
injected an unknown substance into her stomach. She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon
regaining consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was aching and soaked with
white and red substance. She put on her clothes and returned to the house. She attended
school the next morning. During her class, she broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her
teacher came to her aid and had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to her
teacher.

However, Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, insisting that he was sleeping
in his house at midnight of January 20, 2000, having gone to bed there at 8PM and waking up
at 5AM of the next day; that he did not leave the house in that period of time; and that it was
his first time to see AAA when she identified him inside the Municipal Jail as the one who had
raped her.

The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime of rape. The accused appealed and
contended that the rape had not been proven because no direct evidence of the sexual
intercourse was presented due to AAA having unconscious during the rape. However, the CA
affirmed the RTCs judgment. It holds that the conviction for rape could be based on the
circumstantial evidence adduced through the testimony of AAA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of the accused for crime of rape may be proved by
circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct evidence (YES)

RULING:

The appeal lacks merit. The commission of the rape was competently established
although AAA had been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the
commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence
could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence. In this connection,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions set forth in Section 4, Rule
133 of the Rules of Court are shown to exist, to wit:

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Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In People v. Perez, we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape based on
circumstantial evidence, there being no direct proof of the sexual intercourse. Conviction for
rape may be based on circumstantial evidence when the victim cannot testify on the actual
commission of the rape as she was rendered unconscious when the act was committed,
provided that more than one circumstance is duly proved and that the totality or the
unbroken chain of the circumstances proven lead to no other logical conclusion than the
appellants guilt of the crime charged.

The case of AAA has factual kinship with People v. Perez. The Prosecution proved
through AAAs testimony that: (1) Belgar had poked the knife at her neck; (2) he had dragged
her outside the house and had brought her to a nearby tree; (3) he had injected an unknown
substance into her belly that had then rendered her unconscious; (4) upon waking up, she had
found herself lying naked on the ground; (5) she had felt pain in her vagina, which held a red
and white substance in it; and (6) he had been the only person last seen by her before she had
passed out. The lack of direct evidence against him notwithstanding, these circumstances
sufficed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because they formed an unbroken chain
that unerringly showed Belgar, and no other, had committed the rape against her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DELFIN CALISO

G.R. No. 183830, 19 October 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit,
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted.

Delfin Caliso (Caliso) was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, a mentally-
retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death. The records show that AAA died
on June 5, 1997 and the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to
drowning due to smothering. The lone eyewitness, 34-year old Soledad Amegable
(Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a
girl pleading for mercy. The cries came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made
it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on. Amegable subsequently heard sounds
of beating and mauling that soon ended the girls cries. Amegable then proceeded to
get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in
order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing
the number 11 mark, who dragged a girls limp body into the river, where he submerged
the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body. Amegable could not
have a look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her. She
nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar

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with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident.

The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA
because the old- healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims
underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal
knowledge; that the examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the
body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by Amegable that the
man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso
himself was reliable. The RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength to raise the crime from homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in
the information to be used in its generic sense as to include all types of killing. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same
ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by
Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of
the crime. The CA ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator
of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon when the sun had been at
its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegables view had not been obstructed by any
object at the time that AAAs body had been submerged in the water.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA was
positive and reliable.

RULING:

NO. In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself,
must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the
prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the
commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of
identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does

not always require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be
possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial
evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed
innocence of the accused. Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and
not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime.

Calisos conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of

Amegables identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was
thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral
certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime. Her identification of Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability,
the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine
the moral certainty of identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness. To achieve such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should
encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures,
the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical

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facts that set the individual apart from the rest of humanity.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is
not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, though his innocence may be doubted. The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary
importance, and the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution.

REPUBLIC VS. REYES-BAKUNAWA

G.R. No. 180418; FIRST DIVISION; August 28, 2013; BERSAMIN, J:

Assets or properties, to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, must be shown to have

originated from the Government itself, and should have been taken by former President Marcos,
the members of his immediate family, relatives, close subordinates and close associates by illegal
means. That one served as a government official or employee during the Marcos administration
did not immediately make her a close subordinate or close associate of former President Marcos.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Only a

preponderance of evidence was needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-
gotten wealth.We first clarify that the Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance
of evidence was needed to prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
That is quite clear from Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A, which provides: Section 1. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 14 dated May 7, 1986 is hereby amended to read as follows: Sec. 3. The
civil suits to recover unlawfully acquired property under Republic Act No. 1379 or for
restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential and other damages or
any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, members of their immediate
family, close relatives, subordinates, close and/or business associates, dummies, agents and
nominees, may proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Ill-Gotten Wealth; A prima facie showing must be made to show that
one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President
Marcos and/or his wife.Evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was
illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a
position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate
within the context of E.O. No. 1. According to Republic v. Migrio, 189 SCRA 289 (1990), the
term subordinate as used in E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2 referred to a person who enjoyed a close
association with President Marcos and/or his wife similar to that of an immediate family
member, relative, and close associate, or to that of a close relative, business associate, dummy,
agent, or nominee. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully
accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or
his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the administration of President
Marcos as a government official or employee.

Same; Same; Offer of Evidence; The Sandiganbayan could not consider any evidence that
was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the purposes it was specifically
offered.It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could not consider any evidence that

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was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the purposes it was specifically
offered. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly states: Section 34. Offer of
evidence.The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The need to formally offer
evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be overemphasized. This need is
designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the adverse party as well as the trial
court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon to decide the litigation. The offer
and purpose will also put the trial court in the position to determine which rules of evidence it
shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the evidence being offered.

Criminal Law; Ill-Gotten Wealth; Due Process; Due process requires that there be
sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or persons
charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or subordinate of
the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich themselves.It is
true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the pursuit
should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that there be
sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person or
persons charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich
themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge
such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.

FACTS:

Civil Case No. 0023 is an action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages brought by the Republic against respondents Luz Reyes-Bakunawa, Manuel
Bakunawa, Jr., Manuel Bakunawa III, President Marcos and First Lady Imelda R. Marcos for
having allegedly acquired and accumulated ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other
property "in unlawful concert with one another" and "in flagrant breach of trust and of their
fiduciary obligations as public officers, with grave abuse of right and power and in brazen
violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, thus resulting in
their unjust enrichment."

The complaint alleged that respondent Luz Reyes-Bakunawa (Luz Bakunawa) had
served as Imelda Marcos Social Secretary during the Marcos administration; that it was during
that period of her incumbency in that position that Luz Bakunawa and her husband Manuel
Bakunawa had acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly
disproportionate to her salaries and their other lawful income; and that Luz Bakunawa, "by
herself and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, taking undue advantage of her position, influence and connection with the latter
Defendant spouses, for their benefit and unjust enrichment and in order to prevent disclosure
and recovery of assets illegally obtained, engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems."

The Republic prayed for: (a) the reconveyance to itself of all funds and other property
impressed with constructive trust, as well as funds and other property acquired by
respondents abuse of right and power and through unjust enrichment, plus interests; (b)
accounting of all beneficial interests in funds, properties and assets in excess of their unlawful
earnings; and (c) payment of actual damages to be proved during the trial, moral damages
of P50,000,000,000.00, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and treble judicial costs.

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The Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The Republic sought
the reconsideration of the decision which the Sandiganbayan denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

1. WON the quantum of proof required to prove petitioners case against the
Bakunawas is mere preponderance of evidence?

YES. Preponderance of evidence is required in actions brought to recover ill-gotten

wealth. The Republic correctly submits that only a preponderance of evidence was needed to
prove its demand for reconveyance or recovery of ill-gotten wealth. That is quite clear from
Section 1 of E.O. No. 14-A.

Under the rule on preponderance of evidence, the court is instructed to find for and to dismiss
the case against the defendant should the scales hang in equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence that tilts the scales to one or the other side. The plaintiff who had the burden of
proof has failed to establish its case, and the parties are no better off than before they
proceeded upon their litigation. In that situation, the court should leave the parties as they
are.

Moreover, although the evidence of the plaintiff may be stronger than that of the defendant,
there is no preponderance of evidence on the plaintiffs side if its evidence alone is insufficient
to establish its cause of action. Similarly, when only one side is able to present its evidence,
and the other side demurs to the evidence, a preponderance of evidence can result only if the
plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to establish the cause of action. For this purpose, the sheer
volume of the evidence presented by one party cannot tip the scales in its favor. Quality, not
quantity, is the primordial consideration in evaluating evidence.

2. WON the Republic preponderantly showed that the Bakunawas had acquired ill-
gotten wealth during Luz Bakunawas employment during the Marcos administration?

NO. The evidence of the Republic did not preponderantly establish the ill-gotten
nature of the Bakunawas wealth.

Concerning respondents shares of stock here, there is no evidence presented by petitioner

that they belong to the Government of the Philippines or any of its branches,
instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions. Nor is there evidence that
respondents, taking undue advantage of their connections or relationship with former
President Marcos or his family, relatives and close associates, were able to acquire those shares
of stock.

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or
employee during the administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie
showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. This is so because otherwise the
respondents case will fall under existing general laws and procedures on the matter.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing pronouncement, evidentiary substantiation of the

allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that
purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make
the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1.

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We hold that the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the evidence of the Republic was able to
establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the
Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the
Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets
subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.

3. WON petitioner was able to establish that the Bakunawas amassed assets, funds and
properties grossly and manifestly disproportionate to their salaries and other lawful
income because of their position in the government and/or close association and
connection with the Marcoses to the prejudice of petitioner and the Filipino people?

NO. Its evidence could not sustain the belief that the Bakunawas had used their
influence, or the Marcoses influence in acquiring their properties. Nor did it prove that the
ties or relationship between the Bakunawas and the Marcoses had been "similar to that of an
immediate member of the family or a dummy."

The Republic presented documents tending to prove that the dispossessed witnesses had
retained claims to the affected properties, and that the Bakunawas themselves had been issued
pasture leases over the same areas. Given that both the dispossessed witnesses and the
Bakunawas held legal rights of possession respecting the same areas independently of each
other, the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that "the plaintiffs evidence is not conclusive
proof of the ill-gotten character of the lands in the possession of the defendants
Bakunawas." This is really a good reason for the Sandiganbayan to hold that the Republic had
not preponderantly shown that the acts of dispossession and oppression had involved the
improper use of her influence by Luz Bakunawa on account of her close association with the
Marcoses.

Concerning the negotiated construction contracts, the Republic posits that the contracts had
been entered into when Luz Bakunawa was a member of the Presidential Staff during the
Marcos administration, laying heavy emphasis on the notations and handwritten instructions
by President Marcos found on the written communications from Manuel Bakunawa to then
DPWH Secretary Baltazar Aquino.

Yet, the Republic offered the negotiated contracts solely to prove that the Bakunawas had
been incorporators or owners, or had held key positions in the corporations that entered into
the contracts. The Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, therefore, that the contracts could be
considered and appreciated only for those stated purposes, not for the purpose of proving the
irregularity of the contracts.

The Court upholds the Sandiganbayan. It was basic enough that the Sandiganbayan could not
consider any evidence that was not formally offered; and could consider evidence only for the
purposes it was specifically offered.

The need to formally offer evidence by specifying the purpose of the offer cannot be
overemphasized. This need is designed to meet the demand for due process by apprising the
adverse party as well as the trial court on what evidence the court would soon be called upon
to decide the litigation. The offer and purpose will also put the trial court in the position to
determine which rules of evidence it shall apply in admitting or denying admission to the
evidence being offered.

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At any rate, the Court must point out that negotiated contracts are not per se illegal. A
negotiated contract is one that is awarded on the basis of a direct agreement between the
Government and the contractor, without going through the normal procurement process, like
obtaining the prior approval from another authority, or a competitive bidding process. It is
generally resorted to for convenience, or "when time is of the essence, or where there is a lack
of qualified bidders or contractors, or where there is conclusive evidence that greater economy
and efficiency would be achieved." The Court has upheld the validity of a negotiated contract
made pursuant to law, like a negotiated contract entered into by a City Mayor pursuant to the
then existing Local Government Code, or a negotiated contract that eventually redounded to
the benefit of the general public, even if there was no specific covering appropriation pursuant
to COA rules, or a negotiated contract that was made due to an emergency in the health
sector, or a negotiated contract for long overdue repair and renovation needed to provide
better health services.

Absent evidence proving that the negotiated construction contracts had been
irregularly entered into by the Bakunawas, or that the public had been thereby prejudiced, it is
pointless for the Court to declare their invalidity. On the contrary, the Sandiganbayan
correctly observed that the presumption of the validity of the contracts prevailed.

It is true that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth should be relentlessly pursued. But the
pursuit should not be mindless as to be oppressive towards anyone. Due process requires that
there be sufficient competent evidence of the asset being ill-gotten wealth, and of the person
or persons charged with the illegal acquisition of ill-gotten wealth being a close associate or
subordinate of the Marcoses who took advantage of such ties with the Marcoses to enrich
themselves. In that effort, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof, and must discharge
such burden fully; otherwise, the effort would fail and fall.

HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND

VALENTINA CLAVE
G.R. No. 170604; FIRST DIVISION; September 2, 2013; BERSAMIN, J.:

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the
subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale
with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the
Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence
other than the original document.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in
proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must be produced in court.

Same; Same; Same; The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are
in issue.The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When
the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution
or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.

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Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.This case involves an
action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant
and other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no
rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of
both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as
use, and even abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable
requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Same; Same; The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not be
material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For
instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for
not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary
evidence of its contents. There is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into
play.

FACTS:

In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, the
respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr.
and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land; that their parents had
been in possession of the property during their lifetime; that upon their parents deaths, they
had continued the possession of the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due
thereon; that they could not locate the owners duplicate copy, but the original copy of TCT
No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy
contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the
right of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the
deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did not exist. Consequently,
they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.

In her answer, Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on
September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered
with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property;
and that she had then become the absolute owner of the property due to its non-repurchase
within the given 6-month period.

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During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of
Manila.

The RTC found the plaintiffs contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
did not exist UNTENABLE. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. The heirs of Margarita
Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of
Defendant and for Reconsideration of the Decision. The CA issued its resolution, allowing the
substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for reconsideration
for its lack of merit.

Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the Court through
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the Best Evidence Rule applies?

RULING:

NO. Best Evidence Rule was not applicable herein. The Best Evidence Rule stipulates
that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must be
produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original;
(b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and
(c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed.

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the
evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original.

This case involves an action for quieting of title. The action for quieting of title may be
based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of
the writing may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the
ground alleged by the plaintiff.

It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of
sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the respondents as the plaintiffs,
which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed.

Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the
deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and
determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence, had been established by Prodons evidence. It should have simply
addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and "execution" of the deed as the
facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.

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Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of evidence other than the original
document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary
Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even
without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.

Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed
of sale with right to repurchase. The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required
Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed. This was because the
deed, although a collateral document, was the foundation of her defense in this action for
quieting of title. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to
prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the
rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the proof of the
loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or
unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a
writing.

Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the loss or explain the unavailability of
the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Moreover, a duplicate original
could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to have been
exerted in that direction. The records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the
existence of the deed.
The annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry in
the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of
the deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the
deed was not conclusive proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner
of the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that
registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is
inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the
certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument. It is relevant to mention that
the law on land registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered,
because the purpose of registration is only to give notice.

By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could only
be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had been notarized by him, but did not
establish the due execution of the deed.

The respondents remaining in the peaceful possession of the property was further
convincing evidence demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed
of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised
her right to take over the property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976
of the repurchase period stipulated under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her
name and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index of the
falsity of her claim against the respondents.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents
preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to repurchase executed by the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.

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BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION,** petitioner, vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT,

respondent.
G.R. No. 163654 October 8, 2014, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN, J.

Credit Cards; The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is
a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership
agreement.The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership
agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of their
breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to
do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. However, a conscious or
intentional design need not always be present because negligence may occasionally be so gross
as to amount to malice or bad faith. Hence, bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil
Code includes gross negligence.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Considering that the terms and conditions
nowhere stated that the card holder must submit the new application form in order to reactivate
her credit card, to allow BPI Express Credit to impose the duty to submit the new application
form in order to enable Armovit to reactivate the credit card would contravene the Parol
Evidence Rule.Considering that the terms and conditions nowhere stated that the card
holder must submit the new application form in order to reactivate her credit card, to allow
BPI Express Credit to impose the duty to submit the new application form in order to enable
Armovit to reactivate the credit card would contravene the Parol Evidence Rule. Indeed, there
was no agreement between the parties to add the submission of the new application form as
the means to reactivate the credit card. When she did not promptly settle her outstanding
balance, BPI Express Credit sent a message on March 19, 1992 demanding payment with the
warning that her failure to pay would force it to temporarily suspend her credit card effective
March 31, 1992. It then sent another demand letter dated March 31, 1992 requesting her to
settle her obligation in order to lift the suspension of her credit card and prevent its
cancellation. In April 1992, she paid her obligation. In the context of the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties, the only condition for the reinstatement of her credit card was
the payment of her outstanding obligation. Had it intended otherwise, BPI Express Credit
would have surely informed her of the additional requirement in its letters of March 19, 1992
and March 31, 1992. That it did not do so confirmed that they did not agree on having her
submit the new application form as the condition to reactivate her credit card.

FACTS:

Armovit, then a depositor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was issued by BPI
Express Credit a preapproved BPI Express Credit Card (credit card) in 1989 that was to expire
at the end of March 1993. On November 21, 1992, she treated her British friends from Hong
Kong to lunch at Marios Restaurant in the Ortigas Center in Pasig. As the host, she handed to
the waiter her credit card to settle the bill, but the waiter soon returned to inform her that her
credit card had been cancelled upon verification with BPI Express Credit and would not be
honored. Inasmuch as she was relying on her credit card because she did not then carry
enough cash that day, her guests were made to share the bill to her extreme embarrassment.

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Outraged, Armovit called BPI Express Credit to verify the status of her credit card. She
learned that her credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding
obligations. She vehemently denied having defaulted on her payments. BPI Express Credit
claimed that it had sent Armovit a telegraphic message on March 19, 1992 requesting her to
pay her arrears for three consecutive months, and that she did not comply with the request,
causing it to temporarily suspend her credit card effective March 31, 1992. It further claimed
that she had been notified of the suspension and cautioned to refrain from using the credit
card to avoid inconvenience or embarrassment; and that while the obligation was settled by
April, 1992, she failed to submit the required application form in order to reactivate
her credit card privileges.

Armovit sued BPI Express Credit for damages in the RTC. Finding BPI Express Credit
guilty of negligence and bad faith, the RTC ordered it to pay Armovit moral damages and
exemplary damages. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the award of moral and exemplary damages
in favor of Armovit.

RULING:

The award of moral and exemplary damages is proper.

The relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder is a
contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions found in the card membership
agreement. Such terms and conditions constitute the law between the parties. In case of their
breach, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith in the context of Article 2220 of the Civil Code includes
gross negligence.

BPI Express Credit contends that it was not grossly negligent in refusing to lift the
suspension of Armovits credit card privileges inasmuch as she had not complied with the
requisite submission of a new application form. The Court disagrees with the contentions of
BPI Express Credit. The Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI
Express Credit Card printed on the credit card application form spelled out the terms and
conditions of the contract between BPI Express Credit and its card holders, including Armovit.
Such terms and conditions determined the rights and obligations of the parties. Yet, a review
of such terms and conditions did not reveal that Armovit needed to submit her new
application as the antecedent condition for her credit card to be taken out of the list of
suspended cards.

Considering that the terms and conditions nowhere stated that the card holder must
submit the new application form in order to reactivate her credit card, to allow BPI Express
Credit to impose the duty to submit the new application form in order to enable Armovit to
reactivate the credit card would contravene the Parol Evidence Rule. Indeed, there was no
agreement between the parties to add the submission of the new application form as the
means to reactivate the credit card. When she did not promptly settle her outstanding
balance, BPI Express Credit sent a message on March 19, 1992 demanding payment with the
warning that her failure to pay would force it to temporarily suspend her credit card effective
March 31, 1992. It then sent another demand letter dated March 31, 1992 requesting her to

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settle her obligation in order to lift the suspension of her credit card and prevent its
cancellation. In April 1992, she paid her obligation. In the context of the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties, the only condition for the reinstatement of her credit card was
the payment of her outstanding obligation. Had it intended otherwise, BPI Express Credit
would have surely informed her of the additional requirement in its letters of March 19, 1992
and March 31, 1992. That it did not do so confirmed that they did not agree on having her
submit the new application form as the condition to reactivate her credit card.

Bereft of the clear basis to continue with the suspension of the credit card privileges
of Armovit, BPI Express Credit acted in wanton disregard of its contractual obligations with
her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDISON C. MAGBITANG

G.R. No. 175592, June 14, 2016, BERSAMIN, J., EN BANC*

Every child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known his perception
can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify.

FACTS:

At around 5 p.m. of December 25, 1998, 7-year old AAA asked permission from her
mother, BBB, to go to a nearby store. BBB allowed her daughter to leave the house, but the
child did not return home. Later that evening, the childs lifeless body was found by the
riverbank. The post-mortem examination revealed that she had succumbed to asphyxiation,
and that there were incidental findings compatible to rape.

The lone witness to what had befallen AAA was 6-year old CCC, who recalled in court
that he and AAA had been playing when Magbitang approached AAA; and that Magbitang
brought AAA to his house. CCC testified on re-direct examination that he had witnessed
Magbitang raping AAA, as well as burning her face with a cigarette.

Magbitang, denying the accusation, claimed that he had attended a baptismal party on
December 25, 1998, and had been in the party from 4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.; that from the party
he had gone looking for his nephew to have the latter tend to his watermelon farm; that he
had returned home by around 6:00p.m.; that around 7:30 p.m., he had gone to his farm to
check on his nephew; and that he and his wife had remained in the farm until 4 a.m. of the
following day.

The RTC found Magbitang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. This
was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a child of tender age can be a competent witness.

RULING:

Yes. Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial
court determines upon proper showing that the childs mental maturity is such as to render

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him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating
the facts truthfully. The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive
and make known the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an
improper motive to testify. Once it is established that the child fully understands the
character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence. In the case of CCC, the
Defense did not persuasively discredit his worthiness and competence as a witness. As such,
the Court considers the reliance by the trial court on his recollection fully justified.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y

BELLO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012, FIRST DIVISION, BERSAMIN J.

An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that meets the

conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence is admissible
either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae, or both.

Criminal Law; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had
attacked Bolanon from behind and had encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and
delivered the stabbing blow using the right (hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right
sideways and another one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple. Relying on
Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to
be attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with. We join the CAs concurrence
because Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack remained uncontested by
Salafranca who merely insisted on his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed
constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from behind and included an aggressive
physical control of the latters movements that ensured the success of the attack without any
retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon. According to the Revised Penal Code, treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Dying Declarations; A dying

declaration is generally inadmissible for being hearsay; Exceptions.A dying declaration,
although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c) that
the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim. All the requisites
were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying
Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was
conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according
to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in the
hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which occurred under three hours
after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the

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imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own statements or from
circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence,
or by the opinion of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the
subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this
criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Gestae; Requisites for declaration or an utterance as part
of the res gestae to be admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule.A declaration
or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. The requisites for admissibility of a
declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the
assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by
Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and
thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance
about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
startling occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified Salafranca as the
perpetrator.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The term res gestae has been defined as those
circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae refers to the
circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its
character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the
excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.

FACTS:

The established facts show that past midnight on July 31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed
near the Del Pan Sports Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his
assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle Rodolfo B.
Estao in order to seek help; that his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao that it was Salafranca who had
stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving
medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time.

Salafranca was charged with and tried for murder, and was ultimately found guilty of
the felony by the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA).

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ISSUE:

Whether the utterance of Bolanon identifying Salafranca as his assailant constitutes a

dying declaration and part of res gestae.

RULING:

It appears from Estaos testimony that Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao,
his uncle, to seek help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had hurriedly
dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way
to the hospital, Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told
Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had
seemed to be having a hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk anymore;
and that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon
had expired and had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance
of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae, considering that the
Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after
the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res
gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay

character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of
an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem statement
to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At the time of his
statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained a stab wound in
the chest and, according to Estao, was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing.
Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission, which
occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the
declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown by the declarants own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements
made in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician would have been competent to testify
on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in
this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in
evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur herein.
Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a
startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab
that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of

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Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant
because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

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